



MISSISSIPPI CODE 1972

Annotated

Ports, Harbors, Landings and Watercraft
Aviation
Motor Vehicles and Traffic Regulations

Titles 59 to 63

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MISSISSIPPI CODE

1972

ANNOTATED

ADOPTED AS THE OFFICIAL CODE OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
BY THE
1972 SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE

VOLUME THIRTEEN A

PORTS, HARBORS, LANDINGS AND WATERCRAFT

AVIATION

**MOTOR VEHICLES AND
TRAFFIC REGULATIONS**

§§ 59-1-1 to 63-27-7

CONTAINING PERMANENT PUBLIC STATUTES OF MISSISSIPPI
TO THE END OF THE 2004 REGULAR SESSION AND
1ST AND 2ND EXTRAORDINARY LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS



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PREFACE

The Mississippi Code of 1972, which became effective on November 1, 1973, is the culmination of nearly four years of effort on the part of the Legislature, the Attorney General's office and the publishers, which brings together provisions of general statutory law having a common subject matter into a more orderly and logical framework of code titles and chapters, and employing a modern and effective section numbering system. A major by-product of the code revision will be the state-owned magnetic computer tape containing the Mississippi Code of 1972, which will be of invaluable assistance to the Legislature and to the state.

The enabling act for the code was a recommendation of the Mississippi State Bar, which resulted in the consideration and passage of Senate Bill 1964, Chapter 465, Laws of 1970, signed into law by Governor John Bell Williams.

The Code Committee provided for in that act was comprised of A. F. Summer, Attorney General, Heber Ladner, Secretary of State, Representative Edgar J. Stephens, Jr., Chairman, House Appropriations Committee, Senator William G. Burgin, Jr., Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee, Representative H. L. Meredith, Jr., Chairman, House Judiciary "A" and Judiciary en banc Committees, Senator E. K. Collins, Chairman, Senate Judiciary "A" and Judiciary en banc Committees, Representative Ney McKinley Gore, Jr., Chairman, House Judiciary "B" Committee, and Senator William E. Alexander, Chairman, Senate Judiciary "B" Committee. In 1972, Representative Marby Robert Penton and Senator Herman B. Decell, Chairman of House and Senate Judiciary "B" Committees, respectively, became members of the Committee, replacing Representative Gore and Senator Collins, Senator Alexander having been appointed Chairman of Senate Judiciary "A" and Judiciary en banc Committees. The Deputy Attorney General, Delos H. Burks, served the Code Committee as Secretary. Special Assistant Attorney General Fred J. Lotterhos, under the supervision of the Attorney General, was assigned the principal responsibility for the supervision of the recodification, including the consideration and treatment of some 16,000 sections of code manuscript.

Final legislative approval was given to the Mississippi Code of 1972 by passage of Senate Bill 2034, Laws of 1972, which was signed by Governor William L. Waller on April 26, 1972. A copy of that act is set out in Volume 1, following the Publisher's Foreword.

The Code Committee is of the opinion that the recodification has been thoroughly and well accomplished, and will result in a greatly improved repository of the general statutory law of the state.

A. F. SUMMER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

This 2004 Replacement Volume 13A of the Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated represents material appearing in both the original 1973 bound volume and the 1996 Replacement Volume 13A, as well as reflecting amendments, repeals, and new Code provisions enacted by the Mississippi Legislature through the 2004 Regular and 1st and 2nd Extraordinary Legislative Sessions.

This volume contains the full text of Titles 59 through 63 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated, as amended through the 2004 Regular and 1st and 2nd Extraordinary Legislative Sessions.

Case annotations are included based on decisions of the state and federal courts in cases arising in Mississippi. Many of these cases were decided under the former statutes in effect prior to the enactment of the Code of 1972. These earlier cases have been moved to pertinent sections of the Code where they may be useful in interpreting the current statutes. Annotations to collateral research references are also included.

To better serve our customers by making our annotations more current, LexisNexis has changed the sources that are read to create annotations for this publication. Rather than waiting for cases to appear in printed reporters, we now read court decisions as they are released by the courts. A consequence of this more current reading of cases, as they are posted online on LexisNexis, is that the most recent cases annotated may not yet have print reporter citations. These will be provided, as they become available, through later publications.

This publication contains annotations taken from decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals with decision dates up to May 1, 2004, and decisions of the appropriate federal courts with decision dates up to April 25, 2004. These cases will be printed in the following reporters:

- Southern Reporter, 2nd Series
- United States Supreme Court Reports
- Supreme Court Reporter
- United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition, 2nd Series
- Federal Reporter, 3rd Series
- Federal Supplement, 2nd Series
- Federal Rules Decisions
- Bankruptcy Reporter

Additionally, annotations have been taken from the following sources:

- American Law Reports, 5th Series: through 117 A.L.R.5th
- American Law Reports, Federal Series: through 192 A.L.R.Fed
- Mississippi College Law Review: through 20 Miss. Coll. L.R. 211
- Mississippi Law Journal: through Volume 72 Miss. L.J. 1029

Finally, published Opinions of the Attorney General and opinions of the Ethics Commission have been examined for annotations.

A comprehensive Index appears at the end of this volume.

PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

Visit the LexisNexis website at <http://www.lexisnexis.com> for an online bookstore, technical support, customer support, and other company information.

For further information or assistance, please call us toll-free at (800) 833-9844, fax us toll-free at (800) 643-1280, e-mail us at customer.support@bender.com, or write to: Mississippi Code Editor, LexisNexis, P.O. Box 7587, Charlottesville, VA 22906-7587.

September 2004

LexisNexis

User's Guide

This guide is designed to help both the lawyer and the layperson get the most out of the Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated. Information about key features of the Code and suggestions for its more effective use are given under the following headings:

- Advance Code Service
- Advance Sheets
- Amendment Notes
- Analyses
- Attorney General Opinions
- Code Status
- Comparable Legislation from other States
- Court Rules
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- Editor's Notes
- Effective Dates
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- Organization and Numbering System
- Placement of Notes
- Replacement Volumes
- Research and Practice References
- Source Notes
- Statute Headings
- Tables

If you have a question not addressed by the User's Guide, or comments about your Code service, you may contact us by calling us toll-free at (800) 833-9844, faxing us toll-free at (800) 643-1280, e-mailing us at customer.support@bender.com, or writing to Mississippi Code Editor, LexisNexis, P.O. Box 7587, Charlottesville, VA 22906-7587.

ADVANCE CODE SERVICE

Three times a year, at roughly quarterly intervals between delivery of Code supplement pocket parts, we publish the Mississippi Advance Code Service pamphlets. These pamphlets contain updated statutory material and annotations to Attorney General opinions, research and practice references, and recent court decisions construing the Code. Each pamphlet is cumulative, so that each is a "one-stop" source of case notes updating those in your Code bound volumes and pocket parts.

ADVANCE SHEETS

The Advance Sheets consist of a series of pamphlets issued in the spring. The series reproduces the acts passed by the Mississippi Legislature and

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approved by the Governor during the legislative session. Features include tables showing the impact of legislation on sections of the Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated, and a cumulative index. These pamphlets enable the user to receive a preview of approved legislation prior to supplement availability, and serve as an excellent source of legislative history.

AMENDMENT NOTES

Every time a Code provision is amended, we prepare a note describing the effect of the amendment. By reading the note, you can ascertain the impact of the change without having to check the former statute itself.

Amendment notes are retained in the Supplement until the bound volume is replaced, at which time notes from all but the last two years are deleted.

ANALYSES

Each title, chapter, and article appearing in a bound volume or supplement is preceded by an analysis. The analysis details the scope of the title, chapter, and article and enables you to see at a glance the content of the title, chapter, and article without resorting to a page-by-page examination in the bound volume or supplement.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Opinions of the attorney general for the state of Mississippi have been read for constructions of Mississippi law. Notes describing the subject matter of the opinions have been placed under relevant code provisions under the heading "Attorney General Opinions." The citation at the end of each note refers to the person requesting the opinion, the date of the opinion, and the opinion number.

CODE STATUS

The Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated is Mississippi's official code and is considered evidence of the statute law of the state of Mississippi (see § 1-1-8). The Code was enacted by Chapter 394 of the Laws of 1972, which was signed by the Governor on April 26, 1972.

The text of Chapter 394 is printed in Volume 1, on the pages following the Publisher's Foreword. In addition, Title 1, Chapters 1 through 5 of the Code contain statutes governing the status and construction of the Code.

COMPARABLE LEGISLATION FROM OTHER STATES

Notes to comparable legislation from other states appear for uniform laws, interstate compacts, statutory provisions pertaining to reciprocity and cooper-

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ation with other states, and various important statutes of general interest. Other states' statutes that are similar in subject matter and scope to those of Mississippi are cited, generally, under the first section of the chapter or article to which they pertain. Occasionally, comparable legislation pertains to only one section, in which case it is cited under that section rather than at the chapter or article level.

See also *Federal Aspects*.

COURT RULES

The Mississippi Court Rules are published separately by LexisNexis in a fully annotated softcover volume which is replaced annually and supplemented semi-annually.

The Court Rules volume contains statewide rules of procedure of the state courts, the local rules of the United States district courts and bankruptcy courts for Mississippi, and the rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Rules are received from the courts and edited only for stylistic consistency. For further information, see the Preface to the Mississippi Court Rules volume.

CROSS REFERENCES

Cross references refer you to notes under other Code sections, that may affect a law or place it in context. Cross references also are used under repealed provisions to refer you to an existing law on a similar subject. Cross references do not cite all related statutes, however, since these can be identified by using the General Index.

See also *Comparable Legislation from other States and Federal Aspects*.

EDITOR'S NOTES

Editor's notes are notes prepared by the Publisher that contain information about important or unusual features of a law, or special circumstances surrounding passage of the law, that are not apparent from the law's text.

See also *Effective Dates*.

EFFECTIVE DATES

Absent a specific effective date provision within an act, Mississippi laws generally take effect upon approval date, which is the date the act is signed into law by the Governor. Acts affecting voting rights and procedures take effect on the date the United States Attorney General interposes no objection under § 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965.

FEDERAL ASPECTS

Notes to federal legislation that is similar in subject matter and scope to the laws of Mississippi are referenced throughout the Code. In addition, the

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Code contains the United States Code Service citation for any federal law that is referred to in a Mississippi statute by its popular name or by its session law designation.

See also *Comparable Legislation from other States*.

INDEX

The Code is completely indexed in two softcover Index volumes, which are updated and replaced annually. In addition, each volume of the Code is followed by its own index. As accurate and thorough as the Index is, your best defense against index wild goose chases is familiarity with indexing techniques. To that end, an explanatory Foreword to the Index appears in the first Index volume.

JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE NOTES

Joint Legislative Committee notes are included in the Code to describe codification decisions made by the Mississippi Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation. Examples of Committee actions that warrant the inclusion of a note are the integration of multiple amendments to a single Code section during the same legislative session, and the correction of typographical errors appearing in the Code.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Every reported case from the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the Court of Appeals of Mississippi, federal district courts for Mississippi, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court has been read for constructions of Mississippi law. These constructions are noted under pertinent sections of the statutes or Mississippi Constitution provisions, under the heading "Judicial Decisions." Where a decision has been reviewed by a higher court, subsequent judicial history and disposition is noted in the case note if such disposition has any bearing on the annotated material. Where two or more decisions state the same rule of law, the case citations are cumulated under one case note.

Case notes are grouped together under headings called "catchlines." The catchlines identify the basic subject matter of the case notes and assist the user in locating pertinent notes. Catchlines are numbered and arranged thematically, with "In general" first. Where there are two or more catchlines, an analysis, listing all the catchlines, precedes the annotations.

Frequently, statutes carry notes to cases that arose under earlier laws on the same subject. Case notes are retained so long as the editor believes the note will have some relevance under current law, though of course the relevance may be diminished by later changes in the law. These case notes appear under the heading "Decisions under former law."

ORGANIZATION AND NUMBERING SYSTEM

The Code is organized by titles, chapters, articles, subarticles, undesignated centered headings and sections. Analyses at the beginning of each title, chapter, article, and subarticle help you understand the internal arrangement of each Code unit (see *Analyses*).

Odd numbers are generally used for the numbering of titles, chapters and sections. Even numbers have been used for some chapters and sections so that a particular new chapter or section might be logically placed with other chapters and sections dealing with the same or similar subject matter. Similarly, the use of numbers with decimal points has been used for some sections in order that they may be inserted among other sections pertaining to the same subject.

The title, chapter, and section for each Code section is revealed by its section number. Thus, in the designation “§ 1-3-65,” the first digit (“1”) means the provision is in Title 1 (“Laws and Statutes”); the second (“3”) indicates Chapter 3 (“Construction of Statutes”); and the last two digits (“65”) mean the 65th section in that chapter (“Construction of terms generally”).

Articles and subarticles are not reflected by section number designations.

Within sections, subsections and paragraphs usually are designated following this pattern: (1)(a)(i)1. or (1)(a)(i)A. A distinctive indention scheme is applied to suggest the relative value of each unit within this hierarchy.

PLACEMENT OF NOTES

Where a note pertains to a single statute section, it will of course be set out following that section. In many instances, however, a note applies equally to several statute section or to an entire chapter or article. If the pertinent sections are scattered, or few in number, the note will be duplicated for each section. But where the note applies to all or most of the sections in a chapter or article, we prevent the space-consuming repetition of notes by placing the note at the very beginning of the chapter or article. Look for these unit-wide notes between the title, chapter, or article analysis and the first section in that unit.

REPLACEMENT VOLUMES

The Code is periodically updated and streamlined by the replacement of volumes. Although a current set of the Code contains all currently applicable statutes, we encourage you to retain replaced volumes and their supplement pockets parts for historical reference.

RESEARCH AND PRACTICE REFERENCES

Citations to references in American Jurisprudence, American Jurisprudence Pleading and Practice, American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts, Ameri-

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can Jurisprudence Trials, American Law Reports, First through Fifth Series, ALR Federal, Corpus Juris Secundum, various other treatises and practice guides, and Mississippi law journals are given under this heading, wherever the references appear to discuss the statute under which the citation appears, or a topic related to the statute. These citations are intended only to give you a starting point for your library research. The Mississippi law journals include Mississippi Law Journal and Mississippi College Law Review.

SOURCE NOTES

Each section of the code is followed by a brief note showing the acts of the legislature on which it is based, including the act that originally enacted the section and any subsequent amendments.

The source note follows the section text, preceding any other annotations for the section. Information in the source note is listed in chronological order, with the most recent information listed last. If a section has been renumbered, the former number will appear in the source note. References to comparable provisions in statutes also are listed.

The tables volume should also be consulted when researching the history of a statutory section, since it contains cross reference tables that provide a statutory citation for each section of the session laws and the date each act went into effect.

STATUTE HEADINGS

Headings or “catchlines” for Code sections and subsections are generally created and maintained by the publisher. They are mere catchwords and are not to be deemed or taken as the official title of a section or as a part of the section. Your suggestions for the improvement of particular catchlines are invited.

TABLES

The Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated contains several tables that can assist you in your research. These are published in the Statutory Tables volume of the Code, and include the following:

- Sections of the Code of 1930 carried into the Code of 1942.
- Sections of the Code of 1942 carried into the Code of 1972.
- Allocation of Acts of Legislature, 1931 — 1972.
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- Consolidated Tables of amendments and repeals of 1942 Code sections.
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CHAPTER 1

Harbor or Port Commissions; Powers of Political Subdivision; Pilotage

SEC.	
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§ 59-1-1. Creation of port commission; composition and jurisdiction of commission generally.

Any city in the State of Mississippi having a seaport or harbor therein designated as a port of entry by the United States government shall have a harbor commission, to be known as a port commission, and same shall be composed of five resident citizens of such city, who shall be qualified electors therein, three of whom shall be skilled and experienced in maritime affairs. Said commission shall have jurisdiction over the port and terminals and harbor and passes leading thereto, and all vessels, boats and wharves, common carriers and public utilities therein, using the same, within their respective cities. In the cities of Natchez, Vicksburg and Greenville, the mayor and board of commissioners, or mayor and board of aldermen of such cities shall be the port commissioners of their respective harbors.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4849; Laws, 1942, § 7546.

Cross References — Bridge and park commissions, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

Establishment and maintenance of foreign trade zones, see §§ 59-3-31 to 59-3-37.

The State Ports and Harbors Law, see §§ 59-5-1 et seq.

Taxation for port fund, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

Issuance of revenue bonds for port or harbor improvements, see §§ 59-7-501 et seq.

County development commissions, see §§ 59-9-1 et seq.

County port and harbor commissions, see § 59-11-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In view of the powers and duties vested in the port commissioners with respect to control over port and harbor facilities, it could not be said that a municipality

owned warehouses, constructed by it, in a proprietary capacity rather than a public and governmental capacity, so as to preclude a suit by the state tax collector on behalf of the municipality to collect

charges due on a contract for rental of such municipal warehouses. *Gully v. Williams Bros.*, 182 Miss. 119, 180 So. 400 (1938).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 *Am. Jur.* 2d, Shipping Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).
 §§ 83-85.
CJS. 65 *C.J.S.*, Navigable Waters § 34. CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).
Practice References. USCS National

§ 59-1-3. Appointment, oath, bond, and terms of office of members of commission.

The port commission provided for in Section 59-1-1 shall be appointed as follows: one shall be appointed by the governor who shall be skilled and experienced in maritime affairs; one shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of the county in which such port of entry is located, who shall be skilled and experienced in maritime affairs, and three shall be appointed by the mayor and board of aldermen or mayor and board of commissioners of the city where such port of entry is located, one of whom shall be skilled and experienced in maritime affairs. Before entering upon the duties of the office, each of said commissioners shall take and subscribe to the oath of office required by Section 268 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, and shall give bond to be approved by the clerk of the city in which the port of entry is located, in the sum of five thousand (\$5,000.00) dollars, conditioned upon the faithful performance of their duties. Said bond shall be made payable to the city in which the port of entry is located, and in case of breach thereof, suit may be brought on the relation of the city for the benefit of said commission. The commissioners shall hold office for a term of four years from the day of their appointment and qualification, and until their successor or successors shall be appointed and qualify as set out herein.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4850; Laws, 1942, § 7547.

Cross References — Prohibition against interest in public contracts, see Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 109.

Who may administer oaths, see §§ 11-1-1, 25-1-9.

Appointment of port commissioners, see §§ 59-7-125, 59-7-407.

Appointment of county port authority or development commission members, see § 59-9-9.

Appointment of county port and harbor commissioners, see § 59-11-3.

§ 59-1-5. Compensation of members of commission.

Each member of any port commission created under the provisions of this chapter, operating in a county bounded by the Gulf of Mexico shall receive as compensation twenty-two dollars and fifty cents (\$22.50) per day while engaged in attendance upon meetings of the commission, or engaged in other duties of the commission, not to exceed sixty (60) days in any one (1) year, and shall receive their actual traveling expenses, to be audited and allowed by the commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7557; Laws, 1936, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 25; Laws, 1973, ch. 344, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1973).

Cross References — Salary of port director, see §§ 59-1-27, 59-7-129.

§ 59-1-7. Meetings; officers.

When the port commissioners shall have been appointed and shall be qualified as set out in this chapter, they shall meet at the regular place for the meetings of the mayor and board of aldermen, or mayor and board of commissioners, of the municipality, after giving at least ten days notice of the time and place of such meeting by publication in a newspaper published in such city, and they shall elect a president and secretary, who shall be members of the commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4851; Laws, 1942, § 7548.

Cross References — Meeting of port commissioners, see §§ 59-7-127, 59-7-409. Meetings of county development commission, see § 59-9-11.

§ 59-1-9. General powers and duties of commission; commission may enter into joint venture for construction and operation of facilities under jurisdiction of commission.

It shall be the duty of the commission to keep a minute book in which shall be recorded all of their acts, orders, rules and regulations. It shall be the duty of said commission to adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with law to govern their official acts. The commissioners are hereby empowered and authorized to act as port wardens and pilot commissioners, and to perform any and all duties pertaining to such within their respective municipalities. It shall be the duty of the commission to make and publish all needful rules and regulations to govern the harbor, docks and passes within their respective jurisdictions, and to fix and prescribe tariffs, fees, fines, penalties and forfeitures for the violations of the rules and regulations of said commission, and said commission shall have the power to fix and determine all port and terminal charges, and they may enforce the collection thereof through any court of competent jurisdiction in this state. This section shall not apply to public utilities nor to railroad terminal charges covered by or carried in approved tariffs authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission nor to lawful railroad operation and activities.

It shall be the duty of the port commissioners within their respective jurisdictions to see that all port positions, such as harbormaster, pilots, boatmen, stevedores, surveyors, watchmen, police, ship chandlers, ship agents and such other persons performing services for the public shipping, carry out their duties in a manner that is not detrimental to the port and shall not be unduly burdensome to the public shipping.

It shall be the duty of the commissioners to appoint annually a sufficient number of pilots, and all agents and factors necessary for the protection of the harbor and the advancement of public shipping, except that pilots shall be

appointed for a term of four (4) years, and before any person shall be appointed a pilot, harbormaster, boatman, stevedore, surveyor, watchman, police, ship Chandler or ship agent, his qualifications for the same shall be passed upon by said port commissioners. After satisfying themselves that any applicant for the position of pilot, harbormaster, boatman, stevedore, surveyor, watchman, police, ship Chandler or ship agent is competent and well qualified to perform the duties of such position and his services are required for the protection of the harbor and the advancement of public shipping, the port commissioners shall issue a license to such applicant, provided and upon condition that such applicant shall enter into a good and sufficient bond in an amount in each case to be determined by the commissioners, the bond to be entered into not to exceed the sum of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), said bond to be payable to the city of the port of entry, conditioned according to law for the faithful performance of his duties, and in case of breach thereof, suit may be brought thereon in the name of the city for the benefit of said port commissioners. The port commissioners shall have the right to revoke any such license for neglect of duty, incompetency, inefficiency, physical disability or for any act or acts detrimental to the interests of the port. Additional pilots may be examined and licensed when in the opinion of said port commissioners the services of same are required for the protection of the harbor and the advancement of public shipping.

In addition to the general powers and duties of a port commission, a port commission may enter into joint ventures or community alliances with private entities or other port commissions or development commissions to construct and operate any facilities under the jurisdiction of such commissions.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4852; Laws, 1942, § 7549; Laws, 1984, ch. 493, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 327, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References — Duties of port commission, see §§ 59-7-129, 59-7-131.

Stevedore's license, see § 59-1-39.

Requirement for compulsory pilotage, see § 59-1-41.

Penalty for performing harbor services without being duly licensed, see § 59-1-43.

Supplemental duties of port commission where certain federal projects are involved, see § 59-7-205.

Collection of fees, etc., see § 59-7-307.

Criminal offense of forgery or counterfeiting of licenses, see § 97-21-35.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Ownership of facilities.

1. In general.

The rule-making power conferred by this section [Code 1942, § 7549] extends to the establishment of methods of calling special meetings. *Simpson v. City of Gulfport*, 239 Miss. 136, 121 So. 2d 409 (1960).

2. Ownership of facilities.

In view of the powers and duties vested in the port commissioners with respect to control over port and harbor facilities, it could not be said that a municipality owned warehouses, constructed by it, in a proprietary capacity rather than a public and governmental capacity, so as to preclude a suit by the state tax collector on

behalf of the municipality to collect charges due on a contract for rental of such municipal warehouses. *Gully v. Williams Bros.*, 182 Miss. 119, 180 So. 400 (1938).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Port Commission may not pay Rotary Club dues of Port Director; Section 59-1-9 and 59-1-11 of Mississippi Code, describing powers of Port Commission, do not authorize Port Commission to make such payment on behalf of Port. *Tindall* Aug. 25, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0551.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 **Am. Jur.** 2d, Shipping **CJS.** 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters § 38. §§ 83-85, 288 et seq.

§ 59-1-11. Additional powers of port commission.

In addition to the power and authority conferred in Section 59-1-1, the port commission and mayor and board of commissioners of the port of entry, acting jointly only, may in their discretion negotiate a contract or contracts for any and all repairs or any part thereof affecting the reconstruction, repair or maintenance of any pier, dock, warehouse, grain elevator, bulk loading plant, sheds or any other property at the port of entry under the jurisdiction of said port commission and city, under terms and conditions as both bodies may deem best and economical to the city wherein the port of entry is located.

The port commission is given full power and authority to employ engineers, attorneys and other professional and technical help in or about the operation, development and advancement of said port, and to pay reasonable compensation therefor. Such employment and compensation therefor to be approved by the mayor and board of commissioners of the port of entry.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.5; Laws, 1948, ch. 391.

Cross References — Supplementary and additional powers in connection with flood control projects, see § 59-7-205.
Repair contracts let by county port commissioners, see § 59-9-25.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Port Commission may not pay Rotary Club dues of Port Director; Section 59-1-9 and 59-1-11 of Mississippi Code, describing powers of Port Commission, do not authorize Port Commission to make such payment on behalf of Port. *Tindall* Aug. 25, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0551.

§ 59-1-13. Construction of Sections 59-1-13 through 59-1-25 generally.

Being for the purpose of relieving unemployment and promoting industrial development and the development of fisheries, commerce and shipping in the state, Sections 59-1-13 through 59-1-25 shall be construed as granting

additional authority to the several port commissions of the State of Mississippi, and the same shall not repeal or impair any existing law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-08; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 8.

§ 59-1-15. Definition of "industrial operations."

The term "industrial operations" as used in Sections 59-1-13 through 59-1-25 shall include but not be limited to any and all enterprises the operation of which will aid in the development of fisheries, commerce, navigation or shipping in the port, as well as all forms of manufacturing enterprises.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-04; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 4.

§ 59-1-17. Jurisdiction of commission; reclamation, use and disposition of lands subject to commission jurisdiction generally; leasing and subleasing of certain submerged lands and tidelands owned by state.

(1) The several port commissions in the State of Mississippi are each hereby vested with full jurisdiction and control of any and all lands lying within, or adjacent to, any river, bay or natural lake which are now, or heretofore were, below the mean high tide mark, and which lands lie within or adjacent to any port or harbor within the jurisdiction of such port commission, and as to which lands the claims of private persons or private corporations have been, or hereinafter are, acquired by such port commission, or by the city for its benefit, by purchase, lease, conveyance or eminent domain proceedings. Any such port commission is hereby authorized to reclaim any and all such lands, by filling, dredging or other methods and to utilize, lease or dispose of same for the development and operation of the port to the same extent it is now, or may hereinafter be, authorized to utilize its other facilities.

(2) It is hereby declared that the leasing or use for commercial purposes, port purposes and for industrial development related thereto of the following described submerged lands and tidelands belonging to the State of Mississippi in an area lying between the East Pascagoula River and the West Pascagoula River, Jackson County, Mississippi, will serve a higher public interest in accordance with the purposes of this section and with the public policy of this state as set forth in Section 49-27-3, said property being more particularly described as follows:

All that part of the Lowry Island Resurvey, which is bounded on the South by the L & N (now CSX) Railroad Track; on the East by the East Pascagoula River; on the West by the West Pascagoula River; and on the North by the North corporate limits of the City of Pascagoula and the South corporate limits of the City of Moss Point, LESS AND EXCEPT, however, that part of said property now owned by any private corporations.

(3) The city port commission of the city in which such state lands are located and the governing authority thereof, jointly, are hereby authorized to apply for and secure a lease in accordance with Section 29-1-107, except for a

period of time not to exceed forty (40) years, of such state lands as may be necessary for the development for commercial purposes, port purposes and related industrial facilities in the aforesaid areas described in subsection (2) hereof.

Application for a lease shall be made with the Secretary of State.

Utilization of any and all submerged land and/or tideland shall be in such a manner so as not to obstruct normal navigation of any normal and natural channel. Title to the property shall remain vested in the State of Mississippi.

All oil, gas and other minerals in, on or under said lands leased are hereby specifically reserved unto the State of Mississippi.

The city port commission and city governing authority, jointly, are hereby authorized to sublease such lands for commercial purposes, port purposes and for industrial development related thereto.

All subleases executed by the city port commission and city governing authority shall be on such terms and conditions, and with such safeguards, as will best promote and protect the public interest. Such subleases shall be submitted to the Secretary of State for approval. Each sublease shall provide that if such property is not utilized within five (5) years, or if commercial, port or industrial usage ceases and such termination continues for a period of two (2) years, the sublease shall terminate and all rights thereunder shall revert to the city and port commission. If such nonutilization for a period of five (5) years or cessation of use for a period of two (2) years shall be caused, suspended, delayed or interrupted by act of God, fire, war, rebellion, scarcity of water, insurrection, riot, strike, scarcity of labor, differences with employees, failure of a carrier to transport or furnish facilities for transportation; or as a result of some order, rule or regulation of any federal, state, municipality or other governmental agency; or as the result of failure of the sublessee to obtain any required permit or certificate; or as the result of any cause whatsoever beyond the control of sublessee, the time of such delay or interruption shall not be counted against the sublessee in determining such period of five (5) years or two (2) years. All subleases shall be for a fair and adequate consideration and the compensation and revenues therefrom shall be retained by the state.

(4) This section is to be considered as supplementary and cumulative and nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or amending any options, leases, deeds, contracts, agreements or legal instruments heretofore entered into by the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, or the port commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-01; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 336, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1988).

§ 59-1-19. Sale, lease or other disposition of land not used for port purposes.

In the event any part of lands as are described in Section 59-1-17 are not used for port purposes, and navigation and commerce will not be impeded thereby, such port commission may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of same to

individuals, firms or corporations, public or private, for industrial use, on such terms and conditions and with such safeguard as will best promote and protect the public interest, and they are hereby authorized to transfer title or possession to any part or all of such lands by special warranty deed, lease, contract, or other customary business instrument; however, no such lease shall be executed for a term in excess of ninety-nine years from its date, and before execution of same any such conveyance, lease, contract or other disposition shall be authorized by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of such port commission by order or resolution entered on its minutes, which order or resolution shall set forth the substantial terms of such conveyance, lease, contract, or other disposition. In the event title to any such land under the jurisdiction of the port commission is in the name of the city, no such transaction shall be consummated until and unless the same be authorized by proper resolution of the port commission and of the city, in which event the city shall join the port commission in the execution of any such instrument.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-02; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 2.

Cross References — Lease of mineral lands other than sixteenth section or lieu lands, see §§ 17-9-1 et seq.

Public lands generally, see §§ 29-1-1 et seq.

Lease of surface and submerged lands generally, see § 29-1-107.

Mineral leases of state lands generally, see §§ 29-7-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 78 Am. Jur. 2d, Waters §§ 306, 308.

§ 59-1-21. Terms and conditions of conveyances, contracts, leases, etc.

Any such conveyance, contract, lease or other disposition authorized by Section 59-1-19 of any or all such lands described in Section 59-1-17 may be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration as may be found to be adequate by the port commission, and approved by the city, in orders or resolutions authorizing same, and the covenants and obligations of the lessee or grantee to make expenditures in determined amounts, and within such time or times, for improvements to be erected on the land, by such lessee or grantee, and to conduct thereon industrial operations in such aggregate payroll amounts and for such period of time or times as may be determined and defined in such lease, deed or other disposition, shall constitute and be deemed sufficient consideration for the execution of any such conveyance, lease, contract or other disposition. Any such instrument shall, however, contain reasonable provisions for the termination of the lease or revision of title to the land, but, unless otherwise agreed to, not the improvements of grantee or lessee, in the event of default on the part of the lessee or grantee of his or its obligations or covenants under any such agreement.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-03; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 3.

§ 59-1-23. Assistance of municipalities in establishing industries.

In lieu of exercising the authority herein granted, a port commission may cooperate and assist any authorized municipality, as defined in Sections 57-1-1 through 57-1-51, Mississippi Code of 1972, to which a certificate of public convenience and necessity has been issued under such sections, in the establishment of an industry or industries by such municipality, and may for such purpose or purposes, convey or lease any or all such lands to any such municipality, or join such municipality in the execution of a contract, lease, conveyance or other disposition for the operation of the industry, but any such disposition shall be subject to termination or revision of title in the event of abandonment of the industry, non-compliance with its terms, or non-user for the purposes for which same is made.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-05; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 5.

Cross References — Municipal industrial enterprises generally, see §§ 57-1-1 et seq.

Industrial parks and districts generally, see §§ 57-5-1 et seq.

§ 59-1-25. Reservation of oil, gas and minerals in sale, lease or other disposition of lands.

Any sale, lease or other disposition made under Sections 59-1-13 through 59-1-25 shall except all oil, gas and other minerals, except sand, clay and gravel on, in and under the land, and shall reserve to the owner thereof the right to develop and produce same in such manner as will not injure or endanger the improvements of the lessee or grantee placed on the land after the execution of such lease, conveyance or other disposition.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7549.7-06; Laws, 1950, ch. 450, § 6.

Cross References — Lease of state lands for minerals generally, see § 29-7-3.

§ 59-1-27. Port director.

The port commission is hereby authorized, in its discretion, to employ a port director. It shall be the duty of said port director to solicit business for the port, investigate railroad and ocean rates for the protection of the general public in using said port. The salary of the port director shall be fixed by the commissioners with the approval of the mayor and board of aldermen, or the mayor and board of commissioners, and shall be paid from funds derived under the provisions of this chapter, or from the general funds or special funds raised for such purpose in the city treasury; such port commission may, in its discretion, select from its membership a competent person to serve in the capacity of port director, in which case the salary paid such member for services rendered as port director shall not be subject to the restrictions fixed in Section 59-1-5.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4853; Laws, 1942, § 7550; Laws, 1940, ch. 314.

Cross References — Compensation of port commissioners, see § 59-1-5.
Salary of county port director, see § 59-7-129.

§ 59-1-29. Appropriation of funds for use of port commission by municipal authorities.

The mayor and board of aldermen or the mayor and board of commissioners of a municipality having a port of entry as herein defined are hereby authorized and empowered in their discretion to appropriate money for the use and benefit of the port commission to be expended under the direction of the port commission with the approval of said municipal authorities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4856; Laws, 1942, § 7553.

Cross References — Purposes for which bonds may be issued by municipality, see § 21-33-301.

Powers of municipalities over harbors and wharves, see § 21-37-15.

Ports of entry generally, see §§ 59-3-1 et seq.

Small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-1 et seq.

§ 59-1-31. Appropriation of funds for use of port commission by county governing authorities.

The board of supervisors of a county having a port of entry as herein defined is hereby authorized and empowered in its discretion to appropriate money for the use and benefit of the port to be expended under the direction of the port commissioners with the approval of said board of supervisors.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4857; Laws, 1942, § 7554.

Cross References — Powers of boards of supervisors generally, see § 19-3-41.

County port authorities or development commissions, see §§ 59-9-1 et seq.

§ 59-1-33. County membership in rivers and harbors association.

The board of supervisors of the various counties are hereby authorized, in their discretion, to join on behalf of their respective counties the rivers and harbors association of Mississippi, and to pay from the general fund of the county membership dues of the association. The payment of membership dues shall entitle the county to all of the rights and privileges of membership and the county shall not be liable for any additional dues or assessments. After a county has joined the association, it may terminate its membership by formal resolution or failure to pay membership dues.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7557.5; Laws, 1959, Ex. Sess. ch. 37.

§ 59-1-35. Affiliation with rivers and harbors association by cities and other political subdivisions or agencies.

All city, county, district and state ports, harbors and waterway systems and any other agency, department or political subdivision, including municipi-

palities and boards of supervisors, may, in their discretion, become affiliated with, support and pay dues to the rivers and harbors association of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7557.6; Laws, 1970, ch. 411, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1970).

§ 59-1-37. Acquisition of land for industrial purposes or port and terminal facilities by certain cities and counties.

(1) Any city or cities situated in any county bordering on the Mississippi River and/or any such county, acting alone or jointly with any said city or cities, is and/or are hereby authorized and empowered, acting through its or their governing authorities, to acquire by purchase or otherwise, and to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of land situated in such county, either within or outside the corporate limits of such city or cities, for industrial purposes, or for river port and port facilities, for terminal and terminal facilities, and for landing and landing facilities, for storage and transportation of freight and passengers on the waters of the Mississippi River.

(2) For the purposes aforesaid, the said city or cities and/or county, acting alone or jointly, is and/or are authorized and empowered to borrow money and issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness, or notes as security therefor, in such form and amounts, and bearing such interest, not to exceed six per cent (6%) per annum, and maturities as may be determined by the governing authorities thereof, and to levy ad valorem taxes for payment of the principal and interest thereon.

(3) The said city or cities and/or county may pay for any property purchased under authority of this section from the general funds of the city or cities and/or county and/or the proceeds from the sale of any bonds, certificates of indebtedness, or notes issued for such purposes by the city, cities or county.

(4) The bonds, certificates of indebtedness, or notes provided for herein may be issued under and in the same manner, notice and conditions as is provided by any law authorizing said city or cities or county to issue the general full faith and credit bonds, or other evidences of indebtedness of said city or cities or county, and shall not be included in any limitation now imposed by law but may be in addition thereto.

(5) The land which may be purchased under authority hereof by any said city or cities, whether acting alone or jointly with said county, and situated outside of the corporate limits of said city or cities shall be located not more than seven miles from the line of the corporate limits of the city nearest thereto.

(6) Said city or cities or county, through its or their governing authorities, is and/or are hereby authorized and empowered to do and perform all acts and things necessary for the purposes hereof.

(7) This section shall be considered and is an alternative plan and authority supplemental to and in addition to any other law in effect dealing with and pertaining to the subject matter and provisions hereof, and shall not amend or repeal any existing law, but as aforesaid shall be and is an

alternative plan and authority applicable to any city or cities within the class as herein provided for.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7557.8; Laws, 1964, ch. 500, §§ 1-8; Laws, 1964, ch. 282, §§ 1-7, eff from and after passage (approved April 23, 1964).

Cross References — Municipal bonds, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq.

Municipal industrial enterprises generally, see §§ 57-1-1 et seq.

Industrial parks established in certain municipalities, see § 57-5-17.

Landings, see §§ 59-19-1 et seq.

§ 59-1-39. Licensing of harbor masters, pilots, stevedores, etc.

Contracting stevedores shall pay a privilege license not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00) per year, the amount within this limit, to be fixed and determined by the port commissioners, and the same shall be paid to the port commission or port authority to be used for port expenses and maintenance as directed by the port commissioner or port authority. Harbor masters, pilots, boatmen, stevedores, surveyors, watchmen, police, ship agents, ship chandlers and such other persons performing services for the public shipping as the port commissioners may require, shall pay annually such license or permit fee as may be prescribed and required by the port commissioners not to exceed fifty dollars (\$50.00). The fees for piloting, inward and outward, shall be so fixed as not to be unduly burdensome on shipping. The piloting fees for boarding vessels on arrival, for docking and for each shift or move thereafter shall be determined and fixed by the port commissioners as may from time to time be considered reasonable and proper under existing conditions.

It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, to act as harbor master, pilot, boatman, stevedore, surveyor, watchman, ship agent, ship Chandler or in any other capacity as the port commissioners may designate, without first being duly licensed and qualified as set out in this section, or without having been issued a permit that such service is necessary for the protection of the harbor or advancement of public shipping.

It shall be unlawful for any vessel, firm or corporation to employ a harbor master, pilot, boatman, stevedore, surveyor, watchman, police, ship agent, ship Chandler or any other such person until such person shall have been first duly licensed and qualified as provided in this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4854; Laws, 1942, § 7551; Laws, 1948, ch. 381, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 579, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 493, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1984).

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the second paragraph. The word “on” was changed to “or” so that “to act as ...ship agent, ship Chandler on in any other capacity” now reads as “to act as ...ship agent, ship Chandler or in any other capacity.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping § 95.

§ 59-1-41. Compulsory pilotage.

It shall be unlawful for any vessel of over 250 tons net registered tonnage to enter the harbors or passes leading thereto without being piloted and under the direction of a licensed pilot, and all vessels shall be subject to compulsory pilotage except American vessels laden with coast-wise cargo not destined for foreign ports.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4858; Laws, 1942, § 7555.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Compulsory pilotage requirement applies to all vessels over 250 tons net registered tonnage entering Gulfport Ship Channel and not just to those entering vessels destined for Port at Gulfport. Stone, Feb. 8, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0064.

Because Legislature has authorized each of port commissions on coast to license their own pilots, it did not intend for pilots from one port (i.e., Gulfport) to have

monopoly on pilotage; Authority may only compel vessels bound for Gulfport to take on one of its pilots. Stone, Feb. 8, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0064.

Port of destination or origination has authority to require that pilot be on board if vessel is bound for another port other than Gulfport, i.e., Biloxi, Pascagoula, etc. Stone, Feb. 8, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0064.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping §§ 99 et seq.

§ 59-1-43. Use of or actions by unlicensed persons.

Any person or persons, vessel, firm or corporation, acting as or employing a harbor master, pilot, boatman, stevedore, surveyor, watchman, police, ship agent, ship chandler or such other persons as may be required by the port commissioners, performing services for the public shipping, without first being duly licensed and qualified as provided in this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall pay a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00) per day for each day while so acting, and serve not more than thirty (30) days in jail, or both in the discretion of the court; and it shall be unlawful and a misdemeanor for any person not licensed by the board of commissioners to interfere with the duties of the harbor master, pilot, boatmen, stevedores or their employees, surveyors, watchmen, police, ship agents, ship chandlers or such other persons who have been duly licensed while performing services for the public shipping except in cases of distress; and any person or persons violating the provisions hereof in that regard, on conviction, in the city, county or state court, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars (\$100.00) or sentenced to thirty (30) days in jail, or both, and

not more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00) or six (6) months in jail, or both, for each offense at the discretion of the court trying the case.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 4859; Laws, 1942, § 7556; Laws, 1984, ch. 493, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1984).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see § 99-19-73.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Penalties set forth in statute are exclusive remedies available for violation of compulsory pilotage requirement; provision does not provide Authority with private right of action against violators. Stone, Feb. 8, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0064.

Since criminal penalties set forth in statute are exclusive remedies for violations of compulsory pilotage laws, only available means of putting these mechanisms into action is by signing affidavit. Stone, Feb. 8, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0064.

§ 59-1-45. Disposition of fines and penalties.

The fines and penalties collected under this chapter shall be paid into the city treasury to be used by the mayor and board of commissioners or mayor and board of aldermen for the benefit of the port.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, §§ 4855, 4859; Laws, 1942, §§ 7552, 7556.

CHAPTER 3

Ports of Entry

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IN GENERAL

SEC.

59-3-1.	General municipal powers.
59-3-3.	Issuance of bonds authorized.
59-3-5.	Details of bonds; tax levy; supplemental powers and authorizations for bond issues.
59-3-7.	Conduct of election on issuance of bonds.
59-3-9.	Qualifications of electors; form and marking of ballots; issuance of bonds without elections.
59-3-11.	Issuance of bonds; maturities, interest, and execution of bonds; payment of principal and interest.
59-3-13.	Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalty for diversion.

§ 59-3-1. General municipal powers.

The corporate authorities of any municipality in which there is situated, wholly or partially within its boundaries, a harbor that is a port of entry, shall have the following power and authority: to construct all needful improvements in such harbor, including the deepening of any part of said harbor, and/or extending, enlarging and adding to the same by dredging in any direction including inland; to acquire, construct, repair and improve public wharves and docks for said municipality, in connection with said harbor, and to operate the same under the port commissioners; to own, construct, lease and maintain sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, and other structures and facilities needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, and other works of public improvement, including roadways necessary or useful for such port, harbor, and/or dock and wharf purposes, and to control and operate the same under the port commissioners; said sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses and other works of public improvements, including roadways, to be situated either upon the municipal wharves and docks, and/or upon lands owned, purchased, reclaimed or leased by the municipality and situated within reasonable and practical proximity to such wharves, docks, harbor or port; to set aside or lease portions or all of the said lands, wharves, docks, sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, and other structures and facilities needful for convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, or any of the said necessary or useful improvements, for special purposes, for a term not exceeding twenty-five years; and to lease same for industrial use for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years to individuals, firms or corporations, public or private, on such terms and conditions and with such

safeguards as will best promote and protect the public interest. Any such industrial lease may be executed upon such terms and conditions and for such monetary rental or other consideration as may be found adequate and approved by the city in orders or resolutions authorizing the same. Any covenants and obligations of the lessee to make expenditures in determined amounts and within such time or times, for improvements to be erected on the land by such lessee and to conduct thereon industrial operations in such aggregate payroll amounts and for such period of time or times as may be determined and defined in such lease, and to give preference in employment where practicable to qualified residents of the port of entry and of the county in which said port is situated, shall, if included in said lease, constitute and be deemed sufficient consideration for the execution of any such lease in the absence of a monetary rental or other considerations; any such instrument may contain reasonable provisions giving the lessee the right to remove its or his improvements upon termination of the lease. Such corporate authority shall also have the power and authority to acquire by eminent domain proceedings, purchase, or otherwise, the land, property and rights that may be necessary or useful for the foregoing purposes, and for such purposes the municipality shall have the right to reclaim submerged lands.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7558; Laws, 1931, ch. 11; Laws, 1954, ch. 343; Laws, 1960, ch. 341.

Cross References — General powers of municipality, see §§ 21-17-1 et seq.

Municipal powers in relation to harbors and wharves generally, see § 21-37-15.

Authority to establish bridge and park commission for harbor development, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

Power of municipality to appropriate money for use of port commission generally, see § 59-1-29.

County port authority, see §§ 59-9-1 et seq.

County port and harbor commission, see §§ 59-11-1 et seq.

Municipal powers in relation to small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-3, 59-15-5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The City of Gulfport is authorized to construct a small craft commercial harbor and other improvements for the purpose

of improving and enlarging the port of Gulfport and in extending its port facilities. *Xidis v. City of Gulfport*, 221 Miss. 79, 72 So. 2d 153 (1954).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

City has authority to enter into a lease of harbor property for a term not exceeding twenty-five years, on such terms and conditions as best promote the public interest, and to consent to the execution by the lessee of a leasehold deed of trust in

and/or a pledge of rights thereunder, upon a finding by the city governing authorities that such lease would be in aid of commerce. *Artman*, Nov. 25, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0773.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping
§§ 83-85.

§ 59-3-3. Issuance of bonds authorized.

The corporate authorities referred to in Section 59-3-1 are authorized to issue bonds or other obligations of the municipality for any or all of the purposes enumerated and authorized under Section 59-3-1. The conditions of the sale of said bonds shall be fixed by the said corporate authorities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7559; Laws, 1931, ch. 11.

Cross References — Municipal bonds generally, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq.
Additional powers conferred in connection with issuance of bonds, see § 31-21-5.
Details of bonds, see § 59-3-5.
Supplemental powers and authorizations for issuance of bonds, see § 59-3-5.
Bond issues for municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-9, 59-7-11, 59-7-309, 59-7-415.
Municipal bonds for small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-5 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

Practice References. USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

§ 59-3-5. Details of bonds; tax levy; supplemental powers and authorizations for bond issues.

All bonds authorized by Section 59-3-3 shall be lithographed or engraved, and printed in two (2) or more colors, to prevent counterfeiting, and shall be in sums not less than one hundred dollars (\$100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00) each, and shall be registered as issued, be numbered in a regular series from one (1) upward, be signed by the mayor and countersigned by the clerk, who shall impress the municipal seal upon each bond as it is issued. Every such bond shall specify on its face the purpose for which it was issued; and the total amount authorized to be issued, and each shall be made payable to bearer. The corporate authorities shall levy annually a special tax to be used exclusively in paying the interest on such bonds and the bonds maturing within one (1) year, and in providing a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds issued.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, bonds referred to hereinabove may be issued pursuant to the supplemental powers and authorizations conferred by the provisions of the Registered Bond Act, being Sections 31-21-1 through 31-21-7.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7560; Laws, 1931, ch. 11; Laws, 1983, ch. 494, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved April 11, 1983).

Cross References — Details of bonds issued for county harbors, see § 59-7-107. Details of bonds issued for small craft harbors, see § 59-15-11.

§ 59-3-7. Conduct of election on issuance of bonds.

Before issuing bonds authorized by Section 59-3-3 the corporate authorities shall by resolution spread upon their minutes, declare their intention of issuing said bonds, fixing in such resolution the maximum amount thereof, and the purpose for which they are to be issued, and where an election is required shall fix in such resolution a date upon which an election shall be held in said municipality, of which not less than three weeks' notice shall be given by the clerk by a notice published in a newspaper published in said municipality once a week for three weeks preceding said election at three public places in said municipality. Such election shall be held, as far as practicable, as other elections are held in municipalities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7561; Laws, 1931, ch. 11.

Cross References — Municipal bond elections generally, see §§ 21-33-307 et seq. Details of issuance of bonds approved by election required by this section, see § 59-3-11.

Elections for county and municipal harbor bond issues, see § 59-7-17.

Elections on bond issues for small craft harbors, see § 59-15-7.

§ 59-3-9. Qualifications of electors; form and marking of ballots; issuance of bonds without elections.

At such election as is provided for by Section 59-3-7, all qualified electors may vote and the ballots used shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the amount and purpose of the proposed bond issue and the words, "For the bond issue," and the words, "Against the bond issue," and the voter shall vote by placing a cross (X) opposite his choice of the proposition. In cities of less than twelve thousand inhabitants, when the amount to be issued is not more than thirty thousand dollars the corporate authorities shall publish the resolution as herein provided declaring their intention to issue said bonds for three weeks, giving the day and date upon which said bonds are to be issued; and if twenty per cent of the qualified electors of the municipality file a written protest against the issuance of said bonds on or before said date, then an election shall be had as herein provided, and if no protest shall be filed said bonds shall be issued without an election.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7562; Laws, 1931, ch. 11.

Cross References — Details of bonds issued pursuant to the authority of this section, see § 59-3-11.

§ 59-3-11. Issuance of bonds; maturities, interest, and execution of bonds; payment of principal and interest.

Should the election provided for in Sections 59-3-7 and 59-3-9 result in favor of the proposed bond issue, by a majority of those voting in said election

voting in favor of the issuance of said bonds, the corporate authorities may issue such bonds, either in whole or in part, within one (1) year after the date of such election or within one (1) year after final favorable determination of any litigation affecting such bonds as they may deem best, and should said bonds be issued by the municipality without an election therefor as provided in the preceding section, then said bonds may be issued as herein provided. All bonds shall mature annually, with all maturities not longer than twenty (20) years, with not less than one-fiftieth ($\frac{1}{50}$) of the total issue to mature each year during the first five (5) years of the life of said bonds, and not less than one-twenty-fifth ($\frac{1}{25}$) of the said total issue to mature annually during the succeeding ten-year period of the life of said bonds, and the remainder to be divided into approximately equal payments, one (1) payment to mature during each year for the remaining life of the bonds. Said bonds shall not bear a greater rate of interest than that allowed in Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972, payable semiannually, the denomination, form and place of payment to be fixed in the ordinance of the corporate authorities issuing said bonds, and they shall be prepared and signed by the mayor and clerk of said municipality with the seal of the municipality affixed thereto, but the coupons may only bear a facsimile signature of such mayor and clerk. Such bonds, when issued, shall constitute a lien on all the taxable property in such municipality and the corporate authorities shall annually levy a special tax on all such property sufficient to pay the principal and interest on such bonds as the same falls due.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7563; Laws, 1931, ch. 11; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 14; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 27; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 34, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1983).

Cross References — Maturity and interest of municipal bonds generally, see § 21-33-315.

Additional powers conferred in connection with issuance of bonds, see § 31-21-5.

Details of bonds, see § 59-3-5.

Supplemental powers and authorizations for issuance of bonds, see § 59-3-5.

Bonds for municipal harbors, see § 59-7-417.

Bonds for small craft harbors, see § 59-15-11.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

§ 59-3-13. Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalty for diversion.

The proceeds of any bonds issued under authority of Sections 59-3-1 through 59-3-13, shall be placed in the municipal treasury or depository, if there be one, as a special fund and shall be used for no other purpose than the purpose set forth in the original resolution of the corporate authorities of such municipality, and any officer diverting or assisting to divert any such funds to any other purpose than the purpose originally set forth in said resolution of the corporate authorities of such municipality shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable accordingly, and shall be liable both personally and on his official bond for such diversion.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564; Laws, 1931, ch. 11.

Cross References — Diversion of proceeds of municipal bonds generally, see § 21-33-317.

Diversion of proceeds of municipal bonds issued for harbor purposes, see § 59-7-419.

Diversion of proceeds of municipal bonds issued for small craft harbors, see § 59-15-13.

FOREIGN TRADE ZONES

SEC.

59-3-31. "Public corporation" defined.

59-3-33. Establishment and operation by public corporation.

59-3-35. Establishment and operation by private corporation.

59-3-37. Operation and maintenance pursuant to terms of Act of Congress.

§ 59-3-31. "Public corporation" defined.

The term "public corporation", for the purposes of Sections 59-3-31 through 59-3-37, means the State of Mississippi or any political subdivision thereof or any public agency of this state or of any political subdivision thereof or any public board, bureau, commission or authority created by the legislature of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-42; Laws, 1966, ch. 288, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved June 14, 1966).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Practice References. USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).
Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

§ 59-3-33. Establishment and operation by public corporation.

Any public corporation of the State of Mississippi, as that term is defined in Section 59-3-31, is hereby authorized to make application for the privilege of establishing, operating and maintaining a foreign-trade zone in accordance with an Act of Congress approved June 18, 1934, entitled "An Act to provide for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for other purposes."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-41; Laws, 1966, ch. 288, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved June 14, 1966).

Federal Aspects — Foreign trade zones, see 19 USCS §§ 81a et seq.

§ 59-3-35. Establishment and operation by private corporation.

Any private corporation hereafter organized under the laws of this state for the purpose of establishing, operating and maintaining a foreign-trade zone in accordance with the Act of Congress referred to in Section 59-3-33, is likewise hereby authorized to make application for the privilege of establishing, operating and maintaining a foreign-trade zone in accordance with the said Act of Congress.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-43; Laws, 1966, ch. 288, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 14, 1966).

Federal Aspects — Foreign trade zones, see 19 USCS §§ 81a et seq.

§ 59-3-37. Operation and maintenance pursuant to terms of Act of Congress.

Any public or private corporation authorized by Sections 59-3-31 through 59-3-37 to make application for the privilege of establishing, operating and maintaining such foreign-trade zone, whose application is granted pursuant to the terms of the Act of Congress referred to in Section 59-3-33, is hereby authorized to establish such foreign-trade zone and to operate and maintain the same, subject to the conditions and restrictions of said Act of Congress, and any amendments thereto, and under such rules and regulations and for the period of time that may be prescribed by the board established by said Act of Congress to carry out the provisions of said Act of Congress.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-44; Laws, 1966, ch. 288, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved June 14, 1966).

Federal Aspects — Foreign trade zones, see 19 USCS §§ 81a et seq.

CHAPTER 5

State Ports and Harbors

SEC.

- 59-5-1. Short title; definition of "board".
- 59-5-3. Declaration of public policy.
- 59-5-5. Construction of chapter.
- 59-5-7. Activities of board and state port authority pursuant to chapter as governmental functions.
- 59-5-9. Implementation of public policy by board; discretion of board; construction of rights, powers and duties of board.
- 59-5-11. General powers of board; lands subject to jurisdiction and control of board.
- 59-5-13. Acceptance of grants and contributions.
- 59-5-15. Analysis and survey by city, county or other agency of port or harbor proposed to be conveyed to state.
- 59-5-17. Negotiation of agreement with city, county or agency for state acquisition of port or harbor.
- 59-5-19. Approval of agreement for conveyance of port or harbor to state; terms and conditions of conveyance.
- 59-5-21. Operation by state port authority of ports or harbors acquired by or conveyed to state.
- 59-5-23. Authorization of contracts, etc., for improvement, operation, etc., of port or harbor.
- 59-5-25. Approval of agreement for improvement, operation, etc., of port or harbor; appropriation of excess funds or levy of tax.
- 59-5-27. Bond of members of port or harbor agency.
- 59-5-29. Increase in membership of county port authority upon issuance of bonds.
- 59-5-31. Additional powers and authority for certain port commissions and authorities; revenue bonds; tax exemptions.
- 59-5-33. State ports fund; joint activities or employment of personnel.
- 59-5-35. Setting aside or leasing of lands, docks, warehouses, etc.; exemption from certain ad valorem taxes.
- 59-5-37. Employment of personnel, execution of contracts, etc., for development, promotion, maintenance, etc., of ports, harbors, rivers, etc.; suits by and against state port authority; advertising and bidding requirements for contracts or purchases.
- 59-5-39. Acquisition of rights of way, land, etc.
- 59-5-41. State bonds; issuance, terms, and conditions; interim financing of construction projects.
- 59-5-43. Negotiability of bonds; exemption from taxation.
- 59-5-45. Manner and price of sale of bonds; interest; maturity and redemption.
- 59-5-47. Disposition of proceeds of bonds.
- 59-5-49. Validation of bonds.
- 59-5-51. Payment of interest and principal on bonds; limitation on amount of bonds issued.
- 59-5-53. Withdrawals of bond proceeds from special fund.
- 59-5-55. Use of net revenues, rents, and earnings from state owned ports.
- 59-5-57. Payment of county's share of state ad valorem taxes for harbor purposes to state port authority.
- 59-5-59. Allocation of revenues, rents and earnings to payment of bonds; sinking fund.
- 59-5-61. Refunding bonds.

- 59-5-63. Bonds as legal investments and securities for deposits of public funds.
- 59-5-65. Representation of State Bond Commission by Attorney General; payment of costs of sale, issuance and delivery of bonds.
- 59-5-67. Annual audit of state port authorities.
- 59-5-69. Annual budget of state port authorities.

§ 59-5-1. Short title; definition of “board”.

This chapter may be cited as the “State Ports and Harbors Law.”

As used in this chapter the word “board” shall mean the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-01; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Editor’s Note — Section 57-1-2 provides that the words “Agricultural and Industrial Board” shall mean the “Department of Economic and Community Development”.

Cross References — County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

Small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-1 et seq.

State inland ports, see §§ 59-17-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping
§§ 83-85.

CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

Practice References. USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

§ 59-5-3. Declaration of public policy.

It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to aid and encourage the promotion, development, improvement, and expansion of the state’s ports, harbors and inland waterways.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-02; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-5. Construction of chapter.

(1) This chapter shall be construed liberally and broadly to effectuate the policy and purposes herein set out.

(2) This chapter shall be deemed to be full and complete authority for the exercise of the powers herein granted, but this chapter shall not be deemed to repeal or to be in derogation of any existing law of this state.

(3) The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to repeal, amend, limit, or restrict statutes heretofore or hereinafter enacted, providing for the establishment, support, financing, and maintenance of port commissions, authorities, or other local agencies having jurisdiction over harbors, ports, rivers, channels, and waterways, nor to be applicable to any bond issue, heretofore or hereafter issued for port or harbor purposes by any county or municipality in which said port is located and the provisions hereof shall be

supplemental and cumulative and shall not repeal, limit or restrict the authority granted any public body or agency under any existing statute, except as herein otherwise expressly provided.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 7564-03, 7564-26, 7564-29; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, §§ 3, 26, 29; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 4; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Lessees of state-owned port facilities were clothed with the same power of control and possessory rights as if they were the owner, and the general law of landlord and tenant gives a leasehold tenant the

right to exclude entry to one whom he considers unsatisfactory, or detrimental to his business, or a hazard. *Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Putnam*, 290 So. 2d 612 (Miss. 1974).

§ 59-5-7. Activities of board and state port authority pursuant to chapter as governmental functions.

The carrying out of the corporate purposes of the board and the state port authority hereinafter created is in all respects for the benefit of the people of the State of Mississippi and is a public purpose, and the board and such state port authority will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-24; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 24, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-9. Implementation of public policy by board; discretion of board; construction of rights, powers and duties of board.

There is hereby vested in the board the duty to implement such declared public policy as herein provided. Wide latitude and discretion shall be vested in the board in the exercise of its powers and duties, and the enumeration of specific rights, powers, and duties of said board, when followed by general powers, shall not be construed in the restrictive sense.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-03; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-11. General powers of board; lands subject to jurisdiction and control of board.

The board shall have power to acquire, purchase, install, lease, construct, own, hold, maintain, equip, use, control, and operate ports, harbors, waterways, channels, wharves, piers, docks, quays, elevators, tipples, compresses, bulk loading and unloading facilities, warehouses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, dredges and any other facilities required and incidental to the construction, outfitting, drydocking or repair of ships or

vessels, and water, air and rail terminals, and roadways and approaches thereto, and other structures and facilities needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, including the dredging, deepening, extending, widening, or enlarging of any ports, harbors, rivers, channels, and waterways, the damming of inland waterways, the establishment of water basins, the acquisition and development of industrial sites and the reclaiming of submerged lands. For such purposes the board is vested with full jurisdiction and control of any and all lands lying within, adjacent to, or near any state-owned or operated ports, harbors, rivers, channels, and waterways, or natural lakes, which lands are below the mean high tide mark, and which lands are not within the jurisdiction of any other public body.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-04; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 4; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Cross References — Contracts with lessees for the construction of facilities such as those referred to in this section, and acquisition thereof by the board, see § 59-5-37. County harbor and industrial site development, see §§ 59-9-65 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Judicial review.

In an action against the Port Authority for an alleged breach of lease, the scope of review of the Port Authority's actions was not limited and the Port Authority was not entitled to deference as the case did not

pertain to a determination of whether the Port Authority acted within its statutory authority and was, instead, a an action for breach of contract. *Gulfside Casino Partnership v. Mississippi State Port Auth.*, 757 So. 2d 250 (Miss. 2000).

§ 59-5-13. Acceptance of grants and contributions.

The board, in addition to the moneys which may be received by it from the sale of bonds and from the collection of revenues, rents, and earnings derived under the provisions of this chapter, shall have the authority to accept from any public or private agency, or from any individual, grants for or in aid of the construction of any planned development, or for the payment of bonds, and to receive and accept contributions from any source, of money or property or other things of value to be held, used and applied only for the purposes for which such grants or contributions may be made.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-25; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 25, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-15. Analysis and survey by city, county or other agency of port or harbor proposed to be conveyed to state.

Any city or county or other authorized port or harbor agency for which a port or harbor commission or authority has been heretofore or may be hereafter created, and which desires state ownership of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, is hereby authorized to employ competent engineers to prepare an analysis and survey of the assets, liabilities, and operation of such

port or harbor, or any part thereof, proposed to be conveyed to the state, which survey shall include the reasonable market value of the land and/or facilities, the outstanding aggregate indebtedness, if any, the gross and net revenues accruing from such operation and such other information as may be required by the board, together with a plan for the improvement, operation, development, and expansion of such port or harbor, or such part thereof, which plan shall include the estimated cost of construction, the estimated cost of lands, properties, facilities, machinery, rights, easements, and franchises to be acquired, the estimated cost of engineering, architectural and legal expenses, and of financing charges and interest, and such other estimated expenses as may be necessary or incidental to such planned development, together with a projection of the gross and net revenues anticipated from the operation of the improved facilities, and any options, contracts, or commitments for the use of such improved facilities, and such other information as may be required by the board.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-05; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Cross References — County port authorities and development commissions, see §§ 59-9-1 et seq.

County port and harbor commissions, see §§ 59-11-1 et seq.

§ 59-5-17. Negotiation of agreement with city, county or agency for state acquisition of port or harbor.

On the receipt of an application from any city or county or other authorized port or harbor agency for state ownership of any port or harbor, or any part thereof, the board shall cause an independent determination and appraisal to be made of such analysis and survey, and the plan for the improvement, operation, development, and expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, and if the board shall find and determine that the plan for the improvement, operation, development, or expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, is practical and feasible and is in the public interest, and that such port or harbor, or any part thereof, can be operated economically under state ownership and that the revenues therefrom would be sufficient, over a period of time, to make such ownership and/or operation by the state self-liquidating, then the board in its discretion, may negotiate with such city and county or other authorized port or harbor agency on the terms of an agreement for the acquisition by the state of such port or harbor, or any part thereof. The board may modify the proposed plan for the improvement, operation, development, or expansion of such port or harbor or any part thereof, and may impose such terms and conditions as, in its discretion, it may require to protect the interest of the state, provided that if an entire port or harbor shall be conveyed to the state that all bonds theretofore issued and outstanding for the improvement of such port or harbor by any county or city, or both acting jointly, or other authorized port or harbor agency, shall be

redeemed by the issuance of bonds as herein provided or assumed in conjunction with the plan for the development of such port or harbor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-06; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-19. Approval of agreement for conveyance of port or harbor to state; terms and conditions of conveyance.

Any agreement as hereinabove provided for, reached between the board and the city or county, or other authorized port or harbor agency, shall be reduced to writing and shall set out the terms and conditions under which such port or harbor, or any part thereof, shall be conveyed to the state and shall specifically set out the minimum amount of bonds, if any, to be issued by the state for the improvement, operation, development, and expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof. When such agreement has been approved by the board, the city or county, or other authorized port or harbor agency, and the port commission, or port authority of the city or county, a conveyance of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, to the State of Mississippi, shall be executed by the city or county, or other authorized port or harbor agency, joined in by the port commission or port authority of the city or county, without monetary consideration. Such conveyance shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the board, but shall be conditioned on the issuance of bonds by the state in the minimum amount set out in such agreement for the improvement, operation, development or expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof. If such agreement shall provide that the entire port or harbor shall be conveyed to the state and shall be owned and operated by the state, then no such agreement shall become effective until approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the city or county having jurisdiction of such port or harbor voting in an election called for that purpose in the same manner as in other city or county special elections.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-06; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-21. Operation by state port authority of ports or harbors acquired by or conveyed to state.

Any port or harbor, or any part thereof, and all facilities, structures, lands or other improvements, acquired by or conveyed to the state, shall be operated by the board acting through a state port authority for such port or harbor, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter. Such state port authority shall be an agency of the state and shall be vested, in addition to the rights, powers and duties conferred hereunder, with the same jurisdiction and the same rights, powers and duties vested by law in the port commission or port authority or other authorized port or harbor agency having jurisdiction of such port or harbor under statutes in effect on the date of the conveyance of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, to the state. Such state port authority shall

consist of five (5) qualified electors of the city or county in which such port or harbor is located. The initial terms of the members of such port authority shall be staggered, one (1) member thereof, to be appointed by the governing authorities of the municipality in which such port or harbor is located or adjacent to, to serve for an initial term of one (1) year, one (1) member thereof, to be appointed by the board of supervisors of the county in which such port or harbor is located, to serve for an initial term of two (2) years, and three (3) members thereof, to be appointed by the Governor, to serve for initial terms of three (3), four (4) and five (5) years respectively, but all succeeding appointments shall be for terms of five (5) years. The members of the state port authority shall organize in the same manner authorized by law for the port commission or port authority formerly having jurisdiction over such port or harbor, or any part thereof. Members of the state port authority shall be entitled to compensation pursuant to Section 25-3-69 and travel expenses pursuant to Section 25-3-41. In its operation of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, such state port authority shall not be responsible to the city or county, or other authorized port or harbor agency, in which such port or harbor, or any part thereof, may be located, but shall be responsible solely to the board, and the board shall have the same rights and duties and the same relationship toward such state port authority as is vested by law in the county, city or other authorized port or harbor agency in its relation to the port commission or port authority formerly having jurisdiction of such port or harbor, or part thereof. Before entering upon the duties of the office, each of said members shall take and subscribe to the oath of office required by Section 268 of the Constitution of the state of Mississippi, and shall file same with the secretary of state, and shall give bond in the sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00), with a surety company or companies, authorized to do business in this state, conditioned according to law, and to be delivered to and approved by the treasurer of the state of Mississippi; the premiums on said bonds shall be paid from port funds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-07; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 7; Laws, 1984, ch. 493, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1984).

Cross References — Powers of municipal port authorities, see § 59-3-1.

Powers and duties of county port commissions, see §§ 59-7-205, 59-7-209.

Authority of certain municipalities to operate port facilities, see §§ 59-7-305, 59-7-405.

Duties of municipal port commission, see § 59-7-411.

Powers and duties of county port authority or development commission, see § 59-9-15.

§ 59-5-23. Authorization of contracts, etc., for improvement, operation, etc., of port or harbor.

Any city, county, or city and county acting jointly, or authorized port or harbor agency may enter into contracts, leases or agreements with the board upon such terms or conditions and for such purposes relating to the improvement, operation, development, and expansion of any port, harbor, or inland

waterway, or any part thereof as they deem advisable and may agree upon, and, without limiting the generalities of the foregoing, authority is hereby granted to any city, county, or city and county acting jointly, or authorized port or harbor agency to prepare and submit to the board in the manner set out in Section 59-5-15, a plan for the improvement, operation, development or expansion of such port, harbor, waterway or any part thereof. The board shall cause an independent determination and appraisal to be made of such plan, and if the board shall find and determine that such plan is practical and feasible and is in the public interest, and that the revenues to be derived therefrom will, over a period of time, be sufficient to service and retire any bonds issued to complete such planned development, then the board, in its discretion, may negotiate with such city and county or other authorized port or harbor agency on the terms of a contract or agreement for the issuance of bonds necessary to complete such planned development. The board may modify the proposed plan for the improvement, operation, development, or expansion of such port, harbor, or waterway, or any part thereof, and may impose such terms and conditions as, in its discretion, it may require to protect the interest of the state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-08; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 8; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 2; ch. 347.

§ 59-5-25. Approval of agreement for improvement, operation, etc., of port or harbor; appropriation of excess funds or levy of tax.

Any agreement reached between the board and the city or county, or city and county acting jointly, or authorized port or harbor agency shall be reduced to writing and set out the terms and conditions under which such planned development shall be completed, and shall specifically set out the maximum amount of bonds, if any, to be issued by the state for the completion of such planned development. No such agreement shall become effective until approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the city or county having jurisdiction of such port or harbor voting in an election called for that purpose in the same manner as in other city or county special elections. Any plan, agreement and contract which has been approved by the qualified electors of a county or municipality as herein provided, may be amended or supplemented to add additional projects thereto in the same manner as provided herein for the submission, modification and approval of the original plan, agreement and contract, save that instead of submitting such supplemental contract to the qualified electors of the county having jurisdiction of such port or harbor for approval, the governing body of the county or municipality shall, by the affirmative vote of two thirds ($\frac{2}{3}$) of all members of such governing body, adopt a resolution reciting the substantial terms of such supplemental contract and giving notice that such contract shall become effective on the date specified therein which shall be not less than twenty-five days from the date of the first publication of such resolution. Such resolution shall be published once a week

for at least three successive weeks in the newspapers published and of general circulation within such county or municipality. The first of such publications shall be made at least twenty-one days prior to the date set forth in said resolution as the date upon which the supplemental contract shall become effective and the last of such publications shall be made not more than seven days prior to such date. If prior to the date set forth as aforesaid there shall be filed with the clerk of the governing body of the county or municipality a petition in writing signed by twenty per cent (20%) of the qualified electors of such county or municipality requesting an election on the question of whether or not such contract shall be effective, then such contract shall not become effective unless approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the county or municipality who vote therein at an election to be ordered by the appropriate governing body for that purpose. Notice of such election shall be given and such election shall be held and conducted in like manner as approved by law with respect to the submission of bond issues in the county or municipality. If the proposition so submitted shall fail to receive approval at such election, then such contract shall not become effective. If, however, no such petition shall be so filed, or if at such election, or subsequent election, such proposition be assented to by the majority of qualified electors voting therein then such contract shall become effective on the dates set forth in the resolution. Any such contract or supplemental contract shall require that any such city, county, or city and county acting jointly, or authorized port or harbor agency shall pledge all net revenues to be derived from the planned development to the payment of principal and interest on the bonds issued for such planned development, and shall further require such agency to pay the principal and interest on such bonds, and all premiums, fees, or other charges in connection therewith as the same shall mature or become due. The proceeds of any bonds issued for such planned development shall be expended only for the purposes set out in such approved contract. To meet the obligations imposed by this section, any such city, county, or city and county acting jointly, or authorized port or harbor agency is hereby authorized to appropriate therefor any surplus funds from any source available to said city or county, or both acting jointly, or to levy a tax therefor not to exceed five mills on all taxable property in said county or city, or both. The levies made under this provision shall not be reimbursed under the Homestead Exemption Law of 1946, being Sections 27-33-1 through 27-33-65, Mississippi Code of 1972. The ownership, operation and control of such planned development shall remain vested in the city, county, or other authorized port or harbor agency in such manner as is now or may hereafter be authorized by law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-08; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 8; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 2; ch. 347.

Cross References — County bonds, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.

Municipal bonds, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq.

Revenue bonds for county and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-501 et seq.

§ 59-5-27. Bond of members of port or harbor agency.

Each member of a port or harbor agency shall give a good and sufficient bond in the amount of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office. This shall be effective only upon consummation of an agreement to issue bonds as hereinabove set forth.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-08; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 8; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 2; ch. 347.

Cross References — Bonds of public officials generally, see §§ 25-1-13 et seq.

§ 59-5-29. Increase in membership of county port authority upon issuance of bonds.

Whenever any bonds of the State of Mississippi have been issued as provided in Sections 59-5-23 and 59-5-25, and where the authorized port or harbor agency is a county port authority organized as provided by Sections 59-9-1 through 59-9-75, the membership of such county port authority shall be increased by two members, to be appointed by the governor who shall be qualified electors of the county, and whose term shall be concurrent with that of the appointing governor. One such member shall be appointed by the governor from the county at large, and the other such member shall be appointed from a municipality located on the navigable channel or waterway on which the port facilities are located, but which municipality shall not be the county seat of such county. The two additional members hereby authorized to be appointed to such county port authority shall be vested with all the rights and duties and powers as members thereof, but such appointments shall be made to such county port authority and shall continue only so long as any such state bonds shall be outstanding and unpaid. The members of such county port authority appointed by the governor under the authority of this section shall make bond and qualify as members of such port authority in the same manner provided by law for the other members of such county port authority, and as provided in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-08; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 8; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 2; ch. 347.

Editor's Note — The reference in this section to "Sections 59-9-1 through 59-9-75" probably should be to "Sections 59-9-1 through 59-9-85."

Cross References — Appointment of members of county port authority, see § 59-9-9.

§ 59-5-31. Additional powers and authority for certain port commissions and authorities; revenue bonds; tax exemptions.

Any port commission existing under the provisions of Article 3 of Chapter 7 of this title, and any other port commission or port authority now or hereafter constituted by law which has not expressly been granted such powers, may, in

addition to all powers now or hereafter vested in it by law, exercise all powers and authority granted to county port authorities or county development commissions under Sections 59-9-15 through 59-9-35, which sections are hereby incorporated herein by reference, and may in addition to such powers acquire, own, operate and maintain gas, electric, water, sewerage or other public utility systems or pipelines and easements necessary thereto. In the event that a joint agreement cannot be consummated jointly with the board as provided in this chapter, the boards of supervisors of any county, or the governing authority of any municipality, or both acting jointly, may issue revenue bonds of such county or municipality, or both, acting jointly, as provided by section 59-7-311. Such revenue bonds may be issued without an election on resolution of the board of supervisors, governing body of the municipality, or both acting jointly, and shall not be subject to any limitation as to amount, and shall not be included or computed in the statutory limitation of indebtedness of any such county or municipality.

All leases executed by such port commissions or port authorities for port, harbor, commercial or industrial improvements, and all structures and all improvements and other permanent facilities erected, installed or located by such lessees, or their successors or assignees within the limits of any port, harbor or part thereof, may be free and exempt from all state, county and municipal ad valorem taxes if so stipulated in such lease, and for such period as may be fixed in such lease, not to exceed such periods of time as are now authorized or may be hereafter authorized by law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-09; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 9; Laws, 1980, ch. 439, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1980.

Cross References — Powers of county port commissioners, see §§ 59-7-125, 59-7-205, 59-7-209.

Authority of the board of supervisors of a county to issue revenue bonds for purposes set out in this section, see § 59-9-41.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Judicial review.

In an action against the Port Authority for an alleged breach of lease, the scope of review of the Port Authority's actions was not limited and the Port Authority was not entitled to deference as the case did not

pertain to a determination of whether the Port Authority acted within its statutory authority and was, instead, an action for breach of contract. *Gulfside Casino Partnership v. Mississippi State Port Auth.*, 757 So. 2d 250 (Miss. 2000).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 59-5-31 states that leases executed by port commissions or port authorities "may be free and exempt from all state, county and municipal ad valorem taxes if so stipulated"; based on "this clear and unambiguous language", exemption from ad valorem school taxes is

allowed. *Wetzel*, Mar. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0111.

Miss. Code Section 59-5-31 does not provide any time limitation on tax exemption. *Wetzel*, Mar. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0111.

§ 59-5-33. State ports fund; joint activities or employment of personnel.

The agreement between the board and the city, county or other authorized port or harbor agency shall provide that a fair and proportionate part of the expense of the board administering this chapter, shall be considered a part of the cost of the development or operation of the planned development and such costs shall be paid into a separate state fund in the state treasury, to be known as the state ports fund. Such fund shall be used by the board for the promotion, development, construction, improvement, expansion, maintenance, advertising, and general advancement of the state harbors, ports, rivers, channels, and waterways and may be expended on requisition of the board for such purposes and such other purposes as in the opinion of the board is to the best interest of the ports, harbors, and waterways of this state. The salaries of all officers, employees, or agents of the board, performing duties required by this chapter, and all other expenses incidental to the port, harbor, or waterway operation of the board shall be fixed by the board and payable out of said fund. The board may contract with one or more state port authorities, or any city, county or other authorized port or harbor agency for any joint activity or for the joint employment of personnel with the expense of the activity or salary of such personnel to be paid by the board from operational funds provided by the contracting parties.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-11; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-35. Setting aside or leasing of lands, docks, warehouses, etc.; exemption from certain ad valorem taxes.

The board, acting jointly with the state port authority, is authorized to set aside, or lease all or portions of any lands, roads, docks, sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, or any other necessary or useful improvements constructed or acquired by it to individuals, firms, or corporations, public or private, for port, harbor, commercial or industrial purposes for a period not to exceed ninety-nine years, or to execute a conveyance of sale, except as otherwise limited by law, on such terms and conditions and with such safeguards as would best promote and protect the public interest. Any industrial lease of lands may be executed upon such terms and conditions and for such monetary rental or other consideration as may be found adequate and approved by the board in orders or resolutions authorizing the same. Any covenants and agreements of the lessee to make expenditures in determined amounts, and within such time or times, for improvements to be erected upon the land, by such lessee and to conduct thereon industrial and/or other operations in such aggregate payroll amounts and for such period of time as may be determined and defined in such lease, and to give preference in employment where practical to residents of the State of Mississippi, and to qualified residents of the city and of the county in

which such port or harbor is located, shall if included in such lease constitute and be deemed sufficient consideration for the execution of any such lease in the absence of monetary rental or other considerations; and such instrument may contain reasonable provisions giving the lessee the right to remove its or his improvements upon the termination of the lease. All leases theretofore made by any port commission, port authority, or other public agency authorized by law to execute leases for port, harbor, commercial or industrial improvements, which leases are now in effect or which may be hereafter executed by any such public agency or by the board, and all structures and all improvements and other permanent facilities erected, installed or located by such lessees or their successors or assignees within the limits of any port, harbor or part thereof, may be free and exempt from all state, county, and municipal ad valorem taxes if so stipulated in such lease, and for such period as may be fixed in such lease.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-12; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 12; Laws, 1960, ch. 342, § 3.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 59-5-35 states that leases executed by port commissions or port authorities "may be free and exempt from all state, county and municipal ad valorem taxes if so stipulated"; based on "this clear and unambiguous language", exemption from ad valorem school taxes is

allowed. Wetzel, Mar. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0111.

Miss. Code Section 59-5-35 does not provide any time limitation on tax exemption. Wetzel, Mar. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0111.

§ 59-5-37. Employment of personnel, execution of contracts, etc., for development, promotion, maintenance, etc., of ports, harbors, rivers, etc.; suits by and against state port authority; advertising and bidding requirements for contracts or purchases.

The board or State Port Authority, in the performance of its duties, may employ such personnel and make all contracts and purchases incidental to or necessary for the advancement, promotion, development, establishment, insurance, maintenance, repair, improvement and operation of any ports, harbors, rivers, channels and waterways including, if required for its protection, retirement benefits, workers' compensation insurance and other employee benefits for the benefit of any employees of the board or State Port Authority. The board or State Port Authority may establish a trade development and promotion account to pay all direct and necessary expenses for the promotion and development of the state port. The authority is granted the power to sue and be sued in its own name.

The board or State Port Authority may, in its discretion, make such contracts or purchases according to the state purchasing laws. Contracts let for any port, harbor, river, channel or waterway improvements shall be advertised as required by law for the letting of public contracts, and such contracts shall

be awarded to the lowest and best bidder who shall make bond as shall be required by the board or State Port Authority conditioned for the faithful prosecution and completion of work according to such contracts, such bond to be furnished by a corporate surety company qualified to do business in this state. Except, however, that the board may negotiate and enter into contracts with responsible lessees for the construction of facilities by lessees, such as those referred to in Section 59-5-11, and the acquisition thereof by the board upon such terms and conditions and for such amount as may be approved by the board.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 13; Laws, 1962, ch. 389; Laws, 1976, ch. 400, § 2; Laws, 1984; reenacted and amended, 1985, ch. 474, § 17; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 39; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 40; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 37; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 35; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 36; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 36; Laws, 1992, ch. 491, § 38; Laws, 1997, ch. 401, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 321, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 5, 2001.)

Cross References — Immunity of state and political subdivisions from liability and suit for torts and torts of its employees, see §§ 11-46-1 et seq.

Participation in a comprehensive plan of one or more policies of liability insurance procured and administered by the Department of Finance and Administration, see § 11-46-17.

Public contracts generally, see §§ 31-1-1 et seq.

Worker's compensation, see §§ 71-3-1 et seq.

§ 59-5-39. Acquisition of rights of way, land, etc.

For the acquiring of rights-of-way, land and property including existing easements, restrictive covenants and reversionary estates necessary for the purposes herein authorized, the board shall have the right and power to acquire the same by purchase, negotiation or condemnation, and should it elect to exercise the right of eminent domain, it may proceed in the manner provided by the general laws of the state of Mississippi for procedure by any county, municipality or corporation organized under the laws of this state, or in any other manner provided by law. The power of eminent domain shall apply not only as to all property of private persons or corporations, but also as to property already devoted to public use including leaseholds, excepting interests in property owned by levee boards, drainage districts, or other flood control agencies. However, the board shall have no authority to acquire without the consent of the owner thereof any property operated and used for port, harbor or industrial purposes or such purposes as the board is authorized to acquire and use property for, unless an actual necessity therefor be alleged and proven. The board is authorized to accept donations of lands, rights therein, monies and materials required for the maintenance or development of any port or harbor. The board may exchange any property or properties acquired under the authority of this chapter for other property or properties usable in carrying out the powers hereby conferred, and also remove from

lands needed for its purposes and reconstruct on other locations, buildings, utilities, terminals, railroads or other structures upon the payment of just compensation, if it is necessary so to do in order to carry out any of its plans for port development. The title to all land or property acquired under the authority of this chapter shall vest in the state of Mississippi. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to authorize the taking by eminent domain of any private property except for necessary public use.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-14; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 14; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 248, *eff from and after July 1, 1984*.

Cross References — Taking private property for public use, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 17.

Eminent domain, see §§ 11-27-1 *et seq.*

§ 59-5-41. State bonds; issuance, terms, and conditions; interim financing of construction projects.

The board is hereby authorized, at one (1) time or from time to time, to petition by resolution to the state bond commission for the issuance of negotiable bonds of the state of Mississippi by the state bond commission to provide funds for the purpose of paying all or any part of the cost of the acquisition of any state port, harbor, waterway or part thereof and the planned development thereof or to complete the planned development of any port, harbor, waterway or part thereof, but in no event shall the amount of such bonds issued exceed the actual cost of an approved plan for the development of any port, harbor, waterway or part thereof. The principal of and the interest on such bonds shall be payable from a special fund to be provided for that purpose in the manner hereinafter set forth. Such bonds shall bear date or dates, be in such denomination or denominations, bear interest at such rate or rates, be payable at such place or places within or without the state of Mississippi, shall mature absolutely at such time or times, be redeemable prior to maturity at such time or times and upon such terms, with or without premium, shall bear such registration privileges, and shall be substantially in such form, all as shall be determined by resolution of the state bond commission. Such bonds shall mature or otherwise be retired in annual installments beginning not more than five (5) years from date thereof and extending not more than forty (40) years from date thereof. Such bonds shall be signed by the chairman of the state bond commission, or by his facsimile signature, and the official seal of the state bond commission shall be affixed thereto, attested by the secretary of the state bond commission. The interest coupons to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of said officers. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officials herein designated to sign the bonds, who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing

such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser, or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

Any state port authority organized and existing under the provisions of this chapter, with the concurrence of the board, shall have the power to obtain loans from banking institutions authorized to do business in the state of Mississippi, for necessary interim financing pending the receipt of the proceeds from the sale of bonds, on such terms and at such interest rates as the authority, with the concurrence of the board, may deem feasible. All such interim loans shall be payable from the proceeds of the permanent obligations when same shall be sold and issued, or from the proceeds of any federal grant.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 15; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 431, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 484, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 249, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References — State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

§ 59-5-43. Negotiability of bonds; exemption from taxation.

All bonds and interest coupons issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be and are hereby declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the provisions of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code and in exercising the powers granted by this chapter, the board and/or state bond commission shall not be required to and need not comply with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Such bonds and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-16; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 16; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Cross References — General exemptions from ad valorem taxes, see §§ 27-31-1 et seq.

Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

§ 59-5-45. Manner and price of sale of bonds; interest; maturity and redemption.

The State Bond Commission shall sell such bonds at public sale or private sale, and for such price as it may determine to be for the best interest of the State of Mississippi, but no sale shall be made at a price of less than ninety-eight percent (98%) of par, plus accrued interest. However, the One Hundred Thirty Million Dollars (\$130,000,000.00) additional bonds herein authorized shall mature annually, with all maturities not longer than twenty-five (25) years, and may be sold for a price of not less than ninety-eight percent (98%) of par, plus accrued interest, to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. All bonds shall bear interest at such rate or rates not exceeding that allowed in Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972. All interest accruing on such bonds so issued shall be payable semiannually or annually.

No interest payment due on any bond shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon and supplemental coupons will not be permitted.

Notice of the public sale of any such bonds shall be published at least two (2) times, the first of which shall be made not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale, and shall be so published in one or more newspapers having a general circulation in the City of Jackson and in one or more other newspapers or financial journals with a large national circulation, to be selected by the State Bond Commission.

The State Bond Commission, when issuing any bonds under the authority of this chapter, shall provide that bonds maturing eleven (11) or more years after the date of the issuance of such bonds may, at the option of the State of Mississippi, be called in for payment and redemption at the call price named therein and accrued interest, or on the tenth anniversary of the date of issue, or on any interest payment date thereafter prior to maturity.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-17; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 17; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 4; Laws, 1974, ch. 484, § 2; Laws, 1975, ch. 456; Laws, 1976, ch. 415; Laws, 1980, ch. 530, § 4; Laws, 1982, ch. 425; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 35; Laws, 1991, ch. 397 § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 472, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1993).

Cross References — State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

§ 59-5-47. Disposition of proceeds of bonds.

The proceeds of bonds issued under authority of this chapter shall be paid into a special fund or funds in banks qualified to act as depositories for the city or county in which the port or harbor is located, allocated in such equitable manner as the board may determine and such depositories shall qualify as such by depositing bonds or other securities authorized by law to secure deposits in state depositories. The proceeds of such bonds shall be used solely for payment of the cost of the planned development and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds and shall be disbursed upon order of the board with such restrictions, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the planned development, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit which, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the purpose for which the bonds were issued, the surplus shall be paid into the fund established for the payment of the principal of and the interest on such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-18; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 18, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Cross References — Depositories for funds of local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

§ 59-5-49. Validation of bonds.

Such bonds as are authorized by this chapter may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified or required by this chapter. The bonds authorized under the authority of this chapter may, in the discretion of the state bond commission, be validated in the chancery court of Hinds County, Mississippi, in the manner and with the force and effect provided now or hereafter by Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district, and other bonds. The necessary papers for such validation proceedings shall be transmitted to the state bond attorney by the attorney general, and the required notice shall be published in a newspaper published in the City of Jackson, Mississippi, and in a newspaper of general circulation published in the city or county where the planned development is located.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-19; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 19, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Cross References — State bond attorney, see § 31-13-1.

Validation of bond issues, see §§ 31-13-3 et seq.

State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

§ 59-5-51. Payment of interest and principal on bonds; limitation on amount of bonds issued.

(1) The bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be payable from the special fund provided therefor as hereinafter set out and shall be the general obligations of the State of Mississippi and backed by the full faith and credit of the state, and if the funds supplied by the board to the State Treasurer from the sources prescribed by this chapter be insufficient to fully pay the interest on the bonds when due or to pay the principal of the bonds when due or when declared to be due as provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds, then the deficiency shall be paid by the State Treasurer from any funds in the State Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and all such bonds shall contain recitals on their face substantially covering the foregoing provisions of this section.

The amount of bonds issued for the acquisition and planned development of any one (1) state port, harbor or waterway shall not exceed the sum of Eighty Million Dollars (\$80,000,000.00) outstanding at any one (1) time, nor shall any additional bonds be issued to complete the planned development of any other port, harbor or waterway to exceed in the aggregate the sum of Eighty Million Dollars (\$80,000,000.00), outstanding at any one (1) time. However, such limitation on the amount of bonds that may be issued shall not apply to any additional bonds issued in connection with the planned development of any

other port, harbor or waterway not to exceed in the aggregate the sum of One Hundred Thirty Million Dollars (\$130,000,000.00) notwithstanding the provisions of Section 59-5-47, nor any other provisions to the contrary. The entire proceeds of the One Hundred Thirty Million Dollars (\$130,000,000.00) shall be used solely for the construction or acquisition of ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, dredges, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats or any other facilities required or incidental to the construction, outfitting, dry docking or repair of ships or vessels. However, no such additional bonds shall be issued except where such facility or facilities are to be leased or sold in whole or in part for industrial purposes and the annual payments made under the lease contract and/or proceeds of sale shall be sufficient to pay the interest on the bonds when due and to pay the principal of the bonds at or prior to maturity as provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds to finance such project, and all costs in connection therewith. Such lease shall have been first fully guaranteed by such person, firm or corporation, if any, having control, ownership or management of the lessee. Such lease and/or sale contract and the terms and conditions thereof, shall require the joint and several approval of the board of supervisors of the county in which the port is located, the port authority and the Department of Economic and Community Development. No borrowing under this section shall be finalized prior to ten (10) days after written notice of intent to borrow is furnished to the Legislative Budget Office.

(2) The full five-mill ad valorem levy provided for by this chapter shall be levied and collected as needed for the retirement of any bonds issued under this chapter, and all rents, emoluments and charges made and collected by the port authority, less maintenance cost and incidental expenses, shall be covered in a fund to be used to retire all bonds issued under this chapter; and also all receipts from the two-mill state ad valorem levy, disbursed to such city, county or other port or harbor agency, shall be used to service such bonds.

(3) In the event any city, county or other port, or harbor agency, however designated, shall pay to the board an amount insufficient to meet all bond and interest payments when due on their respective obligations, then any such delinquency paid by the state shall be deducted from future reimbursements for homestead exemptions under the provisions of Sections 27-33-1 through 27-33-65 from that portion reimbursed to the general county fund. Should the amount deducted from the homestead exemption reimbursement be insufficient to meet the delinquency, then the remainder of such delinquency shall be deducted from any distributions made under the provisions of Section 27-5-101 for gasoline taxes.

(4) In the event all of the above-listed sources prove inadequate to pay the principal and interest on the bonds issued and paid for by the State of Mississippi under this chapter, then such city, county or other port or harbor agency shall levy and collect an additional ad valorem levy of not more than five (5) mills per year on all the taxable property of such city, county or other port or harbor agency, which funds so secured shall be applied toward such obligations to the State of Mississippi.

(5) The requirements of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this section shall not be applicable to the additional bonds in the aggregate amount of One Hundred Thirty Million Dollars (\$130,000,000.00) authorized in subsection (1) of this section for the construction or acquisition of ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, dredges, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats or any other facilities required or incidental to the construction, outfitting, dry docking or repair of ships or vessels; provided, such county shall, at the time of issuance of any of such bonds, convey to the State of Mississippi all of its right, title and interest in and to all of the land and above-mentioned shipbuilding facilities, together with the county's right, title and interest in and to any leases, deeds, contracts or other customary business instruments which have been entered into in connection with the land and shipbuilding facilities, but such conveyance or conveyances shall be subject to the terms and provisions of such leases, deeds, contracts or other customary business instruments entered into in connection therewith. The right, title and interest of the State of Mississippi in the land and shipbuilding facilities shall be under the supervision and control of the Department of Economic and Community Development.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-20; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 20; Laws, 1960, ch. 404; Laws, 1964, ch. 425; Laws, 1966, ch. 447, § 1, ch. 448, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 5; Laws, 1968, ch. 432, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 530, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 250; Laws, 1990, ch. 570, § 14; Laws, 1995, ch. 471, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1995).

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, ch. 570, § 20, effective July 1, 1990, provides as follows:

“(1) Any attorney's fees paid as the result of the issuance of bonds under this act shall be in compliance with the limits on attorney's fees for bond issues as adopted by the State Bond Commission. Attorney's fees paid as the result of the issuance of bonds under this act shall be subject to negotiation but in no event shall exceed the limits established by the State Bond Commission. A detailed accounting of all expenses incurred by all persons, firms, corporations, associations or other organizations involved in such bond issues shall be submitted to the State Bond Commission within ninety (90) days after the issuance of such bonds and shall be a matter of public record.

“(2) No member of the Legislature, elected official or appointed official, or any partner or associate of any member of the Legislature, elected official or appointed official, shall derive any income from the issuance of any bonds or the disposition of any property under this act contrary to the provisions of Section 109, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, or Article 3, Chapter 4, Title 25, Mississippi Code of 1972.

“(3) In connection with the issuance and sale of bonds authorized under this act, the State Bond Commission shall select a bond attorney or attorneys who are listed in the “Directory of Municipal Bond Dealers of the United States” and who are members in good standing of the Mississippi State Bar Association and licensed to practice law in the State of Mississippi; however, upon a finding by the commission spread on its official minutes that the public interest will best be served thereby, the commission may select any bond attorney or attorneys listed in the ‘Directory of Municipal Bond Dealers of the United States.’”

Cross References — Joint legislative budget committee and legislative budget office generally, see §§ 27-103-101 et seq.

§ 59-5-53. Withdrawals of bond proceeds from special fund.

The funds which are transferred from the sale of bonds under this chapter to the special fund in the qualified depositories set up for each separate port, harbor, or part thereof may be withdrawn only in the following manner: said funds shall be paid by such qualified depositories upon warrants issued by the state auditor of public accounts, which warrants shall be issued upon requisition of the board or state port authority. All expenditures ordered by the board or state port authority shall be entered upon their minutes, and the board and each state port authority shall submit a full report of their work and all the transactions carried on by them, and a complete statement of all their revenues and expenditures to the legislature at each regular session of the legislature.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-28; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

Cross References — State depositories, see §§ 27-105-1 et seq.

Depositories for local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

§ 59-5-55. Use of net revenues, rents, and earnings from state owned ports.

All net revenues, rents, and earnings from the operation or maintenance of any state owned port or harbor, or any part thereof, shall be set aside by the board exclusively for the payment of any bonds issued by the state for such port or harbor, or any part thereof, and shall not be commingled with the funds of any other state port or harbor, or any part thereof, but shall be expended by the board exclusively for the payment of such bonds as provided in Section 59-5-51, and if no such bonds shall be outstanding, then by the state port authority for the improvement, operation, advancement, development, maintenance and advertising of the port to which such funds have accrued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-10; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-57. Payment of county's share of state ad valorem taxes for harbor purposes to state port authority.

In the event of state ownership of any port or harbor, in its entirety, in any county which may now or hereafter be authorized by law to receive a portion of the state ad valorem tax for port or harbor purposes, such portion of the state ad valorem tax shall be paid to the state port authority and shall be used

for the improvement, development, operation and expansion of such port under the provision of this chapter, and the port fund of such county to which such ad valorem tax is paid shall be subject to the requisition of the state port authority.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-10; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

§ 59-5-59. Allocation of revenues, rents and earnings to payment of bonds; sinking fund.

The net revenues, rents, and earnings derived from any planned development or the net revenues, rents, and earnings received by the board produced by a state port, harbor, or part thereof, for which bonds have been issued, shall be pledged and allocated by the board to the payment of the principal of and interest on the bonds issued for such planned development as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide, and such pledge may include funds received from one or more or all sources available to such planned development and shall be set aside at regular intervals into a sinking fund, which sinking fund shall be pledged to and charged with the payment of:

- (a) The interest upon such bonds as such interest shall accrue.
- (b) The principal of the bonds when due, or when declared to be due, as prescribed by the resolution authorizing the bonds.
- (c) The necessary charges of the paying agent or paying agents for paying principal and interest of and on such bonds.
- (d) Any premium on bonds retired by call or purchase as may be provided therein.
- (e) Net revenues shall be defined in the agreement between the board and the city or county, or other authorized port or harbor agency, as provided in Sections 59-5-17 and 59-5-19.

The use and disposition of such sinking fund shall be subject to such regulations as may be provided in the resolution authorizing any issue of bonds, but except as may otherwise be provided in such resolution such sinking fund shall be a fund for the benefit of all bonds issued under such resolution, without distinction or priority of one over the other. Subject to the provisions of the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds, surplus moneys in the sinking fund may be applied to the purchase or redemption of any of such bonds, and any such bonds so purchased or redeemed shall forthwith be cancelled and shall not again be issued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7464-21; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 21; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 7, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Cross References — Special municipal tax to provide sinking fund, see § 59-3-5.
 Sinking fund for municipal port purposes, see § 59-7-13.
 Power of municipality to provide for sinking fund, see § 59-7-427.
 Sinking fund for joint county and municipal harbor and port facilities, see § 59-9-59.

§ 59-5-61. Refunding bonds.

The board is authorized to provide by resolution for the issuance of refunding bonds by the state bond commission for the purpose of refunding any bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter and then outstanding, together with interest thereon to the date of such refunding bonds, and redemption premium thereon, if any. The issuance of such refunding bonds, the maturity, and all other details thereof, the rights of the holders thereof and the duties of the board and state port authority in respect thereto shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter in so far as the same may be applicable.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-22; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 22, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Cross References — Refunding bonds generally, see §§ 31-15-1 et seq.

§ 59-5-63. Bonds as legal investments and securities for deposits of public funds.

All bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be legal investments for trustees and other fiduciaries, and for savings banks, trust companies, the board of trustees of the public employees' retirement system, and insurance companies organized under the laws of the State of Mississippi, and such bonds shall be legal securities which may be deposited with and shall be received by all public officers and bodies of this state and all municipalities and political subdivisions for the purpose of securing the deposit of public funds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-23; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 23, eff from and after passage (approved April 28, 1958).

Cross References — Investment of excess social security funds, see § 25-11-121.

Investments by domestic insurance companies, see §§ 83-19-51, 83-19-53.

Investment of trust funds held by fiduciaries, see §§ 91-13-1 et seq.

Investments by guardians, see § 93-13-57.

§ 59-5-65. Representation of Sate Bond Commission by Attorney General; payment of costs of sale, issuance and delivery of bonds.

The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall represent the State Bond Commission in issuing, selling and validating bonds herein provided for. The State Bond Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to pay the costs that are incident to the sale, issuance and delivery of the bonds herein provided for, and such costs may be paid for out of the proceeds derived from the sale of such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-27; Laws, 1958, ch. 365, § 27; Laws, 1991, ch. 397 § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1991).

Cross References — Attorney general, see §§ 7-5-1 et seq.
State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

§ 59-5-67. Annual audit of state port authorities.

The books and accounts of all state port authorities shall be audited at the end of each fiscal year by the state auditor. A copy of the audit shall be filed with the governor, the state auditor, the state fiscal management board, legislative budget office and the Mississippi Board of Economic Development, and a copy shall be kept on file in the office of the particular state port authority so audited.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-32; Laws, 1970, ch. 304, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 251, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

Section 27-104-1 provides that the term "Fiscal Management Board" shall mean the "Department of Finance and Administration".

Section 57-1-2 provides that the term "Board of Economic Development" shall mean the "Mississippi Development Authority".

§ 59-5-69. Annual budget of state port authorities.

Each state port shall adopt a complete, detailed and itemized budget for each fiscal year and all expenditures shall be made only pursuant to appropriation approved by the legislature and as provided by law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7564-33; Laws, 1970, ch. 304, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 252, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

CHAPTER 6

Compact for Development of Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal

SEC.

- 59-6-1. "Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal" defined.
- 59-6-3. Authorization of compact.
- 59-6-5. Basic form of compact.
- 59-6-7. Grant of powers; authority and duties of state officers; appointment of members of authority.

§ 59-6-1. "Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal" defined.

For the purpose of this chapter, the term "Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal" means a structure, series of structures, or facility of any type located on the continental shelf off the coast designed to accommodate deep draft vessels whose draft is greater than the depths of the present United States' harbors and waterways commonly used by oceangoing traffic, and includes all functionally-related structures and facilities which are necessary or useful to the operation of the terminal whether on land or seaward of the main structure or facility.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 379, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1973).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Practice References. USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie). CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

§ 59-6-3. Authorization of compact.

The governor, on behalf of this state, is hereby authorized to execute a compact, in substantially the form as provided hereinafter, with the State of Alabama.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 379, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1973).

§ 59-6-5. Basic form of compact.

The basic form of the compact shall be as follows:

ARTICLE I. The purpose of this compact is to promote the development of a deep draft harbor and terminal to be located on the continental shelf of the United States, in the Gulf of Mexico, and to establish a joint interstate authority to assist in this effort.

ARTICLE II. This compact shall become effective immediately upon ratification by the legislature of each state. Any state not mentioned in this section which is contiguous with any member state may become a party to this compact, subject to approval by the legislature of each of the member states.

ARTICLE III. The states which are parties to this compact (hereinafter referred to as "party states") do hereby establish and create a joint agency which shall be known as the Gulf Coast Superport Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Authority"). The membership of which authority shall consist of the governor of each party state and five (5) other citizens of each party state, to be appointed by the governor thereof. Each appointive member of the authority shall be a citizen of that state who is interested in the promotion and development of deep draft harbor and terminals, and in the economic and industrial development of the south. The appointive members of the authority shall serve for terms of four (4) years each. Vacancies on the authority shall be filled by appointment by the governor for the unexpired portion of the term. The members of the authority shall not be compensated, but each shall be entitled to actual expenses incurred in attending meetings, or incurred otherwise in the performance of his duties as a member of the authority. The members of the authority shall hold regular quarterly meetings and such special meetings as its business may require. They shall choose annually a chairman and vice-chairman from among their members, and the chairmanship shall rotate each year among the party states in order of their acceptance of this compact. The secretary of the authority (hereinafter provided for) shall notify each member in writing of all meetings of the authority in such a manner and under such rules and regulations as the authority may prescribe. The authority shall adopt rules and regulations for the transaction of its business; and the secretary shall keep a record of all its business and shall furnish a copy thereof to each member of the authority. It shall be the duty of the authority, in general, to promote, encourage, and coordinate the efforts of the party states to secure the development of a Gulf Coast deep draft harbor and terminal. Toward this end, the authority shall have power to hold hearings; to conduct studies and surveys of all problems, benefits, and other matters associated with the development of a Gulf Coast deep draft harbor and terminal, and to make reports thereon; to acquire, by gift or otherwise, and hold and dispose of such money and property as may be provided for the proper performance of their function; to cooperate with other public or private groups, whether local, state, regional, or national, having an interest in the development of deep draft harbors and terminals; to formulate and execute plans and policies for emphasizing the purpose of this compact before the Congress of the United States and other appropriate offices and agencies of the United States; and to exercise such other powers as may be appropriate to enable it to accomplish its functions and duties in connection with the development of a deep draft harbor and terminal and to carry out the purposes of this compact.

ARTICLE IV. The authority shall appoint an executive secretary, who shall be the compact administrator. His term of office shall be at the pleasure of the authority and shall receive such compensation as the authority shall prescribe. He shall maintain custody of the authority's books, records, and papers, which he shall keep at the office of the authority, and he shall perform all functions and duties, and exercise all powers and authorities, that may be delegated to him by the authority.

ARTICLE V. Each party state agrees that, when authorized by its legislature, it will from time to time make available and pay over to the authority such funds as may be required for the establishment and operation of the authority. The contribution of each party state shall be in the proportion that its population bears to the total population of the states which are parties hereto, as shown by the most recent official report of the United States Bureau of the Census, or upon such other basis as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VI. Nothing in this compact shall be construed so as to conflict with any existing statute, or to limit the powers of any party state, or to repeal or prevent legislation, or to authorize or permit curtailment or diminution of any other harbor or terminal project, or to affect any existing or future cooperative arrangement or relationship between any federal agency or a party state.

ARTICLE VII. This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each party state until the legislature or governor of each or either state takes action to withdraw therefrom; provided that such withdrawal shall not become effective until six (6) months after the date of the action taken by the legislature or governor. Notice of such action shall be given to the other party state or states by the secretary of state of the party state which takes such action.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 379, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1973).

Comparable Laws from other States — Code of Ala. §§ 33-9-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Practice References. USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie). CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

§ 59-6-7. Grant of powers; authority and duties of state officers; appointment of members of authority.

There is hereby granted to the governor, to the members of the Gulf Coast Superport Development Authority for Mississippi and to the compact administrator all the powers provided for in said compact and in this chapter. All officers of the State of Mississippi are hereby authorized and directed to do all things falling within their respective jurisdictions which are necessary or incidental to carrying out the purpose of said compact. The members of the authority appointed by the governor of the State of Mississippi under the provisions of Article III of the compact shall be with the advice and consent of the senate.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 379, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1973).

CHAPTER 7

County and Municipal Harbors

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ARTICLE 1.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

SEC.

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§ 59-7-1. Payment of portion of state ad valorem taxes collected by certain counties into county depository.

In all counties in the State of Mississippi in which there is located a harbor or port of entry where commodities are exported to foreign nations, and where there is maintained a channel and/or harbor or port to a depth of not less than twenty feet, the tax collector of said county shall pay into the county depository, the amount of two mills of all ad valorem taxes due by said county to the State of Mississippi which is collected by the tax collector of said county or which may be collected by any other lawful taxing agency of such county and state for such county.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7565; Laws, 1932, ch. 269; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 11, eff from and after January 1, 1972.

Cross References — Depositories for funds of local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

Development of county harbor facilities by bridge and park commissions, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

State ports and harbors, see §§ 59-5-1 et seq.

Bond provisions which supersede the bond provisions of this article, see § 59-7-301.

Counties authorized to withhold state tax for port funds, see § 59-7-303.

Authority of certain counties to levy tax for port fund, see § 59-7-403.

County port authorities or development commissions, see §§ 59-9-1 et seq.

County port and harbor commissions, see §§ 59-11-1 et seq.

Harbor improvements by coast counties, see §§ 59-13-1 et seq.

Small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 **Am. Jur.** 2d, **Shipping** **CJS.** 65 **C.J.S.**, **Navigable Waters** § 34.
§§ 83-85.

§ 59-7-3. Port fund.

The board of supervisors of the county or counties designated in section 59-7-1 shall place all money so retained and collected in the county depository in the county to the credit of a fund which shall be known as a port fund, and such fund so deposited shall be used only for the maintenance, construction, promotion, advertising and general advancement of the port of entry so located in said county, and the fund shall be expended by the board of supervisors of the county for the maintenance, construction, promotion, advertisement, and general advancement of any port or ports of entry in said county or counties and the payment of any outstanding bonds and interest thereon heretofore or hereafter issued for port purposes by any municipality in which said port or ports are located as hereinafter provided.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7566; Laws, 1932, ch. 269; Laws, 1935, ch. 66.

§ 59-7-5. Authorization of municipal harbor improvements.

The authorities of any municipality in which there is situated and located, in whole or in part, a port of entry through which commodities are imported and exported to foreign nations, which maintains a channel and/or harbor to a depth of not less than twenty feet, are hereby given the authority to engage in, through the agency hereinafter provided and designated and such other agencies as hereinafter may be provided by law, work of internal improvement, or promoting, developing, constructing, maintaining, and operating harbors or seaports within the state and its jurisdiction, acting through the commission hereinafter provided for, shall have the power to acquire, purchase, install, lease, construct, own, hold, maintain, equip, use, control and operate at seaports, wharves, piers, docks, quays, grain elevators, cotton compresses, warehouses and other water and rail terminals and other structures, and facilities needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce including the dredging of approaches thereto, provided that such work on improvements and facilities shall always be and remain under the management and control of said municipality through the governing agency herein-

after provided and designated, or other such governing agency or agencies as hereinafter may be provided by law. The entire cost of the said municipality of engaging in such work or development shall not exceed the sum of one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7567; Laws, 1932, ch. 269.

Cross References — Authority of municipalities to operate port facilities, see § 59-7-305.

§ 59-7-7. Operation of improvements; disposition of revenues; annual report.

All improvements, constructed by and under the provisions of this article, shall be operated under the control of a port commission as provided in Chapter 1 of this title. All revenue created or collected from the use of said docks, harbors and facilities of whatsoever nature shall be paid into the city treasury of said port of entry to be used exclusively for the advancement, development and advertising of said port in whatsoever method or manner said port commissioners shall see fit, and all revenue provided for in this article, either by levy or collection from said docks and harbor facilities may be paid to the retirement of any bonds heretofore issued or hereafter issued by any such municipality for wharf construction or other port purposes, regardless of the time of issuance of such bonds. Said port commissioners of said port of entry shall make an annual report to the governor of the State of Mississippi, to the state legislature, to the board of supervisors, and to the municipal governing authorities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7568; Laws, 1932, ch. 269; Laws, 1935, ch. 66; Laws, 1970, ch. 406, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1970.

Cross References — Creation of port commission, see § 59-1-1.
Operation of port facilities by port commission, see § 59-7-309.

§ 59-7-9. Expenditure of funds arising under article; bonds generally.

All monies accruing by virtue of this article, either through revenues, tariffs, or bonds, or through other sources, shall be expended at the direction of the port commission appointed for any port of entry, as designated herein, and any bond issue hereunder by any municipality, coming under the provisions of this article, shall be exclusive of any and all other bonds issued by said municipality, and the same shall not be limited as now provided by law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7569; Laws, 1932, ch. 269.

§ 59-7-11. Authorization for issuance of bonds generally.

The authorities of any municipality in which there is situated and located in whole or in part a port of entry through which commodities are imported or

exported are hereby given authority to issue bonds or other obligations to construct all needful improvement or improvements in harbors within their corporate limits, and including the deepening of any part of said harbor or extending, enlarging and adding to the same by dredging of any part of said harbor or extending inland, to acquire, construct, repair and improve public wharves and docks of said municipality in connection with said harbor; to own, construct, lease and maintain sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses and other works of public improvement, including roadways or rail trackage necessary or useful for such port, harbor and/or docks and wharf purposes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7570; Laws, 1932, ch. 269.

Cross References — Uniform system for issuance of negotiable notes or certificates of indebtedness, see § 17-21-51.

Details of bonds, see §§ 31-21-5 and 59-7-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

§ 59-7-13. Details of bonds; supplemental powers and authorizations for issuance of bonds.

All of the bonds issued pursuant to the authority set forth in Section 59-7-11 shall be lithographed or engraved, and printed in two (2) or more colors, to prevent counterfeiting, and shall be in sums not less than one hundred dollars (\$100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00) each, and shall be registered as issued, be numbered in a regular series from one (1) upward, be signed by the mayor and countersigned by the clerk who shall impress the municipal seal upon each bond as it is issued; and every bond shall specify on its face the purpose for which it was issued; and the total amount authorized to be issued and each shall be payable to bearer. All such monies above referred to, as retained by the boards of supervisors, shall first be appropriated by the boards of supervisors for the payment of interest and sinking fund for any and all bonds issued by the municipality for port purposes and the balance, if any, shall be expended by the boards of supervisors by and under the direction and advice of the port commission of said municipality. However, in case there is not sufficient money to pay the interest and sinking funds on said bonds the corporate authorities of municipalities issuing said bonds shall levy annually a special levy to be used exclusively in paying the interest on each bond and bonds maturing within the year providing a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds issued. However, such tax levy shall not be made by municipalities to pay bonds, nor the interest thereon, issued under article 7 of this chapter.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, bonds referred to hereinabove may be issued pursuant to the supplemental powers and authorizations conferred by the provisions of the Registered Bond Act, being Sections 31-21-1 through 31-21-7.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7571; Laws, 1932, ch. 269; Laws, 1935, ch. 66; Laws, 1983, ch. 494, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved April 11, 1983).

Cross References — Details of certain municipal or county bonds for harbor purposes, see § 59-7-311.

Power of municipality to establish sinking fund, see § 59-7-427.

Sinking fund for joint county and municipal bond issue, see § 59-9-59.

§ 59-7-15. Conduct of bond issue election generally.

Before issuing the bonds authorized by Section 59-7-11, the corporate authorities shall by resolution spread upon the minutes, declare their intention of issuing said bonds, fixing in said resolution the maximum amount thereof, and the purpose for which they are issued and where an election is required shall fix in such resolution a date upon which an election shall be held in said municipality, of which not less than three weeks notice shall be given by the clerk by a notice published in a newspaper published in said municipality once a week for three weeks preceding said election at three public places in said municipality. Such election shall be held as far as practicable, as other elections are held in municipalities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7572; Laws, 1932, ch. 269.

Cross References — Municipal elections generally, see Miss Const § 245.

Details of issuance of bonds approved by election required by this section, see § 59-7-19.

§ 59-7-17. Qualifications of electors; form and marking of ballots; issuance of bonds without election.

At an election required by Section 59-7-15, all qualified electors of said municipality may vote, and the ballots used shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the amount and purpose of the proposed bond issue and the words, "For the bond issue", and the words, "Against the bond issue", and the voter shall vote by placing a cross (X) opposite his choice of the proposition. In cities of less than twelve thousand inhabitants, when the amount to be issued is not more than thirty thousand dollars the corporate authorities shall publish the resolution in some newspaper published in the county for three full consecutive weeks as herein provided, declaring their intention to issue said bonds, giving the day and date upon which said bonds are to be issued and if twenty per cent of the qualified electors of the municipality file a written protest against the issuance of said bonds, on or before said date, then an election shall be had as herein provided, and if no protest shall be filed, said bonds shall be issued without an election.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7573; Laws, 1932, ch. 269.

Cross References — Details of bonds issued pursuant to the authority of this section, see § 59-7-19.

§ 59-7-19. Issuance of bonds; maturities, interest, and execution; payment of principal and interest on bonds.

Should the election provided for in Sections 59-7-15 and 59-7-17 result in favor of the issuance of the bonds, the corporate authorities may issue said bonds, either in whole or in part within one (1) year after the date of such election or within (1) year after final favorable determination of any litigation affecting such bonds, as may be deemed best, and should the bonds be issued by the municipalities without an election therefor as provided. All bonds shall mature annually, with all maturities not longer than twenty (20) years, with not less than one-fiftieth ($\frac{1}{50}$) of the total issue to mature each year during the first five (5) years of the life of said bonds, and not less than one-twenty-fifth ($\frac{1}{25}$) of the said total issue to mature annually during the succeeding ten-year period of the life of said bonds, and the remainder to be divided into approximately equal payments, one (1) payment to mature during each year of the remaining life of the bonds. Said bonds shall not bear a greater rate of interest than that allowed in Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972, payable semiannually, the denomination and form and place of payment to be fixed in the ordinance of the corporate authorities issuing said bonds, and they shall be prepared and signed by the mayor and clerk of said municipality with the seal of the municipality affixed thereto, but the coupons may only bear a facsimile signature of such mayor and clerk. Such bonds when issued, shall constitute a lien on all the taxable property in such municipality and county and the corporate authorities shall annually levy a special tax on all such property sufficient to pay the principal and interest of such bonds as the same falls due, if there not be sufficient funds provided herein.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7574; Laws, 1932, ch. 269; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 15; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 28; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 36, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1983).

Cross References — Powers conferred in connection with issuance of bonds, see § 31-21-5.

Supplemental powers and authorities, see § 59-7-13.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

§ 59-7-21. Disposition of proceeds from bonds; penalty for diversion; guarantee of payment.

The proceeds of any bonds issued under the authority of this article shall be placed in the municipal treasury or depository, if there be one, as a special fund and shall be used for no other purpose than the purpose set forth in the original resolution of the corporate authorities of such municipality, and any officer diverting or assisting to divert any such funds to any other purpose than the purpose originally set forth in said resolution of the corporate authorities of said municipality shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable accordingly, and shall be liable both personally and on his official bond for such

diversion. Nothing in this article shall be construed as a guarantee on the part of the State of Mississippi to pay the interest or principal on any bonds issued under this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7575; Laws, 1932, ch. 269.

Cross References — Depositories for local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq. Diversion of bond proceeds for county port fund, see § 59-7-121.

ARTICLE 3.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS.

SEC.

- 59-7-101. Nature and application of article.
- 59-7-103. Port fund; procedure for bringing county within provisions of article.
- 59-7-105. Issuance of bonds by board of supervisors.
- 59-7-107. Details of bonds; supplemental powers and authorizations as to bond issues.
- 59-7-109. Maturities of bonds; interest.
- 59-7-111. Levy of special tax for payment of principal and interest on bonds; port bonds interest and sinking fund.
- 59-7-113. Resolution of intention to issue bonds; bond issue election generally.
- 59-7-115. Notice of election on bond issue.
- 59-7-117. Conduct of election on issue of bonds; qualifications of electors; form and marking of ballots.
- 59-7-119. Duties of board of supervisors as to elections.
- 59-7-121. Disposition of proceeds of bond issues; penalties for diversion.
- 59-7-123. Transfer of proceeds of bond issue to port bonds interest and sinking fund.
- 59-7-125. Port commission; composition, dissolution, oath, bond, terms and quorum.
- 59-7-127. Meetings; officers.
- 59-7-129. Powers and duties of commission generally.
- 59-7-131. Recommendations by commission as to expenditure of funds.

§ 59-7-101. Nature and application of article.

This article is supplementary and in addition to Article 1 of this chapter, and shall not apply to any county or counties of the state already receiving two mills of the state ad valorem taxes for port or harbor purposes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-16; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 16.

Cross References — Supplemental provisions applying to counties in which a flood control project has been authorized, see §§ 59-7-201 et seq.

Revenue bonds for port and harbor improvements issued by counties complying with this article, see §§ 59-7-501 et seq.

§ 59-7-103. Port fund; procedure for bringing county within provisions of article.

(1) In order to provide for the improvement, promotion, development, construction, maintenance and operation of harbors or ports in counties having

or hereafter providing harbors or ports where wharf or terminal or other facilities exist for the handling of inbound or outbound waterborne cargo moving in interstate or foreign commerce and where there is maintained a channel, harbor or port with a depth of not less than nine (9) feet, there shall be and there is hereby created in each such county electing to exercise the provisions of this article a special fund to be known as the "port fund," into which payments shall be made as follows:

(a) The tax collector of each such county electing to come under this article shall deduct from all state ad valorem taxes collected by him a sum equal to the avails of a levy of two (2) mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of taxable property within such county upon which state ad valorem taxes are levied and collected. The amount so deducted shall be set aside by the tax collector and shall by him be paid into the said port fund of such county. Such payments shall be continued as long as there remains unpaid and outstanding any bonded indebtedness created by the board of supervisors of such county as hereinafter provided.

(b) The board of supervisors of each such county electing to exercise the provisions of this article shall pay or cause to be paid into the aforesaid port fund a sum equal to one-fourth ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the sum paid into said fund under subsection (a) above and such payments shall be continued as long as there remains unpaid and outstanding any bonded indebtedness created by such board of supervisors as hereinafter provided. Any such board of supervisors shall provide the sum herein required either by appropriation from any available funds of the county or by the levy, in addition to all other county taxes, of a tax of not more than two (2) mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of taxable property within such county upon which taxes for the general county fund are levied and collected. In case of a special tax levy as herein authorized, the tax collector of each such county shall set aside the avails of such levy and shall pay the same directly into the port fund of such county.

(c) The port commission hereinafter provided for shall pay into the port fund all of the revenues of whatsoever nature which may be derived from or through the use of the harbor, port, wharf or terminal facilities under its jurisdiction as hereinafter provided.

(2) In order to come within the provisions of this article, the board of supervisors of any such county shall, by appropriate resolution spread upon its minutes, declare its intention so to do and shall annually provide for the necessary matching county funds. A certified copy of such resolution shall be filed with the tax collector of such county and shall constitute his authority to set aside the taxes hereinabove referred to and to pay the same into the aforesaid port fund.

Provided further, that any county in the state of Mississippi through which a river or other stream flows, and which stream is classed as navigable and maintained as such by any agency of the federal government, and wherein harbors, wharves, ports, terminals or other facilities exist or are proposed or established hereafter for the handling of inbound or outbound waterborne

cargo moving in interstate or foreign commerce, and where there is maintained a channel, harbor or port of such depth necessary for said purposes, then in such event such county may come under the provisions of this article if and when its application to come under the provisions of this article is approved by the Mississippi Board of Economic Development, which board shall adjudicate and determine the feasibility of said project so applied for and whether or not it is economically feasible. Certified copies of the order of said board shall be filed with the auditor of public accounts and the tax collector of such county affected.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-01; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 1; Laws, 1958, ch. 583; Laws, 1962, ch. 390; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 12; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 253, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section 57-1-2 provides that the term “Board of Economic Development” shall mean the “Department of Economic and Community Development”.

Cross References — Resolution declaring intention to issue bonds generally, see § 19-9-11.

County tax collectors, see §§ 27-1-1 et seq.

State ad valorem taxes generally, see §§ 27-31-1 et seq.

Exemption from ad valorem taxes of certain leases executed by port commissions, see § 59-5-31.

Use of ad valorem state taxes for port fund, see § 59-7-1.

Bond issue election, see § 59-7-113.

Authority of counties to withhold state tax for port fund, see § 59-7-303.

Authority of counties complying with this article to issue revenue bonds for port and harbor improvement, see § 59-7-501.

Right of county to receive state ad valorem tax for port improvement, see § 59-11-7.

§ 59-7-105. Issuance of bonds by board of supervisors.

To provide additional or supplemental funds for the aforesaid purposes, and in connection therewith to acquire and develop water, air and rail terminals, rail lines, and such other structures, facilities, lands, property or rights therein needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, and land for industrial operations, including the establishment and development of industrial parks, as provided in Section 59-9-17 and related sections, the board of supervisors of any such county may issue bonds of such county in an amount not exceeding the principal sum of eleven million dollars (\$11,000,000.00). No county shall issue bonds under the provisions of this article which will result in outstanding bonded indebtedness incurred under the provisions of this article in excess of eight million dollars (\$8,000,000.00) unless and until the question of the issuance of such bonds shall have been submitted to and approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the county voting in an election called and held for the purpose of considering whether or not such bonds should be issued. The first six million dollars (\$6,000,000.00) in

aggregate original principal amount of bonds issued under authority of this article shall not be included in computing any present or future debt limit of such county under any present or future law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-02; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 2; Laws, 1960, ch. 205; Laws, 1962, ch. 391; Laws, 1964, ch. 426; Laws, 1974, ch. 445; Laws, 1978, ch. 411, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 324, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 359; Laws, 1984, ch. 423, eff from and after passage (approved April 23, 1984).

Cross References — County bonds, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.

County bond elections generally, see §§ 19-9-11 through 19-9-17.

Details of bonds, see §§ 31-21-5 and 59-7-107.

Maturities and interest rates of bonds issued under authority of this section, see § 59-7-109.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

15 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 214:17-214:19.

§ 59-7-107. Details of bonds; supplemental powers and authorizations as to bond issues.

All bonds authorized by Section 59-7-105 shall be negotiable instruments within the meaning of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, shall be lithographed or engraved, and printed in two (2) or more colors, to prevent counterfeiting, shall be registered as issued, shall be numbered in a regular series from one (1) upward, and each bond shall specify on its face the purpose for which it was issued and the total amount authorized to be issued, shall be payable to bearer, and the interest to accrue thereon shall be evidenced by proper coupons to be attached thereto. Such bonds shall be executed by the manual of facsimile signature of the president of the board of supervisors, or the vice president in the absence or disability of the president, and countersigned by the manual of facsimile signature of the clerk thereof, with the official seal of the county affixed thereto. At least one (1) signature on each bond shall be a manual signature, as specified in the issuing resolution. The coupons may bear only the facsimile signatures of such president, or vice president and clerk. All such bonds shall be sold at public sale as provided by law, and no such bonds shall be issued and sold for less than par and accrued interest, and not more than one (1) series of interest coupons shall be attached to any such bonds. All interest accruing on such bonds shall be payable semiannually, except that the first interest coupon attached to any such bond may represent interest for any period not exceeding one (1) year.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, bonds referred to hereinabove may be issued pursuant to the supplemental powers and authorizations conferred by the provisions of the Registered Bond Act, being Sections 31-21-1 through 31-21-7.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-03; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 3; Laws, 1978, ch. 411, § 2; Laws, 1983, ch. 494, § 29; eff from and after passage (approved April 11, 1983).

Cross References — Details of municipal harbor bonds, see § 59-7-13.

Details of bonds issued for joint county and municipal harbor projects, see § 59-7-311.

§ 59-7-109. Maturities of bonds; interest.

All bonds authorized by Section 59-7-105 shall mature annually, with all maturities not longer than twenty (20) years, with not less than one-fiftieth ($\frac{1}{50}$) of the total issue to mature each year during the first five (5) years of the life of such bonds, not less than one-twenty-fifth ($\frac{1}{25}$) of the total issue to mature each year during the succeeding ten-year period of the life of such bonds, and the remainder to be divided into approximately equal annual payments, one (1) payment to mature each year for the remaining life of such bonds. Such bonds shall not bear a greater overall maximum interest rate to maturity than that allowed in Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972. The denomination, form and place or places of payment of such bonds shall be fixed in the resolution or order of the board of supervisors issuing such bonds.

No interest payment shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon, and neither cancelled nor supplemental coupons shall be permitted. The lowest interest rate specified for any bonds issued shall not be less than sixty percent (60%) of the highest interest rate specified for the same bond issue. The interest rate of any one (1) interest coupon shall not exceed the maximum interest rate allowed on such bonds.

Each interest rate specified in any bid must be in multiples of one-eighth of one percent ($\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%) or in multiples of one-tenth of one percent ($\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%), and a zero rate of interest cannot be named.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-04; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 4; Laws, 1970, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 443; Laws, 1978, ch. 411, § 3; Laws, 1980, ch. 324, § 2; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 16; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 29; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 37, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1983).

Cross References — Additional powers conferred in connection with issuance of bonds generally, see § 31-21-5.

Supplemental powers and authorities, see § 59-7-107.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 172 et seq., 374 et seq.

15 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 214:71 et seq.

§ 59-7-111. Levy of special tax for payment of principal and interest on bonds; port bonds interest and sinking fund.

The board of supervisors of any county which shall have issued bonds under the provisions of this article shall, unless there be sufficient funds otherwise available therefor in the port bonds interest and sinking fund, annually levy a special tax upon all of the taxable property within such county at a rate which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of the principal of and the interest on such bonds according to the terms thereof. All taxes thus collected shall be credited to a special fund in the county treasury of such county to be known and designated as the "port bonds interest and sinking fund," and all sums credited to said fund shall be used to pay such bonds as they mature and the interest thereon as it accrues, and for no other purpose. It shall be the mandatory duty of such board of supervisors to transfer funds from said port fund to the port bonds interest and sinking fund in amounts sufficient to pay maturing principal and accruing interest on bonds issued hereunder, if balances standing to the credit of said port fund are sufficient for that purpose. To the extent that funds are thus made available for the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon, the special tax levy hereinabove provided for may be correspondingly reduced. The said bonds nevertheless shall be general obligations of the county issuing the same, and the full faith, credit and resources of such county shall be pledged to the payment thereof and the interest thereon.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-05; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 5.

Cross References — Levy of special tax by municipal authorities to provide sinking fund for redemption of bonds, see § 59-3-5.

Sinking fund for municipal harbor bonds, see § 59-7-15.

Provision that the port fund shall be subject to expenditure by the port commission except as provided in this section, see § 59-7-131.

Power of municipality to establish sinking fund, see § 59-7-427.

Sinking fund for joint municipal and county harbors, see § 59-9-59.

§ 59-7-113. Resolution of intention to issue bonds; bond issue election generally.

Before issuing any bonds for any of the purposes herein enumerated, the board of supervisors shall adopt a resolution declaring its intention so to do, stating the amount of bonds proposed to be issued and the purpose for which the bonds are to be issued, and the date upon which the board proposes to direct the issuance of such bonds. Such resolution shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in at least one newspaper published in such county. The first publication of such resolution shall be made not less than twenty-one days prior to the date fixed in such resolution for the issuance of the bonds, and the last publication shall be made not more than seven days prior to such date. If no newspaper be published in such county, then such notice shall be given by publishing the resolution for the required time in some

newspaper having a general circulation in such county and, in addition, by posting a copy of such resolution for at least twenty-one days next preceding the date fixed therein at three public places in such county. If twenty per cent (20%) of the qualified electors of the county shall file a written protest against the issuance of such bonds on or before the date specified in such resolution, then an election on the question of the issuance of such bonds shall be called and held as is herein provided. If no such protest be filed, then such bonds may be issued without an election on the question of the issuance thereof, at any time within a period of two years after the date specified in the above-mentioned resolution. However, the board of supervisors, in its discretion, may nevertheless call an election on such question, in which event it shall not be necessary to publish the resolution declaring its intention to issue such bonds as herein provided.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-06; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 6.

Cross References — Resolution declaring intention to issue county bonds, see §§ 19-9-11, 59-7-103.

§ 59-7-115. Notice of election on bond issue.

Where an election is to be called, as provided in Section 59-7-113, notice of such election shall be signed by the clerk of the board of supervisors and shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks, in at least one newspaper published in such county. The first publication of such notice shall be made not less than twenty-one days prior to the date fixed for such election and the last publication shall be made not more than seven days prior to such date. If no newspaper is published in such county, then such notice shall be given by publishing the same for the required time in some newspaper having a general circulation in such county, and, in addition, by posting a copy of such notice for at least twenty-one days next preceding such election at three public places in such county.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-07; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 7.

Cross References — Elections on question of county bond issues generally, see §§ 19-9-11 et seq.

§ 59-7-117. Conduct of election on issue of bonds; qualifications of electors; form and marking of ballots.

The election provided for in Sections 59-7-113 and 59-7-115 shall be held, as far as is practicable, in the same manner as other elections are held in counties. At such election, all qualified electors of such county may vote, and the ballots used at such election shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the amount and purpose of the proposed bond issue and the words "FOR THE BOND ISSUE" and "AGAINST THE BOND ISSUE," and the voter shall vote by placing a cross (x) or check mark (✓) opposite his choice on the proposition.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-08; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 8.

§ 59-7-119. Duties of board of supervisors as to elections.

When the results of the election on the question of the issuance of bonds under the provisions of this article shall have been canvassed by the election commissioners of such county and certified by them to the board of supervisors of such county, it shall be the duty of such board of supervisors to determine and adjudicate whether or not three-fifths ($\frac{3}{5}$ ths) of the qualified electors who voted in such election voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds and, unless three-fifths ($\frac{3}{5}$ ths) of the qualified electors who voted in such election shall have voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then such bonds shall not be issued. Should three-fifths ($\frac{3}{5}$ ths) of the qualified electors who vote in such election vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then the board of supervisors of the county may issue such bonds, either in whole or in part, within two years from the date of such election, or within two years after the final favorable termination of any litigation affecting the issuance of such bonds, as such board shall deem best.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-09; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 9.

§ 59-7-121. Disposition of proceeds of bond issues; penalties for diversion.

The proceeds of any bonds issued by any county pursuant to the provisions of this article shall be placed in the county treasury or depository, if there be one, in a special fund and shall be expended by the board of supervisors of such county for the purpose or purposes for which the bonds were authorized to be issued, and for no other. If the board of supervisors of any such county or any member thereof or any other officer shall willfully divert or aid or assist in diverting any such fund, or any part thereof, to any purpose other than that for which such bonds were authorized to be issued, such person shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years and, in addition, shall be liable personally on his official bond for the amount so diverted. Any member of such board of supervisors may escape the penalty herein provided for by having his vote recorded in the negative on any illegal diversion of the proceeds of such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-10; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 10.

Cross References — Diversion of county bond proceeds by board of supervisors generally, see § 19-9-21.

Depositories for local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

Diversion of municipal bond proceeds, see § 59-7-21.

§ 59-7-123. Transfer of proceeds of bond issue to port bonds interest and sinking fund.

Whenever a balance shall remain in the proceeds of any bond issue after the purpose for which such bonds were issued shall have been accomplished,

such balance shall forthwith be transferred to the port bonds interest and sinking fund hereinabove provided for.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-11; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 11.

Cross References — Power of municipality to provide sinking fund for bonds issued for ports of entry, see § 59-3-5.

Sinking fund for municipal bonds, see § 59-7-13.

Power of municipality to provide for sinking funds, see § 59-7-427.

Sinking fund for joint bond issue by county port authority and municipality, see § 59-9-59.

§ 59-7-125. Port commission; composition, dissolution, oath, bond, terms and quorum.

(1) All improvements constructed by the board of supervisors under the provisions of this article shall be operated and maintained by a port commission composed of five (5) residents of such county who shall be qualified electors therein. Such commission shall have jurisdiction over the port, terminals, harbors and passes leading thereto, and all vessels, boats and wharves, common carriers, and public utilities therein, using the same, within their respective counties. Such port commission shall be appointed as follows: one (1) member shall be appointed by the Governor, two (2) shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of the county, and two (2) shall be appointed by the governing body of the municipality which is the county seat of such county in such cases where the county seat of such county is situate on or adjacent to such port facilities, otherwise, four (4) members shall be appointed by the board of supervisors. A county and a municipality may by joint resolution dissolve a port commission created under this section which is governed by a commission with two (2) commissioners appointed by each. The joint resolution must provide that the municipality relinquishes its duties and obligations related to the port, and that the county assumes all duties and obligations related to the port. Any commission so dissolved shall be reconstituted to consist of five (5) members, one (1) member appointed from each supervisor district. The board of supervisors shall provide for staggered terms in its order providing for the appointment of the reconstituted port commission. Before entering upon the duties of the office, each of such commissioners shall take and subscribe to the oath of office required by Section 268 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, and shall give bond, to be approved by the board of supervisors, in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), conditioned upon the faithful performance of their duties. Such bond shall be made payable to the county and in case of breach thereof, suit may be brought on the relation of the county for the benefit of such port commission. Such commissioners shall hold office for a term of four (4) years from the date of their appointment and qualification and until their successor or successors shall be appointed and qualified as set out herein. Three (3) members of the port commission shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the conducting of business.

(2) The members of the board of supervisors shall be ex officio members of the port commission, but no bond shall be required of them in such capacity;

provided, however, the members of the board of supervisors shall be nonvoting members of the port commission and shall not be included or counted for the determination of a quorum for conducting of business by the port commission unless and until the board of supervisors of a particular county, by order entered on its minutes, expressly provides that the members of the board of supervisors shall be voting members of the port commission and the number of members required for a quorum to conduct business of the port commission, but in no event shall the number required for a quorum to conduct business of the port commission be less than three (3).

(3) All actions heretofore taken by the various port commissions at which at least three (3) members were present and which would otherwise have been legal actions except for the absence of a legal quorum being present and voting are hereby ratified, confirmed and approved.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-12; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 12; Laws, 1976, ch. 448; Laws, 1998, ch. 365, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 16, 1998).

Cross References — Who may administer oaths, see §§ 11-1-1, 25-1-9.

Creation of harbor commission, see § 59-1-1.

Bonds of port commission, see § 59-1-3.

Control of port commission over county and municipal harbors, see § 59-7-7.

Operation of county and municipal harbors by port commission, see § 59-7-307.

§ 59-7-127. Meetings; officers.

When such port commissioners provided for in Section 59-7-125 shall have been appointed and shall have been qualified as set out herein, they shall meet at the regular meeting place of the board of supervisors of such county, after giving at least five days' notice of the time and place of such meeting by publication in a newspaper published at the county seat of such county. At such meeting they shall elect a president and a secretary who shall be members of the commission, and adopt such rules as may govern the time and place for holding meetings, regular and special, not inconsistent with the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-13; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 13.

Cross References — Meetings of port commissioners, see §§ 59-1-5, 59-1-7, 59-7-409.

§ 59-7-129. Powers and duties of commission generally.

The duties and powers of such port commission provided for in Section 59-7-125 shall be the same as those which are set forth and prescribed in Sections 59-1-9 and 59-1-27, except that the salary of the port director shall be subject to the approval of the board of supervisors.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-14; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 14.

Cross References — Additional duties and powers of port commission, see § 59-7-205.

§ 59-7-131. Recommendations by commission as to expenditure of funds.

It shall be the duty of such port commission, from time to time, to make recommendations to the board of supervisors of such county concerning expenditures to be made for the improvement, promotion, development, construction, maintenance and operation of the harbor and port facilities of such county, and shall annually submit to such board of supervisors a proposed budget for the operation and maintenance of such harbor and port facilities, which recommendations and budget shall be subject to approval of the board of supervisors. Except as provided in Section 59-7-111, the port fund shall be subject to expenditure by the port commission.

The port commission may recommend to the Legislative Budget Office, the State Fiscal Management Board, and the county board of supervisors that certain excess funds in the port fund be transferred to any industrial development authority within the county. Upon approval by the State Fiscal Management Board and the county board of supervisors, the port commission may transfer such excess funds, or any portion thereof which may be designated by the State Fiscal Management Board and county board of supervisors, as provided herein.

The port commission in any county bordering the Mississippi River and having a population of more than fifty-one thousand (51,000) but less than fifty-two thousand (52,000) according to the 1980 federal census may recommend to the board of supervisors the expenditure of excess funds in the port fund for the acquisition of lands in the county to be used for industrial development purposes. Upon the acquisition of such lands, excess funds in the port fund may also be expended to provide necessary utilities and other improvements the board of supervisors deems necessary and requisite for industrial development. Any lands acquired hereunder shall be titled in the name of the county.

For the purposes of this section, the term "excess funds" means monies determined to be in excess of those necessary to fund the budget for the fiscal year.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-15; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 28, § 15; Laws, 1983, ch. 532; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 254; Laws, 1986, ch. 323, eff from and after passage (approved March 13, 1986).

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected typographical errors in the third paragraph. The word "aquisition" was changed to "acquisition" in two places. The Joint Committee ratified the corrections at its December 3, 1996 meeting, and the section has been reprinted in the supplement to reflect the corrected language.

Editor's Note — Section 27-104-1 provides that the term "Fiscal Management Board" shall mean the "Department of Finance and Administration".

Cross References — Joint legislative budget committee and legislative budget office, generally, see §§ 27-103-101 et seq.

Submission of budget requests to legislative budget office, see § 27-103-127.

Creation of interest and sinking fund, see § 59-7-111.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A port commission possesses the power to employ or contract for personnel and consulting services to assist it in the performance of its responsibility, and if the commission finds, consistent with fact,

that a planning consultant will assist the commission in accomplishing its lawful duty, the commission may employ such consultant. Varner, June 3, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0362.

ARTICLE 5.

SUPPLEMENTAL AND ADDITIONAL POWERS.

SEC.

- 59-7-201. Application and construction of article.
- 59-7-203. Acquisition of lands after giving of assurances required by federal authorities.
- 59-7-205. General duties and powers of port commission.
- 59-7-207. Operation of port facilities; employment of personnel.
- 59-7-209. Delegation of additional duties, powers and rights to commission; approval of acts and expenditures of commission; liability of commissioners and counties.
- 59-7-211. Sale, lease or conveyance of lands or easements.
- 59-7-213. Maintenance of records by commission; public inspection of records.

§ 59-7-201. Application and construction of article.

This article shall be applicable to all counties electing to come under the terms and provisions of Article 3 of this chapter and in which a flood control project has been authorized or may be authorized by the federal government which either directly or indirectly involves, or has the result of creating, a potential industrial area or the protection of such an area. This article is supplementary to said Article 3 of this chapter, and all other laws of this state concerning ports and harbors and shall not be construed by way of limitation on any of the powers or authority heretofore granted, but the authority conferred herein is in addition and cumulative thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-21; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 1.

§ 59-7-203. Acquisition of lands after giving of assurances required by federal authorities.

Where any county in connection with any such flood control project has given or may give assurances of local cooperation required by the federal authorities, as authorized by law, the board of supervisors of such county shall have the added power and authority, if necessary or desirable for the fulfillment of such assurances, to acquire all lands and easements and rights-of-way, and the fee title to such lands where advisable, either by purchase or by condemnation and, if by condemnation, according to the existing statutes applicable to the acquisition by counties of property for public use.

Where any county of the state which operates any such project has been required to give its assurances by the federal authorities or other agency of the government of the United States of local cooperation and participation in any such project by agreeing to pay any part of the construction costs of such project or projects, then the board of supervisors of such county shall have the added power and authority, if necessary and desirable for the fulfillment of such assurances, to sign agreements with such federal authorities or other agency of the government of the United States whereby such participating county agrees to pay its part of the cost of such construction or any fractional part thereof, including interest of not more than three per cent (3%) per annum, and provided further that said assurances shall be due and payable within the primary term of forty years from the time such assurances are given.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-22; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 392, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 22, 1962).

Cross References — Flood control agreements with United States, see §§ 51-35-1 et seq.

Assurances given to federal authorities in relation to flood control projects, see §§ 51-35-15, 51-35-17.

§ 59-7-205. General duties and powers of port commission.

(1) In any county where a port commission has been established or may be established and where the board of supervisors of said county directs that said commission undertake, on behalf of such county, jurisdiction over and duties in connection with the fulfillment of the assurances of local cooperation and handling of the harbor project upon which construction may be done by the federal government, as contemplated by Section 59-7-201, and where either all or over half of the lands and properties involved in said project are beyond the confines of any municipality lying within said county, then the board of supervisors of said county shall appoint four (4) members of said port commission in accordance with the terms and provisions of Section 59-7-125, and, where such port commission has been established or may be established in such instance, then said port commission shall undertake and perform the duties assigned to it by said board, as hereby authorized, and said commissions shall, in addition, manage and control all port facilities which may be authorized and constructed by virtue of the terms and provisions of Article 3 of this chapter, and all appurtenant and physical properties connected therewith, both real and personal, and shall provide for the regular inspection, repair, maintenance and improvement of said port facilities. Said port commission, in the performance of its duties, may make any contract and authorize any purchases from any funds on hand in the port fund of any such county, which said contracts and purchases shall be made in accordance with Section 31-7-1 et seq. Said contracts and purchases shall include all contracts and purchases incidental to or necessary for the proper establishment, insurance, maintenance, repair, improvement and operation of said port facilities, including, if

indicated for their protection, workmen's compensation insurance for the benefit of any employees of said port commission.

Any such port commission is further authorized and empowered, in its discretion, to own and operate any or all dock, terminal, warehouse or railroad facilities which may by it be deemed necessary or desirable to promote the development of any port or industrial facilities under its control or supervision and to such end such port commission is authorized and empowered to acquire by purchase, construction or lease any buildings, structure or equipment, to employ any personnel or technical assistance, to enter into any contracts with any persons, firms or corporations, and to establish, charge and collect any tariffs, rates or other charges in connection therewith, as may be deemed necessary or advisable to accomplish such purposes. Said port commission is likewise authorized and empowered to operate such dock, terminal, warehouse or railroad facilities through agents or lessees by such contractual or lease agreements as may be entered into by said port commission upon such terms and conditions as said commission may deem proper. The authority granted hereby shall extend only to the lands under the control and supervision of said port commission.

(2) The powers and authority granted by this section are supplemental to all other powers and authority granted to said port commission and the same shall in nowise be construed to limit any such powers and authority heretofore granted.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 3; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 31, §§ 1-3; Laws, 1980, ch. 440, § 24, eff from and after January 1, 1981.

Editor's Note — Section 71-3-1 provides that the term "workmen's compensation" shall mean "workers' compensation".

Cross References — Cooperation of port authorities with counties and municipalities, see § 57-1-49.

Duties and powers of port commission, see §§ 59-1-9, 59-7-129, 59-7-209.

§ 59-7-207. Operation of port facilities; employment of personnel.

The commission referred to in Section 59-7-205 may establish and operate said port facilities on such plan as it may determine upon, including the right to employ, or delegate to the port director the employment of such engineering and legal assistants and such subordinate personnel as the commission may deem necessary, to provide for the wages and compensation of the port director and all other employees; and, in their discretion, to require that the port director and such other subordinate personnel as may be deemed necessary and desirable post a bond written by a surety company or companies authorized to do business in the State of Mississippi in such amount as the commission may designate, conditioned on the faithful discharge of all of their duties as such employees, the premiums on such bonds to be paid from said port fund in the discretion of the commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-24; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 4.

Cross References — Workers' compensation insurance generally, see §§ 71-3-1 et seq.

§ 59-7-209. Delegation of additional duties, powers and rights to commission; approval of acts and expenditures of commission; liability of commissioners and counties.

The board of supervisors of any such county described in Section 59-7-201 may prescribe such further duties, powers and rights of such commission as may be within the authority of such board to delegate and provide for the reasonable compensation, if any, of the chairman and members of the commission, and shall provide that the acts of such commissioners shall regularly, and not less than quarterly or more than monthly, be reported to said board and be subject to its approval and concurrence by order spread upon the minutes of said board generally approving such reports and minutes. The obligations incurred and the expenditures authorized to be made by said commission shall in the manner herein set forth be subject to the approval of the board of supervisors of said county; and when and should the board decline to grant its approval of any act of said commission, it shall signify its reason for withholding that approval on the minutes of said board. All expenditures so authorized and provided for shall be made upon special port commission warrants to be countersigned by the clerk of said board. There shall be no personal obligation or liability on the part of any member of said commission except for a wilful wrong, nor shall there be any general obligation or liability on said county other than from the revenues derived from the operation of said port and revenues allocated by law to the aforesaid port fund of said county, except for the obligation of a condemnation award or for any such obligation which may be provided for in any trust indenture or resolution under which bonds are issued under the terms and provisions of Article 3 of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-26; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 6.

Cross References — Punishment of public officers for neglect of duty or misdemeanor in office, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 175.

Removal of public officers from office for misconduct or misdemeanor in office, see § 25-5-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where the statute required the approval of the county board of supervisors of construction contracts entered into by a county port commission, neither the port commission nor the county would be liable

for the payment of the cost of contract changes and additions which had not been approved by the supervisors in the manner required by law. *Warren County Port Comm'n v. Farrell Constr. Co.*, 395 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968).

§ 59-7-211. Sale, lease or conveyance of lands or easements.

In all such counties, described in Section 59-7-201, upon and with the approval of the board of supervisors, the port commission shall have the power and authority to sell or lease any lands or easements acquired by any such county in conjunction with the establishment and construction of any port or harbor under the jurisdiction of said commission for the purposes of industrial development, but the terms and provisions of any such sales or lease shall include limitations as to the use of such lands and easements for industrial activities integrated to water transportation in accordance with the terms and provisions of such assurances of local cooperation as may have been given by virtue of Section 51-35-15 or Section 51-35-17, Mississippi Code of 1972, and the provisions of this article. Furthermore, said port commission, upon and with the approval of the board of supervisors, shall have the power and is hereby authorized, in its discretion, to sell and convey to the United States of America, without any limitations whatsoever, by general or special warranty deed or other acceptable form or conveyance, the full title to any lands acquired or held by any such county in connection with the establishment and development of any harbor or port project under the jurisdiction of said commission in exchange for the title to lands of the United States of America deemed useful for or needed by any county in connection with the establishment, enlargement, development, construction or maintenance of any port or harbor project under the jurisdiction of said commission, or for such other consideration as said commission and said board find to be adequate and sufficient. Said port commission, upon and with the approval of the board of supervisors of the county, is further hereby authorized to donate and/or sell and convey, without any limitations, upon such terms and conditions as may be deemed proper by the said commission and said board of supervisors, to the United States of America any of the lands needed by the United States of America for navigation and/or flood control purposes, or in fulfillment of any authorized assurances which have been given or which may be given by said county to the United States of America, or for the purpose of the display of the Gunboat Cairo.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-27; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 7; Laws, 1964, ch. 467; Laws, 1966, ch. 275, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved June 16, 1966).

Cross References — Flood control agreements with the United States, see §§ 51-35-1 et seq.

Industrial research and development generally, see §§ 57-1-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Section 59-7-211 does not contemplate sale or lease of property owned by county through port commission which has ceased to be used by both county and port commission; board of supervisors upon

finding by port commission that property is not needed for port commission purposes, and at request of port commission, may authorize sale of property that has ceased to be used for any county or port

commission purpose pursuant to Section 19-7-3. Cox, March 23, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0174.

§ 59-7-213. Maintenance of records by commission; public inspection of records.

The port commission shall keep regular minutes of all its official actions and shall provide for an adequate bookkeeping system and regular audits and keep or cause to be kept full and correct records of the finances of said port commission and shall, from said port funds, provide for, and pay to the clerk of said board fees and sums as are found to be proper and reasonable for the extra duties and work hereby imposed upon him. All such minutes, books and records shall be kept in the office of the chancery clerk of the county in which the port is located or in such other place as the board of supervisors may designate by order spread upon their minutes to the end that such minutes, books and records shall, under reasonable conditions, be available at all times to the public for inspection.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-25; Laws, 1956, ch. 183, § 5.

ARTICLE 7.

CUMULATIVE PROVISIONS.

SEC.

- 59-7-301. Construction and effect of article.
- 59-7-303. Levy of ad valorem tax in certain counties; disposition of proceeds of tax.
- 59-7-305. Powers of municipal authorities as to promotion, development, etc., of harbors or seaports.
- 59-7-307. Maintenance and operation of improvements and facilities by port commission; collection, etc., of rents, fees, etc.; disposition of revenues; annual reports.
- 59-7-309. Authorization of issuance of bonds by municipalities; audit and inspection of accounts.
- 59-7-311. Exercise of authority for issuance of bonds; form, terms and conditions of bonds; execution of bonds; negotiability and sale of bonds; disposition of proceeds of sale; payment of principal and interests on bonds.
- 59-7-313. Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalties for diversion; guarantee of payment.
- 59-7-315. Mortgage or deed of trust securing bonds.
- 59-7-317. Applicability of municipal debt limitations to bond issues; funds from which bonds payable.
- 59-7-319. Exemption from taxation of bonds.
- 59-7-321. Powers of municipality with respect to issuance of bonds.
- 59-7-323. Trustees.

§ 59-7-301. Construction and effect of article.

This article, as to the subject matters hereof, shall supersede all other laws, general, special or local, including charters of municipalities. Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article shall have no power thereafter to issue bonds or other obligations pursuant to the

provisions of Article 1 of this chapter, unless and until all bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, and interest thereon, have been fully paid and discharged.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7589; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

§ 59-7-303. Levy of ad valorem tax in certain counties; disposition of proceeds of tax.

An ad valorem tax of two mills on each one dollar of the total assessed valuation of all the taxable property in each county or counties in the State of Mississippi, in which there is located a harbor or port of entry where commodities are exported to foreign nations, and where there is maintained a channel and/or harbor or port to a depth of not less than twenty feet, be, and the same is hereby, levied on all said taxable property, in or for each year in which the principal of or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article becomes due. The receipts from said two-mill tax shall be withheld by the tax collector of said county, and/or by any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for the collection of said taxes, from receipts from state ad valorem taxes now in effect or which may be hereafter levied, so long as the state ad valorem taxes shall be not less than the two-mill tax herein levied. However, if no state ad valorem taxes equal to or greater than the said two-mill tax herein levied is now or shall be hereafter levied, then and in that event, the said two-mill tax herein levied shall continue to be levied and collected as herein provided in each such county or counties in or for each year in which the principal of or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article becomes due. The tax collector, and/or any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for the collection of said taxes, shall pay over all moneys collected or to be collected as receipts from said two-mill tax to any trustee or successor thereto established as hereinafter in this article provided, and in the event that there is no such trustee, then said tax collector, and/or any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for collection of said taxes, shall pay over all such moneys into the county depository of each such county to the credit of a fund which shall be known as a port fund. Any such moneys so paid into the county depository of each such county to the credit of said port fund may be expended at the direction of the port commission, appointed for any port of entry as designated in chapter 1 of this title. But in no county within the terms of this article shall there be withheld from the state treasury under the provisions of this article and Article 1 of this chapter, for any one year an amount in excess of the receipts from said two-mill tax. The provisions of this article shall be deemed to be a contract with the holders of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7577; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

Cross References — County tax collectors, see §§ 27-1-1 et seq.
Ad valorem taxes generally, see §§ 27-29-1 et seq.

§ 59-7-305. Powers of municipal authorities as to promotion, development, etc., of harbors or seaports.

The authorities of any municipality in which there is situated and located, in whole or in part, a port of entry through which commodities are imported and exported to foreign nations, which maintains a channel and/or harbor to a depth of not less than twenty feet, are hereby given the authority to engage in, either directly or through the commission hereinafter provided and designated and such other agencies as hereafter may be provided by law, work of internal improvement, or promoting, developing, constructing, maintaining, and operating harbors or seaports within the state and its jurisdiction, and either directly or through the commission hereinafter provided for, shall have the power to acquire, purchase, install, rent, lease, mortgage, and/or otherwise encumber, to construct, own, hold, maintain, equip, use, control and operate at seaports, wharves, piers, docks, quays, grain elevators, cotton compresses, warehouses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, cold storage facilities and other water and rail terminals and other structures, and facilities needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce including the dredging of approaches thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7578; Laws, 1934, ch. 209; Laws, 1960, ch. 435.

Cross References — Municipal harbor improvements generally, see § 59-7-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping §§ 81
et seq.

§ 59-7-307. Maintenance and operation of improvements and facilities by port commission; collection, etc., of rents, fees, etc.; disposition of revenues; annual reports.

All improvements and facilities constructed pursuant to Article 1 of this chapter, and/or constructed pursuant to this article, shall be maintained and operated under the control of the port commission as provided in chapter 1 of this title. The said port commission shall, subject to and in accordance with any agreement or agreements as may be made by any such municipality with the purchaser or purchasers of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, prescribe, levy and collect all rents, fees, tolls, revenues, and/or other charges in connection with the use and occupancy of the aforesaid improvements and facilities, and shall pay over all net revenues derived from the operation of said improvements and facilities to any trustee, or successor thereto, established as hereinafter in this article provided. Net revenues shall be deemed to be such as may be defined in any agreement or agreements entered into between any such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article. The said port commission shall make an annual report to the governor of the State of

Mississippi, to the municipality having such port of entry, and to the state legislature.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7579; Laws, 1934, ch. 209; Laws, 1970, ch. 409, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1970.

Cross References — Control by port commission generally, see § 59-7-7.
Powers and duties of county port authorities, see § 59-9-15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping §§ 81
et seq.

§ 59-7-309. Authorization of issuance of bonds by municipalities; audit and inspection of accounts.

Any municipality, in which there is situated and located in whole or in part a port of entry through which commodities are imported or exported as aforesaid, is hereby given authority, upon the adoption of a resolution to such effect, to issue bonds or other obligations for any or all of the purposes as provided in this article. The books of account and other sources of information pertaining to duties under the provisions of this article, of any port commission, municipality and/or county affected by this article, shall be and remain at all times open to inspection and subject to audit by the holder or holders of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7581; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

Cross References — Authority of municipalities to issue bonds, see § 59-7-11.
Authority of county to issue bonds, see § 59-9-37.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

§ 59-7-311. Exercise of authority for issuance of bonds; form, terms and conditions of bonds; execution of bonds; negotiability and sale of bonds; disposition of proceeds of sale; payment of principal and interests on bonds.

The power to issue bonds or other obligations authorized by this article and Section 59-5-31, shall be vested in and may be exercised from time to time by the governing bodies of any municipality or county so authorized in such laws.

Such revenue bonds may be issued without an election upon the adoption of a resolution of the board of supervisors of such county, declaring its intention to issue such bonds, and shall not be subject to any limitation as to amount, and shall not be included or computed in the statutory limitation of indebted-

ness of any such county. Such bonds shall bear date or dates, be in such denomination or denominations, bear interest at such rate or rates, be payable at such place or places within or without the State of Mississippi, shall mature at such time or times and upon such terms, with or without premium, shall bear such registration privileges, and shall be substantially in such form, all as shall be determined by resolution of the board of supervisors of such county. Such bonds shall mature in annual installments beginning not more than five years from date thereof and extending not more than thirty-five years from date thereof. Such bonds shall be signed by the president of the board of supervisors of such county, and the official seal of the county shall be affixed thereto, attested by the clerk of the board of supervisors of such county. The interest coupons to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of said officers. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officials herein designated to sign the bonds who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

All bonds and interest coupons issued under the provisions of this article shall have and are hereby declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code. Such bonds and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.

The board of supervisors of such county shall sell such bonds in such manner and for such price as it may determine to be for the best interest of said county, but no such sale shall be made at a price less than par plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. Notice of the sale of any such bonds shall be published at least one time not less than ten days prior to the date of sale and shall be published in a newspaper published in and having general circulation within the county.

The proceeds of such bonds shall be paid into a special fund or funds in banks qualified to act as depositories for such county. The proceeds of such bonds shall be solely for the purposes for which they were issued, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, and shall be disbursed upon the order of the board of supervisors of such county, with such restrictions, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the purpose for which they were issued, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit which, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference

or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the purpose for which the bonds were issued, the surplus shall be paid into the fund established for the payment of the principal of and the interest on such bonds.

Such bonds may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified or required by this article. The bonds authorized under the authority of this article may, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, be validated in the chancery court of such county in the manner and with the force and effect provided by Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district, and other bonds.

The revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this section shall be payable solely out of the revenues to accrue from the operation of such project, development, improvement or utility systems, and the full faith and credit of the county shall not be pledged therefor, nor shall any ad valorem tax be levied therefor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7585; Laws, 1934, ch. 209; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 49; Laws, 1960, ch. 436; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 26, 1962).

Cross References — Revenue bonds issued by county and municipality jointly, see § 59-5-31.

Details of municipal bonds, see § 59-7-13.

Terms of municipal bonds, see § 59-7-417.

Uniform commercial code, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

§ 59-7-313. Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalties for diversion; guarantee of payment.

The proceeds from the sale of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article shall be placed to the credit of such municipality in a bank or banks which are members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and may be withdrawn therefrom in accordance with any agreement or agreements entered into between such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations and in accordance with the laws regulating the disbursement of municipal funds and shall be used for no other purpose than the purpose or purposes set forth in the original resolution of the governing body of such municipality. Any officer or other person diverting or assisting to divert any such funds to any other purpose or purposes than the purpose or purposes originally set forth in said resolution of the governing body of said municipality shall be guilty of a felony and punishable accordingly, and shall be liable both personally and on official bonds for such diversion. Nothing in this article shall be construed as a guarantee on the part of the State of Mississippi to pay the principal of or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7586; Laws, 1934, ch. 209; Laws, 1938, ch. 137.

Cross References — Depositories for funds of local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

Diversion of funds, see §§ 59-3-13, 59-7-21, 59-7-121, 59-7-419, 59-15-13.

§ 59-7-315. Mortgage or deed of trust securing bonds.

Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article by resolution or resolutions duly adopted, is hereby given authority to execute and deliver a mortgage or deed of trust, in such form, with such validity and with such remedies as at present authorized under the laws of the State of Mississippi, on any or all properties, improvements and facilities, the acquisition, construction, maintenance and/or operation of which are provided for by this article. Such resolution or resolutions of said municipality shall prescribe the provisions, covenants and conditions of any such mortgage or deed of trust. Such provisions, covenants and conditions, if not self-executing, may be enforced by appropriate proceedings, either in law or in equity.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7587; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

Cross References — Authority to mortgage port facility, see §§ 59-7-305, 59-7-405, 59-7-421.

Security for small craft harbor bonds, see §§ 59-15-1, 59-15-5, 59-15-9, 59-15-15.

§ 59-7-317. Applicability of municipal debt limitations to bond issues; funds from which bonds payable.

The bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality of the State of Mississippi pursuant to this article shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of any statutory limitation as to the amount of debt which may be incurred by any such municipality, nor shall such bonds or other obligations be payable out of any funds other than the revenue collected or collectible from the use of said docks, harbors and facilities of whatsoever nature, and out of the receipts from the said two-mill ad valorem tax, in accordance with the provisions of Section 59-7-303.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7580; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

Cross References — Applicability of debt limitations to municipal port bonds, see § 59-7-423.

Applicability of debt limitations to municipal small craft harbor bonds, see § 59-15-9.

§ 59-7-319. Exemption from taxation of bonds.

Bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article and any interest thereon or income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation, except gift, transfer and inheritance taxes, in so far as may be within the power of the State of Mississippi so to provide.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7584; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

Cross References — Exemption of bonds from taxation, see §§ 59-7-425, 59-9-83.

§ 59-7-321. Powers of municipality with respect to issuance of bonds.

In connection with the issuance of bonds or other obligations by any municipality pursuant to this article, or in order to secure the payment of said bonds or other obligations, such municipality shall have power:

(a) To accept grants from the United States of America, the president of the United States, the federal emergency administrator of public works, or such other agencies, instrumentalities or corporations as may be designated or created to make grants or loans (hereinafter termed "federal agency") pursuant to the national industrial recovery act and any further act of the congress of the United States providing for the construction of useful public works (hereinafter termed "national industrial recovery act"), for or in aid of work, development or improvement authorized by this article.

(b) To make such contracts and execute such instruments containing such provisions, covenants and conditions as in the discretion of the authorities of any such municipalities may be necessary, proper or advisable for the purpose of obtaining or securing grants, loans, or other financial assistance from any federal agency pursuant to the national industrial recovery act; to make such further, different or additional contracts and execute all instruments necessary or convenient in or for the furtherance of any work, development or improvement, including but not limited to all property real and personal appurtenant thereto or connected therewith and the existing work, development or improvement, if any, to which the work, development or improvement authorized by this article is an extension, addition, betterment or embellishment (hereinafter termed "work, development or improvement"), to carry out and perform the terms and conditions of any such contract or instrument.

(c) To pledge all or any part of the fees, rents, tolls, revenues or other charges received or receivable by such municipality and/or port commission from any work, development or improvement to which its right then exists or the right to which may thereafter come into existence.

(d) To covenant against the pledging of all or any part of the fees, rents, tolls, revenues or other charges received or receivable by such municipality and/or port commission from any work, development or improvement to which its right then exists or the right to which may thereafter come into existence.

(e) To covenant against the encumbering of all or any part of any work, development or improvement or against permitting or suffering any lien thereon.

(f) To covenant as to what other or additional debt may be incurred by such municipality.

(g) To provide for the preparation, specifications, terms, form, registration, extension, execution and authentication of any bonds or other obligations, issued pursuant to this article.

(h) To provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed or mutilated bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

(i) To covenant as to the fees, rents, revenues or tolls to be charged, the amount to be raised each year or other period of time and as to the use and disbursement to be made thereof.

(j) To covenant to set aside or to pay over reserves and sinking funds and as to the disposal thereof.

(k) To redeem prior to maturity, with or without premium, bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article and to covenant for their prior redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof.

(l) To covenant against extending the time for the payment of the interest on or principal of the bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article directly or indirectly by any means or in any manner.

(m) To covenant as to books of account of such municipality and as to the inspection and audit thereof and as to the accounting methods.

(n) To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers and duties arising upon the breach by such municipality of any covenant, condition or obligation assumed pursuant to this article.

(o) To make such covenants and do any and all such acts and things as may be necessary, convenient or desirable in order to secure any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, or in the absolute discretion of the authorities of such municipality in order to make such bonds or other obligations more marketable, notwithstanding that such covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated herein or expressly authorized herein; it being the intention hereby to give the authorities of any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article the power to do all things in the issuance of said bonds or other obligations and for their execution that may not be inconsistent with the constitution of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7582; Laws, 1934, ch. 209.

Cross References — Authority of municipality to issue bonds, see §§ 59-7-309, 59-7-415.

Powers of municipality in connection with issuance of bond, see § 59-7-427.

§ 59-7-323. Trustees.

Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article shall, so long as any such bonds or other obligations remain outstanding and unpaid, by resolution or resolutions duly adopted, authorize and appoint a trustee, satisfactory to the purchaser or purchasers of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article or any successor thereto, with the following powers and duties:

(a) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall receive and receipt for all monies collected or to be collected as receipts from the aforesaid two-mill tax by the aforesaid tax collector, and/or any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for the collection of said taxes, as provided for in Section 59-7-303;

(b) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall receive and receipt for all monies paid or to be paid to it in accordance with Section

59-7-307, constituting the net revenues derived from the operation of the improvements and facilities authorized by this article;

(c) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall deposit all monies received or to be received, in a special account or accounts in a bank or banks which are members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with such provisions for security therefor as may be incorporated in any agreement or agreements entered into between any such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of any such bonds or other obligations;

(d) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall use and apply all such monies so received to the payment of principal of and interest on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article, as the same become due, and shall use and apply any surplus remaining after such payment or payments for the prior redemption, with or without premium, of bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article, or in accordance with the provisions of any agreement or agreements as may be made between any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations;

(e) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall have and be vested with all rights, powers and duties, in addition to the foregoing, as may be provided for in any agreement or agreements between any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds, or other obligations;

(f) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall by an instrument in writing, accept such trust and shall file such written acceptance of such trust with the clerk of the municipality so appointing such trustee;

(g) If such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall fail, neglect or refuse to perform any of the duties herein imposed or that may be imposed by reason of any of the provisions of any agreement or agreements as aforesaid, such trustee, or any successor thereto, shall, on the written request of twenty per centum or more in aggregate principal amount of the holder or holders of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, be removed, by resolution duly adopted by the municipality by which such trustee, or any successor thereto, was appointed; and in such event, it shall be the duty of any such trustee so removed to effectuate a valid transfer of all monies then in the possession or under the control of such trustee so removed to a duly appointed successor, and a failure on the part of such trustee so removed to do so shall constitute an embezzlement of such monies and shall be punishable accordingly;

(h) In the event any such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall be removed as hereinabove provided, it shall be the duty of any municipality, which shall have removed any such trustee, immediately by resolution duly adopted to appoint a trustee, as successor thereto, who is satisfactory to said holder or holders of twenty per centum or more in aggregate principal amount of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7583; Laws, 1934, ch. 209; Laws, 1950, ch. 202.

Cross References — Powers and duties of trustees, see § 59-7-429.
Trusts and trustees generally, see §§ 91-9-1 et seq.

ARTICLE 9.

ADDITIONAL CUMULATIVE PROVISIONS.

SEC.

- 59-7-401. Construction and effect of article.
- 59-7-403. Levy of ad valorem tax in certain counties; disposition of proceeds of tax.
- 59-7-405. Powers of municipal authorities as to promotion, development, etc., of harbors and seaports.
- 59-7-407. Port commission; composition; appointment, compensation and terms of office of members; organization; dissolution.
- 59-7-408. Procedure and requirements for dissolution of municipal port commission.
- 59-7-409. Meetings of commission; officers.
- 59-7-411. Duties of commission generally; employees.
- 59-7-413. Maintenance and operation of improvements and facilities by commission; collection, etc., of rents, fees, etc.; disposition of revenues; annual reports.
- 59-7-415. Authorization of issuance of bonds by municipalities; audit and inspection of accounts.
- 59-7-417. Exercise of authority for issuance of bonds; form, terms and conditions of bonds; execution of bonds; negotiability and sale of bonds; interim certificates.
- 59-7-419. Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalties for diversion; guarantee of payment.
- 59-7-421. Mortgage or deed of trust securing bonds.
- 59-7-423. Applicability of municipal debt limitations to bond issues; funds from which bonds payable.
- 59-7-425. Exemption from taxation of bonds.
- 59-7-427. Powers of municipality with respect to issuance of bonds.
- 59-7-429. Trustees.

§ 59-7-401. Construction and effect of article.

Nothing in this article shall be construed as repealing or altering any existing laws now on the statute books affecting any ports or port laws, and this article is to be considered supplementary, and any word, sentence or paragraph in this article that may be in conflict with the provisions of any other law shall not affect any such law. The constitutionality of this article shall not affect any existing law now on the statute, nor shall the constitutionality of any law now on the statutes be questioned with this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

§ 59-7-403. Levy of ad valorem tax in certain counties; disposition of proceeds of tax.

An ad valorem tax of one mill on each one dollar of the total assessed valuation of all the taxable property in each county or counties in the State of

Mississippi, in which there is located a port or harbor where there is maintained a channel to a depth of not less than eight feet, is hereby levied on all taxable property, in or for each year in which the principal of or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article becomes due. The receipts from said one mill tax shall be withheld by the tax collector of said county, and/or by any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for the collection of said taxes, from receipts from state ad valorem taxes now in effect or which may be hereafter levied, so long as said state ad valorem taxes shall be not less than the said one mill tax herein levied. However, if no state ad valorem taxes equal to or greater than the said one mill tax herein levied is now or shall be hereafter levied, then and in that event, the said one mill tax herein levied shall continue to be levied and collected as herein provided in each such county or counties in or for each year in which the principal of or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article becomes due. The said tax collector, and/or any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for the collection of said taxes, shall pay over all moneys collected or to be collected as receipts from the one mill tax to any trustee or successor thereto established as hereinafter provided in Section 59-7-429, and in the event that there is no such trustee, then said tax collector, and/or any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for collection of said taxes, shall pay over all such moneys into the county depository of each such county to the credit of a fund which shall be known as a port fund. Any such moneys so paid into the county depository of each such county to the credit of said port fund may be expended at the direction of the port commission, appointed for any port or harbor through which commerce flows and having not less than eight industries engaged in the seafood industry. The provisions of this article shall be deemed to be a contract with the holders of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7590; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — County tax collectors, see §§ 27-1-1 et seq.

Ad valorem taxes generally, see §§ 27-29-1 et seq.

Authority to construct and operate harbors or seaports under supervision of bridge and park commission, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

Use of state tax for port fund, see § 59-7-1.

§ 59-7-405. Powers of municipal authorities as to promotion, development, etc., of harbors and seaports.

(1)(a) The governing authorities of any municipality in which there is situated and located, in whole or in part, a port or harbor through which commerce flows, and having not less than eight (8) industries engaged in the seafood industry, which maintains a channel and/or harbor to a depth of not less than eight (8) feet, may engage in, either directly or through the commission hereinafter provided and designated, and such other agencies as hereafter may be provided by law, works of internal improvement, or promoting, developing, constructing, maintaining and operating harbors or

seaports within the state and its jurisdiction, and either directly or through the commission hereinafter provided for, with the power and authority to acquire, purchase, install, rent, lease, mortgage and/or otherwise encumber, to construct, own, hold, maintain, equip, use, control and operate at seaports or harbors, wharves, piers, docks, warehouses, cold storage facilities, water and rail terminals, airplane landing fields and strips, and other structures and facilities, needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce and navigation, and including the dredging of channels and approaches to the facilities, and being authorized to fill in and reclaim bottomlands where incidental and necessary to the foregoing development.

(b) A municipality, which is operating a port through a port commission under this section, may dissolve the port commission as provided in Section 59-7-408 and directly operate and maintain the port as provided under this article.

(2) The municipal authorities or commission, in connection with the exercise of the foregoing works of improvement and development, may as an adjunct to any such work of improvement or development to erect or construct such bridges, causeways or structures as may be required for access to and from the harbors or facilities provided as aforesaid by the municipal authorities or the commission, and including any necessary bridge or causeway or combination of the same, connecting with any island or islands lying within three (3) leagues of the main shoreline of the Mississippi Sound or the Gulf of Mexico, and whether the same be within or without the limits of the municipality concerned.

(3) The municipal authorities or commission may procure, by gift, grant, purchase, or by the exercise of eminent domain, and for the public purposes and uses herein provided for, such land or interest therein as may be required for the purposes of this article, and regardless of whether the land be within or without the limits of the municipality involved.

(4) The municipal authorities or commission, in the exercise of the powers granted hereunder, may provide any of the aforesaid facilities alone or in collaboration and in conjunction with any other public bodies, entities or commissions, as may now or hereafter be established by law.

(5) The municipal authorities or commission may provide, among other harbor facilities, small craft and pleasure craft harbors and facilities needed therefor, including park and recreational facilities as an adjunct thereto, and in order to develop and promote tourist and recreational trade in the port.

(6) The municipal authorities or commission have the power and authority to carry out the provisions of this article, to employ engineers, attorneys, and such employees as may be necessary in carrying out the provisions of this article, from time to time, and for the purpose of operating the facilities herein provided for, and may prescribe reasonable compensation in connection with such employment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7591; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1960, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 444, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 385, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 20, 2004.)

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added (1)(b) and redesignated former (1) as present (1)(a); in (1)(a), substituted “may engage in” for “are hereby given the authority to engage in” following “a depth not less than eight (8) feet”; in (2), substituted “may as an adjunct” for “shall have the power and authority as an adjunct”; in (3), substituted “may procure” for “herein provided for shall have the right and authority to procure”; in (4), deleted “herein provided for” preceding “in the exercise of the powers granted hereunder” and substituted “may provide” for “shall have the right to provide” thereafter; in (5), substituted “may provide” for “herein provided for shall have specifically the authority to provide”; in (6), substituted “have the power and authority to carry out” for “herein provided for shall have the following power and authority in carrying out,” and substituted “may prescribe” for “shall be authorized to prescribe”; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

Cross References — Taking private property for public use, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 17.

Eminent domain, see §§ 11-27-1 et seq.

General power of municipalities to construct harbor improvements, see § 21-37-15.

Authority to construct and operate port facilities under supervision of bridge and park commission, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

Issuance of bonds to finance construction and operation of port facilities, see § 59-7-417.

Limitation on debts which may be incurred by municipality, see § 59-7-423.

Small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-1 et seq.

Construction of bridges or causeways to waters opening into Gulf of Mexico or Mississippi Sound, see § 65-23-101.

§ 59-7-407. Port commission; composition; appointment, compensation and terms of office of members; organization; dissolution.

A port commission created under this article shall consist of six (6) members who shall be qualified electors of the municipality operating under this article, and shall be appointed as follows: two (2) shall be appointed by the Governor, two (2) shall be appointed by the governing authorities of the municipality, and two (2) shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of the county. The commission shall have jurisdiction over the port, terminals, harbors and passes leading thereto, and all vessels, boats and wharves, common carriers and public utilities using the port. Commissioners shall be paid the uniform per diem compensation authorized in Section 25-3-69 for the discharge of official duties at meetings called in accordance with Section 59-7-409.

In the first instance, the two (2) commissioners appointed by the Governor shall be appointed for terms of five (5) and four (4) years, respectively, from the date of appointment; one (1) member appointed by the board of supervisors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years from the date of appointment, and the members appointed by the governing authorities of the municipality shall be appointed for terms of two (2) and one (1) years, respectively, from the date of appointment. The additional member appointed by the board of supervisors shall be appointed to a term of five (5) years. After the first appointments, thereafter each member appointed shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years.

The commission shall, upon appointment, organize as provided in Section 59-7-409.

A port commission created under this article may be dissolved by the governing authorities of the municipality as provided under Section 59-7-408.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7592; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1960, ch. 344, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 444, § 2; Laws, 1998, ch. 371, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 385, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 20, 2004.)

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added the last paragraph.

Cross References — Creation of harbor commission and appointment of commissioners, see §§ 59-1-1 et seq.

§ 59-7-408. Procedure and requirements for dissolution of municipal port commission.

(1) The governing authorities of a municipality may dissolve a port commission created under this article by adopting a resolution in which they determine that the dissolution of the port commission is in the best interest of the citizens of the municipality and authorizing the municipality to assume the powers and duties of the port commission.

(2) After the adoption of the dissolution resolution, the port commission shall enter into an agreement with the municipality which shall provide for:

(a) the transfer of all powers, duties, and responsibilities of the port commission to the municipality;

(b) the transfer of all property and assets, real and personal, of the port commission to the municipality;

(c) the assignment of all contracts, leases, agreements and revenue generated by the port commission to the municipality;

(d) the assumption by the municipality of all just claims and obligations of the port commission associated with the operation and maintenance of the port facilities; and

(e) any other provisions necessary for the implementation of the dissolution.

(3) All tax levies and assessments used for existing bonded indebtedness shall continue until such indebtedness is paid.

SOURCES: Laws, 2004, ch. 385, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 20, 2004.)

§ 59-7-409. Meetings of commission; officers.

The port commission established by Section 59-7-407 shall meet at a regular place to be designated by the port commission for organization as a port commission, after giving at least ten (10) days' notice of the time and place of the meeting by publication in a newspaper published in the city, and they shall elect a president and secretary who shall be members of the commission. The president shall be elected annually and shall vote only in cases of a tie vote.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7593; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1998, ch. 371, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 16, 1998).

§ 59-7-411. Duties of commission generally; employees.

It shall be the duty of the commission to keep a minute book in which shall be recorded all of their acts, orders, rules and regulations. It shall be the duty of said commission to adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with law to govern their official acts. It shall be the duty of said commission to make and publish all needful rules and regulations to govern the harbor, docks, and passes within its jurisdiction, and to fix tariffs, fees, fines, penalties and forfeitures for the violations of the rules and regulations of said commission, and said commission shall have the power to fix and determine all port and terminal charges, and it may enforce the collection thereof through any court of competent jurisdiction in this state. This section shall not apply to public utilities nor to railroad terminal charges covered by or carried in approved tariffs authorized by Interstate Commerce Commission nor to lawful railroad operation and activities.

It shall be the duty of said commission to employ such help, including a port director, secretary, and such other help as will be necessary to carry on the business and work of such commission, and it will be the duty of said port commissioners to see that all port employees, such as harbormaster, pilots, and any and all other necessary employees for the operation of said port, perform any and all such duties as required for the operation of said port, at salaries to be determined by said port commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7594; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — Duties and powers of harbor commission, see § 59-1-9.
Duties and powers of county port authority, see § 59-9-15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping §§ 81
et seq.

§ 59-7-413. Maintenance and operation of improvements and facilities by commission; collection, etc., of rents, fees, etc.; disposition of revenues; annual reports.

All improvements and facilities constructed pursuant to this article shall be maintained and operated under the control of the port commission as provided by this article. The port commission shall, subject to and in accordance with any agreement or agreements as may be made by any such municipality with the purchaser or purchasers of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, prescribe, levy and collect all rents, fees, tolls, revenues and/or other charges in connection with the use and occupancy of the aforesaid improvements and facilities, and shall pay over all net revenues derived from the operation of said improvements and facilities to any trustee,

or successor thereto, established as hereinafter provided in Section 59-7-429. The net revenues shall be deemed to be such as may be defined in any agreement or agreements entered into between any such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article. The port commission shall make an annual report to the governor of the State of Mississippi, to the municipality having such port or harbor, and to the state legislature.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7595; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1970, ch. 410, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1970.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping §§ 81 et seq.

§ 59-7-415. Authorization of issuance of bonds by municipalities; audit and inspection of accounts.

Any municipality, in which there is situated and located in whole or in part a port or harbor through which commerce flows and having not less than eight industries engaged in the seafood industry as aforesaid, is hereby given authority, upon the adoption of a resolution to such effect, to issue bonds or other obligations for any or all of the purposes as provided in this article. The books of account and other sources of information pertaining to duties under the provisions of this article, or any port commission, municipality and/or county affected by this article, shall be and remain at all times open to inspection and subject to audit by the holder or holders of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7597; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — Municipal bonds generally, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq.

Authority of municipality in which port of entry is located to issue bonds, see § 59-7-309.

Details of bonds issued pursuant to authority of this section, see § 59-7-417.

Bond issues pursuant to law creating county port authority, see § 59-9-37.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

§ 59-7-417. Exercise of authority for issuance of bonds; form, terms and conditions of bonds; execution of bonds; negotiability and sale of bonds; interim certificates.

The power to issue bonds or other obligations authorized by Section 59-7-415 shall be vested in, and may be exercised from time to time by the governing body of any such municipality described in said section. Such bonds

or other obligations shall be authorized by resolution of the governing body of any such municipality and shall bear such date or dates, mature at such time or times, not exceeding twenty (20) years from their respective dates, be in such denomination, be in such form, either coupon or registered, carry such registration privileges, be executed in such a manner, be payable in such medium of payment, at such place or places, and be subject to such terms of prior redemption, with or without premium, as such resolution or resolutions may provide. Such bonds shall not bear a greater overall maximum interest rate to maturity than that allowed in Section 75-17-103. No bond shall bear more than one (1) rate of interest; each bond shall bear interest from its date to its stated maturity date at the interest rate specified in the bid; all bonds of the same maturity shall bear the same rate of interest from date to maturity; all interest accruing on such bonds so issued shall be payable semiannually or annually, except that the first interest coupon attached to any such bond may be for any period not exceeding one (1) year.

No interest payment shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon and neither cancelled nor supplemental coupons shall be permitted. The lowest interest rate specified for any bonds issued shall not be less than seventy percent (70%) of the highest interest rate specified for the same bond issue. The interest rate of any one (1) interest coupon shall not exceed the maximum interest rate on such bonds.

Each interest rate specified in any bid must be in multiples of one-eighth of one percent ($\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%) or in multiples of one-tenth of one percent ($\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%). Such bonds shall be executed by the manual or facsimile signature of the mayor and clerk of such municipality, with the seal of the municipality affixed thereto. At least one (1) signature on each bond shall be a manual signature, as specified in the resolution. The coupons may bear only the facsimile signatures of such mayor and clerk. Such bonds or other obligations may be sold at public or private sale for such price or prices as the governing body of such municipality shall determine, but in no case to exceed the rate of interest hereinbefore provided. No bonds shall be issued and sold under the provisions of this article for less than par and accrued interest.

Such bonds or other obligations may be issued by any municipality described in Section 59-7-415 in a principal amount not exceeding Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$7,500,000.00) outstanding at any one (1) time for any purpose or purposes authorized by Section 59-7-405. Such municipality shall have power, out of any funds available, to purchase any bonds or other obligations issued by it pursuant to this article, and all bonds or other obligations so purchased shall be cancelled, and no bonds or other obligations shall be issued in lieu thereof. In anticipation of the issuance of the definitive bonds authorized by this article, any such municipality may issue interim certificates. Such interim certificates shall be in such form, contain such terms, conditions or provisions, bear such date or dates, and evidence such agreement or agreements, relating to their discharge by payment or by the delivery of the definitive bonds, as such municipality, by resolution of its governing body, may determine. Any bonds, interim certificates or other

obligations issued pursuant to this article shall be fully negotiable within the meaning and for all the purposes of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, and may be validated as provided by statute.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7601; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1960, ch. 344, § 3; Laws, 1970, ch. 500, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 17; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 30; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 38; Laws, 1984, ch. 444, § 3; Laws, 1988, ch. 452, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1988).

Cross References — Details of bonds issued by municipality in which port of entry is located, see § 59-7-311.

§ 59-7-419. Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalties for diversion; guarantee of payment.

The proceeds from the sale of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article shall be placed to the credit of such municipality in a bank or banks, which are members of the federal deposit insurance corporation and may be withdrawn therefrom in accordance with any agreement or agreements entered into between such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations and shall be used for no other purpose than the purpose of such municipality. Any officer or other person diverting or assisting to divert any such funds to any other purpose or purposes than the purpose or purposes originally set forth in said resolution of the governing body of said municipality shall be guilty of a felony and punishable accordingly, and shall be liable both personally and on official bonds for such diversion.

Nothing in this article shall be construed as a guarantee on the part of the State of Mississippi to pay the principal or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7602; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1944, ch. 216, § 2.

Cross References — Penalty for diversion of municipal bonds, see § 21-33-317.

§ 59-7-421. Mortgage or deed of trust securing bonds.

Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article by resolution or resolutions duly adopted, is hereby given authority to execute and deliver a mortgage or deed of trust, in such form, with such validity and with such remedies as at present authorized under the laws of the State of Mississippi, on any or all properties, improvements and facilities, the acquisition, construction, maintenance and/or operation of which are provided for by this article. Such resolution or resolutions of said municipality shall prescribe the provisions, covenants and conditions of any such mortgage or deed of trust. Such provisions, covenants and conditions, if not self-executing, may be enforced by appropriate proceedings, either in law or in equity.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7603; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — Form of mortgage or deed of trust, see § 89-1-63.

§ 59-7-423. Applicability of municipal debt limitations to bond issues; funds from which bonds payable.

The bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality of the State of Mississippi pursuant to this article shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of any statutory limitation as to the amount of debt which may be incurred by any such municipality, nor shall such bonds or other obligations be payable out of any funds other than the revenue collected or collectible from the use of said docks, harbors and facilities of whatsoever nature, and out of the receipts the said one mill ad valorem tax, in accordance with the provisions of Section 59-7-403.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7596; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — Applicability of debt limitations to municipal harbor bonds, see § 59-7-317.

Applicability of debt limitations to municipal small craft harbor bonds, see § 59-15-9.

§ 59-7-425. Exemption from taxation of bonds.

Bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article and any interest thereon or income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation, except gift, transfer and inheritance taxes, in so far as may be within the power of the State of Mississippi so to provide.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7600; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — Exemption of bonds from taxation, see §§ 59-7-319, 59-9-83.

§ 59-7-427. Powers of municipality with respect to issuance of bonds.

In connection with the issuance of bonds or other obligations by any municipality pursuant to this article, or in order to secure the payment of said bonds or other obligations, such municipality shall have power:

(a) To accept grants from the United States of America, the president of the United States, the federal emergency administrator of public works, or such other agencies, instrumentalities or corporations as may be designated or created to make grants or loans (hereinafter termed "federal agency") pursuant to the national industry recovery act and any further act of the congress of the United States providing for the construction of useful public works (hereinafter termed "national industrial recovery act"), for or in aid of work, development or improvement authorized by this article.

(b) To make such contracts and execute such instruments containing such provisions, covenants and conditions as in the discretion of the authorities of any such municipalities may be necessary, proper or advisable for the purpose of obtaining or securing grants, loans, or other financial assistance from any federal agency pursuant to the national industrial recovery act; to make such further, different or additional contracts and

execute all instruments necessary or convenient in or for the furtherance of any work, development or improvement, including but not limited to all property, real and personal, appurtenant thereto or connected therewith and the existing work, development or improvement, if any, to which the work, development or improvement authorized by this article is an extension, addition, betterment or embellishment (hereinafter termed "work, development or improvement") to carry out and perform the terms and conditions of any such contract or instrument.

(c) To pledge all or any part of the fees, rents, tolls, revenues or other charges received or receivable by such municipality and/or port commission from any work, development or improvement to which its right then exists or the right to which may thereafter come into existence.

(d) To covenant against the pledging of all or any part of the fees, rents, tolls, revenues or other charges received or receivable by such municipality and/or port commission from any work, development or improvement to which its right then exists or the right to which may thereafter come into existence.

(e) To covenant against the encumbering of all or any part of any work, development or improvement or against permitting or suffering any lien thereon.

(f) To covenant as to what other or additional debt may be incurred by such municipality.

(g) To provide for the preparation, specifications, terms, form, registration, extension, execution and authentication of any bonds or other obligations, issued pursuant to this article.

(h) To provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed or mutilated bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

(i) To covenant as to the fees, rents, revenues or tolls to be charged, the amount to be raised each year or other period of time and as to the use and disbursement to be made thereof.

(j) To covenant to set aside or to pay over reserves and sinking funds and as to the disposal thereof.

(k) To redeem prior to maturity, with or without premium, bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article and to covenant for their prior redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof.

(l) To covenant against extending the time for the payment of the interest on or principal of the bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article directly or indirectly by any means or in any manner.

(m) To covenant as to books of account of such municipality and as to the inspection and audit thereof and as to the accounting methods.

(n) To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers and duties arising upon the breach by such municipality of any covenant, condition or obligation assumed pursuant to this article.

(o) To make such covenants and do any and all such acts and things as may be necessary, convenient or desirable in order to secure any bonds or

other obligations issued pursuant to this article, or in the absolute discretion of the authorities of such municipality in order to make such bonds or other obligations more marketable, notwithstanding that such covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated herein or expressly authorized herein; it being the intention hereby to give the authorities of any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article the power to do all things in the issuance of said bonds or other obligations and for their execution that may not be inconsistent with the constitution of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7598; Laws, 1940, ch. 290.

Cross References — Municipal bonds generally, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq.

Establishment of sinking fund for certain municipal bonds, see §§ 59-3-5, 59-7-13.

Powers of municipality to issue bonds for operation of port facilities, see § 59-7-321.

Sinking fund for joint county and municipal bond issue, see § 59-9-59.

§ 59-7-429. Trustees.

Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article shall, so long as any such bonds or other obligations remain outstanding and unpaid, by resolution or resolutions duly adopted, authorize and appoint a trustee, satisfactory to the purchaser or purchasers of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, or any successor thereto, with the following powers and duties:

(a) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall receive and receipt for all moneys collected or to be collected as receipts from the aforesaid two-mill tax by the aforesaid tax collector, and/or any other tax collecting agency authorized by law for the collection of said taxes, as provided for in Section 59-7-403;

(b) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall receive and receipt for all moneys paid or to be paid to it in accordance with Section 59-7-407, constituting the net revenues derived from the operation of the improvements and facilities authorized by this article;

(c) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall deposit all moneys received or to be received, in a special account or accounts in a bank or banks which are members of the federal deposit insurance corporation, with such provisions for security therefor as may be incorporated in any agreement or agreements entered into between any such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of any such bonds or other obligations;

(d) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall use and apply all such moneys so received to the payment of principal of and interest on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article, as the same becomes due, and shall use and apply any surplus remaining after such payment or payments for the prior redemption, with or without premium, of bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this article, or in accordance with the provisions of any agreement or agreements as may be made between any municipality issuing

bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations;

(e) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall have and be vested with all rights, powers and duties, in addition to the foregoing, as may be provided for in any agreement or agreements between any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this article and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations;

(f) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall by an instrument in writing, accept such trust and shall file such written acceptance of such trust with the clerk of the municipality so appointing such trustee;

(g) If such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall fail, neglect or refuse to perform any of the duties herein imposed or that may be imposed by reason of any of the provisions of any agreement or agreements as aforesaid, such trustee, or any successor thereto, shall, on the written request of twenty per centum or more in aggregate principal amount of the holder or holders of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article, be removed, by resolution duly adopted by the municipality by which such trustee, or any successor thereto, was appointed; and in such event, it shall be the duty of any such trustee so removed to effectuate a valid transfer of all moneys then in the possession or under the control of such trustee so removed to a duly appointed successor, and a failure on the part of such trustee so removed to do so shall constitute an embezzlement of such moneys and shall be punishable accordingly;

(h) In the event any such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall be removed as hereinabove provided, it shall be the duty of any municipality which shall have removed any such trustee, immediately by resolution duly adopted to appoint a trustee as successor thereto, who is satisfactory to said holder or holders of twenty per centum or more in aggregate principal amount of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7599; Laws, 1940, ch. 290; Laws, 1944, ch. 216, § 1.

Cross References — Powers and duties of trustees, see § 59-7-323.
Trusts and trustees generally, see §§ 91-9-1 et seq.

ARTICLE 10.

PORT COMMISSIONS IN COUNTIES BORDERING ON MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

SEC.

- 59-7-451. Creation of additional county port commissions authorized.
- 59-7-453. Membership of commission; appointment and terms of office of members; general powers and duties.
- 59-7-455. Operative date of commission's duties and authority; expenditure of county funds.

§ 59-7-451. Creation of additional county port commissions authorized.

Any county in the State of Mississippi bordering on the Mississippi River which has not heretofore created a county port authority or county port commission is hereby authorized, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, as evidenced by a resolution adopted by such board of supervisors, to create a county port commission.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 340, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1973).

§ 59-7-453. Membership of commission; appointment and terms of office of members; general powers and duties.

Such county port commission shall consist of seven (7) members to be appointed by the board of supervisors, one (1) of whom shall represent each of the supervisors districts of the county and shall be a resident of such supervisor's district, and two (2) members shall be appointed from the county at large and be residents of the county. The two (2) at-large members shall be designated as post 1 and post 2. The initial terms of office of the members representing the supervisors districts shall expire as follows: District 1, July 1, 1974; District 2, July 1, 1975; District 3, July 1, 1976; District 4, July 1, 1977; District 5, July 1, 1978. The at-large members' terms shall expire as follows: post 1 shall expire July 1, 1979, and post 2 shall expire July 1, 1981. All succeeding terms shall be for terms of five (5) years. Any vacancy occurring therein shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment of the board of supervisors. Where such port commission has been established or may be established as herein provided, the said port commission shall undertake and perform the duties assigned to it by the board of supervisors, and said commission shall manage and control all port facilities which may be authorized and constructed by virtue of the terms and provisions of Sections 59-7-101 through 59-7-131, 59-7-201 through 59-7-213, and 59-7-501 through 59-7-519, and all appurtenant and physical properties connected therewith, both real and personal, and shall provide for the regular inspection, repair, maintenance and improvement of said port facilities as provided therein.

In addition to the authority granted herein, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, the commission may, subject to the approval of the board of supervisors, purchase any existing railroad or railroad facilities, within or without such county, which it deems necessary for the development of its port facilities.

In addition to any other authority to borrow funds for the purposes of this chapter, the board of supervisors may borrow funds from any agency of the United States government on such terms as the board determines to be in the best interest of the county.

Any railroad or railroad facilities purchased under the provisions of this section may be operated by the county or others on behalf of the county, or may

be leased to others by the county. The commission may establish, charge and collect any tariffs, rates or other charges in connection therewith as may be necessary or advisable to accomplish the purposes of this section.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 340, § 2; Laws, 1978, ch. 460, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 304, eff from and after passage (approved February 19, 1979).

Cross References — County bonds generally, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.

Inapplicability of authorization to establish railroad authorities to counties authorized under this section to operate railroad facilities, see § 19-29-47.

§ 59-7-455. Operative date of commission's duties and authority; expenditure of county funds.

The duties and authority conferred in Sections 59-7-101 through 59-7-131, through 59-7-201 through 59-7-211, 59-7-501 through 59-7-519, and Sections 27-39-3 through 27-39-13, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall apply to any county coming within the provisions of this article commencing on the date of the adoption of the aforesaid resolution by the board of supervisors of said county; provided, however, that the members of such port commission shall be appointed by the method and for the terms as herein provided. In addition to the authority granted herein, the board of supervisors may, in its discretion, expend funds from any available source, including the county general fund and federal revenue sharing funds, to carry out the purposes of this article.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 340, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1973).

Editor's Note — Sections 27-39-3 through 27-39-13 referred to in this section were repealed by Laws, 1980, ch. 505, § 24, (as amended by Laws, 1981, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 5, § 1), eff September 30, 1982.

ARTICLE 11.

REVENUE BONDS.

SEC.

- 59-7-501. Authorization for issuance of revenue bonds for port or harbor improvement.
- 59-7-503. Issuance of bonds without election; form, terms and execution of bonds.
- 59-7-505. Interest on bonds.
- 59-7-507. Negotiability of bonds and coupons; exemption from taxation.
- 59-7-509. Sale of bonds.
- 59-7-511. Disposition of proceeds of bonds.
- 59-7-513. Conditions for issuance of bonds; validation of bonds.
- 59-7-515. Sources for payment of principal and interest on bonds.
- 59-7-517. Operation and maintenance of facilities and establishment of user rates, fees and charges by county issuing bonds.
- 59-7-519. Disposition of revenues from facilities.

§ 59-7-501. Authorization for issuance of revenue bonds for port or harbor improvement.

The board of supervisors of any county which has elected or hereafter may elect to establish a port commission under the provisions of Article 3 of this

chapter, and which desires to improve its port and harbor facilities by the construction, maintenance and operation of any revenue-producing port and/or harbor facility or facilities may issue revenue bonds of such county to provide funds for such purpose.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-51; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

§ 59-7-503. Issuance of bonds without election; form, terms and execution of bonds.

Revenue bonds authorized by Section 59-7-501 may be issued without an election thereon upon the adoption of a resolution by the board of supervisors of such county upon the request and recommendation of the port commission of such county. Such revenue bonds shall not be subject to any limitation as to amount and shall not be included in computing the statutory limitation of indebtedness of such county under any present or future law. Such bonds shall bear date or dates, shall be of such denomination or denominations, shall be payable at such place or places within or without the State of Mississippi, shall mature at such time or times and upon such terms and may be made redeemable prior to maturity with or without premium, shall bear such registration privileges and shall be in substantially such form as shall be determined by resolution of the board of supervisors of such county. Such bonds shall mature in annual installments beginning not more than five (5) years from the date thereof and extending not more than twenty-five (25) years from the date thereof. Such bonds shall be signed by the president of the board of supervisors of such county and the official seal of the county shall be affixed thereto, attested by the clerk of the board of supervisors of such county. The interest coupons to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of such officers. Whenever such bonds shall have been signed by the officials designated to sign the same who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the date of the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-52; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 2; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 31, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1982).

Cross References — Signatures on county bonds generally, see § 19-9-19.
Signature on bonds for harbor improvements, see § 59-13-9.

§ 59-7-505. Interest on bonds.

All bonds shall bear interest at such rate or rates as may be determined by resolution of the board of supervisors of the county issuing them, not to exceed

an overall maximum interest rate to maturity than that allowed in Section 75-17-103, Mississippi Code of 1972. No bond shall bear more than one (1) rate of interest; each bond shall bear interest from its date to its stated maturity date at the interest rate specified in the bid; all bonds of the same maturity shall bear the same rate of interest from date to maturity; all interest accruing on such bonds so issued shall be payable semiannually or annually, except that the first interest coupon attached to any such bond may be for any period not exceeding one (1) year.

No interest payment shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon and neither cancelled nor supplemental coupons shall be permitted; the lowest interest rate specified for any bonds issued shall not be less than sixty percent (60%) of the highest interest rate specified for the same bond issue. The interest rate of any one (1) interest coupon shall not exceed the maximum interest rate allowed on such bonds.

Each interest rate specified in any bid must be in multiples of one-eighth of one percent ($\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%) or in multiples of one-tenth of one percent ($\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%), and a zero rate of interest cannot be named.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-53; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 3; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 18; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 32; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 39, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1983).

Cross References — Interest on county bonds generally, see §§ 19-9-7 et seq.

§ 59-7-507. Negotiability of bonds and coupons; exemption from taxation.

All bonds and interest coupons issued under the provisions of this article shall have and hereby are declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code of the State of Mississippi. Such bonds and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-54; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

Cross References — Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

§ 59-7-509. Sale of bonds.

The board of supervisors of any county issuing bonds under the provisions of this article shall sell such bonds on sealed bids at not less than par plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser, and in the manner provided in Section 31-19-25, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-55; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

§ 59-7-511. Disposition of proceeds of bonds.

The proceeds of the revenue bonds shall be paid into a special fund designated as the "special project port improvement fund" in a bank or banks

qualified as depositories for the county issuing bonds under the provisions of this article, and such proceeds shall be used solely for the purposes for which such bonds were issued, except as hereinafter provided, and shall be disbursed upon order of the board of supervisors of such county with such restrictions, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the project for which such bonds were issued, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit which, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same funds without preference or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the project for which the bonds were issued, such surplus shall be paid into the fund established for the payment of the principal of and interest on such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-56; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

Cross References — Depositories for local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

§ 59-7-513. Conditions for issuance of bonds; validation of bonds.

The revenue bonds authorized to be issued by the provisions of this article may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those specified or required by this article. In the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county the bonds authorized and issued hereunder may be submitted to validation in the chancery court of such county in the manner and with the force and effect now or hereafter provided by Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district and other bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-57; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

§ 59-7-515. Sources for payment of principal and interest on bonds.

The revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this article shall be payable, both principal and interest, solely out of the revenues to accrue from the operation of the facilities provided through the special project for which such bonds are issued, and the full faith and credit of the county shall not be pledged therefor, nor shall any ad valorem tax be levied for the payment of such bonds or the interest thereon, and such facts shall be recited on the face of the bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-58; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

§ 59-7-517. Operation and maintenance of facilities and establishment of user rates, fees and charges by county issuing bonds.

Any county issuing revenue bonds under the provisions of this article is hereby authorized by contract or otherwise to provide for the operation and maintenance of facilities provided through the special project for which such bonds are issued and to establish the rates, fees and charges to be paid by users of such port and/or harbor facilities and shall provide for a revision of such rates, fees and charges from time to time as may be necessary to assure the sufficiency of funds to meet the covenants and pledges made in the resolution pursuant to which such bonds were issued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-59; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

§ 59-7-519. Disposition of revenues from facilities.

All revenues of every kind and character derived from the operation of the facilities of any special project authorized by the provisions of this article shall be paid into the port fund of such county and into a special account in said fund to be designated as the "special project revenue fund" and the resolution of the board of supervisors directing the issuance of such bonds shall require that such revenues shall be allocated to and shall be pledged for the following purposes:

(a) an operation and maintenance fund out of which there shall be paid the usual and necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of the project facilities;

(b) a renewal and replacement fund sufficient to assure that the project facilities, including equipment, shall be kept in good repair and working order;

(c) a bond and interest fund which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of the principal of and the interest on the bonds as they mature and accrue, including a reasonable sum for the creation of a bond reserve fund to assure the payment of such bonds and the interest therein in the event that sufficient funds therefor are not otherwise available; and

(d) a contingent fund to provide for unforeseen contingencies arising in the operation of the project facilities. Any surplus funds remaining after making the foregoing allocations shall be dealt with as may be directed by the resolution of the board of supervisors whereunder such bonds are issued, for the repayment of advances received from any source, for the payment of any maturities of principal and interest of such bonds, for the improvement of the port and/or harbor facilities for which such bonds were issued, or for the retirement of the outstanding bonds according to their terms.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7576-60; Laws, 1970, ch. 407, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

CHAPTER 9

County Port Authority or Development Commission

SEC.

- 59-9-1. Declaration of public policy.
- 59-9-3. Construction of chapter.
- 59-9-5. Definitions.
- 59-9-7. Creation of county port authority or development commission; composition; jurisdiction.
- 59-9-9. Appointment, oath, bond, and terms of office of members.
- 59-9-11. Organization; meetings.
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- 59-9-17. General powers and authority of county; validation of prior acts.
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- 59-9-21. Restoration of sand beaches; leasing for development of port and related industrial facilities.
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- 59-9-59. Joint bond issue; tax levy; collection and disposition of taxes.
- 59-9-61. Joint bond issue; control of facilities; collection and disposition of revenues.
- 59-9-63. Joint bond issue; powers and duties of counties and municipalities.
- 59-9-65. Issuance of bonds and obligations for dredging channels and industrial site preparation.

- 59-9-67. Reclamation of submerged lands and tidelands; conveyance of lands by state; lease or sale of lands and facilities by county.
- 59-9-69. Additional general obligation bonds.
- 59-9-71. Dredging and site preparation; fund.
- 59-9-73. Negotiability and taxation of bonds issued under Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75.
- 59-9-75. Proceedings for issuance and validation of bonds issued under Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75; applicability of debt limitations.
- 59-9-77. Construction of chapter.
- 59-9-79. Validation of bonds.
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- 59-9-83. Exemption from taxation of bonds; negotiability.
- 59-9-85. Action to enforce contractual rights.

§ 59-9-1. Declaration of public policy.

It is hereby declared that the public policy of the State of Mississippi is to encourage the expansion and development of Mississippi's harbors and ports.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-26; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 26.

Cross References — Development of harbor facilities by county bridge and park commission, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

County port and harbor commission, see §§ 59-11-1 et seq.

Harbor improvements by coast counties, see §§ 59-13-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

<p>The provisions of title 59, chapter 9 do not give the Jackson County Port Authority authority to contract for residential</p>	<p>wastewater treatment. Hunter, August 15, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0504.</p>
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RESEARCH REFERENCES

<p>ALR. State regulation of maritime pilots under 46 USCS § 211. 35 A.L.R. Fed. 525.</p>	<p>Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping §§ 83-85.</p>
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§ 59-9-3. Construction of chapter.

(1) This chapter shall be construed liberally and broadly to effectuate the purposes set out herein and wide latitude and discretion shall be vested in the public authorities charged with the exercise of the powers and duties conferred upon them by this chapter, except as in the chapter otherwise expressly limited.

(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as repealing or altering existing laws affecting ports, and this chapter is to be considered as supplementary and cumulative. The grant of powers to the board of supervisors of such county, the county port authority, the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, and the port commission, where granted herein by reference to existing statutes, shall incorporate such

statutes herein seriatim, and the subsequent amendment or repeal of such statutes shall not limit or rescind the powers and authority hereby conferred unless expressly so provided in such amending or repealing statute.

(3) The enumeration of any specific rights and powers contained in this chapter, where followed by general powers, shall not be construed in a restrictive sense, but rather in as broad and comprehensive a sense as possible to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.

(4) A county development commission shall have all rights, duties and powers vested upon a county port authority by this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 7605-02, 7605-06, 7605-25, 7605-26; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, §§ 2, 6, 25, 26; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, §§ 2, 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 394, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 30, 1971).

Editor's Note — Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 2, provides as follows:

"Section 2. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to lands or beach-front property on the Gulf of Mexico which existed prior to the effective date of this act, whether or not such claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to such lands or interest therein shall have begun on the date on which this act becomes effective, or shall thereafter be begun. It is expressly provided that every right, title or interest in lands held by any person or groups of persons which front on the Gulf of Mexico in the State of Mississippi shall continue in full force and effect to the same extent as if this act had not become law."

Cross References — General powers of board of supervisors, see § 19-3-41.

Additional powers granted certain port authorities, see § 59-5-31.

§ 59-9-5. Definitions.

(1) The term "industrial operations" as used in this chapter shall include but not be limited to any and all enterprises, the operation of which will aid in the development of fisheries, shipyard operations, commerce, navigation or shipping in the port, as well as all forms of manufacturing enterprises, tourism enterprises, and service enterprises.

(2) Wherever the words "county port authority" appear in this chapter, such words shall be deemed to be identical in meaning and in context with the words "county development commission".

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 7605-02, 7605-12; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, §§ 2, 12; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 394, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 5; Laws, 1988, ch. 359, § 1, eff from and after June 1, 1988.

Cross References — County port and harbor commission, see §§ 59-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. "Industrial operations".

A concrete producer is a manufacturing enterprise and therefore qualifies as an industrial operation as contemplated by

the language of the statute. *Coast Materials Co. v. Harrison County Dev. Comm'n*, 730 So. 2d 1128 (Miss. 1998).

§ 59-9-7. Creation of county port authority or development commission; composition; jurisdiction.

Any county in the State of Mississippi bordering on the Mississippi Sound or the Gulf of Mexico in which county there is or may hereafter be located a municipality having a harbor or port of entry where commodities are exported to foreign nations, and where there is or may hereafter be maintained a channel and/or harbor or port to a depth of not less than twenty (20) feet, and where the board of supervisors of such county shall find and determine that public necessity and convenience requires the same, as evidenced by a resolution adopted and entered on the official minutes of such board, shall have a port authority to be known as the county port authority, but in any such county having four (4) incorporated municipalities therein, such county port authority shall be called and known as the development commission of such county. The county port authority shall be composed of seven (7) resident citizens of such county, who shall be qualified electors therein, but in any such county where a county development commission has been created, such county development commission shall be composed of twelve (12) resident citizens of such county, who shall be qualified electors therein. Such county port authority or county development commission shall have jurisdiction over the ports, terminals, harbors, channels, and passes leading thereto, and all vessels, boats, and wharves, common carriers and public utilities therein, using the same within the county, and not under the jurisdiction of any municipal port commission and exclusive of the jurisdiction of the port commission of any municipality in which a port of entry is located. But by joint resolutions adopted by the governing authorities of the county and the municipality, such county port authority or county development commission may be vested with joint and concurrent jurisdiction over all or any part of said port of entry, or the channels, harbors, or passes leading thereto, outside of the corporate limits of such municipality, and within such county.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-01; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 1; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 314, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Compensation and duties of county patrolmen in counties coming under this chapter, see §§ 45-7-41 et seq.

Harbor developments by county bridge and parks commission, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

Control of county port commission over certain harbors, see § 59-7-7.

County port commission, see § 59-7-407.

§ 59-9-9. Appointment, oath, bond, and terms of office of members.

A county port authority shall be appointed as follows: two (2) members shall be appointed by the Governor, and shall be qualified electors of the county and of the municipality in which the port of entry is located; five (5) members shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of such county; each supervisors district bordering on the Mississippi Sound or the Gulf of Mexico shall have at least one (1) member on such county port authority.

The members of any county port authority created as a county development commission shall be appointed as follows: Two (2) members shall be appointed by the Governor, and shall be qualified electors of the county and of a municipality which is a port of entry in such county; five (5) members shall be appointed, one (1) each by the governing authorities of each incorporated municipality in such county, and five (5) members shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of such county; each supervisors district bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico shall have at least one (1) member on such county development commission. After the expiration of the terms in effect on July 1, 1995, the members of the county development commission for Harrison County, Mississippi, which are appointed by the Governor shall be qualified electors of the county.

Before entering upon the duties of the office, each member of such county port authority or county development commission shall take and subscribe to the oath of office required by Section 268 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi and shall give bond to be approved by the board of supervisors of such county in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00) conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties. Such bond shall be made payable to the county, and in case of a breach thereof, suit may be brought thereon upon the relation of the county for the benefit of the county port authority or county development commission. The members of such county port authority or county development commission shall hold office for a term of four (4) years from the date of their appointment and qualification, and until their successor or successors shall be appointed and qualify as set out herein. The members of any municipal port commission shall be eligible for appointment as members of any county port authority or county development commission, but they shall not be paid additional compensation for attending any joint meeting of the county port authority or county development commission and the municipal port commission.

Notwithstanding any provisions of this chapter to the contrary, successors to members of a county development commission whose terms expire in the calendar year 1962, shall be appointed as follows: two (2) members by the Governor for a two-year term, four (4) members by the mayor of each incorporated municipality in the county for a three-year term; and five (5) members by the board of supervisors for a term of four (4) years. Succeeding appointments to the county development commission shall be for a term of four (4) years or until their successors are appointed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-02; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 2; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 394, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 314, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 432, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

Cross References — Who may administer oaths, see §§ 11-1-1, 25-1-9.

Increase in membership of county port authority upon issuance of bonds, see § 59-5-29.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Makeup of County Development Commission is governed by Miss. Code Section 59-9-9; this section increased number of municipal appointments to five; initial appointment of fifth commissioner expires simultaneously with remaining four municipal commissioners, rather than four years from date of the appointment. Crane, Apr. 14, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0223.

Term "governing authorities" in Section 59-9-9 means mayor and City Council; therefore, board of aldermen for City of Long Beach was authorized to make appointment to fill position on County Development Commission, subject to Mayor's veto. Laird, Feb. 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-1005.

§ 59-9-11. Organization; meetings.

When the members of a county port authority or county development commission shall have been appointed and shall have qualified as set out herein, they shall meet at the regular meeting place of the board of supervisors of such county, after giving at least five days' notice of the time and place of such meeting by publication in any newspaper published in the county seat of such county. At such meetings they shall elect a president and a secretary, who shall be members of the county port authority or county development commission, and adopt such rules as may govern the time and place for holding subsequent meetings, regular and special, not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-03; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 3; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 3.

§ 59-9-13. Compensation of members.

Each member of any county port authority or county development commission created under the provisions of this chapter shall receive per diem compensation in the amount provided by Section 25-3-69 for each day engaged in attendance of meetings of the county port authority or county development commission or engaged in other duties of the county port authority or county development commission, not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) in any one (1) year, and shall receive their actual traveling expenses, to be audited and allowed by the county port authority or county development commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-05; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 5; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 5; Laws, 1962, ch. 394, § 2; Laws, 1974, ch. 456; Laws, 1984, ch. 445, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1984).

§ 59-9-15. General powers and duties of authority or commission; director; additional clerical assistance; commission may enter into joint venture for construction and operation of facilities under jurisdiction of commission.

The duties and powers of a county port authority or county development commission shall be the same, as to matters within their jurisdiction, as those

set forth and prescribed by law, and as the same may be amended from time to time, relating to the duties and powers of a municipal port commission. The board of supervisors, on recommendation of the county port authority or county development commission, may appoint a county port director. The salary of the county port director shall be subject to the approval of the board of supervisors of such county, and the county port director so appointed may be the port director employed by the port commission of the municipality, in which case the board of supervisors of such county and the governing authorities of the municipality may jointly agree on pro rata payments toward the salary and expenses of such port director. The members of such county port authority or county development commission and the county port director shall be public officers within the meaning and the intent of Section 97-11-19, Mississippi Code of 1972. The clerk of the board of supervisors of any county which has appointed a county port authority or county development commission is authorized to employ such additional clerical assistance as may be necessary or required in view of the additional duties imposed upon the board by this chapter, but no employee shall receive a salary of more than Thirty-six Hundred Dollars (\$3600.00) per annum.

In addition to the general powers and duties of a county port commission or county development commission, a county port commission or development commission may enter into joint ventures or community alliances with private entities or other county port commissions or county development commissions to construct and operate any facilities under the jurisdiction of such commissions.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-04; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 4; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 4; Laws, 1960, ch. 346; Laws, 2001, ch. 327, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — Section 97-11-19 referred to in this section was repealed by Laws, 1983, ch. 469, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References — Duties and powers of municipal port commission, see § 59-1-9. Duties of port director, see § 59-1-27.

Additional powers granted certain county port commissions, see § 59-5-31.

Duties of county port commission, see §§ 59-7-129, 59-7-307.

Powers and duties of county port and harbor commission, see § 59-11-7.

§ 59-9-17. General powers and authority of county; validation of prior acts.

The board of supervisors of any county in which there has been created a county port authority or county development commission as provided in this chapter, acting for and on behalf of the county, is hereby given the authority through the county port authority, county development commission, or such other agencies as hereinafter may be provided by law, to engage in work of internal improvement or promoting, developing, constructing, maintaining and operating harbors, channels and other navigation projects within the county and the waters adjacent thereto and to develop land for industrial

operations in connection therewith, and shall have the power to acquire, purchase, install, lease, construct, manufacture, own, maintain, repair, equip, use, control and operate wharves, piers, docks, ways, elevators, compresses, warehouses, roadways, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, ship components, systems, parts, fuel, tourism or service facilities and materials required or incidental to any of such purposes; and all other facilities and equipment reasonably necessary or useful in the operation of harbor facilities, and water, air and rail terminals, and such other structures, facilities, lands, property or rights therein needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, and to deepen any part of said harbor and to extend, enlarge or add to the same by dredging in any direction, including inland, and to acquire land or any estate therein needed to carry out the purposes of this chapter in connection therewith. Such harbor facilities, tourism facilities, and service facilities, except those privately owned as a part of or in connection with industrial operations, shall always be and remain under the management and control of such county through the county port authority or county development commission or such other governing agency or agencies, as may hereinafter be provided by law, or under the joint management and control of such county and the municipality in which the port of entry is located, acting through the county port authority or county development commission and municipal port commission. All prior purchases, acceptances and other acquisitions of land or estates therein by the county in conformity with the purposes of this chapter, whether or not heretofore specifically authorized by law are hereby ratified, approved and confirmed. All acts, orders and resolutions of the board of supervisors of the county and the county port authority or county development commission adopted prior to the effective date of this chapter, which find and adjudicate the public necessity of acquiring lands for the purposes stated in this chapter, are hereby ratified, approved and confirmed; and such acts, orders and resolutions of the board of supervisors and the county port authority or county development commission shall, without any further acts upon the part of the board of supervisors of the county or the county port authority or county development commission, have the same force and effect as if adopted pursuant to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-06; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 6; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 359, § 2, eff from and after June 1, 1988.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 2, provides as follows:

"Section 2. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to lands or beach-front property on the Gulf of Mexico which existed prior to the effective date of this act, whether or not such claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to such lands or interest therein shall have begun on the date on which this act becomes effective, or shall thereafter be begun. It is expressly provided that every right, title or interest in lands held by any person or groups of persons which front on the Gulf of Mexico in the State of Mississippi shall continue in full force and effect to the same extent as if this act had not become law."

Cross References — Taking private property for public use, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 17.

Power of eminent domain, see §§ 11-27-1 et seq.

General powers of board of supervisors, see § 19-3-41.

Additional powers granted certain port commissions, see § 59-5-31.

County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

Issuance of bonds for establishment and development of industrial parks, in connection with port or harbor purposes, see § 59-7-105.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A county, through its port authority, may make rules and regulations to assure compliance with a comprehensive plan in respect to an industrial park, and such rules and regulations may control the use and access of roads inside the park to the extent that such roads are not public roads, but there is no requirement that the board of supervisors approve the rules and regulations established by the port authority; the rules and regulations may restrict the unfettered access by the general public and, if someone enters the park after being instructed not to enter, or remains in the park after being instructed to leave, a charge of trespass or of disorderly conduct, or both, may lie, the determination of which must be based on the specific facts presented. Genin, Jr., March 27, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0151.

The Hancock County Port and Harbor Commission, should it find consistent with fact and encompass such findings in an order spread upon its minutes, that the dredging of Little Lake Pass in Louisiana is necessary to keep the passes open to the commission's industrial park, may advertise for bids and contract for the dredging of such pass; however, such contract might be subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate federal and Louisiana authorities. Genin, April 2, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0142.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 26 **Am. Jur.** 2d, **Eminent Domain** § 53.

§ 59-9-19. Additional powers and authority of county.

The board of supervisors of any county in which there has been created a county port authority or county development commission as provided in this chapter, acting through its county port authority or county development commission, shall have the following additional powers and authority:

(a) To set aside or lease all or portions of said harbor facilities, wharves, docks, sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats or any necessary or useful improvements for special purposes for a term not exceeding ninety-nine (99) years.

(b) To sell, lease or otherwise dispose of tourism facilities, service facilities, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, dredges, facilities and land acquired for industrial or harbor operations to individuals, firms or corporations, public or private, for industrial operations on such terms and conditions and with such safeguards as will best promote and protect the public interest, and they are hereby authorized to transfer possession and/or title to any part of all of such facilities and lands by deed, lease, contract or other customary business instrument; however, no such lease of land or facilities acquired for industrial operations shall be executed

for a term in excess of ninety-nine (99) years from its date, and before the execution of the same any such deed, conveyance, lease, contract or other disposition shall be authorized by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds ($\frac{2}{3}$) of the membership of such port authority or development commission by order or resolution entered on its minutes, which order or resolution shall set forth the substantial terms of such deed, conveyance, lease, contract or other disposition.

In the letting of contracts and in the advertisement for bids thereon, for the development, construction, repair, maintenance or operation of any structures, facilities and lands required pursuant to any of the provisions of this chapter, the board of supervisors and the county port authority shall comply with all of the requirements of the general laws of the State of Mississippi governing the advertisement for bids and the letting of contracts by county boards of supervisors. In the event title to any such lands under jurisdiction of the port authority or development commission is in the name of the county, no such transaction shall be consummated until and unless the same be authorized by proper resolution of the port authority or development commission and of the county, in which event the county shall join the port authority or development commission in the execution of such instrument. Any such sale or lease may be executed upon such terms and conditions and for such monetary rental or other consideration as may be found adequate and approved by the county port authority or county development commission and the board of supervisors in orders or resolutions authorizing the same. Any covenants and obligations of the lessee or purchaser to make expenditures in determined amounts and within such time or times for improvements to be erected on the land by such lessee or purchaser and to conduct thereon industrial operations in such aggregate payroll amounts and for such period of time or times as may be determined and defined in such lease or conveyance, and to give preference in employment where practicable to qualified residents of the port of entry and of the county and/or state in which such port is situated, shall, if included in such lease or conveyance, constitute and be deemed sufficient consideration for the execution of any such lease or conveyance in the absence of a monetary rental or other considerations; any such lease may contain reasonable provisions giving the lessee the right to remove its or his improvements upon termination of the lease. Where the rentals provided in the lease will be sufficient to fully retire the cost of the particular facility or where the monetary consideration for a deed is sufficient to fully repay the cost of land acquired for industrial operations described in said deed, contracts for construction, repairs, maintenance and operation of the facility or for the sale of the land, may be negotiated and consummated without the necessity of advertising and obtaining competitive bids therefor. Such county, acting through the port authority or development commission, shall have the right to reclaim submerged lands for such purposes and shall also have the right to acquire by eminent domain proceedings, purchase or otherwise, any land or estate therein or property and rights that may be necessary for the

purposes of this chapter, provided that land acquired for industrial operations by eminent domain shall be leased or shall be sold only with such provisions in the deed or lease as shall ensure that the use of the land shall be beneficial to the carrying out of the purposes of this chapter and the promotion of commerce through said port. The county, acting through the port authority or development commission, shall have no authority or power to acquire without the consent of the owner thereof any property operated or used for port, harbor or industrial operations, or for such purposes as the county, acting through the port authority or development commission, is authorized to acquire and use such property for, where such property has been sold or leased by the county, acting through the port authority or development commission, to any person, firm or corporation for industrial operations as provided in this chapter. In the exercise of eminent domain, the county, acting through the port authority or development commission, shall determine the amount and character of the land or estate therein thus to be acquired and the public necessity for such exercise and their determination shall be conclusive and shall not be subject to attack in the absence of manifold abuse of discretion or fraud on the part of said county in making such determination and said county, acting through the port authority or development commission, shall have all powers and authority vested in persons or corporations having the right of eminent domain by Sections 11-27-1 through 11-27-49 and all other statutes pertinent thereto.

(c) To accept assurances and other agreements from persons, firms and corporations who are benefited by any action of the port authority pursuant to this chapter, including agreements to save the county harmless on account of any assurances given by the county to the United States of America or any agency thereof, including the Secretary of the Army, and to enter into contracts with such persons, firms or corporations relative to the future development and use of property owned by such persons, firms or corporations.

(d) To obligate the county by contract with persons, firms and corporations owning or agreeing to purchase property in the area benefited by any action of the port authority under the provisions of this chapter for the construction, development, improvement or expansion of channels and other navigation projects by the county at its expense and the continued maintenance and operation thereof by the county at its expense for a period of time not to exceed ninety-nine (99) years, or so long as any such person, firm or corporation continues to use said property for industrial operations.

(e) To obtain liability insurance as deemed appropriate for the needs of the port authority or development commission. If liability insurance is in effect, the port authority or development commission may be sued by anyone affected to the extent of such insurance carried; however, immunity from suit is waived only to the extent of such liability insurance carried, and a judgment creditor shall have recourse only to the proceeds or right to proceeds of such liability insurance.

(f) To invest funds credited to the county development commission. A county development commission is vested with authority to designate

depositories of its funds and to deposit its funds in insured, interest-bearing accounts or securities guaranteed by the good faith of the United States Treasury. All funds in excess of ninety (90) days' operating expenses, to the extent practicable, shall be invested in United States Treasury bills, interest-bearing accounts insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or other securities of the United States Government including United States Treasury bills, notes and bonds, federal agency securities, mortgage-backed securities guaranteed as to repayment of principal by the United States Government, or repurchase agreements and mutual funds invested in obligations of the United States Government or its agencies and repurchase agreements fully collateralized by such obligations.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-06; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 6; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 348; Laws, 1988, ch. 359, § 3; Laws, 1990, ch. 570, § 15; Laws, 1992, ch. 352, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 356, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References — Public contracts generally, see §§ 31-1-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where the objectors to the sale of land in an industrial park by a county to a purchaser argued that the county sold the land to the purchaser for below market value, the argument failed, as Miss. Code Ann. § 59-9-19 anticipated that property sold by the county development commission located in the industrial park within the jurisdiction of the commission could be sold in the absence of monetary rental or other consideration, provided that there were covenants and obligations on the purchaser to make expenditures or construct improvements; a special warranty deed imposed a covenant that the property was to be used as an aggregate distribution facility within one year and imposed restrictions upon its use otherwise. *Citizens Ass'n for Responsible Dev., Inc. v. Conrad Yelvington Distribs.*, 859 So. 2d 361 (Miss. 2003).

Where the objectors to the sale of land in an industrial park by a county to a

purchaser argued that the county and county development commission had not provided a sufficient explanation for their decisions in approving the transactions, the argument failed, as there was no statutory requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 59-9-19 that the commission and county board of supervisors had to make specific findings with regard to the sale of the land. *Citizens Ass'n for Responsible Dev., Inc. v. Conrad Yelvington Distribs.*, 859 So. 2d 361 (Miss. 2003).

This statute prohibits a county and its port authority from reacquiring by eminent domain property previously sold by them if that property is being used or operated for industrial purposes. The county and its port authority were not prohibited from reacquiring land which was no longer being used for such purposes. *H.K. Porter Co. v. Board of Supvrs.*, 324 So. 2d 746 (Miss. 1975).

§ 59-9-21. Restoration of sand beaches; leasing for development of port and related industrial facilities.

(1) In addition to the powers and authority elsewhere conferred by this chapter, the board of supervisors of any county in which there has been created

a county port authority or county development commission, acting through its county port authority or county development commission, shall have the power and authority to rebuild and restore to its previous width and height any sloping beach or sand beach heretofore pumped in or dredged to protect a public highway extending along the beach or shore of any body of tidewater which is exposed to or in danger of damage by water driven against the shore by storms or hurricanes, as heretofore authorized by Section 1 of Chapter 319 enacted at the 1924 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature; and to let by competitive bids a contract therefor in the manner and by the procedure set out in Section 59-9-27. In addition to bonds heretofore issued pursuant to Chapter 462, Laws of 1971, the board of supervisors may issue and sell full faith and credit bonds of said county in the manner and by the procedure set out in this chapter in an amount not exceeding Four Million Dollars (\$4,000,000.00), subject to the limitations and conditions of this chapter, and may apply thereon any funds now or hereafter made available to the use or pledge of the said development commission, and to dredge, fill in and reclaim submerged lands and tidelands belonging to the State of Mississippi.

(2) It is hereby declared that the leasing for the development of port and related industrial facilities of the following described submerged lands and tidelands belonging to the State of Mississippi in an area immediately adjacent to the present port and industrial complex known as the Bayou Casotte Area in Jackson County, Mississippi, will serve a higher public interest in accordance with the purposes of this section and with the public policy of this state as set forth in Section 49-27-3, said property being more particularly described as follows:

Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 8 South, Range 5 West and at grid coordinates N242,489.57 feet, E606,331.52 feet; runs thence North 89 degrees 10' 22" East along the Mid-Section Line of Section 21, Township 8 South, Range 5 West, 661.48 feet to a point at grid coordinates N242,499.12 feet, E606,992.93 feet; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East 1,621.39 feet to a two inch iron pipe with cap, set in concrete at grid coordinates N240,877.78 feet, E607,005.86 feet, said point being the Southeast corner of the property conveyed to Corchem, Inc., by H. K. Porter Company, Inc., by instrument dated December 31, 1971, recorded in Deed Book 419, page 182, Land Deed records of Jackson County, Mississippi, and being the point of beginning; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East, 1,018.61 feet to a point on the South line of said Section 21, said point being North 89 degrees 18' 22" East, 650.33 feet, of the Southwest corner of said Section 21; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East, 2,306.58 feet, to a two inch iron pipe with cap, set in concrete at grid coordinates N237,552.70 feet, E607,032.37 feet; thence continues South 0 degrees 27' 25" East 173 feet, more or less, to the mean water line of the Mississippi Sound, at scaled grid coordinates N237,379 feet, N607,033 feet; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East 1,379 feet, more or less, to the intersection of the N236,000 grid line, at grid coordinates N236,000.00 feet, E607,044.75 feet; runs thence North 90 degrees 00' 00" West, with the N236,000 grid line, 3,305 feet, more or less, to

the mean water line of the Mississippi Sound on the East side of a Spoil Island, at scaled grid coordinates N236,000 feet, E603,740 feet; runs thence across said Spoil Island, North 90 degrees 00' 00" West, 195 feet, more or less, to the mean water line of the Mississippi Sound on the West side of said Spoil Island at scaled grid coordinates N236,000 feet, E603,545 feet; runs thence North 90 degrees 00' 00" West, with the N236,000 grid line 2,140 feet, more or less, to the East Harbor Line of Bayou Casotte at grid coordinates N236,000.00 feet, E601,404.38 feet; runs thence with the East Harbor Line of Bayou Casotte North 0 degrees 03' 00" West, 4,056.52 feet to a point at grid coordinates N240,056.52 feet, E601,400.84 feet; thence continues with the East Harbor Line of Bayou Casotte North 6 degrees 34' 54" East, 746.48 feet to a point that is South 89 degrees 10' 22" West of the point of beginning and at grid coordinates N240,798.08 feet, E601,486.40 feet; runs thence North 89 degrees 10' 22" East, 780 feet, more or less, to the mean water line of the Mississippi Sound at scaled grid coordinates N240,809 feet, E602,266 feet; runs thence North 89 degrees 10' 22" East, 60 feet, more or less, to a two inch iron pipe with cap, set in concrete at grid coordinates N240,810.22 feet, E602,326.35 feet; thence continues North 89 degrees 10' 22" East, along the South boundary of Corchem, Inc., property 4,680.00 feet to the point of beginning and contains 623.7 acres, more or less. The real property herein described is situated in the South one half of Section 20, Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 21, West one half of the Northwest Quarter of Fractional Section 28, and Fractional Section 29, all being located in Township 8 South, Range 5 West, Jackson County, Mississippi.

LESS AND EXCEPT any portion of the following described property which is not owned or otherwise held in trust by the State of Mississippi:

Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 8 South, Range 5 West and at grid coordinates N242,489.57 feet, E606,331.52 feet; runs thence North 89 degrees 10' 22" East along the Mid-Section line of Section 21, Township 8 South, Range 5 West, 661.48 feet to a point at grid coordinates N242,499.12 feet, E606,992.93 feet; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East, 1621.39 feet to a two inch iron pipe with cap, set in concrete, at grid coordinates N240,877.78 feet, E607,005.86 feet, said point being the Southeast corner of the property conveyed to Corchem, Inc., by H. K. Porter Company, Inc., by deed dated December 31, 1971, recorded in Deed Book 419, page 182, Land Deed Records of Jackson County, Mississippi, and the point of beginning; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East, 1,018.61 feet to a point on the South line of said Section 21, said point being 650.33 feet East of the Southwest corner of said Section 21; runs thence South 0 degrees 27' 25" East 2,306.58 feet to a two inch iron pipe with cap, set in concrete at grid coordinates N237,552.70 feet, E607,032.37 feet; thence continues South 0 degrees 27' 25" East, 173 feet, more or less, to the mean water line of the Mississippi Sound as existed in 1961; runs thence Northwesterly along the said meandering mean water line to a point on the West line of Fractional Section 28, Township 8 South, Range 5 West; thence continues along the meandering mean water line of the Mississippi Sound in a Northwesterly

direction to a point on the North line of Fractional Section 29, Township 8 South, Range 5 West; thence continues along said meandering water line of the Mississippi Sound in a Northwesterly direction to a point that is South 89 degrees 10' 22" West of the point of beginning; runs thence North 89 degrees 10' 22" East, 60 feet, more or less, to a two inch iron pipe with cap, set in concrete, at grid coordinates N240,810.22 feet, E602,326.35 feet; thence continues North 89 degrees 10' 22" East along the South boundary of Corchem, Inc., property, 4,680.00 feet to the point of beginning. The parcel of land herein described is situated in the South one-half of Section 20, the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 21, the West one-half of the Northwest Quarter of Fractional Section 28, and Fractional Section 29, all being in Township 8, Range 5 West, Jackson County, Mississippi, and contains 205.4 acres, more or less. Bearings and grid coordinates used in this description refer to the Transverse Mercator Projection for the State of Mississippi East Zone.

(3) It is hereby declared that the leasing or use for commercial fishing purposes, port purposes and for industrial development related thereto of the following described submerged lands and tidelands belonging to the State of Mississippi in an area lying between the East Pascagoula River and Middle River, Jackson County, Mississippi, will serve a higher public interest in accordance with the purposes of this section and with the public policy of this state as set forth in Section 49-27-3, said property being more particularly described as follows:

All that part of the Lowry Island Resurvey, which is bounded on the North by the L & N Railroad Track; on the East by the East Pascagoula River; on the West by Middle River; and on the South by the Mississippi Sound; and also the dredged-up Spoil Island, known as Singing River Island, lying South of the above described land and South of the launching channel South of the lands leased to Litton Ship Systems, Inc., and lying West of the federally maintained dredged channel going from Horn Island Pass to East Pascagoula River; LESS AND EXCEPT, however, that part of said property now owned by Jackson County, Mississippi, and the State of Mississippi and leased to Litton Ship Systems, Inc.

(4) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, the county port authority of the county in which such state lands are located is hereby authorized to apply for and secure a lease for a period of not to exceed ninety-nine (99) years of such state lands as may be necessary for the development of commercial fishing, port and related industrial facilities in the aforesaid areas described in subsections (2) and (3) hereof except for the provisions of subsection (5) of this section.

Application for a lease shall be made with the Secretary of State.

Utilization of any and all submerged land and/or tideland shall be in such a manner so as not to obstruct normal navigation of any normal and natural channel. Title to the property shall remain vested in the State of Mississippi.

All oil, gas and other minerals in, on or under said lands leased are hereby specifically reserved unto the State of Mississippi.

The county port authority is hereby authorized to sublease such lands for commercial fishing, port purposes and for industrial development related thereto.

All subleases executed by the county port authority shall be on such terms and conditions, and with such safeguards, as will best promote and protect the public interest. Such subleases shall be submitted to the Secretary of State for approval. Provided, however, that each sublease shall provide that if such property is not utilized within five (5) years, or if commercial fishing, industrial or port usage ceases and such termination continues for a period of two (2) years, the sublease shall terminate and all rights thereunder shall revert to the county. However, if such nonutilization for a period of five (5) years or cessation of use for a period of two (2) years shall be caused, suspended, delayed or interrupted by act of God, fire, war, rebellion, scarcity of water, insurrection, riot, strike, scarcity of labor, differences with employees, failure of a carrier to transport or furnish facilities for transportation; or as a result of some order, rule or regulation of any federal, state, municipality or other governmental agency; or as the result of failure of the sublessee to obtain any required permit or certificate; or as the result of any cause whatsoever beyond the control of sublessee, the time of such delay or interruption shall not be counted against sublessee in determining such periods of five (5) years or two (2) years. All subleases shall be for a fair and adequate consideration and the compensation and revenues therefrom may be retained by the state or shared with the county in a fashion approved by the Secretary of State for port purposes and industrial development. Such compensation and revenues may be pledged by the county to payment of any bonds required to be issued to finance such commercial fishing, port and industrial development, including a United States Navy home port. However, in the event bonds are issued as provided herein, upon the discharge and payment of the principal and interest of such bonds, any additional revenue generated shall be retained by the state or shared with the county for port purposes and industrial development in a fashion approved by the Secretary of State.

(5)(a) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, upon selection of Jackson County as a site for a home port for a Surface Action Group and upon review of the contract authorized in Section 1 of Chapter 812, Laws of 1985, as amended, the Secretary of State is hereby authorized to lease for a period not to exceed ninety-nine (99) years or sell if required by the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense such state lands as may be necessary for the development by the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense for a home port and related facilities for a naval squadron in the aforesaid area described in subsection (3) hereof. It is hereby declared that the leasing or sale to the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense of any of the aforesaid area described in subsection (3) hereof will provide a major stimulus to employment in Jackson County and the state and will serve a higher public interest in accordance with the purposes of this section and with the public policy as set forth in Section 49-27-3, and such lease or sale may be made for nominal consideration.

(i) If the subject property is to be sold to the United States Navy or to the United States Department of Defense, the instrument of conveyance, which shall be by quitclaim deed, shall include the following:

1. A reservation of all oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under the subject property subject to a provision that no exploration, exploitation or development of any minerals shall be undertaken without prior written consent of the United States Navy; which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld;

2. A reverter which shall be created, declared, imposed and resolved in said quitclaim deed according to the terms of which said title to the subject property shall automatically revert to the state. The reversion shall automatically occur if a. construction of the home port facilities has not commenced within two (2) years of the conveyance of the subject property or b. thereafter, if the subject property is no longer required by the Navy for a home port or related facilities and the Secretary of the Navy shall so determine and promptly notify the State of Mississippi of said determination. In the event of said determination, the subject property as improved shall automatically revert to the State of Mississippi, and the state may pay to the United States of America the fair market value of the Navy's improvements within five (5) years from the date of reversion, less the fair market value of the state and/or county-financed facilities; however, the county financed facilities shall revert to Jackson County unless the state finances the same or unless otherwise agreed upon by Jackson County and the state. If the State of Mississippi elects not to pay to the United States of America the fair market value of the Navy's improvements within said period of five (5) years, then said property and all facilities financed by the State of Mississippi and financed by Jackson County shall automatically revert to the United States of America.

(ii) If the subject property is to be leased to the United States Navy or to the United States Department of Defense, the lease agreement shall contain a termination clause which shall declare that the lease shall be rescinded if either of the conditions described in subsection (5)(a)(i)2 of this section occur. If the condition described in subsection (5)(a)(i)2b. of this section occurs, the United States Navy and the United States Department of Defense shall be allowed two (2) years from the date of termination or utilization of the area leased in which to remove any improvements or facilities thereon, excluding any county financed facilities, which shall revert to Jackson County unless otherwise agreed upon by Jackson County and the state. All references to payment for county financed facilities upon reversion shall also apply to the state if it finances the same.

(b) Provided, however, if revenue bonds are to be issued by the State Bond Commission under Section 1 of Chapter 500, Laws of 1985 [See Editor's Note below], then the lands referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not be sold to the United States Navy or to the United

States Department of Defense but may only be leased and such lease may contain an option to purchase when such bonds are retired. In this case an additional clause shall be included in the lease agreement to provide that upon termination of the lease agreement prior to the retirement of all revenue bonds issued under Section 1 of Chapter 306, Laws of 1987, such payments by the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense as are necessary to retire such revenue bonds shall become due and payable on the date of the termination of the lease.

(6) This section is to be considered as supplementary and cumulative and nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing existing laws, or as repealing or amending any options, leases, deeds, contracts, agreements or legal instruments heretofore entered into by the board of supervisors of such county, the county port authority, the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, or the port commission. The grant of powers to the board of supervisors of such county, the county port authority, the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, and the port commission, where granted herein by reference to existing statutes, shall incorporate such statutes herein seriatim, and the subsequent amendment or repeal of such statutes shall not limit or rescind the powers and authority hereby conferred unless expressly so provided in such amending or repealing statute.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-06; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 6; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 514; Laws, 1982, ch. 445; Laws, 1984, ch. 445, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 500, § 2; Laws, 1987, ch. 306, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved February 27, 1987).

Editor's Note — Laws, 1971, ch. 462, referred to in this section, is codified as §§ 59-9-3, 59-9-17, 59-9-19, 59-9-21, 59-9-23, 59-9-35, and 59-9-85.

Laws of 1985, ch. 812, § 1, referred to in this section, is classified as a local or private law, and is not codified.

Laws, 1987, ch. 306, § 1, referred to in this section, is classified as a state bond law, and is not codified.

Laws, 1985, ch. 500, § 1, referred to in this section, provides as follows:

"In addition to the authority granted in House Bill 617, Regular Session of 1985 (Chapter 812); Senate Bill 2879, Regular Session of 1985 (Chapter 458); and House Bill 1142 (Chapter 879), Regular Session of 1985, and upon the execution of a lease agreement as provided in subsection (5) of Section 59-9-21, the State Bond Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to issue revenue bonds of the State of Mississippi for the purpose of constructing a surface action group base, and for the purpose of widening the East Pascagoula River channel to the extent that funds to be provided by the City of Pascagoula, Jackson County and the Jackson County Port Authority to widen such channel are not provided for such purpose. Such bonds shall not exceed the principal amount of Two Hundred Million Dollars (\$200,000,000.00) and shall be secured by the lease agreement with the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense, and such other additional security as may be required by the State Bond Commission and agreed to by the United States Navy or the United States Department of Defense. No such bonds shall be issued unless the lease is executed for a term sufficient to retire the bonds to be issued hereunder and it is clearly set forth

therein that such bonds will be paid by the United States Government or an agency thereof and that there is no provision in the federal statutes which allows the termination of such lease by nonappropriation of funds for such purpose.

"(2) Such bonds shall bear date or dates, may be in such form and denominations, may be in fully registered form, may bear such conversion privileges and be payable in such installments and at such time or times not exceeding forty (40) years from the date thereof, may bear interest at such rate or rates, may be payable at such time or times and at such place or places within or without the State of Mississippi, may be redeemable prior to maturity at such time or times and upon such terms, with or without premium, and shall be substantially in such form, all as shall be determined by resolution of the State Bond Commission; however, such bonds shall not bear a greater overall maximum interest rate to maturity than that allowed in Section 75-17-103, Mississippi Code of 1972. The State Bond Commission shall sell such bonds on sealed bids at public sale, and for such price as it may determine to be for the best interest of the State of Mississippi, but no such sale shall be made at a price less than ninety-seven percent (97%) of par value plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. All interest accruing on such bonds so issued shall be payable semiannually or annually.

"No bond issued hereunder shall bear more than one (1) rate of interest; each bond shall bear interest from its date to its stated maturity date at the interest rate specified on the bonds; all bonds of the same maturity shall bear the same rate of interest from date to maturity. All interest accruing on bonds issued hereunder shall be payable semiannually or annually, except that the first interest payment may be for any period not exceeding one (1) year. No interest payment on bearer bonds shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon and neither cancelled nor supplemental coupons shall be permitted. The lowest interest rate specified for any bonds issued shall not be less than sixty percent (60%) of the highest interest rate specified for the same bond issue. Each interest rate specified in any bid must be in multiples of either one-eighth of one percent ($\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%) or one-tenth of one percent ($\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%). If serial bonds, such bonds shall mature annually, and the first maturity date thereof shall not be more than five (5) years from the date of such bonds.

"Notice of the sale of any such bonds shall be published at least one (1) time, the first of which shall be made not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale, and shall be so published in one or more newspapers having a general circulation in the City of Jackson and in one or more other newspapers or financial journals with a large national circulation, to be selected by the State Bond Commission.

"Such bonds shall be signed by the Chairman of the State Bond Commission, or by his facsimile signature, and the official seal of the State Bond Commission shall be affixed thereto, attested by the Secretary of the State Bond Commission. The interest coupons, if any, to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of said officers. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officials herein designated to sign the bonds, who were in the office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser, or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

"(3) All bonds issued under this section shall be limited obligations of the State of Mississippi, the principal of, redemption premium, if any, and interest on which shall be payable solely from revenues derived for lease payments as provided in subsection (1) of this section and from such other funds as may be made available for such purpose by the lessee. Bonds and interest coupons, if any, issued under this section shall never constitute an indebtedness of the State of Mississippi within the meaning of any state constitutional provision or statutory limitation, and shall never constitute nor give rise

to a pecuniary liability of the State of Mississippi or a charge against its general credit or taxing powers, and such fact shall be plainly stated on the face of each such bond. All bonds issued under this section and all interest coupons applicable thereto, if any, shall be construed to be negotiable instruments, despite the fact that they are payable solely from a specified source.

“(4) The bonds issued under this section and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation in the State of Mississippi.

“(5) The revenue bonds authorized under this section may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions and things which are specified or required by this section.

“The bonds authorized under this section may be validated in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, in the manner and with the force and effect provided now or hereafter by Chapter 13, Title 31, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district and other bonds. The necessary papers for such validation proceedings shall be transmitted to the State Bond Commission, and the required notice shall be published in a newspaper published in the City of Jackson, Mississippi.

“(6) The proceeds of the bonds issued under this section shall be deposited in a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury to be known as the ‘Surface Action Group Base Construction Fund’. The expenditure of such funds shall be under the direction of the State Bond Commission and shall be paid by the State Treasurer upon warrants issued by the Auditor of Public Accounts, which warrants shall be issued upon requisitions signed by the Chairman of the State Bond Commission.”

Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 2, provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to lands or beach-front property on the Gulf of Mexico which existed prior to the effective date of this act, whether or not such claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to such lands or interest therein shall have begun on the date on which this act becomes effective, or shall thereafter be begun. It is expressly provided that every right, title or interest in lands held by any person or groups of persons which front on the Gulf of Mexico in the State of Mississippi shall continue in full force and effect to the same extent as if this act had not become law.”

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Additional powers granted certain port commissions, see § 59-5-31.

§ 59-9-23. Establishment and development of industrial parks.

In addition to the powers and authority elsewhere conferred in this chapter, the board of supervisors of any county in which there has been created a county port authority or county development commission, acting through its county port authority or county development commission, may establish industrial parks with defined boundaries to develop and utilize lands for industrial operations and in such development may provide for water, sewage, drainage or similar facilities, or transportation, power or communication facilities which are incidental to the use of the lands as industrial parks. The creation of all such parks purported to be so established prior to enactment of this section as would comply with the provisions of this section is hereby ratified and declared valid. Transportation facilities herein authorized may include railroad lines and bridges extending not more than twenty (20) miles from such industrial parks, locomotives and other equipment to be used only in

said county, but if any part of any such facility shall be in another county, only with consent of such county expressed by resolution of its board of supervisors and its county port authority or county development commission. Transportation facilities owned by a county hereunder may be operated by said county or others on behalf of such county or may be leased to others by said county; the Public Service Commission shall have no jurisdiction over such transportation facilities or the financing thereof, nor, so long as said county regulates such rates, the rates charged for the use of such transportation facilities. Revenue bonds, but not general obligation bonds, may be issued to pay the cost of such transportation, power or communication facilities, under Section 59-9-41, or under any other law now or hereafter available, and any such facilities may be sold or leased as hereinafter provided. In connection with an industrial park any such county, through its county port authority or county development commission, may establish a comprehensive plan, may make rules and regulations to assure compliance with such plan, and may set and collect rates and charges for services furnished by such industrial park.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-06; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 6; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 416, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 359, § 4, eff from and after June 1, 1988.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 2, provides as follows:

"SECTION 2. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to lands or beach-front property on the Gulf of Mexico which existed prior to the effective date of this act, whether or not such claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to such lands or interest therein shall have begun on the date on which this act becomes effective, or shall thereafter be begun. It is expressly provided that every right, title or interest in lands held by any person or groups of persons which front on the Gulf of Mexico in the State of Mississippi shall continue in full force and effect to the same extent as if this act had not become law."

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Industrial parks and districts generally, see §§ 57-5-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The board of supervisors of Jackson County, acting by and through the Jackson County Port Authority, may extend water and sewer lines of the Sunplex Light Industrial Park beyond the boundaries of the park. Hunter, July 11, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0409.

A county, through its port authority, may make rules and regulations to assure compliance with a comprehensive plan in respect to an industrial park, and such rules and regulations may control the use

and access of roads inside the park to the extent that such roads are not public roads, but there is no requirement that the board of supervisors approve the rules and regulations established by the port authority; the rules and regulations may restrict the unfettered access by the general public and, if someone enters the park after being instructed not to enter, or remains in the park after being instructed to leave, a charge of trespass or of disorderly conduct, or both, may lie, the deter-

mination of which must be based on the specific facts presented. Genin, Jr., March 27, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0151.

The Board of Supervisors of Jackson County acting through the Jackson County Port Authority is empowered to acquire the interests of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians in the water and sewer lines and rights of way along High-

way 57 in Jackson County and as consideration for such acquisition, may contract with the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians to provide water and sewer services of a value or amount not to exceed the fair market value of the water and sewer lines and rights of way. Hunter, June 11, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0279.

§ 59-9-25. Contracts for construction, maintenance, etc., of ports, facilities, etc.

The board of supervisors of such county, acting through its county port authority, and the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, acting through its port commission, may, in their discretion and acting jointly, enter into a contract or contracts for the development, construction, repair, maintenance or operation of any seaports, wharves, piers, docks, ways, elevators, compresses, warehouses, tourism facilities, service facilities, roadways, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, and water, air and rail terminals and other structures, facilities and lands needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, or any other property at the port of entry under the joint jurisdiction of said county port authority and such port commission under such terms and conditions as both bodies may deem best economically to the city and county wherein the port of entry is located. In the letting of contracts, and in advertisement for bids thereon, for the development, construction, repair, maintenance or operation of any structures, facilities and lands acquired pursuant to any of the provisions of this chapter, the said board of supervisors, the governing authorities of the said municipality, the county port authority and the municipal port commission shall comply with all the requirements of the general laws of the State of Mississippi governing the advertisement for bids and letting of contracts by county boards of supervisors. However, where the rentals provided in a lease will be sufficient to fully retire the cost of the particular facility, contracts for the construction, repair, maintenance and operation of the facility may be negotiated and consummated with the lessee of the facility without the necessity of advertising and obtaining competitive bids therefor. The county port authority is given full power and authority to employ engineers, attorneys and other professional and technical assistance in and about the operations, development and advancement of harbors and ports of such county, and to pay reasonable compensation therefor, such employment and compensation therefor to be approved by the board of supervisors of such county. The county port authority, and the port commission of the port of entry are jointly vested with the power and authority herein conferred, subject to the approval of the board of supervisors and the governing authorities of the municipality of all joint undertakings of such county port authority and port commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-07; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 7; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 359, § 5, eff from and after June 1, 1988.

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The authority of the Tombigbee River Valley Water Management District to contract for dredging services with the Army Corps of Engineers is not subject to public bidding laws. Applewhite, Oct. 12, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0560.

§ 59-9-27. Jurisdiction and duty of port authority over improvements; powers and duties of development commission.

(1) All improvements constructed by the board of supervisors of any county under the provisions of this chapter or under the provisions of any local and private act conferring upon the board of supervisors the authority to engage in port, harbor or channel improvements or development, shall be under the jurisdiction of and operated and maintained by such county port authority. It shall be the duty of such county port authority, from time to time, to make recommendations to the board of supervisors of such county concerning expenditures, maintenance, operation and development of the harbors or port facilities of such county, and to submit annually to such board of supervisors a proposed budget for the operation and maintenance of such harbors and port facilities, which recommendations and budget shall be subject to the approval of the board of supervisors.

(2) In any county having a county development commission, all improvements constructed, including acquisition of land authorized under the provisions of this chapter, shall be constructed, operated and maintained by the county development commission. It shall be the duty of such county development commission, from time to time, to make recommendations to the board of supervisors of such county concerning expenditures, maintenance, operation and development of the harbors or port facilities of such county and the tourism and service facilities authorized under this chapter, and to submit annually to such board of supervisors a proposed budget for the operation and maintenance of such harbors and port facilities and tourism and service facilities, which recommendations and budget shall be subject to the approval of the board of supervisors. The said development commission shall have, and is hereby given, the authority and power to enter into contracts for the performance of all work, including acquisition of land, authorized under this chapter and to expend funds made available therefor, provided that all such expenditures by such commission shall be audited by the county auditor, who shall monthly report such expenditures to the board of supervisors. In letting contracts, and in advertising for bids therefor, the development commission shall comply with all the requirements of the general laws of the State of Mississippi covering the advertisement for bids and the letting of contracts by county boards of supervisors and such commission shall have full power and authority to employ engineers, attorneys, real estate brokers and appraisers, and other professional and technical assistance in and about the operations,

development and advancement of the harbors and ports of such county and the tourism and service facilities authorized under this chapter and to pay reasonable compensation or commission therefor. Any capital expenditures or proposals to employ professional or technical assistance which does not exceed Twenty-five Thousand Dollars (\$25,000.00) may be undertaken by the commission without approval of the board of supervisors and any capital expenditure or proposal to employ professional and technical assistance which exceeds the sum of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars (\$25,000.00) shall not be undertaken except upon approval by the board of supervisors by appropriate order spread upon its minutes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-08; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 8; Laws, 1960, ch. 211, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 359, § 6; Laws, 1998, ch. 364, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Submission of budget requests to legislative budget office, see § 27-103-127.

Public contracts generally, see §§ 31-1-1 et seq.

Application of this section to contracts for restoring and rebuilding beaches, see § 59-9-21.

Harbor improvements by coast counties, see §§ 59-13-1 et seq.

§ 59-9-29. Jurisdiction over lands.

Any county port authority or county development commission created under the provisions of this chapter is hereby vested with full jurisdiction and control of any and all lands lying within or adjacent to any river, bay or natural lake, which are below the mean high tide mark, and which lands lie within or adjacent to any port or harbor within the jurisdiction of such county port authority or county development commission. Any such county port authority or county development commission is hereby authorized to reclaim any and all such lands by filling, dredging, or other means, to utilize, lease, sell, or dispose of same for the development and operation of the port to the same extent it is now or may hereafter be authorized to utilize its other facilities. Any such county port authority or county development commission, pursuant to resolutions adopted by the port commission and the governing body of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, may exercise joint and concurrent jurisdiction of any such lands described in such resolutions within the jurisdiction of the port commission of the port of entry, and outside of the corporate limits of such municipality, and may exercise the above powers jointly with such port commission as to such lands.

Under any such state-owned lands, if any, hereinabove turned over to the county port authority or county development commission, all oil, gas and other mineral rights are hereby reserved unto the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-09; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 9; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 7; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

§ 59-9-31. Lease or sale of unused lands for industrial purposes; authority and limitations.

In the event any part of such lands, as are described in Section 59-9-29, are not used for port purposes, and navigation, commerce and fishing will not be impeded thereby, such county port authority may lease or sell the same to individuals, firms, or corporations, public or private, for industrial operations, on such terms and conditions and with such safeguards as will best promote and protect the public interest, and they are hereby authorized to transfer possession of, lease or sell any part or all of such lands by lease, deed, contract, or other customary business instrument. However, no such lease shall be executed for a term in excess of ninety-nine years from its date, and before execution of same any such lease, deed, or contract or other disposition shall be authorized by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds ($\frac{2}{3}$) of the membership of such county port authority by order or resolution entered upon its minutes, which order or resolutions shall set forth the substantial terms of such lease, deed, contract, or other disposition. No such transaction shall be consummated until and unless the same be authorized by proper resolution of the board of supervisors, who shall join in the execution of any such instrument.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-10; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 10; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Cross References — Industrial developments generally, see §§ 57-1-1 et seq. Additional powers granted certain port commissions and authorities, see § 59-5-31.

§ 59-9-33. Lease or sale of unused lands for industrial purposes; terms and conditions.

Any lease, sale, contract, or other disposition of any or all lands referred to in Section 59-9-29 may be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration as may be found to be adequate by the county port authority, and approved by the board of supervisors in orders or resolutions authorizing same, and the covenants and obligations of the lessee or grantee to make expenditures in determined amounts, and within such time or times, for improvements to be erected on the land by such lessee or grantee, and to conduct thereon industrial operations in such aggregate payroll amounts and for such period of time or times as may be determined and defined in such lease, deed, contract or other disposition, shall constitute and be deemed sufficient consideration for the execution of any such lease, deed, contract or other disposition. Any such lease granted for industrial or harbor operations under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 59-9-19 may contain an option to buy at any time and/or upon termination thereof, and shall, however, contain reasonable provisions for the termination of the lease or reversion of possession of the land and all improvements made by lessee or grantee to the facility, including personal property, unless previously agreed to, in the event of default on the part of the lessee or grantee of his or its obligation or covenants under such agreement.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-11; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 11; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

§ 59-9-35. Exemption from ad valorem taxes of certain lease contracts; time limit; lessee required to pay taxes after expiration of exemption.

Any contract for the lease of any development for the manufacture of ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, ship components, systems, parts, fuel and materials required or incidental to any of such purposes to be constructed out of the proceeds of bonds to be issued under the provisions of this chapter may be exempt from ad valorem taxation except state ad valorem taxation and school district ad valorem taxation. The time of such exemption shall not exceed a total of ten (10) years, which shall commence from the date of the contract. Any request for an exemption must be made in writing before the date of the contract.

The lessee shall be required, after the expiration of any exemption granted hereunder, to pay ad valorem taxes on the leasehold notwithstanding that title to such development is vested in the county and port authority.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-06, Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 6; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 502, § 11; Laws, 1992, ch. 518, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 2, provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to lands or beach-front property on the Gulf of Mexico which existed prior to the effective date of this act, whether or not such claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to such lands or interest therein shall have begun on the date on which this act becomes effective, or shall thereafter be begun. It is expressly provided that every right, title or interest in lands held by any person or groups of persons which front on the Gulf of Mexico in the State of Mississippi shall continue in full force and effect to the same extent as if this act had not become law.”

Cross References — Ad valorem taxes generally, see §§ 27-29-1 et seq.

§ 59-9-37. Issuance of bonds and interim certificates.

The board of supervisors of any county in which a county port authority or county development commission has been created pursuant to this chapter is hereby given authority to issue bonds or other obligations of such county in an amount not to exceed twenty percent (20%) of the assessed valuation of such county to provide funds for any purpose or purposes set out in this chapter. Such bonds may be issued at one (1) time or from time to time in such amount or amounts, shall bear such date or dates, shall be of such denomination or denominations, shall be payable at such place or places, shall bear interest at such rate or rates, not exceeding that allowed in Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall mature in such amount or amounts and at such time or times, not exceeding twenty (20) years from the date thereof, with or without option of prior payment, and shall be executed in such manner, all as may be determined by the said board of supervisors. The resolution or order adopted by the board of supervisors authorizing said bonds may pledge the sources of

revenue authorized under the statutes to pay the principal thereof and interest thereon, and all bonds issued under the one (1) resolution or order may be equally secured and entitled to be paid. In event, however, such board of supervisors elects to delay actual delivery or sale of any part of the bonds so authorized, either until the proceeds thereof are needed, or upon the happening or occurrence of any event or thing, then and in that event the bonds so authorized and any part thereof shall be secured and be entitled to be paid, both as to principal and interest in accordance with the terms and conditions to be fixed and recited in said resolution or order. In anticipation of the issuance of the definitive bonds authorized by this chapter, any such county may issue interim certificates. Such interim certificates shall be in such form, contain such terms, conditions or provisions, bear such date or dates, and evidence such agreement or agreements relating to their discharge by payment or by the delivery of the definitive bonds, as such county, by resolution of its governing body, may determine. Whenever any county shall have issued bonds under this section or Section 59-9-41, a portion of which remains outstanding and unpaid, and the governing authority of such county desires to refund all or any portion of such bonds or to issue additional bonds under this section or Section 59-9-41, for the purpose herein or therein authorized and to consolidate all or any portion of such bonded indebtedness, such governing authority, by resolution or resolutions, may at any time authorize and direct the issuance of bonds. The proceeds of such new bonds shall be used to pay or provide for the payment of, at or prior to maturity, any outstanding and unpaid bonds (including any unpaid accrued interest thereon), and any balance of such proceeds not so utilized shall be used and expended for the purposes authorized by this chapter. In the event that such outstanding bonds, by the terms thereof, are redeemable prior to maturity at the option of such county, then such option of redemption may be exercised in the manner provided in such bonds. Such new bonds shall be issued in like manner and like incidence and shall be payable from the same source or sources and the payment thereof shall be secured in like manner as provided in this section or Section 59-9-41 provided in the case of the issuance of original bonds under this section or under Section 59-9-41. In lieu of selling such portion of such new bonds as may be required to pay or provide for the payment of such outstanding bonds, such new bonds may be issued and delivered in exchange for and upon surrender and cancellation of a like amount of such outstanding bonds.

In addition and supplemental to the rights, duties and powers now or hereafter conferred by law upon counties having created a county port authority or county development commission, such counties are empowered and authorized to issue general obligation bonds of such counties as hereinabove provided, to acquire, establish, construct, develop, improve and maintain revetments, embankments, groins, sea walls, jetties, moles, breakwaters, gates, locks, dams, water basins, reservoirs, aqueducts, canals, water supply and distribution systems or pipelines and easements necessary thereto; and the acquisition, development and improvement of lands and property for any of such purposes. Such counties are further empowered and authorized to enter

into contracts, agreements, assurances, or commitments with the United States of America, or any department or agency thereof, the state of Mississippi, or any department, political subdivision or agency thereof, or any person, firm or corporation relating or in connection with any power or duty authorized, imposed, or conferred upon such county by law, and to cooperate with and assist any public body or agency, or bodies or agencies, having jurisdiction of any waterway, port, harbor, or water development program, and to jointly exercise any or all of such powers as a joint operation with any other county or counties. Any such county or any party entering into any contract with any such county shall be entitled to maintain any action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the county or any other party to said contract to enforce any contractual right arising out of any such contract.

General obligation bonds issued under the provision of this section shall be payable from an ad valorem tax which may be levied without limit as to rate or amount upon all taxable property within the county.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 439, § 2; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 18; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 33; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 40, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1983).

Cross References — County bonds generally, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.

Ad valorem taxes generally, see §§ 27-29-1 et seq.

Refunding bonds generally, see §§ 31-15-1 et seq.

Authority of municipality to issue bonds for port and harbor purposes, see §§ 59-3-3, 59-7-11, 59-7-309, 59-7-415.

Authority of board of supervisors to issue revenue bonds for purposes set out in this chapter, see § 59-9-41.

Authority of coast county to issue bonds for harbor improvements, see §§ 59-13-5, 59-13-7.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

§ 59-9-39. Attorney's fees for issuance of general obligation bonds.

Attorney's fees for the issuance of any general obligation bonds authorized by the provisions of this chapter shall not exceed for each issue the following schedule:

- (1) Up to and including one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00), one per cent (1%).
- (2) Above one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00) and up to and including two million dollars (\$2,000,000.00), one half of one per cent ($\frac{1}{2}$ of 1%).
- (3) Above two million dollars (\$2,000,000.00), one fourth of one per cent ($\frac{1}{4}$ of 1%).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 26, 1962).

§ 59-9-41. Revenue bonds.

In addition to the authority conferred by Section 59-9-37, the board of supervisors of such county is further authorized, in its discretion, to issue revenue bonds of such county to provide funds for any purpose or purposes set out in this chapter or in Section 59-5-31. Such revenue bonds may be issued upon compliance with Section 59-9-51, and shall not be subject to any limitation as to amount, and shall not be included or computed in the statutory limitations of indebtedness of any such county. Such bonds shall bear date or dates, be in such denomination or denominations, bear interest at such rate or rates, provided that the bonds of any issue shall not bear a greater overall maximum interest rate to maturity than that allowed in Section 75-17-103, be payable at such place or places within or without the State of Mississippi, shall mature at such time or times and upon such terms, with or without premium, shall bear such registration privileges and shall be substantially in such form, all as shall be determined by resolution of the board of supervisors of such county. Such bonds shall mature in annual installments beginning not more than five (5) years from date thereof and extending not more than thirty-five (35) years from date thereof. Such bonds shall be signed by the president of the board of supervisors of such county, and the official seal of the county shall be affixed thereto, attested by the clerk of the board of supervisors of such county. The interest coupons, if any, to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of said officers. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officers herein designated to sign the bonds who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

The revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this section shall be payable solely out of the revenues to accrue from the operation of such project development, improvement or utility systems, and the full faith and credit of the county shall not be pledged therefor, nor shall any ad valorem tax be levied therefor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 416, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 477, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1985).

Cross References — Issuance of refunding or additional revenue bonds, see § 59-9-37.

§ 59-9-43. Sale and disposition of proceeds of bonds issued under §§ 59-9-37 and 59-9-41.

The board of supervisors of a county issuing bonds under Sections 59-9-37 and 59-9-41 shall sell such bonds in such manner and for such price as it may

determine to be for the best interest of said county, but no such sale (other than revenue bonds) shall be made at a price less than par plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. Notice of the sale of any such bonds (other than revenue bonds) shall be published at least one (1) time not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale and shall be published in a newspaper published in and having general circulation within such county.

The proceeds of such bonds shall be paid into a special fund or funds in banks qualified to act as depositories for such county. The proceeds of such bonds shall be solely for the purposes for which they were issued, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, and shall be disbursed upon order of the board of supervisors of such county, with such restriction, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the purpose for which they were issued, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit which, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the purpose for which the bonds were issued, the surplus shall be paid into the fund established for the payment of the principal of and the interest on such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 416, § 3; Laws, 1990, ch. 570, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, ch. 570, § 20, effective July 1, 1990, provides as follows:

“(1) Any attorney's fees paid as the result of the issuance of bonds under this act shall be in compliance with the limits on attorney's fees for bond issues as adopted by the State Bond Commission. Attorney's fees paid as the result of the issuance of bonds under this act shall be subject to negotiation but in no event shall exceed the limits established by the State Bond Commission. A detailed accounting of all expenses incurred by all persons, firms, corporations, associations or other organizations involved in such bond issues shall be submitted to the State Bond Commission within ninety (90) days after the issuance of such bonds and shall be a matter of public record.

“(2) No member of the Legislature, elected official or appointed official, or any partner or associate of any member of the Legislature, elected official or appointed official, shall derive any income from the issuance of any bonds or the disposition of any property under this act contrary to the provisions of Section 109, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, or Article 3, Chapter 4, Title 25, Mississippi Code of 1972.

“(3) In connection with the issuance and sale of bonds authorized under this act, the State Bond Commission shall select a bond attorney or attorneys who are listed in the “Directory of Municipal Bond Dealers of the United States” and who are members in good standing of the Mississippi State Bar Association and licensed to practice law in the State of Mississippi; however, upon a finding by the commission spread on its official minutes that the public interest will best be served thereby, the commission may select any bond attorney or attorneys listed in the ‘Directory of Municipal Bond Dealers of the United States.’”

Cross References — Depositories for funds of local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

§ 59-9-45. Negotiability and taxation of bonds issued under §§ 59-3-37 and 59-9-41.

Any bonds, interest coupons, interim certificates or other obligations issued under the provisions of Sections 59-9-37 and 59-9-41 shall have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the provisions of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, provided that it shall not be necessary to file any financing statements or continuation statements to perfect or protect the security of the holders of such bonds or to give notice to third parties of the existence of such security. Such bonds and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 416, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 2, 1976).

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Uniform Commercial Code generally, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial Code §§ 69 et seq.

§ 59-9-47. Proceedings for issuance and validation of bonds issued under §§ 59-9-37 and 59-9-41.

Bonds authorized under the authority of Sections 59-9-37 and 59-9-41 may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified or required by this chapter. The bonds authorized under the authority of this chapter may, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, be validated in the chancery court of such county in a manner and with the force and effect provided now or hereafter by Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district and other bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 26, 1962).

§ 59-9-49. Levy of ad valorem tax for operating fund.

In addition and supplemental to the rights, duties and powers now or hereafter conferred by law upon counties having created a county port authority or county development commission, the board of supervisors of any

such county, at the request of the county port authority or the county development commission, is authorized and empowered, in its discretion, to levy an ad valorem tax, not to exceed two mills on the dollar of assessed valuation of the taxable property of such county, to provide an operating fund for such county port authority or county development commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-14; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 14; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 8; Laws, 1962, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 26, 1962).

Cross References — Ad valorem taxes generally, see §§ 27-29-1 et seq.

§ 59-9-51. County-wide election on issuance of bonds under §§ 59-9-37 and 59-9-41.

A county-wide election shall be held to determine whether such bonds, as are provided for in Sections 59-9-37 and 59-9-41, may be issued. Upon the calling of an election, notice of such election shall be signed by the clerk of the board of supervisors and shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in at least one newspaper published in such county. The first publication of such notice shall be made not less than twenty-one days prior to the date fixed for such election, and the last publication shall be made not more than seven days prior to such date. If no newspaper is published in such county, then such notice shall be given by publishing the same for the required time in some newspaper having a general circulation in such county and, in addition, by posting a copy of such notice for at least twenty-one days next preceding such election in three public places in such county. Such election shall be held, as far as is practicable, in the same manner as other elections are held in counties. At such election, all qualified electors of such county may vote, and the ballots used at such election shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the amount and purpose of the proposed bond issue and the words "FOR THE BOND ISSUE" and "AGAINST THE BOND ISSUE," and the voter shall vote by placing a cross (x) or check (✓) opposite his choice on the proposition. When the results of the election on the question of the issuance of such bonds shall have been canvassed by the election commissioners of such county and certified by them to the board of supervisors of such county, it shall be the duty of such board of supervisors to determine and adjudicate whether or not a majority of the qualified electors who voted thereon in such election shall have voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds, and unless a majority of the qualified electors who voted thereon in such election shall have voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then such bonds shall not be issued. Should a majority of the qualified electors who vote thereon in such election vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then the board of supervisors of the county may issue such bonds, either in whole or in part, within two years from the date of such election, or within two years after the final favorable termination of any litigation affecting the issuance of such bonds, as such board shall deem best. However, the board of supervisors, in its

discretion may, in lieu of the foregoing provisions, adopt a resolution reciting its intention to issue bonds for the purposes authorized by this chapter, stating the amount of bonds proposed to be issued and the date upon which further action will be taken by the board looking toward the issuance of such bonds. Such resolution shall be published once a week for at least three successive weeks in a newspaper published and of general circulation within such county. The first of such publications shall be made at least twenty-one days prior to the date set forth in said resolution as the date upon which further action will be taken by the board, and the last of such publications shall be made not more than seven days prior to such date. If, prior to the date set forth as aforesaid, there shall be filed with the clerk of such board a petition in writing signed by twenty per cent (20%) of the qualified electors of such county, requesting an election on the question of the issuance of such bonds, then such bonds shall not be issued unless authorized by a majority of the qualified electors of such county who vote thereon at an election to be ordered by such board for that purpose. Notice of such election shall be given and such election shall be held and conducted in like manner as provided by law with respect to the submission of other county bond issues in such county. If the proposition so submitted shall fail to receive approval at such election, then no further proceedings for the issuance of such bonds shall be had or taken within a period of six months from and after the date of such election. If, however, no such petition shall be so filed, or if at such election, or subsequent election, such proposition be assented to by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon, then such board of supervisors shall be authorized to proceed with the issuance of such bonds without further election.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-15; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 15; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 9; Laws, 1960, ch. 211, § 2.

Cross References — County bond issues generally, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.
Issuance of revenue bonds upon compliance with this section, see § 59-9-41.

§ 59-9-53. Pledge of county credit and resources for payment of bonds; issuance of revenue bonds.

Such bonds, as are provided for in Section 59-9-37, shall be general obligations of the county, and for the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon, the full faith, credit and resources of such county shall be and are hereby irrevocably pledged, and it shall be the mandatory duty of the board of supervisors of such county annually to levy upon all taxable property within such county an ad valorem tax sufficient to provide for the payment of such bonds as they mature and the interest thereon as it accrues, and the proceeds of such tax levy shall be used for no other purpose. In its discretion, such board of supervisors may also pledge for the payment of such bonds and interest thereon the revenues from facilities operated by the county port authority or county development commission, and any surplus revenues accruing to such county under and by virtue of Sections 65-33-45 and 65-33-47, Mississippi

Code of 1972, and not theretofore pledged or hypothecated, and any other surplus funds available to such county from any other source, and not theretofore pledged or hypothecated. The board of supervisors of such county is further authorized, in its discretion, to issue revenue bonds of such county to provide funds for any purpose or purposes set out in this chapter, in the same manner as provided in Section 59-9-57 for the issuance of joint county and municipal revenue bonds, except that the board of supervisors of such county shall be authorized to issue such revenue bonds without the necessity of joint or concurrent action by any municipality, or the necessity of a separate election in such municipality, and such revenue bonds may be secured, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, as provided in the preceding sentence hereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-16; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 16; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 10.

§ 59-9-55. Investment of proceeds of bonds.

Any county which has heretofore issued bonds pursuant to this chapter, is hereby authorized to invest the proceeds of such bonds not needed for immediate use in bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness of the United States, but such investments shall not be made except upon the approval of the development commission or port authority.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-16.5; Laws, 1962, ch. 394, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

Cross References — Investment of surplus county funds generally, see § 19-9-29.

Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

§ 59-9-57. Joint development, maintenance, operation, etc., of ports by county port authority or commission and municipality; joint bond issue.

The board of supervisors, acting through its county port authority or county development commission, and the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, acting through its port commission, jointly may negotiate a contract or contracts for the development, construction, repair, and maintenance and operation of seaports, wharves, piers, docks, ways, elevators, compresses, warehouses, roadways and water, air and rail terminals and other structures, facilities and lands needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce or any other property at the port of entry under the joint jurisdiction of such county port authority or county development commission and such port commission. Such county and municipality, acting through the board of supervisors of such county, and the governing authorities of such municipality are authorized to jointly issue bonds or other obligations to provide funds for such joint undertakings. Such bonds shall be issued as provided in Sections 59-9-37 through 59-9-51, but

shall be jointly issued by the board of supervisors of such county and by the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, acting concurrently. Such bonds shall be denominated as port improvement bonds of the county and municipality issuing the same. Unless three-fifths ($\frac{3}{5}$) of the qualified electors of such county who voted in an election to be held for that purpose shall have voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds and three-fifths ($\frac{3}{5}$) of the qualified electors of the municipality in which the port of entry is located who voted in an election held for that purpose shall have voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then such bonds shall not be issued. Electors of such county who vote in such election vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds and should three-fifths ($\frac{3}{5}$) of the qualified electors of the municipality in which the port of entry is located who vote in such election vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then the board of supervisors of such county and the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located may issue such bonds, either in whole or part, within three years after the date of such election or within three years after the termination of any litigation affecting the issuance of such bonds, as such board of supervisors and such governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located jointly shall deem best. For the payment of such bonds and interest thereon, the board of supervisors of such county and the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located, may each pledge the two-mill ad valorem tax authorized by Section 59-9-59, or such part thereof as may be required for the payment of such bonds and interest thereon. Such county and municipality, acting jointly, may also pledge for the payment of such bonds and interest thereon, the revenues from all or any of the facilities operated or to be operated jointly by the county port authority or county development commission and port commission and any revenues accruing to such county and municipality under and by virtue of Sections 59-7-1 or 59-7-303, and not theretofore pledged or hypothecated, and any such county may also pledge any surplus funds accruing by virtue of Sections 65-33-45 or 65-33-47, Mississippi Code of 1972, and not theretofore pledged or hypothecated, and any other surplus funds available to such county or municipality from any other source. Such bonds shall not be computed as being within any statutory limitation on the issuance of municipal or county bonds, but the two-mill ad valorem tax, or such part thereof as may be necessary for the payment of such bonds and interest thereon, as well as any revenues accruing to such county and municipality under and by virtue of Sections 59-7-1 or 59-7-303, and any surplus accruing to such county under Sections 65-33-45 or 65-33-47, Mississippi Code of 1972, and not theretofore pledged or hypothecated, shall be irrevocably pledged to the payment of such bonds and interest. Any bonds, or other obligations issued pursuant to this section shall be fully negotiable within the meaning and for all the purposes of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code. Whenever any county and municipality, acting jointly, shall have issued bonds hereunder, a portion of which remain outstanding and unpaid, and the governing authorities of such county and municipality, acting jointly, desire to issue additional bonds hereunder for

the purposes herein authorized and desire to consolidate all such bonded indebtedness, such governing authorities, by resolution or resolutions, may at any time authorize and direct the issuance of bonds. The proceeds of such new bonds shall be used to take up, pay and redeem all of such outstanding and unpaid bonds at their par value, and the balance of such proceeds shall be used and expended for the purposes authorized by this section. In the event that such outstanding bonds, by the terms thereof, shall be redeemable prior to maturity at the option of such county and municipality, acting jointly, then such option of redemption shall be exercised in the manner provided in such bonds, or in the event that such outstanding bonds, by the terms thereof, be not so redeemable prior to maturity, then the consent of the holder or holders thereof shall first be had and obtained to the end that, in either of said events, the redemption of such outstanding bonds may be accomplished concurrently with the issuance of such new bonds. Such new bonds shall be issued in like manner and like incidence and shall be payable from the same source or sources and the payment thereof shall be secured in like manner as herein provided in the case of the issuance of original bonds hereunder. In lieu of selling such portion of such new bonds as may be required to provide for the redemption of such outstanding bonds, such new bonds may be issued and delivered in exchange for and upon surrender and cancellation of a like amount of such outstanding bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-17; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 17; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 11.

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc. used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Sinking funds for municipal ports and harbors, see §§ 59-3-5, 59-7-13, 59-7-427.

County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

Uniform Commercial Code generally, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial Code §§ 69 et seq.

§ 59-9-59. Joint bond issue; tax levy; collection and disposition of taxes.

Where the issuance of bonds has been authorized as provided by Section 59-9-57, and so long as any of such bonds shall be outstanding the board of supervisors of such county, and the governing authorities of the municipality wherein the port of entry is located in such county, are authorized to levy and collect an ad valorem tax not to exceed two mills, for the joint development, construction, maintenance, repair, or operation of harbor and port facilities authorized by this chapter, which levy shall be collected by the tax collector of such county and the tax collector of the municipality, and shall be deposited into a fund to be designated "the county port fund" and into "the municipal port

fund", respectively, and which sums shall be disbursed on the requisition of the county port authority, or the port commission of the municipality, as the case may be, and which funds may also be pledged and used for the payment of bonds issued hereunder.

All taxes collected for the payment of principal of and interest on bonds issued hereunder, shall be credited to a special fund in the county and municipal treasuries of such county and municipality and to be known and designated as the "port bonds interest and sinking fund", and all sums credited to said fund shall be used to pay such bonds as they mature and the interest thereon as it accrues and for no other purpose. It shall be the mandatory duty of such board of supervisors and governing authorities of the municipality to transfer funds from said port funds to the port bonds interest and sinking fund in amounts sufficient to pay maturing principal and accruing interest on bonds issued hereunder. To the extent that funds are thus made available for the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon, the special tax levy herein provided for may be correspondingly reduced.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-18; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 18.

Cross References — Sinking fund for bonds issued by state inland port authority, see § 59-17-51.

§ 59-9-61. Joint bond issue; control of facilities; collection and disposition of revenues.

All improvements and facilities constructed pursuant to the joint issuance of bonds by any county and municipality under the authority of Sections 59-9-57 and 59-9-59, shall be maintained and operated under the control of the county port authority and of the port commission. The county port authority and port commission shall, subject to and in accordance with any agreement or agreements as may be made by any such county and municipality with the purchaser or purchasers of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter, prescribe, levy, and collect all rents, fees, tolls, revenues and other charges in connection with the use and occupancy of the aforesaid improvements and facilities, and shall pay over all net revenues derived from the operation of such improvements and facilities to any trustee, or successor thereto, established as hereinafter in this chapter provided. Net revenues shall be deemed to be such as may be defined in any agreement or agreements entered into between any such county and municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to the aforesaid sections.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-19; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 19.

§ 59-9-63. Joint bond issue; powers and duties of counties and municipalities.

In connection with the issuance of bonds or other obligations by any county and municipality jointly pursuant to this chapter, such county and municipal-

ity, acting jointly, shall have the powers and duties conferred by Sections 59-7-321 and 59-7-323, and all such powers and duties shall apply to and shall be exercised jointly by such county and municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-20; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 20.

§ 59-9-65. Issuance of bonds and obligations for dredging channels and industrial site preparation.

(1) In addition to authority to issue bonds or other obligations pursuant to this chapter, the board of supervisors of any county which has a plan approved by the Mississippi Board of Economic Development for the planned development of any port, harbor or waterway, may, with the approval of the Mississippi Board of Economic Development, issue general obligation bonds of such county in the maximum principal amount of two million dollars (\$2,000,000.00) to provide funds for the dredging of channel and harbor and preparation of site for the construction or acquisition of ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, dredges, floating drydocks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, or any other facilities required or incidental to the construction, outfitting, drydocking or repair of ships or vessels.

(2) Such bonds may be issued at one (1) time or from time to time, in such amount or amounts, shall bear such date or dates, shall be of such denomination or denominations, shall be payable at such place or places, shall bear interest at such rate or rates, not exceeding that allowed in Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall mature in such amount or amounts and at such time or times, not exceeding twenty (20) years from the date thereof, with or without option of prior payment, and shall be executed in such manner, all as may be determined by the said board of supervisors. No interest payment due on any bond shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon and supplemental coupons will not be permitted; the difference between the highest rate of interest specified for any bond issue shall not exceed the lowest rate of interest specified for the same bond issue by more than one and one-fourth percent (1-¼%). Each interest rate specified in any bid must be in a multiple of one-eighth of one percent ($\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%) or one-tenth of one percent ($\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%) and a zero rate of interest cannot be named. Such bonds shall be signed by the president of the board of supervisors of such county, and the official seal of the county shall be affixed thereto, attested by the clerk of the board of supervisors of such county. The interest coupons to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of said officer. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officers herein designated to sign the bonds who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

(3) Before issuing such bonds, the board of supervisors of such county shall adopt a resolution declaring its intention to issue such bonds, stating the amount of bonds proposed to be issued and the date upon which further action will be taken by the board looking toward the issuance of such bonds. Such resolution shall be published once a week for at least three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper published and of general circulation within such county. The first of such publications shall be made at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date set forth in said resolution as the date upon which further action will be taken by the board, and the last of such publications shall be made not more than seven (7) days prior to such date. If, prior to the date set forth as aforesaid, there shall be filed with the clerk of such board a petition in writing signed by twenty percent (20%) of the qualified electors of such county, requesting an election on the question of the issuance of such bonds, then such bonds shall not be issued unless authorized by a majority of the qualified electors of such county who vote thereon at an election to be ordered by such board for that purpose. Notice of such election shall be given and such election shall be held and conducted in like manner as provided by law with respect to the submission of other county bond issues in the county. If, however, no such petition shall be so filed, or if at such election, or subsequent election, such proposition be assented to by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon, then such board of supervisors shall be authorized to proceed with the issuance of such bonds without further election.

(4) The board of supervisors of such county shall sell such bonds in such manner and for such price as it may determine to be for the best interest of said county, but in no case to exceed the rate of interest hereinabove provided, but no such sale shall be made at a price less than par plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. Notice of the sale of any such bonds shall be published at least one (1) time not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale and shall be published in a newspaper published in and having general circulation within the county.

(5) The resolution or order adopted by the board of supervisors authorizing the issuance of said bonds shall pledge the sources of revenues authorized under the statutes to pay the principal thereof and interest thereon; and all bonds issued under one (1) resolution or order may be equally secured and entitled to be paid. In addition to such pledge, such bonds shall be payable from an ad valorem tax which may be levied without limit as to rate or amount upon all taxable property within the county.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3; Laws, 1981, ch. 462, § 20; Laws, 1982, ch. 434, § 34; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 41, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1983).

Editor's Note — Section 57-1-2 provides that the term "Board of Economic Development" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

§ 59-9-67. Reclamation of submerged lands and tidelands; conveyance of lands by state; lease or sale of lands and facilities by county.

(1) For the purposes set out in subsection (1) of Section 59-9-65, the board of supervisors of such county, acting by and through the county port authority, and with the supervision and approval of the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board, shall have the power to dredge, fill in and reclaim submerged lands and tidelands belonging to the State of Mississippi; and the state land commissioner, with the approval of the attorney general and the governor, is hereby authorized and empowered to convey such reclaimed submerged lands and tidelands to such county and to issue the state's patent therefor, but all oil, gas and other minerals in, on or under said lands are hereby specifically reserved unto the State of Mississippi. Such county, acting through its county port authority, shall have the further power to develop and utilize such lands for any of such purposes, provided, however, that no normal or natural channel shall be obstructed so as to interfere with the normal navigation therein.

(2) The board of supervisors of such county, acting jointly with the county port authority, and with the approval of the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board, shall have the power to lease such lands, for a term not in excess of ninety-nine years from the date of such lease, or to sell or otherwise dispose of such land to the State of Mississippi, or to individuals, firms or corporations, public or private, for industrial operations, on such terms and conditions and with such safeguards as will best promote and protect the public interest, and they are hereby authorized to transfer possession and/or title to any part or all of such lands by deed, lease, contract, or other customary business instrument.

(3) Any facilities constructed or acquired for use on such lands under the provisions of Section 59-5-11, including, but not limited to machinery or equipment, may be leased for a term not in excess of ninety-nine years from the date of such lease, or sold, or otherwise disposed of to the State of Mississippi or to individuals, firms or corporations, public or private, for industrial operations, on such terms and conditions, with such safeguards as will best promote and protect the public interest, and subject to the limitations set out in Section 59-5-11, and the board of supervisors of such county, acting jointly with the county port authority, and with the approval of the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board, is authorized to transfer possession and/or title to any part, or all of such facilities, machinery or equipment by deed, lease, contract, or other customary business instrument.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Editor's Note — Section 7-11-4 provided that the words "state land commissioner," "land commissioner," "state land office" and "land office" shall mean the secretary of state.

Section 57-1-2 provides that the words "Agricultural and Industrial Board" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

Reclamation of tidelands, see §§ 59-1-17 et seq.

§ 59-9-69. Additional general obligation bonds.

In addition to the authority set out in subsection (1) of Section 59-9-65, the board of supervisors of such county may issue general obligation bonds of such county in the additional maximum principal amount of five million dollars (\$5,000,000.00), to provide funds for any purposes authorized by Sections 59-9-17 through 59-9-23. Such bonds shall be issued as provided in subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 59-9-65, Section 59-9-73, and subsection (2) of Section 59-9-75.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

§ 59-9-71. Dredging and site preparation; fund.

(1) The Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board shall assist and supervise the dredging of channel and harbor and preparation of site for the construction of ships, vessels, shipyards, shipbuilding facilities, machinery and equipment, dredges, floating drydocks, graving docks, marine railways, tug boats, or any other facilities required or incidental to the construction, outfitting, drydocking or repair of ships or vessels as contemplated by Sections 59-9-65 and 59-9-67. All sums of money received or obtained by the agricultural and industrial board under the provisions of Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75, by appropriation or otherwise, shall be paid into the state treasury and shall constitute a fund to be known as the "agricultural and industrial dredging and site preparation fund." All expenditures shall be paid therefrom by the state treasurer on warrant of the auditor of public accounts; and said auditor shall issue his warrant upon requisition signed by the director and the secretary of the agricultural and industrial board.

(2) To the extent that funds may be available, the agricultural and industrial board shall join with any board of supervisors acting under authority of subsection (1) of Section 59-9-65 in contracting for the work contemplated by said Sections 59-9-65 and 59-9-67, and shall pay from the "agricultural and industrial dredging and site preparation fund" eighty per cent (80%) of the cost of any such project not to exceed four million dollars (\$4,000,000.00) for any one county board of supervisors. The agricultural and industrial board shall require such safeguards and controls for the proper accomplishment of such projects as shall be deemed appropriate. However, the said agricultural and industrial board shall observe all procedures, regulations and requirements of law with regard to public contracts and the letting thereof under the B.A.W.I. acts.

(3) If the program provided by Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75 is terminated or discontinued for any reason in the future, all moneys in the

"agricultural and industrial dredging and site preparation fund," after payment of any outstanding costs in connection with any project undertaken, shall be transferred to the general fund of the state treasury on written certification of the director of the agricultural and industrial board that this program has been discontinued or terminated by said agricultural and industrial board, citing the statutory authority therefor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

Section 57-1-2 provides that the words "Agricultural and Industrial Board" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

Cross References — Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.

§ 59-9-73. Negotiability and taxation of bonds issued under Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75.

All bonds and interest coupons issued under the provisions of Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75 shall be and are hereby declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the provisions of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code and in exercising the powers granted by said sections, the board shall not be required to and need not comply with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Such bonds and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Cross References — Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial Code §§ 69 et seq.

§ 59-9-75. Proceedings for issuance and validation of bonds issued under Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75; applicability of debt limitations.

(1) Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75, without reference to any other statute, shall be deemed to be full and complete authority for the issuance of such bonds by such county, and no proceedings shall be required for the

issuance of such bonds other than those provided for and required herein, and the limitations of Sections 59-9-37 through 59-9-49, shall not be applicable to the bonds issued under the provisions of Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75 nor shall such bonds be included or computed in the statutory limitations of indebtedness of any such county, and all the necessary powers to be exercised by the board of supervisors of such county in order to carry out the provisions of Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75, are hereby conferred.

(2) The bonds authorized under the authority of Sections 59-9-65 through 59-9-75 may, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, be validated in the chancery court of such county in a manner and with the force and effect provided now or hereafter by Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district and other bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

§ 59-9-77. Construction of chapter.

This chapter, without reference to any other statute, shall be deemed full and complete authority for the issuance and sale of bonds as herein provided, and shall be construed as additional and alternative methods therefor, and none of the present restrictions, requirements, conditions, or limitations of law shall be applicable to the issuance and sale of bonds under this chapter, except as herein otherwise expressly limited, and no proceedings shall be required for the issuance of such bonds other than those provided for and required herein, and all powers necessary to be exercised by the board of supervisors of such county, and by the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located in such county, in order to carry out the provisions of this chapter, are hereby conferred.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-21; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 21.

§ 59-9-79. Validation of bonds.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, the bonds issued under this chapter may, in the discretion of the board of supervisors, or the board of supervisors and the governing authorities of the municipality in which the port of entry is located in such county, be validated under Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-22; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 22.

§ 59-9-81. Applicability of debt limitation.

The bonds or other obligations issued by counties or municipalities pursuant to this chapter shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of any statutory limitation as to the amount of debt which may be incurred by any such county or by any such municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 23; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 6, §§ 1-3, eff from and after passage (approved June 29, 1967).

Cross References — Limitation on county indebtedness, see § 19-9-5.
Limitation on municipal indebtedness, see § 21-33-303.

§ 59-9-83. Exemption from taxation of bonds; negotiability.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, all bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter and any interest thereon or income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation, except gift, transfer and inheritance taxes, insofar as may be within the power of the State of Mississippi to provide and shall be negotiable instruments within the meaning of the law of merchants and the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-24; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 24.

Cross References — Estate taxes generally, see §§ 27-9-1 et seq.
Tax on machinery, etc., used in operation of structures, facilities and land acquired and operated pursuant to any provision of this chapter, see § 27-65-20.
Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial
Code §§ 69 et seq.

§ 59-9-85. Action to enforce contractual rights.

The State of Mississippi, any county acting through a county port authority or a county development commission, or any person, firm or corporation entering into any contract with any county, acting through a county port authority or a county development commission authorized by this chapter, shall be entitled to maintain any action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the State of Mississippi, the county and the county port authority and the county development commission to enforce any contractual right arising out of any such contract.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-06; Laws, 1956, ch. 199, § 6; Laws, 1958, ch. 226, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1961, 2nd Ex. Sess. ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1967, Ex. Sess. ch. 5, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 30, 1971).

Editor's Note — Laws, 1971, ch. 462, § 2, provides as follows:

SECTION 2. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to lands or beach-front property on the Gulf of Mexico which existed prior to the effective date of this act, whether or not such claim, cause of action, suit, appeal, right or interest in and to such lands or interest therein shall have begun on the date on which this act becomes effective, or shall thereafter be begun. It is expressly provided that every right, title or interest in lands held by any person or groups of persons which front on the Gulf of Mexico in the State of Mississippi shall continue in full force and effect to the same extent as if this act had not become law.

CHAPTER 11

County Port and Harbor Commission

- SEC.
- 59-11-1. Creation of commission.
- 59-11-3. Appointment of members; terms of office; per diem.
- 59-11-5. Jurisdiction of commission; payments into county port fund; special tax levy.
- 59-11-7. Powers and duties of commission; right of county to receive state ad valorem tax for port improvement.

§ 59-11-1. Creation of commission.

Any county in the State of Mississippi bordering on the Mississippi Sound or the Gulf of Mexico, which has not heretofore created a county port authority or county development commission as authorized by chapter 9 of this title is hereby authorized, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, as evidenced by a resolution adopted by such board of supervisors, to create a county port and harbor commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-41; Laws, 1962, ch. 393, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

Cross References — Development of harbor facilities by county bridge and park commission, see §§ 57-7-1 et seq.

County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

Harbor improvements by coast counties, see §§ 59-13-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

While Commission would be empowered under Chapters 9 and 11 of Title 59 of Mississippi Code to employ security service in connection with operation of Stennis International Airport, there is no

statutory authority for Hancock County Port and Harbor Commission to establish independent police department for this or any other purpose. Genin Sept. 22, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0655.

§ 59-11-3. Appointment of members; terms of office; per diem.

(1) Any county port and harbor commission created pursuant to Section 59-11-1 shall be appointed as follows: two (2) members shall be appointed by the Governor, one (1) from each of the two (2) municipalities of the county, which appointments shall be made from those persons recommended and nominated by the governing authorities of the municipalities, and shall be qualified electors of the county; and five (5) members shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of such county, each supervisor to recommend the appointment of one (1) member thereof. The members of the county port and harbor commission shall serve for terms concurrent with that of the Governor and the board of supervisors making such appointment.

(2) Each member of the county port and harbor commission shall receive

per diem compensation in the amount of Fifty-five Dollars (\$55.00) for each day engaged in attendance of meetings of the county port and harbor commission and shall be reimbursed for mileage and actual travel expenses at the rate authorized for county employees under Section 25-3-41.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-42; Laws, 1962, ch. 393, § 2; Laws, 2004, ch. 433, § 1, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added (2); and made minor stylistic changes.

§ 59-11-5. Jurisdiction of commission; payments into county port fund; special tax levy.

The county port and harbor commission shall have jurisdiction over the ports, terminals, harbors, channels, and passes leading thereto, and all vessels, boats, and wharves, common carriers and public utilities therein, using the same within the county. The board of supervisors of each such county electing to exercise the provisions of this chapter shall pay or cause to be paid into the port fund of said county a sum equal to one fourth of the sum paid into said fund under this chapter from the state tax levy and such payments shall be continued as long as there remains unpaid and outstanding any bonded indebtedness created by such board of supervisors as hereinafter provided. Any such board of supervisors shall provide the sum herein required either by appropriation from any available funds of the county or by the levy, in addition to all other county taxes, of a tax of two mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of taxable property within such county upon which taxes for the general county fund are levied and collected. In case of a special tax levy as herein authorized, the tax collector of each such county shall set aside the avails of such levy and shall pay the same directly into the port fund of such county. However, no part of such two mill levy shall be reimbursable under the homestead exemption laws of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-43; Laws, 1962, ch. 393, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

Cross References — Homestead exemptions, see §§ 27-33-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The Hancock County Port and Harbor Commission, should it find consistent with fact and encompass such findings in an order spread upon its minutes, that the dredging of Little Lake Pass in Louisiana is necessary to keep the passes open to the

commission's industrial park, may advertise for bids and contract for the dredging of such pass; however, such contract might be subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate federal and Louisiana authorities. Genin, April 2, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0142.

§ 59-11-7. Powers and duties of commission; right of county to receive state ad valorem tax for port improvement.

The county port and harbor commission shall have the powers and duties vested in the county port authority or the county development commission by chapter 9 of this title. However, no county in which a county port and harbor commission has been created, as provided in this chapter, shall be entitled to receive any portion of the state ad valorem tax made available for port improvement purposes under the provisions of Section 59-7-103, unless and until such county has made application to the Mississippi Board of Economic Development, and such board shall first adjudicate and determine the feasibility of the project for which application for such funds is made, as provided in Section 59-7-103.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7605-44; Laws, 1962, ch. 393, § 4; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 255, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Editor's Note — Section 57-1-2 provides that the term "Board of Economic Development" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

While Commission would be empowered under Chapters 9 and 11 of Title 59 of Mississippi Code to employ security service in connection with operation of Stennis International Airport, there is no statutory authority for Hancock County Port and Harbor Commission to establish independent police department for this or any other purpose. Genin Sept. 22, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0655.

The Hancock County Port and Harbor Commission, should it find consistent

with fact and encompass such findings in an order spread upon its minutes, that the dredging of Little Lake Pass in Louisiana is necessary to keep the passes open to the commission's industrial park, may advertise for bids and contract for the dredging of such pass; however, such contract might be subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate federal and Louisiana authorities. Genin, April 2, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0142.

CHAPTER 13

Harbor Improvements by Coast Counties

SEC.

- 59-13-1. Harbor improvements by coast counties authorized.
- 59-13-3. Employment of engineers, architects, etc.; adoption of order giving notice of intent to issue bonds.
- 59-13-5. Publication of order giving notice of intent to issue bonds; election on bond issue.
- 59-13-7. Limitations on amount of bond issues; prerequisites for issuance of bonds.
- 59-13-9. Terms and conditions of bonds; tax levy for payment of bonds; execution of bonds.
- 59-13-11. Purchase of land and rights of way; eminent domain.
- 59-13-13. Operation of harbor facilities; collection of charges.
- 59-13-15. Levy of tax by certain coast counties for aiding in development and improvement of harbor or channel.

§ 59-13-1. Harbor improvements by coast counties authorized.

The board of supervisors of any county in the State of Mississippi, bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, having an assessed valuation in excess of eight million dollars (\$8,000,000.00) according to the last completed assessment; and any county in the state bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico having an assessed valuation of less than five million dollars (\$5,000,000.00), according to the last completed assessment, be, and it is hereby authorized, in its discretion, and subject to complying with the provisions of this chapter, to use and expend for public harbor improvements, harbor development, breakwaters, wharves and docks, recreational centers and all buildings in connection therewith deemed necessary or appropriate by such board, and for the purchase of necessary lands and rights of way in the county or in any supervisor's district therein bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, any funds received from the sale of bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7606; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269.

Cross References — Harbor improvements by bridge and park commissions, see §§ 55-7-1 et seq.

County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

§ 59-13-3. Employment of engineers, architects, etc.; adoption of order giving notice of intent to issue bonds.

The board of supervisors of any county described in Section 59-13-1 shall have authority to employ competent engineers or architects to make necessary plans and specifications for such harbor improvements and buildings which the board may deem necessary and proper to be constructed in connection

therewith and said plans and specifications, after the same have been approved by said board, shall be filed with its clerk and the board shall adopt an order to be spread upon its minutes giving notice of its intention to issue bonds to provide funds for such improvements, or any of them, as shown by said plans and specifications.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7607; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269.

Cross References — Architects generally, see §§ 73-1-1 et seq.

Engineers generally, see §§ 73-13-1 et seq.

§ 59-13-5. Publication of order giving notice of intent to issue bonds; election on bond issue.

Upon the adoption of such order by the board of supervisors, as provided for in Section 59-13-3, the clerk of such board shall publish in two weekly issues of some newspaper having a general circulation in the county, a notice of intention to issue bonds for said purposes; if, within fifteen days after the first publication of a copy of such notice twenty-five per cent of the qualified electors of the county if the bonds to be issued are to be county-wide bonds, or twenty-five per cent of the qualified electors of the supervisor's district if the bonds to be issued are to be district bonds, petition the board of supervisors for an election to determine whether or not such bonds shall be issued, such election shall be ordered by said board of supervisors in which the qualified electors of the county, if the bonds to be issued are county-wide bonds, or of the supervisor's district, if the bonds to be issued are district bonds, shall be eligible to participate, and if at such election a majority of those voting vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds the same shall be issued, but if a majority shall vote against the issuance of such bonds the same shall not be issued. Such election shall be held and conducted and the returns thereof made as provided by law for other county or district elections. If no such petition be presented within fifteen days after the first publication of such notice, the bonds shall be issued in the manner provided by law. However, in any case where an election has heretofore been held in any county or supervisors district, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter on the question of issuing bonds of such county or supervisors district for the purpose of providing and constructing public harbor improvements, harbor developments, breakwaters, wharves and docks, recreational centers and all buildings in connection therewith, and providing necessary rights of way, and a majority of those who participated in such election voted in favor of the issuance of such bonds, and such bonds have not for any reason been issued, the board of supervisors of such county in which such supervisors district is situated, as the case may be, may, by resolution of such board, adopted at any time within twelve months from and after the passage of this chapter, authorize and direct the issuance of bonds of such county or district under the provisions of this chapter, in an amount not exceeding the amount set forth in the proposition submitted at such election, and for the purposes authorized by this chapter, without the

giving of any notice required in this section and without any further election on the issuance thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7608; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269.

Cross References — County bond issues generally, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 7608] with regard to the issuance of bonds by certain counties for public harbor improvement, controls over a prior statute pertaining to

harbor improvement and the issuance of bonds, insofar as it deals with the matter specifically. *Tonsmeire v. Board of Supvrs.*, 1 So. 2d 511 (Miss. 1941).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 339 et seq.

§ 59-13-7. Limitations on amount of bond issues; prerequisites for issuance of bonds.

The board of supervisors of any county in Mississippi bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, and having an assessed valuation in excess of eight million dollars (\$8,000,000.00) may, in its discretion, issue and sell the bonds of any supervisor's district therein bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, in an amount not exceeding two hundred thousand (\$200,000) dollars, and the board of supervisors of any such county having an assessed valuation of less than five million dollars (\$5,000,000.00) may, in its discretion, issue and sell the bonds of such county in an amount not exceeding two hundred thousand dollars (\$200,000) and the proceeds of such bonds shall be used to construct the improvements as shown by the aforesaid approved plans and specifications, and to pay all costs and expenses necessarily incident thereto, except as provided in Section 59-13-5. Such bonds shall not be issued until notice of intention to issue and sell the same shall have been made in the manner provided for giving notice in said section, and all of the provisions of said section as to petition for election, time to file petitions for election, ordering and holding an election, shall apply to issuance of such bonds; if no petition for an election be filed in the time fixed, or if an election be called and a majority of those voting thereat vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds, the bonds shall be issued and sold at such time and in such manner as the board of supervisors shall determine.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7609; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 7609], regarding the issuance of bonds by certain counties for public harbor improvement, controls over a prior statute pertaining to

harbor improvement and the issuance of bonds, insofar as it deals with the matter specifically. *Tonsmeire v. Board of Supvrs.*, 1 So. 2d 511 (Miss. 1941).

§ 59-13-9. Terms and conditions of bonds; tax levy for payment of bonds; execution of bonds.

Bonds issued under the authority of this chapter shall be full faith and credit obligations of the county or supervisors district for which the same are issued and the board of supervisors shall annually levy upon all taxable property within such county or supervisors district, as the case may be, an ad valorem tax sufficient to pay said bonds at maturity and the interest thereon as it accrues. Said bonds shall bear interest at a rate to maturity not to exceed that allowed in Section 75-17-101, shall be payable semiannually, shall mature within twenty (20) years of the date of issuance in such annual maturities and denominations and shall be in such form as the board of supervisors may direct and such bonds shall not be subject to any limitation relative to amount of bonded debt. Said bonds shall be executed by the signature of the president of the board of supervisors, countersigned by the clerk thereof, under the seal of such board.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7610; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269; Laws, 1986, ch. 384, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 24, 1986).

Cross References — Signatures on county bonds generally, see § 19-9-19.

Signatures on bonds issued for port or harbor improvements, see § 59-7-503.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

§ 59-13-11. Purchase of land and rights of way; eminent domain.

The board of supervisors of any county in which any harbor improvements may be constructed under the provisions of this chapter, may purchase lands and rights of way necessary therefor and pay for the same out of the proceeds of bonds herein provided; and for the purpose of carrying out the provision of this chapter said boards of supervisors are hereby clothed with the power and authority, and it is made their duty, to exercise the right of eminent domain, in their discretion, in the acquisition of such lands and rights of way.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7611; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269.

Cross References — Taking private property for public use, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 17.

Eminent domain generally, see §§ 11-27-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 53.

§ 59-13-13. Operation of harbor facilities; collection of charges.

The board of supervisors of any county after having constructed improvements under this chapter is hereby authorized and empowered to operate and maintain such harbor facilities and to make and enforce all rules and regulations necessary for such operation and maintenance, and such board may also fix and collect charges for the use of such facilities and may, in its resolution or order directing the issuance of bonds under this chapter, irrevocably pledge to the payment of the principal of and the interest on such bonds the net income and revenue resulting from the operation of such facilities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7612; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 59; Laws, 1940, ch. 269.

§ 59-13-15. Levy of tax by certain coast counties for aiding in development and improvement of harbor or channel.

(1) The board of supervisors of any county in the State of Mississippi bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico having an assessed valuation at its last completed assessment in excess of \$45,000,000.00 and having within its borders a city in which there is maintained a harbor or channel with a depth of not less than four and one-half feet, and in which city there is operated seasonally one or more canning plants for canning, processing or freezing shrimp, oysters or other seafoods, is hereby authorized, in its discretion, to annually levy a tax not to exceed one mill on each dollar of the assessed valuation of all of the taxable property within such county, for the purpose of aiding in the development and improvement of such harbor or channel of said city.

(2) The proceeds of said levy shall be paid to the governing authorities of the city wherein such channel or harbor is located and shall be deposited in the city depository in a special account to be designated as "port fund" of such city and the same shall be expended by the governing authorities of such city for the development and improvement of said channel or harbor, for the purposes and in the manner set out in the general laws of Mississippi, including Section 21-37-15, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(3) No reimbursement shall be made under the Homestead Exemption Law of 1946 Sections 27-33-1 through 27-33-65, Mississippi Code of 1972, for any tax levy made under the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7612.5; Laws, 1956, ch. 200, §§ 1-3.

CHAPTER 15

Small Craft Harbors

SEC.	
59-15-1.	Acquisition of land, harbor sites or water frontage by certain cities.
59-15-3.	Operation of improvements and facilities.
59-15-5.	General powers of municipality as to bonds.
59-15-7.	Authority to issue bonds; audit and inspection of accounts.
59-15-9.	Payment of principal and interest on bonds generally.
59-15-11.	Details of bonds; interim certificates.
59-15-13.	Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalties for diversion; guarantee of payment of bonds.
59-15-15.	Mortgage or deed of trust.
59-15-17.	Exemption from taxation of bonds.
59-15-19.	Trustees.

§ 59-15-1. Acquisition of land, harbor sites or water frontage by certain cities.

The authorities of any city in this state which has a population of ten thousand or more, according to the last official government census, and the authorities of any municipality bordering on the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico are hereby given the authority to acquire by purchase, deed, donation, gift, grant, reclamation, lease, dedication, or otherwise, land, harbor sites or water frontage for the purpose of establishing, developing, promoting, maintaining, and operating harbors for small water crafts and recreational parks connected therewith within its territorial limits, or both, and shall have the power to acquire, purchase, install, rent, lease, mortgage, incumber, construct, own, hold, maintain, equip, use, control and operate recreational parks and harbors for small water craft.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7613; Laws, 1935, ch. 63; Laws, 1938, Ex. Sess. ch. 71.

Cross References — County and municipal harbors, see §§ 59-7-1 et seq.

Landings, see §§ 59-19-1 et seq.

Regulation of boats and other vessels generally, see §§ 59-21-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Shipping
§§ 83-85.

§ 59-15-3. Operation of improvements and facilities.

All improvements and facilities constructed pursuant to this chapter shall be maintained and operated under the control of the city authorities. The city authorities of such city, or cities, shall, subject to and in accordance with any agreement, or agreements, as may be made by any such city with the purchaser, or purchasers, of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter, prescribe, levy and collect all rent, fees, tolls, revenues, privileges,

commissions, and other charges in connection with the operation, use and occupancy of the aforesaid improvements and facilities, and shall pay over all net revenues derived from the operation of said improvements and facilities to any trustee or successor thereto designated as hereinafter in this chapter provided. The net revenues shall be deemed to be such as may be defined in any agreement, or agreements, entered into between any such city, and the purchaser, or purchasers, of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter. The authorities of any such city, or cities, shall make a financial report to the said trustee annually of the operation of the aforesaid improvements and facilities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7614; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

Cross References — Municipal powers generally, see §§ 21-17-1 et seq.

Municipal bonds, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq.

Powers of municipality in which there is situated a port of entry, see §§ 59-3-1 et seq.

§ 59-15-5. General powers of municipality as to bonds.

In connection with the issuance of bonds or other obligations by any municipality pursuant to this chapter or in order to secure the payment of said bonds or other obligations, such municipality shall have power:

(a) To accept grants from the United States of America, the President of the United States, or such agencies, instrumentalities or corporations as may be designated or created to make grants or loans (hereinafter termed “federal agency”) pursuant to any act of the Congress of the United States providing for the construction of useful public works for or in aid of work, development authorized by this chapter.

(b) To make such contracts and execute such instruments containing such provisions, covenants and conditions as in the discretion of the authorities of any such municipalities may be necessary, proper or advisable for the purpose of obtaining or securing grants, loans, or other financial assistance from any federal agency pursuant to any act of Congress of the United States, to make such further, different or additional contracts and execute all instruments necessary or convenient in or for the furtherance of any work, development or improvement, including but not limited to all property real and personal appurtenant thereto or connected therewith and the existing work, development or improvement, if any, to which the work, development or improvement authorized by this chapter is an extension, addition, betterment or embellishment (hereinafter termed “work, development or improvement”), to carry out and perform the terms and conditions of any such contract or instrument.

(c) To pledge all or any part of the fees, rents, tolls, revenues or other charges received or receivable by such municipality from any work, development or improvement to which its right then exists or the right to which may thereafter come into existence.

(d) To covenant against the pledging of all or any part of the fees, rents, tolls, revenues or other charges received or receivable by such municipality

from any work, development or improvement to which its right then exists or the right to which may thereafter come into existence so long as any of the bonds or other obligations issued under the provisions of this chapter remain unpaid.

(e) To covenant against the incumbering of all or any part of any work, development or improvement or against permitting or suffering any lien thereon so long as any of the bonds or other obligations issued under the provisions of this chapter remain unpaid.

(f) To covenant as to what other or additional debt may be incurred by such municipality.

(g) To provide for the preparation, specifications, terms, form, registration, extension, execution and authentication of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter.

(h) To provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed or mutilated bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter.

(i) To covenant as to the fees, rents, revenues, concessions or tolls to be charged, the amount to be raised each year or other period of time and as to the use and disbursement to be made thereof.

(j) To covenant to set aside or to pay over reserves and sinking funds and as to the disposal thereof.

(k) To redeem prior to maturity, with or without premium, bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter and to covenant for their prior redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof.

(l) To covenant against extending the time for the payment of the interest on or principal of the bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter directly or indirectly by any means or in any manner.

(m) To covenant as to books of account of such municipality and as to the inspection and audit thereof and as to the accounting methods.

(n) To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers and duties arising upon the breach by such municipality of any covenant, condition or obligation assumed pursuant to this chapter.

(o) To make such covenants and do any and all such acts and things as may be necessary, convenient or desirable in order to secure any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter or in the absolute discretion of the authorities of such municipality in order to make such bonds or other obligations more marketable, notwithstanding that such covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated herein or expressly authorized herein; it being the intention hereby to give the authorities of any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this chapter the power to do all things in the issuance of said bonds or other obligations and for their execution that may not be inconsistent with the constitution of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7617; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

§ 59-15-7. Authority to issue bonds; audit and inspection of accounts.

Any city as is described in Section 59-15-1, is hereby given authority, upon the adoption of a resolution to such effect, to issue bonds or other obligations for any or all of the purposes as in this chapter herein provided; but such bonds or other obligations shall not be issued unless and until the governing authorities of the municipality are first authorized and requested so to do by a petition signed by not less than seventy-five per cent of the qualified electors of the municipality, or until authorized so to do by two-thirds of the qualified electors of the municipality who vote in an election called for that purpose. Said petition, or the ballot used in such election, as the case may be, shall disclose the purposes for which said funds are sought, and all funds derived thereunder shall be kept in a separate account by the municipality and shall be used solely for the purposes set forth in said petition, or upon the aforesaid ballot, as the case may be. The books of accounts and other sources of information pertaining to duties under the provisions of this chapter of any such city shall be and remain at all times open to inspection and subject to audit by the holder or holders of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7616; Laws, 1935, ch. 63; Laws, 1936, ch. 312.

§ 59-15-9. Payment of principal and interest on bonds generally.

The bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality of the State of Mississippi pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be secured as to payment as hereinafter in this chapter provided, and in addition thereto shall be secured as to payment by the full faith and credit of the municipality issuing the same, and the governing authorities of such municipality shall annually levy a tax on all the taxable property of such municipality sufficient to produce an amount, which, when added to the net revenues hereinafter in this chapter authorized to be pledged for the payment thereof, will be sufficient to pay all interest and principal of such bonds which may mature during such annual period. Such bonds or other obligations so issued, being additionally secured as to payment as hereinafter in this chapter provided, shall not be construed as a debt within the meaning of any statutory limitation as to the amount of which may be incurred by any such municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7615; Laws, 1935, ch. 63; Laws, 1936, ch. 312.

Cross References — Applicability of debt limitations to municipal port and harbor bonds, see §§ 59-7-317, 59-7-423.

§ 59-15-11. Details of bonds; interim certificates.

The power to issue bonds or other obligations authorized by Sections 59-15-1 through 59-15-9, shall be vested in, and may be exercised from time to

time by, the governing body of any municipality described in said sections. Such bonds or other obligations shall be authorized by resolution of the governing body of any such municipality and shall bear such date or dates, mature at such time or times, not exceeding twenty-five years from their respective dates, bear interest at such rate or rates, not exceeding four per centum per annum, be in such denomination, be in such form, either coupon or registered, carry such registration privileges, be executed in such manner, be payable in such medium of payment, at such place or places, and be subject to such terms of prior redemption, with or without premium as such resolution or resolutions may provide. Such bonds or other obligations may be sold at public or private sale for such price or prices as the governing body of such municipality shall determine, provided that the interest cost to maturity of the money received from any issue of said bonds or other obligations shall not exceed four per centum per annum. Such bonds or other obligations may be issued by any municipality described in Sections 59-15-1 through 59-15-9 in a principal amount not exceeding in the aggregate one hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000.00), for any purpose or purposes authorized by said sections. Such municipality shall have power out of any funds available to purchase any bonds or other obligations issued by it pursuant to this chapter, and all bonds or other obligations so purchased shall be canceled and no bonds or other obligations shall be issued in lieu thereof. In anticipation of the issuance of the definitive bonds authorized by this chapter, any such municipality may issue interim certificates. Such interim certificates shall be in such form, contain such terms, conditions or provisions, bear such date or dates, and evidence such agreement or agreements relating to their discharge by payment or by the delivery of the definitive bonds, as such municipality by resolution of its governing body may determine. Any bonds, interim certificates or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter shall be fully negotiable within the meaning and for all the purposes of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7620; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

§ 59-15-13. Disposition of proceeds of bonds; penalties for diversion; guarantee of payment of bonds.

The proceeds from the sale of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter shall be placed to the credit of the municipality issuing such bonds in a bank or banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System and may be withdrawn therefrom in accordance with any agreement or agreements entered into between such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations and shall be used for no other purpose than the purpose or purposes set forth in the original resolution of the governing body of such municipality. Any officer or other person diverting or assisting to divert any such funds to any other purpose or purposes than the purpose or purposes originally set forth in said resolution of the governing body of such municipality shall be guilty of a felony and punishable accordingly, and shall be liable both personally and on official bond

for such diversion. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as a guarantee on the part of such city to pay the principal of or interest on any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7621; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

§ 59-15-15. Mortgage or deed of trust.

Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this chapter by resolution or resolutions duly adopted, is hereby given authority to execute and deliver a mortgage or deed of trust on any or all lands, properties, improvements and facilities, the acquisition, construction, maintenance or operation of which are provided for by this chapter. Such resolution or resolutions of such municipality shall prescribe the provisions, covenants and conditions of any such mortgage or deed of trust. Such provisions, covenants and conditions, if not self-executing, may be enforced by appropriate proceedings, either in law or in equity.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7622; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

§ 59-15-17. Exemption from taxation of bonds.

Bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter and any interest thereon or income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation, except gift, transfer or inheritance taxes, in so far as may be within the power of the State of Mississippi so to provide.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7619; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

§ 59-15-19. Trustees.

Any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this chapter shall, so long as any such bonds or other obligations remain outstanding and unpaid, by resolution or resolutions duly adopted, authorize and appoint a trustee, satisfactory to the purchaser or purchasers of any bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter, or any successor thereto, with the following powers and duties:

(a) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall receive and receipt for all money paid or to be paid to it in accordance with Section 59-15-3, constituting the net revenues derived from the operation of the improvements and facilities authorized by this chapter;

(b) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall deposit all money received or to be received, in a special account or accounts in a bank or banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, with such provisions for security therefor as may be incorporated in any agreement or agreements entered into between any such municipality and the purchaser or purchasers of any such bonds or other obligations;

(c) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall use and apply all such money so received to the payment of principal of and interest

on any bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this chapter, as the same become due, and shall use and apply any surplus remaining after such payment or payments for the prior redemption, with or without premium, of bonds or other obligations issued by any municipality pursuant to this chapter, or in accordance with the provisions of any agreement or agreements as may be made between any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this chapter and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations;

(d) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall have and be vested with all rights, powers and duties, in addition to the foregoing, as may be provided for in any agreement or agreements between any municipality issuing bonds or other obligations pursuant to this chapter and the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds or other obligations;

(e) Such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall by an instrument in writing, accept such trust and shall file such written acceptance of such trust with the clerk of the municipality so appointing such trustee;

(f) If such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall die, fail, neglect or refuse to perform any of the duties herein imposed or that may be imposed by reason of any of the provisions of any agreement or agreements as aforesaid, such trustee, or any successor thereto, shall, on the written request of the holder or holders of twenty per centum or more in aggregate principal amount of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter then outstanding and unpaid, be removed, by resolution duly adopted by the municipality by which such trustee, or any successor thereto, was appointed; and in such event, it shall be the duty of any such trustee so removed to effectuate a valid transfer of all money then in the possession or under the control of such trustee so removed to a duly appointed successor, and a failure on the part of such trustee so removed to do so shall constitute an embezzlement of such money and shall be punishable accordingly;

(g) In the event any such trustee so appointed, or any successor thereto, shall die or be removed as hereinabove provided, it shall be the duty of any such municipality immediately by resolution duly adopted to appoint a trustee, as successor thereto, who is satisfactory to said holder or holders of twenty per centum or more in aggregate principal amount of bonds or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter then outstanding and unpaid.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7618; Laws, 1935, ch. 63.

CHAPTER 17

State Inland Ports

SEC.

- 59-17-1. Short title; "board" defined.
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§ 59-17-1. Short title; "board" defined.

This chapter may be cited as the "State Inland Ports Law."

As used in this chapter, the word "board" shall mean the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-01; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Editor's Note — Section 57-1-2 provides that the words "Agricultural and Industrial Board" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

§ 59-17-3. Declaration of public policy.

It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to aid the industrial development and economy of the state through the acquisition, promotion, development, improvement and expansion of inland ports and attendant industrial sites.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-02; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-5. Construction of chapter.

(1) This chapter shall be construed liberally and broadly to effectuate the policy and purposes set out herein.

(2) This chapter shall be deemed to be full and complete authority for the exercise of the powers herein granted, but this chapter shall not be deemed to repeal or to be in derogation of any existing law of this state.

(3) The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to repeal, amend, limit, or restrict statutes heretofore or hereinafter enacted, providing for the establishment, support, financing, and maintenance of port commissions, authorities, or other local agencies having jurisdiction over harbors, ports, rivers, channels, and waterways, nor to be applicable to any bond issue, heretofore or hereafter issued for port or harbor purposes by any county or municipality in which said port is located, and the provisions hereof shall be supplemental and cumulative and shall not repeal, limit, or restrict the authority granted any public body or agency under any existing statute, except as herein otherwise expressly provided.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 7623-03, 7623-26, 7623-29; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, §§ 3, 26, 29, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-7. Functions of board and inland port as essential governmental functions.

The carrying out of the corporate purposes of the board and the state inland port authority is, in all respects, for the benefit of the people of the State of Mississippi and is a public purpose, and the board and such state inland port authority will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-24; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 24, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-9. Duty of board to implement public policy; construction of rights, powers and duties of board.

There is hereby vested in the board the duty to implement such declared public policy as herein provided. Wide latitude and discretion shall be vested in the board in the exercise of its powers and duties, and the enumeration of

specific rights, powers, and duties of said board, when followed by general powers, shall not be construed in the restrictive sense.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-03; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-11. Condition precedent to board action.

The board shall take no action in building, constructing, acquiring, or developing any state-owned inland port unless the Tennessee Valley Authority or other governmental agency agrees to furnish at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the cost of building, acquiring, constructing, or developing said port.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-04; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Payments by Tennessee Valley Authority in lieu of taxes, see §§ 27-37-301 et seq.

§ 59-17-13. General powers of board.

The board shall have power to acquire, purchase, install, lease, construct, own, hold, maintain, equip, use, control, and operate ports, harbors, waterways, channels, wharves, piers, docks, quays, elevators, tipples, compresses, bulk loading and unloading facilities, warehouses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, and water, air and rail terminals, and roadways and approaches thereto, and other structures and facilities needful for the convenient use of the same in the aid of commerce, including the dredging, deepening, extending, widening, or enlarging of any ports, harbors, rivers, channels, and waterways, the damming of inland waterways, the establishment of water basins, the acquisition and development of industrial sites and the reclaiming of submerged lands.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-05; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Contracts with lessees for the construction of facilities such as those referred to in this section, and acquisition thereof by the board, see § 59-17-31.

§ 59-17-15. Acceptance of grants and contributions by board.

The board, in addition to the moneys which may be received by it from the sale of bonds and from the collection of revenues, rents and earnings derived under the provisions of this chapter, shall have the authority to accept from any public or private agency, or from any individual grants for or in aid of the construction of any planned development, or for the payment of bonds, and to receive and accept contributions from any source, of money or property or other things of value to be held, used and applied only for the purposes for which such grants or contributions may be made.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-25; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 25, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-17. Appraisal of plan for project; agreement between board and county or agency proposing project.

On the receipt of an application from any county or agency authorized under the laws of the state of Mississippi to operate or support a port or harbor project, or any part thereof, the board shall cause an independent determination and appraisal to be made of such analysis and survey, and the plan for the improvement, operation, development and expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, and if the board shall find and determine that the plan for the improvement, operation, development or expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, is practical and feasible and is in the public interest, and that such port or harbor, or any part thereof, can be operated economically under state ownership, and that the revenues therefrom would be sufficient, over a period of time, to make such ownership and/or operation by the state self-liquidating, then the board, in its discretion, may negotiate with such participating counties as required by this chapter or other authorized agency on the terms of an agreement for the acquisition by the state of such port or harbor, or any part thereof. The board may modify the proposed plan for the improvement, operation, development or expansion of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, and may impose such terms and conditions as, in its discretion, it may require to protect the interest of the state. Any agreement reached between the board and the participating counties, or other authorized agency, shall be reduced to writing.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-07; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 7; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 256, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

§ 59-17-19. Tax levy by counties for payment of bonds.

Before any additional bonds may be issued for equipment as authorized by Section 59-17-41, at least one (1) county shall have levied a tax upon all the taxable property, both real and personal, within its boundaries for the purpose of paying the principal and interest on such bonds and the aggregate amount of the additional issue shall have been approved by the board of economic development. Such tax shall be in an amount sufficient to pay the principal of and interest on the additional bonds issued for equipment as authorized by Section 59-17-41, and such tax levy shall not be reimbursable under the homestead exemption laws of this state.

The ad valorem tax levied by any county or counties under this section shall be reduced in whole or in part when the board and the state inland port authority find and determine that there has been or will be received in the state inland port authority fund a sufficient sum of money from other net revenues, thereby eliminating the need for this county tax levy.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-06; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 6; Laws, 1980, ch. 530, § 2; Laws, 1981, ch. 509, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 257, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Editor's Note — Section 57-1-2 provides that the term "Board of Economic Development" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

Cross References — Bonds to be issued for inland port facilities and equipment contingent upon the tax levy authorized under this section, see § 59-17-41.

§ 59-17-21. Contract with master water management district to underwrite financial obligations for project.

In the event no three (3) counties shall contract on the basis provided for in Section 59-17-19, then any master water management district may be considered an authorized agency and may enter into a contract with the board whereby they must agree to underwrite any deficits incurred from the operation of the port and/or obligations incurred by the board for the port authority. The board will contract with a master water management district only after they have been convinced that adequate security has been furnished the board to protect the state's investment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-06; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 6; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 258, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References — Water management districts, see §§ 51-7-1 et seq.

§ 59-17-23. Operation of port or harbor by state inland port authority; composition of authority; appointment and terms of office of members.

Any port or harbor, or any part thereof, and all facilities, structures, lands or other improvements, leased by, acquired by or conveyed to the state shall be operated by the board acting through a state inland port authority for such port or harbor, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter. Such port authority shall be vested, in addition to the rights, powers and duties conferred hereunder, with the same jurisdiction, and the same rights, powers, and duties vested by law, in other port authorities within the state. Any conflict with other laws shall be governed by this chapter.

The state inland port authority shall consist of one member from the county in which the port is located and one member from each county that is contiguous to the county in which the port is located to be appointed for a period of four years by the respective board of supervisors of each of those counties, provided each county has levied the two mills required in Sections 59-17-19 and 59-17-21 and the governor shall appoint one member from each participating county outlined above of which two mills has been levied, plus one additional member from any one of the participating counties outlined above of which two mills has been levied. The initial terms by the governor's appointees shall be staggered, one member appointed for two years and others by adding one additional year; no term shall exceed five years. The number of years to be served on regular terms shall be the same number as the number of governor's appointees.

In the event the contracting agency is any master water management district, the board shall consist of the following: one member from the county in which the port is located and one member from each county that is

contiguous to the county in which the port is located to be appointed by the respective boards of supervisors for a period of four years, and the governor shall appoint one member from each of the counties outlined above, plus one additional member from any one of the counties outlined above. The governor's five appointees' initial terms shall be for one, two, three, four and five years respectively, but all succeeding appointments shall be for terms of five years.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-08; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Water management districts, see §§ 51-7-1 et seq.

§ 59-17-25. Organization of state inland port authority; oath and bond of members.

The members of the state inland port authority shall organize under the direction of the board in the same manner that state port authorities are organized and shall be entitled to compensation not exceeding that authorized by law for a state port authority. In its operation of such port or harbor, or any part thereof, such state inland port authority shall not be responsible to the counties participating, in which such port or harbor, or any part thereof, may be located, or other authorized port or harbor agency, but shall be responsible solely to the board. Before entering upon the duties of the office, each of said members shall take and subscribe to the oath of office required by Section 268 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, and shall file same with the secretary of state, and shall give bond in the sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00), with a surety company or companies, authorized to do business in this state, conditioned according to law, and to be delivered to and approved by the treasurer of the State of Mississippi; the premiums on said bonds shall be paid from port funds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-09; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Who may administer oaths, see §§ 11-1-1, 25-1-9.
Compensation of port commissioners, see § 59-1-5.

§ 59-17-27. State inland port fund; board may contract for joint activities or employment of personnel.

The agreement between the board and the participating counties or other authorized agency shall provide that a fair and proportionate part of the expense of the board administering this chapter shall be considered a part of the cost of the development or operation of the planned development, and such costs shall be paid into a separate state fund in the state treasury, to be known as the "state inland ports fund." Such fund shall be used by the board for the promotion, development, construction, improvement, expansion, maintenance, advertising, and general advancement of the state harbors, ports, rivers, channels, and waterways and may be expended on requisition of the board for

such purposes and such other purposes as in the opinion of the board is to the best interest of the ports, harbors, and waterways of this state. The salaries of all officers, employees, or agents of the board, performing duties required by this chapter, and all other expenses incidental to the port, harbor, or waterway operation of the board shall be fixed by the board and payable out of said fund. The board may contract with one or more state inland port authorities, or any city, county or other authorized port or harbor agency for any joint activity or for the joint employment of personnel with the expense of the activity or salary of such personnel to be paid by the board from operational funds provided by the contracting parties.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-11; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-29. Setting aside or leasing of lands and facilities by board.

The board, acting jointly with the state inland port authority, is authorized to set aside, or lease all or portions of any lands, roads, docks, sheds, warehouses, elevators, compresses, floating dry docks, graving docks, marine railways, tugboats, or any other necessary or useful improvements constructed or acquired by it to individuals, firms, or corporations, public or private, for port, harbor, commercial or industrial purposes for a period not to exceed ninety-nine years, or to execute a conveyance of sale, except as otherwise limited by law, on such terms and conditions and with such safeguards as would best promote and protect the public interest. Any industrial lease of lands may be executed upon such terms and conditions and for such monetary rental or other consideration as may be found adequate and approved by the board in orders or resolutions authorizing the same. Any covenants and agreements shall require the lessee to make expenditures in determined amounts, and within such time or times, for improvements to be erected upon the land, by such lessee and to conduct thereon industrial and/or other operations in such aggregate payroll amounts and for such period of time as may be determined and defined in such lease. Such instrument may contain reasonable provisions giving the lessee the right to remove its or his improvements upon the termination of the lease.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-12; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

An inland port authority, acting jointly with the Department of Economic and Community Development, may sell or transfer property pursuant to the statute for less than fair market value or may lease the property for less than fair mar-

ket rental upon a finding, consistent with fact, and spread upon its minutes, that the terms and conditions of such sale or lease will best promote and protect the public interest. Michael, April 24, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0220.

§ 59-17-31. Authority of board or inland port authority to employ personnel, make contracts and purchases, and sue and be sued.

The board or the State Inland Port Authority, in the performance of its duties, may employ such personnel and make all contracts and purchases incidental to or necessary for the advancement, promotion, development, establishment, insurance, maintenance, repair, improvement and operation of any ports, harbors, rivers, channels and waterways, including, if required for its protection, retirement benefits, workers' compensation insurance and other employee benefits for the benefit of any employees of the board or State Inland Port Authority. The board or State Inland Port Authority may, in its discretion, make such contract or purchase without the necessity of prior advertisement or public bids, provided such contract or purchase does not involve the expenditure of sums in excess of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$2,500.00); and any other contracts let for any port, harbor, river, channel or waterway improvements shall be advertised as required by law for the letting of public contracts, and such contracts shall be awarded to the lowest and best bidder, who shall make such bond as shall be required by the board or State Inland Port Authority, conditioned for the faithful prosecution and completion of the work according to such contract, such bond to be furnished by a corporate surety company qualified to do business in this state. However, the board may negotiate and enter into contracts with responsible lessees for the construction of facilities by lessees, such as those referred to in Section 59-17-13, Mississippi Code of 1972, and the acquisition thereof by the board upon such terms and conditions and for such amounts as may be approved by the board.

The authority is granted the power to sue and be sued in its own name.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-13; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 13; Laws, 1976, ch. 400, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 495, § 27; reenacted and amended, 1985, ch. 474, § 18; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 40; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 41; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 38; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 36; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 37; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 37; Laws, 1992, ch. 491, § 39, eff from and after passage (approved May 12, 1992).

Cross References — Immunity of state and political subdivisions from liability and suit for torts and torts of its employees, see §§ 11-46-1 et seq.

Participation in a comprehensive plan of one or more policies of liability insurance procured and administered by the Department of Finance and Administration, see § 11-46-17.

Public contracts generally, see §§ 31-1-1 et seq.

Workers' compensation, see §§ 71-3-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The powers granted to state inland port authorities are set forth in this section and include the powers to employ personnel, make contracts and purchases, purchase insurance, and sue and be sued, but

may not establish a revolving loan program. Michael, August 22, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0429.

The statute does not allow a port authority to enter into a commercial venture

to build, manage, develop, and operate a hotel and marina. Michael, Sept. 28, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0611.

§ 59-17-33. Acquisition of rights of way, land and property by board generally; restriction on power of eminent domain.

For the acquiring of rights-of-way, land and property, including existing easements, restrictive covenants and reversionary estates necessary for the purpose herein authorized, the board shall have the right and power to acquire the same by purchase, negotiation or condemnation, and, should it elect to exercise the right of eminent domain, it may proceed in the manner provided by the general laws of the state of Mississippi for procedure by any county, municipality or corporation organized under the laws of this state, or in any other manner provided by law. The power of eminent domain shall apply not only as to all property of private persons or corporations, but also as to property already devoted to public use, including leaseholds, excepting interests in property owned by levee boards, drainage districts, or other flood control agencies. However, the board shall have no authority to acquire without the consent of the owner thereof any property operated and used for port, harbor or industrial purposes or such purposes as the board is authorized to acquire and use property for, unless an actual necessity therefor be alleged and proven. The board is authorized to accept donations of lands, rights therein, moneys and materials required for the maintenance or development of any port or harbor. The board may exchange any property or properties acquired under the authority of this chapter for other property or properties usable in carrying out the powers hereby conferred, and also remove from lands needed for its purposes and reconstruct on other locations, buildings, utilities, terminals, railroads or other structures upon the payment of just compensation, if it is necessary so to do, in order to carry out any of its plans for port development. The title to all land or property acquired under the authority of this chapter shall vest in the state of Mississippi. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to authorize the taking by eminent domain of any private property except for necessary public use, said right of eminent domain to be limited to the acquisition of railroad rights-of-way, road rights-of-way and land for industrial use only.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-14; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 14; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 259, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References — Taking private property for public use, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 17.

Eminent domain, see §§ 11-27-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 53.

§ 59-17-35. State bonds; issuance, terms, and conditions generally.

The board shall have power and is hereby authorized, at one (1) time, or from time to time, to provide by resolution for the issuance of negotiable bonds of the state of Mississippi by the state bond commission to provide funds for the purpose of paying all or any part of the cost of the acquisition of any state port, harbor, waterway or part thereof, and the planned development of any port, harbor, waterway or part thereof, but in no event shall the amount of such bonds issued exceed the actual cost of an approved plan for the development of any port, harbor, waterway or part thereof. The principal of and the interest on such bonds shall be payable from a special fund to be provided for that purpose in the manner hereinafter set forth. Such bonds shall bear the date or dates, be in such denomination or denominations, bear interest at such rate or rates, be payable at such place or places within or without the state of Mississippi, shall mature absolutely at such time or times, be redeemable prior to maturity at such time or times and upon such terms, with or without premium, shall bear such registration privileges, and shall be substantially in such form, all as shall be determined by resolution of the board. Such bonds shall mature in annual installments beginning not more than four (4) years from date thereof and extending not more than thirty (30) years from date thereof. In no event shall any bonds be issued for a period of time which shall be longer than ninety percent (90%) of the expected useful life of the project or projects to be financed by the proceeds of said bonds. Such bonds shall be signed by the governor or by his facsimile signature, and the official seal of the state shall be affixed thereto, attested by the secretary of state. The interest coupons to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of said officers. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officials herein designated to sign the bonds who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-15; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 15; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 260, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References — State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

§ 59-17-37. State bonds; negotiability; exemption from taxation.

All bonds and interest coupons issued under the provisions of this chapter shall have and are hereby declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code of the State of

Mississippi. Such bonds and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-16; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 16, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-1-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial Code §§ 69 et seq.

§ 59-17-39. State bonds; proceedings for issuance; validation.

Such bonds as are issued under this chapter may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified or required by this chapter. The bonds authorized under the authority of this chapter may, in the discretion of the state bond commission, be validated in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, in the manner and with the force and effect provided now or hereafter by Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1971, for the validation of county, municipal, school district, and other bonds. The necessary papers for such validation proceedings shall be transmitted to the state bond attorney by the attorney general, and the required notice shall be published in a newspaper published in the City of Jackson, Mississippi, and in a newspaper of general circulation published in the city or county where the planned development is located.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-17; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 17, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — State bond attorney, see § 31-13-1.
State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

§ 59-17-41. State bonds; payment of principal and interest; limitation on amount issued.

The bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be payable from the special fund provided therefor as hereinafter set out and shall be the general obligations of the State of Mississippi and backed by the full faith and credit of the state, and, if the funds supplied by the board to the state treasurer from the sources prescribed by this chapter be insufficient to fully pay at maturity any installment of interest on said bonds or to pay at maturity the principal of said bonds, then the deficiency shall be paid by the state treasurer from any funds in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, and all such bonds shall contain recitals on their face substantially covering the foregoing provisions of this section. The amount of bonds issued for the acquisition and planned development of any state inland ports, harbors, or waterways shall

not exceed the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars (\$1,500,000.00). The purpose of this one million five hundred thousand dollar (\$1,500,000.00) bond issue is to purchase industrial sites and railroad right-of-way nearby the inland port.

From and after July 1, 1980, and contingent upon the tax levy authorized in Section 59-17-19, an additional amount of bonds not to exceed two million dollars (\$2,000,000.00) may be issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to be used for the construction of buildings and related facilities and the acquisition of equipment for inland ports organized under this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-18; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 18; Laws, 1980, ch. 530, § 3; Laws, 1981, ch. 356, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 18, 1981).

Cross References — County property tax levy sufficient to fund bonds as prerequisite to issuance of additional equipment bonds authorized by this section, see § 59-17-19.

§ 59-17-43. State bonds; manner and price of sale.

The state bond commission shall sell such state bonds in such manner and for such price as it may determine to be for the best interest of the State of Mississippi, but no such sale shall be made at a price less than par plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. Notice of the sale of any such bonds shall be published at least one time not less than ten days prior to the date of sale and shall be so published in one or more newspapers published in Jackson, Mississippi, and having general circulation within the State of Mississippi, and in one or more other newspapers or financial journals as may be directed by the state bond commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-19; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 19, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-45. State bonds; disposition of proceeds from sale.

The proceeds of such state bonds issued pursuant to this chapter shall be paid into a special fund or funds in banks qualified to act as depositories for the participating counties in which the port or harbor is located, allocated in such equitable manner as the board may determine and such depositories shall qualify as such by depositing bonds or other securities authorized by law to secure deposits in state depositories. The proceeds of such bonds shall be used solely for payment of the cost of the planned development and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds and shall be disbursed upon order of the board with such restrictions, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the planned development, and the redeeming of any outstanding bonds, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit which, unless otherwise provided in the

resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the purpose for which the bonds were issued, the surplus shall be paid into the fund established for the payment of the principal of and the interest on such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-20; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 20, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Depositories for funds of local governments, see §§ 27-105-301 et seq.

§ 59-17-47. Withdrawals from special fund for payment of bonds.

The funds which are transferred from the sale of bonds under this chapter to the special fund in the qualified depositories set up for each separate port, harbor, or part thereof, may be withdrawn only in the following manner: said funds shall be paid by such qualified depositories upon warrants issued by the state auditor of public accounts, which warrants shall be issued upon requisition of the board or state inland port authority. All expenditures ordered by the board or state inland port authority shall be entered upon their minutes, and the board and each state inland port authority shall submit a full report of their work and all the transactions carried on by them, and a complete statement of all their revenues and expenditures to the legislature at each regular session of the legislature.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-28; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

§ 59-17-49. Disposition of net revenues, rents, and earnings from port or harbor.

All net revenues, rents, and earnings from the operation or maintenance of any state-owned inland port or harbor, or any part thereof, shall be set aside by the board exclusively for the payment of any bonds issued by the state for such port or harbor, or any part thereof, and shall not be commingled with the funds of any other port or harbor, or any part thereof, but shall be expended by the board exclusively for the payment of such bonds as provided in Section 59-17-51, and, if no such bonds be outstanding, then by the state inland port

authority for the improvement, operation, advancement, development, maintenance and advertising of the port to which such funds have accrued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-10; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

§ 59-17-51. Pledge of revenues, rents and earnings to payment of bonds; sinking fund.

The net revenues, rents, and earnings derived from any planned development or the net revenues, rents, and earnings received by the board produced by a state inland port, harbor, or part thereof, for which bonds have been issued, shall be pledged and allocated by the board to the payment of the principal of and interest on the bonds issued for such planned development as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds may provide, and such pledge may include funds received from one or more or all sources available to such planned development and shall be set aside at regular intervals into a sinking fund, which sinking fund shall be pledged to and charged with the payment of:

(a) The interest upon such bonds as such interest shall accrue.

(b) The principal of the bonds as the same shall become due.

(c) The necessary charges of the paying agent or paying agents for paying principal and interest of and on such bonds.

(d) Any premium on bonds retired by call or purchase as may be provided therein.

(e) Net revenues shall be defined in the agreement between the board and the participating counties, or other authorized agency.

The use and disposition of such sinking fund shall be subject to such regulations as may be provided in the resolution authorizing any issue of bonds, but except as may otherwise be provided in such resolution, such sinking fund shall be a fund for the benefit of all bonds issued under such resolution, without distinction or priority of one over the other. Subject to the provisions of the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds, surplus moneys in the sinking fund may be applied to the purchase or redemption of any of such bonds, and any such bonds so purchased or redeemed shall forthwith be cancelled and shall not again be issued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-21; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 21, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Sinking funds for municipal harbor bonds, see §§ 59-3-5, 59-7-13, 59-7-427.

Sinking fund for joint bond issue by county and municipality, see § 59-9-9.

§ 59-17-53. Refunding bonds.

The board is authorized to provide by resolution for the issuance of refunding bonds by the state bond commission for the purpose of refunding any bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter and then outstanding,

together with interest thereon to the date of such refunding bonds, and redemption premium thereon, if any. The issuance of such refunding bonds, the maturity, and all other details thereof, the rights of the holders thereof and the duties of the board and state inland port authority in respect thereto shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter, insofar as the same may be applicable.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-22; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 22, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Refunding bonds generally, see §§ 31-15-1 et seq.

§ 59-17-55. Bonds as legal investments and security for deposits.

All bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be legal investments for trustees and other fiduciaries, and for savings banks, trust companies, the board of trustees of the public employees' retirement system, and insurance companies organized under the laws of the State of Mississippi, and such bonds shall be legal securities which may be deposited with and shall be received by all public officers and bodies of this state and all municipalities and political subdivisions for the purpose of securing the deposit of public funds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-23; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 23, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — Public employee's retirement benefits, see §§ 25-11-1 et seq. Investment of excess social security funds, see § 25-11-121.

Investments by domestic insurance companies, see §§ 83-19-51, 83-19-53.

Investment of trust funds held by fiduciaries, see §§ 91-13-1 et seq.

Investments by guardians, see § 93-13-57.

§ 59-17-57. Representation of state bond commission by attorney general.

The attorney general of the State of Mississippi shall represent the state bond commission in issuing, selling and validating bonds herein provided for, and the board is hereby authorized and empowered to expend any sum not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000.00) from the proceeds derived from the sale of any one series of bonds authorized hereunder to pay for the cost of the approving attorney's fees, validating, printing and cost of delivery of bonds authorized under this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7623-27; Laws, 1968, ch. 430, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved August 8, 1968).

Cross References — State bond commission, see §§ 31-17-1 et seq.

CHAPTER 19

Landings

SEC.

- 59-19-1. Initiation of proceedings to establish landing.
- 59-19-3. Notice of proceedings to establish landing.
- 59-19-5. Confirmation of report; assessment of damages.
- 59-19-7. Replacement of jurors; fines.
- 59-19-9. Appeal of assessment to circuit court.
- 59-19-11. Use of landing; penalty for misuse.
- 59-19-13. Compensation of participants.
- 59-19-15. Leasing of landing.

§ 59-19-1. Initiation of proceedings to establish landing.

Any three or more freeholders residing in any county bordering on the Mississippi River or other navigable river, bayou, bay, or inlet, may petition the board of supervisors of such county to cause a lot of ground, outside of a city, town, or village, on the bank of the river, bayou, bay, or inlet, to be designated and set apart as a boat landing and cotton-yard, for the use of the public, stating in the petition the name of the owner of the land proposed to be so taken; and said board shall thereupon appoint three of its members a committee to examine and determine whether such landing be required for public convenience, and, if so, to lay off and mark such lot of ground, not exceeding two acres, at such point as will be most convenient to the public.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 1; 1871, § 1881; 1880, § 916; 1892, § 2487; Laws, 1906, § 2824; Hemingway's 1917, § 5218; Laws, 1930, § 5321; Laws, 1942, § 7624.

Cross References — Definition of "navigable waters," see §§ 1-3-31, 51-1-1. Small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A grant on valuable consideration of the right perpetually to lay off new landings, as the river bank caves, to the exclusion of all others, on the water front of a large

plantation, next a growing town, is not so unfair that chancery will decline to enforce it. *Carson v. Percy*, 57 Miss. 97 (1879).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges §§ 21 et seq., 217 et seq.

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Wharves §§ 22-24.

§ 59-19-3. Notice of proceedings to establish landing.

The board of supervisors shall fix the time and place for the meeting of the committee provided for in Section 59-19-1, and the sheriff of the county shall

deliver to the owner of the land proposed to be taken a copy of the order five days previous to the time of meeting. The committee shall make a full report of its proceedings, in writing, to the board of supervisors at its next regular meeting, and the board may confirm or set aside the report, and order another examination, or otherwise, at its discretion. And the owner of the land, having been served with notice as provided, shall take notice of all future proceedings. In case the owner be a non-resident, or cannot be found, he may be notified by publication of the order of the board in the same manner as publication is made for non-resident defendants in chancery.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 2; 1871, § 1882; 1880, § 917; 1892, § 2488; Laws, 1906, § 2825; Hemingway's 1917, § 5219; Laws, 1930, § 5322; Laws, 1942, § 7625.

§ 59-19-5. Confirmation of report; assessment of damages.

Should the report of the committee be confirmed, the board of supervisors shall direct its clerk to issue a writ to the sheriff of the county to summon twelve disinterested freeholders, competent jurors of the county, to meet on the premises, at a time to be fixed by the sheriff, of which the jurors and parties shall have five days' notice. The jury, being first sworn by the sheriff, shall assess the damages to be awarded to the owner of the land or other person, and shall reduce their finding to writing, and sign the same. The sheriff shall return the inquisition to the next meeting of the board, by whom the same shall be confirmed or set aside and a new jury ordered. And if the same shall be confirmed, the damages so awarded shall be paid by the parties applying to have said lot condemned and the costs of the proceeding. It shall not be lawful to enter upon or use the lot for any of the purposes for which it was condemned until the damages and the costs shall be paid or tendered.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 3; 1871, § 1883; 1880, § 918; 1892, § 2489; Laws, 1906, § 2826; Hemingway's 1917, § 5220; Laws, 1930, § 5323; Laws, 1942, § 7626.

Cross References — Taking private property for public use, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 17.

Eminent domain proceedings, see §§ 11-27-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Juror qualifications.

use. *Pearson v. Johnson*, 54 Miss. 259 (1876).

1. In general.

The right of eminent domain is paramount to the private right of property but compensation must first be made before private property can be taken for public

2. Juror qualifications.

The persons summoned by the sheriff must be freeholders and competent jurors. *Board of Levee Comm'rs v. Allen*, 60 Miss. 93 (1882); *Cage v. Trager*, 60 Miss. 563 (1882).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 26 *Am. Jur. 2d*, *Eminent Domain* § 53.

§ 59-19-7. Replacement of jurors; fines.

If any of the jurors should fail to attend, the sheriff shall forthwith summon other proper persons in their places, and the defaulters shall be reported to the board of supervisors, and shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than twenty dollars, unless good cause against the same be shown.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 5; 1871, § 1885; 1880, § 920; 1892, § 2490; Laws, 1906, § 2827; Hemingway's 1917, § 5221; Laws, 1930, § 5324; Laws, 1942, § 7627.

Cross References — Juries in eminent domain proceedings, see § 13-5-89.

§ 59-19-9. Appeal of assessment to circuit court.

Should the owner of the land, or other person claiming compensation or damages, be not satisfied with the verdict of the jury, such person may appeal from the order of the board of supervisors confirming the same, within ten days after such order, to the circuit court; and the court may review the proceedings as to any matter of law and may award a trial de novo as to the amount of damages. If the order of the board confirming the finding of the jury be reversed on a question of law, the cause shall be remanded to the board for a new writ to be issued for the assessment of damages; or such other order shall be made by the circuit court as shall be proper.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 4; 1871, § 1884; 1880, § 918; 1892, § 2491; Laws, 1906, § 2828; Hemingway's 1917, § 5222; Laws, 1930, § 5325; Laws, 1942, § 7628.

§ 59-19-11. Use of landing; penalty for misuse.

After the termination of the proceedings and the payment or tender of the damages and costs, the applicants may erect warehouses, sheds, and such other buildings as may be necessary for the reception, storage, or shipment of cotton or other freight, and shall have such lot substantially inclosed, provided with suitable gates, and kept in good repair; and it shall not be lawful for any person to use the lot, shed, warehouses, or other buildings for any other purposes than those designated, under the penalty of five hundred dollars, to be recovered of the petitioners or of any person so using the said lot or buildings, by and for the use of the owner of the land, and the right to use the same for any purpose shall be forfeited.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 4; 1871, § 1884; 1880, § 919; 1892, § 2492; Laws, 1906, § 2829; Hemingway's 1917, § 5223; Laws, 1930, § 5326; Laws, 1942, § 7629.

§ 59-19-13. Compensation of participants.

The members of the committee shall receive the same pay as jurors in the circuit court; and the sheriff shall receive such further sum, in addition to his fees, as the board of supervisors may allow; all costs to be paid by the petitioners for the condemnation of the lot.

SOURCES: Codes, 1857, ch. 22, art. 6; 1871, § 1886; 1880, § 921; 1892, § 2493; Laws, 1906, § 2830; Hemingway's 1917, § 5224; Laws, 1930, § 5327; Laws, 1942, § 7630.

Cross References — Fee of jurors, see §§ 25-7-61, 25-7-63.

§ 59-19-15. Leasing of landing.

The board of supervisors may lease the lot or landing for a term not exceeding five years, the lessee to transact thereat only a general receiving and forwarding business; and, in case of a lease, the board shall fix, with power to alter, a schedule of rates and charges for receiving and forwarding freight, and require of the lessee a bond, payable to the county, in a penalty not less than five hundred dollars as shall be proper, conditioned to observe the terms of the lease and to perform the duties imposed on him by law. The lessee shall keep the schedule of rates conspicuously posted on the premises, and any overcharge shall subject the lessee and his sureties to a penalty of twenty dollars in favor of the party injured. A lease shall not abridge the right of any person to store and forward his own freight at the landing free of charge.

SOURCES: Codes, 1892, § 2494; Laws, 1906, § 2831; Hemingway's 1917, § 5225; Laws, 1930, § 5328; Laws, 1942, § 7631.

CHAPTER 21

Boats and Other Vessels

In General	59-21-1
Numbering of Undocumented Vessels	59-21-5
Manufacturing and Related Processes	59-21-41
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IN GENERAL

SEC.

59-21-1. Short title.

59-21-3. Definitions.

§ 59-21-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Mississippi Boating Law of 1960.”

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-01; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

Cross References — Small craft harbors, see §§ 59-15-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 4 et seq.

CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

Practice References. USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

§ 59-21-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires a different meaning:

(a) “Commission” means the Mississippi Commission on Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

(b) “Length” means the length of the vessel measured from end to end over the deck excluding sheer.

(c) “Livery boat” means any boat for rent or hire.

(d) “Machinery” means inboard and outboard engines and all other types of motors or mechanical devices.

(e) “Motorboat” means any undocumented vessel propelled by machinery, whether or not such machinery is the principal source of propulsion. The term motorboat includes personal watercraft.

(f) “Operate” means to navigate or otherwise use a motorboat or vessel.

(g) "Operator" means the person who operates or who has charge of the navigation or use of a motorboat or a vessel.

(h) "Owner" means the person who claims lawful possession of a vessel by virtue of legal title or equitable interest therein which entitles him to such possession.

(i) "Person" means an individual, partnership, firm, corporation, association, or other entity.

(j) "Ships' lifeboats" means lifeboats used solely for lifesaving purposes and does not include dinghies, tenders, speedboats, or other type of craft carried aboard a vessel and used for other than lifesaving purposes.

(k) "Undocumented vessel" means any vessel which is not required to have, and does not have, a valid marine document issued by the Bureau of Customs.

(l) "Vessel" means every description of watercraft, other than seaplane on the water, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.

(m) "Waters of this state" means any waters within the territorial limits of this state, and the marginal sea adjacent to this state and the high seas when navigated as a part of a journey or ride to or from the shore of the state; however, "waters of this state" does not mean any private pond or lake which is not used for boat rentals or the charging of fees for fishing therein.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-02; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 1; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 2; Laws, 1973, ch. 409, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 353, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 640, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 545, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1997.

Cross References — Definition of "navigable waters," see §§ 1-3-31, 51-1-1.

Exemption from ad valorem taxes of certain vessels, as defined in this section, while in hands of bona fide dealers, see § 27-31-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 4 et seq.

NUMBERING OF UNDOCUMENTED VESSELS

SEC.

- 59-21-5. Requirement of numbering of undocumented vessels.
- 59-21-7. Numbering pattern.
- 59-21-9. Display of awarded number on vessel; use of other numbers prohibited.
- 59-21-11. Application for certificate of number.
- 59-21-13. Renewal of certificate of number; notice as to loss or destruction; replacement of certificate of number.
- 59-21-15. Certified statement of ownership as evidence of ownership; effect of liens as to determination of ownership; application for number by person obtaining title through default in terms of lien instrument.
- 59-21-17. Contents of certificate of number; duties of commission; release of information on vessels; fees and charges for copying, certifying or searching records.

- 59-21-19. Size of certificate of number; temporary certificates; expiration dates; livery boat certificates; manufacturers' and dealers' certificates and numbers.
- 59-21-21. Surrender of certificate of number; notification of change of owner's address or loss, destruction, abandonment or transfer of vessel; application for number by new owner of vessel.
- 59-21-23. Cancellation or voiding of certificate of number.
- 59-21-25. Fees for certificates of number; disposition of proceeds.
- 59-21-27. Additional certificates of numbers for livery boats; fees; renewals.
- 59-21-29. Registration of serial numbers of outboard motors.
- 59-21-31. Alteration of identification numbers or marks on vessels, outboard motors, boats or boat trailers; purchase, sale or possession of vessels, outboard motors, boats or boat trailers with altered identifications; examinations and reports.
- 59-21-33. Seizure and forfeiture of vessels, outboard motors, boats and trailers with altered identification numbers or marks.

§ 59-21-5. Requirement of numbering of undocumented vessels.

All sailboats and every undocumented vessel equipped with propulsion machinery, whether or not such machinery is the principal source of propulsion, using the territorial and navigable waters of the State of Mississippi, and every such vessel owned in the State of Mississippi and using the high seas shall be numbered in accordance with this chapter, except:

- (1) Foreign vessels temporarily using the navigable waters of the State of Mississippi;
- (2) Public vessels of the United States;
- (3) State and municipal vessels used solely for official business and displaying proper visual identification on its hull;
- (4) Ships' lifeboats;
- (5) Vessels designated by the appropriate federal authority;
- (6) Undocumented vessels used exclusively for racing;
- (7) Undocumented vessels operating under valid temporary certificates of number;
- (8) Vessels already covered by a number in full force and effect awarded pursuant to federal law, or a federally approved numbering system of another state, provided that such vessels shall not have been within this state for a period in excess of sixty (60) days. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the numbering of any undocumented vessel upon the request of the owner.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-03; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 3; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 3; Laws, 1973, ch. 409, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 599, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

§ 59-21-7. Numbering pattern.

The numbering pattern to be used shall be as follows:

The number shall be divided into three (3) parts. The first part shall consist of the symbol MI; the second part shall consist of a numerical group

having a maximum of four (4) digits; the third part shall consist of an alphabetical group having a maximum of two (2) letters. Each part shall be separated by hyphens or equivalent spaces.

Vessels shall be given numerical and alphabetical designations in the second and third groups in the order of their application.

The number awarded to a vessel under the provisions of this chapter shall remain the number for such vessel until the vessel is lost, destroyed, abandoned or registered in another state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-05; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 5; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 3; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 364, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

§ 59-21-9. Display of awarded number on vessel; use of other numbers prohibited.

The number awarded shall be painted on or attached to each side of the bow of the vessel for which it was issued. The numbers shall be placed on each side of the forward half of the vessel in such position as to provide clear legibility for identification. The numbers shall read from left to right and shall be in block characters of good proportion not less than three inches in height. The numbers shall be of a color which will contrast with the color of the background and so maintained as to be clearly visible and legible, i.e., dark numbers on a light background, or light numbers on a dark background. No other number shall be carried on the bow of such vessel.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-06; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

§ 59-21-11. Application for certificate of number.

The owner of any vessel required to be numbered under this chapter shall apply, within ten (10) days from the date of acquisition of the vessel, to the commission, on forms provided, for a certificate of number. The application for a number shall include the following:

- (a) Name and address of owner.
- (b) Date of birth of owner.
- (c) Social Security number or driver's license number of the owner.
- (d) Present citizenship of owner (county, state, country).
- (e) County in which the vessel is principally used.
- (f) Present number (if any).
- (g) Hull material (wood, steel; aluminum, plastic, other).
- (h) Type of propulsion (outboard, inboard, other).
- (i) Type of fuel (gas, diesel, other).
- (j) Length of vessel.
- (k) Make and year built (if known).
- (l) Statement as to use (pleasure, livery, dealer, manufacturer, commercial-passenger, commercial-fishing, commercial-other).

(m) A certification of ownership by the applicant.

(n) Serial number of outboard motor, boat and trailer owned by the applicant.

(o) Signature of owner.

(p) A receipt, sales or otherwise, which shows whether or not a sales or use tax was paid at the time of the purchase of the vessel. If the vessel was purchased outside the State of Mississippi, from and after July 1, 1978, and the tax for the privilege of using or consuming tangible personal property imposed by Section 27-67-5 was not paid at the time the vessel was acquired, then the owner shall be required to pay the tax as provided by the Mississippi Use Tax Law before a certificate of number can be issued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-07; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 7; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 4; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 3; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 56; Laws, 1975, ch. 468, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 454, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 606, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

Cross References — County tax collectors, see §§ 27-1-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 22 et seq.

§ 59-21-13. Renewal of certificate of number; notice as to loss or destruction; replacement of certificate of number.

An application for renewal of a certificate of number shall be made by the owner on an application which must be received by the commission within the last ninety (90) days before the expiration date on the certificate of number. The same number will be issued upon renewal. If a certificate of number is lost or destroyed, the owner shall, within fifteen (15) days, notify the commission's office. The notification shall be in writing, shall describe the circumstances of the loss or destruction and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed in this chapter. The certificate of number issued as a result of such report will replace the certificate so lost or destroyed.

The commission shall mail notice of expiration of numbers, together with an application for renewal of number, to each registered boat owner not less than sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date. The commission shall verify annually an up-to-date list of all numbers in effect and those numbers not renewed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-08; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 8; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 57; Laws, 1975, ch. 468, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 364, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 369, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 59-21-15. Certified statement of ownership as evidence of ownership; effect of liens as to determination of ownership; application for number by person obtaining title through default in terms of lien instrument.

The certified statement of ownership on the application for the award of a number shall constitute prima facie evidence of proof of ownership. Liens of all kinds, including reservations or transfers of title to secure debts or claims, will be disregarded in determining ownership under this chapter. A lienholder who acquires possession and title by virtue of default in the terms of the lien instrument, or any other person who acquires ownership through any such action of a lienholder, may apply for a number and shall attach to such application a signed statement explaining the facts in detail.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-09; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

§ 59-21-17. Contents of certificate of number; duties of commission; release of information on vessels; fees and charges for copying, certifying or searching records.

(1) The certificate of number shall include the following:

- (a) Name and address of owner.
- (b) Date of birth of owner.
- (c) Present citizenship of owner (county, state, country).
- (d) County in which vessel is principally used.
- (e) Present number (if any).
- (f) Hull material (wood, steel, aluminum, plastic, other).
- (g) Type of propulsion (outboard, inboard, other).
- (h) Type of fuel (gas, diesel, other).
- (i) Length of vessel.
- (j) Make and year built (if known).
- (k) Statement as to use (pleasure, livery, dealer, manufacturer, commercial-passenger, commercial-fishing, commercial-other).
- (l) A certificate of ownership by the applicant.
- (m) Signature of owner.
- (n) Number awarded to vessel.
- (o) Expiration date of certificate.
- (p) Notice to the owner that he shall report within fifteen (15) days changes of ownership or address, and destruction or abandonment of vessel.
- (q) Notice to the owner that the operator shall:
 - (i) Always carry this certificate on vessel when in use.
 - (ii) Report every accident involving injury or death to persons, or property damage over One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00).
 - (iii) Stop and render aid or assistance if involved in a boating accident.

(2) The commission shall furnish and ensure that the forms required by this section and Section 59-21-13 are stocked at various county offices, boat

companies, fishing camps, marinas, with enforcement officers, and at such other places as to make them available to boat owners. The commission shall award certificates of number and shall keep current a consolidated record of all certificates of numbers awarded and renewals of numbers.

(3) Upon request, information on ownership and identity of numbered vessels shall be available to federal, state and local officials, as needed, in any enforcement or assistance programs. The records pertaining to the numbering of undocumented vessels pursuant to this chapter are considered to be public records. Information based on such records may be released upon oral or written inquiry, subject only to reasonable restrictions necessary to carry on the business of the office. The commission may permit excerpts to be made or the copying or reproduction thereof by a private individual or concern. The fees and charges for copying, certifying or searching of records for information shall be assessed in accordance with usual fees allowed for such services.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-10; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 10; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 58; Laws, 1975, ch. 468, § 3; Laws, 1986, ch. 364, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

§ 59-21-19. Size of certificate of number; temporary certificates; expiration dates; livery boat certificates; manufacturers' and dealers' certificates and numbers.

(1) The certificate of number shall be pocket-size, approximately two and one-half inches (2-½") by three and one-half inches (3-½"), and water resistant.

(2) Pending the issuance of the original certificate of number, the owner of the vessel may be furnished a temporary certificate of number valid for sixty (60) days from the date of issue. This temporary certificate shall be carried on board when the vessel is being operated.

(3) Each applicant for an original or transfer certificate of number, who is entitled to issuance thereof, shall be issued a certificate for a period of two (2) years from the last day of the month of receipt of the original or transfer certificate. This subsection shall not apply to the certificate of number of a livery boat.

(4) The certificate of number of a livery boat shall be plainly marked "livery boat." The description of the motor and type of fuel will be omitted from the certificate of number in any case where the motor is not rented with the boat. Original and renewal certificates of number of a livery boat shall be valid for a period of two (2) years and shall expire at midnight on June 30 of each biennium beginning June 30, 1971.

(5) Numbers and certificates of number awarded boats operated by manufacturers and dealers may be transferred from one (1) boat to another. In lieu of the description, the word "manufacturer" or "dealer," as appropriate, will be plainly marked on each certificate. The manufacturer or dealer may have the number awarded printed upon or attached to a removable sign or signs to be temporarily mounted upon or attached to the boat being demonstrated or tested so long as the display meets the requirements of Section 59-21-9.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-11; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 11; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 4; Laws, 1979, ch. 383, eff from and after July 1, 1980.

§ 59-21-21. Surrender of certificate of number; notification of change of owner's address or loss, destruction, abandonment or transfer of vessel; application for number by new owner of vessel.

(1) When the owner of a numbered vessel removes his residence to another state, or the numbered vessel is not usually moored, docked, housed or garaged within this state, the owner shall, within ninety (90) days thereafter, surrender the certificate of number to the commission.

(2) When the owner of a numbered vessel changes his address from that shown on the certificate of number, he shall notify the commission of his new address within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from such change.

(3) When a numbered vessel is lost, destroyed, abandoned or transferred to another person, the certificate of number issued for the vessel shall be surrendered to the commission within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days after such event. When the vessel is lost, destroyed or abandoned and the certificate of number has been destroyed, the owner shall, within fifteen (15) days, notify the commission by letter or postal card of the change in the status of the vessel.

The application for number by a new owner of a vessel shall, for the purpose of fee, be regarded as an original application for number, but where the vessel will continue in use in the state, the new number shall be identical with the previous one.

(4) A change of motor is not required to be reported to the commission.

(5) The owner of an undocumented vessel shall not have more than one (1) valid number or valid certificate of number for any one (1) vessel at any time.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-12; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 12; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 59; Laws, 1975, ch. 468, § 4; Laws, 1986, ch. 364, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

§ 59-21-23. Cancellation or voiding of certificate of number.

Certificates of number may be cancelled or voided under the following circumstances:

- (a) Surrender of certificate for cancellation;
- (b) Issuance of a new number for the same vessel;
- (c) Issuance of a marine document by the Bureau of Customs for the same vessel;
- (d) False or fraudulent certification in an application for number;
- (e) Willful mutilation, defacing, or altering of a number.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-13; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 13; Laws, 1973, ch. 409, § 3; Laws, 1986, ch. 364, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

Cross References — Penalties for a violation of this section, see § 59-21-153.

§ 59-21-25. Fees for certificates of number; disposition of proceeds.

(1) Fees for the award of certificates of number for original, transfer, renewal, livery, dealer and duplicate shall be as follows:

(a) Less than 16 feet	\$ 5.00
(b) 16 feet but less than 26 feet	\$15.00
(c) 26 feet and over	\$30.00
(d) Dealer number	\$25.00
(e) Duplicate	\$ 5.00

(2) All fees for numbers and renewal of number shall be payable to the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks to be deposited by the department in the State Treasury in a special fund to be designated as the Fisheries and Wildlife Fund, which shall be disbursed upon the recommendation of the department as may be appropriated by the Legislature. The State Treasurer shall release to the department such sums as are required to defray all administrative costs of the boat registration fee division of the department and to improve the law enforcement capability of the department on the inland and marine waters of the State of Mississippi and as may be budgeted by the department for the purpose of paying the cost of the administration of this chapter for education on water safety, improvement of water safety and motorboating facilities in the state, and advertising and promoting the waterways of the state. Any and all revenue over and above the actual administrative cost of implementing this act shall be used to fund salaries of additional conservation officers in all eighty-two (82) counties.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-14; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 14; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 5; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 60; Laws, 1975, ch. 468, § 5; Laws, 1982, ch. 365, § 13; Laws, 1988, ch. 599, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 516, § 128, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 30, 2000.)

Editor's Note — Section 49-1-4 provides that the term "Department of Wildlife Conservation" shall mean the "Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks".

Cross References — Apportionment of taxes imposed on gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene to Fisheries and Wildlife Fund, see § 27-5-101.

Fisheries and wildlife fund, see § 49-5-21.

Additional certificates of numbers for livery boats, see § 59-21-27.

§ 59-21-27. Additional certificates of numbers for livery boats; fees; renewals.

An owner of more than one livery boat shall be entitled to be awarded certificates of number for all such vessels on the payment of fees provided in Section 59-21-25. Each vessel shall have a separate and distinct number and shall be issued a separate certificate of number. Certificates of number under this section may be renewed on the payment of a single fee provided in Section 59-21-25.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-15; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 15; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 6; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 6; Laws, 1988, ch. 599, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

§ 59-21-29. Registration of serial numbers of outboard motors.

Each person registering a boat or boats under this chapter may at the same time register with the commission the serial numbers of all outboard motors owned by said person.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-25; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 25; Laws, 1973, ch. 458, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 9, 1973).

§ 59-21-31. Alteration of identification numbers or marks on vessels, outboard motors, boats or boat trailers; purchase, sale or possession of vessels, outboard motors, boats or boat trailers with altered identifications; examinations and reports.

No person shall remove, change or in any manner mutilate or deface any number awarded a vessel, or any motor number or other stamped, cast, or forged numbers or letters or other marks upon any vessel, outboard motor, boat or boat trailer, or assist in so doing, or, having knowledge of such change, fail to report the same to the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks in which such vessel, motor, boat or boat trailer is usually moored, docked, housed or garaged. Any person or owner, being in possession of a vessel, outboard motor, boat or boat trailer, shall examine the same and report such changes to the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

No person shall buy, sell or possess a vessel, outboard motor, boat or boat trailer on which any awarded number or identification number has been removed, changed, mutilated or defaced. It shall be the duty of any person buying, or any lienholder financing, a vessel, outboard motor, boat or boat trailer, to inspect the vessel, outboard motor, boat or boat trailer prior to its purchase or creation of a lien thereon, to ensure that it is in compliance with this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-25; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 25; Laws, 1993, ch. 480, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 551, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

§ 59-21-33. Seizure and forfeiture of vessels, outboard motors, boats and trailers with altered identification numbers or marks.

All vessels, outboard motors, boats and trailers having awarded numbers or identification numbers or marks which have been removed, changed, mutilated or defaced contrary to this chapter are subject to forfeiture. Any such property shall be seized by any conservation officer or enforcement officer of the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, or other officer of the law

including any sheriff or deputy sheriff. Upon the seizure of such property, forfeiture proceedings shall be instituted pursuant to Sections 49-7-251 through 49-7-257. Provided, however, that any such property which has previously been registered or titled within the State of Mississippi is not subject to forfeiture if the application for registration or title contained no false or fraudulent information, or if the property seized has a value less than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-25; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 25; Laws, 1982, ch. 365, § 12; Laws, 1991, ch. 522, § 6; Laws, 1993, ch. 480, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 551, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

Cross References — Fisheries and wildlife fund, see § 49-5-21.

Procedure for forfeiture of property seized for violation of fish and game laws, see §§ 49-7-251 et seq.

MANUFACTURING AND RELATED PROCESSES

SEC.

59-21-41. Duplication of boat hulls and parts by direct molding process.

§ 59-21-41. Duplication of boat hulls and parts by direct molding process.

(1) As used in this section:

(a) "Direct molding process" means any process in which the original manufactured boat hull or component part of a boat is itself used as a plug for the making of the mold, which is then used to manufacture a duplicate item.

(b) "Mold" means a matrix or form in which a substance or material is shaped.

(c) "Plug" means a device or model used to make a mold for the purpose of exact duplication.

(2) It is unlawful for any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured boat hull or component part of a boat made by another without the written permission of that other person.

(3) The provisions of this section shall apply only to boat hulls or component parts of boats duplicated using a mold made on or after the effective date of this section.

(4) Any person who suffers injury or damage as the result of a violation of the provisions of this section may bring an action in the chancery court for an injunction prohibiting such violations. In addition, such person shall be entitled to actual damages incurred as a result of such violation, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 355, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 1985).

BOATING ACCIDENTS

SEC.

- 59-21-51. Duty to report boating accidents; "boating accident" defined.
 59-21-53. Time for submission of accident reports; contents; distribution; disclosure.
 59-21-55. Duty of vessel operator to remain at scene of accident and render aid and assistance; liability for rendering assistance.

§ 59-21-51. Duty to report boating accidents; "boating accident" defined.

In the case of a boating accident involving collision, accident or other casualty involving a motorboat or vessel subject to this chapter, while operated upon the waters of this state, the operator thereof, if the collision, accident or other casualty results in death to any person, injury causing any person to remain incapacitated for a period in excess of twenty-four (24) hours, or damage to property in excess of one hundred dollars (\$100.00), shall file, on forms provided, with the commission an accident report with a full description of the collision, accident or other casualty, including such other information as is required under the provisions of this chapter. The commission shall furnish copies of reports to the appropriate federal agencies and sheriff of the county in which such accident or other casualty takes place.

For the purpose of this chapter, a "boating accident" means a collision, accident or other casualty involving (1) an undocumented motorboat or (2) any other undocumented vessel used for pleasure or recreational purposes. A vessel subject to this chapter is considered to be involved in a "boating accident" whenever the occurrence results in damage by or to the vessel or its equipment; in injury or loss of life to any person, or in the disappearance of any person from on board under circumstances which indicate the possibility of death or injury. A "boating accident" includes, but is not limited to, capsizing, collision, foundering, flooding, fire, explosion and the disappearance of a vessel other than by theft. A report is required whenever a vessel subject to this chapter is involved in a "boating accident" which results in any one or more of the following:

- (1) Loss of life.
- (2) Injury causing any person to remain incapacitated for a period in excess of twenty-four (24) hours.
- (3) Actual physical damage to property (including vessels) in excess of one hundred dollars (\$100.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-16; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 16; Laws, 1973, ch. 372, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1973.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or damage by motorboat. 63 A.L.R.2d 343.

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 16 et seq.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 161, Motorboat Propeller Injury Accidents.

43 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 395, Negligent Operation of a Boat.

Practice References. Maraist and Galligan, Personal Injury in Admiralty (Michie).

USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

§ 59-21-53. Time for submission of accident reports; contents; distribution; disclosure.

Whenever death results from a boating accident, a written report shall be submitted within forty-eight (48) hours. For every other reportable boating accident a written report shall be submitted within five (5) days after such accident. The operator(s) of the boat(s) shall prepare and submit the written report(s) to the commission. Every written report shall contain the following information:

- (1) The numbers and/or names of vessels involved.
- (2) The locality where the accident occurred.
- (3) The time and date when the accident occurred.
- (4) Weather and sea conditions at time of accident.
- (5) The name, address, age, and boat operating experience of the operator of the reporting vessel.
- (6) The names and addresses of operators of other vessels involved.
- (7) The names and addresses of the owners of vessels or property involved.
- (8) The names and addresses of any person or persons injured or killed.
- (9) The nature and extent of injury to any person or persons.
- (10) A description of damage to property (including vessels) and estimated cost of repairs.
- (11) A description of the accident (including opinions as to the causes).
- (12) The length, propulsion, horsepower, fuel and construction of the reporting vessel.
- (13) Names and addresses of known witnesses.

The commission shall ensure that the forms required by this section are stocked at various county offices, boat companies, fishing camps, marinas, law enforcement offices, and at such other places as to make them reasonably available at all times.

The commission shall consolidate such reports and transmit the same to the appropriate agencies. Boating accident reports shall not be a public record nor made available for public distribution, except as otherwise provided by law.

The commission may, upon written request of any person involved in a boating accident or upon written request of the representative of his or her estate, his or her surviving spouse, or one or more of his or her surviving next of kin, disclose to such requester or his or her legal counsel or a represen-

tative of his insurer any information contained in such report except the parties' version of the accident as set out in the written report filed by such parties.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-17; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 17; Laws, 1973, ch. 372, § 2; Laws, 1998, ch. 378, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or damage by motorboat. 63 A.L.R.2d 343.

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 16 et seq.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 161, Motorboat Propeller Injury Accidents.

§ 59-21-55. Duty of vessel operator to remain at scene of accident and render aid and assistance; liability for rendering assistance.

(1) It shall be the duty of the operator of any vessel involved in a boating accident to remain at the scene of such accident until he has rendered all necessary aid and assistance, including the carrying or the making of arrangements for the carrying of any person involved in such accident to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical, surgical or hospital treatment, if necessary, or if such carrying is requested by such injured person, and it is the further duty of the operator of any vessel or vessels involved in a boating accident required to be reported under this chapter to report the same as herein provided.

(2) Any person who complies with subsection (1) of this section or who gratuitously and in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care renders assistance at the scene of a vessel collision, accident, or other casualty without objection of any person assisted, shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of the rendering of assistance or for any act committed in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care or omission in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care by such person in providing or arranging salvage, towage, medical treatment, or other assistance where the assisting person acts as an ordinary, reasonable, prudent man would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-18; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 18; Laws, 1973, ch. 372, § 3; Laws, 1979, ch. 376, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

Cross References — “Good Samaritan” statute, see § 73-25-37.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or damage by motorboat. 63 A.L.R.2d 343.

Liability of owner or operator of pleasure boat for injury or death of guest passenger. 35 A.L.R.4th 104.

Construction and application of “Good Samaritan” statutes. 68 A.L.R.4th 294.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently at-

tempting to rescue persons or property. 73 A.L.R.4th 737.

Rescue Doctrine: applicability and application of comparative negligence principles. 75 A.L.R.4th 875.

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 16 et seq.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 161, Motorboat Propeller Injury Accidents.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 415, Imminent Peril Inviting Rescue Attempt.

Law Reviews. 1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 887, December, 1979.

SAFETY EQUIPMENT; OPERATION OF VESSELS

SEC.

- 59-21-81. Requirements as to lights, personal flotation devices and other safety equipment; children required to wear personal flotation devices; vessels to be seaworthy; safety requirements for operation of personal watercraft.
- 59-21-83. Operation of vessel in reckless or negligent manner, while operator is incapacitated, etc.
- 59-21-85. Age restrictions on operation of motorboats.
- 59-21-87. Regulation of water skiing, aquaplaning, etc.
- 59-21-89. Use of oscillating or rotating blue lights on vessels.

§ 59-21-81. Requirements as to lights, personal flotation devices and other safety equipment; children required to wear personal flotation devices; vessels to be seaworthy; safety requirements for operation of personal watercraft.

(1) Every vessel shall have on board a Coast Guard approved personal flotation device for each person aboard such vessel, and every person twelve (12) years or younger on board a motorboat, sailboat, or vessel which measures less than twenty-six (26) feet in length shall wear a type I, II, or III Coast Guard approved personal flotation device while such motorboat, sailboat, or vessel is underway. For the purpose of this section "underway" shall mean at all times except when a motorboat, sailboat, or vessel is anchored, moored, or aground. Every vessel shall have lights during the hours of darkness, which comply with all federal regulations applicable to vessels of its classification. Such vessel shall not be operated unless in a safe and seaworthy condition; the owner and operator shall employ such safety devices as may be necessary for the safe operation of such vessel, including an efficient natural or mechanical ventilating system when necessary for safe operation. In addition to the requirements imposed by this section, all vessels shall comply with all federal regulations applicable to vessels of such classification.

(2) For purposes of this subsection, "personal watercraft" means a vessel which uses an inboard motor powering a water jet pump and which is designed to be operated by a person sitting, standing or kneeling on the vessel, rather than the conventional manner of sitting or standing inside the vessel. A person shall not operate a personal watercraft unless each person on board or being towed behind is wearing a type I, type II or type III, personal flotation device approved by the United States Coast Guard.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-19; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 19; Laws, 1973, ch. 397, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 434; Laws, 2001, ch. 496, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 24, 2001.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Evidence.

1. In general.

Failure of farmer to provide life preserver to fishermen who rent boat to fish on lake owned by farmer is negligence per se where boat sinks and one of fishermen drowns. *Byrd v. McGill*, 478 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1985).

clude admission into evidence of actual statutes and regulations intended to counter allegations of negligent design and strict products liability, where such statutes and regulations were in no way related to particular violation alleged and all relevant and material evidence was allowed. *Detroit Marine Eng'g v. McRee*, 510 So. 2d 462 (Miss. 1987).

2. Evidence.

It was not error for trial court to pre-

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 41 Am. Jur. Trials 161, Motor-boat Propeller Injury Accidents.

Maraist and Galligan, Personal Injury in Admiralty (Michie).

Practice References. Maraist and Galligan, Personal Injury in Admiralty (Michie).

USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

§ 59-21-83. Operation of vessel in reckless or negligent manner, while operator is incapacitated, etc.

No vessel shall be operated within this state in a reckless or negligent manner or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the then existing circumstances or when the operator is so physically or mentally incapacitated as to be incapable of safely operating such vessel, or while the operator is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotics, or when such vessel is overloaded beyond its reasonable carrying capacity. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to all watercraft operating on the waters of this state inclusive of, but not limited to, undocumented or unnumbered vessels and shall specifically include all vessels exempted from numbering by Section 59-21-5 and surfboards, aquaplanes, airboats, water skis or other watercraft.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-20; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 20; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 7, eff from and after June 15, 1964.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or death of nonparticipant caused by water skiing. 67 A.L.R.3d 1218.

Liability of owner or operator of boat livery for injury to patron. 94 A.L.R.3d 876.

Criminal liability for injury or death caused by operation of pleasure boat. 8 A.L.R.4th 886.

Liability of owner or operator of pleasure boat for injury or death of guest passenger. 35 A.L.R.4th 104.

What constitutes unlawful conduct subject to federal statutes prohibiting drug-related activities aboard United States vessels (21 USCS §§ 955 et seq). 73 A.L.R. Fed. 586.

Am Jur. 5 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Boats and Boating, Forms 21 et seq. (personal injuries; swimmers and water skiers).

5 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Boats and Boating, Forms 61 et seq. (property damage).

41 Am. Jur. Trials 161, Motorboat Propeller Injury Accidents.

36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 525, Liability for Negligent Operation of Ski Boat.

43 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 395, Negligent Operation of a Boat.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 459, Proof and disproof of alcohol-induced driving impairment through evidence of observable intoxication and coordination testing.

Practice References. Maraist and Galligan, Personal Injury in Admiralty (Michie).

USCS National Guard/Navigation and Navigable Waters Set: Titles 32-34 (Michie).

CMI Handbook of Maritime Conventions, Second Edition (Matthew Bender).

§ 59-21-85. Age restrictions on operation of motorboats.

(1)(a) No motorboat required to be numbered under this chapter shall be operated by any person who is under the age of twelve (12) years, unless he possesses a certificate as required under this section and is also accompanied by a parent, guardian or other person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age and qualified and capable of operating the same.

(b) A motorboat required to be numbered under this chapter may not be operated by any person born after June 30, 1980, unless the person has completed a course in boating safety conducted or approved by the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, and the person has in his immediate possession while operating a motorboat a certificate of satisfactory completion of the boating safety course.

(c) The requirement of possessing a certificate under this subsection shall not apply to any person operating a motorboat that is rented from a person engaged in the business of renting motorboats.

(2) Boating safety courses shall be held by the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, or instructors designated and approved by the department. The Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall issue a certificate to each person who satisfactorily completes the boating safety course.

(3) In lieu of any other penalties provided for a violation of this chapter, a violation of this section is punishable by a fine of not less than Twenty-Five Dollars (\$25.00) nor more than Fifty Dollars (\$50.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-20; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 20; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 7; Laws, 1973, ch. 397, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 545, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1997.

§ 59-21-87. Regulation of water skiing, aquaplaning, etc.

No person shall operate a motorboat on any waters of this state while towing a person on water skis, or on an aquaplane or similar device, without

an observer in the boat in addition to the operator. Such observer shall be above ten years of age.

The provisions of the first paragraph of this section do not apply to a person engaged in a professional exhibition or a person participating in an official regatta, motorboat race, marine parade, tournament or exhibition.

No person shall operate or manipulate any motorboat, tow rope or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, aquaplane, or similar device may be affected or controlled in such a way as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon to collide or strike against any object or person, except slalom buoys, ski jumps or like objects used normally in competitive or recreational skiing.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-21; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 21; Laws, 1962, ch. 220, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved May 1, 1962).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Reasonable care does not require amusement park proprietor to assume control over actual operation of, or to

instruct or inquire into the qualifications of, observers in boat towing water skiers. *Hennington v. Curtis*, 248 Miss. 435, 160 So. 2d 193 (1964).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Products liability: skiing equipment. 76 A.L.R.4th 256.

Liability for injuries to, or death of, water-skiers. 34 A.L.R.5th 77.

Am Jur. 5 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Boats and Boating, Forms 21 et seq.

(personal injuries; swimmers and water skiers).

5 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Boats and Boating, Forms 61 et seq. (property damage).

§ 59-21-89. Use of oscillating or rotating blue lights on vessels.

(1) It is unlawful for any person, other than a law enforcement officer on duty, to use or display oscillating or rotating blue lights on a vessel operating on the public waters of this state. Upon the approach of an authorized law enforcement vessel operating a strobe, rotating or oscillating blue light or giving audible signal by siren or both, the operator of a vessel shall yield the right-of-way and shall stop and remain in position until the authorized law enforcement vessel has passed, except when otherwise directed by a law enforcement officer.

(2) A person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00).

SOURCES: Laws, 1994, ch. 353, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 640, § 1; reenacted and amended, 1995, ch. 476; reenacted and amended, 1995, ch. 600, § 1, eff from and after July 2, 1995.

Editor's Note — Section 59-21-89 was added by Laws, 1994, ch. 353 and by Laws, 1994, ch. 640, § 1. The only difference in the version of the section as added by the two different chapters is that chapter 640 added a subsection (3), which repeals the section from and after July 1, 1995, and which does not appear in chapter 353. At the direction of the Attorney General's office, this section reads as added by chapter 640.

BOAT AND WATER SAFETY COMMISSION

SEC.	
59-21-111.	Assumption of duties and responsibilities of Boat and Water Safety Commission.
59-21-113.	Repealed.
59-21-115.	Repealed.
59-21-117.	Promulgation of rules and regulations generally.
59-21-119.	Purchase, operation and maintenance of equipment.
59-21-121.	Regulation of regattas, boat races, exhibitions, etc.
59-21-123.	Enforcement officers; employment and compensation.
59-21-125.	Enforcement officers; bond.
59-21-127.	Enforcement officers; powers and duties.
59-21-129.	Adoption of special rules and regulations.

§ 59-21-111. Assumption of duties and responsibilities of Boat and Water Safety Commission.

(1) The Mississippi Commission on Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall be the Mississippi Boat and Water Safety Commission, and shall exercise the duties and responsibilities of the Mississippi Boat and Water Safety Commission through the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, insofar as practicable under the provisions of Chapter 4 of Title 49, Mississippi Code of 1972; except on marine waters under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Marine Resources.

(2) The Commission on Marine Resources shall exercise the duties and responsibilities of the Mississippi Boat and Water Safety Commission through the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources on the marine waters of the state. The Commission on Marine Resources shall not exercise any powers related to numbering of undocumented vessels. Those powers are vested exclusively in the Commission on Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-22; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 8; Laws, 1968, ch. 266, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 484, § 29; Laws, 1994, ch. 353, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 640, § 3; Laws, 1995, ch. 439, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 585, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 59-21-113. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1978, ch. 484, § 30, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

[Codes, 1942, § 8496-22; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 22; 1964, ch. 468, § 8; 1968, ch. 266, § 1]

Editor's Note — Former § 59-21-113 provided for the terms of office and compensation of the Mississippi Boat and Water Safety Commission members.

§ 59-21-115. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1978, ch. 484, § 30, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

[Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23; 1964, ch. 468, § 9; 1968, ch. 265, § 4]

Editor's Note — Former § 59-21-115 provided for office space and supplies for the Boat and Water Safety Commission.

§ 59-21-117. Promulgation of rules and regulations generally.

(1) The commission shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this chapter, and to advertise and promote the fresh waterways of the state.

(2) The Commission on Marine Resources shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of Sections 59-21-111 through 59-21-129. The Commission on Marine Resources shall adopt rules and regulations in accordance with subsections (4) and (5).

(3) The provisions of Sections 59-21-117 through 59-21-127 shall be applicable to all waters of this state that are under the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi.

(4) Before any rules and regulations are adopted, the proposed rules and regulations shall be reduced to writing and a public hearing shall be held after at least thirty (30) days' notice of the hearing. The notice shall be published at least one (1) time in a newspaper of general circulation in this state. A copy of the proposed rules and regulations shall be furnished to the sheriff of each county affected at least thirty (30) days prior to the hearing. The hearing shall be held at a place convenient to the largest number of owners of vessels affected by the proposed rules and regulations or, if of general statewide application, shall be held in the City of Jackson, Mississippi.

(5) A copy of the regulations adopted pursuant to this section, and amendments thereto, shall be filed in the office of the commission adopting the regulations and in the office of the sheriff of each county affected where the same shall be maintained as a public record. The rules and regulations shall be published in a convenient form and shall be given to each recipient of an original, renewed, transferred, or a recorded certificate of number.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 9; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 4; Laws, 1973, ch. 458, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 439, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The commission is authorized, after notice and public hearing as provided by this section, to make such special rules and regulations with reference to the opera-

tion, equipment or safety of vessels or motorboats on any such waters of the state. Whitmore, May 10, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0148.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Public regulations requiring mufflers or similar noise-preventing devices on motor vehicles, aircraft, or boats. 49 A.L.R.2d 1202.

§ 59-21-119. Purchase, operation and maintenance of equipment.

The commission is hereby authorized to purchase, operate and maintain such motor vehicles, boats, trailers, motors and other equipment as may be deemed necessary and proper for the administration of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 9; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved July 4, 1968).

§ 59-21-121. Regulation of regattas, boat races, exhibitions, etc.

Any person or organization sponsoring a regatta, motorboat or other boat race, marine parade, tournament or exhibition shall be responsible for providing adequate protection from marine traffic interference and hazards. The commission may adopt and may from time to time amend regulations governing the same.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 9; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved July 4, 1968).

§ 59-21-123. Enforcement officers; employment and compensation.

The executive director with the approval of the commission may employ and fix the duties of such clerical assistants, enforcement officers and other agents as may be deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter, and to fix their tenure of employment and compensation therefor; provided, however, that enforcement officers shall meet the same requirements and qualifications as required for conservation officers in Section 49-1-15(1) and (2).

The salaries of such paid employees shall be paid out of any funds which may be received by the commission for the administration of this chapter. All salaries and positions are to conform with the requirements of the state classification commission law of 1970. In addition to their salaries, the enforcement officers may be paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-3-41, Mississippi Code of 1972, for their necessary travel when performed by private conveyance and will be reimbursed for their actual expenses not to exceed eighteen dollars (\$18.00) per day while actually engaged in the performance of their duties, to be allowed only on expense account itemized and filed by them with, and approved by, the executive director and the commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 9; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 4; Laws, 1973, ch. 458, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 553, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1980.

Editor's Note — Section 49-1-1 provides that the word "director" shall mean and refer to the Executive Director of the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

Cross References — Statewide personnel system, see §§ 25-9-101 et seq.

§ 59-21-125. Enforcement officers; bond.

Each enforcement officer shall execute and file with the state treasurer a good and sufficient surety bond in the sum of two thousand dollars (\$2,000.00), conditioned on the faithful performance of his respective duties. Each enforcement officer shall be reimbursed by the commission for the premiums on his bond.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23, 1964, ch. 468, § 9; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved July 4, 1968).

§ 59-21-127. Enforcement officers; powers and duties.

It shall be the duty of all enforcement officers to enforce, and to obey and carry out all instructions, directions, rules and regulations of the commission with respect to the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter. Each enforcement officer shall account for and pay over, pursuant to law, all monies received by him under this chapter.

Such enforcement officers shall have the power, and it shall be their duty, to execute all warrants for violations of the rules and regulations of the commission and the provisions of this chapter; to serve subpoenas issued for the examination and investigation or trial of such violations; to board and examine, without warrant, any vessel required to be numbered under this chapter, to ascertain whether any of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation of the commission has been or is being violated, and to use such force as may be necessary for the purpose of such examination and inspection; to arrest, without warrant, any person committing a violation of this chapter or the rules and regulations of the commission in the presence of the enforcement officers, and to take such person before a magistrate or court having jurisdiction for trial or hearing; and to exercise such other powers of peace officers in the enforcement of this chapter and the rules and regulations of the commission or of a judgment for the violation thereof, as are not herein specifically provided. No enforcement officers shall compromise or settle out of court any violation of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation promulgated by the commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-23; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 23; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 9; Laws, 1968, ch. 265, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved July 4, 1968).

Cross References — Arrest generally, see §§ 99-3-1 et seq.

§ 59-21-129. Adoption of special rules and regulations.

(1) Any agency or political subdivision of this state may make application to the commission for special rules and regulations with reference to the operation, equipment or safety of vessels on any waters of this state within its territorial limits or authorized jurisdiction and shall set forth therein the reasons which make special rules or regulations necessary or appropriate. The commission is hereby authorized, after notice and a public hearing as provided in Section 59-21-117, to make special rules and regulations with reference to the operation, equipment or safety of vessels or motorboats on any waters of the state.

(2) The several counties and municipalities bordering the Mississippi Sound or the other coastal or tidal waters of this state are authorized and empowered to adopt ordinances setting out special rules and regulations with reference to the operation, equipment, or safety of vessels or motorboats on the Mississippi Sound or the other coastal or tidal waters of the state within their territorial limits, and shall set forth therein the reasons which make special rules and regulations necessary or appropriate. No ordinance shall conflict with the provisions of this chapter or with the regulations of any federal agency having jurisdiction over those waters. Notice shall be given of the proposed ordinance and a hearing shall be held thereon before the Commission on Marine Resources as provided in Section 59-21-117, and as a condition precedent, the Commission on Marine Resources shall recommend the adoption of the ordinance.

(3) It is the intent of this chapter that uniform regulations of general application to all the waters of this state shall be adopted and promulgated wherever practicable, and any special regulation or local ordinance, as authorized herein, shall be limited to the exigencies of local conditions which cannot be corrected by a regulation generally applicable to all the waters of the state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-24; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 24; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 10; Laws, 1973, ch. 458, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 439, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A municipality may enact local ordinances governing waterways within its boundaries only pursuant to the procedure established in this Section. Whitmore, May 10, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0148.

ENFORCEMENT; PENALTIES; ACTIONS

SEC.	
59-21-151.	Enforcement of chapter.
59-21-153.	Penalties.
59-21-155.	Disposition of fines and penalties.
59-21-157.	Civil liability for violation of provisions of chapter.
59-21-159.	Venue of actions based upon chapter.
59-21-161.	Service of process on nonresidents.
59-21-163.	Effect of Sections 59-21-157 through 59-21-161 on other causes of action.

§ 59-21-151. Enforcement of chapter.

All peace officers and other law enforcement officials are hereby authorized, empowered and enjoined to enforce the provisions of this chapter within their respective jurisdictions.

It shall be the duty of each district attorney in this state and each county prosecuting attorney in each county of this state to prosecute and defend, for the state, in all courts of the county or counties in his district or county, all causes, criminal or civil, arising under the provisions of this chapter or under any rule or regulation adopted and promulgated under this chapter, in which the state may be a party or may be interested or concerned.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-26; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 26; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 11, eff from and after June 15, 1964.

Cross References — Sheriffs and constables generally, see §§ 19-19-1 et seq., 19-25-1 et seq.

County attorneys, see §§ 19-23-1 et seq.

District attorneys, see §§ 25-31-1 et seq.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Under section 59-21-151, local law enforcement agencies can enforce existing state safety regulations involving watercraft such as storing the adequate number of personal flotation devices, overloading

of individuals of a vessel, and improper equipment and/or invalid permits. Whitmore, May 10, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0148.

§ 59-21-153. Penalties.

Any person who violates any provision of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to the following penalties:

(a) For a violation of any of the provisions of Sections 59-21-23(d), 59-21-29, 59-21-33, 59-21-55, 59-21-81 through 59-21-87, and 59-21-111 through 59-21-129, by a fine not to exceed Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both.

(b) For the violation of any provision of Section 59-21-31, by a fine of not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both.

(c) For the violation of any other provision of this chapter, by a fine of not less than Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) nor more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-26; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 26; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 11; Laws, 1988, ch. 327, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Criminal liability for injury or death caused by operation of pleasure boat. 8 A.L.R.4th 886.

Liability of owner or operator of pleasure boat for injury or death of guest passenger. 35 A.L.R.4th 104.

§ 59-21-155. Disposition of fines and penalties.

All monies collected as fines or penalties for violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be paid over by the court, justice court judge, or other officer collecting or receiving the fines or penalties to the county having jurisdiction over the violation as provided by law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-26; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 26; Laws, 1964, ch. 468, § 11; Laws, 1982, ch. 365, § 14; Laws, 1995, ch. 439, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

Cross References — Fisheries and wildlife fund, see § 49-5-21.

§ 59-21-157. Civil liability for violation of provisions of chapter.

The owner or operator of a vessel, or both, shall be civilly liable for any injury or damage proximately resulting from the negligent failure of such owner or operator to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-27; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This statute is not retroactive, so as to be applicable where the cause of action

accrued before its enactment. *Hudgins v. Tug Kevin Moran*, 206 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Miss. 1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of owner or operator of motorboat for injury or damage. 63 A.L.R.2d 343.

Action for death caused by maritime tort within a state's territorial waters. 71 A.L.R.2d 1296.

Liability of owner or operator of plea-

sure boat for injury or death of guest passenger. 35 A.L.R.4th 104.

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 35 et seq.

7 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Motorboat Accident Litigation.

§ 59-21-159. Venue of actions based upon chapter.

The venue of any action based on this chapter may be in the county in which the vessel is usually moored, docked, housed or garaged, or in the county in which a vessel is involved in a boating accident, or in event of a boating accident taking place on a navigable waterway which is the boundary line of a

county in either county so bounded, or in the county of the residence of the owner or operator of any such vessel.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-27; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

§ 59-21-161. Service of process on nonresidents.

The acceptance by a nonresident of the right and privileges of operating a vessel or motorboat on any of the waters of this state, as evidenced by his operating, either in person or by agent or employee, a vessel or motorboat upon any of the navigable waters of this state, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the secretary of state of the State of Mississippi to be his true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all lawful processes or summonses in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of a violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any accident in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a vessel or motorboat on the navigable waters of the state. Such service of process may be had in the same manner as is provided by Section 13-3-63, for the service of process on nonresidents operating motor vehicles upon the highways of this state, and shall have the same effect.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-27; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

Cross References — Service of process on nonresident motorist, see § 13-3-63.

§ 59-21-163. Effect of Sections 59-21-157 through 59-21-161 on other causes of action.

The provisions of Sections 59-21-157 through 59-21-161 shall not be construed to limit any cause of action heretofore maintainable at common law, maritime law or in admiralty, but shall be cumulative and supplemental thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8496-27; Laws, 1960, ch. 165, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1960).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boats and Boating §§ 35 et seq.

CHAPTER 23

Alcohol Boating Safety Act

SEC.

- 59-23-1. Short title.
- 59-23-3. Definitions.
- 59-23-5. Consent to chemical or breath tests by persons operating watercraft; offer and administration of tests; advisement of effect of refusal to submit to test; advisement of persons arrested of rights; uniform citation form.
- 59-23-7. Offenses and penalties.

§ 59-23-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Alcohol Boating Safety Act."

SOURCES: Laws, 1995, ch. 620, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

§ 59-23-3. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter, the following terms shall have the following meanings unless the context shall prescribe otherwise:

(a) "Chemical test" means an analysis of a person's blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance for the determination of the presence of alcohol or any other substance which may impair a person's mental or physical ability.

(b) "Department" means Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

(c) "Executive director" means the chief officer of the department.

(d) "Intoxicated" means under the influence of alcohol or any combination of alcohol, controlled substance or drugs, so that there is impaired thought and action and loss of normal control of a person's faculties to such an extent as to endanger any person.

(e) "Law enforcement officer" means an officer described in Section 63-11-19 and includes a conservation officer employed by the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

(f) "Prima facie evidence of intoxication" includes evidence that at the time of an alleged violation there was ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood.

(g) "Public waters" means all public waters over which the state has jurisdiction.

(h) "Watercraft" means a motorized vessel with a motor of twenty-five (25) horsepower or greater used for transportation on public waters and personal watercraft (jet skis).

(i) "Operates a watercraft" or "operation of a watercraft" shall mean a watercraft that is underway in the water.

SOURCES: Laws, 1995, ch. 620, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 406, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1996).

§ 59-23-5. Consent to chemical or breath tests by persons operating watercraft; offer and administration of tests; advisement of effect of refusal to submit to test; advisement of persons arrested of rights; uniform citation form.

(1) A person who operates a watercraft in waters over which this state has jurisdiction shall be deemed to have given consent to submit to a chemical test or test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, as a condition of operating the watercraft in this state.

(2) A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense under this chapter shall offer the person the opportunity to submit to a chemical test. It is not necessary for the law enforcement officer to offer a chemical test to an unconscious person. A law enforcement officer may offer a person more than one (1) chemical test under this section. However, all tests must be administered within three (3) hours after the officer has probable cause to believe the person violated this chapter. If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test under this chapter, the person shall be informed by the law enforcement officer that the refusal to submit to the test shall subject him to arrest and punishment consistent with the penalties prescribed in Section 59-23-7 for persons submitting to the test, and that the court shall order the person not to operate a watercraft for at least one (1) year.

(3) If the chemical test results in prima facie evidence that the person is intoxicated, he shall immediately be arrested.

(4)(a) The law enforcement officer arresting a person pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall inform the person arrested that:

(i) The person arrested has the right to be represented by legal counsel;

(ii) The person arrested may waive the right to be represented by legal counsel; and

(iii) The charge for which the person is being arrested may be used against him, upon conviction, for purposes of receiving an enhanced penalty as provided in Section 59-23-7.

(b) The citation or affidavit which is issued to the person arrested shall be uniform throughout all jurisdictions in the State of Mississippi and shall contain a place for the arresting official to sign, stating that he has advised the person arrested of the information contained in paragraph (a) of this subsection. The judge hearing the case or accepting the guilty plea, as the case may be, shall sign in a place provided on the citation or affidavit stating that the person arrested either employed an attorney or waived his right to an attorney after having been advised pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection. If the person arrested employed an attorney, the name, address and telephone number of the attorney shall be written on the citation or affidavit.

(c) The Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall prepare and furnish, no later than July 1, 1995, to all jurisdictions in the

State of Mississippi a uniform citation form consistent with this chapter, which shall be used in all jurisdictions in the State of Mississippi.

(d) The Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall notify, by whatever means it deems appropriate, all law enforcement officers who are authorized to enforce the provisions of this chapter of their obligation to provide the information and execute the citation or affidavit, as described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection.

SOURCES: Laws, 1995, ch. 620, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

§ 59-23-7. Offenses and penalties.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to operate a watercraft on the public waters of this state who:

(a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor;

(b) Is under the influence of any other substance which has impaired such person's ability to operate a watercraft; or

(c) Has ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more by weight volume of alcohol in the person's blood based upon milligrams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's breath, blood or urine administered as authorized by this chapter.

(2)(a) Upon conviction of any person for the first offense of violating subsection (1) of this section where chemical tests provided for under Section 59-23-5 were given, or where chemical test results are not available, such person shall be fined not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00), or imprisoned for not more than twenty-four (24) hours in jail, or both; and the court shall order such person to attend and complete a boating safety education course developed by the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

(b) Upon any second conviction of any person violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be fined not less than Six Hundred Dollars (\$600.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) and shall be imprisoned not less than forty-eight (48) consecutive hours nor more than one (1) year or sentenced to community service work for not less than ten (10) days nor more than one (1) year. The court shall order such person not to operate a watercraft for one (1) year.

(c) For any third conviction of any person violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be fined not less than Eight Hundred Dollars (\$800.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) and shall be imprisoned not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year. The court shall order such person not to operate a watercraft for two (2) years.

(d) Any fourth or subsequent violation of subsection (1) of this section shall be a felony offense and, upon conviction, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be fined not less than Two

Thousand Dollars (\$2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00) and shall be imprisoned not less than ninety (90) days nor more than five (5) years in the state penitentiary. The court shall order such person not to operate a watercraft for three (3) years.

(3) Any person convicted of operating any watercraft in violation of subsection (1) of this section where the person (a) refused a law enforcement officer's request to submit to a chemical test, or (b) was unconscious at the time of a chemical test and refused to consent to the introduction of the results of such test in any prosecution, shall be punished consistent with the penalties prescribed herein for persons submitting to the test and the court shall order such person not to operate a watercraft for the time periods specified in subsection (2) of this section.

(4) Any person who operates any watercraft in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other member or limb of another shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years.

(5) Upon conviction of any violation of subsection (1) of this section, the judge shall cause a copy of the citation and any other pertinent documents concerning the conviction to be sent immediately to the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks. A copy of the citation or other pertinent documents, having been attested as true and correct by the Director of the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, or his designee, shall be sufficient proof of the conviction for purposes of determining the enhanced penalty for any subsequent convictions of violations of subsection (1) of this section.

SOURCES: Laws, 1995, ch. 620, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

CHAPTER 25

Certificates of Title for Boats and Other Vessels

SEC.	
59-25-1.	Definitions.
59-25-3.	Application for certificate of title; application requirements; contents of certificate of title.
59-25-5.	Issuances of certificate of title; procedures and fees.
59-25-7.	Certificate of origin; records of sale, purchase, or exchange of vessel.
59-25-9.	Hull identification numbers; motor serial numbers.
59-25-11.	Transfer of title by operation of law.
59-25-13.	Certificate of title showing security interest.
59-25-15.	Certificate of number prima facie evidence of ownership.
59-25-17.	Authority of department to adopt rules and regulations, prescribe forms, and carry out investigations.

§ 59-25-1. Definitions.

The following words, as used in this chapter, shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Certificate of origin" means the document provided by the manufacturer of a new vessel, or its distributor, which is the only valid indication of ownership between the manufacturer, its distributor, its franchised new vessel dealers and the original purchaser.

(b) "Dealer" means any person engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling or offering for sale, buying or taking in trade for the purpose of resale, or exchanging, displaying, demonstrating or offering for sale vessels or motors, and who receive or expect to receive money, profit or any other thing of value.

(c) "Department" means the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks.

(d) "Documented vessel" means a vessel documented under 46 U.S.C.S., Chapter 121.

(e) "Lienholder" means a person holding a security interest.

(f) "Manufacturer" means any person engaged in the manufacture, construction or assembly of vessels, or their importation into the United States, for the purpose of sale or trade.

(g) "Motor" means any type of outboard device providing motorized propulsion for vessels operated by any type fuel.

(h) "Operate" means to navigate or otherwise use a vessel.

(i) "Owner" means a person, other than a lienholder, having the property in or title to a vessel or motor. The term includes a person entitled to the use or possession of a vessel or motor subject to an interest in another person, reserved or created by agreement and securing payment of performance of an obligation, but the term excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security.

(j) "Person" means an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association or governmental entity and includes a trustee, receiver, assignee or similar representative of any of them.

(k) "Security interest" means an interest which is reserved or created by an agreement which secures payment or performance of an obligation and is valid against third parties generally.

(l) "State of principal operation" means the state on whose waters a vessel is used or to be used most during a calendar year.

(m) "Titling authority" means a state whose vessel titling system has been certified by the Coast Guard as complying with the guidelines for state vessel titling systems listed in 33 CFR, Part 187.

(n) "Use" means to operate, navigate or employ a vessel. A vessel is in use whenever it is upon the water.

(o) "Vessel" means every description of watercraft, other than a sea-plane on the water, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water, that is required to be numbered in accordance with the Mississippi Boating Law, Chapter 21 of Title 59, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 362, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 16, 1998).

§ 59-25-3. Application for certificate of title; application requirements; contents of certificate of title.

(1) Any owner of a vessel principally operated on the waters of the state and required to be numbered may apply to the department for a certificate of title for the vessel or the motor.

(2)(a) The application shall contain the name and mailing address of the owner, and the names and addresses of all persons having any liens or encumbrances upon the vessel or motor in the order of their priority. The application shall contain the signatures of all owners certifying that statements made are true and correct to the best of the applicant's knowledge, information and belief, under penalty of perjury.

(b) Every application for a certificate of title shall contain a description of the vessel or motor to be titled, including the state certificate of number (if previously assigned), hull length, type and principal material of construction, model year, the date of purchase, hull identification number, manufacturer, horse power, serial number and the name and address of the person from whom the vessel or motor was purchased. The application shall contain the date of sale and gross purchase price of the vessel or motor, or the fair market value if no sale immediately preceded the transfer and any additional information the department requires. If the application is made for a vessel or motor previously registered or titled in another state or foreign country, it shall contain this information. The application shall be on forms prescribed and furnished by the department and shall contain any other information required by the department.

(3) If a dealer buys or acquires a used numbered vessel or motor for resale, he shall report the acquisition to the department on forms the department provides, or he may apply for and obtain a certificate of title as provided in this chapter. If a dealer acquires a new vessel or motor requiring titling for resale, he may apply for and obtain a certificate of title as provided in this chapter.

Every dealer transferring a vessel or motor requiring titling, as determined by the department, shall assign the title to the new owner, or in the case of a new vessel or motor assign either the certificate of origin or, if titled, the title.

(4) No person may sell, assign or transfer a vessel or motor titled by the department without delivering to the purchaser or transferee a certificate of title with an assignment on it showing title in the purchaser or transferee's name. No person may purchase or otherwise acquire a vessel or motor titled by the department without obtaining a certificate of title for it in his name.

(5) Every certificate of title shall contain the owner's name; the address of the principal place of residence of an individual owner and the address of the principal place of business of an owner that is not an individual, including zip code; date of title issuance; vessel or motor description, including the vessel or motor identification number as described in 33 CFR 187.05, name of manufacturer or model, year built or the model year, vessel length, vessel type, drive or propulsion type, motor horsepower, vessel use, hull material and fuel type; each lienholder's name and address; recording or perfection date of new liens and original recording date of any liens outstanding; and other items as required by the department. Space must also be provided for assignment of interest, with a certification that statements provided on the title assignment are true and correct to the best of the owner's knowledge, under penalty of perjury.

(6) The department shall retain the evidence used to establish the accuracy of the information required for titling purposes, and shall maintain a record of any certificate of title it issues.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The definition of "public record" contained in the statute applies to the records of agencies or appointed or elected officials which records were created prior to July 1, 1981. Hilliard, December 11, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0641.

The definition of "public record" contained in the statute applies to records

that were created prior to July 1, 1981, and that were retained outside of agency custody by an appointed or elected official or state government employee after the expiration of his term of service. Hilliard, December 11, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0641.

§ 59-25-5. Issuances of certificate of title; procedures and fees.

(1) The department may charge a fee not to exceed Ten Dollars (\$10.00) to issue a certificate of title; a transfer of title or a duplicate or corrected certificate of title.

(2) The holder of an original title shall apply for a duplicate title within thirty (30) days after, or after the discovery of, the loss, theft, mutilation or destruction of an original certificate of title. The department shall issue a duplicate certificate of title plainly marked "duplicate" across its face upon

application by the person entitled to hold the certificate if the department is satisfied that the original certificate has been lost, stolen, mutilated, destroyed or has become illegible. The applicant shall furnish information concerning the original certificate and the circumstances of its loss, theft, mutilation or destruction. Mutilated or illegible certificates shall be returned to the department with the application for a duplicate. If a duplicate certificate of title has been issued and the lost or stolen original is recovered, the original shall be promptly surrendered to the department for cancellation.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

§ 59-25-7. Certificate of origin; records of sale, purchase, or exchange of vessel.

(1) No dealer shall purchase or acquire a new vessel or motor without obtaining from the seller a manufacturer's or importer's certificate of origin. No manufacturer, importer, dealer or other person shall sell or otherwise dispose of a new vessel or motor to a dealer for purposes of resale without delivering to the dealer a manufacturer's or importer's certificate of origin.

(2) The manufacturer's or importer's certificate of origin shall be a uniform or standardized form prescribed by the department and shall contain: a description of the vessel or motor including its trade name, model year, length, type and hull identification number; an assignment form, including the certification of date of transfer of vessel or motor, the name and address of transferee; certification that the vessel or motor is new, and a warranty that the vessel or motor at the time of delivery is subject only to such liens and encumbrances as set forth and described in full in the assignment.

(3) Every dealer shall maintain for at least three (3) years a record of any vessel or motor bought, sold, exchanged or received for sale or exchange. This record shall be available for inspection by department representatives during reasonable business hours.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

§ 59-25-9. Hull identification numbers; motor serial numbers.

(1) Every vessel shall have a hull identification number assigned and affixed. The department shall assign a hull identification number to an undocumented vessel not having a hull identification number at the time of numbering or applying for a certificate of title after transfer of ownership or change of state of principal operation. Every motor shall have a motor serial number affixed.

(2) A person may not destroy, remove, alter, cover or deface the manufacturer's hull identification number or motor serial number, the plate bearing it or any hull identification number or motor serial number the department assigns to any vessel or motor, without authorization from the department.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

§ 59-25-11. Transfer of title by operation of law.

(1) In the event of a transfer by operation of law of the title or interest of an owner in a vessel or motor titled under this chapter, the transferee or his legal representative shall apply to the department for a certificate of title within thirty (30) days of the transfer. The application shall be accompanied by the title or other states registration previously issued for the vessel or motor, if available, together with any instruments or documents of authority, or certified copies thereof, satisfactory to the department as proof of ownership and the required fee.

(2) For purposes of this chapter, transfer by operation of law shall include transfers to anyone as legatee or distributee or as surviving joint owner or by an order in bankruptcy or insolvency, execution sale, repossession upon default in the performing of the terms of a lease or executory sales contract, or transfers pursuant to any written agreement ratified or incorporated in a decree or order of a court of record, or otherwise than by the voluntary act of the person whose title or interest is so transferred.

(3) If the holder of a certificate of title is deceased and there has been no qualification on his estate, a transfer may be made by a legatee or distributee. The legatee or distributee presents to the department the original certificate of title and a statement made to the effect that there has not been or expected to be a qualification on the estate and that the decedent's debts have been paid or that the proceeds from the sale of the vessel or motor will be applied against his debts. The statement shall contain the name, residence at the time of death, date of death of the decedent, and the names of any other persons having an interest in the vessel or motor for which the title is to be transferred. If these persons are of legal age, they shall indicate in writing their consent to the transfer of the title.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

§ 59-25-13. Certificate of title showing security interest.

(1) The department, upon receiving an application for a certificate of title to a vessel or motor showing security interest on the vessel or motor, shall show upon the face of the certificate of title all security interest in the order of their priority as shown on the application. When a security interest exists, the application for a certificate of title must also contain the name and address of the secured party and the date and amount of the security interest.

(2) Security interest created after the original issue of title to the owner must be shown on the certificate of title. The owner shall surrender the original certificate of title to the department and file an application with the department containing the name and address of the secured party, the amount of the security interest, the date and payment of a filing fee. The department shall then issue a new certificate of title showing name and address of the secured party. The newly issued certificate of title shall be sent to the secured party.

For the purpose of recording a subsequent security interest, the department shall require any secured party to deliver the certificate of title to the

department. Upon receipt of the certificate of title, completion of the forms and required fees, the department shall then issue a new certificate of title showing the security interest in the order of their priority according to the date of the filing of the application. The newly issued certificate of title shall be sent to the first secured party listed on the certificate of title.

(3) The certificate of title when issued by the department showing a security interest shall be adequate notice to the state, creditors and purchasers that a security interest exists. The recording or filing of the security interest in the county or city where the purchaser or debtor resides shall not be required.

(4) If application for the recordation of a security interest is filed in the principal office of the department within five (5) days from the date of the applicant's purchase of the vessel or motor, it shall be valid to all persons as if the recordation had been done on the day the security interest was acquired.

(5) The security interest, except security interest in inventory held for sale, shown on the certificates of title issued by the department pursuant to applications for certificates shall have priority over any other liens or security interest however created and recorded, except for liens designated by the department.

(6) The certificate of title shall be delivered to the person holding the security interest having first priority. The title shall be retained by that lienholder until the entire amount of the security interest is fully paid by the owner. The certificate of title shall then be delivered to the secured party next in order of priority and so on, or, if none, then to the owner.

(7) Upon the satisfaction of a security interest, the secured party shall attach to the certificate of title a release of security interest or in whatever form as may be prescribed by the department. Within five (5) days the secured party shall mail or deliver the certificate of title to the owner and a copy of the security release, if required by the department. Upon request of the owner and upon receipt of a copy of the security release, if required, and the certificate of title, the department shall correct its records and issue a new certificate of title to the owner.

(8) It shall constitute a misdemeanor for a secured party who holds a security interest as provided for in this chapter to refuse or fail to surrender the certificate of title to the person to whom it is legally entitled within five (5) days after the security interest has been paid and satisfied. The misdemeanor is punishable as provided in Section 59-21-153(a).

(9) This section does not apply to any of the following: a lien given by statute or rule of law to a supplier of services or materials for the vessel or motor; a lien given by statute to the United States, a state or a political subdivision thereof; or any lien arising out of an attachment of a vessel or motor.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

§ 59-25-15. Certificate of number prima facie evidence of ownership.

Issuance of a certificate of number shall be prima facie evidence of ownership of a vessel and entitles a person to a certificate of title, but certificate of number and certificate of title shall be subject to rebuttal.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

§ 59-25-17. Authority of department to adopt rules and regulations, prescribe forms, and carry out investigations.

(1) The department shall adopt the necessary rules and regulations to implement this chapter.

(2) The department shall prescribe and provide suitable forms of applications, certificates of title, notices of security interests and all other notices and forms necessary to carry out this chapter.

(3) The department may make necessary investigations to procure information required to carry out this chapter.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 393, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

TITLE 61

AVIATION

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CHAPTER 1

Transportation Commission

SEC.	
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61-1-49.	Exchange of information as to violations.

§ 61-1-1. Purpose of chapter.

It is hereby declared that the purpose of this chapter is to further the public interest and aeronautical progress by providing for the protection, promotion and development of aeronautics; by cooperating in effecting a uniformity of the laws relating to the development of aeronautics in the several states; by revising existing statutes relative to the development and regulation

of aeronautics so as to grant to a state agency such powers and impose upon it such duties that the state may properly perform its functions relative to aeronautics and effectively exercise its jurisdiction over persons and property within the state, that the state may assist in the promotion of a statewide system of airports, and that the state may cooperate with and assist the political subdivisions of this state in order that those engaged in aeronautics of every character may so engage with the least possible restriction consistent with the safety and the rights of other persons; and by providing for cooperation with the federal authorities in the development of a national system of civil aviation and for the coordination of the aeronautical activities of those authorities and the authorities of this state by assisting in accomplishing the purposes of federal legislation and eliminating costly and unnecessary duplication of functions properly in the province of the federal agencies.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-01; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 1; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Liability for personal injuries.

1. In general.

No federal statute or constitutional provision and no state constitutional provision, is contravened by this statute. *Hays v. Morgan*, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).

2. Liability for personal injuries.

In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he

was struck by an airplane used to spray cotton on a farm, owners of the airplane were liable, where they reserved the right to direct when and how the work of spraying cotton was to be carried on, and where there was no lease of any kind of airplane to pilot and where the bailment was at the will of the owners. *Hays v. Morgan*, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.) or Suits in Admiralty Act (46 App. U.S.C.S. §§ 741 et seq.), for injuries or damages arising from issuance, preparation, or distribution of

charts, maps, or like navigational aids. 164 A.L.R. Fed. 541.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 1 et seq.

Practice References. Aviation Accident Law (Matthew Bender).

§ 61-1-3. Definitions.

For the purpose of the laws of this state relating to aeronautics the following words, terms and phrases shall have the meanings herein given, unless otherwise specifically defined, or unless another intention clearly appears, or the context otherwise requires:

(a) "Aeronautics" means transportation by aircraft; the operation, construction, repair or maintenance of aircraft, aircraft power plants and accessories; the design, establishment, construction, extension, operation, improvement, repair or maintenance of airports or other air navigation facilities, including, but not limited to, privately-owned airports that are

open to the general public and are otherwise eligible to receive federal funds; and air instruction;

(b) "Aircraft" means any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used or designed for navigation of or flight in the air;

(c) "Public aircraft" means an aircraft exclusively in the service of any government or of any political subdivision thereof, including the government of any state, territory or possession of the United States or the District of Columbia, but not including any government-owned aircraft engaged in carrying persons or property for commercial purposes;

(d) "Civil aircraft" means any aircraft other than a public aircraft;

(e) "Airport" means any area of land or water which is designed for the landing and take off of aircraft, whether or not facilities are provided for the shelter, servicing or repair of aircraft, or for receiving or discharging passengers or cargo, and all appurtenant areas used or suitable for airport buildings or other airport facilities, and all appurtenant rights-of-way, whether heretofore or hereafter established;

(f) "Commission" means the Mississippi Transportation Commission;

(g) "State" or "this state" means the State of Mississippi;

(h) "Director" means the Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Transportation or his designee.

(i) "Air navigation" means the operation or navigation of aircraft in the air space over this state, or upon any airport within this state;

(j) "Operation of aircraft" or "operate aircraft" means the use of aircraft for the purpose of air navigation, and includes the navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state;

(k) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint stock association, or body politic, and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee or other similar representative thereof;

(l) "Navigable air space" means air space above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by the laws of the United States;

(m) "Municipality" means any county, incorporated city, village or town of this state and any other political subdivision or district in this state which is or may be authorized by law to acquire, establish, construct, maintain, improve and operate airports and other air navigation facilities;

(n) The Mississippi Aeronautics Chart, published annually, will identify "private airport," and if an airport is open to the public, as determined by the owner, the chart will note "open to the public" under the airport identifier.

The singular shall include the plural, and the plural the singular.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-26; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 21; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 52; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 27; Laws, 2001, ch. 564, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References — Apportionment of tax on aviation fuels and oils for support and development of aeronautics as defined in this section, see § 27-5-101.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Relationship to other laws.
3. Compensation for taking of property.
4. Liability for damages.

1. In general.

No federal statute or constitutional provision and no state constitutional provision, is contravened by this statute. *Hays v. Morgan*, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).

2. Relationship to other laws.

Where the use of the air space above the plaintiffs' land by aircraft approaching and taking off from a municipal airport amounted to a taking for which the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation, they were not limited to recovery against the United States on the theory that federal legislation had placed navigable air spaces in the public domain and had preempted the field. *Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wright*, 232 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1970).

3. Compensation for taking of property.

Although a municipal airport had informally, without resorting to eminent domain or other legal process, acquired an overflight easement in the air space above the plaintiffs' land there had been an actual taking for public use of private property for which the owners were entitled to compensation, where low over-

flights of great numbers of aircraft habitually and constantly invaded the air space and substantially impaired the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of their property, the owners were entitled to compensation. *Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wright*, 232 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1970).

4. Liability for damages.

Owner of an aircraft was not held vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-employee pilot who borrowed the aircraft for the benefit of his personal friends. *Malone v. Capital Corr. Res., Inc.*, — So. 2d —, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. Aug. 23, 2001).

In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he was struck by an airplane used to spray cotton on a farm, owners of the airplane were liable, where they reserved the right to direct when and how the work of spraying cotton was to be carried on, and where there was no lease of any kind of airplane to pilot and where the bailment was at the will of the owners. *Hays v. Morgan*, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).

The employer of one hiring the pilot of an airplane to transport him in the course of his employment is liable in damages for the stampeding of cattle by a takeoff, by the employee's direction, from the pasture in which the plane had landed. *Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co.*, 243 Miss. 607, 139 So. 2d 380 (1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 2.
CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 3 et seq.

Practice References. Aviation Accident Law (Matthew Bender).

§ 61-1-5. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 36, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

[Codes, 1942, § 7536-02; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 2; 1948, ch. 189, § 2; 1958, ch. 462; 1989, ch. 544, § 51, eff from and after July 1, 1989]

Editor's Note — Former § 61-1-5 transferred all the functions of the Mississippi Aeronautics Commission to the Mississippi Department of Economic and Community Development.

§§ 61-1-7 through 61-1-11. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 53, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

§ 61-1-7. [Codes, 1942, § 7536-03; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 3; 1948, ch. 189, § 3; 1970, ch. 424, § 1]

§ 61-1-9. [Codes, 1942, §§ 7536-03, 7536-04; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, §§ 3, 4; 1948, ch. 189, §§ 3, 4; 1970, ch. 424, § 1]

§ 61-1-11. [Codes, 1942, § 7536-05; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 5; 1948, ch. 189, § 5]

Editor's Note — Former § 61-1-7 specified the organization of the Aeronautics Commission, its offices, and reports required of the commission.

Former § 61-1-9 provided for meetings of the Aeronautics Commission, the employment of a director and other employees, and for office space for the commission.

Former § 61-1-11 specified the powers and duties of the director of aeronautics.

§ 61-1-13. General powers and duties of commission.

(1) The commission is empowered and directed to encourage, foster and assist in the development of aeronautics in this state, and to encourage the establishment of airports and other air navigation facilities.

(2) The commission may recommend necessary legislation to advance the interests of the state in aeronautics and represent the state in aeronautical matters before federal agencies and other state agencies.

(3) The commission may render financial assistance in the acquisition, development, operation or maintenance of airports out of any monies made available by the Legislature for that purpose. In addition, the commission may render financial assistance for the purpose of providing air-marking and to aid in the establishment, development and maintenance of the Civil Air Patrol Program in Mississippi and the program of other local worthy organizations which tend to promote aeronautics in the state, as the commission, in its discretion, shall deem advisable, out of any funds appropriated by the Legislature for the operation of the commission. All such funds so expended by the commission during each calendar year for such purposes shall be reported to the Governor in the commission's annual report to the Governor as provided in this chapter.

(4) The commission is authorized to buy, own, operate, maintain, lease, charter or rent an aircraft for the use of the commission, and for carrying on the business of the commission only, out of any monies appropriated by the Legislature for the operation and maintenance of the commission.

The commission is further authorized, in its discretion, to obtain and pay the premium on all risk, ground and flight coverage for physical loss or damage coverage upon any aircraft owned by or under the control of the commission.

(5) The commission is authorized to affiliate itself with the National Association of State Aviation Officials and to pay such reasonable fees and dues for membership and services as may be required.

(6) The commission may enter into any contract necessary to the execution of the powers granted it by this chapter but shall have no authority to enter into any contract or agreement binding the State of Mississippi for the

payment of any monies which have not been specifically authorized by the Legislature, nor shall it enter into any contract or agreement binding the State of Mississippi, in excess of the powers granted in this chapter.

(7) The commission shall conduct hearings and shall make investigation as it may deem necessary for the purposes of determining the location, type of construction and the cost to the State of Mississippi of maintenance of emergency and all other classes of airports owned, operated or directly financed in whole or in part by the state within the State of Mississippi. It shall render assistance within its power, not inconsistent with this chapter, to any such subdivisions of the state in procuring such aid as the federal government may grant for the purpose of establishing and maintaining airports.

(8) The commission is hereby given full power and authority to grant permits or franchises to any airline operating wholly intrastate and within the bounds of the State of Mississippi, when proper proof is shown to the commission that the applicant therefor is fit, willing, ready and able to operate said airline under said permit or franchise. The commission is hereby authorized to designate, promulgate and initiate all and any rules, regulations, franchises and directives establishing air lanes governing intrastate air routes for the purpose of commercial scheduled intrastate flights by any person, firm or establishment engaging in the business of commercial intrastate air transportation. All such designated air routes shall conform to the standards prescribed by the federal government and its related agencies.

However, nothing contained in this subsection shall in any way apply to an air carrier operating by authority of a certificate or certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or any other federal agency authorized to issue such certificates.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-06; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 6; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 6; Laws, 1962, ch. 501; Laws, 1984, ch. 495, § 28; reenacted and amended, 1985, ch. 474, § 19; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 41; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 42; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 39; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 37; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 38; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 38; Laws, 1992, ch. 491, § 40, eff from and after passage (approved May 12, 1992).

Cross References — Immunity of state and political subdivisions from liability and suit for torts and torts of its employees, see §§ 11-46-1 et seq.

Participation in a comprehensive plan of one or more policies of liability insurance procured and administered by Department of Finance and Administration, see § 11-46-17.

Duty of the state tax commission to furnish information concerning registration of aircraft, see § 61-15-9.

Cooperation with the board of agricultural aviation, see § 69-21-109.

Formation of insurance companies for purpose of insuring aircraft, see § 83-19-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as affecting immunity from tort. 68 A.L.R.2d 1437.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 27 et seq.

CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 14, 26-34.

§ 61-1-15. Rules, regulations, standards, orders and procedures.

(1) **Power to issue.** — The commission may perform such acts, issue and amend such orders, make, promulgate, and amend such reasonable general or special rules, regulations and procedures, and establish such minimum standards consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as it shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter and to perform its duties hereunder, all commensurate with and for the purpose of protecting and insuring the general public interest and safety, the safety of persons operating, using or traveling in aircraft or persons receiving instruction in flying or ground subjects pertaining to aeronautics, and the safety of persons and property on land or water, and developing and promoting aeronautics in this state. No rule or regulation of the commission shall apply to airports or air navigation facilities owned or operated by the United States.

(2) **Conformity to federal legislation and rules.** — No rules, regulations, orders or standards prescribed by the commission shall be inconsistent with, or contrary to, any act of the congress of the United States or any regulations promulgated or standards established pursuant thereto.

(3) **Filing.** — The commission shall keep on file with the secretary of state, and at the principal office of the commission, a copy of all its rules and regulations for public inspection.

(4) **Distribution.** — The commission shall provide for the publication and general distribution of all its orders, rules, regulations and procedures having general effect.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-11; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Aircraft operated wholly within state as subject to Federal regulation. 9 A.L.R.2d 485.

Liability of owner or operator of airport in connection with furnishing rescue equipment or services. 34 A.L.R.3d 1449.

Liability for injury to guest in airplane. 40 A.L.R.3d 1117.

Strict liability, in absence of statute, for injury or damage occurring on the ground caused by ascent, descent, or flight of aircraft. 73 A.L.R.4th 416.

Am Jur. 4 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Aviation, Form 272.1 (complaint arising out of crash of aircraft into residence during storm).

§ 61-1-17. Cooperation with federal government.

The commission is authorized to cooperate with the government of the United States, and any agency or department thereof, in the acquisition, construction, improvement, maintenance and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities in this state, and to comply with the provisions of the laws of the United States and any regulations made thereunder for the expenditure of federal monies upon such airports and other air navigation facilities.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-07; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 7(1); Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 7(1), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-19. Acceptance of federal funds and other donations.

The commission is authorized to accept, receive, and receipt for federal monies and other monies, either public or private, for and in behalf of this state, or any municipality thereof, when authorized by the municipality to do so, for the acquisition, construction, improvement, maintenance, and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities, whether such work is to be done by the state or by such municipalities or any other political subdivision of the State of Mississippi aided by grants of aid for the United States, upon such terms and conditions as are or may be prescribed by the laws of the United States and any rules or regulations made thereunder. The commission is authorized to act as agent of any municipality or other person or persons in accepting, receiving, and receipting for such monies in its behalf for airports or other air navigation facility purposes, and in contracting for the acquisition, construction, improvement, maintenance, or operation of airports or other air navigation facilities, financed either in whole or in part by federal monies. The governing body of any such municipality or other person or persons is authorized to designate the commission as its agent for such purposes and to enter into an agreement with it prescribing the terms and conditions of such agency in accordance with federal laws, rules and regulations and with this chapter. Such monies as are paid over by the United States government shall be retained by the state or paid over to said municipalities or other person or persons under such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the United States government in making such grants.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-08; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 7(2); Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 7(2), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

Cross References — Municipal airport law, see §§ 61-5-1 et seq.

§ 61-1-21. Contracts of commission.

All contracts for the acquisition, construction, improvement, maintenance, and operation of airports, or other air navigation facilities made by the commission, either as the agent of this state or as the agent of any municipality or other person or persons, shall be made pursuant to the laws of this state governing the making of like contracts. However, where the acquisition, construction, improvement, maintenance, and operation of any airport, landing strip, or other air navigation facility is financed wholly or partially with federal money, the commission, as agent of the state or any municipality or other person or persons thereof, may let contracts in the same manner prescribed by the federal authorities, acting under the laws of the United States, and any rules or regulations made thereunder, notwithstanding any other state law to the contrary.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-09; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 7(3); Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 7(3), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-23. Deposit and disbursement of funds.

All monies accepted for disbursement by the commission pursuant to Section 61-1-19 shall be deposited in the state treasury, and unless otherwise prescribed by the authority from which the money is received, kept in separate funds, designated according to the purposes for which the monies were made available, and held by the state in trust for such purposes. All monies are hereby appropriated for the purposes for which the same were made available, to be expended in accordance with federal laws and regulations and with this chapter. The commission is authorized, whether acting for this state or as the agent of any of its municipalities or other person or persons, or when requested by the United States government or any agency or department thereof, to disburse such monies for the designated purposes, but this shall not preclude any other authorized method of disbursement.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-10; Laws, 1946, ch. 417, § 7(4); Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 7(4), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§§ 61-1-25 through 61-1-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1984, ch. 516, § 9, eff from and after December 31, 1984.

§ 61-1-25. [Codes, 1942, § 7536-15; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 11; repealed 1982, ch. 469, § 9; reenacted 1984, ch. 516, § 9]

§ 61-1-27. [Codes, 1942, § 7536-15; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 11; repealed 1982, ch. 469, § 9; reenacted 1984, ch. 516 § 9]

§ 61-1-29. [Codes, 1942, § 7536-15; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 11; 1972, ch. 475, § 1; repealed 1982, ch. 469, § 9; reenacted 1984, ch. 516, § 9]

Editor's Note — Former § 61-1-25 provided for the registration of aircraft, and the fees for registration.

Former § 61-1-27 provided the requisites for registering aircraft, provided for the issuance of certificates of registration, and made it unlawful to fail to register aircraft.

Former § 61-1-29 provided exemptions from registration requirements.

§ 61-1-31. Licensing of airports.

(1) **Site approvals.** — Except as provided in this section, the commission is authorized to provide for the approval of airport sites and the issuance of certificates of such approvals. No charge shall be made for any such approval, and certificates of such an approval shall be issued without charge to all persons requesting them. Upon the promulgation of a rule or regulation providing for such approvals, any municipality or person desiring or planning to construct or establish an airport may, prior to the acquisition of the site or prior to the construction or establishment of the proposed airport, make application to the commission for approval of this site. The commission shall, with reasonable dispatch, grant approval of a site if it is satisfied: (a) that the site is adequate for the proposed airport; (b) that such proposed airport, if constructed or established, will conform to minimum standards of safety; and

(c) that safe air traffic patterns could be worked out for such proposed airport and for all existing airports and approved airport sites in its vicinity. An approval of a site may be granted subject to any reasonable conditions which the commission may deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section, and shall remain in effect, unless sooner revoked by the commission, until a license for an airport located on the approved site has been issued pursuant to this section. The commission may, after notice and opportunity for hearing to holders of certificates of an approval, revoke such approval when it shall reasonably determine (1) that there has been an abandonment of the site as an airport site, or (2) that there has been a failure within the time prescribed, or if no time was prescribed, within a reasonable time, to develop the site as an airport or to comply with the conditions of the approval, or (3) that because of change of physical or legal conditions or circumstances the site is no longer usable for the aeronautical purposes for which the approval was granted. No approval shall be required for the site of any existing airport.

(2) **Optional public hearings.** — In connection with the grant of approval of a proposed airport site or the issuance of an airport license under the provisions of this section, the commission may, on its own motion or upon the request of an affected or interested person, hold a hearing open to the public as provided in this section.

(3) **Exemptions.** — The provisions of this section shall not apply to airports owned or operated by the United States or its agencies. The commission may, from time to time, to the extent necessary, exempt any other class of airports, pursuant to a reasonable classification or grouping, from any rule or regulation promulgated under this section or from any requirement of such a rule or regulation, if it finds that the application of such rule, regulation or requirement would be an undue burden on such class and is not required in the interest of public safety.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-16; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

Cross References — Municipal airport law, see §§ 61-5-1 et seq.

Acquisition of airport by county, see § 61-5-73.

Acquisition of airport by municipality, see § 61-5-75.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

<p>Am Jur. 1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to</p>	<p>suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)</p>
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§ 61-1-33. Approval of municipal projects.

No municipality in this state, whether acting alone or jointly with another municipality, or with the state, shall submit to any federal agency or department of the United States any project application under the provisions of any

act of Congress which provides airport planning funds or airport construction and development funds for the expansion and improvement of the airport system unless the project and project application have been first approved by the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-25; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 20; Laws, 1974, ch. 447; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 28, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Cross References — Municipal airport law, see §§ 61-5-1 et seq.

Acquisition of airport by county, see § 61-5-73.

Acquisition of airport by municipality, see § 61-5-75.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 83 et seq.

§ 61-1-35. Conduct of investigations, inquiries and hearings.

The commission, any member thereof, the director or any officer or employee of the commission designated by it, shall have the power to hold investigations, inquiries and hearings concerning matters covered by the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations and orders of the commission, and concerning accidents in aeronautics within this state. Hearings shall be open to the public, and, except as provided in this chapter, shall be held upon such call or notice as the commission shall deem advisable. Each member of the commission, the director and every officer or employee of the commission designated by it to hold any inquiry, investigation or hearing shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations, certify to all official acts, issue subpoenas, and order the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of papers, books and documents. In case of the failure of any person to comply with any subpoena or order issued under the authority of this section, the commission or its authorized representative may invoke the aid of any court of this state of general jurisdiction. The court may thereupon order such person to comply with the requirements of the subpoena or order or to give evidence touching the matter in question. Failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-17; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 13(1), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-37. Use and limitations on reports of investigations and hearings.

In order to facilitate the making of investigations by the commission in the interest of public safety and promotion of aeronautics, the public interest requires, and it is therefor provided, that the reports of investigations or hearings or any part thereof, shall not be admitted in evidence or used for any purpose in any suit, action or proceeding growing out of any matter referred to

in said investigation, hearing or report thereof, except in case of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, instituted by or in behalf of the commission or in the name of the state under the provisions of this chapter or other laws of the state relating to aeronautics. No member of the commission, or the director, or any officer or employee of the commission shall be required to testify to any facts ascertained in, or information gained by reason of, his official capacity, or be required to testify as an expert witness in any suit, action or proceeding involving any aircraft. Subject to the foregoing provisions, the commission may in its discretion make available to appropriate federal, state and municipal agencies information and material developed in the course of its investigations and hearings.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-18; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 13(2), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-39. Federal-state joint hearings; cooperation between governments; accident reporting.

The commission is authorized to confer with or to hold joint hearings with any agency of the United States in connection with any matter arising under this chapter, or relating to the sound development of aeronautics.

The commission is authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records and facilities of the agencies of the United States as fully as may be practicable in the administration and enforcement of this chapter. The commission shall furnish to the agencies of the United States its cooperation, services, records and facilities, insofar as may be practicable.

The commission shall report to the appropriate agency of the United States all accidents in aeronautics in this state of which it is informed, and shall insofar as is practicable preserve, protect and prevent the removal of the component parts of any aircraft involved in an accident being investigated by it until the federal agency institutes an investigation.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-19; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-41. Use of state and municipal facilities and services.

In carrying out the provisions of this chapter the commission may use the facilities and services of other agencies of the state and of the municipalities of the state to the utmost extent possible. Such agencies and municipalities are authorized and directed to make available their facilities and services.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-20; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-43. Enforcement of chapter and rules and regulations.

It shall be the duty of the commission, its members, the director, officers

and employees of the commission, and every state and municipal officer charged with the enforcement of state and municipal laws, to enforce and assist in the enforcement of this chapter and of all rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto and of all other laws of this state relating to aeronautics. In that connection each of the aforesaid persons is authorized to inspect and examine at reasonable hours any premises, and the buildings and other structures thereon, where airports, air navigation facilities, air schools, or other aeronautical activities are operated or conducted. In aid of the enforcement of this chapter, the rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto and of all other laws of the state relating to aeronautics, general police powers are hereby conferred upon the commission, each of its members, the director, and such of the officers and employees of the commission as may be designated by it to exercise such powers.

The commission is authorized, in the name of the state, to enforce the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto by injunction or other legal process in the courts of this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-21; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

§ 61-1-45. Commission orders.

Every order of the commission requiring performance of certain acts or compliance with certain requirements, and every denial or revocation of an approval, certificate or license, shall set forth the reasons and shall state the acts to be done or requirements to be met before approval by the commission will be given or the approval, license or certificate granted or restored or the order modified or changed. Orders issued by the commission pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be served upon the persons affected either by registered mail or in person. In every case where notice and opportunity for hearing are required under the provisions of this chapter the order of the commission shall, on not less than thirty days' notice, specify a time when and place where the person affected may be heard, or the time within which he may request hearing. Such order shall become effective upon the expiration of the time for exercising such opportunity for hearing, unless a hearing is held or requested within the time provided, in which case the order shall be suspended until the commission shall affirm, disaffirm or modify such order after hearing held or default by the person affected. To the extent practicable, hearings on such orders shall be held in the county where the affected person resides or does business. Any person aggrieved by an order of the commission or by the grant, denial or revocation of any approval, license or certificate may have the action of the commission reviewed by the circuit court of Hinds County, Mississippi, on appeal thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-22; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to

suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

§ 61-1-47. Penalties for violations of chapter and rules and regulations.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter or any of the rules, regulations or orders issued pursuant thereto, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) or by imprisonment of more than six (6) months, or both.

For any violation of the provisions of this chapter, in addition to, or in lieu of, the penalties provided by the first paragraph of this section, or as a condition to the suspension of a sentence which may be imposed pursuant thereto, the court, in its discretion, may prohibit the violator from operating an aircraft within the state for such period as it may determine but not to exceed one year. Violation of the duly imposed prohibition of the court may be treated as a separate offense under this section or as a contempt of court. Upon a plea of guilty or conviction hereunder in any case involving a registrant, under the provisions of this chapter, the court shall cause a notation of such plea or conviction and of the sentence imposed to be marked upon the pilot certificate or other evidence of pilot registration or receipt provided by the commission under the provisions of this chapter and the court shall cause a copy of its order or sentence to be forwarded to the commission, the cost of furnishing same to be added as a part of cost in such cause. In no event shall this paragraph be construed as warrant for the court or any other agency or person to take away, impound, hold or mark any federal airman or aircraft certificate, permit, rating or license, or to take away, impound or hold any state registration certificate or other evidence of such registration.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-23; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 18; Laws, 1956, ch. 361.

§ 61-1-49. Exchange of information as to violations.

The commission is authorized to report to the appropriate federal agencies and agencies of other states all proceedings instituted charging violation of the provisions of this chapter and all penalties, of which it has knowledge, imposed upon airmen or the owners or operators of aircraft for violations of the law of this state relating to aeronautics or for violations of the rules, regulations or orders of the commission. The commission is authorized to receive reports of penalties and other data from agencies of the federal government and other states, and when necessary, to enter into agreements with federal agencies and the agencies of other states governing the delivery, receipt, exchange and use of reports and data. The commission may make the reports and data of the federal agencies, the agencies of other states, and the courts of this state available, with or without request therefor, to any and all courts of this state,

and to any officer of the state or of a municipality authorized pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to enforce the aeronautics laws.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-24; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 19, eff from and after July 1, 1948.

CHAPTER 3

Airport Authorities

SEC.

- 61-3-1. Short title.
- 61-3-3. Definitions.
- 61-3-5. Creation of municipal airport authority.
- 61-3-7. Creation of regional airport authority.
- 61-3-8. Government of regional airport authority located within two or more judicial districts.
- 61-3-9. Certificate of incorporation of regional airport authority.
- 61-3-11. Proof of existence and authority of airport authority.
- 61-3-13. Compensation of commissioners; meetings of authority; voting; officers.
- 61-3-15. General powers of authority.
- 61-3-17. Exercise of power of eminent domain.
- 61-3-19. Disposal of airport property.
- 61-3-21. Operation and use privileges; exemption from taxation.
- 61-3-23. Promulgation, repeal, etc., of resolutions, rules, regulations, orders and standards.
- 61-3-25. Acceptance of federal and state aid; designation of agent.
- 61-3-27. Issuance of bonds; attorneys' services.
- 61-3-29. Issuance of bonds; authorization resolution.
- 61-3-31. Grounds for contesting validation of bonds.
- 61-3-33. Conclusiveness of authority's classification of project and period of usefulness.
- 61-3-35. Notice of sale of bonds.
- 61-3-37. Opening and award of bids; payment of premium.
- 61-3-39. Payment of bonds.
- 61-3-41. Interest on bonds; details of bonds generally.
- 61-3-43. Execution of bonds.
- 61-3-45. Form of bonds and notes; registration.
- 61-3-47. Redemption of bonds and notes.
- 61-3-49. Securing of bond by trust agreement.
- 61-3-51. Lien on revenues pledged to payment of bonds.
- 61-3-53. Refunding bonds.
- 61-3-55. Redemption of bonds and notes.
- 61-3-57. Negotiability of bonds, notes and coupons.
- 61-3-59. Bonds not to be delivered until validated.
- 61-3-60. Short term borrowing by airport authorities.
- 61-3-61. Exemption from taxation of interest on bonds and notes.
- 61-3-63. Factors to be considered by authority in determining cost of project.
- 61-3-65. Exercise of incidental powers; issuance of general obligation municipal bonds for airport facilities; adoption of rules and regulations for management of airports.
- 61-3-67. Joint operations; authorization.
- 61-3-69. Joint operations; agreement.
- 61-3-71. Joint operations; joint board generally.
- 61-3-73. Joint operations; limitation of powers of joint board.
- 61-3-75. Joint operations; joint fund.
- 61-3-77. Exemption from taxation of airport property and income.
- 61-3-79. Municipal cooperation with authority.
- 61-3-81. Effect of chapter upon municipal airport zoning regulation.
- 61-3-83. Acquisition, etc., of airports, air navigation facilities, etc.; tort liability.

- 61-3-85. Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds.

§ 61-3-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the "Airport Authorities Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-52; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 22.

Cross References — Municipal airport law, see §§ 61-5-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Omission in the Airport Authorities Law of any provision for immunity in tort continued in effect the rule of law that an Airport Authority had no immunity from suit arising out of proprietary or corporate functions. *Anderson ex rel. Doss v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.*, 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982), answer to certified question conformed to, 691 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982).

Allegations of supply equipment for maintenance purposes are sufficient to describe proprietary or corporate functions of an Airport Authority for which there is no immunity from suit. *Anderson ex rel. Doss v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.*, 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982), answer to certified question conformed to, 691 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. 1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts; Sovereign Immunity as a Defense to Tort Liability. 53 Miss. L. J. 171, March, 1983.

§ 61-3-3. Definitions.

The following words or terms, whenever used or referred to in this chapter, shall have the following respective meanings unless different meanings clearly appear from the context:

(a) "Airport" means any area of land or water which is used, or intended for use, for the landing and taking off of aircraft, and any appurtenant areas which are used, or intended for use, for airport buildings or other airport facilities or rights-of-way, or for other appropriate purposes, including buffer areas and areas for airport compatible development, together with all buildings and facilities located thereon.

(b) "Airport authority" or "authority" means any regional airport authority or municipal airport authority created pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

(c) "Airport hazard" means any structure, object or natural growth, or use of land which obstructs the airspace required for the flight of aircraft in landing or taking off at an airport, or is otherwise hazardous to such landing or taking off of aircraft.

(d) "Air navigation facility" means any facility other than one owned and operated by the United States, used in, available for use in, or designed for use in aid of air navigation, including any structures, mechanisms, lights, beacons, markers, communicating systems, or other instrumentalities, or

devices used or useful as an aid, or constituting an advantage or convenience, to the safe taking off, navigation and landing of aircraft, or the safe and efficient operation or maintenance of an airport, and any combination of any or all of such facilities.

(e) "Bonds" means any bonds, notes, interim certificates, debentures or similar obligations issued by an authority pursuant to this chapter.

(f) "Clerk" means the custodian of the official records of a municipality.

(g) "Governing body" means the official or officials authorized by law to exercise ordinance or other lawmaking powers of a municipality.

(h) "Local government" means any local governmental unit as defined in Section 17-13-5.

(i) "Municipal airport authority" or "municipal authority" means a municipal airport authority created pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-3-5.

(j) "Municipality" means any county, supervisors district or supervisors districts, or all that portion of the county lying outside the territorial boundaries of any named city, town or village, and a city, town and village of this state or any state-supported institution of higher learning or any public community or junior college.

(k) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint stock association or body politic, and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee or other similar representative thereof.

(l) "Regional airport authority" or "regional authority" means a regional airport authority created pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-3-7.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-31; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 362, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 379, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 309, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 335, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 13, 2004.)

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (a). The word "takeoff" was changed to "taking off". The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 8, 2004 meeting.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment placed the definitions in alphabetical order; and in (a), inserted "or for other appropriate purposes, including buffer areas and areas for airport compatible development."

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of United States for negligence of air traffic controller. 46 A.L.R. Fed. 24.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 2.
CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 3 et seq.

§ 61-3-5. Creation of municipal airport authority.

Any municipality or a state-supported institution of higher learning or a public community or junior college, by resolution, may create a public body, corporate and politic, to be known as a municipal airport authority, which shall be authorized to exercise its functions upon the appointment and qualification

of the first commissioners thereof. Upon the adoption of a resolution creating a municipal airport authority, the governing body of the municipality or of the state-supported institution of higher learning or other public community or junior college, pursuant to the resolution, shall appoint five (5) persons as commissioners of the authority. The commissioners who are first appointed shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1), two (2), three (3), four (4) and five (5) years, respectively. Thereafter, each commissioner shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years, except that vacancies occurring otherwise than by the expiration of term shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointments.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-32; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 309, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — General jurisdiction and powers of counties, see § 19-3-41.

General powers of municipalities, see § 21-17-1.

Acquisition of airport by county, see § 61-5-73.

Acquisition of airport by municipality, see § 61-5-75.

Lease of municipal airport facilities to private concerns in certain municipalities, see § 61-5-91.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

There is no authority for county to donate funds to municipal airport authority which county has not created pursuant to Section 61-3-5 but county could provide

financial support to authority pursuant to proper interlocal agreement under Section 17-13-1 et. seq. Leggett, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-1022.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 91.

§ 61-3-7. Creation of regional airport authority.

(1) Two (2) or more municipalities or two (2) or more municipalities and any state-supported institution of higher learning or a public community or junior college, by resolution of each, may create a public body, corporate and politic, to be known as a regional airport authority which shall be authorized to exercise its functions upon the issuance by the Secretary of State of a certificate of incorporation. The governing body of each municipality, the institution of higher learning or the public community or junior college, pursuant to its resolution, shall appoint one (1) person as a commissioner of the authority. However, that if the regional airport authority consists of an even number of participants, which include two (2) or more municipalities or two (2) or more municipalities and a state institution of higher learning or a public community or junior college, an additional commissioner shall be appointed by the Governor. Such additional commissioner shall be a resident of a county other than the counties of the participating municipalities but contiguous to at least one (1) of such counties.

(2) A regional airport authority may be increased from time to time to serve one or more additional municipalities if each additional municipality and each of the municipalities and the institution of higher learning or the public community or junior college then included in the regional authority and the commissioners of the regional authority, respectively, adopt a resolution consenting thereto. If a municipal airport authority for any municipality seeking to be included in the regional authority is then in existence, the commissioners of the municipal authority shall consent to the inclusion of the municipality, institution of higher learning or the public community or junior college in the regional authority, and if the municipal authority has any bonds outstanding, unless the holders of fifty-one percent (51%) or more in amount of the bonds consent, in writing, to the inclusion of the municipality in the regional authority, no such inclusion shall be effected. Upon the inclusion of any municipality, institution of higher learning or the public community or junior college in the regional authority, all rights, contracts, obligations and property, real and personal, of the municipal authority shall be in the name of and vest in the regional authority.

(3) A regional airport authority may be decreased if each of the municipalities and the institution of higher learning or the public community or junior college then included in the regional authority and the commissioners of the regional authority consent to the decrease and make provision for the retention or disposition of its assets and liabilities. However, if the regional authority has any bonds outstanding, no decrease shall be effected unless seventy-five percent (75%) or more of the holders of the bonds consent thereto in writing.

(4) A municipality, institution of higher learning or public community or junior college shall not adopt any resolution authorized by this section without a public hearing thereon. Notice thereof shall be given at least ten (10) days before the hearing in a newspaper published in the municipality, in the institution of higher learning or in the public community or junior college, or if there is no newspaper published therein, then in a newspaper having general circulation in the municipality, in the institution of higher learning or in the public community or junior college.

(5) At the expiration of the term of all commissioners serving as of January 1, 1978, the airport authority shall effect staggered terms by the drawing of lots and reporting thereon to appointing authorities. The commissioners shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1) year, two (2) years, three (3) years, four (4) years and so forth depending upon the number of participating appointing authorities. Thereafter, each commissioner shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years except that vacancies occurring otherwise than by expiration of terms shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-33; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 3; Laws, 1978, ch. 396, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 309, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — General jurisdiction and powers of counties, see § 19-3-41.

General powers of municipalities, see § 21-17-1.

Acquisition of airport by county, see § 61-5-73.

Acquisition of airport by municipality, see § 61-5-75.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 91.

§ 61-3-8. Government of regional airport authority located within two or more judicial districts.

A regional airport authority located outside of municipal boundaries and that is within two (2) or more judicial districts may, in its discretion, adopt a resolution declaring which judicial district shall govern the regional airport authority. Upon adoption of the resolution, the regional airport authority shall be governed by all laws, regulations, rules and ordinances applicable to the judicial district.

SOURCES: Laws, 1992, ch. 464, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 5, 1992).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 91, 92.

CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace § 58.

§ 61-3-9. Certificate of incorporation of regional airport authority.

Upon the appointment and qualification of the commissioners first appointed to a regional airport authority, they shall submit to the secretary of state a certified copy of each resolution adopted pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 61-3-7 by the municipalities included in the regional authority. Upon receipt thereof, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate of incorporation to the regional airport authority.

When a regional airport authority is increased or decreased pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) of Section 61-3-7, it shall forward to the secretary of state a certified copy of each resolution adopted pursuant thereto and, upon receipt thereof, the secretary of state shall issue an amended certificate of incorporation in accordance therewith.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-34; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 4.

§ 61-3-11. Proof of existence and authority of airport authority.

In any suit, action, or proceeding involving the validity or enforcement of, or relating to, any contract of a municipal airport authority, created pursuant to Section 61-3-5, the municipal authority shall be conclusively deemed to have become established and authorized to transact its business and exercise its

powers upon proof of the adoption by the municipality of the resolution creating the municipal airport authority and of the appointment and qualification of the first commissioners thereof. Duly certified copies of the resolution creating the authority and of the certificates of appointment of the commissioners shall be admissible in evidence in any suit, action, or proceeding.

In any suit, action, or proceeding involving the validity or enforcement of, or relating to, any contract of a regional airport authority, such regional airport authority shall be conclusively deemed to have become established and authorized to transact its business and exercise its powers upon proof of the issuance by the secretary of state of a certificate of incorporation of such regional airport authority. A copy of such certificate of incorporation, duly certified by the secretary of state, shall be admissible in evidence in any suit, action, or proceeding.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-35; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 5.

§ 61-3-13. Compensation of commissioners; meetings of authority; voting; officers.

Each commissioner of a regional or municipal airport authority may receive from that airport authority per diem compensation in the amount provided by Section 25-3-69 for each day or fraction of a day engaged in attendance of meetings of the authority or engaged in other official duties of the authority, not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days in any one (1) year, and may receive from the airport authority actual traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of his duties. Each commissioner shall hold office until his successor has been appointed and has qualified. The certificates of the appointment and reappointment of commissioners shall be filed with the authority.

The powers of each authority shall be vested in the commissioners of that authority. A majority of the commissioners of an authority shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of conducting the business of the authority and exercising its powers and for all other purposes. Action may be taken by the authority upon a vote of not less than a majority of the commissioners present. There shall be elected a chairman and vice chairman from among the commissioners.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-36; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 6; Laws, 1978, ch. 396, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 384, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 433, § 2, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment substituted “one hundred twenty (120)” for “sixty (60)” in the first paragraph.

§ 61-3-15. General powers of authority.

An authority shall have all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out the purposes of this chapter (excluding the power to levy and collect taxes or special assessments) including, but not limited to, the power:

(a) To sue and be sued, to have a seal and to have perpetual succession.

(b) To purchase general liability insurance coverage, including errors and omissions insurance, for its officials and employees.

(c) To employ an executive director, secretary, technical experts, and such other officers, agents and employees, permanent and temporary, as it may require, and to determine their qualifications and duties, and to establish compensation and other employment benefits as may be advisable to attract and retain proficient personnel.

(d) To execute such contracts and other instruments and take such other action as may be necessary or convenient to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

(e) To plan, establish, develop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regulate and protect airports and air navigation facilities within this state and within any adjoining state, including the acquisition, lease, lease-purchase, construction, installation, equipment, maintenance and operation of such airports or buildings, equipment and other facilities or other property for the servicing of aircraft or for the comfort and accommodation of air travelers or for any other purpose deemed by the authority to be necessary to carry out its duties; to develop, operate, manage or own and maintain intermodal facilities to serve air and surface cargo and multimodal facilities to serve highway and rail passenger transportation needs to ensure interface and interaction between modes for cargo and passengers; to market, promote and advertise airport properties, goods and services; and to directly purchase and sell supplies, goods and commodities incident to the operation of its airport properties without having to make purchases thereof through the municipal governing authorities. For such purposes an authority may, by purchase, gift, devise, lease, eminent domain proceedings or otherwise, acquire property, real or personal, or any interest therein, including easements in airport hazards or land outside the boundaries of an airport or airport site, as are necessary to permit the removal, elimination, obstruction-marking or obstruction-lighting of airport hazards, to prevent the establishment of airport hazards or to carry out its duties.

(f) To acquire, by purchase, gift, devise, lease, lease-purchase, eminent domain proceedings or otherwise, existing airports and air navigation facilities. However, an authority shall not acquire or take over any airport or air navigation facility owned or controlled by another authority, a municipality or public agency of this or any other state without the consent of such authority, municipality or public agency.

(g) To establish or acquire and maintain airports in, over and upon any public waters of this state, and any submerged lands under such public waters, and to construct and maintain terminal buildings, landing floats, causeways, roadways and bridges for approaches to or connecting with any such airport, and landing floats and breakwaters for the protection thereof.

(h) To establish, enact and enforce ordinances, rules, regulations and standards for public safety, aviation safety, airport operations and the

preservation of good order and peace of the authority; to prevent injury to, destruction of or interference with public or private property; to protect property, health and lives and to enhance the general welfare of the authority by restricting the movements of citizens or any group thereof on the property of the authority when there is imminent danger to the public safety because of freedom of movement thereof; to regulate the entrances to property and buildings of the authority and the way of ingress and egress to and from the same; to establish fire limits and to regulate, restrain or prohibit construction failing to meet standards established by the authority; to appoint and discharge police officers with jurisdiction limited to property of the airport authority and authorization to enforce the ordinances, rules and regulations of the authority, as well as the laws of the State of Mississippi, and to issue citations for infractions of all of such ordinances, rules, regulations, standards and laws of the State of Mississippi returnable to the court of appropriate jurisdiction.

(i) To develop and operate an industrial park or parks and exercise all authority provided for under Chapter 7, Title 57, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(j) To attach, pursuant to the power and procedure set forth in Chapter 33, Title 11, Mississippi Code of 1972, the equipment of debtors of the authority.

(k) To enter into agreements with local governments pursuant to Section 17-13-1 et seq.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-37; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 7; Laws, 1978, ch. 396, § 3; Laws, 1979, ch. 441; Laws, 1980, ch. 410, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 495, § 30; Laws, 1985, ch. 447, § 1; reenacted and amended, 1985, ch. 474, § 29; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 42; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 43; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 40; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 38; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 39; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 39; Laws, 1992, ch. 379, § 3; Laws, 1992, ch. 491 § 41; Laws, 1994, ch. 394, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 580, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 422, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 24, 1997).

Cross References — Procedures pertaining to remedy of attachment at law against debtors, see § 11-33-1 et seq.

Participation in a comprehensive plan of one or more policies of liability insurance procured and administered by the Department of Finance and Administration, see § 11-46-17.

Authority of regional airport authority to sell or develop surplus airport land or other lands for industrial purposes, see § 57-7-1 et seq.

Authority for the creation of a regional airport authority, see § 61-3-7.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Under this section, there is no legal authority for the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority to grant parking passes to state legislators and local elected officials allowing them to park without charge at

Jackson International Airport when not on official business. Moore, April 27, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0157.

Section 61-3-15(c) cannot override the provisions of Section 31-7-13(g) regarding

the ability to enter into change orders without board approval. Montague, Dec. 10, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0647.

The determination of whether a particular expenditure contemplated pursuant to subsection (e) will “market, promote or advertise” the resources of the airport must be made by the governing authority, i.e., the airport authority, and such findings must be spread upon the minutes of the meeting at which the determination is made. Ozerden, Mar. 22, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0122.

A regional airport authority may enforce contracts and leases of airport property in a court of competent jurisdiction, and the civil remedies available to the airport authority include eviction of tenants who are holding over without the

permission of the airport authority as a result of breaches of contracts and/or leases; local prosecutors may also prosecute violations of state criminal laws and airport criminal ordinances in a court of competent jurisdiction; however, there is no authority for a regional airport authority to use the criminal process to seek civil remedies for breaches of contracts or leases or to enforce minimum standards for businesses which provide goods and services associated with the operation of regional airport. Montague, May 3, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0199.

Violations of ordinances, rules, regulations, and standards described in subsection (h) may be charged in a court of competent jurisdiction. Montague, July 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0345.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation §§ 34:81 et seq. (airport facilities; leases and other agreements).

§ 61-3-17. Exercise of power of eminent domain.

In the acquisition of property by eminent domain proceedings authorized by this chapter, an authority shall proceed in the manner provided by Chapter 27 of Title 11, Mississippi Code of 1972, and as elsewhere provided by law. For the purpose of making surveys and examinations relative to eminent domain proceedings, it shall be lawful for the authority to enter upon the land, doing no unnecessary damage. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute or other law, an authority may take possession of any property to be acquired by eminent domain proceedings at any time after the commencement of such proceedings upon a specific finding by the authority of the public necessity for the immediate acquisition of the property pursuant to Sections 11-27-81 et seq., and compliance with all the provisions of Sections 11-27-81 et seq., including the provisions for making a deposit. The authority shall not be precluded from abandoning such proceedings at any time prior to final order and decree of the court having jurisdiction of such proceedings. The authority shall be liable to the owner of the property for any damage done to the property during possession thereof by the authority.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-38; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 8; Laws, 1996, ch. 404, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References — Exercise of power of eminent domain under municipal airport law, see § 61-5-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

§ 61-3-19. Disposal of airport property.

Except as may be limited by the terms and conditions of any grant, loan or agreement authorized by Section 61-3-25, an authority may, by sale, lease or otherwise, dispose of any airport, air navigation facility or other property, real or personal, or portion thereof or interest therein, acquired pursuant to this chapter. In the event that Section 29-1-1 is applicable to a sale of real property, such sale shall comply with Section 29-1-1. Otherwise, such disposal by sale, lease or otherwise, shall be in accordance with the following procedure: The authority shall find and determine by resolution duly and lawfully adopted and spread upon its minutes (a) that the property is no longer needed for authority purposes and is not to be used in the authority's operation; (b) that there is no state agency, board, commission or any governing authority within the state that has expressed a need or use for the property and the federal government has not expressed a need or use for the property; and (c) that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is to be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of will promote and foster the development and improvement of the authority or of the community in which it is located and the civic, social, educational, cultural, moral, economic or industrial welfare thereof. The authority, after having made such determinations, may proceed to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the subject property in accordance with applicable law and by any of the following methods:

(a) The authority may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the subject property as long as the consideration therefor is not less than the fair market price for such property as determined by averaging the appraisals of two (2) professional property appraisers selected by the authority and approved by the purchaser or lessee. Appraisal fees shall be shared equally by the authority and the purchaser or lessee.

(b) The authority may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the subject property to the highest bidder after publishing at least once each week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a public newspaper published in the county in which the property is located, or if no newspaper be published as such, then in a newspaper having general circulation therein, the authority's intention to lease, sell or otherwise dispose of, as the case may be, the subject property and to accept sealed competitive bids for the sale, lease or disposal thereof. The authority shall thereafter accept bids for the sale, lease or disposal of the subject property and shall award the sale, lease or disposal to the highest bidder.

(c) The authority may sell and dispose of personal property at public sale for cash to the highest bidder after publishing at least once each week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a public newspaper published in the county in which the property is located, or if no newspaper be published as

such, then in a newspaper having general circulation therein, the authority's intention to sell and dispose of the personal property at public sale for cash. Any such public sale for cash may be conducted by or on behalf of the authority. At such public sale for cash, the personal property shall be sold and disposed of to the highest bidder.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, in the case of a sale, lease or disposal of property to another authority, a municipality or an agency of the state or federal government for use and operation as a public airport, the sale, lease or other disposal thereof may be effected in such manner and upon such terms as the commissioners of the authority may deem to be in the best interest of civil aviation.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-39; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 9; Laws, 1984, ch. 370; Laws, 1992, ch. 379, § 7; Laws, 1993, ch. 615, § 14; Laws, 1996, ch. 404, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References — Power of county to dispose of its real property, see § 19-7-3.

Power of municipality to dispose of its real property, see § 21-17-1.

Support of university or college airport by certain municipalities, see § 21-19-59.

Disposal of airport property under municipal airport law, see § 61-5-9.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Disposal and/or lease of surplus property "no longer needed for authority purposes" or operations must be accomplished in accordance with the enumerated procedures. Barnett, Nov. 27, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0891.

An airport authority which sells surplus airport property pursuant to § 57-7-1 does not have to comply with the terms of § 61-3-19. Crowell, July 26, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0358.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

4 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Aviation, Form 111.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation §§ 34:81 et seq.

Law Reviews. 1984 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Property. 55 Miss. L. J. 135, March, 1985.

§ 61-3-21. Operation and use privileges; exemption from taxation.

(1) In connection with the operation of an airport or air navigation facility owned or controlled by an authority, the authority may enter into contracts, leases and other arrangements for terms not to exceed forty (40) years with any persons: (a) granting the privilege of using or improving the airport or air navigation facility or any portion or facility thereof or space therein for commercial purposes; (b) conferring the privilege of supplying goods, commodities, things, services or facilities at the airport or air navigation facility; and (c) making available services to be furnished by the authority or its agents at the airport or air navigation facility.

In each case the authority may establish the terms and conditions and fix the charges, rentals or fees for the privileges or services, which shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of privilege or service and which shall be established with due regard to the property and improvements used and the expenses of operation to the authority. In no case shall the public be deprived of its rightful, equal and uniform use of the airport, air navigation facility or portion or facility thereof.

(2) Except as may be limited by the terms and conditions of any grant, loan or agreement authorized by Section 61-3-25, Mississippi Code of 1972, an authority may, by contract, lease or other arrangements, upon a consideration fixed by it, grant to any qualified person for a term not to exceed forty (40) years, the privilege of operating, as agent of the authority or otherwise, any airport owned or controlled by the authority. However, no person shall be granted any authority to operate an airport other than as a public airport or to enter into any contracts, leases or other arrangements in connection with the operation of the airport which the authority might not have undertaken under subsection (1) of this section.

(3) All contracts, leases and other arrangements entered into pursuant to this section are deemed to serve a public and governmental purpose as a matter of public necessity; therefore, all such contracts, leases, and other arrangements and all structures, improvements and other facilities erected, installed, constructed or located in connection therewith on an airport or air navigation facility owned or controlled by an authority, or any portion of facility thereof or space therein, shall be free and exempt from all state, county and municipal ad valorem taxes on real property and personal property for so long as may otherwise be lawful, and the charges, rentals and fees received by an authority in connection with such contracts, leases and other arrangements shall be deemed to be in lieu of said taxes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-41; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 11; Laws, 1992, ch. 464, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 5, 1992).

Cross References — Operation and use privileges under municipal airport law, see § 61-5-11.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 61-3-21 authorizes airport authority to enter into lease granting any persons privilege of using or improving airport or any portion of airport for a term up to forty years; airport authority may establish terms and conditions of lease, and need not advertise property for lease before entering into lease and need not give notice to public of proposed lease; also, terms of lease must be reasonable and established with due regard to property and improvements

used and expenses of operation. Dulaney, Jan. 20, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0993.

Section 61-3-21 and Section 61-5-11 provide exemption from state, county and municipal taxes, including school taxes, for contracts, leases and other arrangements relating to such property when used in accordance with and for purposes stated in Section 61-3-21 and 61-5-11; leasehold interest in such property is also exempt from ad valorem taxes. Broome Aug. 30, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0467.

The board of an airport established through an interlocal agreement between a city and a county had authority to enter into a contract to permit the holding of an air show and related activities on the airport runways and adjacent property, which agreement would have an initial term of three years, and would automatically renew for a period of one year to cover an additional annual air show. Bowman, Feb. 11, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0046.

Sections 61-3-21 and 61-5-11 clearly exempt from state, county, and municipal real and personal property ad valorem

taxes any structures, improvements, and other facilities which are erected, installed, or located on that leasehold and in furtherance of these statutes. Mitchell, III, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0164.

Property which is utilized as an industrial park, even if it may be owned by a municipality or municipal airport authority, is not used in connection with the airport or air navigation facility and, therefore, the exemptions provided by §§ 61-3-21(3) and 61-5-11(3) are not be available to such property. Mitchell, III, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0164.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 96 et seq.

4 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Aviation, Form 111.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation §§ 34:81 et seq.

§ 61-3-23. Promulgation, repeal, etc., of resolutions, rules, regulations, orders and standards.

An authority is authorized to adopt, amend, and repeal such reasonable resolutions, rules, regulations, and orders as it shall deem necessary for the management, government, and use of any airport or air navigation facility owned by it or under its control. No rule, regulation, order, or standard prescribed by the commission shall be inconsistent with, or contrary to, this chapter, or any act of the congress of the United States or any regulation promulgated or standard established pursuant thereto. The authority shall keep on file at the principal office of the authority for public inspection a copy of all its rules and regulations.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-42; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 12.

§ 61-3-25. Acceptance of federal and state aid; designation of agent.

An authority is authorized to accept, receive, receipt for, disburse, and expend federal and state monies and other monies, public or private, made available by grant or loan or both, to accomplish, in whole or in part, any of the purposes of this chapter. All federal monies accepted under this section shall be accepted and expended by the authority upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the United States and as are consistent with state law. All state monies accepted under this section shall be accepted and expended by the authority upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the state.

An authority is authorized to designate the Mississippi Transportation Commission as its agent to accept, receive, receipt for, and disburse federal and state monies, and other monies, public or private, made available by grant or

loan or both, to accomplish in whole or in part, any of the purposes of this chapter, and an authority is authorized to designate such commission as its agent in contracting for and supervising the planning, acquisition, development, construction, improvement, maintenance, equipment or operation of any airport or other air navigation facility. An authority may enter into an agreement with the commission prescribing the terms and conditions of the agency in accordance with such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the United States, if federal money is involved, and in accordance with the applicable laws of this state. All federal monies accepted under this section by the commission shall be accepted and transferred or expended by such commission upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the United States. All monies received by the commission pursuant to this paragraph shall be deposited in the State Treasury, and unless otherwise prescribed by the agency from which such monies were received, shall be kept in separate funds designated according to the purposes for which the monies were made available, and held by the state in trust for such purpose.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-43; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 13; Laws, 1992, ch. 379, § 4; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 29, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Editor's Note — Section 61-3-25 was amended twice during the 1992 legislative session. By direction of the Attorney General, section 61-3-25, as amended by Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 29, is set out above as the latest expression of legislative intent.

Cross References — General powers and duties of commission, see § 61-1-13.

Acceptance of federal and state aid under municipal airport law, see § 61-5-15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 93
et seq.

§ 61-3-27. Issuance of bonds; attorneys' services.

An authority shall have the power to borrow money for any of its corporate purposes and issue its bonds therefor, including refunding bonds, which bonds may be payable out of any revenues of the authority, including grants or contributions from the federal government or other sources. Any bonds of an authority issued pursuant to this chapter which are payable, as to principal and interest, solely from revenues of an airport or air navigation facility (and they shall so state on their face) shall not constitute a debt of any municipality, the state, or any political subdivision thereof other than the authority, and shall not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction. Neither the commissioners of an authority nor any person executing such bonds shall be liable personally thereon by reason of the issuance thereof, provided the issuance is in compliance with this chapter.

An authority proposing to issue bonds or notes as defined in this chapter of any kind, nature, or description shall have, prior to authorization, issuance, and subsequent validation thereof, secured the legal services of a competent

practicing attorney or firm of attorneys. In no instance shall the attorney's fees paid for the issuance or refunding of such bonds exceed the following amounts, to wit:

On all such bond issues the attorney's fees shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the first five hundred thousand dollars (\$500,000.00); one-half percent (½%) of all over five hundred thousand dollars (\$500,000.00) and not more than one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00); and one-fourth percent (¼%) of all amounts in excess of one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Issuance of bonds under municipal airport law, see § 61-5-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

§ 61-3-29. Issuance of bonds; authorization resolution.

The issuance of bonds by an authority shall be authorized by a resolution of the governing body of such authority. Every such resolution shall be adopted by the affirmative vote of at least three-fifths (¾) of all the members of such governing body.

A resolution in compliance with this section shall include any covenants with the bondholders deemed necessary by the commissioners to make such bonds secure and marketable, including, but without limitation, covenants regarding the application of the bond proceeds; the pledging, application and securing of the revenues of the authority, the creation and maintenance of reserves; the investment of funds; the issuance of additional bonds; the maintenance of minimum fees, charges and rentals; the operation and maintenance of its airport; insurance and insurance proceeds; accounts and audits; the sale of airport properties; remedies of bondholders; the vesting in a trustee or trustees such powers and rights as may be necessary to secure the bonds and the revenues and funds from which they are payable; the terms and conditions upon which bondholders may exercise their rights and remedies; the replacement of lost, destroyed or mutilated bonds; the definition, consequences and remedies of an event of default; the amendment of such resolution; and the appointment of a receiver in the event of a default.

Upon final enactment, each resolution authorizing bonds shall be published in full.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Issuance of short term notes to provide for the safe and convenient operation of airports, see § 61-3-60.

Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 74 et seq.

§ 61-3-31. Grounds for contesting validation of bonds.

After the publication of such authorizing resolution or amendatory resolution, if any, the validation of the bonds authorized thereby may be contested only if:

(a) Such bonds were authorized for an objective or purpose for which the political subdivision is not authorized to expend money, or

(b) The provisions of law which should have been complied with, on or before the date of such publication, were not complied with, and an action, suit or proceeding contesting such validity is commenced within twenty days after such publication of the resolution authorizing the bonds, or, as to changes made by an amendatory resolution, within twenty days after such publication of such amendatory resolution, or

(c) Such bonds were authorized in violation of the provisions of the constitution or laws of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35 § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 323 et seq, 384.

§ 61-3-33. Conclusiveness of authority's classification of project and period of usefulness.

The determination of the authority, in the resolution authorizing bonds, as to the classification of the project for which such bonds are authorized and as to the maximum period of usefulness, shall be conclusive in any action or proceeding involving the validity of such bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

§ 61-3-35. Notice of sale of bonds.

(1) Bonds issued under this chapter may be sold on sealed bids at public sale after publication of at least three (3) weekly notices, published in a

financial publication carrying political subdivision bond notices and devoted primarily to financial news or to the subject of state and political subdivision bonds and having circulation among a large number of dealers in political subdivision bonds.

(2) The public notice of sale shall describe the bonds or notes and set forth the terms and conditions of sale. It shall invite bidders to name the rate or rates of interest to be borne by the bonds or notes, which rate or rates shall be stated in conformity to the details of the issues as outlined in this chapter, all of which shall be included in the notice of sale.

(3) The notice of sale may permit bidders to name one or more interest rates for the bonds or notes proposed to be sold, within such limitations as outlined in Section 61-3-41.

The notice of sale shall state that all bonds or notes will be awarded to the bidder whose bid constitutes the lowest cost to the authority. The lowest cost to the authority shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 61-3-41.

(4) The notice of sale, in case of a sale of more than one (1) issue of bonds payable from the same source, after describing the separate issues, shall state the combined maturities as if such combined maturities constituted a single issue. The notice of sale shall state that the bonds or notes will be awarded to the bidder whose bid constitutes the lowest cost as determined by Section 61-3-41, and, as between bidders whose bids constitute the same lowest cost to the authority, such lowest bidders may negotiate between themselves, immediately after the announcement of said bids as to the conditions upon which the bid shall be awarded. If no agreement is reached, the award shall be determined by lot fairly and publicly drawn.

(5) The notice of sale shall require all bidders except governmental agencies or departments to deposit a certified or cashier's check for two percent (2%) of the amount of bonds or notes proposed to be sold, partially to secure the authority from any loss resulting from the failure of the bidder to comply with the terms of his bid. In case the bidder to whom the award is made shall fail to comply with the award, his certified or cashier's check in the amount of two percent (2%) shall be forfeited to the authority. The certified or cashier's checks of unsuccessful bidders shall be returned promptly.

(6) Each notice of sale shall require the purchaser to pay interest accrued on the face amount of the bonds or notes awarded, at the rate borne thereby, from the date of the bonds or notes to the date of payment of the purchase price.

(7) Each notice of sale shall reserve the right to reject any and all bids and shall state that any bid not complying with the terms of the notice shall be rejected.

(8) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in this chapter, bonds or notes issued pursuant to this chapter may be sold at a private sale in a manner and at a price determined by the authority to be the most advantageous to the authority.

(9) Bonds or notes issued pursuant to this chapter may be for not less than ninety-eight percent (98%) of par value. Any notice of sale shall state whether or not the bonds or notes will be sold for less than their par value.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230 § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds, see § 61-3-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 193 et seq.

§ 61-3-37. Opening and award of bids; payment of premium.

All proposals or bids shall be submitted to the authority in a sealed envelope and subsequently opened publicly at the time and place stated in the notice of sale, and each bid shall be publicly announced at the time of opening of bids. A determination with respect to acceptance of a bid shall be made promptly after receipt of bids and, if a bid is accepted, a prompt award of the bonds or notes shall be made in writing to the successful bidder.

Bonds and notes shall be awarded to the bidder whose bid specifies the lowest maximum interest cost.

Any premium must be paid in bank funds as a part of the purchase price. Bids shall not contemplate the cancellation of any interest coupon or the waiver of interest or other concession by the bidder as a substitute for bank funds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 203, 204.

§ 61-3-39. Payment of bonds.

All bonds except term bonds of a single issue shall be paid in consecutive annual or semiannual payments.

The first annual or semiannual principal payment upon each authorized issue shall be paid not more than thirty-six (36) months after the date of the bonds.

The last payment of each authorized issue of bonds shall mature not later than forty (40) years after its date of issue.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds, see § 61-3-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 339 et seq.

§ 61-3-41. Interest on bonds; details of bonds generally.

All bonds shall bear interest at such rate or rates not to exceed that allowed in Section 75-17-103. No bond shall bear more than one (1) rate of interest. Each bond shall bear interest from its date to its stated maturity date at the interest rate specified in the bid or as agreed to by the authority. All bonds of the same maturity shall bear the same rate of interest. All interest accruing on such bonds so issued shall be payable semiannually or annually, except that the first interest coupon attached to any such bond may be for any period not exceeding one (1) year.

No interest payment shall be evidenced by more than one (1) coupon and neither cancelled nor supplemental coupons shall be permitted. The lowest interest rate specified for any bonds issued shall not be less than two-thirds ($\frac{2}{3}$) of the highest interest rate specified for the same bond issue. The interest rate of any one (1) interest coupon shall not exceed the maximum interest rate allowed on such bonds.

Each interest rate specified in any bid must be in multiples of one-eighth of one percent ($\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%) or in multiples of one-tenth of one percent ($\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%), and a zero rate of interest cannot be named.

All bonds shall be lithographed, engraved or typewritten, shall be in denominations of not less than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), shall be registered by the authority, and shall be consecutively numbered in a regular series from one (1) upward. Each such bond shall specify on its face the purpose for which it was issued and the total amount authorized to be issued. The interest to accrue on each bond shall be evidenced by proper coupons to be attached thereto, unless the bonds are fully registered no-coupon bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 477, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 541, § 42; Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds, see § 61-3-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 374 et seq.

§ 61-3-43. Execution of bonds.

All bonds and notes shall be executed in the name of the authority by the manual or facsimile signatures of such officials, including a financial officer, as may be designated by resolution and shall be under the seal (or a facsimile thereof) of the authority. At least one signature on each such bond or note shall be a manual signature. Coupons attached to a bond may be executed by the facsimile signature of the financial officer signing the bond.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230 § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 183 et seq.

§ 61-3-45. Form of bonds and notes; registration.

Bonds may be issued in form payable to bearer with coupons attached for the payment of interest and, if so issued, shall be subject to registration as to principal only or as to both principal and interest. Bonds may also be issued in fully registered form without coupons. Coupon and registered bonds shall be interchangeable only as provided in the resolution authorizing such bonds.

Notes may be issued in registered form or notes may be issued in form payable to bearer, with interest payable to bearer on presentation for endorsement and, if so issued, shall be subject to complete registration. Interest on notes issued in registered form and interest on bearer notes which have been registered shall be payable to the registered holder.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds, see § 61-3-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 153, 165 et seq.

§ 61-3-47. Redemption of bonds and notes.

No bonds or notes shall be made payable on demand, but any bond or note may be made subject to redemption prior to maturity on such notice and at such time or times and with such redemption provisions as may be stated in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bond or note. When any such bond or note shall have been validly called for redemption and payment of the principal thereof and of the interest thereon accrued to the date of redemption shall have been tendered or made, interest thereon shall cease. A complete schedule of redemption dates shall be included in the resolution authorizing the bond issue.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations § 175.

§ 61-3-49. Securing of bond by trust agreement.

In the discretion of the authority, all bonds may be further secured by a trust agreement between the authority and a corporate trustee, which may be any trust company or bank having powers of a trust company within or without the state. Any such trust agreement or any resolution providing for the issuance of such bonds may contain such provisions for protecting and enforcing the rights and remedies of the bondholders as are reasonable and proper and not in violation of law.

The trust agreement may contain provisions for the issuance of additional bonds under the procedures established by this chapter for any of the purposes authorized by this chapter which shall be secured by the revenues pledged thereunder for such bonds to the extent provided therein.

The trust agreement may include provisions to the effect that, if there is any default in the payment of principal or interest on any of said bonds, any court of competent jurisdiction may appoint a receiver to administer the properties and facilities of the authority described in the trust agreement on behalf of the authority, including authority to sell or make contracts for the sale of any services, facilities or commodities of the authority or to renew such contracts, subject to the approval of the court appointing the said receiver, and with power to provide for the payment of such bonds outstanding, or the

payment of operating expenses, and to apply the income and revenues to the payment of the said bonds and interest thereon in accordance with the resolution of the authority authorizing the issuance of such bonds and the said trust agreement. The fee for the services of any corporate trustee shall not exceed the normal charges for acting as paying agent, plus any additional amount or amounts allowed by the court as the reasonable value of services rendered by the corporate trustee.

The powers herein granted may be exercised whether or not a trust agreement is entered into and, if no trust agreement is entered into, such provisions as are above authorized may be set out in the resolution authorizing the bonds.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

§ 61-3-51. Lien on revenues pledged to payment of bonds.

All revenues pledged to the payment of bonds shall be subject to a lien in favor of the holders of such bonds, and all such revenues received by the authority shall be immediately subject to such lien without any physical delivery thereof or further act by the authority. The lien shall be effective as against all parties asserting claims against the authority, whether by way of tort, contract or otherwise, whether or not such parties may have had notice of such lien. The pledge or trust agreement creating the same need not be filed or recorded except in the official minutes of the authority. The revenues may also be pledged as security for the payment of obligations due providers of credit enhancement with respect to any bonds issued.

The state does hereby covenant with the holders of any such bonds that it will not, while any such bonds shall be outstanding, limit or diminish the right and power of the authority to establish, maintain and collect rates, fees, rentals and other charges pledged to the payment of such bonds, or to fulfill any covenants with respect to rates, fees, rentals and other charges made by the authority with such bondholders.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds, see § 61-3-85.

§ 61-3-53. Refunding bonds.

Any authority, authorized by a statute other than this chapter to refund its outstanding bonds and permitted to do so by the terms of any resolutions and

trust agreements pertaining to such bonds, may refund all, or any part of, one or more bond issues. However, the refunding bonds shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

In no case shall any bonds be refunded whereby:

(a) The interest cost to the authority computed on the basis of the interest rates borne by the bonds refunded and by the refunding bonds, will be increased by reason of the refunding; or

(b) The average maturity of the bonds refunded, computed to their stated maturities will be increased by reason of the refunding; or

(c) The time at which bonds may be redeemed is more than twelve (12) months after the date of sale of the refunding bonds;

(d) However, if it can be clearly shown that the refunding is being accomplished to prevent default or to provide flexibility to the authority in the financing of its projects, and if the State Treasurer shall certify that the need to refund an outstanding issue to prevent default or to provide flexibility to the authority in the financing of its projects has been determined by sufficient evidence filed with the State Treasurer, the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) shall not prevent refunding.

It shall not be necessary for the bonds refunded to be surrendered and cancelled simultaneously with the delivery of the refunding bonds, but the proceeds of the sale of the refunding bonds, not used to pay for surrendered and cancelled bonds at the time of refunding, shall be deposited in a trust fund under conditions satisfactory to the authority and the State Treasurer.

If the refunding bonds are being issued to prevent default, the authority may exchange them with bondholders under such rules and regulations as established by the State Treasurer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds, see § 61-3-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 215 et seq.

§ 61-3-55. Redemption of bonds and notes.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to confer on any authority any right or option to redeem any bonds or notes heretofore or hereafter issued, except as is or may be provided in the proceedings under which such bonds were or shall be issued.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Suspension of driving privileges of person convicted of violations of Uniform Controlled Substance Law, see § 63-1-71.

§ 61-3-57. Negotiability of bonds, notes and coupons.

All bonds and notes and appurtenant coupons issued pursuant to this chapter shall be negotiable instruments within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

Law of negotiable instruments under Uniform Commercial Code, see § 75-3-101 et seq.

§ 61-3-59. Bonds not to be delivered until validated.

No bonds shall be delivered to any purchaser by any authority unless they shall have first been validated in accordance with the provisions of Sections 31-13-1 through 31-13-11, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 189 et seq.

§ 61-3-60. Short term borrowing by airport authorities.

(1) In addition to the power to borrow money pursuant to Sections 61-3-27 through 61-3-61, Mississippi Code of 1972, an airport authority may, in anticipation of the receipt of income, revenues, grants or subsidies from any source, including, but not limited to, the federal government or any federal agency, the state or any state agency, any municipality or taxing authority, or the proceeds of bonds authorized by Sections 61-3-27 through 61-3-61, Mississippi Code of 1972, borrow money to be payable over a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years, in an amount or amounts not to exceed in the aggregate Ten Million Dollars (\$10,000,000.00) for the purposes and under the terms and conditions set out in subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of this section.

(2) Any loans made under this section shall be first authorized by

resolution of the airport authority setting out the need for such loan, the purposes for which the proceeds shall be used, and the source or sources from which it anticipates that the loan shall be retired. The purposes for which such loans are authorized may include any purposes for which bonds may be issued under this chapter and for the maintenance and repair of runways, taxiways, ramps or other facilities necessary for the safe, orderly and convenient handling of aircraft traffic; and for the employment of personnel and purchase of supplies and equipment and payment of expenses which, in the judgment of the authority, shall be necessary or convenient in the safe operation of the airport facilities. The resolution shall also set out the schedule of repayment and may pledge therefor any anticipated funds not previously pledged to the retirement of the loan or loans.

(3) The loans authorized by this section may be made by any bank located in the State of Mississippi or by any trust companies or other lending institutions, investment banking firms or persons in the United States having the authority to enter into such loans. The loans may bear interest at a rate not to exceed thirteen percent (13%) per annum. The loans shall be evidenced by the notes of the airport authority and shall not constitute a debt of the commissioners thereof, and the lender shall have the right of mandamus and any other appropriate writ or legal or equitable remedy for the collection of the notes and the cost of collection.

(4) In order to provide for, and in connection with, such short-term borrowings, an airport authority is authorized to enter into any note, loan, credit agreement or agreements, or other agreement or agreements necessary therefor containing provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this section.

(5) The interest on the notes authorized by this section shall at all times be exempt from all taxation in this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1991, ch. 477, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 404, § 5; Laws, 1998, ch. 305, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 325, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 7, 2003.)

Editor's Note — A former § 61-3-60, [En, Laws, 1979, ch. 339; repealed by Laws, 1979, ch. 339, § 4; En, Laws, 1981, ch. 467, § 1] repealed by Laws, 1981, ch. 467, § 3, eff from and after June 1, 1983, also provided for short term borrowing by an airport authority.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment substituted "Ten Million Dollars (\$10,000,000.00)" for "Five Million Dollars (\$5,000,000)" in (1); deleted "the provisions" following "Any loans made under" in the first sentence of (2); and made minor stylistic changes in (3).

§ 61-3-61. Exemption from taxation of interest on bonds and notes.

The accomplishment of the purposes stated in this chapter being for the benefit of the people of this state and for the improvement of their properties and industries, the authority, in carrying out the purposes of this chapter, will

be performing an essential public function, and the interest on the bonds and notes issued hereunder shall at all times be free from taxation within this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

Cross References — Authorization for short term borrowing by airport authorities, see § 61-3-60.

§ 61-3-63. Factors to be considered by authority in determining cost of project.

In determining the amount to be expended for a project pursuant to this chapter, the authority may include the engineering, legal, fiscal, architectural, inspection, recording, printing, publishing and related cost of the acquisition, construction or reconstruction of the property or improvement to be financed, including interest during construction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-40; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 10; Laws, 1969, Ex. Sess. ch. 35, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved October 7, 1969).

§ 61-3-65. Exercise of incidental powers; issuance of general obligation municipal bonds for airport facilities; adoption of rules and regulations for management of airports.

In addition to the general and special powers conferred by this chapter, every authority is authorized to exercise such powers as are necessarily incidental to the exercise of such general and special powers.

The governing authority of each municipality, as defined herein, shall have the authority to issue general obligation bonds of the municipality, as defined herein, for the purposes set out in Sections 61-5-17 and 19-9-1(j). For the purposes of this chapter, the portion of the county, being a supervisors district or supervisors districts, or that portion of the county lying outside the territorial boundary of the other participating municipalities, shall constitute a special taxing district and for all purposes under this chapter, taxes may be levied upon the property therein and such territory shall be considered a municipality for the issuance of bonds for the purposes of this chapter. Bonds issued pursuant to authority contained in this section shall, if issued by a city, town or village, be issued in conformity with the uniform system for the issuance of municipal bonds, as set out in Sections 21-33-301 through 21-33-329, inclusive, and, if issued by a special taxing district, be issued by the board of supervisors of the county, and shall be issued in conformity with the uniform system for the issuance of county bonds, being Sections 19-9-1 through 19-9-31, inclusive.

The regional airport authority shall have the power and authority to adopt all rules and regulations appropriate to the management of the airport and the activities conducted thereon, including the establishment of all rules and regulations with respect to automobiles and other traffic, the storage and disposition of property, including automobiles, and the disposition thereof of any unclaimed vehicles within a reasonable time. Such rules and regulations shall be posted in an accessible place at the airport terminal and shall be enforced by the courts of the county in which the airport is located.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-48; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 18; Laws, 1978, ch. 362, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Cross References — Purposes for issuance of county bonds, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq. Uniform system for issuance of municipal bonds, see §§ 21-33-301 et seq. Issuance of bonds for financing acquisition costs and improvements, see § 61-5-17.

§ 61-3-67. Joint operations; authorization.

For the purposes of Sections 61-3-67 through 61-3-75, unless otherwise qualified, the term “public agency” includes municipality and authority, each as defined in this chapter, any agency of the state government and of the United States, and any municipality, political subdivision and agency of an adjoining state. The term “governing body” includes the commissioners of an authority, the governing body of a municipality, and the head of an agency of a state or the United States if the public agency is other than an authority or municipality.

All powers, privileges, and authority granted by this chapter may be exercised and enjoyed by an authority jointly with any public agency of this state, and jointly with any public agency of any adjoining state or of the United States to the extent that the laws of such other state or of the United States permit such joint exercise of enjoyment. Any agency of the state government, when acting jointly with any authority, may exercise and enjoy all the powers, privileges, and authority conferred by this chapter upon an authority.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-44; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 14.

Cross References — Joint operations under municipal airport law, see §§ 61-5-33 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity of agreements.

Circuit court erred in ruling a joint operations agreement between a Mississippi city and a Louisiana city and parish to create an airport was invalid since the city had not first created a separate cor-

porate authority under either Miss. Code Ann. §§ 61-3-5 or 61-3-7; under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 61-3-67 and 61-3-69, no such intermediary was needed. *Falco Lime, Inc. v. Mayor of Vicksburg*, 836 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 2002).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 91.

§ 61-3-69. Joint operations; agreement.

Any two or more public agencies may enter into agreements with each other for joint action pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-3-67. Each agreement shall specify its duration, the proportionate interest which each public agency shall have in the property, facilities, and privileges involved in the joint undertaking, the proportion of costs of operation, etc., to be borne by each public agency, and such other terms as are deemed necessary or required by law. The agreement may also provide for amendments and termination; disposal of all or any of the property, facilities, and privileges jointly owned, prior to or at such time as said property, facilities, and privileges, or any part thereof, cease to be used for the purposes provided in this chapter, or upon termination of the agreement; the distribution of the proceeds received upon any disposal, and of any funds or other property jointly owned and undisposed of; the assumption or payment of any indebtedness arising from the joint undertaking which remains unpaid upon the disposal of all assets or upon a termination of the agreement; and such other provisions as may be necessary or convenient.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-44; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 14.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS**1. Validity of agreements.**

Circuit court erred in ruling a joint operations agreement between a Mississippi city and a Louisiana city and parish to create an airport was invalid since the city had not first created a separate cor-

porate authority under either Miss. Code Ann. §§ 61-3-5 or 61-3-7; under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 61-3-67 and 61-3-69, no such intermediary was needed. *Falco Lime, Inc. v. Mayor of Vicksburg*, 836 So. 2d 711 (Miss. 2002).

§ 61-3-71. Joint operations; joint board generally.

Public agencies acting jointly pursuant to Section 61-3-67 shall create a joint board which shall consist of members appointed by the governing body of each participating public agency. The number to be appointed, their term and compensation, if any, shall be provided for in the joint agreement. Each joint board shall organize, select officers for such terms as are fixed by the agreement, and adopt and amend, from time to time, rules for its own procedure. The joint board shall have power, as agent of the participating public agencies, to plan, acquire, establish, develop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, lease, regulate, protect, and police any airport or other air navigation facility, airport hazard or other airport property, real or personal, to be jointly acquired, controlled, and operated and to lease any property, real or personal, inside or outside the boundaries of an airport or airport site as it may deem necessary to carry out its duties. The board may be

authorized by the participating public agencies to exercise on behalf of its constituent public agencies all the powers of each with respect to the airport, air navigation facility, airport hazard, or other airport property, real or personal, subject to the limitations of Section 61-3-73.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-44; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 14; Laws, 1985, ch. 447, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 29, 1985).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Membership of Airport Board, owned jointly by City and County, may be increased from five (5) to seven (7) members provided agreement is lawfully and properly amended to reflect same; however,

official acts of board can be taken only at official meeting with majority of members present. Seals, August 22, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0629.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 90 et seq.

§ 61-3-73. Joint operations; limitation of powers of joint board.

The total expenditures to be made by the joint board for any purpose in any calendar year shall be as determined by a budget approved by the constituent public agencies on or before the preceding October 1st, or as otherwise specifically authorized by the constituent public agencies.

No airport, air navigation facility, airport hazard, or real or personal property, the cost of which is in excess of sums fixed therefor by the joint agreement or allotted in the annual budget, may be acquired, established, or developed by the joint board without the approval of the governing bodies of its constituent public agencies.

Eminent domain proceedings may be instituted by the joint board only by authority of the governing bodies of the constituent public agencies of the joint board. If so authorized, such proceedings shall be instituted in the names of the constituent public agencies jointly, and the property so acquired shall be held by said public agencies as tenants in common.

The joint board shall not dispose of any airport, air navigation facility, or real property under its jurisdiction except with the consent of the governing bodies of its constituent public agencies. However, the joint board may, without such consent, enter into contracts, leases, or other arrangements contemplated by Section 61-3-21.

Any resolutions, rules, regulations, or orders of the joint board dealing with subjects authorized by Section 61-3-23 shall become effective only upon approval of the governing bodies of the constituent public agencies. Upon such approval, the resolutions, rules, regulations, or orders of the joint board shall have the same force and effect in the territories or jurisdictions involved as the

ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations, or orders of each public agency would have in its own territory or jurisdiction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-44; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 14.

§ 61-3-75. Joint operations; joint fund.

For the purpose of providing the joint board with moneys for the necessary expenditures in carrying out the provisions of Sections 61-3-67 through 61-3-75, a joint fund shall be created and maintained into which shall be deposited the share of each of the constituent public agencies as provided by the joint agreement. Any federal, state, or other grants, contributions, or loans, and the revenues obtained from the joint ownership, control, and operation of any airport or air navigation facility under the jurisdiction of the joint board, shall be paid into the joint fund. Disbursements from such fund shall be made by order of the board, subject to the limitations prescribed in Section 61-3-73.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-44; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 14.

§ 61-3-77. Exemption from taxation of airport property and income.

Any property in this state acquired by an authority for airport purposes pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, and any income derived by the authority from the ownership, operation, or control thereof, shall be exempt from taxation to the same extent as other property belonging to political subdivisions of this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-46; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 15.

Cross References — Items excluded from definition of “gross income” under Income Tax Law, see § 27-7-15.

Exemption of property belonging to political subdivisions from taxation, see § 27-31-1.

§ 61-3-79. Municipal cooperation with authority.

For the purpose of aiding and cooperating in the planning, undertaking, construction, or operation of airports and air navigation facilities pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, any municipality for which an authority has been created may, upon such terms, with or without consideration, as it may determine:

- (a) Lend or donate money to the authority;
- (b) Provide that all or a portion of the taxes or funds available or to become available to, or required by law to be used by, the municipality for airport purposes, be transferred or paid directly to the airport authority as such funds become available to the municipality;
- (c) Cause water, sewer, or drainage facilities, or any other facilities which it is empowered to provide, to be furnished adjacent to or in connection with such airports or air navigation facilities;

(d) Dedicate, sell, convey, or lease any of its interest in any property, or grant easements, licenses, or any other rights or privileges therein to the authority;

(e) Furnish, dedicate, close, pave, install, grade, regrade, plan or replan streets, roads, roadways, and walks from established streets or roads to such airports or air navigation facilities;

(f) Do any and all things, whether or not specifically authorized in this section and not otherwise prohibited by law, that are necessary or convenient to aid and cooperate with the authority in the planning, undertaking, construction, or operation of airports and air navigation facilities; and

(g) Enter into agreements with the authority respecting action to be taken by the municipality pursuant to the provisions of this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-47; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 17.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 61-3-79 authorizes municipality which has created airport authority to lend or donate money to airport authority; therefore, city may, in its discretion, provide health insurance for employees of airport authority who in turn reimburse city for their premiums, provided insurer consents to inclusion of such nonmunicipal employees within its policy coverage. Primeaux, Apr. 7, 1993. A.G. Op. #93-0201.

Subsection (d) authorizes a municipality to lease property to an airport authority for use as airport property, but does not authorize a municipality to lease a street leading to the airport to the airport authority for purposes of maintenance or landscaping of the street by the airport authority. Faneca, Sept. 7, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0459.

§ 61-3-81. Effect of chapter upon municipal airport zoning regulation.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit any right, power, or authority of a municipality to regulate airport hazards by zoning.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-49; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 19.

Cross References — Airport zoning law, see § 61-7-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

§ 61-3-83. Acquisition, etc., of airports, air navigation facilities, etc.; tort liability.

The acquisition of any land, or interest therein, pursuant to this chapter, the planning, acquisition, establishment, development, construction, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, regulation and protection of air-

ports and air navigation facilities, including the acquisition or elimination of airport hazards, and the exercise of any other powers granted in this chapter to authorities and other public agencies, to be severally or jointly exercised, are hereby declared to be public and governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose and matters of public necessity. All land and other property and privileges acquired and used by or on behalf of any authority or other public agency in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in this chapter shall and are hereby declared to be acquired and used for public and governmental purposes and as a matter of public necessity.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-45; Laws, 1958, ch. 230, § 15; Laws, 1983, ch. 528; Laws, 1984, ch. 495, § 31; reenacted and amended, 1985, ch. 474, § 30; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 43; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 44; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 41; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 39; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 40; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 40; Laws, 1992, ch. 491 § 42, eff from and after passage (approved May 12, 1992).

Cross References — Immunity of state and political subdivisions from liability and suit for torts and torts of its employees, see §§ 11-46-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Bailment and service contract.
3. Immunity.

1. In general.

The power to maintain and operate an airport being expressly vested in the municipality, such power would also include, as necessary and ancillary thereto, the power to contract with owners of airplanes to furnish them parking and tying-down facilities at the airport. *City of Jackson v. Brummett*, 224 Miss. 501, 80 So. 2d 827 (1955). But see *Anderson ex rel. Doss v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.*, 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982), answer to certified question conformed to, 691 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982).

2. Bailment and service contract.

Where a municipality has the power to contract with owners of airplanes to fur-

nish them parking and tying-down facilities at the airport, an agreement of the general manager of the airport to park and tie down plane was a valid bailment and service contract. *City of Jackson v. Brummett*, 224 Miss. 501, 80 So. 2d 827 (1955). But see *Anderson ex rel. Doss v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.*, 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982), answer to certified question conformed to, 691 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982).

3. Immunity.

Omission in Airport Authorities Law of any provision for immunity in tort continued in effect the rule that an Airport Authority has no immunity from suit arising out of propriety or corporate functions. *Anderson ex rel. Doss v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.*, 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982), answer to certified question conformed to, 691 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. 1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts, Sovereign Im-

munity as a Defense to Tort Liability. 53 Miss. L. J. 171, March, 1983.

§ 61-3-85. Certain persons prohibited from deriving income from issuance of bonds.

No member of the Legislature, elected official or appointed official, or any partner or associate of any member of the Legislature, elected official or appointed official, shall derive any income from the issuance of any bonds under Sections 61-3-35, 61-3-39, 61-3-41, 61-3-45, 61-3-51, or 61-3-53 contrary to the provisions of Section 109, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, or Article 3, Chapter 4, Title 25, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Laws, 1991, ch. 520, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1991).

CHAPTER 4

Mississippi Wayport Authority Act

SEC.

- 61-4-1. Short title.
- 61-4-3. Legislative findings and declarations.
- 61-4-5. Definitions.
- 61-4-7. Division of Mississippi Wayport Authority created within Office of the Governor; executive director; advisory council.
- 61-4-9. Submission of site proposal.
- 61-4-11. General powers and duties of Authority.
- 61-4-13. Construction of chapter.

§ 61-4-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Mississippi Wayport Authority Act.”

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

Cross References — Ad valorem taxation exemption for project of facility related to Mississippi Wayport Authority Act, see § 27-31-35.

§ 61-4-3. Legislative findings and declarations.

The Legislature hereby finds and declares that:

(a) There exists in the State of Mississippi a continuing need for gainful employment for the citizens of this state.

(b) The concept of building four (4) to six (6) giant, new airports in remote or sparsely populated areas of the country for connecting operations in order to take the pressure off capacity-troubled metropolitan airports is gaining increasing support from a variety of aviation officials, including the Federal Aviation Administration. Such facilities, called “wayports,” would cater to connecting and transit traffic, leaving capacity-constrained airports such as Atlanta, St. Louis and Chicago available for increased origin-and-destination traffic. The airports would have 15,000-foot-long runways and be ideal ports for 21st Century air traffic and modern aircraft.

(c) Air space over state-owned land at Parchman, Mississippi, is free of air traffic patterns, making the location ideal for such a “wayport” in the Southeast. Congress soon will order the U.S. Department of Transportation to study the concept, and then, if approved, to fund much of the airports’ costs with the financially sound Federal Aviation Trust Fund.

(d) The Delta’s rural, state-owned land at Parchman and central location could make Mississippi among the most attractive sites for a wayport. Most of the sprawling state-owned land in Sunflower County is rented out for farming. As selling points, there are existing highway systems, such as U.S. 49 W. and Mississippi 32, and plenty of land that would not require much preparation for development.

(e) The wayport concept is a tremendous opportunity to ask the U.S. Congress to recognize the economic problems of rural areas.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

§ 61-4-5. Definitions.

Words and phrases used in this chapter shall have meanings as follows, unless the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

(a) “Act” means the Mississippi Wayport Authority Act as originally enacted or as hereafter amended.

(b) “Authority” means the Mississippi Wayport Authority created pursuant to this chapter.

(c) “Facility related to the project” means and includes any of the following, as the same may pertain to the project: (i) facilities to provide potable and industrial water supply systems and sewage and waste disposal systems to the site of the project; (ii) airports, airfields and air terminals; (iii) rail lines; (iv) port facilities; (v) highways, streets and other roadways; (vi) public school buildings, classrooms and instructional facilities, including any functionally related facilities; (vii) parks, outdoor recreation facilities and athletic facilities; and (viii) auditoriums, pavilions, campgrounds, art centers, cultural centers, folklore centers and other public facilities.

(d) “Person” means any natural person, corporation, association, partnership, receiver, trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, fiduciary, governmental unit, public agency, political subdivision, or any other group acting as a unit, and the plural as well as the singular.

(e) “Project” means the 21st Century Airport and Airspace System, known as the “Wayport Concept,” being considered as an interdepartmental concept by the U.S. Department of Transportation, as described in “The Wayports Concept” issued by the Federal Aviation Administration, as now or hereafter supplemented or amended, together with all real property required for construction, maintenance and operation of a wayport facility for the Southeastern United States within the State of Mississippi, and all buildings, tunneling and other supporting land and facilities required or useful for construction, maintenance and operation of the Mississippi Wayport.

(f) “Project area” means the project site, estimated to require up to twenty-five thousand (25,000) acres of land for four (4) runways of fifteen thousand (15,000) feet, to be conveyed to the federal or state government agency or creation thereof, whether or not such area or territory be contiguous. “Project site” means the real property to be conveyed to the federal or state government agency or creation thereof as set forth in the application to be filed with the federal government agency, or creation thereof, by the Authority.

(g) “Public agency” means and includes: (i) the state and any department, board, commission, institution or other agency or instrumentality of

the state, including but not limited to, the Mississippi Department of Economic Development and the Mississippi Aeronautics Commission or its successor; (ii) any city, town, county, political subdivision, school district or other district created or existing under the laws of the state or any public agency of any such city, town, county, political subdivision or district; (iii) any department, commission, agency or instrumentality of the United States of America; and (iv) any other state of the United States of America which may be cooperating with respect to location of the project within the state, or any agency thereof.

(h) "State" means State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

Editor's Note — Section 57-1-54 provides that the term "Mississippi Department of Economic Development" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

§ 61-4-7. Division of Mississippi Wayport Authority created within Office of the Governor; executive director; advisory council.

(1) There is created within the Office of the Governor a division to be known as the "Mississippi Wayport Authority" for the performance of essential public functions. The Governor shall appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, an executive director, who shall serve at the will and pleasure of the Governor. The Governor shall prescribe the duties of and fix the compensation of such executive director. The executive director shall have the authority to employ and dismiss employees of the Authority.

(2) The executive director shall administer, manage and direct the affairs and business of the Authority, subject to the policies, direction, control and approval of the Governor.

(3) The Mississippi Department of Economic and Community Development shall cooperate with and provide any needed technical assistance to effectuate the duties of the Mississippi Wayport Authority.

(4) There is hereby established a Mississippi Wayport Authority Advisory Council which shall act in a purely advisory capacity to the executive director of the Authority. The council shall be composed of the Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Economic and Community Development, the chief executive officer of the Institute for Technology Development, or his designee, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, three (3) Senators appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, three (3) House members appointed by the Speaker of the House, a representative of the Delta Council appointed by the Governor from the membership of the Delta Council, and one (1) member appointed by the Governor from each congressional district as such districts existed on January 1, 1989. The legislative members thereof shall report the actions of the Authority to the appropriate legislative committees.

The advisory council shall meet upon the call of the Lieutenant Governor. The advisory council shall have no jurisdiction or vote on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Authority. When the Legislature is not in session, legislative members may be paid per diem and all actual and necessary expenses, including mileage expenses, from their respective contingent expense funds at the rate authorized for committee meetings when the Legislature is not in session; however, no per diem and expenses will be paid legislative members when the Legislature is in session. The Authority may reimburse non-legislative members funds for their expenses and per diem. The terms of the elected members of the advisory council shall expire at the end of their terms of office. Non-elected members shall serve for terms concurrent with the appointing Governor or as long as they hold the position by which they are entitled to ex officio membership on the advisory council.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

Editor's Note — Section 57-1-2 provides that executive director of the Mississippi Department of Economic Development shall mean the executive officer of the Mississippi Department of Economic and Community Development.

Section 57-1-54 provides that the term "Mississippi Department of Economic Development" shall mean the "Department of Economic and Community Development".

§ 61-4-9. Submission of site proposal.

The Authority is hereby designated and empowered to act on behalf of the state in submitting a siting proposal for the project. If the Authority is not operational as of the date of the proposal, the Governor is authorized to submit the proposal. The Authority is empowered to take all steps appropriate or necessary to effect the siting, development, and operation of the Southeastern United States Wayport facility within the state. If the state is selected as the preferred site for the project, the Authority is hereby designated and empowered to act on behalf of the state and to represent the state in the planning, financing, development, construction and operation of the project or any facility related to the project, with the concurrence of the affected public agency. The Authority shall take affirmative steps to coordinate fully all aspects of the submission of a siting proposal for the project and, if the state is selected as the preferred site, to coordinate fully the development of the project or any facility related to the project with the federal government agency or creation thereof, the Lower Mississippi Delta Commission and other public agencies; however, the development of the project or any facility related to the project by the Authority may be done only with the concurrence of the affected public agency. Other state agencies and local governmental entities in this state shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible to effectuate the duties of the Authority.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

§ 61-4-11. General powers and duties of Authority.

The Authority, in addition to any and all powers now or hereafter granted to it, is hereby empowered:

(a) To maintain an office at a place or places in the state.

(b) To employ or contract with architects, engineers, attorneys, accountants, construction and financial experts and such other advisors, consultants and agents as may be necessary in its judgment and to fix and pay their compensation.

(c) To make such applications and enter into such contracts for financial assistance as may be appropriate under applicable federal or state law.

(d) To apply for, accept and utilize grants, gifts and other funds or aid from any source for any purpose contemplated by this chapter, and to comply, subject to the provisions of this chapter, with the terms and conditions thereof.

(e) To acquire by purchase, lease, gift, or in other manner other than by eminent domain, or obtain options to acquire, and to own, maintain, use, operate and convey any and all property of any kind, real, personal, or mixed, or any interest or estate therein, (including easements, rights-of-way, air rights or subsurface rights, or a stratified fee estate in a specified volume of land located below, at, or above the surface) within or without the project area, necessary or convenient for the project or any facility related to the project or necessary or convenient for any enhancement offered to secure the siting of the project in the state or for the exercise of the powers granted by this chapter.

(f) To acquire by purchase or lease any public lands and public property, including sixteenth section lands and lieu lands, and including not more than fifteen thousand (15,000) acres of state-owned land at Parchman, Sunflower County, Mississippi, within the project area, which are necessary or convenient for the project. Sixteenth section lands or lieu lands acquired under this chapter shall be deemed to be acquired for the purposes of industrial development thereon and such acquisition will serve a higher public interest in accordance with the purposes of this chapter. With the approval of the Secretary of State and the assistance of the Office of Attorney General, any part of, up to fifteen thousand (15,000) acres of state-owned land at Parchman may either be dedicated for the project, leased or sold to the federal or state government agency or creation thereof for a nominal consideration, or may be managed by the Authority for the purposes specified in this chapter.

(g) To make or cause to be made such examinations and surveys as may be necessary to the planning, design, construction and operation of the project; and for such purpose the Authority, its agents, servants, or any public agency involved in the project selection, design, construction or operation, shall have immediate and full right of entry upon the lands and waters of any person for the purposes of survey and exploration.

(h) From and after the date of notification to the Authority by the federal government agency or creation thereof that the state has been finally

selected as the site of the project, with the concurrence of the affected public agency, to acquire by condemnation and to own, maintain, use, operate and convey or otherwise dispose of any and all property of any kind, real, personal or mixed, or any interest or estate therein, (including easements, rights-of-way, air rights or subsurface rights, or a stratified fee estate in a specified volume of land located below, at, or above the surface), within the project area, necessary or convenient for the project or any facility related to the project and the exercise of the powers granted by this chapter, according to the procedures provided by Chapter 27, Title 11, Mississippi Code of 1972, except as modified by this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, the right of eminent domain shall be superior and dominant to the right of eminent domain of other public agencies and of railroad, telephone, telegraph, gas, power and other companies or corporations and shall extend to public and private lands including sixteenth section lands. The amount and character of interest in land, other property, and easements thus to be acquired shall be determined by the Authority, and its determination shall be conclusive and shall not be subject to attack in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion or fraud on the part of the Authority in making such determination. However,

(i) In acquiring lands by condemnation, the Authority shall not acquire minerals or royalties in minerals unless a competent registered professional engineer shall have certified that the acquisition of such minerals and royalties in minerals is necessary for purposes of the project; provided that limestone, clay, chalk, sand and gravel shall not be considered as minerals within the meaning of this section; and

(ii) Unless minerals or royalties in minerals have been acquired by condemnation or otherwise, no person or persons owning the drilling rights or the right to share in production of minerals shall be prevented from exploring, developing, or producing oil or gas with necessary rights-of-way for ingress and egress, pipelines and other means of transporting interests on any land or interest therein of the Authority held or used for the purposes of this chapter; but any such activities shall be under such reasonable regulation by the Authority as will adequately protect the project contemplated by this chapter as provided in subparagraph (s) of this section. For the purpose of acquiring by condemnation land and easements for the project or any facility related to the project located within the project area, the Authority shall have the right of immediate possession pursuant to Sections 11-27-81 through 11-27-89, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(i) In any proceeding in any court which has been or may be instituted by and in the name of the Authority for the acquisition of any land or easement or right-of-way in land for the public use as provided in subparagraph (h) of this section, the Authority may file in the cause, with the petition or at any time before judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the Authority, declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the Authority in connection with the location of the project. Said declaration of taking shall contain or have annexed thereto:

(i) A statement of the statutory authority under which and the public use for which said lands are taken.

(ii) A description of the lands taken sufficient for the identification thereof.

(iii) A statement of the estate or interest in said lands taken for said public use.

(iv) A statement of the necessity of the immediate vesting of title in the Authority in order to convey such property to the United States for the use in connection with the project.

(v) A statement of the sum of money estimated by the Authority to be due compensation for the land taken. Upon filing the declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in the declaration, title to such lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in the declaration, shall vest in the Authority, and such lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the Authority, and the right to due compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto; and compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in the proceeding and established by judgment therein, and the judgment shall include, as part of the due compensation awarded, interest in accordance with law on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking, from such date to the date of payment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the court. No sum so paid into the court shall be charged with commissions or poundage.

Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court may order that the money deposited in the court, or any part thereof, be paid forthwith for or on account of the due compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. If the compensation finally awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the amount of the money so received by any person entitled, the court shall enter judgment against the Authority for the amount of the deficiency.

Upon the filing of a declaration of taking, the court shall have power to fix the time within which and the terms upon which the parties in possession shall be required to surrender possession to the petitioner. The court shall have power to make such orders in respect of encumbrances, liens, rents, taxes, assessments, insurance, and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. No appeal in any cause under this subparagraph (i) of this section nor any bond or undertaking given therein shall operate to prevent or delay the vesting of title to such lands in the Authority.

(j) With the concurrence of the affected public agency, to construct and maintain or require the necessary relocation or rerouting of roads and highways, railroad, telephone and telegraph lines and properties, electric power lines, pipelines and related facilities, or to require the anchoring or other protection of any of these, provided due compensation is paid to the owners thereof or agreement is had with such owners regarding the payment

of the cost of such relocation, and to acquire by condemnation or otherwise easements or rights-of-way for such relocation or rerouting and to convey the same to the owners of the facilities being relocated or rerouted in connection with the purposes of this chapter.

(k) To require the necessary relocation of cemeteries and to pay all reasonable costs thereof.

(l) To perform or have performed any and all acts and make all payments necessary to comply with all applicable federal laws, rules or regulations including but not limited to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4601, 4602, 4621 to 4638, and 4651 to 4655) and relocation rules and regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation.

(m) To construct, extend, improve, maintain, and reconstruct, to cause to be constructed, extended, improved, maintained and reconstructed, and to use and operate any and all components of the project or any facility related to the project, within the project area, necessary or convenient to the project and to the exercise of such powers, rights and privileges granted the Authority.

(n) To incur or defray any designated portion of the cost of any component of the project or any facility related to the project acquired or constructed by any public agency.

(o) To lease, sell, give, donate, convey or otherwise transfer any or all property acquired by the Authority under the provisions of this chapter to the federal or state government agency or creation thereof, their successors or assigns, and in connection therewith to pay the costs of title search, perfection of title, title insurance and recording fees as may be required. The Authority shall provide in the instrument conveying such property a provision reserving all minerals, other than limestone, clay, chalk, sand and gravel and a provision that such property shall revert to the Authority if, as and when the property is declared by the federal government agency or creation thereof to be no longer needed for the Wayport facility.

(p) To enter into contracts with any person, public agency or political subdivision in furtherance of any of the purposes authorized by this chapter upon such consideration as the Authority and such person, public agency or political subdivision may agree. Any such contract may extend over any period of time, notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, may be upon such terms as the parties thereto shall agree. Any such contract shall be binding upon the parties thereto according to its terms. Such contracts may include an agreement to reimburse the federal government agency or creation thereof, its successors and assigns for any assistance provided by the federal government agency or creation thereof in the acquisition of real property for the project or any facility related to the project.

(q) To establish and maintain reasonable rates and charges for the use of any facility within the project area owned or operated by the Authority, and from time to time to adjust such rates and to impose penalties for failure to pay such rates and charges when due.

(r) To make and enforce, and from time to time amend and repeal, rules and regulations for the construction, use, maintenance and operation of any facility related to the project under its management and control and any other of its properties.

(s) To adopt and enforce with the concurrence of the affected public agency all necessary and reasonable rules and regulations to carry out and effectuate the implementation of the project and any land use plan or zoning classification adopted for the project area, including but not limited to rules, regulations, and restrictions concerning mining, construction, excavation or any other activity the occurrence of which may endanger the structure or operation of the project. Such rules may be enforced within the project area and without the project area as necessary to protect the structure and operation of the project. The Authority is authorized to plan or replan, zone or rezone, and make exceptions to any regulations, whether local or state, which are inconsistent with the design, planning, construction or operation of the project and facilities related to the project.

(t) To plan, design, coordinate and implement measures and programs to mitigate impacts on the natural environment caused by the project or any facility related to the project.

(u) To assist any public agency involved with the project design, construction or operation in securing any state or local permits and approval required for the project or any facility related to the project.

(v) To do any and all things necessary or convenient to carry out the Authority's purposes and to exercise the powers given and granted in this chapter.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

Federal Aspects — Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 USCS §§ 4601, 4602, 4621 to 4638, and 4651 to 4655.

§ 61-4-13. Construction of chapter.

The provisions of this chapter are cumulative of other statutes now or hereafter enacted relating to the Authority, and the Authority may exercise all presently held powers in the furtherance of this chapter. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, section or part of the provisions of this chapter shall be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder thereof directly involved in the controversy in which judgment shall have been rendered.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 535, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1989).

CHAPTER 5

Acquisition, Disposition and Support of Airport Facilities

Municipal Airport Law	61-5-1
Support of Airport Facilities for State University and Colleges	61-5-71
Lease of Facilities by Certain Municipalities	61-5-91

MUNICIPAL AIRPORT LAW

SEC.

61-5-1.	Short title.
61-5-3.	Definitions.
61-5-5.	General powers of municipalities as to establishment, acquisition, operation, etc., of airports and air navigation facilities.
61-5-7.	Exercise of power of eminent domain.
61-5-9.	Disposal of airport property.
61-5-11.	Operation and use privileges; exemption from taxation.
61-5-13.	Promulgation, etc., of ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations and orders; enforcement.
61-5-15.	Acceptance, etc., of federal and state aid; designation of agent.
61-5-17.	Bond issues for financing facility costs.
61-5-19.	Authority to contract.
61-5-21.	Incidental powers.
61-5-23.	Validation of prior acquisitions and actions.
61-5-25.	Delegation of municipal authority to airport board or other agency.
61-5-27.	Liens in favor of municipality.
61-5-29.	Appropriation of funds; taxation.
61-5-31.	Disposition of airport revenues.
61-5-33.	Joint operations; authorization.
61-5-35.	Joint operations; agreement.
61-5-37.	Joint operations; joint board generally.
61-5-39.	Joint operations; limitations of powers of joint board.
61-5-41.	Joint operations; joint fund.
61-5-43.	Exemption from taxation of airport property and income.
61-5-45.	Effect of law upon municipal airport zoning regulation.
61-5-47.	Acquisition, etc. of airports, air navigation facilities, etc.; tort liability.
61-5-49.	Interpretation and construction.

§ 61-5-1. Short title.

Sections 61-5-1 through 61-5-49 may be cited as the "Municipal Airport Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-23; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 23.

Cross References — Airport authorities law, see §§ 61-3-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. 1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts, Sovereign Immunity as a Defense to Tort Liability. 53 Miss. L. J. 171, March 1983.

§ 61-5-3. Definitions.

As used in the Municipal Airport Law, unless the text otherwise requires:

(a) "Airport" means any area of land or water which is used, or intended for use, for the landing and taking off of aircraft, and any appurtenant areas which are used, or intended for use, for airport buildings or other airport facilities or rights of way, or for other appropriate purposes, including buffer areas and areas for airport compatible development, together with all buildings and facilities located thereon.

(b) "Airport hazard" means any structure, object of natural growth, or use of land which obstructs the airspace required for the flight of aircraft in landing or taking-off at an airport or is otherwise hazardous to such landing or taking-off of aircraft.

(c) "Air navigation facility" means any facility, other than one owned and operated by the United States, used in, available for use in, or designed for use in, aid of air navigation, including any structures, mechanisms, lights, beacons, markers, communicating systems, or other instrumentalities, or devices used or useful as an aid, or constituting an advantage or convenience, to the safe taking-off, navigation, and landing of aircraft, or the safe and efficient operation or maintenance of an airport, and any combination of any or all of such facilities.

(d) "Joint airport board" shall mean a joint airport board created pursuant to Section 61-5-35.

(e) "Municipal airport board" shall mean a municipal airport board created pursuant to Section 61-5-25.

(f) "Municipality" means any county, city, village, town, supervisors district or supervisors districts of this state. "Municipal" means pertaining to a municipality as herein defined.

(g) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or body politic, and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee or other similar representative thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-01; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 335, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 13, 2004.)

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected typographical errors in (a), (d), and (e). The word "take-off" has been changed to "taking off" in (a), and the word "section" has been changed to "Section" in (d) and (e). The Joint Committee ratified the corrections at its July 8, 2004 meeting.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment placed the definitions in alphabetical order; and in (a), inserted "or for other appropriate purposes, including buffer areas and areas for airport compatible development."

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of United States for negligence of air traffic controller. 46 A.L.R. Fed. 24.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 2.
CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 3 et seq.

§ 61-5-5. General powers of municipalities as to establishment, acquisition, operation, etc., of airports and air navigation facilities.

Every municipality is authorized, out of any appropriations or other moneys made available for such purposes, to plan, establish, develop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regulate, protect and police airports and air navigation facilities, either within or without the territorial limits of such municipality including the construction, installation, equipment, maintenance and operation at such airports of buildings and other facilities for the servicing of aircraft or for the comfort and accommodation of air travelers, and the purchase and sale of supplies, goods and commodities as an incident to the operation of its airport properties. For such purposes the municipality may use any available property that it may now or hereafter own or control and may, by purchase, gift, devise, lease, eminent domain proceedings or otherwise, acquire property, real or personal, or any interest therein including easements in airport hazards or land outside the boundaries of an airport or airport site, as are necessary to permit safe and efficient operation of the airport or to permit the removal, elimination, obstruction marking or obstruction lighting of airport hazards or to prevent the establishment of airport hazards.

The municipality may by purchase, gift, devise, lease, eminent domain proceedings or otherwise, acquire existing airports and air navigation facilities. However, it shall not acquire or take over any airport or air navigation facility owned or controlled by another municipality or public agency without the consent of such municipality or public agency.

All air navigation facilities established or operated by municipalities shall be supplementary to and coordinated in design and operation with those established and operated by the federal and state governments.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-02; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 2.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the last paragraph. The word “co-ordinated” was changed to “coordinated”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 20, 1998 meeting, and the section has been reprinted in the supplement to reflect the corrected language.

Cross References — General jurisdiction and powers of counties, see § 19-3-41.

General powers of municipalities, see § 21-17-1.

Approval of airport sites and issuance of certificates of approval, see § 61-1-31.

Acquisition of airport by county, see § 61-5-73.

Acquisition of airport by municipality, see § 61-5-75.

Lease of municipal airport facilities to private concerns in certain municipalities, see § 61-5-91.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 90
et seq.

§ 61-5-7. Exercise of power of eminent domain.

In the acquisition of property by eminent domain proceedings authorized by the Municipal Airport Law, the municipality shall proceed in the manner provided by Chapter 27 of Title 11, Mississippi Code of 1972, and as elsewhere provided by law. For the purpose of making surveys and examinations relative to any eminent domain proceedings, it shall be lawful to enter upon the land, doing no unnecessary damage. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute or other law, the municipality may take possession of any property to be acquired by eminent domain proceedings at any time after the commencement of such proceedings upon a specific finding by the municipality of the public necessity for the immediate acquisition of the property pursuant to Section 11-27-81 et seq., and compliance with all provisions of Section 11-27-81 et seq., including the provisions for making a deposit. The municipality shall not be precluded from abandoning such proceedings at any time prior to final order and decree of the court having jurisdiction of such proceedings. The municipality shall be liable to the owner of the property for any damage done to the property during possession thereof by the municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-03; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 3; Laws, 1996, ch. 404, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References — Exercise of power of eminent domain under airport authorities law, see § 61-3-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

§ 61-5-9. Disposal of airport property.

Except as may be limited by the terms and conditions of any grant, loan, or agreement pursuant to Section 61-5-15, every municipality may by sale, lease or otherwise, dispose of any airport, air navigation facility or other property, or portion thereof or interest therein, acquired pursuant to the Municipal Airport Law. Such disposal by sale, lease, or otherwise, shall be in accordance with the laws of this state, or provisions of the charter of the municipality, governing the disposition of other property of the municipality, except that in the case of disposal to another municipality or agency of the state or federal government for aeronautical purposes incident thereto, the sale, lease, or other disposal may be effected in such manner and upon such terms as the governing body of the municipality may deem in the best interest of the municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-04; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 4.

Cross References — Power of county to dispose of its real property, see § 19-7-3. Power of municipality to dispose of its real property, see § 21-17-1. Support of university or college airport by certain municipalities, see § 21-19-59. Disposal of airport property under airport authorities law, see § 61-3-19.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq. 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation §§ 34:81 et seq.
4 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Aviation, Form 111.

§ 61-5-11. Operation and use privileges; exemption from taxation.

(1) In operating an airport or air navigation facility owned, leased or controlled by a municipality, such municipality may, except as may be limited by the terms and conditions of any grant, loan or agreement pursuant to Section 61-5-15, enter into contracts, leases and other arrangements for a term not exceeding forty (40) years with any persons:

(a) Granting the privilege of using or improving such airport or air navigation facility or any portion or facility thereof, or space therein for commercial purposes; or

(b) Conferring the privilege of supplying goods, commodities, things, services or facilities at such airport or air navigation facility; or

(c) Making available services to be furnished by the municipality or its agents at such airport or air navigation facility.

In each case the municipality may establish the terms and conditions and fix the charges, rentals or fees for the privileges or services, which shall be reasonable and uniform for the same class of privilege or service and shall be established with due regard to the property and improvements used and the expenses of operation to the municipality.

(2) Except as may be limited by the terms and conditions of any grant, loan, or agreement pursuant to Section 61-5-15, a municipality may by contract, lease or other arrangement, upon a consideration fixed by it, grant to any qualified person for a term not to exceed forty (40) years the privilege of operating, as agent of the municipality or otherwise, any airport owned or controlled by the municipality. However, no person shall be granted any authority to operate an airport other than as a public airport or to enter into any contracts, leases, or other arrangements in connection with the operation of the airport which the municipality might not have undertaken under subsection (1) of this section.

(3) All contracts, leases and other arrangements entered into pursuant to this section are deemed to serve a public and governmental purpose as a matter of public necessity; therefore, all such contracts, leases, and other arrangements, and all structures, improvements and other facilities erected, installed, constructed or located in connection therewith on an airport or air navigation facility owned or controlled by a municipality, or any portion or facility thereof or space therein, shall be free and exempt from all state, county and municipal ad valorem taxes on real property and personal property for so long as may otherwise be lawful, and the charges, rentals and fees received by a municipality in connection with such contracts, leases and other arrangements shall be deemed to be in lieu of said taxes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-05; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 5; Laws, 1992, ch. 464, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 5, 1992).

Cross References — Operation and use privileges under airport authorities law, see § 61-3-21.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Leases of municipally owned airports which are operated as public airports, structures, improvements and other facilities constructed in connection with leases are exempt from state, county and municipal ad valorem taxes on real and personal property. Woods, August 5, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0582.

Section 61-3-21 and Section 61-5-11 provide exemption from state, county and municipal taxes, including school taxes, for contracts, leases and other arrangements relating to such property when used in accordance with and for purposes stated in Section 61-3-21 and 61-5-11; leasehold interest in such property is also exempt from ad valorem taxes. Broome Aug. 30, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0467.

Upon termination of employment, each school attendance officer's unused personal leave in excess of thirty days shall be counted as creditable service for the purposes of the retirement system. See Sections 25-11-103 and 25-11-109. Leggett, October 25, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0505.

Assuming an Airport Board no longer exists, a city may, as set forth in the Municipal Airport Laws, and particularly pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-5-11, enter into a contract or lease agreement with a qualified individual to be the

fixed base operator of the County Airport. However, if it is determined that the Airport Board still exists, the same type of contract or lease may be entered into by the Airport Board as set forth in 61-3-21(2). Peeples, October 25, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0669.

Section 61-5-11 as authorizing a municipality to "lease the municipal airport to a private individual or corporation under terms granting the individual or corporation the privilege of operating the airport for profit." Peeples, October 25, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0669.

Sections 61-3-21 and 61-5-11 clearly exempt from state, county, and municipal real and personal property ad valorem taxes any structures, improvements, and other facilities which are erected, installed, or located on that leasehold and in furtherance of these statutes. Mitchell, III, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0164.

Property which is utilized as an industrial park, even if it may be owned by a municipality or municipal airport authority, is not used in connection with the airport or air navigation facility and, therefore, the exemptions provided by §§ 61-3-21(3) and 61-5-11(3) are not be available to such property. Mitchell, III, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0164.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 96 et seq.

4 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Aviation, Form 111.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation § 34:81 et seq.

§ 61-5-13. Promulgation, etc., of ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations and orders; enforcement.

A municipality, which has established or acquired or which may hereafter establish or acquire an airport or air navigation facility, is authorized to adopt, amend and repeal such reasonable ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations

and orders as it shall deem necessary for the management, government and use of such airport or air navigation facility under its control whether situated within or without the territorial limits of the municipality.

As for the enforcement thereof, the municipality, may, by ordinance or resolution, as may by law be appropriate, appoint airport guards or police, with full police powers, and fix penalties, within the limits prescribed by law, for the violation of the aforesaid ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations and orders. Said penalties shall be enforced in the same manner in which penalties prescribed by other ordinances or resolutions of the municipality are enforced. To the extent that an airport or other air navigation facility controlled and operated by a municipality is located outside the territorial limits of the municipality, it shall, subject to federal and state laws, rules and regulations, be under the jurisdiction and control of the municipality controlling or operating it, and no other municipality shall have any authority to charge or exact a license fee or occupation tax for operations thereon.

All ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations or orders which are issued by the municipality shall be kept in substantial conformity with the laws of the state or any regulations promulgated or standards established pursuant thereto, and, as nearly as may be, with the federal laws governing aeronautics and the rules, regulations and standards duly issued thereunder.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-08; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 8.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity of municipal regulation of aircraft flight paths or altitudes. 36 A.L.R.3d 1314.

§ 61-5-15. Acceptance, etc., of federal and state aid; designation of agent.

Every municipality is authorized to accept, receive, receipt for, disburse and expend federal and state monies and other monies, public or private, made available by grant or loan or both to accomplish, in whole or in part, any of the purposes of the Municipal Airport Law. All federal monies accepted under this section shall be accepted and expended by the municipality upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the United States and as are consistent with state law. All state monies accepted under this section shall be accepted and expended by the municipality upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the state. All local government monies accepted under this section shall be accepted and expended by the municipality upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the local government. Unless otherwise prescribed by the agency from which such monies were received, the chief financial officer of the municipality shall on its behalf deposit all monies received pursuant to this section and shall keep them, in separate funds designated according to the purposes for which the monies were made available, in trust for such purposes.

Every municipality is authorized to designate the Mississippi Transportation Commission as its agent to accept, receive, receipt for, and disburse federal, state and local government monies and other monies, public or private, made available by grant or loan or both, to accomplish in whole or in part, any of the purposes of the Municipal Airport Law. Every municipality is authorized to designate such commission as its agent in contracting for and supervising the planning, acquisition, development, construction, improvement, maintenance, equipment or operation of any airport or other air navigation facility. Every municipality may enter into an agreement with the commission prescribing the terms and conditions of the agency in accordance with such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the United States, if federal money is involved, and in accordance with the applicable laws of this state. All federal monies accepted under this section by such commission shall be accepted and transferred or expended by the commission upon such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the United States. All monies received by such commission pursuant to this paragraph shall be deposited in the State Treasury, and unless otherwise prescribed by the agency from which such monies were received, shall be kept in separate funds designated according to the purposes for which the monies were made available, and held by the state in trust for such purposes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 13; Laws, 1992, ch. 379, § 5; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 30, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Cross References — Acceptance of federal and state aid under airport authorities law, see § 61-3-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 93 et seq.

§ 61-5-17. Bond issues for financing facility costs.

The cost of planning and acquiring, establishing, developing, constructing, enlarging, improving, or equipping an airport or air navigation facility, or the site therefor, including buildings and other facilities incidental to the operation thereof, and the acquisition or elimination of airport hazards, may be paid for wholly or partly from the proceeds of the sale of bonds or notes of the municipality, as the governing body of the municipality shall determine. For such purposes a municipality may issue general or special obligation bonds, revenue bonds or other forms of bonds or notes, secured or unsecured, including refunding bonds, in the manner and within the limitations prescribed by the laws of this state or the charter of the municipality for the authorization and issuance of bonds or notes thereof for public purposes generally. Such bonds may be sold at public or private sale at not less than par and shall bear interest at a rate or rates as the municipality shall determine, provided that the bonds of any issue shall not bear a greater overall maximum

interest rate to maturity than that allowed in Section 75-17-101 for general obligation bonds, or Section 75-17-103 for revenue bonds, as the case may be. Any bonds or notes issued by a municipality pursuant to this section which are payable, as to principal and interest, solely from the revenues of an airport or air navigation facility (and such bonds or notes shall so state on their face), shall not constitute a debt of such municipality within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction. In any suit, action or proceeding involving the security, or the validity or enforceability, of any bond or note issued by a municipality, which bond or note states on its face that it was issued pursuant to the provision of this section and for a purpose or purposes authorized or accomplished by this section, such bond or note shall be conclusively deemed to have been issued pursuant to this section for such purpose or purposes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-10; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 10; Laws, 1976, ch. 329; Laws, 1985, ch. 477, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1985).

Cross References — Issuance of bonds under airport authorities law, see §§ 61-3-27 et seq.

Municipalities authorized to issue general obligation bonds for airport facilities, see § 61-3-65.

Limitation on the maximum interest rate to maturity on obligations issued under the provisions of this section, see § 75-17-101.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations §§ 1 et seq.

§ 61-5-19. Authority to contract.

A municipality may enter into any contracts necessary to the execution of the powers granted it, and for the purposes provided by the Municipal Airport Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-14; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 14.

§ 61-5-21. Incidental powers.

In addition to the general and special powers conferred by the Municipal Airport Law, every municipality is authorized to exercise such powers as are necessarily incidental to the exercise of such general and special powers.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-18; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 18.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Assuming an Airport Board no longer exists, a city may, as set forth in the Municipal Airport Laws, and particularly pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-5-11, enter into a contract or lease agreement with a qualified individual to be the

fixed base operator of the County Airport. However, if it is determined that the Airport Board still exists, the same type of contract or lease may be entered into by

the Airport Board as set forth in 61-3-21(2). Peeples, October 25, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0669.

§ 61-5-23. Validation of prior acquisitions and actions.

Any acquisition of property made prior to April 21, 1958, within or without the limits of any municipality, for the purposes authorized by the Municipal Airport Law, and any other action taken prior to said date by a municipality in furtherance of such purposes, including, but not limited to the making of appropriations, the expenditure of money, the incurring of debts, the acceptance and disbursement of federal, state or other grants or loans, the issuance and payment of bonds and notes, the execution of leases and contracts, which acquisition or action would have been authorized had said law been in effect at the time of such acquisition or action, is hereby ratified and made valid. All bonds and notes issued prior to said date in furtherance of purposes authorized by said law and actions ratified by this section are confirmed as legal obligations of the municipality, and, without prejudice to the general powers granted to the municipality by said law, such municipality is hereby authorized to issue further bonds and notes for such purposes up to the limit fixed in the original authorization therefor, which bonds and notes shall be legal obligations in accordance with their terms.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-11; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 11.

§ 61-5-25. Delegation of municipal authority to airport board or other agency.

Any authority vested by the Municipal Airport Law in a municipality or in the governing body thereof, for the planning, establishment, development, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, regulation, protection and policing of airports or other air navigation facilities established, owned or controlled, or to be established, owned or controlled by the municipality may be vested by resolution of the governing body of the municipality in an airport board, or other municipal agency, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed in the resolution. However, the expense of such planning, establishment, development, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, regulation, protection and policing shall be a responsibility of the municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-07; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 7.

§ 61-5-27. Liens in favor of municipality.

To enforce the payment of any charges for repairs or improvements to or storage or care of, any personal property made or furnished by the municipality or its agents in connection with the operation of an airport or air navigation facility owned or operated by the municipality, the municipality shall have

liens on such property, which shall be enforceable by the municipality as provided by law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-06; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 6.

Cross References — Enforcement of liens generally, see §§ 85-7-141 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 39.

§ 61-5-29. Appropriation of funds; taxation.

The governing body of any municipality having power to appropriate and raise money, is hereby authorized to appropriate, and to raise by taxation or otherwise, sufficient moneys to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Municipal Airport Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-09; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 9.

Cross References — Constitutional requirement that provision be made to prevent municipal corporations from abusing taxing power, see Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 80.

Constitutional directive that provision be made whereby cities and towns may encourage enterprises of public utility by exempting property for such use from municipal taxation, see Miss. Const. Art. 7, § 192.

County finance and taxation generally, see §§ 19-9-1 et seq.

Municipal finance and taxation generally, see §§ 21-33-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

§ 61-5-31. Disposition of airport revenues.

The revenues obtained by a municipality from the ownership, control or operation of any airport or air navigation facility, including proceeds from the sale of any airport or portion thereof or air navigation facility property, shall be deposited in a special fund to be designated the “_____ Airport Fund,” which revenues shall be appropriated solely to, and used by the municipality for, the purposes authorized by the Municipal Airport Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-12; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 12.

§ 61-5-33. Joint operations; authorization.

For the purposes of Sections 61-5-33 through 61-5-41, unless otherwise qualified, the term “public agency” includes municipality, as defined in Section 61-5-3, and any agency of the state government and of the United States. The term “governing body” means the governing body of a county or municipality, and the head of the agency if the public agency is other than a county or municipality. All powers, privileges and authority granted to any municipality

by the Municipal Airport Law may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with any public agency of this state, or of the United States to the extent that the laws of the United States permit such joint exercise or enjoyment. If not otherwise authorized by law, any agency of the state government when acting jointly with any municipality, may exercise and enjoy all of the powers, privileges and authority conferred by the Municipal Airport Law upon a municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 15.

Cross References — Joint operations under airport authorities law, see §§ 61-3-67 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 90.

§ 61-5-35. Joint operations; agreement.

Any two or more public agencies may enter into agreements with each other for joint action pursuant to the provisions of Section 61-5-33. Concurrent action by ordinance, resolution or otherwise of the governing bodies of the participating public agencies shall constitute joint action. Each such agreement shall specify its duration, the proportionate interest which each public agency shall have in the property, facilities and privileges involved, the proportion to be borne by each public agency of preliminary costs and costs of acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, and equipment of the airport or air navigation facility, the proportion of the expenses of maintenance, operation, regulation and protection thereof to be borne by each, and such other terms as are required by the provisions of Sections 61-5-33 through 61-5-41. The agreement may also provide for: amendments thereof, and conditions and methods of termination of the agreement; the disposal of all or any of the property, facilities and privileges jointly owned, prior to or upon said property, facilities and privileges, or any part thereof, ceasing to be used for the purposes provided in the Municipal Airport Law, or upon termination of the agreement; the distribution of the proceeds received upon any such disposal, and of any funds or other property jointly owned and undisposed of; the assumption or payment of any indebtedness arising from the joint venture which remains unpaid upon the disposal of all assets or upon a termination of the agreement; and such other provisions as may be necessary or convenient.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 15.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

An interlocal agreement was not necessary in connection with the extension of an agreement between a city and a county for the operation of a public airport as the

statute contained specific authority to enter the agreement. Bowman, Mar. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0078.

No specific limit exists on the length of an agreement between a city and a county

for the operation of a public airport, but the agreement must specify its duration. Bowman, Mar. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0078.

§ 61-5-37. Joint operations; joint board generally.

Public agencies acting jointly pursuant to Section 61-5-33 shall create a joint board which shall consist of members appointed by the governing body of each participating public agency. The number to be appointed, their term and compensation, if any, shall be provided for in the joint agreement. Each such joint board shall organize, select officers for terms to be fixed by the agreement, and adopt and amend from time to time rules for its own procedure. The joint board shall have power to plan, acquire, establish, develop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, lease, regulate, protect and police any airport or air navigation facility or airport hazard, or other airport property, real or personal, to be jointly acquired, controlled and operated and to lease any property, real or personal, inside or outside the boundaries of an airport or airport site as it may deem necessary to carry out its duties. Such board may exercise, on behalf of its constituent public agencies, all the powers of each with respect to such airport, air navigation facility or airport hazard, subject to the limitations of Section 61-5-39.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 15; Laws, 1985, ch. 447, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 29, 1985).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Neither a city nor a county had authority to use their law enforcement personnel or policemen to enforce laws on a jointly operated airport located in another county, except in a rare situation of hot pursuit; however, the joint airport board

was authorized to establish an airport police department, whose officers would be authorized to enforce the laws on airport property. Bowman, Mar. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0078.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

§ 61-5-39. Joint operations; limitations of powers of joint board.

(1) The total expenditures to be made by the joint board for any purpose in any calendar year shall be determined by a budget approved by the governing bodies of its constituent public agencies on or before the preceding December first.

(2) No airport, air navigation facility, airport hazard, or real or personal property, the cost of which is in excess of sums therefor fixed by the joint

agreement or allotted in the annual budget, may be acquired by the joint board without the approval of the governing bodies of its constituent public agencies.

(3) Eminent domain proceedings may be instituted only by authority of the governing bodies of the constituent public agencies of the joint board. If so authorized, such proceedings shall be instituted in the names of the constituent public agencies jointly, and the property so acquired shall be held by said public agencies as tenants in common until conveyed by them to the joint board.

(4) The joint board shall not dispose of any airport, air navigation facility or real property under its jurisdiction except with the consent of the governing bodies of its constituent public agencies. However, the joint board may, without such consent, enter into the contract, lease or other arrangements contemplated by Section 61-5-11.

(5) Any resolutions, rules, regulations or orders of the joint board dealing with subjects authorized by Section 61-5-13 shall become effective only upon approval of the governing bodies of the constituent public agencies. Upon such approval the resolutions, rules, regulations or orders of the joint board shall have the same force and effect in the territories or jurisdictions involved as the ordinances, resolutions, rules, regulations or orders of each public agency would have in its own territory or jurisdiction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 15.

§ 61-5-41. Joint operations; joint fund.

For the purposes of providing a joint board with moneys for the necessary expenditures in carrying out the provisions of Sections 61-5-33 through 61-5-41, a joint fund shall be created and maintained, into which shall be deposited the share of each of the constituent public agencies as provided by the joint agreement. Each of the constituent public agencies shall provide its share of the fund from sources available to each. Any federal, state or other contributions or loans, and the revenues obtained from the joint ownership, control and operation of any airport or air navigation facility under the jurisdiction of the joint board shall be paid into the joint fund. Disbursements from such fund shall be made by order of the board, subject to the limitations prescribed in Section 61-5-39.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 15.

§ 61-5-43. Exemption from taxation of airport property and income.

Any property in this state acquired by a municipality for airport purposes pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Airport Law, and any income derived by such municipality from the ownership, operation or control thereof, shall be exempt from taxation to the same extent as other property belonging to political subdivisions of this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-17; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 17.

Cross References — Items excluded from definition of “gross income” under Income Tax Law, see § 27-7-15.

Exemption of property belonging to political subdivisions from taxation, see § 27-31-1.

§ 61-5-45. Effect of law upon municipal airport zoning regulation.

Nothing contained in the Municipal Airport Law shall be construed to limit any right, power or authority of a municipality to regulate airport hazards by zoning.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-19; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 19.

Cross References — Airport zoning law, see §§ 61-7-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

§ 61-5-47. Acquisition, etc. of airports, air navigation facilities, etc.; tort liability.

The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports or other air navigation facilities, the acquisition of any airport protection privileges, the acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvements, maintenance, equipment and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities by any municipality or municipalities of this state, separately or jointly, and the exercise of any other powers granted in the Municipal Airport Law to any airport board, joint board or authority are hereby declared to be public and governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity. Such lands and other property and privileges acquired and used by the municipality in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in said law shall and are hereby declared to be acquired and used for public and governmental purposes and as a matter of public necessity.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-16; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 16; Laws, 1985, ch. 474, § 54; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 44; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 45; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 42; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 40; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 41; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 41; Laws, 1992, ch. 491 § 43, eff from and after passage (approved May 12, 1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Liability.

Amendment to the statute was part of an act that amended the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1

through 11-46-23, and made conforming amendments to other statutes; it was clear that the provision that gave immunity to any airport board, joint board or

authority was superceded by the adoption of the MTCA such that the airport authority could not escape liability by merely

asserting that it was really an airport board. *Spencer v. Greenwood/Leflore Airport Auth.*, 834 So. 2d 707 (Miss. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. 1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts, Sovereign Im-

munity as a Defense to Tort Liability. 53 Miss. L. J. 171, March, 1983.

§ 61-5-49. Interpretation and construction.

The Municipal Airport Law shall be so interpreted and construed as to make uniform so far as possible the laws and regulations of the state and other states and of the government of the United States having to do with the subject of municipal airports.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-20; Laws, 1958, ch. 513, § 20.

SUPPORT OF AIRPORT FACILITIES FOR STATE UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGES

SEC.

- | | |
|----------|---|
| 61-5-71. | Declaration of public policy; legislative intent. |
| 61-5-73. | Powers of counties. |
| 61-5-75. | Powers of municipalities. |
| 61-5-77. | Construction. |

§ 61-5-71. Declaration of public policy; legislative intent.

It shall be the public policy of this state to encourage the construction, equipping, maintenance and operation of adequate transportation facilities, including airports, if needed, for use of the state university and the state supported four year colleges now or hereafter located in the state, as necessary in the operation and training program of such university and colleges and desirable for the use of the municipalities and areas in or near which such airports may be located as well as being helpful in the economic, industrial and business development of said counties. It is the intent of Sections 61-5-71 through 61-5-77 to provide means whereby the board of trustees of state institutions of higher learning, the state building commission and any and all other state agencies which have either constructed such airport facilities, or contemplate so doing, may obtain assistance and contributions of funds from any municipality in or near which any such college may be located and from the county in which any such airport facilities may be located. It is also the intent of said sections to authorize such municipalities and counties to borrow money and issue bonds, under their respective bond laws, to provide funds for the purpose of aiding and assisting in the acquisition of sites for such airports, construction of buildings, construction of runways and extension of runways and in constructing and equipping all facilities needed or desirable for such airports.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536.5; Laws, 1957, Ex. Sess. ch. 13, § 1.

§ 61-5-73. Powers of counties.

The boards of supervisors of the several counties of the state are authorized, in their discretion, to acquire by condemnation, donation, lease or purchase land to be used as an airport or landing place for airplanes. They may erect such buildings thereon as they may deem necessary for such purpose, and equip and maintain such airport.

The boards of supervisors of the several counties of the state, wherein the university or other state supported four year colleges now or hereafter in existence, are or shall be located, are authorized, in their discretion, to assist the board of trustees of state institutions of higher learning, the state building commission or any other state agency by contributing county funds to be used in the acquisition of a site for an airport, erecting suitable buildings, building or extending runways and equipping, maintaining and operating an airport, which shall be available for the use of said university or colleges, as the case may be, and for the general public.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 3571; Laws, 1942, § 7537; Laws, 1928, ch. 63; Laws, 1957, Ex. Sess. ch. 13, § 2.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the second paragraph. The word “board” was changed to “boards”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its December 3, 1996 meeting, and the section has been reprinted in the supplement to reflect the corrected language.

Cross References — General jurisdiction and powers of counties, see § 19-3-41.

Approval of airport sites and issuance of certificates of such approval, see § 61-1-31.

Airport authorities law, see §§ 61-3-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Eminent Domain, Form 31.1 (Complaint, pe-

tition, or declaration — For condemnation — By state agency — For state transportation facility).

§ 61-5-75. Powers of municipalities.

The governing authorities of any municipality are authorized, in their discretion, to exercise all the powers conferred on boards of supervisors with reference to acquiring land to be used as an airport or landing place for airplanes, and erect suitable buildings thereon, and equip and maintain such airport. They may acquire airports or landing places already established. Such airport or landing place may be situated beyond the limits of such municipality. The governing authorities of a municipality may lease, or sublease, or contract the maintenance and operation of, any airport or landing place for airplanes to the United States of America, or any department or agency thereof, or to any person, firm, association, or corporation, for the purpose of training aviators

and for other legal purposes. The county wherein such airport may be situated is hereby authorized to make such contribution to the cost of acquiring the necessary land for such airport, the placing of same in suitable condition, and the equipping and maintenance thereof, as the board of supervisors of such county and the governing body of such municipality may mutually agree upon.

The governing authorities of the several municipalities of the state in or near which the state university or a state supported four year college, now or hereafter in existence, are or shall be located, are authorized, in their discretion, to assist the board of trustees of state institutions of higher learning, the state building commission or any other state agency by contributing municipal funds to be used in the acquisition of a site for an airport, erecting suitable buildings and building or extending runways, equipping, maintaining and operating an airport, which shall be available for the use of said university or colleges, as the case may be, and for the general public.

Any such municipality which offers assistance in the acquisition of a site for constructing suitable buildings, building or extending runways or maintaining and operating such airports for the university or other state supported colleges, as the case may be, may or may not be in the county in which the university or the state supported four year college is located, provided the airport is not more than ten miles from said municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1930, § 3572; Laws, 1942, §§ 7538, 7538.1; Laws, 1928, ch. 63; Laws, 1942, ch. 174; Laws, 1946, ch. 231, § 1; Laws, 1957, Ex. Sess. ch. 13, §§ 3, 7.

Cross References — General powers of municipalities, see § 21-17-1.

Support of university or college airport by certain municipalities, see § 21-19-59.

Issuance of municipal bonds for support of university or college airport, see § 21-33-301.

Approval of airport sites and issuance of certificates of such approval by department of economic and community development, see § 61-1-31.

Airport authorities law, see §§ 61-3-1 et seq.

Lease of municipal airport facilities to private concerns in certain municipalities, see § 61-5-91.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Under statutes which give the city the power to maintain an airport, the word "maintain," in the connection in which it was used by the legislature, includes the power to operate the field and the two words "maintain" and "operate" have been held to be synonymous as applied to oper-

ating an airport. *Brummett v. City of Jackson*, 211 Miss. 116, 51 So. 2d 52 (1951). But see *Anderson ex rel. Doss v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.*, 419 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1982), answer to certified question conformed to, 691 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 89 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Eminent Domain, Form 31.1 (Complaint, pe-

tition, or declaration — For condemnation
— By state agency — For state transportation facility).

§ 61-5-77. Construction.

Sections 61-5-71 through 61-5-75 are remedial, are entitled to a liberal construction, and are supplemental and in addition to all other laws on the subject. In event, however, said sections are in conflict with any other law, they shall take precedence, in order to accomplish the purpose of development for which they are expressly written.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7538.2; Laws, 1957, Ex. Sess. ch. 13, § 8.

Editor's Note — Section 31-11-1 provides that the term "state building commission" or "building commission" wherever it appears in the laws of Mississippi shall be construed to mean the governor's office of general services.

LEASE OF FACILITIES BY CERTAIN MUNICIPALITIES

SEC.

61-5-91. Lease of airport facilities to private concerns.

§ 61-5-91. Lease of airport facilities to private concerns.

Any municipality having a population, according to the last federal census, in excess of ten thousand inhabitants is authorized to lease any part or all of its airport grounds and improvements to one or more private concerns for not longer than twenty-five years by awarding such contract competitively after due notice of such public letting as public contracts are made. The city may lease a part of the land included in its airport either with or without the improvements thereon, and may require the lessee to erect improvements on such land and maintain the same at its expense or the city may in the discretion of its governing authorities make such contract thereunto as may appear most advantageous and profitable to it. Any such lease contract shall be made only for the purpose of the expansion and development of such airport and its use in furtherance of the promotion of private and commercial aviation therein. The city is authorized to construct and maintain suitable airstrips and landing and take-off areas at its expense in connection with such lease thereof, and it may lease all or any part of its airport buildings and hangars to federal agencies (such as weather bureau and C. A. A.) and private and commercial airlines using such airport as a depot, but the rental thereon shall never be less than the current charges for the upkeep and maintenance thereof and the period of such contract shall not exceed twenty-five years. It is the intent and purpose of this section to vest in such municipalities within the stated class full and plenary power and authority to develop and expand its airport facilities by allowing private concerns to erect improvements thereon at their expense for repairing and servicing private and commercial airplanes and for the sale and servicing of airplanes thereat so as to assure and encourage such continued use

of said property and the development thereto at the least possible expense to the public.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7540-01; Laws, 1946, ch. 313, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 99.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation

§§ 34:81 et seq.

CHAPTER 7

Airport Zoning

SEC.	
61-7-1.	Short title.
61-7-3.	Definitions.
61-7-5.	Airport hazards declared contrary to public interest.
61-7-7.	Power to adopt airport zoning regulations.
61-7-9.	Relationship of airport regulations to comprehensive zoning ordinance.
61-7-11.	Procedure for adoption of zoning regulations.
61-7-13.	Airport zoning commission.
61-7-15.	Requirements of airport zoning regulations generally.
61-7-17.	Permits and variances.
61-7-19.	Administration of airport zoning regulations.
61-7-21.	Board of adjustment.
61-7-23.	Appeals of administrative decisions to board of adjustment.
61-7-25.	Judicial review of administrative decisions.
61-7-27.	Penalties for violations of chapter and rules, regulations, orders, etc.; enforcement.
61-7-29.	Acquisition of air rights.

§ 61-7-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Airport Zoning Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-15; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

Cross References — Zoning, planning and subdivision regulation, see §§ 17-1-1 et seq.

§ 61-7-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Airport" means any area of land or water designed and set aside for the landing and taking-off of aircraft and utilized or to be utilized in the interest of the public for such purposes, including airports and airport facilities owned, operated or controlled by the United States Government for use by military aircraft. However, none of the provisions of this chapter shall be construed as granting to a political subdivision any power or authority that is prohibited by or that is in conflict with any law of the United States or any rule or regulation of any department, board, commission or agency of the United States.

(2) "Airport hazard" means any structure or tree or use of land which obstructs the airspace required for the flight of aircraft in landing or taking-off at any airport or is otherwise hazardous to such landing or taking-off of aircraft.

(3) "Airport hazard area" means any area of land or water upon which an airport hazard might be established if not prevented as provided in this chapter.

(4) "Political subdivision" means any municipality, city, town, village or county.

(5) "Person" means any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or body politic, and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee or other similar representative thereof.

(6) "Structure" means any object constructed or installed by man, including but without limitation, buildings, towers, smokestacks and overhead transmission lines.

(7) "Tree" means any object of natural growth.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-01; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 301, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved February 14, 1994).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation § 2.

CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 3 et seq.

§ 61-7-5. Airport hazards declared contrary to public interest.

It is hereby found that an airport hazard endangers the lives and property of users of the airport and of occupants of land in its vicinity, and also, if of the obstruction type, in effect reduces the size of the area available for the landing, taking-off and maneuvering of aircraft, thus tending to destroy or impair the utility of the airport and the public investment therein. Accordingly, it is hereby declared: (a) that the creation or establishment of an airport hazard is a public nuisance and an injury to the community served by the airport in question; (b) that it is therefore necessary in the interest of the public health, public safety, and general welfare that the creation or establishment of airport hazards be prevented; and (c) that this should be accomplished, to the extent legally possible, by exercise of the police power, without compensation. It is further declared that both the prevention of the creation or establishment of airport hazards and the elimination, removal, alteration, mitigation, or making and lighting of existing airport hazards are public purposes for which political subdivisions may raise and expend public funds and acquire land or property interest therein.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-02; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance. 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 87, 88.

Law Reviews. 1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 137, March, 1979.

§ 61-7-7. Power to adopt airport zoning regulations.

(1) In order to prevent the creation or establishment of airport hazards, every political subdivision having an airport hazard within its territorial limits may adopt, administer, and enforce under the police power and in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed in this chapter, airport zoning regulations for such airport hazard area. Such regulations may divide such area into zones, and, within such zones, specify the land uses permitted and regulate and restrict the height to which structures and trees be erected or allowed to grow.

(2) Where an airport is owned or controlled by a political subdivision or by any state institution and any airport hazard area appertaining to such airport is located outside the territorial limits of said political subdivision, within or without the state, the political subdivision owning and controlling the airport or within which the airport owned and controlled by a state institution is located and the political subdivisions within which the airport hazard area is located may, by ordinance or resolution duly adopted, create a joint airport zoning board. Said board shall have the same power to adopt, administer and enforce airport zoning regulations applicable to the airport hazard in question as that vested by subsection (1) in the political subdivisions within which such area is located. Each such joint board shall have as members two representatives appointed by each political subdivision participating in its creation and, in addition, a chairman elected by a majority of the members so appointed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-03; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 3; Laws, 1956, ch. 362.

Cross References — Zoning, planning and subdivision regulation generally, see Chapter 1 of Title 17.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Substantial compliance with this section is sufficient. *Citizens for Equal Property Rights v. Board of Supvrs.*, 730 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1999).

The statute does not contemplate that every existing airport zoning hazard in

the affected area be identified before airport zoning regulations may be adopted. *Citizens for Equal Property Rights v. Board of Supvrs.*, 730 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1999).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with

emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 61-7-9. Relationship of airport regulations to comprehensive zoning ordinance.

In the event that a political subdivision has adopted, or hereafter adopts, a comprehensive zoning ordinance regulating, among other things, the height of buildings, any airport zoning regulations applicable to the same area or portion thereof, may be incorporated in and made a part of such comprehensive zoning regulations, and be administered and enforced in connection therewith.

In the event of conflict between any airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter and any other regulations applicable to the same area, whether the conflict be with respect to the height of structures or trees, the use of land, or any other matter, and whether such other regulations were adopted by the airport zoning regulations or by some other political subdivision, the more stringent limitation or requirement shall govern and prevail.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-04; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

§ 61-7-11. Procedure for adoption of zoning regulations.

No airport zoning regulations shall be adopted, amended, or changed under this chapter except by action of the legislative body of the political subdivision in question, or the joint board provided for in subsection (2) of Section 61-7-7, after a public hearing in relation thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. At least 15 days' notice of the hearing shall be published in an official paper, or a paper of general circulation, in the political subdivision or subdivisions in which is located the airport hazard to be zoned.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-05; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 499 et seq.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning § 13.

§ 61-7-13. Airport zoning commission.

Prior to the initial zoning of any airport hazard area under this chapter, the political subdivision or joint airport zoning board which is to adopt the regulations shall appoint a commission, to be known as the airport zoning commission, to recommend the boundaries of the various zones to be established and the regulations to be adopted therefor. Such commission shall make a preliminary report and hold public hearings thereon before submitting its final report, and the legislative body of the political subdivision or the joint airport zoning board shall not hold its public hearings or take other action until it has received the final report of such commission. Where a city plan

commission or comprehensive zoning commission already exists, it may be appointed as the airport zoning commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-05; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section is not clear as to the form of the required reports; thus, where the zoning commission made recommendations

and held several public hearings, it complied with the intent of this section. *Citizens for Equal Property Rights v. Board of Supvrs.*, 730 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1999).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning § 388.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 10, 29.

§ 61-7-15. Requirements of airport zoning regulations generally.

All airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter shall be reasonable and none shall impose any requirements or restriction which is not reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter. In determining what regulations it may adopt, each political subdivision and joint airport zoning board shall consider, among other things, the character of the flying operations expected to be conducted at the airport, the nature of the terrain within the airport hazard area, the character of the neighborhood, and the uses to which the property to be zoned is put and adaptable.

No airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter shall require the removal, lowering or other change or alteration of any structure or tree not conforming to the regulations when adopted or amended, or otherwise interfere with the continuance of any non-conforming use, except as provided in subsection (3) of Section 61-7-17.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-06; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Injunction.

1. In general.

A city and a municipal airport authority which, by enactment of an authorized valid zoning ordinance, had assumed, for the protection of an instrument approach zone and a transition surface zone, to prohibit the owner of property located approximately 3500 feet from the main airport runway from using or encroaching

upon air space more than 50 feet above his land, had so interfered with and restricted the owner's use and enjoyment of his private property for public use as to constitute a taking or damaging thereof without due compensation. *Ballard v. Maraman*, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966).

2. Injunction.

A bill for an injunction to require the owner of land located approximately 3500 feet from the main airport runway to top

or remove trees which had been permitted to extend into a restricted area more than 50 feet above the surface and established by an otherwise valid zoning order as an instrument approach zone and transition surface zone, was dismissed on the ground

that the zoning restriction constituted an unlawful taking or damage of private property for public use without due compensation. *Ballard v. Maraman*, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Change in area or location of nonconforming use as violation of zoning ordinance. 56 A.L.R.4th 769.

Alteration, extension, reconstruction, or repair of nonconforming structure or structure devoted to nonconforming use as violation of zoning ordinance. 63 A.L.R.4th 275.

Am Jur. 83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 388, 499 et seq.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 467, Zoning — Circumstances Warranting Expansion of a Nonconforming Use.

§ 61-7-17. Permits and variances.

(1) Any airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter may require that a permit be obtained before any new structure or use may be constructed or established and before any existing use or structure may be substantially changed or substantially altered or repaired. In any event, however, all such regulations shall provide that before any non-conforming structure or tree may be replaced, substantially altered or repaired, rebuilt, allowed to grow higher, or replanted, a permit must be secured from the administrative agency authorized to administer and enforce the regulations, authorizing such replacement, change or repair. No permit shall be granted that would allow the establishment or creation of an airport hazard or permit a non-conforming structure or tree or non-conforming use to be made or become higher or become a greater hazard to air navigation than it was when the applicable regulation was adopted or than it is when the application for a permit is made. Except as provided herein, all applications for permits shall be granted.

(2) Any person desiring to erect any structure, or increase the height of any structure, or permit the growth of any tree, or otherwise use his property in violation of airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter, may apply to the board of adjustment for a variance from the zoning regulations in question. Such variances shall be allowed where a literal application or enforcement of the regulations would result in practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship and the relief granted would not be contrary to the public interest but do substantial justice and be in accordance with the spirit of the regulations and this chapter. Any variance may be allowed subject to any reasonable conditions that the board of adjustment may deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.

(3) In granting any permit or variance under this section, the administrative agency or board of adjustment may, if it deems such action advisable to effectuate the purposes of this chapter and reasonable in the circumstances, so

condition such permit or variance as to require the owner of the structure or tree in question to permit the political subdivision, at its own expense, to install, operate and maintain thereon such markers and lights as may be necessary to indicate to flyers the presence of an airport hazard.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-07; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

Cross References — Zoning changes generally, see § 17-1-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 97 et seq.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 191 et seq.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 61-7-19. Administration of airport zoning regulations.

All airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter shall provide for the administration and enforcement of such regulations by an administrative agency which may be an agency created by such regulations or any official, board, or other existing agency of the political subdivision adopting the regulations or of one of the political subdivisions which participated in the creation of the joint airport zoning board adopting the regulations, if satisfactory to that political subdivision, but in no case shall such administrative agency be or include any member of the board of adjustment. The duties of any administrative agency designated pursuant to this section shall include that of hearing and deciding all permits under subsection (1) of Section 61-7-17. Such agency shall not have or exercise any of the powers delegated in this chapter to the board of adjustment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-09; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 177-179.

§ 61-7-21. Board of adjustment.

(1) All airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter shall provide for a board of adjustment to be composed of not less than three members, to have and exercise the following powers:

(a) To hear and decide appeals from any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the administrative agency in the enforcement of the airport zoning regulations, as provided in Section 61-7-23.

(b) To hear and decide any special exceptions to the terms of the airport zoning regulations upon which such board may be required to pass under such regulations.

(c) To hear and decide specific variances under subsection (2) of section 61-7-17.

(2) Where a zoning board of appeals or adjustment already exists, it may be appointed as the board of adjustment. Otherwise, the board of adjustment shall consist of five members, each to be appointed for a term of three years by the authority adopting the regulations and to be removable by the appointing authority for cause, upon written charges and after public hearing.

(3) The concurring vote of a majority of the members of the board of adjustment shall be sufficient to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination, of the administrative agency, or to decide in favor of the applicant on any matter upon which it is required to pass under the airport zoning regulations, or to effect any variation in such regulations.

(4) The board shall adopt rules in accordance with the provisions of the ordinances or resolution by which it was created. Meetings of the board shall be held at the call of the chairman and at such other times as the board may determine. The chairman, or in his absence, the acting chairman, may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses. All hearings of the board shall be public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member upon each question, or, if absent or failing to vote, indicating such fact. The board shall keep records of its examinations and other official actions, all of which shall immediately be filed in the office of the board and shall be a public record.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-10; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 649 et seq.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 180 et seq.

§ 61-7-23. Appeals of administrative decisions to board of adjustment.

Any person aggrieved by any decision of an administrative agency made in its administration of airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter, or any governing body of a political subdivision, or any joint airport zoning board, which is of the opinion that a decision of such an administrative agency is an improper application of airport zoning regulations of concern to such governing body or board, may appeal to the board of adjustment authorized to hear and decide appeals from the decisions of such administrative agency.

All appeals taken under this section must be taken within a reasonable time, as provided by the rules of the board, by filing with the agency from which the appeal is taken and with the board, a notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The agency from which the appeal is taken shall forthwith

transmit to the board all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.

An appeal shall stay all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from, unless the agency from which the appeal is taken certifies to the board, after the notice of appeal has been filed with it, that by reason of the facts stated in the certificate a stay would, in its opinion, cause imminent peril to life or property. In such cases proceedings shall not be stayed otherwise than by order of the board on notice to the agency from which the appeal is taken and on due cause shown.

The board shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of appeals, give public notice and due notice to the parties in interest, and decide the same within a reasonable time. Upon the hearing any party may appear in person or by agent or by attorney.

The board may, in conformity with the provisions of this chapter, reverse, affirm, wholly or partly, or modify, the order, requirement, decision, or determination appealed from and may make such order, requirement, decision, or determination as ought to be made, and to that end shall have all the powers of the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-08; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 180 et seq.

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 649 et seq., 928.

§ 61-7-25. Judicial review of administrative decisions.

Any person aggrieved, or taxpayer affected, by any decision of a board of adjustment, or any governing body of a political subdivision or any joint airport zoning board which is of the opinion that a decision of a board of adjustment is illegal, may present to the circuit court of the county wherein such decision was rendered a verified petition setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of illegality. Such petition shall be presented to the court within 30 days after the decision is filed in the office of the board.

Upon presentation of such petition the court may allow a writ of certiorari directed to the board of adjustment to review such decision of the board. The allowance of the writ shall not stay proceedings upon the decision appealed from, but the court may, on application, on notice to the board and on due cause shown, grant a restraining order.

The board of adjustment shall not be required to return the original papers acted upon by it, but it shall be sufficient to return certified or sworn copies thereof or of such portions thereof as may be called for by the writ. The return

shall concisely set forth such other facts as may be pertinent and material to show the grounds of the decision appealed from and shall be verified.

The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside the decision brought up for review, in whole or in part, and if need be, to order further proceedings by the board of adjustment. The findings of fact of the board, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be accepted by the court as conclusive. No objection to a decision of the board shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the board, or, if it was not so urged, unless there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so.

Cost shall not be allowed against the board of adjustment unless it appears to the court that it acted with gross negligence, in bad faith, or with malice, in making the decision appealed from.

In any case in which airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter, although generally reasonable, are held by a court to interfere with the use or enjoyment of a particular structure or parcel of land to such an extent, or to be so onerous in their application to such a structure or parcel of land, as to constitute a taking or deprivation of that property in violation of the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States, such holding shall not affect the application of such regulations to other structures and parcels of land.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-11; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 915 et seq.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 265 et seq.

§ 61-7-27. Penalties for violations of chapter and rules, regulations, orders, etc.; enforcement.

Each violation of this chapter or of any regulations, orders, or rulings promulgated or made pursuant to this chapter, shall constitute a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) or imprisonment for not more than 30 days or by both such fine and imprisonment. Each day a violation continues to exist shall constitute a separate offense. In addition, the political subdivision or agency adopting zoning regulations under this chapter may institute in any court of competent jurisdiction, an action to prevent, restrain, correct, or abate any violation of this chapter, or of airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter, or of any order or ruling made in connection with their administration or enforcement. The court shall adjudge to the plaintiff such relief, by way of injunction (which may be mandatory) or otherwise, as may be proper under all the facts and circumstances of the case, in order fully to effectuate the purposes of this

chapter and of the regulations adopted and orders and rulings made pursuant thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-12; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

Cross References — Penalties for zoning ordinance violations, see § 17-1-27.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 979 et seq.

CJS. 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning §§ 334 et seq.

§ 61-7-29. Acquisition of air rights.

In any case in which: (1) it is desired to remove, lower, or otherwise terminate a nonconforming structure or use; or (2) the approach protection necessary cannot, because of constitutional limitations, be provided by airport zoning regulations under this chapter; or (3) it appears advisable that the necessary approach protection be provided by acquisition of property rights rather than by airport zoning regulations, then the political subdivision within which the property or non-conforming use is located or the political subdivision owning the airport or served by it may acquire, by purchase, grant, or condemnation in the manner provided by the law under which political subdivisions are authorized to acquire real property for public purposes, such air right, aviation easement, or other estate or interest in the property or non-conforming structure or use in question as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7544-13; Laws, 1950, ch. 284, § 13, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1950).

Cross References — Eminent domain generally, see §§ 11-27-1 et seq.

Power of county to acquire real estate, see § 19-7-1.

Power of municipality to acquire real estate, see § 21-17-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A city and a municipal airport authority which, by enactment of an authorized valid zoning ordinance, had assumed, for the protection of an instrument approach zone and a transition surface zone, to prohibit the owner of property located approximately 3500 feet from the main

airport runway from using or encroaching upon air space more than 50 feet above his land, had so interfered with and restricted the owner's use and enjoyment of his private property for public use as to constitute a taking or damaging thereof without due compensation. *Ballard v. Maraman*, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 3
et seq.

CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aero-
space §§ 1, 2.

CHAPTER 9

Incorporation of Airport Into Corporate Boundaries of Municipality

SEC.

- 61-9-1. Authorization and procedure generally.
- 61-9-3. Contents and effect of ordinance providing for incorporation.
- 61-9-5. Incorporation of airport property located in another county.
- 61-9-7. Judicial review.
- 61-9-9. Construction and application of chapter.

§ 61-9-1. Authorization and procedure generally.

Any incorporated municipality of this state which has heretofore or may hereafter establish or acquire an airport or air navigational facility any part of which is situated within ten miles of the corporate limits of such municipality, may, by ordinance adopted for such purpose, incorporate the properties constituting such airport or air navigational facility into its corporate boundaries. Such incorporation may be accomplished by the adoption of an ordinance as provided in this chapter, regardless of whether or not such airport or air navigational facility is located within the same county as that of the incorporated municipality and irrespective of whether or not it is adjacent or contiguous thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-71; Laws, 1964, ch. 495, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 22, 1964).

Cross References — Enlargement of municipal boundaries by adding adjacent unincorporated territory, see §§ 21-1-27 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

- 1. In general.
- 2. Sale of alcoholic beverages.

1. In general.

Subsection 3 of Code 1942, § 7545-71 under which all laws and ordinances of a city were made applicable to a noncontiguous municipal airport was repealed by implication by Code 1942, § 10265-36 to the extent that it conflicted with the provisions of the Local Option Beverage Control Law, so although the city was located in a county where the sale of alcoholic beverages was legal this did not authorize the sale of such beverages at the municipal airport which was located in a "dry" county. *Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Shivers*, 206 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1968).

2. Sale of alcoholic beverages.

Where, acting under this section [Code 1942, § 7545-71], a city adopted an ordinance incorporating within its territory the entire area embraced in a noncontiguous municipal airport, and at the time of the adoption of the ordinance the sale of light wines and beer was legal within the city under the provisions of Code 1942, § 10207, the fact that the airport was located in a "dry" county did not prevent the sale of such beverages at the airport. *McDonald v. Koostra*, 196 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1967).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 39 et seq.

CJS. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §§ 45-51.

§ 61-9-3. Contents and effect of ordinance providing for incorporation.

Any ordinance to incorporate properties constituting an airport or air navigational facility into the corporate boundaries of a municipality shall include the following provisions and shall be effective as follows:

(1) Such ordinance shall accurately describe the metes and bounds of the property of the airport or air navigational facility to be incorporated; only such portions of property constituting the airport or air navigational facility as shall be owned by the municipality and properties in which easements have been acquired by it for streets, public utilities and public roads and used in connection therewith shall be subject to such incorporation.

(2) Such ordinance shall provide that it shall not become operative until publication thereof shall have been made once each week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper, or newspapers, published or having a general circulation in the county or counties where both the municipality and such airport or air navigational facility shall be located.

(3) Subject only to the provisions hereof, and irrespective of the geographic location of the airport or air navigational facility in a county or judicial district other than the county or judicial district within which the principal office of the municipality is located, any such ordinance shall become effective upon the effective date fixed therein. On and after such effective date and on or after March 10, 1976 all laws, municipal ordinances, and local options effective in the municipality as a result of municipal, judicial district and county options exercised in the municipality, judicial district or the county within which the principal office of the municipality is located, and all other laws, orders, codes and resolutions of and applicable to the municipality availing or having availed itself of the provisions hereof as well as those of the board of supervisors of the county in which the principal office of the municipality is located, shall be applicable to such airport or air navigational facility; provided, however, that no permit for the sale of any alcoholic beverage as defined in Section 67-1-5, Mississippi Code of 1972, except an on-premises retailer's permit as authorized by Section 67-1-51(c), shall be issued for use at such airport or air navigational facility. Venue for the trial of all offenses against such laws and ordinances shall be in the county in which the principal office of the municipality is located.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict the county wherein the airport or air navigational facility is geographically located from levying and collecting state, county and school district ad valorem taxes on taxable properties situated thereat; and nothing in this section shall operate to impair or restrict the detachment of territory from a municipal separate

school district and the annexation thereof to a county school district under Section 37-7-609, Mississippi Code of 1972, whether occurring prior to or subsequent to March 10, 1976.

(5) Provided, however, that this chapter shall apply only to municipalities having a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or more.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-71; Laws, 1964, ch. 495, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 310, eff from and after passage (approved March 10, 1976).

Editor's Note — Section 37-7-609, referred to in (4), was repealed by Laws, 1986, ch. 492, § 47, effective from and after July 1, 1987.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 39 et seq. **CJS.** 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §§ 54 et seq., 67.

§ 61-9-5. Incorporation of airport property located in another county.

If any municipality shall, pursuant to the authority of this chapter, incorporate into its corporate boundaries property situated in a county other than the county in which the principal office of the municipality is located, it shall not thereafter extend its boundaries into such other county, without, in addition to complying with all existing laws of this state governing or relating to the extension of corporate boundaries of municipalities, first obtaining the consent and approval of the board of supervisors of such county into which it desires to extend its corporate boundaries.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-74; Laws, 1964, ch. 495, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 22, 1964).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Under Code 1942 § 7545-74, the City of Jackson is prohibited by law from annexing the Pearl area except with the consent

of the board of supervisors of Rankin County. *Boling v. City of Jackson*, 279 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1973).

§ 61-9-7. Judicial review.

Any person aggrieved by any municipal ordinance adopted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to an appeal to the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the municipality is located in the manner provided for appeals from judgments or decisions of municipal authorities as set forth in Section 11-51-75, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-73; Laws, 1964, ch. 495, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 22, 1964).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 438, 439.

§ 61-9-9. Construction and application of chapter.

The provisions of this chapter shall be independent of, and in addition to, all existing laws of this state governing the extension or enlargement of municipal corporate boundaries and shall apply to all municipalities, whether any such municipality be operating under the code charter, under the commission form of government, or under a special charter, and regardless of whether a different or special procedure be provided by any such special charter, or by any other laws of the state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7545-72; Laws, 1964, ch. 495, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 22, 1964).

CHAPTER 11

Operation of Aircraft; Certification and Licensing of Pilots and Aircraft

SEC.	
61-11-1.	Operation of aircraft in careless manner, while under influence of intoxicating liquor, etc.; hunting or spotting game for purpose of hunting from aircraft.
61-11-3.	Operation of aircraft without federal certificate, permit, etc.
61-11-5.	Possession, display, etc., of federal certificate, permit, etc.
61-11-7.	Penalties for violations of §§ 61-11-1 to 61-11-5.

§ 61-11-1. Operation of aircraft in careless manner, while under influence of intoxicating liquor, etc.; hunting or spotting game for purpose of hunting from aircraft.

(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an aircraft in the air or on the ground or water, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or other habit-forming drug, or to operate an aircraft in the air or on the ground or water, in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. In any proceeding charging careless or reckless operation of aircraft in violation of this section, the court in determining whether the operation was careless or reckless shall consider the standards for safe operation of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aeronautics.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to pursue, chase, hunt, take or kill any wild game or waterfowl from an aircraft, or to spot and communicate the location of any wild game from an aircraft to another for the purpose of hunting, killing or taking such wild game. Before a person may be arrested for a violation of the provision of this subsection that prohibits the spotting and communication of the location of wild game from an aircraft for the purpose of hunting, killing or taking such wild game, the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds and probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. Any person convicted under this subsection (2) shall be subject to the penalties provided in Section 61-11-7, and shall also forfeit all hunting, trapping and fishing privileges for a period of not less than twelve (12) months from the date of conviction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-12; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 9; Laws, 1992, ch. 542, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Cross References — Confiscation of aircraft for assisting in harvesting of redfish, see § 49-15-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Persons and entities liable.
3. Negligence.
4. Instructions.

1. In general.

No federal statute or constitutional provision and no state constitutional provision is contravened by this statute. *Hays v. Morgan*, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).

2. Persons and entities liable.

Owner of an aircraft was not held vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-employee pilot who borrowed the aircraft for the benefit of his personal friends. *Malone v. Capital Corr. Res., Inc.*, — So. 2d —, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. Aug. 23, 2001).

In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he was struck by an airplane used to spray cotton on a farm, owners of the airplane were liable, where they reserved the right to direct when and how the work of spraying cotton was to be carried on, and where there was no lease of any kind of airplane to pilot and where the bailment was at the will of the owners. *Hays v. Morgan*, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).

3. Negligence.

The operator of an airplane may be found to have been negligent where his take-off from a pasture in which he had landed caused the cattle grazing therein to stampede. *Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co.*, 243 Miss. 607, 139 So. 2d 380 (1962).

4. Instructions.

In an unsuccessful suit against an airplane company and a pilot for the wrongful death of a flagman who was struck and killed by an airplane spraying herbicides while he attempted to guide it beneath transmission wires, the trial court properly denied plaintiff's request for a peremptory instruction where the uncontradicted testimony at trial was that the pilot had kept the best lookout possible under the circumstances; while violation of this section is negligence per se, no showing was made that the statute was indeed violated. *Cannon v. Jones*, 377 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Aviation law: liability of air carrier for injury to, or death of, passenger on charter flight. 41 A.L.R.3d 455.

Validity, construction, and application of state criminal statute prohibiting reckless operation of aircraft. 89 A.L.R.3d 893.

Res ipsa loquitur in aviation accidents. 25 A.L.R.4th 1237.

Strict liability, in absence of statute, for injury or damage occurring on the ground caused by ascent, descent, or flight of aircraft. 73 A.L.R.4th 416.

Limitation of liability of air carrier for

personal injury or death. 91 A.L.R. Fed. 547.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 210 et seq.

4 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Aviation, Form 272.1 (complaint arising out of crash of aircraft into residence during storm).

CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 272-276.

Practice References. Aviation Accident Law (Matthew Bender).

§ 61-11-3. Operation of aircraft without federal certificate, permit, etc.

It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or cause or authorize to be operated any civil aircraft within this state unless such aircraft has an appropriate effective certificate, permit or license issued by the United States, if such certificate, permit or license is required by the United States. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in aeronautics as an airman in the state unless he has an appropriate effective airman certificate, permit, rating or license issued by the United States authorizing him to engage in the particular class of aeronautics in which he is engaged, if such certificate, permit, rating or license is required by the United States.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-13; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 10(1), eff from and after July 1, 1948.

Cross References — License fees of pilots and aircraft under agriculture aviation licensing law, see § 69-21-119.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity of Federal Aviation Administration regulations (14 CFR §§ 67.13, 67.15, 67.17) prescribing standards for issuance of medical certificates to airmen. 59 A.L.R. Fed. 682.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 50-52.

CJS. 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 38, 39.

§ 61-11-5. Possession, display, etc., of federal certificate, permit, etc.

When a certificate, permit, rating or license is required for an airman by the United States, it shall be kept in his personal possession when he is operating within the state and shall be presented for inspection upon the demand of any peace officer, or any other officer of the state or of a municipality or member, official or employee of the Mississippi Department of Transportation authorized pursuant to law to enforce the aeronautics laws, or any official, manager or person in charge of any airport upon which the airman shall land, or upon the reasonable request of any other person.

Where a certificate, permit or license is required by the United States for an aircraft, it shall be carried in the aircraft at all times while the aircraft is operating in the state, shall be conspicuously posted in the aircraft where it may be readily seen by passengers or inspectors, and shall be presented for inspection upon the demand of any peace officer, or any other officer of the state or of a municipality or member, official or employee of the Mississippi Department of Transportation authorized pursuant to law to enforce the aeronautics laws, or any official, manager, or person in charge of any airport upon which the aircraft shall land, or upon the reasonable request of any person.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-14; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 10(2); Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 31, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Presumptions.

Holifield, 240 Miss. 106, 126 So. 2d 508 (1961).

2. Presumptions.

1. In general.
Violation of statute by operating a motor vehicle without a license does not raise an inference of negligence. Myrick v.

In the absence of information to the contrary, it is legally presumed that a motorist has a driver's license. Gause v. State, 203 Miss. 377, 34 So. 2d 729 (1948).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 50-52. **CJS.** 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace §§ 38, 39.

§ 61-11-7. Penalties for violations of §§ 61-11-1 to 61-11-5.

Any person violating any of the provisions of Sections 61-11-1 through 61-11-5, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) or by imprisonment of more than six (6) months, or both.

For any violation of the provisions of such sections, in addition to, or in lieu of, the penalties provided by the first paragraph of this section, or as a condition to the suspension of a sentence which may be imposed pursuant thereto, the court, in its discretion, may prohibit the violator from operating an aircraft within the state for such period as it may determine but not to exceed one year. Violation of the duly imposed prohibition of the court may be treated as a separate offense under this section or as a contempt of court. Upon a plea of guilty or conviction hereunder in any case involving a registrant, under the provisions of such sections, the court shall cause a notation of such plea or conviction and of the sentence imposed to be marked upon the pilot certificate or other evidence of pilot registration or receipt provided by the Mississippi Department of Transportation. The court shall cause a copy of its order or sentence to be forwarded to the commission, the cost of furnishing same to be added as a part of cost in such cause. In no event shall this paragraph be construed as warrant for the court or any other agency or person to take away, impound, hold or mark any federal airman or aircraft certificate, permit, rating or license, or to take away, impound or hold any state registration certificate or other evidence of such registration.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 7536-23; Laws, 1948, ch. 189, § 18; Laws, 1956, ch. 361; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 32, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Cross References — Penalties provided for in this section applicable to violations involving reckless operation of aircraft or hunting from aircraft, see § 61-11-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of state criminal statute prohibiting reckless operation of aircraft. 89 A.L.R.3d 893.

CHAPTER 13

Aircraft for Use of Governor, State Departments and Agencies

SEC.

- 61-13-1. Purchase, lease, operation, etc., of nonmilitary aircraft for state use.
- 61-13-3. Employment of pilots and technical and administrative personnel.
- 61-13-5. Laws governing purchase of airplanes, supplies and equipment.
- 61-13-7. Assignment of aircraft to state departments, agencies, etc.; record-keeping requirements.
- 61-13-9. Documentation of use of airplanes.
- 61-13-11. Allocation of cost of operation of airplanes to state departments, institutions or agencies.
- 61-13-13. Purchase of insurance.
- 61-13-15. Sale of surplus airplanes and disposition of proceeds; sale of airplanes purchased prior to July 1, 1986.
- 61-13-17. Payment of costs and expenses; disposition of proceeds of sale of aircraft.
- 61-13-19. Penalties for violations of chapter.
- 61-13-21. Transfer of certain powers of Adjutant General to Department of Finance and Administration.
- 61-13-23. Maintenance and pilot proficiency requirements; maintenance of policy manual and records of aircraft operations; availability of aircraft for emergency use.
- 61-13-25. Powers and duties of Department of Finance and Administration.

§ 61-13-1. Purchase, lease, operation, etc., of nonmilitary aircraft for state use.

The Department of Finance and Administration of the State of Mississippi, is authorized and empowered to purchase or lease, operate and maintain nonmilitary aircraft for use by the Governor's Office, state departments, agencies, boards and commissions, the Legislature, its officers and employees, all under the general direction of the Department of Finance and Administration.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-01; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 484, § 1; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 46; Laws, 1989, ch. 502, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 29, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

State military department, see § 33-3-3.

Adjutant general, see § 33-3-7.

§ 61-13-3. Employment of pilots and technical and administrative personnel.

The Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration is authorized to employ pilots and such other technical and administrative personnel as he deems necessary in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, and to fix the compensation of all such employees, subject to the guidelines established by the State Personnel Board.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-02; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 484, § 2; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 30, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

General powers and duties of adjutant general, see § 33-3-11.

§ 61-13-5. Laws governing purchase of airplanes, supplies and equipment.

All purchases of airplanes, supplies and other necessary equipment for the successful operation of the aforesaid airplanes shall be purchased in strict compliance with Sections 25-1-77, 25-1-85, 25-1-89, and 31-7-1 through 31-7-21, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-03; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 17, 1966).

Editor's Note — Section 25-1-85, referred to in this section, was repealed by Laws, 2001, ch. 561, § 2, effective from and after April 7, 2001.

§ 61-13-7. Assignment of aircraft to state departments, agencies, etc.; recordkeeping requirements.

This chapter shall not be construed so as to prevent the Department of Finance and Administration from permanently assigning aircraft to departments, institutions, commissions or agencies thereof. However, all airplanes owned by the State of Mississippi or by any department, institution, bureau, commission or agency thereof, with the exception of planes owned and operated by the various educational institutions of this state for educational purposes, shall be subject to the record-keeping provisions of this chapter and, in the discretion of the Department of Finance and Administration, such aircraft may be subject to the provisions of Section 61-13-15(2).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-04; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 4; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 47; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 31, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

Aircraft excluded by this section not subject to maintenance and pilot proficiency requirements, see § 61-13-23.

§ 61-13-9. Documentation of use of airplanes.

The Department of Finance and Administration shall require of all planes operated under the provisions of this chapter an accounting on forms furnished by the Department of Finance and Administration, which shall show among other things the trips made, names of passengers carried, date of beginning and termination of trips, miles traveled, stops made, fuel consumed and cost per hour of operation.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-05; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 5; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 261; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 32, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

§ 61-13-11. Allocation of cost of operation of airplanes to state departments, institutions or agencies.

Whenever the Department of Finance and Administration under the direction of the Governor's office makes an airplane or airplanes available to some department, institution or agency of the State of Mississippi, the actual cost for the operation thereof during the time the aforesaid airplane is so assigned shall be charged to and paid for by the aforesaid department, institution or agency into the special fund set up in Section 61-13-17 for the operation of such airplanes, except planes used by the Governor and Lieutenant Governor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-06; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 6; Laws, 1989, ch. 502, § 2; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 33, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

§ 61-13-13. Purchase of insurance.

The Department of Finance and Administration is hereby authorized to obtain adequate comprehensive insurance coverage for each of such airplanes as may be purchased or operated under the provisions of this chapter and any other insurance other than liability insurance deemed necessary by the Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration. The purchase of such insurance shall be on a bid basis in accordance with generally accepted practice for insurance purchases by departments of state government.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-07; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 7; Laws, 1984, ch. 495, § 29; reenacted and amended, 1985, ch. 474, § 20; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 45; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 46; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 43; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 41; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 34; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 42; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 42; Laws, 1992, ch. 491, § 44, eff from and after passage (approved May 12, 1992).

§ 61-13-15. Sale of surplus airplanes and disposition of proceeds; sale of airplanes purchased prior to July 1, 1986.

(1) Any airplane purchased or operated under the provisions of this chapter which becomes surplus to the needs of the state may be sold by the Department of Finance and Administration upon the receipt of not less than three (3) sealed bids after three (3) public advertisements inviting such bids in some newspaper published in the State of Mississippi and having general

circulation therein. The Department of Finance and Administration, may reject any or all bids and readvertise, in its discretion. The sums derived from such sale shall be placed in the special fund as established by Section 61-13-17 for the operation of airplanes purchased and operated under the provisions of this chapter.

(2) The Department of Finance and Administration shall proceed to sell one or more of the aircraft purchased prior to July 1, 1986, pursuant to this chapter. The sale of such aircraft pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to the bid requirements of subsection (1). It is the intent of the Legislature that the sale of such aircraft shall be timed to produce the maximum revenues at sale.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-08; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 8; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 262; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 48; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 35, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

Discretion of department of finance and administration to subject agency aircraft to provisions of this section, see § 61-13-7.

Provision that certain monies allocated for the operation, maintenance, and repair of aircraft disposed of pursuant to this section shall be transferred to the State General Fund, see § 61-13-17.

Planes owned and operated by various educational institutions subject to provisions of this section, see § 61-13-21.

§ 61-13-17. Payment of costs and expenses; disposition of proceeds of sale of aircraft.

There is hereby created a special fund in the State Treasury out of which all costs and expenses incurred pursuant to this chapter shall be paid. All salaries, allocations and charges for the cost of operating, repairing and servicing the airplanes shall be paid from this fund. The Legislature shall appropriate the necessary funds to carry out the purposes of this chapter. The Department of Finance and Administration shall disburse over his signature all funds expended for carrying out the provisions of this chapter.

Any monies in such fund which have been allocated for the operation, maintenance and repair of an aircraft which has been disposed of pursuant to Section 61-13-15 shall be transferred to the State General Fund.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-09; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 9; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 49; Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 36, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

Proceeds from charges for use of aircraft to be deposited into fund created in this section, see § 61-13-11.

Provision that sums derived from the sale of surplus airplanes shall be placed in the special fund established by this section, see § 61-13-15.

§ 61-13-19. Penalties for violations of chapter.

Any violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be punishable upon conviction by a fine of not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8533-12; Laws, 1966, ch. 562, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved June 17, 1966).

§ 61-13-21. Transfer of certain powers of Adjutant General to Department of Finance and Administration.

It is the intent of "the Mississippi Executive Reorganization Act of 1989 [Laws, 1989, Chapter 544]" to transfer the powers of the Adjutant General, Military Department of the State of Mississippi, with regard to the purchase or lease, operation and maintenance of nonmilitary aircraft for use by the departments, agencies, boards and commissions, the Legislature, its officers and employees to the Department of Finance and Administration. The executive director may assign to appropriate divisions such powers and duties as he deems appropriate to carry out the lawful functions of the department.

The transfer shall include, but is not limited to, all aircraft, support equipment, tools, vehicles, hangars and other items associated with the operation of state aircraft. The affected agencies shall transfer complete title of the transferred items.

The provisions of "the Mississippi Executive Reorganization Act of 1989 [Laws, 1989, Chapter 544]" do not apply to military aircraft activities or to aircraft owned and operated by the various educational institutions for educational purposes, except that the planes owned and operated by the various educational institutions may be subject to the provisions of Section 61-13-15(2), Mississippi Code of 1972, at the discretion of the Department of Finance and Administration.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 26, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Editor's Note — For a complete distribution of sections of the Mississippi Executive Reorganization Act of 1989 (Laws, 1989, ch. 544) see Allocation of Acts Table in the Statutory Tables Volume.

Cross References — General provisions regarding the reorganization of the executive branch of government, see §§ 7-17-1 et seq.

Creation and organization of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-101.

§ 61-13-23. Maintenance and pilot proficiency requirements; maintenance of policy manual and records of aircraft operations; availability of aircraft for emergency use.

Upon the effective date of this act, all state aircraft activity, except those excluded by Section 61-13-7, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall adhere to the maintenance and pilot proficiency requirements as established by either the Federal Aviation Administration or the Department of Finance and Administration. A policy manual and records of all aircraft operations shall be maintained by the department. All state aircraft shall be on call for emergency use, as determined by the Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 27, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

§ 61-13-25. Powers and duties of Department of Finance and Administration.

The Department of Finance and Administration shall have the following powers, duties and functions with regard to state aircraft operations:

- (a) To administer, maintain and schedule a comprehensive program of management of state aviation activities;
- (b) To maintain a record of all flights made by state aircraft;
- (c) To initiate and maintain a pilot proficiency training program;
- (d) To establish priorities concerning the use of state aircraft;
- (e) To prepare and maintain a policy/procedure manual in order to standardize all state aviation activities;
- (f) To reassign state aircraft, when needed, that are under the control of the department. The agency to which the aircraft is assigned shall pay the operating cost.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 544, § 28, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — General powers and duties of Department of Finance and Administration, see § 27-104-103.

CHAPTER 15

Registration of Aircraft

SEC.

- 61-15-1. Duties of State Tax Commission generally.
- 61-15-3. "Aircraft" defined.
- 61-15-5. Exemptions from registration.
- 61-15-7. Filing of application for registration; fees; form and contents of applications; exemptions from registration requirement; exemption license; penalties for failure to register.
- 61-15-9. Maintenance of records on registered aircraft; assignment of license number; registration stickers; replacement of certificate of registration; renewal of registration; sale of registration certificate; transfer of registration.
- 61-15-11. Registration schedule and rates; applicability of laws relating to sales tax; prorata registration and taxation; listing of aircraft on personal property rolls.
- 61-15-13. Promulgation of rules and regulations by State Tax Commission.

§ 61-15-1. Duties of State Tax Commission generally.

It shall be the duty of the State Tax Commission to promulgate any additional rules and regulations and designate forms and procedures for the implementation of this chapter.

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 1; reenacted, 1984, ch. 516, § 1; reenacted, 1988, ch. 531, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 434, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 1995.

Cross References — Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

Form and content of an application for registration, see § 61-15-7.

Authority of state tax commission to promulgate rules and regulations, see § 61-15-13.

§ 61-15-3. "Aircraft" defined.

Notwithstanding any other definition thereof in any other statute, the term "aircraft" as used herein shall, for license and registration purposes, include any contrivance now known, or hereafter invented, used or designed for navigation of or flight in the air or airspace, manufactured by mass production or individually constructed or assembled, which are subject to registration with the Federal Aviation Administration.

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 2; reenacted, 1984, ch. 516, § 2; reenacted, 1988, ch. 531, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1989.

Cross References — Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

§ 61-15-5. Exemptions from registration.

The following aircraft are exempt from provisions of this chapter:

(a) Aircraft manufactured within the state under an FAA approved type certificate which are owned and in the physical possession of the manufacturers as provided in subsection (4) of Section 61-15-7 of this chapter;

(b) Aircraft owned by charitable organizations and used solely for the furtherance of charitable purposes;

(c) Aircraft belonging to nonresidents of this state and registered and taxed in another state;

(d) Aircraft of the federal government, any agency thereof, any territory or possession thereof, any state government or agency or political subdivision thereof, and any aircraft of the Civil Air Patrol used solely in transaction of official business by a unit of the Civil Air Patrol;

(e) Aircraft licensed by a foreign country with which the United States has a reciprocal agreement covering the operation of such licensed aircraft;

(f) Aircraft not currently licensed or holding a current airworthiness certificate by the Federal Aviation Administration;

(g) Aircraft taxable under the provisions of Sections 27-35-701 through 27-35-711; and

(h) Aircraft used for commercial fishing purposes and aircraft used primarily for agricultural purposes which are subject to the regulation of the Agricultural Aviation Board of the State of Mississippi pursuant to the Agricultural Aviation Licensing Law of 1966, Sections 69-21-101 through 69-21-125, Mississippi Code of 1972, and to which are issued current licenses by the Agricultural Aviation Board.

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 3; reenacted, 1984, ch. 516, § 3; reenacted, 1988, ch. 531, § 3, eff from and after January 1, 1989.

Cross References — Exemption of registered aircraft from ad valorem taxes, see §§ 27-31-27 and 61-15-7.

Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

§ 61-15-7. Filing of application for registration; fees; form and contents of applications; exemptions from registration requirement; exemption license; penalties for failure to register.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every owner or person in charge of an aircraft which shall be based and operated on or from any airport of any type in this state shall file an application for a certificate of registration by mail or otherwise with the tax collector of the county in which the aircraft is based for each such aircraft. The State Tax Commission shall prescribe the form of such applications and shall make them available to the county tax collectors. The county tax collector may charge a fee not to exceed Two Dollars

(\$2.00) per application mailed to registrants to defray the expense of the mailing process; and such fee shall be in addition to the registration fee and shall be deposited to the credit of the county general fund. The registration shall be valid for the calendar year. The application for a certificate of registration shall contain:

(a) A description of each aircraft to be registered including the name of the manufacturer, aircraft registration number, type and maximum certificated gross weight; and

(b) The name and address of the owner of such aircraft and the county and municipality where aircraft is based.

The State Tax Commission may prescribe the form of renewal applications after the initial year of registration and shall make them available to county tax collectors.

(2)(a) All dealers in the sale of aircraft shall be exempt from registration requirements upon purchase of an "exemption license" from the tax collector of the county in which the business is located, cost of which shall be Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00). This exemption shall not apply to dealers' personal aircraft.

(b) Dealers' "sales aircraft" shall be exempt from payment of ad valorem taxes and registration fees as provided in Section 61-15-11 upon proof satisfactory to the tax collector of the county in which the business is located, that each particular aircraft is used for delivery and demonstration purposes only.

(3) All manufacturers of aircraft shall be exempt from registration requirements of inventory upon purchase of an "exemption license" from the tax collector of the county in which the business is located, the cost of which shall be Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00).

(4) Aircraft owners shall purchase the required certificate of registration within sixty (60) days after the date of purchase of the aircraft. Aircraft owners failing or refusing to purchase the required certificate of registration within the prescribed time shall be guilty of violating the provisions of this chapter, and shall be liable for the amount of the registration fee, plus a penalty as follows:

(a) For all aircraft registered pursuant to Section 61-15-11 with a maximum certified gross weight of three thousand six hundred (3,600) pounds or less, a penalty of Fifty Dollars (\$50.00);

(b) For all aircraft registered pursuant to Section 61-15-11 with a maximum certified gross weight of more than three thousand six hundred (3,600) pounds but not more than ten thousand (10,000) pounds, a penalty of One Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$150.00);

(c) For all other aircraft registered hereunder, a penalty of Three Hundred Dollars (\$300.00).

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 4; reenacted and amended, 1984, ch. 516, § 4; reenacted and amended, 1988, ch. 531, § 4; Laws, 1994, ch. 434, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1995.

Cross References — Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

Specific provision for exemption from ad valorem taxes as to registered aircraft, see § 27-31-27.

The responsibility of the State Tax Commission to furnish a list of aircraft owners whose aircraft are liable for registration, see § 61-15-11.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation, §§ 34.41 et seq. (lease of aircraft).

§ 61-15-9. Maintenance of records on registered aircraft; assignment of license number; registration stickers; replacement of certificate of registration; renewal of registration; sale of registration certificate; transfer of registration.

(1) Upon receipt of an application for the registration of an aircraft, as herein provided, the county tax collector shall file such application and register such aircraft with the name and address of the owner, manufacturer or dealer, as the case may be, together with facts stated in such application under the distinctive number assigned to such aircraft in the manner prescribed by the State Tax Commission.

(2) Upon the filing of such application and the payment of the fee herein provided for, the county tax collector shall assign to that aircraft the distinctive license number used by the federal government to identify that aircraft, and issue and deliver to the owner a sticker containing a registration number to be posted on the aircraft in a conspicuous place at the discretion of the owner of such aircraft. Such stickers shall be furnished to the county tax collector by the State Tax Commission. Such certificate shall be subject to inspection by the State Tax Commission and/or the county tax collector. A list of each application and certificate shall be provided by the State Tax Commission to the Mississippi Department of Transportation. The State Tax Commission may provide each county and municipality with the full details of aircraft registrations and collections hereunder.

(3) In the event of loss, mutilation or destruction of a certificate of registration, the owner of a registered aircraft may obtain from the county tax collector a duplicate thereof upon filing with the county tax collector an affidavit showing the facts and upon the payment of a service charge of Ten Dollars (\$10.00) for each duplicate.

(4) Such registration shall be renewed annually and in the same manner and upon payment of the same fee as provided for the original aircraft registration.

(5) The sale of registration certificates for aircraft shall be by the county tax collector.

(6) Registration of aircraft may be transferred upon payment of a fee of Ten Dollars (\$10.00).

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 5; reenacted and amended, 1984, ch. 516, § 5; reenacted, 1988, ch. 531, § 5; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 33; Laws, 1994, ch. 434, § 3, eff from and after January 1, 1995.

Cross References — Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

§ 61-15-11. Registration schedule and rates; applicability of laws relating to sales tax; prorata registration and taxation; listing of aircraft on personal property rolls.

(1) Registration fees shall be paid to and collected by the tax collector of the county in which the aircraft is based.

The registration and reregistration of aircraft shall be subject to the following schedule and rates:

(a) Aircraft other than those described in paragraph (b) of this subsection shall be taxed according to the following schedule:

MAXIMUM CERTIFICATED GROSS WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	
IN POUNDS	FEE
Less than 3,600	\$ 25.00
3,601 through 10,000	250.00
10,001 and over	2,500.00

(b) Antique aircraft, as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration, sailplanes, balloons and home-built aircraft shall be subject to a flat rate fee of Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00);

(2) All administrative provisions of the Mississippi Sales Tax Law, including those which fix damages, penalties and interest for nonpayment of taxes, failure to file returns, and for other noncompliance with the provisions of said chapter, and all other requirements and duties imposed upon taxpayers, shall apply to all persons liable for taxes under the provisions of this chapter, and the commission shall exercise all the power and authority and perform all the duties with respect to taxpayers under this chapter as are provided in said Sales Tax Law, except that in cases of conflict, then the provisions of this chapter shall control.

(3) Aircraft purchased after January 1 of each year and subject to registration as herein provided shall be registered and taxed on a prorated basis by month. Registration fees shall be in lieu of all aircraft ad valorem taxes except as provided in subsection (4) of this section. All such monies collected shall be distributed as provided in this subsection.

The county tax collector shall determine for each county and for each municipality, if any, having aircraft within its boundaries which are subject to this chapter and the registration fees collected on aircraft in each county and municipality. The amount so determined due each county and municipality shall be divided equally between the county and municipality and the amount

due the municipality shall be transmitted monthly to the city clerk of the municipality. The counties and municipalities shall allocate such revenues to funds in the same manner and proportion as revenues from ad valorem taxes within the county and municipality.

(4) The county tax collector shall make reasonable efforts to determine which aircraft in their county have been registered as required by this chapter. The county tax collector shall, on or before June 1 of each year, furnish to the tax assessor of their county a list of aircraft owners which have aircraft that are registered, setting forth the description of the aircraft and the location of the aircraft as to county and municipality. The tax assessor shall, upon receipt of the list, add the aircraft which have not been registered to the personal property roll of the county and of the municipality in which the aircraft may be located and such aircraft shall be taxed as other personal property within the county and municipality except as provided hereinafter. The county tax collector may accept registration fees, as follows:

(a) Fees on a prorated basis by month for aircraft purchased in a bona fide, good faith transaction after January 1 of the registration year; or

(b) Total fees and penalties for aircraft liable for registration on January 1 when the owner of the aircraft was the owner on January 1 of the registration year.

The tax assessor may remove an aircraft from the personal property rolls prior to December 31 of the registration year upon receipt of a notice from the county tax collector that the registration fees and penalties, when required, have been paid in full by the owner of the aircraft. The aircraft may not be removed from the personal property rolls after December 31 of the registration year.

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 6; reenacted and amended, 1984, ch. 478, § 30; reenacted and amended, 1984, ch. 516 § 6; Laws, 1986, ch. 405, § 1; reenacted and amended, 1988, ch. 531, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 434, § 4, eff from and after January 1, 1995.

Cross References — Specific provisions exempting registered aircraft from ad valorem taxes, see §§ 27-31-27 and 61-15-7.

Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

§ 61-15-13. Promulgation of rules and regulations by State Tax Commission.

Authority is hereby given to the State Tax Commission to promulgate rules and regulations for the purpose of regulating and enforcing this chapter.

SOURCES: Laws, 1982, ch. 469, § 7; reenacted, 1984, ch. 516, § 7; reenacted, 1988, ch. 531, § 7, eff from and after January 1, 1989.

Cross References — Provision that tax assessors shall include on the personal property tax roll a list of aircraft which have not been registered as required under this chapter, see §§ 27-35-15 and 27-35-23.

CHAPTER 17

Concealing or Misrepresenting Aircraft Identification Number; Non-Conforming Aircraft Fuel Containers

SEC.

- 61-17-1. Possession, sale, receipt, etc., of aircraft or part on which identification numbers have been altered, removed, etc.
- 61-17-3. Failure to display aircraft identification number.
- 61-17-5. Maintenance or possession of aircraft with non-conforming fuel container.
- 61-17-7. Equipping aircraft with, or installing in aircraft, non-conforming fuel container.
- 61-17-9. Ownership or possession of improperly registered aircraft.
- 61-17-11. Probable cause to inspect aircraft for violation.
- 61-17-13. Penalties for violation of §§ 61-17-1 through 61-17-9.

§ 61-17-1. Possession, sale, receipt, etc., of aircraft or part on which identification numbers have been altered, removed, etc.

It shall be unlawful, with intent to conceal or misrepresent the true identity of the aircraft, for any person, firm, association or corporation to knowingly possess, buy, sell, offer for sale, receive, dispose of, conceal or to endeavor to possess, buy, sell, offer for sale, receive, dispose of or conceal, any aircraft or part thereof on which the assigned aircraft identification number has been altered, removed, destroyed, covered or defaced, or to maintain such aircraft in any manner which conceals or misrepresents the true identity of the aircraft.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — What constitutes probable cause authorizing further inspection of an aircraft when violation of this section is suspected, see § 61-17-11.

Penalty for violation of this section, see § 61-17-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 13 et seq., 29 et seq., 210 et seq. 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Aviation §§ 34:11 et seq. (aircraft and aircraft equipment; sales).

§ 61-17-3. Failure to display aircraft identification number.

It shall be unlawful, with intent to conceal or misrepresent the true identity of the aircraft, to fail to have the aircraft identification number clearly displayed on the aircraft and in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration regulations.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — What constitutes probable cause authorizing further inspection of an aircraft when violation of this section is suspected, see § 61-17-11.

Penalty for a violation of this section, see § 61-17-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 13 et seq., 29 et seq., 210 et seq.

§ 61-17-5. Maintenance or possession of aircraft with non-conforming fuel container.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to knowingly own, maintain or possess any aircraft which has been equipped with or had installed in its wings or fuselage, any fuel tank, bladder, drum or other container which will hold fuel and which does not conform to Federal Aviation Administration regulations or which has not been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration by special permit.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — What constitutes probable cause authorizing further inspection of an aircraft when violation of this section is suspected, see § 61-17-11.

Penalty for a violation of this section, see § 61-17-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Risks and causes of loss covered or excluded by aviation liability policy. 86 A.L.R.3d 118.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in aircraft or its parts, supplies, or equipment. 97 A.L.R.3d 627.

Products liability: Manufacturer's postsale obligation to modify, repair, or recall product. 47 A.L.R.5th 395.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 13 et seq., 29 et seq., 210 et seq.

§ 61-17-7. Equipping aircraft with, or installing in aircraft, non-conforming fuel container.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to equip any aircraft with, or to install in the wings or fuselage of any aircraft, any fuel tank, bladder, drum or other container which will hold fuel and which does not conform to Federal Aviation Administration regulations or which has not been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration by special permit.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — What constitutes probable cause authorizing further inspection of an aircraft when violation of this section is suspected, see § 61-17-11.

Penalty for a violation of this section, see § 61-17-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for alleged negligence of independent servicer or repairer of aircraft. 41 A.L.R.3d 1320.

Risks and causes of loss covered or excluded by aviation liability policy. 86 A.L.R.3d 118.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in air-

craft or its parts, supplies, or equipment. 97 A.L.R.3d 627.

Products liability: Manufacturer's postsale obligation to modify, repair, or recall product. 47 A.L.R.5th 395.

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 13 et seq., 29 et seq., 210 et seq.

§ 61-17-9. Ownership or possession of improperly registered aircraft.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to knowingly own or possess an aircraft which is improperly registered with intent to conceal or misrepresent the true identity of the aircraft. Any aircraft registered to a nonexistent person, firm, association, corporation or address shall be in violation of this section. Any aircraft registered to a firm, association or corporation that has no physical location, no corporate officers, or has lapsed into an inactive state shall be in violation of this section.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — What constitutes probable cause authorizing further inspection of an aircraft when violation of this section is suspected, see § 61-17-11.

Penalty for a violation of this section, see § 61-17-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation §§ 13 et seq., 29 et seq., 210 et seq.

§ 61-17-11. Probable cause to inspect aircraft for violation.

Any law enforcement officer who has reason to believe and does believe that a violation of Sections 61-17-1 through 61-17-9 has occurred shall have probable cause to make further inspection of the aircraft in question to ascertain its true identity.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

§ 61-17-13. Penalties for violation of §§ 61-17-1 through 61-17-9.

Any person who violates Section 61-17-1 through 61-17-9 shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years or fined not more than Twenty-five Thousand Dollars (\$25,000.00), or both.

SOURCES: Laws, 1988, ch. 427, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any felony violation, see § 99-19-73.

TITLE 63

MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC REGULATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

Driver's License

Article 1.	Driver's License	63-1-1
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ARTICLE 1.

DRIVER'S LICENSE.

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- 63-1-71. Revocation or suspension of driving privilege of person convicted of violation of Uniform Controlled Substance Law or violation of similar law of another jurisdiction; reduction of suspension in hardship cases.

§ 63-1-1. Short title.

This article may be cited as the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver's License Law of 1938.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8076; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

Cross References — Program of driver's education and training in public schools, see §§ 37-25-1 et seq.

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §§ 45-35-1 et seq.

Provision of this article applicable to Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law, see § 63-1-74.

Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law exemptions not exemption from provisions of this article, see § 63-1-78.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 105 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 256 et seq.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

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Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-1-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases when used in this article shall, for the purpose of such law, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section:

(a) The term "commissioner" means the commissioner of public safety of this state;

(b) The term "highway" means every way or place of whatever nature open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel, and shall include streets of municipalities;

(c) The term "operator" means any person in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the highway;

(d) The term "owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle; in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee

or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8077; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

§ 63-1-5. Requirement of motor vehicle operator's license.

No person shall drive or operate a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle upon the highways of the State of Mississippi without first securing an operator's license to drive on the highways of the state, except those persons especially exempted by Section 63-1-7.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8091; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — Municipal licensing of drivers or operators of buses of transportation systems for transportation of passengers, see §§ 21-27-151 et seq.

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see § 45-35-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see § 63-9-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Lack of proper automobile registration or operator's license as evidence of operator's negligence. 29 A.L.R.2d 963.

Validity and construction of statute making it a criminal offense for the operator of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his operator's license or the vehicle registration certificate. 6 A.L.R.3d 506.

State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Automobiles; necessity or emergency as defense in prosecution for driving without operator's license or while license is suspended. 7 A.L.R.5th 73.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 107.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 260, 261.

§ 63-1-6. Requirement of motorcycle operator's license.

No person shall drive or operate a motorcycle upon the highways of the State of Mississippi without first securing either a regular operator's license with a motorcycle endorsement upon it, or a restricted motorcycle operator's license, except those persons especially exempted by Section 63-1-7, Mississippi Code of 1972; provided, however, that any person possessing a valid Mississippi operator's license issued prior to July 1, 1985, may operate a motorcycle upon the highways of this state until such time as said license expires. Upon the expiration of a license issued prior to July 1, 1985, and the payment of One Dollar (\$1.00), the applicant for renewal may obtain the necessary motorcycle endorsement without further examination.

A motorcycle endorsement may be issued any person who holds a valid Mississippi driver's license and meets the other requirement for such endorsement contained in this chapter.

A restricted motorcycle operator's license may be issued to any applicant who fulfills all the requirements necessary to obtain a Mississippi operator's license that may be applicable to the operation of a motorcycle. Such license shall entitle the holder thereof to operate a motorcycle, and no other motor vehicle, upon the highways of this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — License requirement in general, see § 63-1-5.

Exemptions from license requirement, see § 63-1-7.

Persons not entitled to license, see § 63-1-9.

Duties of license examiners, see § 63-1-15.

Application for license, see § 63-1-19.

Temporary driving permits, see § 63-1-21.

Parental consent for application of person under age of 17, see § 63-1-23.

Appeal of license denial, see § 63-1-31.

Driver's examination, see § 63-1-33.

Form of license, see § 63-1-35.

Duplicate licenses, see § 63-1-37.

Signing of license by applicant, see § 63-1-39.

Possession of license while driving, see § 63-1-41.

Fee for restricted motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-43.

License examiners tender of fees and applications to commissioner, see § 63-1-45.

Fee for reinstatement of license, see § 63-1-46.

Duration and renewal of licenses, see § 63-1-47.

Renewal of expired license, see § 63-1-49.

Revocation of license, see § 63-1-51.

Driving while license is suspended or revoked, see § 63-1-57.

Using the operator's license of another person, see § 63-1-65.

§ 63-1-7. Exemption from license requirement.

No license issued pursuant to this article shall be required of:

(a) Any person while operating a motor vehicle of the Armed Forces of the United States.

(b) Any nonresident person who has in his immediate possession a valid license to drive a motor vehicle on the highways of his home state or country, issued to him by the proper authorities of his home state or country, or of any nonresident person whose home state or country does not require the licensing of a person to operate a motor vehicle on the highways but does require him to be duly registered. Such person being eighteen (18) years of age or older may operate a motor vehicle in the state for a period of sixty (60) days without securing a license. However, any nonresident person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be subject to all the provisions of this article, except as specified above.

(c) Any person while operating a road roller, road machinery or any farm tractor or implement of husbandry temporarily drawn, moved or propelled on the highways.

(d) Any engineer or motorman using tracks for road or street, though used in the streets.

(e) Any person while operating an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in Section 63-3-103.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8092; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 3; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment added (e).

Cross References — License of motorcycle operator, see § 63-1-6.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Person who has had license revoked for DUI may legally operate road roller, road machinery, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry which is temporarily on highways. Harper, April 24, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0261.

An individual who has had his license suspended or revoked may still legally operate a road roller, road machinery, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry

which is temporarily on the highways, in accordance with Section 63-1-7(c). Miletich, March 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0113.

A person who does not have a Mississippi driver's license may operate machinery, such as backhoes, tractors, and other farm equipment on the public streets and highways. Brewer, June 23, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0345.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity and construction of statute making it criminal offense for the operator of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his operator's license or the vehicle registration certificate. 6 A.L.R.3d 506.

Denial, suspension, or cancellation of driver's license because of physical disease or defect. 38 A.L.R.3d 452.

Automobiles: necessity or emergency as defense in prosecution for driving without

operator's license or while license is suspended. 61 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Validity, construction, and application of age requirements for licensing of motor vehicle operators. 86 A.L.R.3d 475.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 105 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 256 et seq.

§ 63-1-9. Persons prohibited from obtaining license; issuance of temporary driving permits and intermediate licenses to persons under seventeen years of age.

(1) No driver's license, intermediate license or temporary learning permit shall be issued pursuant to this article:

(a) To any person under the age of eighteen (18) years except as provided in this article.

(b) To any person whose license to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of Mississippi has been previously revoked or suspended by this state or any other state and/or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, and such revocation or suspension period has not expired.

(c) To any person who is an habitual drunkard or who is addicted to the use of other narcotic drugs.

(d) To any person who would not be able by reason of physical or mental disability, in the opinion of the commissioner or other person authorized to

grant an operator's license, to operate a motor vehicle on the highways with safety. However, persons who have one (1) arm or leg, or have arms or legs deformed, and have their car provided with mechanical devices whereby they are able to drive in a safe manner over the highways, if otherwise qualified, shall receive an operator's license the same as other persons. Moreover, deafness shall not be a bar to obtaining a license.

(e) To any person who is under the age of seventeen (17) years to drive any motor vehicle while in use as a school bus for the transportation of pupils to or from school, or to drive any motor vehicle while in use as a public or common carrier of persons or property.

(f) To any person as an operator who has previously been adjudged to be afflicted with and suffering from any mental disability and who has not at time of application been restored to mental competency.

(g) To any unmarried person under the age of eighteen (18) years who does not at the time of application present a diploma or other certificate of high school graduation or a general education development certificate issued to the person in this state or any other state, or documentation that the person:

(i) Is enrolled and making satisfactory progress in a course leading to a general education development certificate;

(ii) Is enrolled in school in this state or any other state;

(iii) Is enrolled in a "nonpublic school," as such term is defined in Section 37-13-91(2) (i); or

(iv) Is unable to attend any school program due to circumstances deemed acceptable as set out in Section 63-1-10.

(h) To any person under the age of eighteen (18) years who has been convicted under Section 63-11-30.

(2) All permits and licenses issued on or before June 30, 2000, shall be valid according to the terms upon which issued. From and after July 1, 2000:

(a) A temporary driving permit may be issued to any person who is at least fifteen (15) years of age who otherwise meets the requirements of this article.

(b) An intermediate license may be issued to any person who is at least fifteen (15) years of age who otherwise meets the requirements of this article and who has held a temporary driving permit for at least six (6) months without any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation. Any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation shall restart the six-month requirement for the holding of a temporary driving permit before an applicant can qualify for an intermediate license.

(c) A driver's license may be issued to any person who is at least sixteen (16) years of age who otherwise meets the requirements of this article and who has held an intermediate license for at least six (6) months without any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation. Any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation shall restart the six-month requirement for the holding of an intermediate license before an applicant

can qualify for a driver's license. However, a person who is at least seventeen (17) years of age who has been issued a temporary driving permit and who has never been convicted under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation shall not be required to have held an intermediate license.

(d) An applicant for a Mississippi driver's license who, at the time of application, is at least sixteen (16) years of age and who has held a valid motor vehicle driver's license issued by another state for at least six (6) months shall not be required to hold a temporary driving permit or an intermediate license before being issued a driver's license.

(3) The commissioner shall ensure that the temporary driving permit, intermediate license and driver's license issued under this article are clear, distinct and easily distinguishable from one another.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8093; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 7; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 540, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 21, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Cross References — Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see § 45-35-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Driver license compact law, see §§ 63-1-101 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The provision fixing a minimum age for licensing drivers is a legislative determination that a child under that age does not

possess sufficient judgment and discretion to operate an automobile. *United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones*, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So. 2d 240 (1959).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

There is no provision for the invalidation or revocation of the right to drive for a fifteen year old who ceases to be gainfully employed after obtaining a license that specifies the hours of the day within which he or she may drive; in that in-

stance, the minor may continue to legally drive, but will still be restricted or prohibited from driving between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. *Darby*, January 16, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-003.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Automobiles: driving under the influence, or when addicted to the use, of

drugs as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.3d 815.

Denial, suspension, or cancellation of driver's license because of physical disease or defect. 38 A.L.R.3d 452.

Validity, construction, and application of age requirements for licensing of motor vehicle operators. 86 A.L.R.3d 475.

Liability of donor of motor vehicle for injuries resulting from owner's operation. 22 A.L.R.4th 738.

State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 119-123.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 268 et seq.

§ 63-1-10. Educational requirements for issuance of license to person under eighteen years of age; documentation; appeal of denial of license.

(1) Any applicant for a license under eighteen (18) years of age must submit with the application documentation from the appropriate authority that the applicant is in compliance with Section 63-1-9(1)(g). The appropriate authority shall be the school principal of a public or private school or his designee, or, in the case of a home study program, the parent, or the adult education supervisor of the General Education Development Program or his designee. Documentation of the applicant's enrollment status shall be on a form designed by the Department of Education as approved by the Department of Public Safety in a manner that insures the authenticity of the form and any information or signature contained thereon. Any student who is eligible to apply for a license and who is properly enrolled in a school under the jurisdiction of the authority is entitled to receive the documentation for presentation to the Department of Public Safety to accompany the application. The forms required under this section to provide documentation shall be made available to public schools, private schools approved by the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, and adult education supervisors at school board offices and shall be made available to others through the Department of Public Safety.

(2) Whenever an applicant who is under eighteen (18) years of age is unable to attend any school program due to acceptable circumstances, the appropriate authority where the student last attended shall provide the student with documentation to present to the department to excuse such student from the provisions of Section 63-1-9(1)(g). The appropriate authority shall be the sole judge of whether withdrawal of a student or failure of a student to attend is due to acceptable circumstances. Suspension or expulsion from school or incarceration in a correctional institution is not an acceptable circumstance for a person being unable to attend school.

(3) Any person denied a license for failure to satisfy the education requirements of Section 63-1-9(1)(g) shall have the right to file a request within thirty (30) days thereafter for a hearing before the Department of Public Safety to determine whether the person is entitled to a license or is subject to the cancellation of his license under the provisions of this section. The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days of the receipt by the department of the request. Appeal from the decision of the department may be taken under Section 63-1-31.

SOURCES: Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 2, eff from and after September 1, 1995.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of driver's license for reason unrelated to use of, or ability to operate, motor vehicle. 18 A.L.R.5th 542.

§ 63-1-11. Promulgation of rules and regulations.

The provisions of this article with reference to administration shall be under the supervision of the commissioner of public safety at Jackson, Mississippi, who, if not otherwise specifically authorized, is hereby empowered to make and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8099; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The Commissioner may at his discretion waive or change any regulations or policies adopted by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol regarding road tests or any other policies adopted to carry out Section 63-1-11. Head, July 26, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0419.

The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt a method to assign an alternate identifier for a driver's license for an individual who cannot obtain a Social Security number from the Social Security Administration. Head, September 14, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0553.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of highway user for injuries resulting from failure to remove or protect against material spilled from vehicle onto public street or highway. 34 A.L.R.4th 520.

§ 63-1-13. Driver Services Division; director; technical, professional and clerical assistants.

The commissioner is hereby authorized and empowered to appoint a Director of the Driver Services Division who is a qualified elector of the State of Mississippi. Such director shall execute and furnish a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00) with a surety company authorized to do business in this state. The bond shall be conditioned on the faithful performance of his duties and be subject to the approval of the commissioner. The director shall have control and supervision of the Driver Services Division and shall be answerable to the commissioner in the performance of his duties.

The commissioner shall employ such other technical, professional and clerical assistants as may be needed to conduct the work of the division. The commissioner is also authorized to employ a Director of the Driver License Examining Bureau and the necessary supervising examiners to assist the Director of the Driver License Examining Bureau in the supervision of the license personnel. The commissioner is also authorized to employ the neces-

sary additional personnel to serve and be designated as license examiners. The commissioner shall not adopt or enforce any policy or any rule or regulation which prohibits any Highway Patrol officer from being employed and serving in any position in the Driver License Examining Bureau. The commissioner shall employ such other technical, professional and clerical assistants as may be needed to conduct the work of the bureau.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8119; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 9; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 7; Laws, 1950, ch. 407, § 4; Laws, 1952, ch. 357, § 3; Laws, 1960, ch. 338, § 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 517; Laws, 1973, ch. 410, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 20; Laws, 1995, ch. 421, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 548, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 326, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment, substituted “to serve and be” for “not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) in number” in the third sentence of the second paragraph.

Cross References — Salaries of employees of highway safety patrol, see § 45-3-7.

§ 63-1-15. Designation and duties of drivers' license examiners.

The Commissioner of Public Safety shall be authorized to designate persons who may act as examiners for license or instruction permits.

It shall be the duty of the license examiners to forward to the commissioner all applications rejected or approved in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the commissioner.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8099, 8102; Laws, 1938, 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 7; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 5; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 3; Laws, 1958, ch. 493; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 8; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

§ 63-1-17. Maintenance of records relating to licenses and permits.

As the license examiners file their statements showing the serial numbers of licenses and temporary driving permits issued pursuant to this article during the preceding month, the commissioner shall keep a record of all licenses and permits issued pursuant to this article by such examiners, a record of all licenses and permits revoked, a record of all perforated sections mailed to him by the trial judges, and such other information that he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8118; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 9; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§ 63-1-51 to 63-1-55.

§ 63-1-19. Application for license; registration with Selective Service for certain males.

(1)(a) Every applicant for a license or permit issued pursuant to this article, or for renewal of such license or permit, shall file an application for such license, permit or renewal, on a form provided by the Department of Public Safety, with the commissioner or an official license examiner of the department. All persons not holding valid, unexpired licenses issued in this state shall be required to secure an original license, except those specifically exempted from licensing under Section 63-1-7. The application shall state the name, date of birth, the social security number of the applicant unless the applicant is not a United States citizen and does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government, sex, race, color of eyes, color of hair, weight, height and residence address, and whether or not the applicant's privilege to drive has been suspended or revoked at any time, and, if so, when, by whom, and for what cause, and whether any previous application by him has been denied, and whether he has any physical defects which would interfere with his operating a motor vehicle safely upon the highways.

(b) Every applicant for an original license shall show proof of domicile in this state. The commissioner shall promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to enforce this requirement and shall prescribe the means by which an applicant for an original license may show domicile in this state. Proof of domicile shall not be required of applicants under eighteen (18) years of age.

(c) Unless the applicant is not a United States citizen and does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government, each application or filing made under this section shall include the social security number(s) of the applicant in accordance with Section 93-11-64, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(2) No person who is illegally in the United States or Mississippi shall be issued a license. The application of a person who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government shall state the name, date of birth, sex, race, color of eyes, color of hair, weight, height and residence address, and whether or not the applicant's privilege to drive has been suspended or revoked at any time, and, if so, when, by whom, and for what cause, and whether any previous application by him has been denied, and whether he has any physical defects which would interfere with his operating a motor vehicle safely upon the highways. The commissioner shall adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as he deems appropriate requiring additional documents, materials, information or physical evidence to be provided by the applicant as may be necessary to establish the identity of the applicant and that the applicant is not present in the United States or the State of Mississippi illegally.

(3)(a) Any male who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-six (26) years of age and who applies for a permit or license or a

renewal of a permit or license under this chapter shall be registered in compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx 451 et seq., as amended.

(b) The department shall forward in an electronic format the necessary personal information of the applicant to the Selective Service System. The applicant's submission of the application shall serve as an indication that the applicant either has already registered with the Selective Service System or that he is authorizing the department to forward to the Selective Service System the necessary information for registration. The commissioner shall notify the applicant on, or as a part of, the application that his submission of the application will serve as his consent to registration with the Selective Service System, if so required. The commissioner also shall notify any male applicant under the age of eighteen (18) that he will be registered upon turning age eighteen (18) as required by federal law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8094; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 10; Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 19; Laws, 1999, ch. 397, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 388, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 3, eff from and after Sept. 1, 2002.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Section 1 of ch. 388, Laws, 2002, eff from and after September 1, 2002 (approved March 19, 2002), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 584, Laws, 2002, eff from and after September 1, 2002 (approved April 11, 2002), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 584, Laws, 2002, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 22, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 150, provides as follows:

"SECTION 150. Any person or entity shall be absolutely immune from any liability arising from compliance with the dictates of this act unless such conduct by the person or entity is willful and intentional."

Amendment Notes — The first 2002 amendment (Ch. 388) rewrote the section.

The second 2002 amendment (Ch. 584) rewrote the section.

Cross References — Requirement that an application for an identification card issued by the department of public safety contain the information required on a driver's license application, see § 45-35-5.

Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Federal Aspects — Registration in compliance with the requirements of § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, see 50 USCS Appx 451 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 108. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 276-280.

§ 63-1-21. Temporary permits; intermediate licenses.

(1) Every applicant for a new or original driver's or operator's license, except persons holding an out-of-state license, shall first obtain a temporary driving permit upon the payment of a fee of One Dollar (\$1.00) to the Department of Public Safety and upon the successful completion of the examination provided for in Section 63-1-33 and the payment of the fee for such examination provided for in Section 63-1-43.

(2) A temporary driving permit entitles the holder, provided the permit is in his immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle on the highways of the State of Mississippi only when accompanied by a licensed operator who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age and who is actually occupying the seat beside the driver. A temporary driving permit may be issued to any applicant who is at least fifteen (15) years of age. A temporary driving permit shall be valid for a period of one (1) year from the date of issue.

(3) An intermediate license allows unsupervised driving from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. At all other times the intermediate licensee must be supervised by a parent, guardian or other person age twenty-one (21) years or older who holds a valid driver's license under this article and who is actually occupying the seat beside the driver.

(4) The fee for issuance of an intermediate license shall be Five Dollars (\$5.00).

Except as otherwise provided by Section 63-1-6, every applicant for a restricted motorcycle operator's license or a motorcycle endorsement shall first obtain a temporary motorcycle driving permit upon the payment of a fee of One Dollar (\$1.00) to the Department of Public Safety, and upon the successful completion of the examination provided for in Section 63-1-33, and payment of the fee for said examination provided for in Section 63-1-43. All applicants for such temporary permit shall (a) be at least fifteen (15) years of age; (b) operate a motorcycle only under the direct supervision of a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age who possesses either a valid driver's or operator's license with a motorcycle endorsement or a valid restricted motorcycle operator's license; (c) be prohibited from transporting a passenger on a motorcycle; (d) be prohibited from operating a motorcycle upon any controlled access highway; and (e) be prohibited from operating a motorcycle during the hours of 6:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m. Temporary motorcycle driving permits shall be valid for the same period of time and may be renewed upon the same conditions as temporary driving permits issued for vehicles other than motorcycles.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8095; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 2; Laws, 1964, ch. 454; Laws, 1966, ch. 570, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 6; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Cross References — Issuance, validity, and expiration of temporary permit for student enrolled in driver education and training program, see § 37-25-7.

License of motorcycle operator, see § 63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Grandparent as licensee.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather's vehicle with a learner's permit and struck another driver because there was no Mississippi case law that extended the special

duty recognized between the parent and child to other members of the family; Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-21 only required that the licensee, in this case, the grandmother, be seated in the front passenger seat and over the age of 21. *Warren v. Glascoe*, 852 So. 2d 634 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 118.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 264.

§ 63-1-23. Signature and verification of application for license of person under seventeen years of age by parents or other responsible person.

The application of any person under the age of seventeen (17) years for a temporary driving permit, intermediate license or license issued pursuant to this article shall be signed and verified before a person authorized to administer oaths by both the father and mother of the applicant, if both are living and have custody of him, or in the event neither parent is living then by the person or guardian having such custody or by an employer of him, or in the event there is no guardian or employer then by any other responsible person who is willing to assume the obligation imposed under Section 63-1-25 upon a person signing the application of a minor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8096; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 11; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 24, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence of minor.

1. In general.

An automobile operator's license is a

privilege granted by the state, in accepting which the motorist accepts all reasonable conditions imposed by the state. *Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg*, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).

2. Negligence of minor.

Negligence of a minor, whose application for a driver's license was not signed

by either his father or mother, in operating an automobile was not imputable to his parents even though the minor had exhibited his father's driver's license to the officer who examined the minor and took his application for a driver's license. *Prewitt v. Walker*, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor's application

for vehicle operator's license liable for licensee's negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

§ 63-1-25. Imputation of negligence or willful misconduct of driver under seventeen years of age to person signing application for license.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 63-1-27, any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor under the age of seventeen years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly or severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by such negligence or wilful misconduct.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8096; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Extent of liability-generally.
3. —Age of driver at time of accident.
4. —Application not signed by parents.
5. —Renewal license.
6. Limitations of actions.

1. In general.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-25, and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather's vehicle with a learner's permit and struck another driver. *Warren v. Glascoe*, 852 So. 2d 634 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

No liability can arise under this statute absent negligent use or willful misconduct in use of vehicle; therefore, same reasoning that would exclude coverage for liability on basis of negligent entrustment and

negligent supervision, would apply to claim of coverage for statutory liability under this section. *Love ex rel. Smith v. McDonough*, 758 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Miss. 1991), *aff'd*, 947 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1991).

An automobile operator's license is a privilege granted by the state, in accepting which the motorist accepts all reasonable conditions imposed by the state. *Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg*, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).

2. Extent of liability-generally.

One signing an application for an operator's certificate for a minor is liable only for damages occurring during the year for which the license was issued. *Houston v. Holmes*, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138 (1947).

3. —Age of driver at time of accident.

Although parents signed their minor

son's application for an automobile operator's license at a time when the son was under 17 years of age, they were not liable for damages allegedly caused by the son's negligent operation of an automobile at a time when the son was over 17 years of age. *Carter v. Graves*, 230 Miss. 463, 93 So. 2d 177 (1957).

4. —Application not signed by parents.

Negligence of a minor, whose application for a driver's license was not signed by either his father or mother, in operating an automobile was not imputable to his parents even though the minor had exhibited his father's driver's license to the officer who examined the minor and took his application for a driver's license. *Prewitt v. Walker*, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514 (1957).

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son's negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by par-

ent. *Houston v. Holmes*, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138 (1947).

5. —Renewal license.

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son's negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. *Houston v. Holmes*, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138 (1947).

6. Limitations of actions.

In an action by a plaintiff who was injured in automobile accident against parents who had enabled a minor to obtain driver's license by agreeing to accept responsibility for negligence of the minor in operating a motor vehicle and to be liable for damages resulting from misconduct, this was an action *ex delicto* rather than *ex contractu* and when brought in a federal court of Alabama, it was subject to Alabama's one year statute of limitations. *Hickman v. Tullos*, 121 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1954).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other

person signing minor's application for vehicle operator's license liable for licensee's negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

§ 63-1-27. Request for cancellation of minor's license by person signing application; release from liability for negligence or misconduct of minor.

Any person who has signed the application of a minor for a license may thereafter file with the commissioner a verified written request that the license of said minor so granted be canceled. Thereupon the commissioner shall cancel the license of said minor and the person who signed the application of such minor shall be relieved from the liability imposed under Section 63-1-25 by reason of having signed such application on account of any subsequent negligence or wilful misconduct of such minor in operating a motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8097; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor's application for ve-

hicle operator's license liable for licensee's negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 31, 32.

§ 63-1-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 9, eff from and after September 1, 1995.

[Codes, 1942, § 8098; Laws, 1938, ch. 143]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-1-29 related to revocation of license upon death of person signing minor's application.

§ 63-1-31. Appeal from denial of application for license or temporary permit.

When a person is denied a license or any temporary driving permit after filing the proper application, he shall have the right within sixty (60) days thereafter to file a petition, in the county circuit or chancery court in the county wherein such application was filed, praying for a hearing in the matter before the judge of the court in which such application is presented. Such judge or chancellor is hereby vested with jurisdiction to hear such matters forthwith within term time or during vacation, upon five (5) days' written notice to the officer who refused to issue such license or any temporary driving permit. Said hearing shall be conducted at such place as may suit the convenience of the court. On the hearing of the petition, testimony may be taken, and the court shall render such judgment in the matter as it deems right and proper under the law and evidence.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8105; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist whose operator's license was revoked following his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not entitled to proceed by writ of certiorari in the circuit court to review the action of the commis-

sioner of public safety when he had previously failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Code 1942, § 8105. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Berry, 217 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 113.

§ 63-1-33. Examination of applicant for license or temporary permit; inspection of applicant's automobile.

It shall be the duty of the license examiner, when application is made for an operator's license or temporary driving permit, to test the applicant's ability to read and understand road signs and to give the required signals as adopted by the National Advisory Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.

The commissioner shall have prepared and administer a test composed of at least ten (10) questions relating to the safe operation of a motor vehicle and testing the applicant's knowledge of the proper operation of a motor vehicle.

Prior to the administration of the test the license examiner shall inspect the horn, lights, brakes, inspection certificate and vehicle registration of the motor vehicle which the applicant expects to operate while being tested, and if he finds that any of the aforementioned items are deficient, no license or endorsement shall be issued to the applicant until same have been repaired.

An applicant for a Mississippi driver's license who, at the time of application, holds a valid motor vehicle driver's license issued by another state shall not be required to take a written test.

Except as otherwise provided by Section 63-1-6, when application is made for an original motorcycle endorsement or a restricted motorcycle operator's license, the applicant shall be required to pass a written test which consists of questions relating to the safe operation of a motorcycle and a skill test similar to the "Motorcycle Operator Skill Test," which is endorsed by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. The commissioner may exempt any applicant from the skill test if the applicant presents a certificate showing successful completion of a course approved by the commissioner, which includes a similar examination of skills needed in the safe operation of a motorcycle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8100; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 3; Laws, 1998, ch. 352, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 393, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 614, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Cross References — License of motorcycle operator, see § 63-1-6.

Requirements for temporary driving permits, see § 63-1-21.

Video-taped instructional material to assist reading impaired applicants to prepare for driver's examination, see § 63-1-34.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Proper operation of vehicle.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather's vehicle with a learner's permit and struck

another driver because the grandchild was operating the vehicle in accordance with directives required of him pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-33. *Warren v. Glascoe*, 852 So. 2d 634 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 123.

§ 63-1-34. Provision of video-taped instructional material to assist reading impaired applicants in preparing for driver's license examinations.

From and after January 1, 1991, the Mississippi Authority for Educational Television shall prepare and the Commissioner of Public Safety shall make available for loan to applicants for driving permits and licenses under this article and under Article 2 of this chapter, who are reading impaired, video tapes of instructional material designed to assist such applicants in preparing for driver's license examinations. The commissioner shall be authorized to charge and collect a fee from any person to whom any such video tape is loaned, such fee to serve as security for the return of the video tape and which fee shall be refunded to the person upon return of the video tape to the commissioner. Such fee shall be in an amount as the commissioner determines necessary to defray the actual cost to the commissioner in replacing the video tape but shall not exceed the amount of the fee provided by law to be paid for the issuance of the class of driver's license for which the person is applying. The video tape shall be returned, in good working order, to the location that such tape was borrowed in order for the individual to receive his security refund. In the event such tape is not returned within thirty (30) days from time of rental all security fees will be forfeited to the Department of Public Safety. Such security funds and all forfeited fees shall be placed in a separate interest-bearing account known as the "Driver License Educational Fund for the Reading Impaired." All forfeited security fees shall be used to replace unreturned tapes and to offset the cost of this program.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 319, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 12, 1990).

§ 63-1-34.1. Issuance of limited driver's license for persons using bioptic telescopic lenses; rehabilitation permit.

(1) The Commissioner of Public Safety may issue a limited driver's license for persons using bioptic telescopic lenses. The license shall be valid for one (1) year from the date of issuance. The commissioner may require the reevaluation of a licensee before the reissuance of a limited driver's license.

(2) The commissioner shall prepare and administer a test for the central and peripheral vision of persons using bioptic telescopic lenses. If the person passes the test and is otherwise qualified, the person may receive a license under this section.

(3) The commissioner may issue a one-year driving rehabilitation permit subject to such restrictions as the commissioner may require.

(4) The fee for a license or permit issued under this section shall be the fee required for one-year licenses under Section 63-1-43, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(5) The commissioner may impose restrictions on any license or permit issued under this section and may issue rules and regulations governing such licenses and permits.

SOURCES: Laws, 1999, ch. 393, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-1-35. Form of license; use of Social Security number of licensee; photograph of licensee; renewal of license by electronic means; payment of fees with credit or debit card.

(1) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall prescribe the form of licenses issued pursuant to this article which shall, among other features, include a driver's license number assigned by the Department of Public Safety which, at the option of the licensee, may or may not be the social security number of the licensee. A licensee who chooses not to use his social security number as his driver's license number, except as otherwise provided under subsection (2) of this section, shall list his social security number with the department which shall cross reference the social security number with the driver's license number for purposes of identification. Additionally, each license shall bear a full face color photograph of the licensee in such form that the license and the photograph cannot be separated. Such photograph shall be taken so that one (1) exposure will photograph the applicant and the application simultaneously on the same film. The department shall use a process in the issuance of a license with a color photograph which shall prevent as nearly as possible any alteration, counterfeiting, duplication, reproduction, forging or modification of such license or the superimposition of a photograph without ready detection. Such photograph shall be replaced by the department at the time of renewal. Driver licenses, including photographs appearing thereon, may be renewed by electronic means according to rules and regulations promulgated by the commissioner. The Department of Public Safety may accept bank credit cards and debit cards in payment of fees for driver license renewals that are processed by electronic means and, if authorized by general law, may charge an additional fee for the use of such cards.

(2) The commissioner shall prescribe the form of licenses issued pursuant to this article to licensees who are not United States citizens and who do not possess a social security number issued by the United States government. The licenses of such persons shall include a number and/or other identifying features.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8103; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1968, ch. 540, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 453, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 13; Laws, 1996, ch. 466, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment redesignated the first paragraph as (1) and inserted "except as otherwise provided under subsection (2) of this section" following "driver's license number;" and added (2).

Cross References — Provisions for identifying of anatomical organ donors on their driver's license, see § 41-39-53.

Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt a method to assign an alternate identifier for a driver's license for an individual who cannot obtain a Social Security

number from the Social Security Administration. Head, September 14, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0553.

§ 63-1-37. Issuance of duplicate license.

In the event that a license or temporary driving permit issued under the provisions of this article is lost or destroyed, the licensee shall obtain from the commissioner a duplicate copy thereof and shall pay a fee in the amount of Three Dollars (\$3.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for the first duplicate copy and a fee in the amount of Eight Dollars (\$8.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for the second and each subsequent duplicate copy. The license or permit shall be marked "Duplicate."

All fees collected under this section, except photograph fees, shall be deposited into the State General Fund. Photograph fees collected under this section shall be deposited pursuant to the provisions of Section 63-1-43.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8104; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 4; Laws, 1984, ch. 349; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 14 eff from and after July 1, 1985; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Application of this section to an application for a duplicate commercial driver's license or permit, see § 63-1-82.

Criminal offense of applying for duplicate license at time when license has been posted for appearance in court, see § 63-9-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 277-279.

§ 63-1-39. Signatures on license.

No license issued pursuant to this article shall be valid under the provisions of this article until it has been signed by the commissioner, assistant commissioner or an authorized deputy, and signed in ink by the applicant.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8101; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

§ 63-1-41. Possession and display of license upon demand.

Every licensee shall have the required license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same, upon

demand of a justice court judge, a peace officer or license examiner or other authorized employee of the commissioner. However, no person charged with violating this section shall be convicted if he produces in court a license theretofore issued to him and valid at the time of his arrest.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8108; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see § 63-9-25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Persons who have authority under statute.
3. Authority to stop vehicle.

1. In general.

This provision is a valid exercise of the police power. *Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg*, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).

2. Persons who have authority under statute.

A person never formally appointed in writing as required by law who was employed by a sheriff as a deputy, had signed an oath of office, and had acted for a long time as a deputy in uniform without challenge, had the right to arrest for motor vehicle violations and to demand driver's licenses. *United States v. Williams*, 416 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S. Ct. 908, 25 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 968, 90 S. Ct. 1008, 25 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1970).

3. Authority to stop vehicle.

This section [Code 1942, § 8108], authorizes, by implication, officers to stop a car and require exhibition of a driver's license; but this right must be exercised in good faith for the purpose of determining whether the operator is licensed, and not as a blind search without warrant. *Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg*, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).

The stopping of cars and detaining drivers momentarily for the purpose of checking the driver's license does not constitute an arrest warranting an incidental search. *Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg*, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).

One who evades a road block set up to check driver's licenses may be pursued by the officer in good faith for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has a license. *Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg*, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity and construction of statute making it a criminal offense for the operator of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his operator's license or the vehicle registration certificate. 6 A.L.R.3d 506.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 111, 112, 284.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 284, 285.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1426, 1427, 1541.

§ 63-1-43. Fees for licenses generally.

(1) The fee for receiving the application and issuing the regular driver's or operator's license and the fee for renewing the license shall be:

(a) Eighteen Dollars (\$18.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for each applicant for a four-year license;

(b) Three Dollars (\$3.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for each applicant for a one-year license, except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection; and

(c) Eight Dollars (\$8.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for a one-year license for each applicant who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government.

All originals and renewals of regular operators' licenses shall be in compliance with Section 63-1-47.

(2) The fee for receiving the application and issuing a motorcycle endorsement shall be Five Dollars (\$5.00). Motorcycle endorsements shall be valid for the same period of time as the applicant's operator's license.

(3) The fee for receiving the application and issuing a restricted motorcycle operator's license and the fee for renewing such license shall be:

(a) Eleven Dollars (\$11.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for a four-year license; and

(b) Eight Dollars (\$8.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for a one (1) year license.

All originals and renewals of restricted motorcycle licenses shall be valid for the same period of time that an original regular driver's license may be issued to such person in compliance with Section 63-1-47.

(4) From and after January 1, 1990, every person who makes application for an original license or a renewal license to operate a vehicle as a common carrier by motor vehicle, taxicab, passenger coach, dray, contract carrier or private commercial carrier as such terms are defined in Section 27-19-3, except for those vehicles for which a Class A, B or C license is required under Article 2 of this chapter, shall, in lieu of the regular driver's license above provided for, apply for and obtain a Class D commercial driver's license. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (5) of this section, the fee for the issuance of a Class D commercial driver's license shall be Twenty-three Dollars (\$23.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for a period of four (4) years; however, except as required under Article 2 of this chapter, no driver of a pickup truck shall be required to have a commercial license regardless of the purpose for which the pickup truck is used.

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (5) of this section, all originals and renewals of commercial licenses issued under this section shall be valid for a period of four (4) years, in compliance with Section 63-1-47. Only persons who operate the above-mentioned vehicles in the course of the regular and customary business of the owner shall be required to obtain a Class D commercial operator's license, and persons operating such vehicles for private purposes or in emergencies shall not be required to obtain such license.

(5) The original and each renewal of a commercial driver's license issued under this section to a person who is not a United States citizen and who does

not possess a social security number issued by the United States government shall be issued for a period of one (1) year for a fee of Eight Dollars (\$8.00) plus the applicable photograph fee and shall expire one (1) year from the date of issuance. Such person may renew a commercial license issued under this section within thirty (30) days of expiration of the license.

(6) The Commissioner of Public Safety, by rule or regulation, shall establish a driver's license photograph fee which shall be the actual cost of the photograph rounded off to the next highest dollar. Monies collected for the photograph fee shall be deposited into a special photograph fee account which the Department of Public Safety shall use to pay the actual cost of producing the photographs. Any monies collected in excess of the actual costs of the photography shall be deposited to the General Fund of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8102; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 7; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 5; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 3; Laws, 1958, ch. 493; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 383, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 453, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 4; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 23; Laws, 1992, ch. 469, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 8; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 3; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

Cross References — License of motorcycle operator, see § 63-1-6.

Requirements for temporary driving permits, see § 63-1-21.

Allocation of portion of certain fees charged under this section for licenses, to special fund for purchase of State Highway Safety Patrol cars, equipment, and weapons, see § 63-1-45.

Fee for reinstatement of license subsequent to suspension, revocation or cancellation, see § 63-1-46.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Private commercial carrier by motor vehicle.

1. In general.

Statute which provides that operator of a private commercial carrier must obtain a commercial driver's license, applies uniformly to all persons regularly so engaged as operators of private commercial carriers and the statute is constitutional. *Lumpkin v. Birdsong*, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230 (1951).

2. Private commercial carrier by motor vehicle.

A person employed by a railroad as an

operator or driver of one of the railroad's motor trucks in the transportation of other employees and tools to and from their work, was, in respect to the use of such truck, a private commercial carrier by motor vehicle within the statute requiring driver's license, in that it was used in the furtherance of the commercial enterprise of railroading. *Lumpkin v. Birdsong*, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230 (1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 281-283.

§ 63-1-45. Maintenance of records relating to application forms and fees; audit of forms and funds; receipt for fees; effect of dishonor of check; disposition of fees.

License examiners shall keep a complete record of all funds received from applicants upon forms to be prescribed and furnished by the department out of the operating funds of the department. Application forms shall be printed in book form and serially numbered and in such form that the original thereof may be transmitted by the license examiner to the commissioner, together with the renewal fee. A copy thereof, signed by the examiner, shall be given to the applicant, and a copy thereof shall be retained by the examiner. The license examiner shall, not later than ten (10) days from the date of an application, transmit the same, together with the fee, to the commissioner. Such application blanks and funds shall be subject to audit at any time. The commissioner shall maintain records of all application forms on hand and issued to the examiners, who shall be charged therewith. The receipt provided for herein shall be the only valid and recognized form of receipt for fees paid by applicants, and such receipt shall be sufficient in lieu of the renewed license for a period of sixty (60) days or until such renewed license has been issued to the applicant by the commissioner. There shall be tendered with all applications for a temporary driving permit or temporary motorcycle driving permit, or for the initial issuance of any license issued pursuant to this article, the proper fee required by law, in cash, or by money order, cashier's or certified check. The required fee for issuance of renewal licenses, duplicate licenses or other services for which a fee is charged, shall be tendered with the application therefor by cash, check or money order. In the event a check for renewal of a license is dishonored for any reason, the person whose license was being renewed by such check shall be notified in writing and be given thirty (30) days after such written notice in which to pay the renewal fee. This shall be done by forwarding a certified check or postal money order in the correct amount to the department. If, at the end of thirty (30) days, such certified check or postal money order has not been received by the department, the commissioner shall cancel that person's license, and, in order for that license to be reinstated, a reinstatement fee of Ten Dollars (\$10.00) plus the amount due on the returned check must be received by the department.

The Commissioner of Public Safety shall deposit the amount of fees, together with all fees for duplicate licenses, permits, delinquent fees and reinstatement fees collected by him into the general fund of the State Treasury, in accordance with the provisions of Section 45-1-23(2); however, Seven Dollars (\$7.00) of the fee derived from the fee charged for original and renewal operators' licenses imposed under Section 63-1-43(1) and Four Dollars (\$4.00) of the fee derived from the fee charged for original and renewal Class D

commercial drivers' licenses under Section 63-1-43(4) shall be deposited into a special fund that is created in the State Treasury. Monies in the fund may be expended pursuant to legislative appropriation solely for the purchase by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol of patrol cars, communications equipment and weapons.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8102, 8114; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, §§ 7, 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, §§ 5, 6; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, §§ 3, 5; Laws, 1958, chs. 493, 509; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 396, § 5; Laws, 1978, ch. 422, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 17; Laws, 1992, ch. 469, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Cross References — Highway patrol operating fund generally, see § 45-1-23.

Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person's driver's license or driving privileges, see § 63-1-52.

§ 63-1-46. Fees for reinstatement of license subsequent to suspension, revocation or cancellation generally; disposition of fees; procedure and fees for reinstatement of license suspended for noncompliance with support order.

(1) A fee of Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) shall be charged for the reinstatement of a license issued pursuant to this article to every person whose license has been validly suspended, revoked or cancelled. This fee shall be in addition to the fee provided for in Section 63-1-43, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(2) The funds received under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be deposited into the State General Fund in accordance with Section 45-1-23, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(3) In addition to the fee provided for in subsection (1) of this section, an additional fee of Seventy-five Dollars (\$75.00) shall be charged for the reinstatement of a license issued pursuant to this article to every person whose license has been suspended or revoked under the provisions of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law or as a result of a conviction of a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Law under the provisions of Section 63-1-71.

(4) The funds received under the provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall be placed in a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury. Monies in such special fund may be expended solely to contribute to the Disability and Relief Fund for members of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol such amounts as are necessary to make sworn agents of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics who were employed by such bureau prior to December 1, 1990, and who were subsequently employed as enforcement troopers by the Department of Public Safety, full members of the retirement system for the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol with full credit for the time they were employed as sworn agents for the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics. The Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System shall certify to the State Treasurer the amounts necessary for the purposes described above. The

State Treasurer shall monthly transfer from the special fund created pursuant to this subsection the amounts deposited in such special fund to the Disability and Relief Fund for members of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol until such time as the certified amount has been transferred. At such time as the certified amount has been transferred, the State Treasurer shall transfer any funds remaining in the special fund created pursuant to this subsection to the State General Fund and shall then dissolve such special fund. This subsection (4) shall stand repealed at such time when the State Treasurer transfers funds and dissolves the special fund account in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.

(5) The procedure for the reinstatement of a license issued pursuant to this article that has been suspended for being out of compliance with an order for support, as defined in Section 93-11-153, and the payment of any fees for the reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be.

SOURCES: Laws, 1980, ch. 335; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 18; Laws, 1989, ch. 501, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 468 § 3; Laws, 1996, ch. 507, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the last sentence of subsection (4). The words “This subsection (4) of Section (3) shall stand repealed” were changed to “This subsection (4) shall stand repealed”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 20, 1998 meeting, and the section has been reprinted in the supplement to reflect the corrected language.

Editor’s Note — Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 26, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Cross References — Operation of disability and relief fund for members of Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, see § 25-13-7.

Provision that future funding for members who elect early retirement under the Highway Safety Patrol Retirement System shall be provided from surplus funds of such system as deposited therein pursuant to this section, see § 25-13-14.

Creation of highway patrol operating fund and budget therefor, see § 45-1-23.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see § 63-1-6.

Fees for licenses generally, see § 63-1-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 124 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 290 et seq.

§ 63-1-47. Duration and expiration of licenses.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, each applicant for an original license issued pursuant to this article, who is entitled to issuance of same, and who is eighteen (18) years of age or older, shall be issued a four-year license which will expire at midnight on the licensee's birthday.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all renewal licenses of operators eighteen (18) years of age or older shall be for four-year periods and may be renewed any time within six (6) months before the expiration of the license upon application and payment of the required fee, unless required to be reexamined.

(b) From and after January 1, 1990, no commercial driver's license shall be issued under the provisions of this article for any commercial motor vehicle, the lawful operation of which requires the driver to obtain a Class A, B or C commercial driver's license under Article 2 of this chapter; however, from time to time, the holder of a commercial license may apply for a commercial driver's license under Article 2 of this chapter; and, if he fails to pass the required test for such license, he shall be entitled to an extension of his license that shall be valid for one hundred twenty (120) days or until he again is tested under Article 2 of this chapter, whichever occurs first. The extension shall entitle the license holder to operate all vehicles which such license authorized him to operate prior to taking the required test. The first extension shall be without charge; however, a fee of Fifteen Dollars (\$15.00) shall be imposed for any subsequent extension. No extension shall be valid past March 31, 1992.

(2) Any commercial driver's license issued under this article before January 1, 1990, which expires after March 31, 1992, shall be void on April 1, 1992, for the operation of any commercial vehicle requiring a commercial license to be issued under Article 2 of this chapter; however, if the holder of any such license applies for a commercial driver's license under Article 2 of this chapter, passes the required tests for such license, pays all applicable fees under Article 2 of this chapter except the Forty Dollars (\$40.00) license fee and otherwise meets all requirements for the issuance of such license, then such person shall be issued a license under Article 2 of this chapter which shall expire on the expiration date of the commercial driver's license being replaced.

(3) The fee for the issuance of an original and renewals of a Class D commercial driver's license under this article to an applicant who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government and the period for which such license will be valid and expire shall be as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.

(4) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall notify, by United States mail addressed to the last known address of record with the Department of Public Safety, all holders of a commercial driver's license issued under this article before January 1, 1990, and which expire after March 31, 1992, that such license will be void on and after April 1, 1992, for the operation of any vehicle for which a commercial driver's license is required to be issued under Article 2 of this chapter.

(5) Any person holding a valid commercial driver's license issued under this article before January 1, 1990, shall continue thereafter, until expiration of such license, to be entitled to operate all vehicles which such license authorized him to operate immediately before January 1, 1990, except that from and after April 1, 1992, such license shall not entitle the licensee to operate a commercial motor vehicle the lawful operation of which requires a commercial driver's license under Article 2 of this chapter.

(6) Except as otherwise provided in this article, each applicant for an original driver's license issued pursuant to this article, who is entitled to issuance of same, being under eighteen (18) years of age, shall be issued a one-year license which will expire at midnight on the licensee's birthday. Renewal drivers' licenses of operators under the age of eighteen (18) shall be for one-year periods and may be renewed any time within two (2) months before the expiration of the license upon application and payment of the required fee, unless required to be reexamined. An intermediate license shall be valid for one (1) year from its date of issue and may be renewed any time within fourteen (14) days before expiration of the license. All applications by an operator under the age of eighteen (18) must be accompanied by documentation that the applicant is in compliance with the education requirements of Section 63-1-9(1)(g), and the documentation must be dated no more than thirty (30) days prior to the date of application.

(7) Any license issued under this article to a person who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government shall expire one (1) year from the date of issuance and may be renewed, if such person is otherwise qualified to renew such license, within thirty (30) days of expiration. The fee for any such license and for renewal shall be as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8114; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 6; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 5; Laws, 1958, ch. 509; Laws, 1968, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 453, § 3; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 19; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 24; Laws, 1990, ch. 310, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 7; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 5; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

Fees for operators' and commercial drivers' licenses, see § 63-1-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 105 et seq. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 277-279.

§ 63-1-49. Renewal of licenses.

(1) An expired license issued pursuant to this article may be renewed at any time within twelve (12) months after the expiration date of said license upon application and payment of the required fee, and the payment of a

delinquent fee of One Dollar (\$1.00), in lieu of a driver examination, unless the holder of the expired license is required to be examined, or unless the department has reason to believe the licensee is no longer qualified to receive a license. If any person shall obtain a new license, his last previous license having been good and valid, except for its lapsing, without his having obtained a renewal within the time required by law, then such reissuance of a license shall constitute a renewal of the previous license and not a new license.

(2)(a) Any person in the armed services of the United States, holding a valid license issued pursuant to this article and being out of state due to military service at the time said license expires, may renew said license at any time within ninety (90) days after being discharged from such military service or upon returning to the state, without payment of any delinquent fee or examination, unless the department has reason to believe that the licensee is no longer qualified to receive a license. Said person shall make proof by affidavit of the fact of such military service and of the time of discharge or return. The expiration of the license of a military person under the provisions of this paragraph (a) shall not affect the validity of the license, but such license shall continue to be valid and permit such person to operate a motor vehicle for a period of ninety (90) days after he is discharged from military service or returns to the state or until he renews his license, whichever event first occurs.

(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) also apply to the spouse or a child of a person in the armed services of the United States who is out of state due to military service if the spouse or child resides out of state with the armed services member and the license of the spouse or child expires during his or her absence from the state. The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this paragraph.

(3) Any person holding a valid license issued pursuant to this article who is going overseas for two (2) to four (4) years and whose license shall expire during the stay overseas may renew said license for four (4) years prior to leaving. Said person shall make proof by affidavit of the fact of such overseas travel. Such reissuance of a license shall constitute a renewal of the previous license and not a new license.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8102, 8114; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, §§ 7, 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, §§ 5, 6; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, §§ 3, 5; Laws, 1958, chs. 493, 509; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 20; Laws, 1991, ch. 328 § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 339, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment added (2)(b) and redesignated former (2) as present (2)(a); and substituted “this paragraph (a)” for “this subsection” in (2)(a).

Cross References — Motorcycle operator's license, see § 63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son's negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for suc-

ceeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. *Houston v. Holmes*, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138 (1947).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 105 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 277-279.

§ 63-1-51. Grounds and procedure for revocation of licenses; suspension of license for noncompliance with order for support.

(1) It shall be the duty of the trial judge, upon conviction of any person holding a license issued pursuant to this article where the penalty for a traffic violation is as much as Ten Dollars (\$10.00), to mail a copy of abstract of the court record or provide an electronically or computer generated copy of abstract of the court record immediately to the commissioner at Jackson, Mississippi, showing the date of conviction, penalty, etc., so that a record of same may be made by the Department of Public Safety. The commissioner shall forthwith revoke the license of any person for a period of one (1) year upon receiving a duly certified record of each person's convictions of any of the following offenses when such conviction has become final:

(a) Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;

(b) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;

(c) Failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state in event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another;

(d) Perjury or the willful making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the department under this article or under any other law relating to the ownership or operation of motor vehicles;

(e) Conviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon three (3) charges of reckless driving committed within a period of twelve (12) months;

(f) Contempt for failure to pay a fine or fee or to respond to a summons or citation pursuant to a charge of a violation of this title.

(2) The commissioner shall revoke the license issued pursuant to this article of any person convicted of negligent homicide, in addition to any penalty now provided by law.

(3) In addition to the reasons specified in this section, the commissioner shall be authorized to suspend the license issued to any person pursuant to this article for being out of compliance with an order for support, as defined in Section 93-11-153. The procedure for suspension of a license for being out of compliance with an order for support, and the procedure for the reissuance or

reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, and the payment of any fees for the reissuance or reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be. If there is any conflict between any provision of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163 and any provision of this article, the provisions of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, shall control.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8106, 8173; Laws, 1938, chs. 143, 200; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1956, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 26; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 21; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 50; Laws, 1995, ch. 506, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References — Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person's driver's license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see § 21-23-19.

Revocation of municipal license of bus operator, see § 21-27-155.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person's driver's license or driving privileges, see § 63-1-52.

Application of this section to suspension of commercial driver's license or permit for falsifying license or permit application, see § 63-1-81.

Applicability of Article IV of Driver License Compact Law to offenses enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, see § 63-1-113.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist whose operator's license was revoked following his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not entitled to proceed by writ of certiorari in the circuit court to review the action of the commis-

sioner of public safety when he had previously failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Code 1942, § 8105. *Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Berry*, 217 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What constitutes "operation" or "negligence in operation" within statute making owner of motor vehicle liable for negligence in its operation. 13 A.L.R.2d 378.

Criminal responsibility of one other than driver under "hit-and-run" statute. 62 A.L.R.2d 1130.

What is a "motor vehicle" within statutes making it an offense to drive while intoxicated. 66 A.L.R.2d 1146.

What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver's license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Suspension or revocation of driver's license for refusal to take sobriety test. 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Ordinance providing for suspension or revocation of state-issued driver's license as within municipal power. 92 A.L.R.2d 204.

Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspending automobile driver's license as providing for trial de novo. 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Regulations establishing a "point system" as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.3d 690.

Construction and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference of intoxication from specified percentages of alcohol present in system. 16 A.L.R.3d 748.

Right to trial by jury in criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated or similar offense. 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.

Automobiles: driving under the influence, or when addicted to the use, of drugs as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.3d 815.

What amounts to negligence within meaning of statutes penalizing negligent homicide by operation of motor vehicle. 20 A.L.R.3d 473.

Homicide by automobile as murder. 21 A.L.R.3d 116.

Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor. 58 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Necessity of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver's license. 60 A.L.R.3d 361.

Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver's license. 60 A.L.R.3d 427.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance mandating imprisonment for habitual or repeated traffic offender. 2 A.L.R.4th 618.

Drunk driving: Motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations. 48 A.L.R.4th 367.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 124 et seq.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 49.1.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 290 et seq.

§ 63-1-52. Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of person's driver's license or driving privileges.

(1) Whenever the Commissioner of Public Safety suspends, cancels or revokes the driver's license or driving privileges of any person, notice of the suspension, cancellation or revocation shall be given to such person by the commissioner, or his duly authorized agent, in the manner provided in subsection (2) of this section and at the time provided in subsection (3) of this section or in the manner and at the time provided in subsection (4) of this section.

(2) Notice shall be given in the following manner:

(a) In writing, (i) by United States Certificate of Mail; or (ii) by personal service at the person's address as it appears on the driving record maintained by the Department of Public Safety or at the person's last known address; or (iii) by personal notice being given by any law enforcement officer of this state or any duly authorized agent of the Commissioner of Public Safety on forms prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner of Public Safety; whenever a person's driver's license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Driver License Compact Law, the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law or paragraphs (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e) or (2)(f) of Section 63-1-53.

(b) In writing, by United States first class mail, whenever a person's driver's license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in

accordance with the Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law, the Youth Court Law, Chapter 23 of Title 43, Mississippi Code of 1972, Section 63-1-45, Section 63-1-51, paragraph (2)(g), (2)(h) or (2)(i) of Section 63-1-53 or Section 63-9-25.

(3) Notice shall be given at the following time:

(a) Before suspension, revocation or cancellation, whenever a person's driver's license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Driver License Compact Law, the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law or paragraph (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e) or (2)(f) of Section 63-1-53.

(b) Unless otherwise specifically provided for by law, at the time of suspension, revocation or cancellation, whenever a person's driver's license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law, the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, the Youth Court Law, Chapter 23 of Title 43, Mississippi Code of 1972, Section 63-1-45, Section 63-1-51, paragraph (2)(g), (2)(h) or (2)(i) of Section 63-1-53 or Section 63-9-25.

(4) Whenever the Commissioner of Public Safety suspends, revokes or cancels the driver's license or driving privileges of any person in accordance with some provision of law other than a provision of law referred to in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, and the manner and time for giving notice is not provided for in such law, then notice of such suspension, revocation or cancellation shall be given in the manner and at the time provided for under paragraphs (2)(b) and (3)(b) of this section.

SOURCES: Laws, 1991, ch. 412, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor's Note — Chapter 23 of Title 43 (pertaining to family courts), referred to in (2)(b) and (3)(b), was repealed by Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 2, effective from and after May 28, 1999.

Cross References — Suspension of driver's license by commissioner for failure to respond to summons or citation or to pay fine, fees and assessments, see § 63-1-51.

Notice of suspension of license without preliminary hearing, see § 63-1-53.

Notice of suspension of license for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor, see § 63-11-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to

suspend or revoke license — Attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

§ 63-1-53. Notice to accused upon failure to respond to summons or citation, or failure to pay fine; notice to Commissioner of Public Safety; authority of commissioner to suspend license without preliminary hearing; notice of suspension; hearing.

(1) Upon failure of any person to respond timely and properly to a summons or citation charging such person with any violation of this title, or upon failure of any person to pay timely any fine, fee or assessment levied as a result of any violation of this title, the clerk of the court shall give written notice to such person by United States first class mail at his last known address advising such person that if within ten (10) days after such notice is deposited in the mail the person has not properly responded to the summons or citation or has not paid the entire amount of all fines, fees and assessments levied, then the court will give notice thereof to the Commissioner of Public Safety and the commissioner may suspend the driver's license of such person. The actual cost incurred by the court in the giving of such notice may be added to any other court costs assessed in such case. If within ten (10) days after the notice is given in accordance with this subsection such person has not satisfactorily disposed of the matter pending before the court, then the clerk of the court immediately shall mail a copy of the abstract of the court record, along with a certified copy of the notice given under this subsection, to the Commissioner of Public Safety, and the commissioner may suspend the driver's license of such person as authorized under subsections (2) and (3) of this section.

(2) The commissioner is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:

(a) Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license is required upon conviction except under the provisions of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law;

(b) Has been involved as a driver in any accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another or serious property damage;

(c) Is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle;

(d) Has been convicted with such frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways;

(e) Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle;

(f) Has permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of such license;

(g) Has committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation;

(h) Has failed to pay any fine, fee or other assessment levied as a result of any violation of this title;

(i) Has failed to respond to a summons or citation which charged a violation of this title; or

(j) Has committed a violation for which mandatory revocation of license is required upon conviction, entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudication of delinquency, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 63-1-71.

(3) Notice that a person's license is suspended or will be suspended under subsection (2) of this section shall be given by the commissioner in the manner and at the time provided for under Section 63-1-52, and upon such person's request, he shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing as early as practical within not to exceed twenty (20) days after receipt of such request in the county wherein the licensee resides unless the department and the licensee agree that such hearing may be held in some other county. Upon such hearing the commissioner, or his duly authorized agent, may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers and may require a reexamination of the licensee. Upon such hearing the commissioner shall either rescind any order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may extend any suspension of such license or revoke such license.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8107; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1956, ch. 379, § 2; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 27; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 51; Laws, 1991, ch. 403, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 468 § 7; Laws, 1991, ch. 615 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch 487, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 25, amended this section effective July 1, 1990 provided that the Legislature, by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Laws, 1993, ch. 487, § 3, effective July 1, 1993, provides as follows:

"SECTION 3. The amendments to the sections of law contained in this act shall apply only to convictions occurring from and after July 1, 1993."

Cross References — Suspension of license for unlawfully parking in an area designated for handicapped parking, see § 27-19-56.

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person's driver's license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see § 21-23-19.

Suspension of municipal license of bus operator, see § 21-27-155.

Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§ 41-29-101 et seq.

Replacement of unexpired driver's license surrendered or suspended for medical reasons by free identification card, see § 45-35-7.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person's driver's license or driving privileges. see § 63-1-52.

Forfeiture for 90 days of person under arrest who refuses to submit to chemical test mandated by Implied Consent Law, see § 63-11-21.

Suspension of license for failure to deposit security and furnish proof of financial responsibility under Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, see § 63-15-11.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

As for revocation of licenses of persons for out-of-state convictions, Miss. Code Section 63-1-53(g) gives Commissioner of Public Safety authority to suspend license of any person who "has committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation". O'Cain, Jan. 20, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0022.

In justice court, clerk or deputy clerk has power, under Miss. Code Section 63-1-53, to send out "fail to appear" notices to defendants on traffic or game and fish violations. Ferguson, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

A 10 day letter (commonly referred to as a DR15) on a traffic citation should be sent upon the failure of the defendant to ap-

pear on the date properly noticed or upon the failure of a defendant to pay any fine assessed; thus, if a defendant fails to appear for an initial appearance after receiving proper notice, the 10 day letter should be sent; in addition a 10 day letter should be sent if a defendant is tried in absentia, found guilty and assessed a fine. Mark, August 6, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0398.

No statute of limitation exists on the collection of unpaid fines, and there is no limit on the authority of the Commissioner of Public Safety to suspend the license of an individual who still owes a fine on a traffic offense conviction where such conviction occurred five or ten years prior. Via, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0185.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulations establishing a "point system" as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.3d 690.

Necessity of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver's license. 60 A.L.R.3d 361.

Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver's license. 60 A.L.R.3d 427.

State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Admissibility, in motor vehicle license suspension proceedings, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure. 23 A.L.R.5th 108.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 124 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 34, 41-56.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 290 et seq.

§ 63-1-55. Suspension of license of minor by trial judge; requirement of completion of defensive driving course; costs and assessments; procedure upon appeal of suspension.

A trial judge, in his discretion, if the person so convicted or who has entered a plea of guilty for any traffic violation, except the offenses enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (e) of subsection (1) of Section 63-1-51 and violations of the Implied Consent Law and the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, is a minor and dependent upon and subject to the care, custody and control of his parents or guardian, may, in lieu of the penalties otherwise provided by law and the provision of said section, suspend such minor's driver's license by taking and keeping same in custody of the court for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days. The judge so ordering such suspension shall enter upon his docket "DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENDED FOR _____ DAYS IN LIEU OF CONVICTION" and such action by the trial judge shall not constitute a conviction. The trial judge also may require the minor to

successfully complete a defensive driving course approved by the judge as a condition of the suspension. Costs of court and penalty assessment for driver education and training program may be imposed in such actions within the discretion of the court. Should a minor appeal, in the time and manner as by law provided, the decision whereby his license is suspended, the trial judge shall then return said license to the minor and impose the fines and/or penalties that he would have otherwise imposed and same shall constitute a conviction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8106; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1956, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 26; Laws, 1992, ch. 323, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 2, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Cross References — Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person's driver's license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see § 21-23-19.

Driver training penalty assessment fund generally, see § 37-25-17.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 63-1-55 provides that justice court judge may suspend minor's driver's license in lieu of conviction, and in addition "may require the minor to

successfully complete defensive driving course approved by the judge as a condition of the suspension." Ferguson, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver's license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspend-

ing automobile driver's license as providing for trial de novo. 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 124 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 290 et seq.

§ 63-1-57. Driving while license or driving privilege cancelled, suspended or revoked.

Any person whose license issued pursuant to this article or driving privilege as a nonresident has been canceled, suspended or revoked as provided in this title or in Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended or revoked, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two (2) days or more than six (6) months. There may be imposed in addition thereto a fine of not less than Two Hundred Dollars (\$200.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) for each offense.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8110; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 22; Laws, 1988, ch. 563, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 507, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Affidavit.

2. —Defect cured by amendment.

1. Affidavit.

The gravamen of the crime under this section [Code 1942, § 8110] is the driving when the driver has no license to drive and the fact that the driver could not tell from the affidavit whether he was charged with so driving when his license had been suspended or when it had been revoked is immaterial. *Middleton v. State*, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320 (1952).

2. —Defect cured by amendment.

Where the original affidavit did not charge the defendant for driving motor vehicle without license upon a public highway in Mississippi the defect was cured by an amendment to the affidavit alleging that defendant was driving in District 5 of Marion County upon Highway No. 24 of the State of Mississippi. *Middleton v. State*, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320 (1952).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Automobiles: necessity or emergency as defense in prosecution for driving without operator's license or while license is suspended. 61 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 285, 286.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1428, 1429.

§ 63-1-59. Making false affidavit or statements.

Any person who makes any false affidavit, or knowingly swears or affirms falsely to any matter or thing required by the terms of this article to be sworn to or affirmed, is guilty of perjury and upon conviction shall be punishable by fine or imprisonment as other persons committing perjury are punishable.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8109; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

Cross References — Punishment of person committing perjury, see § 97-9-61.

§ 63-1-60. Alteration, fraudulent use, or fraudulent procurement of license.

(1) It shall be unlawful for any person:

(a) To display, cause or permit to be displayed, or have in his possession, any fictitious, fraudulently altered or fraudulently obtained driver's license;

(b) To display or represent any driver's license not issued to him as being his own driver's license;

(c) To photograph, photostat, duplicate or in any way reproduce, manufacture, sell or distribute or alter any driver's license, or facsimile thereof, in such a manner that it could be mistaken for a valid driver's license;

(d) To display or have in his possession any photograph, photostat, duplicate, reproduction or facsimile of a driver's license unless authorized by law; or

(e) To take a driver's license examination for another or to use any other name, other than his own, on the driver's license application in an attempt to take the driver's license examination for another.

(2) Any person convicted of a violation of paragraph (a), (b), (d) or (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(3) Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of the offense who is convicted of a violation of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section shall be punished as follows:

(a) A first offense shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(b) A second or subsequent offense, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(4) Any person twenty-one (21) years of age or older at the time of the offense who is convicted of a violation of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), or imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 479; Laws, 1998, ch. 558, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 551, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Office supply store that allegedly made color photocopies of doctored driver's license subsequently used by underage driver to buy alcohol (although not on night of accident that resulted in death of plaintiff's decedent) was not negligent per se based on alleged violation of § 63-1-60, which was designed to prevent persons

from making and using fake or improper drivers' licenses, as statute did not purport to prevent minors from purchasing alcoholic beverages and did not specifically state that it applied to businesses that had photocopying capability. *Main v. Office Depot, Inc.*, 914 F. Supp. 1413 (S.D. Miss. 1996), *aff'd*, 101 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 1996).

§ 63-1-61. Causing or permitting child or ward under sixteen years of age to drive without authorization.

No person shall cause or knowingly permit his child or ward under the age of sixteen (16) years to drive a motor vehicle upon any highway if such minor is not authorized under the provisions of this article or is in violation of any of the provisions of this article. Any penalty imposed under the provisions of this

section shall be in addition to any penalty imposed against the minor for a violation of this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8111; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 4, eff from and after September 1, 1995.

Cross References — Application of penalty provision of this section to falsifying information on a commercial driver's license application, see § 63-1-81.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Evidence insufficient.

1. In general.

A parent is negligent who permits a child under the statutory age for a licensed driver to drive his automobile on the highway, rendering him liable for the act of such child in permitting another to drive, even though he has forbidden child to do so, and to drive upon the road where the accident occurred. *United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones*, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So. 2d 240 (1959).

2. Evidence insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support a judgment against the defendant for property damage caused in an accident between the plaintiffs and the defendant's 14 year old son since there was no evidence that the defendant knew that his son was taking the car. *Chandler v. Coleman*, 759 So. 2d 459 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Construction, application, and effect of legislation making it an offense to permit, or imputing negligence to one who permits an unauthorized or unlicensed person to operate motor vehicle. 69 A.L.R.2d 978.

Liability of donor of motor vehicle for injuries resulting from owner's operation. 22 A.L.R.4th 738.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 287.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1544.

§ 63-1-63. Permitting operation of vehicle by another person in violation of article.

No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized under the provisions of this article or in violation of any of the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8112; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In an action against the parents and a minor for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident, where there was

no proof that the father or mother authorized or knowingly permitted the minor to drive on the occasion in question, the trial court properly peremptorily instructed

the jury to return a verdict for the parents. *Prewitt v. Walker*, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Construction, application, and effect of legislation making it an offense to permit, or imputing negligence to one who permits, an unauthorized or unlicensed person to operate motor vehicle. 69 A.L.R.2d 978.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 287.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1544.

§ 63-1-65. Loan of license or temporary permit to another or use of another's permit or license.

It shall be unlawful for any person to lend or borrow any temporary driving permit or license issued pursuant to this article, or to display or represent a license or temporary permit not issued to himself. Any person violating this section shall be fined not less than Five Dollars (\$5.00) and costs and not more than Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) and costs.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8116; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-1-67. Renting motor vehicle to another.

(1) No person shall rent a motor vehicle to any other person unless the latter person is then duly licensed under the provisions of this article, or, in the case of a nonresident, then duly licensed under the laws of the state or country of his residence except a nonresident whose home state or country does not require that an operator be licensed.

(2) No person shall rent a motor vehicle to another until he has inspected the license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared and verified the signature thereon with the signature of such person written in his presence.

(3) Every person renting a motor vehicle to another shall keep a record of the registration number of the motor vehicle so rented, the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle is rented, the number of the license of said latter person and the date and place when and where said license was issued. Such record shall be open to inspection by any police officer or officers or employee of the commissioner.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8113; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 24, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Criminal offenses in connection with rental of motor vehicles. 38 A.L.R.3d 949. State regulation of motor vehicle rental ("you-drive") business. 60 A.L.R.4th 784.

Rental agency's liability for negligent entrustment of vehicle. 78 A.L.R.3d 1170.

§ 63-1-69. Punishment for violations where no specific penalty provided.

Any person convicted of a violation of this article or any provisions of said article for which no other penalty is provided shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars (\$5.00) and costs and not more than two hundred fifty dollars (\$250.00) and costs, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of from one to six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8117; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

Cross References — Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person's driver's license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see § 21-23-19.

Application of this section to the punishment of a commercial motor vehicle driver for having more than one driver's license, see § 63-1-76.

Application of this section to the punishment for driving commercial motor vehicle without appropriate license or while license suspended, revoked, ect., see § 63-1-77.

Application of this section to the punishment for a state resident using a commercial driver's license issued by another jurisdiction, see § 63-1-81.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-1-71. Revocation or suspension of driving privilege of person convicted of violation of Uniform Controlled Substance Law or violation of similar law of another jurisdiction; reduction of suspension in hardship cases.

(1) In addition to any penalty authorized by the Uniform Controlled Substances Law or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, every person convicted of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent in a court of this state for a violation of any offense defined in the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, and every person convicted of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent under the laws of the United States, another state, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of a violation for the use, distribution, possession, manufacture, sale, barter, transfer or dispensing of a "controlled substance," "counterfeit substance," "narcotic drug" or "drug," as such terms are defined under Section 41-29-105, shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state for a period of

six (6) months. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 63-11-30(2)(a) and in addition to any penalty authorized by the Uniform Controlled Substances Law or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of *nolo contendere* thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, in a court of this state, and every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of *nolo contendere* thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, under the laws of the United States, another state, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state for a period of not less than six (6) months. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence does not have a driver's license or is less than fifteen (15) years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of not less than six (6) months after the day the person obtains a driver's license or reaches the age of fifteen (15) years. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, the revocation or suspension period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension.

(2) The court in this state before whom any person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of an offense under subsection (1) of this section shall collect forthwith the Mississippi driver's license of the person and forward such license to the Department of Public Safety along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or revocation period imposed pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the Commissioner of Public Safety. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or revocation period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or revocation imposed pursuant to this section, the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in Section 63-11-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of Section 63-11-40. If the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the Commissioner of Public Safety who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's nonresident driving privilege in this state.

(3) The county court or circuit court having jurisdiction, on petition, may reduce the suspension of driving privileges under this section if the denial of which would constitute a hardship on the offender. When the petition is filed, such person shall pay to the circuit clerk of the court where the petition is filed a fee of Twenty Dollars (\$20.00) for each year, or portion thereof, of license revocation or suspension remaining under the original sentence, which shall be deposited into the State General Fund to the credit of a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury to be used for alcohol or drug abuse treatment and education, upon appropriation by the Legislature. This fee shall be in addition to any other court costs or fees required for the filing of petitions.

SOURCES: Laws, 1991, ch. 468 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch 487, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1993, ch. 487, § 3, effective July 1, 1993, provides as follows: "SECTION 3. The amendments to the sections of law contained in this act shall apply only to convictions occurring from and after July 1, 1993."

Cross References — Fee for reinstatement of license suspended or revoked for violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see § 63-1-46.

Authority of commissioner to suspend operator's license without preliminary hearing for violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see § 63-1-53.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

This section applies to everyone pleading nolo to, convicted, or adjudicated delinquent of a controlled substances violation. Hankins, Oct. 30, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0798.

Section 63-1-71(2) and Section 41-29-139(c)(2)(A) are not in conflict; report of conviction for less than one ounce of marijuana must be sent to the Bureau of Narcotics pursuant to 41-29-139, and, if court is unable to collect the license of person convicted, court shall also cause

report of conviction to be sent to Commissioner of Public Safety, Driver Improvement Division. Lowe, Sept. 16, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0680.

A defendant's driver's license will be suspended for a conviction of possession of marijuana or for possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle or for possession of paraphernalia and a conviction for any of these should be reported to the Department of Public Safety. Shirley, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

ARTICLE 2.

MISSISSIPPI COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE LAW.

SEC.

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|----------|--|
| 63-1-73. | Short title. |
| 63-1-74. | Purpose; construction. |
| 63-1-75. | Definitions. |
| 63-1-76. | Possession of multiple driver's licenses. |
| 63-1-77. | Driving commercial motor vehicle without appropriate license; driving while license suspended, revoked, etc. |
| 63-1-78. | Applicability of provisions of article. |
| 63-1-79. | Qualifications for license; testing; waiver of test; instruction permit; diabetics allowed to obtain commercial driver's license under certain conditions. |
| 63-1-80. | Nonresident commercial driver's license. |

- 63-1-81. Application for license or permit; fees; use by resident of license issued by another jurisdiction; falsification of information or certification; registration with Selective Service System for certain males.
- 63-1-82. Form of license; privileges conferred by license; classifications of licenses; endorsements and restrictions; requirements as to driving record information; fees; duplicate license or permit; duration of license; renewal.
- 63-1-83. Grounds, procedure and terms for suspension of license.
- 63-1-84. Implied consent to tests for presence of alcohol or controlled substances in blood; effect of refusal to submit to test.
- 63-1-85. Classification of offenses under article; relationship between penalties imposed under article and other provisions of law relating to operation of motor vehicles.
- 63-1-86. Notification of license authority of state of suspension, revocation or cancellation of license and of traffic control violations by nonresident; disclosure of information relating to driving record.
- 63-1-87. Authority to drive commercial motor vehicle in state under license issued by another jurisdiction.
- 63-1-88. Full faith and credit of out-of-state convictions.
- 63-1-89. Rules and regulations.
- 63-1-90. Use of inspection stations for commercial driver's license testing sites.

§ 63-1-73. Short title.

This article may be cited as the "Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law."

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

Cross References — Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Setting up training program to assist county employees who currently drive commercial vehicles for county, in taking drivers test and obtaining of new commercial licenses would not be donation or use

of public funds for private purpose; however, payment of license fee would be donation, and would not be matter that county could fund. Shaw, Feb. 1, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0072.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-1-74. Purpose; construction.

The purpose of this article is to implement the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C.S. Appx. Section 2701 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as "CMVSA," and thereby prevent the loss to the State of Mississippi of substantial federal highway funds as a penalty for failure to comply therewith.

This article is a remedial law which should be liberally construed to promote public health, safety and welfare. The provisions of Article 1 of this chapter, being the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver's License Law of 1938, and the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title 63, Mississippi Code of 1972, being the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, including penalties for violations thereof, shall be applicable to the provisions of this article to the extent that such laws do not conflict with the provisions of this article. If any provisions of this article conflict with the provisions of the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver's License Law of 1938 or the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, then the provisions of this article shall control.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

Federal Aspects — Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, referred to in the first paragraph, may now be found at 49 USCS §§ 31100 et seq.

§ 63-1-75. Definitions.

The following words, as used in this article, shall have the meanings herein ascribed unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

(a) "Alcohol" means any substance containing any form of alcohol, including, but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, propanol and isopropanol;

(b) "Alcohol concentration" means the concentration of alcohol in a person's blood, breath or urine. When expressed as a percentage it means:

(i) The number of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood; or

(ii) The number of grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath; or

(iii) The number of grams of alcohol per sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine;

(c) "Commercial driver's license" means a license issued in accordance with the requirements of this article to an individual which authorizes the individual to drive a Class A, B or C commercial motor vehicle;

(d) "Commercial Driver License Information System" means the information system established pursuant to the CMVSA to serve as a clearinghouse for locating information related to the licensing and identification of commercial motor vehicle drivers;

(e) "Commercial driver instruction permit" means a permit issued pursuant to Section 63-1-79;

(f) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property;

(i) If the vehicle has a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one (26,001) or more pounds, or such lesser rating as determined by applicable federal regulations; or

(ii) If the vehicle is designed to transport sixteen (16) or more passengers, including the driver; or

(iii) If the vehicle is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be placarded in accordance with the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 172, Subpart F;

(g) "Controlled substance" means any substance so classified under Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USCS 802(6), and includes all substances listed on Schedules I through V of 21 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308, as they may be revised from time to time, any substance so classified under Sections 41-29-113 through 41-29-121, Mississippi Code of 1972, and any other substance which would impair a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle;

(h) "Conviction" means an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's appearance in court, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court or tribunal, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended or probated;

(i) "Disqualification" means a withdrawal of the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle, including a suspension, cancellation or revocation of a person's driver's license or driving privileges and an out-of-service order;

(j) "Drive" means to drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle;

(k) "Driver" means any person who drives, operates or is in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle or who is required to hold a commercial driver's license;

(l) "Driver's license" means a license issued by a state to an individual which authorizes the individual to drive a motor vehicle;

(m) "Felony" means any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of one (1) year or more;

(n) "Foreign jurisdiction" means any jurisdiction other than a state or the United States;

(o) "Gross vehicle weight rating" means the value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum loaded weight of a single or a combination (articulated) vehicle, or registered gross weight, whichever is greater. The gross vehicle weight rating of a combination (articulated) vehicle (commonly referred to as the "gross combination weight rating") is the gross vehicle weight rating of the power unit plus the gross vehicle weight rating of the towed unit or units;

(p) "Hazardous materials" has the meaning as that found in Section 103 of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 Appx. USCS 1801 et seq.;

(q) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs and electric assistive mobility devices, as such term is defined in Section 63-3-103;

(r) "Nonresident commercial driver's license" means a commercial driver's license issued by a state to an individual who resides in a foreign jurisdiction;

(s) "Out-of-service order" means a temporary prohibition against driving a commercial motor vehicle;

(t) "Serious traffic violation" means a conviction when operating a commercial motor vehicle of:

(i) Excessive speeding, involving a single charge of any speed fifteen (15) miles per hour or more above the posted speed limit or such other minimum speed above the posted speed limit as prescribed by the CMVSA or federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto;

(ii) Reckless driving as defined under state or local law;

(iii) A violation of any state or local law related to motor vehicle traffic control resulting in a fatal accident other than a parking violation, a vehicle weight violation or a vehicle defect; or

(iv) Any other violation of a state or local law which the United States Secretary of Transportation determines by regulation to be a serious traffic violation under the CMVSA;

(u) "State" means a state of the United States and the District of Columbia;

(v) "United States" means the fifty (50) states and the District of Columbia.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 3; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment added "and electric assistive mobility devices, as such term is defined in Section 63-3-103" at the end of (q).

Federal Aspects — Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 USCS §§ 5101 et seq.

§ 63-1-76. Possession of multiple driver's licenses.

No person who drives a commercial motor vehicle shall have more than one (1) driver's license. Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished as provided by Section 63-1-69, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 4, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 63-1-77. Driving commercial motor vehicle without appropriate license; driving while license suspended, revoked, etc.

(1) Except when driving under a commercial driver instruction permit and accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver's license valid for the

vehicle being driven, from and after April 1, 1992, no person shall drive a commercial motor vehicle on the highways of this state unless the person holds a commercial driver's license with applicable endorsements valid for the vehicle he is driving.

(2) From and after April 1, 1992, no person shall drive a commercial motor vehicle on the highways of this state while his driving privilege is suspended, revoked or cancelled, while subject to a disqualification or in violation of an out-of-service order.

(3) Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished as provided by Section 63-1-69, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 5, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

Cross References — Fee for Class D license to operate vehicle as common carrier by motor vehicle, taxicab, passenger coach, dray, contract carrier or private contract carrier, see § 63-1-43.

Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

§ 63-1-78. Applicability of provisions of article.

(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this article, the provisions of this article shall be inapplicable to the following persons and vehicles:

(a) Those operators of a farm vehicle which is:

(i) Controlled by a farmer and operated by the farmer, an employee of the farmer or a member of the farmer's family;

(ii) Used to transport agricultural products, aquacultural products, unprocessed forestry products, farm machinery or farm supplies, or any combination thereof, to or from a farm;

(iii) Not used in the operations of a common or contract motor carrier; and

(iv) Used within one hundred fifty (150) miles of the person's farm;

(b) Those persons who drive or operate emergency or fire equipment which is necessary to the preservation of life or property or the execution of emergency governmental functions;

(c) Military vehicles when operated in pursuit of military purposes by any active duty military personnel, member of the reserves and National Guard on active duty including personnel on full-time National Guard duty, personnel on part-time training and National Guard military technicians;

(d) Those persons who hold a valid Class D commercial driver's license as provided under Section 63-1-82; and

(e) Any vehicle which is used strictly and exclusively to transport personal possessions or family members for nonbusiness purposes.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not be construed as exempting any person or vehicle from the provisions of the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver's License Law of 1938, the Mississippi Implied Consent Law or the provisions of any other laws of this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 6; Laws, 1992, ch. 304 § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 30, 1992).

Cross References — Fee for Class D license to operate vehicle as common carrier by motor vehicle, taxicab, passenger coach, dray, contract carrier or private contract carrier, see § 63-1-43.

Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

§ 63-1-79. Qualifications for license; testing; waiver of test; instruction permit; diabetics allowed to obtain commercial driver's license under certain conditions.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this article, no person shall be issued a commercial driver's license under this article unless that person is a resident of this state, is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, has passed a knowledge and skills test for driving a commercial motor vehicle which complies with minimum standards established by applicable federal regulations, and has satisfied all other requirements of the CMVSA in addition to other requirements imposed by state law or federal regulation. The tests shall be prescribed and conducted by the Commissioner of Public Safety. Notwithstanding the minimum age requirements for issuance of a commercial driver's license under this article, any person seventeen (17) years of age or older who otherwise meets all requirements for issuance of a commercial driver's license may be issued a commercial driver's license with an endorsement thereon which authorizes the licensee to drive a commercial motor vehicle within the geographic boundaries of this state only.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the Commissioner of Public Safety may authorize another person, including an agency, department, institution, political subdivision or instrumentality of this or another state, an employer, a private driver training facility or other private institution, to administer the skills test specified by this section, provided:

(a) The test is the same which would otherwise be administered by the Commissioner of Public Safety; and

(b) Such person has entered into an agreement with this state which complies with requirements of applicable federal regulations.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall waive the knowledge test and/or skills test specified in this section for a commercial driver's license applicant who meets any waiver requirements of applicable federal regulations.

(4) A commercial driver's license or commercial driver instruction permit shall not be issued to a person while the person is subject to a disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle or while the person's driver's license is suspended, revoked or cancelled in any state; nor may a commercial driver's license be issued to a person who has a commercial driver's license issued by any other state unless the person first surrenders all such licenses, which must be returned to the issuing state or states for cancellation.

(5)(a) A commercial driver instruction permit may be issued to an individual who has passed the vision and written tests required for the class of commercial driver's license applied for under this article.

(b) Unless the Commissioner of Public Safety waives the skills test for a commercial driver's license applicant as provided under this article, any person applying for a commercial driver's license under this article shall be required to obtain a commercial driver instruction permit before applying for or obtaining such commercial driver's license.

(c) A commercial driver instruction permit shall not be issued for a period to exceed six (6) months. Only three (3) renewals shall be granted within a three-year period. The holder of a commercial driver instruction permit may, unless otherwise disqualified, drive a commercial motor vehicle only when accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver's license valid for the type of vehicle driven who occupies a seat beside the individual for the purpose of giving instruction in driving the commercial motor vehicle.

(6) Notwithstanding any requirement imposed by state law or state or federal regulations restricting the issuance of a commercial driver's license to a person suffering from diabetes, a person suffering from diabetes may be issued a commercial driver's license if the person otherwise meets all qualifications for issuance provided:

(a) The driver is physically examined every year, including an examination by a board-certified/eligible endocrinologist attesting to the fact that the driver is:

(i) Free of insulin reactions (an individual is free of insulin reactions if that individual does not have severe hypoglycemia or hypoglycemia unawareness, and has less than one (1) documented, symptomatic hypoglycemic reaction per month);

(ii) Able to and has demonstrated willingness to properly monitor and manage the person's diabetes; and

(iii) Not likely to suffer any diminution in driving ability due to the person's diabetic condition.

(b) The driver agrees to and complies with the following conditions:

(i) A source of rapidly absorbable glucose shall be carried at all times while driving;

(ii) Blood glucose levels shall be self-monitored one (1) hour prior to driving and at least once every four (4) hours while driving or on duty prior to driving using a portable glucose monitoring device equipped with a computerized memory;

(iii) Submit blood glucose logs to the endocrinologist or medical examiner at the annual examination or when otherwise directed by the Department of Public Safety;

(iv) Provide a copy of the endocrinologist's report to the medical examiner at the time of the annual medical examination; and

(v) Provide a copy of the annual medical certification to the person's employer for retention in the driver's qualification file and retain a copy of the certification on his person while driving for presentation to a duly authorized federal, state or local enforcement official.

(c) The commercial license issued under this subsection (6) will bear an endorsement restricting commercial driving on the license to driving only within the boundaries of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 7; Laws, 1992, ch. 467, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 407, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 322, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added (6) to allow diabetics to obtain a commercial driver's license under certain conditions.

Cross References — Video-taped instructional material to assist reading impaired applicants to prepare for driver's examination, see § 63-1-34.

Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

§ 63-1-80. Nonresident commercial driver's license.

The Commissioner of Public Safety may issue a nonresident commercial driver's license to a resident of a foreign jurisdiction if the United States Secretary of Transportation has determined that the commercial motor vehicle testing and licensing standards in the foreign jurisdiction do not meet the testing standards established in 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 383, and if the nonresident applicant otherwise meets the requirements for the issuance of the applicable class of commercial driver's license as required by this article. The word "nonresident" must appear on the face of the nonresident commercial driver's license. An applicant must surrender any nonresident commercial driver's license issued by another state. Before issuing a nonresident commercial driver's license, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall establish the practical capability of revoking, suspending or cancelling the nonresident commercial driver's license and disqualifying that person with the same conditions applicable to the commercial driver's license issued to a resident of this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 8, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 63-1-81. Application for license or permit; fees; use by resident of license issued by another jurisdiction; falsification of information or certification; registration with Selective Service System for certain males.

(1) Each application for a commercial driver's license or commercial driver instruction permit shall include the following:

(a) The full name and the current mailing and residential address of the applicant;

(b) A physical description of the applicant, including sex, height, weight, eye and hair color;

(c) The applicant's date of birth;

(d) The applicant's social security number unless the application is for a nonresident commercial driver's license;

(e) The applicant's signature;

- (f) The applicant's color photograph;
 - (g) All certifications required by applicable federal regulations;
 - (h) Any other information which the Commissioner of Public Safety, by rule or regulation, determines necessary and essential; and
 - (i) The consent of the applicant to release driving record information.
- (2) The fee for accepting and processing an application for a commercial driver instruction permit shall be Ten Dollars (\$10.00).
- (3) The fee for accepting and processing an application for a Class A, B or C commercial driver's license shall be Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00).
- (4) No person who has been a resident of this state for thirty (30) days may drive a commercial motor vehicle under the authority of a commercial driver's license issued by another jurisdiction. Any violation of this subsection shall be punishable as provided by Section 63-1-69, Mississippi Code of 1972.
- (5) Any person who knowingly falsifies information or certifications required under subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in Section 63-1-59, Mississippi Code of 1972, and shall be subject to suspension of his commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license in accordance with Section 63-1-51, Mississippi Code of 1972.
- (6) Each application or filing made under this section shall include the social security number(s) of the applicant in accordance with Section 93-11-64, Mississippi Code of 1972.
- (7)(a) Any male who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-six (26) years of age and who applies for a commercial license or renewal of a commercial license under this article shall be registered in compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx 451 et seq., as amended.
- (b) The department shall forward in an electronic format the necessary personal information of the applicant to the Selective Service System. The applicant's submission of the application shall serve as an indication that the applicant either has already registered with the Selective Service System or that he is authorizing the department to forward to the Selective Service System the necessary information for registration. The commissioner shall notify the applicant on, or as a part of, the application that his submission of the application will serve as his consent to registration with the Selective Service System, if so required. The commissioner also shall notify any male applicant under the age of eighteen (18) that he will be registered upon turning age eighteen (18) as required by federal law.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 9; Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 20; Laws, 2002, ch. 388, § 2, eff from and after Sept. 1, 2002.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 150, provides as follows:

"SECTION 150. Any person or entity shall be absolutely immune from any liability arising from compliance with the dictates of this act unless such conduct by the person or entity is willful and intentional."

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment added (7).

Cross References — Fee for Class D license to operate vehicle as common carrier by motor vehicle, taxicab, passenger coach, dray, contract carrier or private contract carrier, see § 63-1-43.

Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

Application of this section to renewal licenses, see § 63-1-82.

Federal Aspects — Registration in compliance with the requirements of § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, see 50 USCS Appx 451 et seq.

§ 63-1-82. Form of license; privileges conferred by license; classifications of licenses; endorsements and restrictions; requirements as to driving record information; fees; duplicate license or permit; duration of license; renewal.

(1) Each commercial driver's license shall be marked "Commercial Driver's License" or "CDL," and shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be tamper proof. Each such license shall include thereon, but not be limited to, the following information:

- (a) The name and residential address of the licensee;
- (b) The licensee's color photograph;
- (c) A physical description of the licensee, including his sex, height, weight, eye and hair color;
- (d) The licensee's date of birth;
- (e) Except for a nonresident commercial driver's license, the licensee's social security number; and any other identifying information which the Commissioner of Public Safety, by rule or regulation, determines necessary and essential for the purposes of complying with the provisions of this article;
- (f) The licensee's signature;
- (g) The class or type of commercial motor vehicle or vehicles which the licensee is authorized to drive together with any endorsements or restrictions;
- (h) The name of this state; and
- (i) The dates between which the license is valid.

(2) The holder of a valid commercial driver's license may drive all vehicles in the class for which that license is issued and all lesser classes of vehicles, including any vehicle for which an operator's license or commercial driver's license issued under Article 1 of this chapter authorizes a person to drive. However, vehicles which require an endorsement may not be driven unless the proper endorsement appears on the license.

(3) Commercial driver's licenses may be issued with the following classifications:

- (a) Class A. Any combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or more, provided the gross vehicle weight rating of the vehicle or vehicles being towed is in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds;
- (b) Class B. Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or more, and any such vehicle towing a vehicle not in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds;
- (c) Class C. Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or any such vehicle towing a

vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating not in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds comprising:

(i) Vehicles designed to transport sixteen (16) or more passengers, including the driver; and

(ii) Vehicles used in the transportation of hazardous materials which are required to be placarded under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 USCS Appx., Section 1801 et seq.; and

(d) Class D. All other vehicles or combination of vehicles which are not included in Class A, Class B or Class C and for which a commercial license is required to be issued as provided by Section 63-1-43, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(4) Commercial driver's licenses may be issued with the following endorsements and restrictions:

(a) "H" authorizes the driver to drive a vehicle transporting hazardous materials;

(b) "K" restricts the driver to vehicles not equipped with air brakes;

(c) "T" authorizes driving double and triple trailers;

(d) "P" authorizes driving vehicles carrying passengers;

(e) "N" authorizes driving tank vehicles;

(f) "X" represents a combination of hazardous materials and tank vehicle endorsements;

(g) "S" restricts the driver to school buses being operated for the purpose of transporting pupils to and from school or to school-related functions and/or to all other vehicles not requiring a commercial driver's license; and

(h) "I" restricts driving which requires a commercial license to intra-state driving only.

(5) Before issuing a commercial driver's license, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall obtain driving record information through the Commercial Driver License Information System.

(6) Within ten (10) days after issuing a commercial driver's license, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall notify the Commercial Driver License Information System of that fact, providing all information required to ensure identification of the person.

(7) The fee charged for the issuance of each original and each renewal of a Class A, B or C commercial driver's license shall be Thirty-eight Dollars (\$38.00) plus the applicable photograph fee. In addition, a fee of Five Dollars (\$5.00) shall be charged for each endorsement or restriction entered on a commercial driver's license under subsection (4) of this section. However, the fee charged for each original and renewal of a commercial driver's license with an "S" restriction shall be the same as the fee for a Class D commercial driver's license in addition to all application fees.

(8) If a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is lost or destroyed, or if the holder of a commercial driver's license changes his name, mailing address or residence, an application for a duplicate permit or license shall be made as provided by Section 63-1-37, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(9) All commercial driver's licenses issued under the provisions of this article shall be issued for a period of not more than four (4) years and shall expire at midnight on the last day of the licensee's month of birth.

(10) Every person applying for renewal of a commercial driver's license shall complete the application form required by Section 63-1-81, Mississippi Code of 1972, providing updated information and required certifications and paying the appropriate fees. If the applicant wishes to retain a hazardous materials endorsement, the written test for a hazardous materials endorsement must be taken and passed.

(11) The Commissioner of Public Safety, by rule or regulation, shall establish a driver's license photograph fee which shall be the actual cost of the photograph rounded off to the next highest dollar. Monies collected for the photograph fee shall be deposited into a special photograph fee account which the Department of Public Safety shall use to pay the actual cost of producing the photographs. Any monies collected in excess of the actual costs of the photography shall be deposited to the General Fund of the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 10; Laws, 1992, ch. 488, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 4; Laws, 2004, ch. 322, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added (4)(h); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References — Fee for Class D license to operate vehicle as common carrier by motor vehicle, taxicab, passenger coach, dray, contract carrier or private contract carrier, see § 63-1-43.

Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

Federal Aspects — Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 USCS Appx., §§ 1801 et seq., referred to in (3)(c)(ii), is now found at 49 USCS §§ 5101 et seq.

§ 63-1-83. Grounds, procedure and terms for suspension of license.

(1) From and after April 1, 1992, it shall be a violation of this article and the Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend for a period of one (1) year the commercial driver's license of any person whom he determines to have committed a first violation of:

(a) Driving a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is required under this article while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance;

(b) Driving a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is required under this article while the alcohol concentration of the person's blood, breath or urine is four one-hundredths percent (.04%) or more;

(c) Knowingly and willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit

or commercial driver's license is required under this article, if the vehicle was driven by such person;

(d) Using a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is required under this article in the commission of any felony as defined in this article; or

(e) Refusing to submit to a test to determine the driver's alcohol concentration while driving a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is required under this article.

If any of the violations in subsection (1) of this section occurred while transporting hazardous materials required to be placarded under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, the commissioner shall suspend the commercial driver's license of such person for a period of three (3) years.

(2) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend the commercial driver's license of a person for life, or such lesser minimum period of time as shall be required under applicable federal law or regulations, if a person is determined to have committed two (2) or more of the violations specified in subsection (1) of this section or any combination of such violations arising from two (2) or more separate incidents. The provisions of this subsection (2) shall apply only to violations occurring on or after April 1, 1992.

(3) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend for life the commercial driver's license of any person who uses a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is required under this article in the commission of any felony involving the manufacture, distribution or dispensing of a controlled substance, or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled substance. The provisions of this subsection (3) shall apply only to violations occurring on or after April 1, 1992.

(4) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend for a period of sixty (60) days the commercial driver's license of any person convicted of two (2) serious traffic violations, or one hundred twenty (120) days if convicted of three (3) serious traffic violations, committed in a commercial motor vehicle for which a commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is required under this article arising from separate incidents occurring within a period of three (3) years. The provisions of this subsection (4) shall apply only to violations occurring on or after April 1, 1992.

(5) In addition to the reasons specified in this section for suspension of the commercial driver's license, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall be authorized to suspend the commercial driver's license of any person for being out of compliance with an order for support, as defined in Section 93-11-153. The procedure for suspension of a commercial driver's license for being out of compliance with an order for support, and the procedure for the reissuance or reinstatement of a commercial driver's license suspended for that purpose, and the payment of any fees for the reissuance or reinstatement of a commercial driver's license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section

93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be. If there is any conflict between any provision of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163 and any provision of this article, the provisions of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, shall control.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 11; Laws, 1996, ch. 507, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References — Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

Application of this section to suspension of commercial driver's license for refusal to submit to test for presence of alcohol or controlled substances in blood, see § 63-1-84.

Federal Aspects — Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, see 49 USCS §§ 5101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle on private property, of legislation making drunken driving a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.5th 655.

Am Jur. 1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (Complaint, petition, or declaration — By

license holder — Against administrative agency — To enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — Attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.

§ 63-1-84. Implied consent to tests for presence of alcohol or controlled substances in blood; effect of refusal to submit to test.

(1) A person who drives a commercial motor vehicle within this state for which a commercial driver instruction permit or a commercial driver's license is required under this article is deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood. A person may give his consent to a chemical test or tests of his blood or urine for the purpose of determining the presence in his body of any other substance which would impair a person's ability to drive a motor vehicle.

(2) The tests shall be administered, and all procedures and proceedings relating thereto shall be performed, as nearly as practicable, in accordance with the provisions of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law. However, from and after April 1, 1992, refusal of any such person to submit to such test or a test given which indicates that such person was driving such motor vehicle within this state with any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his system or while under the influence of a controlled substance shall require such person to be immediately placed out of service for twenty-four (24) hours and shall require suspension of the commercial driver's license of such person for the applicable period of time prescribed in Section 63-1-83.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 12, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

Cross References — Mississippi Implied Consent Law, see § 63-11-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Mental incapacity as justifying refusal to submit to tests for driving while intoxicated. 76 A.L.R.5th 597.

Practice References. Essen, Defense

of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-1-85. Classification of offenses under article; relationship between penalties imposed under article and other provisions of law relating to operation of motor vehicles.

Except as otherwise specifically provided by this article, any violation of this article for which the only penalty under this article is the requirement that the Commissioner of Public Safety suspend the commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license of a person shall not, for the purposes of this article, constitute a criminal offense. However, if a violation of this article also constitutes a criminal offense under the provisions of some other law, then any criminal penalty which may be imposed for violation of such criminal law shall be in addition to suspension of a person's license under this article.

If violation of any law of this state other than a violation of this article requires that the driver's license or driving privileges of a person be suspended, cancelled or revoked, then any suspension, cancellation or revocation imposed for violation of such law shall also result in suspension, revocation or cancellation of such person's commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license under the provisions of this article for the same period of time and to run concurrently therewith.

If any person's commercial driver instruction permit or commercial driver's license is suspended under the provisions of this article and such violation is not an offense for which a person's driver's license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled under the provisions of some law other than the provisions of this article, then such person may apply for and obtain, upon meeting all qualifications as required by law, any type of driver's license other than a commercial driver's license or permit issued under the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 13, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 63-1-86. Notification of license authority of state of suspension, revocation or cancellation of license and of traffic control violations by nonresident; disclosure of information relating to driving record.

(1) After suspending, revoking or cancelling a commercial driver's license, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall update his records to reflect that action within ten (10) days. After suspending, revoking or cancelling a nonresident commercial driver's privileges, the Commissioner of Public Safety

shall notify the licensing authority of the state which issued the commercial driver's license or commercial driver instruction permit within ten (10) days.

(2) Within ten (10) days after receiving a report of the conviction of any nonresident holder of a commercial driver's license for any violation of state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than parking violations, committed in a commercial motor vehicle, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall notify the driver licensing authority in the licensing state of the conviction.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall furnish full information regarding the driving record of any person:

(a) To the driver license administrator of any other state, or province or territory of Canada, requesting that information; and

(b) Any other person who is required under federal law or regulations to be furnished such information, or whom the Commissioner of Public Safety, by rule or regulation, determines is essential to be furnished such information in carrying out the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 14, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 63-1-87. Authority to drive commercial motor vehicle in state under license issued by another jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, a person may drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if the person has a valid commercial driver's license or commercial driver instruction permit issued by any state or any province or territory of Canada in accordance with the minimum federal standards for the issuance of commercial motor vehicle driver's licenses, if the person's license or permit is not suspended, revoked or cancelled and if the person is not disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle or subject to an out-of-service order.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 15, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 63-1-88. Full faith and credit of out-of-state convictions.

The Commissioner of Public Safety shall give all out-of-state convictions full faith and credit and treat them for sanctioning purposes under this article as if they occurred in this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 16, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 63-1-89. Rules and regulations.

The Commissioner of Public Safety is authorized to promulgate and adopt such rules and regulations as shall be necessary to meet minimum requirements of the CMVSA and federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto, and may promulgate and adopt such other rules and regulations and enter into or make agreements, arrangements or declarations as shall be necessary to implement the provisions of this article.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 17, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

Cross References — Issuance, extension and expiration of commercial driver's licenses prior to the effective date of this section, see § 63-1-47.

§ 63-1-90. Use of inspection stations for commercial driver's license testing sites.

The Commissioner of Public Safety is authorized to make use of the facilities and property upon which are located inspection stations, as prescribed in Sections 27-5-71 and 27-5-73, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the purpose of commercial driver's license testing sites under the Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law. The State Tax Commission shall cooperate with the Commissioner of Public Safety in making such property and facilities available for such use; however, the use of such inspection stations by the Commissioner of Public Safety shall not unreasonably interfere with the duties of the State Tax Commission.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 18, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

ARTICLE 3.

DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT LAW.

SEC.

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 63-1-101. | Short title. |
| 63-1-103. | Form of compact. |
| 63-1-105. | Governor as "executive head." |
| 63-1-107. | Commissioner of public safety as "licensing authority;" duties of commissioner. |
| 63-1-109. | Compensation of commissioner as compact administrator. |
| 63-1-111. | Reports by courts or other state agencies to commissioner. |
| 63-1-113. | Applicability of Article IV of compact to certain offenses. |

§ 63-1-101. Short title.

This article may be cited as the Mississippi Driver License Compact Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-01; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Comparable Laws from other States — Code of Alabama §§ 32-6-30 et seq.
Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated § 27-17-101.
Official Code of Georgia Annotated § 40-5-5.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 1420.
Revised Statutes of Missouri § 302.600.
Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 55-50-701 et seq.
Texas Transportation Code §§ 523.001 et seq.

§ 63-1-103. Form of compact.

The Driver License Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:

DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT

ARTICLE I

Findings and Declaration of Policy

(a) The party states find that:

(1) The safety of their streets and highways is materially affected by the degree of compliance with state and local ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.

(2) Violation of such a law or ordinance is evidence that the violator engages in conduct which is likely to endanger the safety of persons and property.

(3) The continuance in force of a license to drive is predicated upon compliance with laws and ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles, in whichever jurisdiction the vehicle is operated.

(b) It is the policy of each of the party states to:

(1) Promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of the jurisdictions where such operators drive motor vehicles.

(2) Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.

ARTICLE II

Definitions

As used in this compact:

(a) "State" means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(b) "Home state" means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.

(c) "Conviction" means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance or administrative rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.

ARTICLE III**Reports of Conviction**

The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted; describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated; identify the court in which action was taken; indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered, or whether the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond or other security; and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.

ARTICLE IV**Effect of Conviction**

(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of conviction for:

(1) Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;

(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;

(3) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;

(4) Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.

(b) As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the home state shall give such effect to the conduct as is provided by the laws of the home state.

(c) If the laws of a party state do not provide for offenses or violations denominated or described in precisely the words employed in subdivision (a) of this Article, such party state shall construe the denomination and description appearing in subdivision (a) hereof as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of a substantially similar nature and the laws of such party state shall contain such provisions as may be necessary to ensure that full force and effect is given to this Article.

ARTICLE V**Application for New Licenses**

Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a

license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:

(1) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension period has not terminated.

(2) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.

(3) The applicant is the holder of a license to drive issued by another party state and currently in force unless the applicant surrenders such license.

ARTICLE VI

Applicability of Other Laws

Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a party state and a nonparty state.

ARTICLE VII

Compact Administrator and Interchange of Information

(a) The head of the licensing authority of each party state shall be the administrator of this compact for his state. The administrators, acting jointly, shall have the power to formulate all necessary and proper procedures for the exchange of information under this compact.

(b) The administrator of each party state shall furnish to the administrator of each other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of this compact.

ARTICLE VIII

Entry Into Force and Withdrawal

(a) This compact shall enter into force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the same into law.

(b) Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same, but no such withdrawal shall take effect until six months after the executive head of the withdrawing state has given notice of the withdrawal to the executive heads of all other party states. No withdrawal shall affect the validity or applicability by the licensing authorities of states remaining party to the compact of any report of conviction occurring prior to the withdrawal.

ARTICLE IX

Construction and Severability

This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-02; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References — Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§ 63-1-51 to 63-1-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 153-156.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency

— to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 300.

§ 63-1-105. Governor as “executive head.”

As used in the compact, with reference to this state, the term “executive head” shall mean the governor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-05; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References — Powers of governor generally, see § 7-1-5.

§ 63-1-107. Commissioner of public safety as “licensing authority;” duties of commissioner.

As used in the compact, the term “licensing authority” with reference to this state, shall mean the department of public safety. The commissioner of public safety shall furnish to the appropriate authorities of any other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of Articles III, IV and V of the compact.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-03; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References — Department of public safety and commissioner thereof generally, see Chapter 1 of Title 45.

§ 63-1-109. Compensation of commissioner as compact administrator.

The commissioner of public safety as compact administrator provided for in Article VII of the compact shall not be entitled to any additional compensation on account of his service as such administrator. However, he shall be entitled to expenses incurred in connection with his duties and responsibilities as such administrator, in the same manner as for expenses incurred in connection with any other duties or responsibilities of his office or employment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-04; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

§ 63-1-111. Reports by courts or other state agencies to commissioner.

Any court or other agency of this state, or a subdivision thereof, which has jurisdiction to take any action suspending, revoking or otherwise limiting a license to drive, shall report any such action and the adjudication upon which it is based to the commissioner of public safety in the manner and within the time provided by subsection (1) of section 63-1-51 and section 63-1-55.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-06; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References — Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§ 63-1-51 to 63-1-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purpose of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver's license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Admissibility of traffic conviction in later state civil trial. 73 A.L.R.4th 691.

§ 63-1-113. Applicability of Article IV of compact to certain offenses.

Article IV of the compact, set forth in section 63-1-103, shall apply to those offenses enumerated in subsection (1) of section 63-1-51, and any suspension therefor shall be governed by the provisions of section 63-1-53.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-07; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References — Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§ 63-1-51 to 63-1-55.

CHAPTER 2

Mandatory Use of Safety Seat Belts

SEC.

- 63-2-1. Requirement of use of safety seat belt system by operator and passengers in passenger motor vehicle; protection of children.
- 63-2-3. Duty, standard of care, right or liability between operator and passenger; contributory or comparative negligence; entry of violation on driving record.
- 63-2-5. Education program; erection of highway signs notifying public of seat-belt-use requirement; notices of requirement accompanying vehicle license tags or decals.
- 63-2-7. Offenses and penalties; recording of violations.

§ 63-2-1. Requirement of use of safety seat belt system by operator and passengers in passenger motor vehicle; protection of children.

(1) When a passenger motor vehicle is operated in forward motion on a public road, street or highways within this state, every operator, every front-seat passenger and every child who is at least four (4) years of age but under eight (8) years of age, regardless of the seat that such child occupies, shall wear a properly fastened safety seat belt system, required to be installed in the vehicle when manufactured pursuant to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208. Children under the age of four (4) years shall be protected as required by Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-313.

(2) "Passenger motor vehicle" for purposes of this chapter means a motor vehicle designed to carry fifteen (15) or fewer passengers, including the driver, but does not include motorcycles, mopeds, all-terrain vehicles or trailers.

(3) This section shall not apply to:

(a) Vehicles which may be registered for "farm" use, including "implements of husbandry" as defined in Section 63-21-5(d), and "farm tractors" as defined in Section 63-3-105(a);

(b) An operator or passenger possessing a written verification from a licensed physician that he is unable to wear a safety belt system for medical reasons;

(c) A passenger car operated by a rural letter carrier of the United States postal Service or by a utility meter reader while on duty; or

(d) Buses.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 501, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

Editor's Note — Section 63-7-313 referred to in (1) was repealed by Laws, 1990, ch. 358, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Violators of seat belt law can not be adjudicated guilty because there is no criminal offense and no fines or assessments may be imposed; charges should be dismissed for failure to allege a crime. Stephens, Jan. 12, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0889.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seatbelt, the driver may be cited for the seatbelt violation only if he is cited for another non-seatbelt violation, and he may not be convicted of the seatbelt violation unless he is also convicted of

the non-seatbelt violation; however, if a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seatbelt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted without a violation of any other non-seatbelt law. Dykes, Feb. 4, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0031.

A person can be charged with the failure to utilize a child restraint device or seat belt and child abuse without violating the double jeopardy clause. Bishop, Feb. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0733.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability under state law for injuries resulting from defective automobile seatbelt, shoulder harness, or restraint system. 48 A.L.R.5th 1.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-2-3. Duty, standard of care, right or liability between operator and passenger; contributory or comparative negligence; entry of violation on driving record.

This chapter shall not be construed to create a duty, standard of care, right or liability between the operator and passenger of any passenger motor vehicle which is not recognized under the laws of the State of Mississippi as such laws exist on the date of passage of this chapter or as such laws may at any time thereafter be constituted by statute or court decision. Failure to provide and use a seat belt restraint device or system shall not be considered contributory or comparative negligence, nor shall the violation be entered on the driving record of any individual.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 20, 1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Evidence.

1. In general.

This section applies to crashworthiness

actions. *Estate of Hunter v. GMC*, 729 So. 2d 1264 (Miss. 1999).

In order to preserve the matter for appeal, the plaintiff was not required to make a contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence where he had already filed a motion in limine pertaining to such evidence. *Jones v. Panola County*, 725 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1998).

In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when his vehicle collided with a gravel pile the plaintiff was entitled to reversal on the basis of the improper introduction of evidence that he was not using his seat belt at the time of the collision. *Jones v. Panola County*, 725 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1998).

Statute barred cross-examination of passenger who brought action arising from single-vehicle accident as to whether she was wearing seat belt at time of accident. *Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co.*, 701 So. 2d 1093 (Miss. 1997), reh'g denied, 702 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1997).

2. Evidence.

Where a minor child was killed by an air bag that deployed when the car that she was riding in was involved in an accident while her teenage older sister was driving, evidence of the decedent's failure to wear a seat belt was relevant

and admissible, the admission of evidence of the driver's non-use of a seat belt was error, and the admission of photographs of the seat belt latches and an expert's opinion that the latches showed insufficient scratches for the family to have used the seat belts regularly was error. *Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.*, — So. 2d —, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 752 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2003).

Evidence of seat belt non-usage may constitute relevant evidence in some, but by no means all or even most, cases, so long as (1) the evidence has some probative value other than as evidence of negligence, (2) this probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and is not barred by some other rule of evidence, and (3) appropriate limiting instructions are given to the jury, barring the consideration of seat belt non-usage as evidence of negligence. *Estate of Hunter v. GMC*, 729 So. 2d 1264 (Miss. 1999).

The statute provides that failure to use a seat belt may not be considered as evidence of contributory or comparative negligence; however, it does not purport to bar the admission of seat belt non-usage in all cases and does not provide that the use of a seat belt may not be considered. *Herring v. Poirrier*, 797 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 2000).

§ 63-2-5. Education program; erection of highway signs notifying public of seat-belt-use requirement; notices of requirement accompanying vehicle license tags or decals.

The Department of Public Safety shall initiate an education program designed to encourage the use of safety belts with emphasis on the effectiveness of safety belts, the monetary savings and other benefits to the public. Funds for such educational program shall be made available through the office of the Governor's representative for highway safety programs.

The State Highway Commission is authorized to direct the Highway Department to erect signs along the highways of this state notifying the traveling public that Mississippi is a mandatory seat-belt-use state.

The State Tax Commission shall provide notices of the requirement for safety belt use which shall accompany the delivery of a passenger motor vehicle license tag or decal.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 20, 1990).

§ 63-2-7. Offenses and penalties; recording of violations.

(1) A violation of this chapter shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) upon conviction; however, only the operator of a vehicle may be fined for a violation of this chapter by the operator or for a violation of this chapter by a passenger. No fine shall be imposed against the operator for a violation of this chapter by the operator or by a front-seat passenger unless at the time the operator was charged with a violation of this chapter he also was charged with some other offense not in this chapter and he is convicted of both offenses. However, an operator may be fined for a violation of this chapter by a child who is at least four (4) years of age but under eight (8) years of age, regardless of the seat that the child occupies and regardless of whether the operator was charged and convicted of some other offense at the time the operator was charged with said violation of this chapter. The maximum fine that may be imposed against the operator of a vehicle for a violation of this chapter by the operator or for a violation of this chapter by one or more passengers shall be Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) in the aggregate.

(2) A violation of this chapter shall not be entered on the driving record of any individual so convicted, nor shall any state assessment provided for by Section 99-19-73, or any other state law, be imposed or collected.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 4; Laws, 1994, ch. 567, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 501, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A court clerk should not accept a plea of guilty on a seat belt violation and accept the fine and costs when the clerk knows that the charge has been made without any other charge being made at the same time. Anderson, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0278.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seatbelt, the driver may be cited for the seatbelt violation only if he is cited for another non-seatbelt violation, and he may not be convicted of the seatbelt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seatbelt violation; however, if a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seatbelt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted without a violation of any other non-seatbelt law. Dykes, Feb. 4, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0031.

If a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seat belt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted under Section 63-2-1 without a violation of any other non-seat belt law. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seat belt as required by statute, the driver may be cited for the seat belt violation only if he is cited for another non-seat belt violation and may not be convicted of the seat belt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seat belt violation; further, an officer may not use a primary seat belt violation in order to charge an offender with a secondary seat belt violation. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

CHAPTER 3

Traffic Regulations and Rules of the Road

Article 1.	General Provisions	63-3-1
Article 3.	Definitions	63-3-101
Article 5.	Obedience to and Effect of Traffic Laws	63-3-201
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Article 11.	Restrictions on Speed; Use of Radar	63-3-501
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Article 15.	Starting and Turning; Signaling	63-3-701
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Article 19.	Stopping, Standing and Parking	63-3-901
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ARTICLE 1.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

SEC.	
63-3-1.	Short title.
63-3-3.	Construction of chapter.
63-3-5.	Application of provisions of chapter relating to operation of vehicles.
63-3-7.	Compilation, printing and distribution of provisions of chapter.
63-3-9.	Teaching of provisions of chapter in public schools.
63-3-11.	Right to recover damages in civil suit unaffected by provisions of chapter.

§ 63-3-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Rules of the Road.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — sizes, weight and load regulations, see §§ 63-5-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — equipment and identification regulations, see §§ 63-7-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Traffic Violations Procedure, see §§ 63-9-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 244 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38 et seq.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, De-

fense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-3. Construction of chapter.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8282; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-5. Application of provisions of chapter relating to operation of vehicles.

The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except:

1. Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section.

2. The provisions of Articles 9 and 25 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8145; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Reckless driving and careless driving may be enforced on commercial parking lots and the like; similarly, a law enforcement officer may investigate and complete

an accident report for an accident that occurs on private property. Godfrey, Oct. 13, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0609.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.

§ 63-3-7. Compilation, printing and distribution of provisions of chapter.

The Commissioner of Public Safety is hereby authorized and directed to compile in a condensed form the Rules of the Road as set out by this chapter and have sufficient copies printed in pocket size booklet form. The booklets shall be made available to the various law enforcement departments, other agencies and members of the public. The Department of Public Safety may charge another department or agency an amount not exceeding the actual costs incurred by the department in compiling, printing and distributing the booklets; however, no charge may be made by the Department of Public Safety or any other department or agency for distribution of the booklets to the public. The Department of Public Safety also may compile a condensed form of the

“Rules of the Road” in electronic format, which shall be accessible by law enforcement departments, other agencies and the public without charge.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8284; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2002, ch. 446, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

§ 63-3-9. Teaching of provisions of chapter in public schools.

The provisions of this chapter shall be taught in the eighth grade of each and every public school of this state. The state superintendent of public education and the county superintendent of each county are hereby directed and required to carry out the provisions of this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-11. Right to recover damages in civil suit unaffected by provisions of chapter.

Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to curtail or abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil suit for damages by reason of injuries to person or property resulting from the negligent use of the highways by any motor vehicle, or its owner, or his employee or agent.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 5785; Laws, 1930, § 5588; Laws, 1942, § 1742; Laws, 1916, ch. 116.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Automobile held not dangerous instrumentality, rendering owner liable for driv-

er’s negligent use. *Vicksburg Gas Co. v. Ferguson*, 140 Miss. 543, 106 So. 258 (1925).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Nonmonetary benefits or contributions by rider as affecting his status under automobile guest statute. 39 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Automobile guest statute: status of rider as affected by payment, amount of which is not determined by expenses incurred. 39 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Payments on expense-sharing basis as affecting guest status of automobile passenger. 39 A.L.R.3d 1224.

Motorist’s liability for striking person lying in road. 41 A.L.R.4th 303.

ARTICLE 3.

DEFINITIONS.

General Provisions	63-3-101
Vehicles, Equipment and the Like Defined	63-3-103
Governmental Agencies, Owners, Police Officers and Other Persons Defined	63-3-115
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GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC.

63-3-101. Applicability of definitions.

§ 63-3-101. Applicability of definitions.

The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for purposes of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND THE LIKE DEFINED

SEC.

63-3-103. Vehicles.
63-3-105. Tractors.
63-3-107. Trailers.
63-3-109. Railroads.
63-3-111. Tires.
63-3-113. Explosives and flammable liquids.

§ 63-3-103. Vehicles.

(a) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

(b) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails. The term "motor vehicle" shall not include electric personal assistive mobility devices.

(c) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground but excluding a tractor.

(d) "Authorized emergency vehicle" means every vehicle of the fire department (fire patrol), every police vehicle, every 911 Emergency Communications District vehicle, every such ambulance and special use EMS vehicle as defined in Section 41-59-3, and every emergency vehicle of municipal departments or public service corporations as is designated or authorized by the commission or the chief of police of an incorporated city.

(e) "School bus" means every motor vehicle operated for the transportation of children to or from any school, provided same is plainly marked "School Bus" on the front and rear thereof and meets the requirements of the State Board of Education as authorized under Section 37-41-1.

(f) "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is mounted on or drawn by another vehicle

and includes travel trailers, fifth wheel trailers, camping trailers, truck campers and motor homes.

(g) "Motor home" means a motor vehicle that is designed and constructed primarily to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use.

(h) "Electric assistive mobility device" means a self-balancing two-tandem wheeled device, designed to transport only one (1) person, with an electric propulsion system that limits the maximum speed of the device to fifteen (15) miles per hour.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8127; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1973, ch. 338, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 348; Laws, 1980, ch. 316, § 2; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 1; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 35; Laws, 2000, ch. 318, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 9; Laws, 2004, ch. 425, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment added the last sentence in (b) and added (h).

The 2004 amendment rewrote (d).

Cross References — Standards for design, construction, equipment and maintenance of ambulances, see § 41-59-25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The mere fact that on occasion the motor of a vehicle is not operating, or cannot be operated, does not alter the fact that it

is a "motor vehicle" as defined in this section [Code 1942, § 8127]. *Farley v. State*, 251 Miss. 497, 170 So. 2d 625 (1965).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The definition of "authorized emergency vehicle" does not include the private vehicle of a volunteer fireman, and therefore, such a vehicle may not be equipped with a

siren, whistle, or bell as allowed by Section 63-7-65. *Baker*, November 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0702.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1-15.

38 Am. Jur. Trials, All-Terrain Vehicle Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Defective Design of an All-Terrain Vehicle, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1-14.

§ 63-3-105. Tractors.

(a) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and other implements of husbandry.

(b) "Road tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry any load thereon either independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so drawn.

(c) "Truck tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8128; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Application of mandatory use of safety seat belts to farm vehicles, see § 63-2-1.

§ 63-3-107. Trailers.

(a) "Trailer" means every vehicle without motive power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle.

(b) "Semitrailer" means every vehicle without motive power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of its weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8129; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What constitutes "trailer" within coverage or exclusion provision of automobile liability policy. 65 A.L.R.3d 804.

§ 63-3-109. Railroads.

(a) "Railroad" means a carrier of persons or property upon cars, other than street cars, operated upon stationary rails.

(b) "Railroad train" means a steam engine, electric or other motor, with or without cars coupled thereto, operated upon rails, except street cars.

(c) "Street car" means a car other than a railroad train for transporting persons or property and operated upon rails principally within a municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8131; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-111. Tires.

(a) "Metal tire" means every tire the surface of which in contact with the highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilient material.

(b) "Pneumatic tire" means every tire in which compressed air is designed to support the load.

(c) "Solid tire" means every tire of rubber or other resilient material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the load.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8130; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-113. Explosives and flammable liquids.

(a) "Explosive" means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion

and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packing that an ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonator of any part of the compound or mixture may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructible effects on contiguous objects or of destroying life or limb.

(b) "Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flash point of 70 degrees F., or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equivalent closed cup test device.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8132; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, OWNERS, POLICE OFFICERS AND OTHER PERSONS DEFINED

SEC.

- | | |
|-----------|------------------------------|
| 63-3-115. | Department of public safety. |
| 63-3-117. | Local authorities. |
| 63-3-119. | Police officers. |
| 63-3-121. | Individuals. |

§ 63-3-115. Department of public safety.

(a) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of public safety.

(b) "Department" means the department of public safety.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8133; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-117. Local authorities.

"Local authority" means every county, municipal, and other local board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations under the constitution and laws of this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8136; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-119. Police officers.

"Police officer" means every officer authorized to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic regulations.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8135; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-121. Individuals.

(a) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.

(b) "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.

(c) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle; in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease

thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this chapter.

(d) "Pedestrian" means any person afoot or a person who uses an electric personal assistive mobility device or a manual or motorized wheelchair.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8134; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment rewrote (d).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Who is "pedestrian" entitled to traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 rights and subject to duties provided by A.L.R.4th 1117.

HIGHWAYS, DISTRICTS, SIGNALS, AND THE LIKE DEFINED

SEC.	
63-3-123.	Traffic.
63-3-125.	Streets, roads, and highways.
63-3-127.	Crosswalks.
63-3-129.	Intersections.
63-3-131.	Safety zones.
63-3-133.	Traffic signals or devices.
63-3-135.	Right-of-way.
63-3-137.	Stopping, standing, and parking.
63-3-139.	Districts.

§ 63-3-123. Traffic.

"Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, street cars, and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for purposes of travel.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8143; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-125. Streets, roads, and highways.

(a) "Street or highway" means the entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.

(b) "Laned highway" means a highway the roadway of which is divided into three or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic.

(c) "Roadway" means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.

(d) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.

(e) "Private road or driveway" means every way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner but not by other persons.

(f) "Through highway" means every highway or portion thereof at the entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to stop before entering or crossing the same and when stop signs are erected as provided in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8137; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an "intersection" so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to § 63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an "intersection" within the meaning of § 63-3-129. An "intersection" requires the conjunction of "2

highways," and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a "highway" where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a "Plant Entrance" sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. *Stewart v. Davis*, 571 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1990).

§ 63-3-127. Crosswalks.

"Crosswalk" means that portion of a roadway ordinarily included within the prolongation or connection of the lateral lines of sidewalks at intersections, or any portion of a roadway distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8139; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-129. Intersections.

"Intersection" means the area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8138; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Public nature of way; driveways.

1. In general.

Where an intersection was formed by a north and south gravel road crossing a

highway, running in an east and west direction, the area embraced within the lateral boundary lines of the two roadways at the point of junction constituted an intersection within the contemplation of this section [Code 1942, § 8138]. *Clark*

v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467 (1957).

2. Public nature of way; driveways.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an "intersection" so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to § 63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an "intersection" within the meaning of § 63-3-129. An "intersection" requires the conjunction of "2 highways," and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a "highway" where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a

"Plant Entrance" sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. *Stewart v. Davis*, 571 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1990).

Where a statute provided that no vehicle shall in overtaking and passing other vehicle be driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection, this statute was not applicable to overtaking automobile which attempted to pass truck as the truck driver attempted to make a left turn into a driveway leading to a store, where there was no showing that the driveway was a highway within the meaning of the statute. *Frizell v. Guthrie*, 222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361 (1954).

§ 63-3-131. Safety zones.

"Safety zone" means the area or space officially set apart within a roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected or is so marked or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all times while set apart as a safety zone.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8140; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-133. Traffic signals or devices.

(a) "Official traffic-control devices" means all signs, signals, markings, and devices not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.

(b) "Official traffic-control signal" means any device, whether manually, electrically or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed to stop and to proceed.

(c) "Railroad sign or signal" means any sign, signal, or device erected by authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad train.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8142; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see § 65-1-8.

§ 63-3-135. Right-of-way.

"Right-of-way" means the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8144; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 327.

§ 63-3-137. Stopping, standing, and parking.

(a) "Stop," when required, means the complete cessation from movement.

(b) "Stop, stopping or standing," when prohibited, means any stopping or standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or of a traffic control sign or signal.

(c) "Park," when prohibited, means the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8144; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 327.

§ 63-3-139. Districts.

(a) "Business district" means the territory contiguous to and including a highway when 50 per cent or more of the frontage thereon for a distance of 300 feet or more is occupied by buildings in use for business.

(b) "Residence district" means the territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district when the property on such highway for a distance of 300 feet or more is in the main improved with residences or residences and buildings in use for business.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8141; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where a fatal accident occurred on an interstate highway, the trial judge should have held, as a matter of law, that the

scene of the accident was outside of a "business district" under § 63-3-139. *Stong v. Freeman Truck Line*, 456 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1984).

ARTICLE 5.

OBEDIENCE TO AND EFFECT OF TRAFFIC LAWS.

SEC.

- 63-3-201. Offenses and penalties generally.
- 63-3-203. Failure or refusal to comply with order or direction of police officer.
- 63-3-205. Applicability of chapter to various public officers and employees.
- 63-3-207. Applicability of chapter to persons riding bicycles or animals or driving animal-drawn vehicles.
- 63-3-208. Use of electric personal assistive mobility devices allowed on highways and sidewalks; restrictions.
- 63-3-209. Uniformity of application of chapter throughout state; local traffic regulation generally.
- 63-3-211. Enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities.
- 63-3-212. Localities prohibited from enacting ordinances restricting cell phone use in motor vehicles.
- 63-3-213. Effect of chapter upon rights of owners of certain real property.

§ 63-3-201. Offenses and penalties generally.

It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this title with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden by this chapter or to fail to perform any act required in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8146; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. *Flynt v. Fondren*, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188 (1920).

Automobile driver is entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the streets and highways while operating his car in a careful and lawful manner, but the driver operating his car in a negligent and reck-

less manner in disregard of the rights and safety of others should be held strictly accountable both civilly and criminally. *Ulmer v. Pistole*, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522 (1917).

2. Jury instructions.

Court may instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff's recovery. *White v. Weitz*, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484 (1934).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 864.1 (Driving on wrong side of road — Failure to control vehicle — Crossing center line).

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-203. Failure or refusal to comply with order or direction of police officer.

No person shall wilfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8147; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the plaintiff had violated this section where (1) the officer stopped the plaintiff's vehicle for speeding, (2) during the traffic stop, the

officer ordered the plaintiff to return to his car and await further instruction, and (3) the plaintiff replied that he did not wish to return to his vehicle and preferred to remain on the roadside. *Dallas v. City of Okolona*, — F. Supp. 2d —, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19547 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 7, 1999).

§ 63-3-205. Applicability of chapter to various public officers and employees.

The provisions of this chapter applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this state or any county, city, town, district, or any other political subdivision of the state, subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this chapter with respect to authorized emergency vehicles.

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling to or from such work.

No driver of any authorized emergency vehicle shall assume any special privilege under this chapter except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8148; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury questions.

1. In general.

Under this section [Code 1942, § 8148] the nighttime operation of a sprinkling truck on the left side of a highway in preparing the surface thereof for receiving surfacing materials was not a violation of statute. *Webb v. Brock*, 232 Miss. 154, 98 So. 2d 139 (1957).

between an automobile driven by a constable in pursuit of a reckless driver and one operated by plaintiff, where the evidence was in conflict as to such matters as to whether the siren on constable's car was sounded, speed and position of vehicles at time of accident, the issue was properly submitted to a jury. *Johnson v. Richardson*, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194 (1959).

2. Jury questions.

In an action arising out of a collision

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent pedestrian or occupant of parked vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 100 A.L.R.3d 815.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 207, 208.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 79, Negligent Vehicular Police Chase.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

§ 63-3-207. Applicability of chapter to persons riding bicycles or animals or driving animal-drawn vehicles.

Every person riding a bicycle or an animal or driving any animal drawing a vehicle upon a highway shall have all of the rights and all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle under this chapter, except those provisions of this chapter which by their nature can have no application.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8149; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury instructions.
3. Verdict.

1. In general.

Motorist overtaking and passing bicycle is required to do so at safe distance; motorist's admission that he did not entirely clear bicyclist's lane of traffic as he passed bicyclist but was only straddling center line and was unaware of location of vehicle in relation to bicycle as he passed it is sufficient basis upon which jury may find that collision between motorist's vehicle and bicycle was caused by motorist's negligence. *Rideout v. Knight*, 463 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1985).

2. Jury instructions.

Since by this section [Code 1942, § 8149], the prohibitions of Code 1942, § 8188, apply to a person riding a bicycle, an instruction to the jury that if they believe that the plaintiff violated Code 1942, § 8188, providing that a person riding bicycle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for speed

of other vehicle and traffic upon the conditions of the street, and such violation was proximate cause of accident they should find for the defendants, was proper in an action for injuries to the plaintiff bicyclist who, approaching defendant's truck from the rear, tried to pass it at intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. *Cochran v. Peeler*, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806 (1950).

3. Verdict.

In an action against an automobile driver for the alleged wrongful death of a minor who was riding a bicycle when it collided with the automobile, a jury verdict in favor of the driver foreclosed all questions of fact, resolved all conflicts in the evidence favorably to the driver, and also amounted to a factual finding by the jury that the driver of the automobile had not been negligent and had acted as a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances. *McCullum v. Randolph*, 220 So. 2d 310 (Miss. 1969).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Horseback riding or operation of horse-drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute. 71 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving statutes. 73 A.L.R.4th 1139.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles

and Highway Traffic §§ 249, 250.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 570.1 (complaint in collision between bicyclists when minor bicyclist enters roadway from private driveway).

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident — Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

§ 63-3-208. Use of electric personal assistive mobility devices allowed on highways and sidewalks; restrictions.

An electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in Section 63-3-103, may be operated:

- (a) On a marked bicycle path;
- (b) On any street or road where bicycles are permitted; or
- (c) On a sidewalk, if the person operating the device yields the right-of-way to pedestrians and gives an audible signal before overtaking and passing a pedestrian.

SOURCES: Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

§ 63-3-209. Uniformity of application of chapter throughout state; local traffic regulation generally.

The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8150; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

- 1. Applicability of state law.
- 2. Municipal ordinances and power.
- 3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
- 11. Under former law.

1. Applicability of state law.

In an action arising out of an intersectional automobile collision, where it was not shown that any public authority had designated one street as a through highway and had directed the placing of stop signs on the intersecting street, state law was applicable, and the plaintiff was not under a duty to stop at the intersection even though someone had at some time placed a stop sign there, it being undisputed that the sign was down and not in place at the time of the collision. *Skelton v. Turnipseed*, 235 So. 2d 694 (Miss. 1970).

2. Municipal ordinances and power.

A municipal ordinance making it unlawful for anyone to operate or ride upon

any two-wheeled, self propelled vehicle upon the public streets without wearing a crash helmet, was a reasonable traffic regulation, rather than an unreasonable limitation on the personal liberty of an individual motorcyclist constituting a violation of equal protection. *City of Jackson v. Lee*, 252 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1971).

This section [Code 1942, § 8150] does not authorize a municipality to establish an automobile testing station and engage in the business of testing automobiles, and consequently a municipality had no authority to contract for the purchase of equipment for such purpose. *Davenport v. Blackmur*, 184 Miss. 836, 186 So. 321 (1939).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

An earlier statutory provision to the same effect as this section was held not to

prohibit municipalities from requiring license for operation of motor vehicles on their streets. *Wasson v. City of Greenville*, 123 Miss. 642, 86 So. 450 (1920).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Municipalities are not authorized to restrict a particular type of vehicle, such as an all terrain vehicle, from municipal streets. Hight, December 6, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0806.

§ 63-3-211. Enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities.

(a) The provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from-

1. Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles;
2. Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic control signals;
3. Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the high-

ways;

4. Designating particular highways as one-way highways and requiring that all vehicles thereon be moved in one specific direction;

5. Regulating the speed of vehicles in public parks;

6. Designating any highway as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles stop before entering or crossing the same or designating any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop at one or more entrances to such intersections;

7. Restricting the use of highways as authorized in Chapter 5 of this title.

(b) No ordinance or regulation enacted under subdivision 4, 5, 6, or 7 of this section shall be effective until signs giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrances to the highway or part thereof affected as may be most appropriate.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8151; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Power of governing authorities of municipalities to exercise full jurisdiction in matter of streets and sidewalks, see § 21-37-3.

Power of county board of supervisors to prescribe kind of wheels which may be used on vehicles on county public roads, see § 65-7-37.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Evidence and witnesses.
- 3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

It is within the power and jurisdiction of

a municipality to prescribe, within reason, the manner, the place at which and the time within which an automobile may be parked upon any street in the municipality, including those streets which are part of a state highway. *City of Ellisville v. State Hwy. Comm'n*, 186 Miss. 473, 191 So. 274 (1939).

This section [Code 1942, § 8151] does not authorize a municipality to establish an automobile testing station and engage in the business of testing automobiles, and consequently a municipality had no authority to contract for the purchase of equipment for such purpose. *Davenport v. Blackmur*, 184 Miss. 836, 186 So. 321 (1939).

2. Evidence and witnesses.

In a suit for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was struck by an automobile, the court properly refused to permit a police officer to testify as to what was permissible to be done under a city

traffic ordinance with reference to a left turn from the highway into the parking area of a restaurant. *Briscoe v. Jones*, 233 So. 2d 125 (Miss. 1970).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Under an earlier statute, not wholly parallel, it was held that where a city had regulated traffic within its limits, state regulation of eight miles an hour in passing pedestrians was inapplicable. *Meridian Coca Cola Co. v. Watson*, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824 (1931).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Public regulation and prohibition of sound amplifiers or loudspeaker broadcasts in streets and other public places. 10 A.L.R.2d 627.

Right of municipality or public to use of subsurface of street or highway for purposes other than sewers, pipes, conduits for wires, and the like. 11 A.L.R.2d 180.

§ 63-3-212. Localities prohibited from enacting ordinances restricting cell phone use in motor vehicles.

No county, municipality or other political subdivision shall enact any ordinance restricting the use of cellular phones in any motor vehicle until such time as the state may authorize a county, municipality or other political subdivision to enact such an ordinance.

SOURCES: Laws, 2002, ch. 491, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Editor's Note — Laws, 2002, ch. 491, was House Bill 1551, 2002 Regular Session, and originally passed the House of Representatives on January 31, 2002, and the Senate on March 7, 2002. The Governor vetoed House Bill 1551 on March 22, 2002. The veto was overridden by both the House of Representatives and the Senate on March 27, 2002.

Cross References — Power of governing authorities of municipalities to exercise full jurisdiction in matter of streets and sidewalks, see § 21-37-3.

Enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities, see § 63-3-211.

§ 63-3-213. Effect of chapter upon rights of owners of certain real property.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the owner of real property used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner and not as a matter of right from prohibiting such use, or from requiring other or different or additional conditions than those specified in this chapter, or otherwise regulating such use as may seem best to such owner.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8152; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

ARTICLE 7.

TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS.

SEC.

- 63-3-301. Adoption of uniform system of traffic-control devices.
- 63-3-303. Placing and maintaining of traffic-control devices upon state and county highways; placement of devices upon such highways by local authorities.
- 63-3-305. Placing and maintaining of traffic-control devices upon highways under local jurisdiction.
- 63-3-307. Reflectors on bridges in state highway system.
- 63-3-309. Traffic-control signal colors and rules.
- 63-3-311. Flashing signal colors and rules.
- 63-3-313. Disobedience of official traffic-control devices.
- 63-3-315. Obedience of official traffic-control devices by emergency vehicles.
- 63-3-317. Unauthorized signs, signals, markings and devices.
- 63-3-319. Interference with official traffic-control devices or railroad signs or signals.
- 63-3-321. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; offenses.
- 63-3-323. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; definitions.
- 63-3-325. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; penalties.

§ 63-3-301. Adoption of uniform system of traffic-control devices.

The commissioner of public safety shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this chapter for use upon highways within this state. Such uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible conform to the system then current as approved by the American Association of State Highway Officials.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8153; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Duty of railroads to erect and maintain warning signboards at intersections of tracks and public roads or streets, see § 77-9-247.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Highways: governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Am Jur. 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights,

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Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-303. Placing and maintaining of traffic-control devices upon state and county highways; placement of devices upon such highways by local authorities.

The commissioner of public safety and the state highway commission shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices conforming to its manual and specifications, upon all state and county highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic.

No local authority shall place or maintain any traffic-control device upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of public safety and the state highway commission except by the latter's permission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8154; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Definitions of traffic signals, see § 63-3-133.

Erection of highway signs or guide boards on public highways, see §§ 65-7-13 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Railroads.

1. In general.

Under this section, the placement of traffic control signs or devices is dependent upon the discretion of the responsible entity. *Jones v. Mississippi DOT*, 744 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1999).

2. Railroads.

In an action arising from a collision between a train and a car that was allegedly caused, in part, by a lack of active protection at a crossing and vegetation

that obstructed the view of the operator of the car, the court rejected the railroad's contention that §§ 63-3-303 and 63-3-305 removed any and all responsibility from its shoulders and transferred the duty to the Mississippi Department of Transportation, as §§ 77-9-245, 77-9-247, 77-9-248, 77-9-251, and 77-9-253 all clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of public safety. *Kansas City S. Ry. v. Johnson*, 798 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S. Ct. 43, 151 L. Ed. 2d 15 (2001).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

At the intersection of a county road and a state highway, under this section, the state is responsible for erecting and maintaining traffic control devices unless the

county receives state permission to do the same. Austin, July 26, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0453.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

§ 63-3-305. Placing and maintaining of traffic-control devices upon highways under local jurisdiction.

Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall place and maintain such traffic control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they may deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or provisions of local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All such traffic-control devices hereafter erected shall conform to the state manual and specifications.

Local authorities in exercising those functions referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be subject to the direction and control of the state highway commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8155; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Burden of proof.
3. Railroads.

1. In general.

Under this section, the placement of traffic control signs or devices is dependent upon the discretion of the responsible entity. *Jones v. Mississippi DOT*, 744 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1999).

In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when his vehicle collided with a gravel pile built on a road as a barrier to an out-of-service bridge on the road, it was error for the court to prevent the plaintiff from introducing the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as proof of the applicable standard of care concerning the placement of warning signs and barricades on public roads where the defendant county did not dispute that such manual is the system approved by the American Association of State Highway Officials. *Jones v. Panola County*, 725 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1998).

In cases involving injuries arising out of vehicular traffic on municipal streets or county roads where special municipal or county speed restrictions have been placed in effect, the party expecting to rely

upon a violation of such restrictions should plead the existence of the special speed limit established by local authority, and its violation. *Niles v. Sanders*, 218 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1969).

2. Burden of proof.

If the existence of a special county or municipal speed restriction is alleged and denied, or if its legality is put in issue by a responsive pleading, proof should then be required, the burden resting upon the party having the affirmative, as in other cases of disputed fact; but where the existence of the speed zone and rate of speed are properly alleged and not denied, proof that speed signs were in fact posted is sufficient to create a presumption that they reflect appropriate action by competent authority in restricting speeds. *Niles v. Sanders*, 218 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1969).

3. Railroads.

In an action arising from a collision between a train and a car that was allegedly caused, in part, by a lack of active protection at a crossing and vegetation that obstructed the view of the operator of the car, the court rejected the railroad's contention that §§ 63-3-303 and 63-3-305 removed any and all responsibility from

its shoulders and transferred the duty to the Mississippi Department of Transportation, as §§ 77-9-245, 77-9-247, 77-9-248, 77-9-251, and 77-9-253 all clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of

public safety. *Kansas City S. Ry. v. Johnson*, 798 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S. Ct. 43, 151 L. Ed. 2d 15 (2001).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Counties are responsible for the installation and maintenance of necessary warning signs and pavement markings at rail crossings on roads under their juris-

diction subject to approval by the State Highway Commission. Fortier, Mar. 29, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0109.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way. 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Liability of municipality for failure to erect traffic warnings against entering or using street partially barred or obstructed by construction or improvement work. 52 A.L.R.2d 689.

Highways: governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Am Jur. 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

§ 63-3-307. Reflectors on bridges in state highway system.

The state highway commission is hereby authorized, in its discretion, to place amber reflectors on each end and on both sides of all bridges on all roads on the state highway system, which will permit a person to see such reflectors so that he might know that he is about to approach a bridge.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8154; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-309. Traffic-control signal colors and rules.

Whenever traffic is controlled by traffic-control signals exhibiting the words "Go," "Caution," or "Stop," or exhibiting different colored lights successively one (1) at a time, only the following colors shall be used and said terms and lights shall indicate as follows:

(1) Green alone or "Go."

(a) Vehicular traffic facing the signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. However, vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection at the time such signal is exhibited.

(b) Pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk.

(2) Yellow alone or "Caution" when shown following the green or "Go" signal.

(a) Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at the intersection, but if such stop cannot be made in safety a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection.

(b) Pedestrians facing such signal are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway, and any pedestrian then starting to cross shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles.

(3) Red alone or "Stop."

(a) Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at such other point as may be indicated by a clearly visible line and shall remain standing until green or "Go" is shown alone, except as provided in (b) and (c) of this paragraph (3);

(b) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal may cautiously enter the intersection to turn right after stopping as required by paragraph (3)(a), unless a sign stating "No Turn On Red" is in place prohibiting such a turn. Such vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other vehicular traffic lawfully using the intersection.

(c) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal at the intersection of two (2) one-way streets may cautiously enter the intersection to turn left in the direction designated for one-way traffic, after stopping as required by paragraph (3)(a), unless a sign stating "No Turn On Red" is in place prohibiting such a turn. Such vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk and to other vehicular traffic lawfully using the intersection.

(d) No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway unless he can do so safely and without interfering with any vehicular traffic.

(4) Red with green arrow.

(a) Vehicular traffic facing such signal may cautiously enter the intersection only to make movement indicated by such arrow but shall not interfere with other traffic or endanger pedestrians lawfully within a crosswalk.

(b) No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway unless he can do so safely and without interfering with any vehicular traffic.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8157; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1974, ch. 399; Laws, 1976, ch. 308; Laws, 1987, ch. 412, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury instructions.
3. Jury issues.

1. In general.

One who had turned left at an intersection while the traffic signal was red, pursuant to a green arrow signal, and who had traversed almost the entire distance of the intersection before another car,

when the signal turned from red to green, had entered the intersection, is not required to yield the right of way. *Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander*, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So. 2d 674 (1963).

2. Jury instructions.

A party is not entitled to an instruction that one should yield to the car first entering an intersection where the statute

requires stopping before entering the intersection in response to a red signal light, and Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. *Gates v. Green*, 214 So. 2d 828 (Miss. 1968).

3. Jury issues.

In tort action stemming from motor vehicle accident where both automobiles

collided while going through yellow traffic signal following green signal, question whether party accused of negligence had right to and did cautiously proceed through yellow signal under circumstances at issue was question to be decided by jury, and directed verdict favoring defendant was inappropriate. *Collins v. Ringwald*, 502 So. 2d 677 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Construction and Application of Statutory Provision Requiring Motorists to Yield Right-of-Way to Emergency Vehicle. 87 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 261.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 879-886.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 891-893, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Auto-

mobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 161-163.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 721-727.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1552.

§ 63-3-311. Flashing signal colors and rules.

Whenever flashing red or yellow signals are used they shall require obedience by vehicular traffic as follows:

1. **Flashing red (stop signal).** — When a red lens is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked and the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign.

2. **Flashing yellow (caution signal).** — When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8158; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Where a motorist approaching an intersection with the signal lights flashing red in her direction, failed to stop before entering therein, the court properly submitted to the jury the issue as to whether such negligence was a sole cause of the

collision. *Bates v. Walker*, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611 (1958).

2. Jury instructions.

In an action for damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff's motorcycle and defendant's automobile in an intersection with a flashing red light and stop sign facing plaintiff and a flashing yellow light and warning sign facing defendant, the

trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff's standard of care instruction which included the language, "the defendant had no lawful right to go forward...under the assumption that it would be open and clear," where a granted instruction detailed the crucial point that the yellow light facing defendant demanded caution, and that a finding of negligence would flow from her failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff if, as he claimed, he had lawfully entered the intersection and stalled unexpectedly. The trial court also properly refused to grant an instruction which stated in part, "the driver of a motor vehicle has a lawful duty to decrease his speed upon approaching an intersection," since § 63-3-311(2)

merely states that a driver "may proceed...only with caution" and caution is a relative concept not necessarily entailing decrease in speed since the current speed may already be a cautious speed. *Allen v. Blanks*, 384 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1980).

Where a motorist had approached an intersection with the signal light flashing red in her direction, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, she was not entitled to an instruction under Code 1942, § 8195, providing that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. *Bates v. Walker*, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611 (1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 261.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 885, 886.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 165.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 894, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1552.

§ 63-3-313. Disobedience of official traffic-control devices.

No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the instructions of any official traffic-control device placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police officer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8156; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Although there was no violation of § 63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present,

there was a violation of § 63-3-313 as he did not obey an official traffic-control device. *Harrison v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), *aff'd*, 800 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way. 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Motorist's liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or

malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 879 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 171.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1342-1524, 1531-2060.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, pe-

tition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 724.

§ 63-3-315. Obedience of official traffic-control devices by emergency vehicles.

The driver of any authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call upon approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign shall slow down as necessary for safety but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign or signal. At other times drivers of authorized emergency vehicles shall stop in obedience to a stop sign or signal.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8148; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, a driver who had a green light was not negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to an emergency police vehicle pursuant to § 63-3-809 because the driver of an emer-

gency vehicle has a duty under § 63-3-315 to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching a red traffic light controlling an intersection. *Andrews v. Jitney Jungle Stores of Am., Inc.*, 537 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms

(Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

§ 63-3-317. Unauthorized signs, signals, markings and devices.

(1) No person shall place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any highway any unauthorized sign, signal, marking or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal. No person shall place or maintain and no public authority shall permit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal

bearing thereon any commercial advertising, or any billboard or advertising sign of any kind or description, except that motorist services business signs and supports which are authorized by the state highway commission pursuant to Section 65-1-8 may be placed and maintained within state highway rights-of-way. This shall not be deemed to prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent to highways of signs giving useful directional information and of a type that cannot be mistaken for official signs provided that said signs are not erected closer than fifty (50) feet to the center line of state highways.

(2) Every such prohibited sign, signal or marking is hereby declared to be a public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highway is hereby empowered to remove the same or cause it to be removed after ten (10) days' notice to the owner thereof by registered letter or otherwise.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8159; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 395, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk. 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like. 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures. 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway. 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

§ 63-3-319. Interference with official traffic-control devices or railroad signs or signals.

No person shall without lawful authority attempt to or in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal, or any inscription, shield, or insignia thereon, or any other part thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8160; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of private person negligently causing malfunctioning, removal, or extinguishment of traffic signal or sign for subsequent motor vehicle accident. 64 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Automobiles: sudden emergency as exception to rule requiring motorist to maintain ability to stop within assured clear distance ahead. 75 A.L.R.3d 327.

§ 63-3-321. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; offenses.

Any person who wilfully destroys, knocks down, removes, defaces, or alters any letters or figures on a detour or warning sign set upon a highway or road of this state, or who wilfully knocks down, removes, rearranges, destroys,

defaces, or alters any letter or figures on a barricade or fence erected on any highway or road of this state, or who drives around or through any barricade or fence on any officially closed highway or road of this state, or who drives around such detour sign or barricade or fence, or who wilfully ignores or disregards a warning sign before such road has been officially opened to the public traffic by the Mississippi State Highway Department, or in appropriate cases by the county or municipal officer responsible for constructing or maintaining such roads, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This shall have no application to peace officers in the performance of their duties, nor to employees of the Mississippi State Highway Department, nor to employees of the contractor, nor to employees of the federal authorities when engaged in inspection of surveys, repairs, maintenance, or construction on or alongside such highways, within the right-of-way, nor to individuals domiciled or making their livelihood within the affected areas, nor to any person or group of persons who shall be authorized by the highway director, or appropriate county or municipal officer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8160.6; Laws, 1972, ch. 397, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1972).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Duty of highway construction detour around obstruction. 29 A.L.R.2d contract or to provide temporary way or 876.

§ 63-3-323. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; definitions.

The following words, terms and phrases, when used in Section 63-3-321 shall have the meaning ascribed to them herein:

(a) "Detour sign" means any sign placed across or on a public road of the state, by the state, the county or municipal authorities or by their contractors, indicating that such road is closed or partially closed, which sign also indicates the direction of an alternate route to be followed to give access to certain points.

(b) "Warning sign" means a sign indicating construction work in area.

(c) "Barricade" means a barrier for obstructing the passage of motor vehicle traffic.

(d) "Fence" means a barrier to prevent the intrusion of motor vehicle traffic.

(e) "Officially closed" means a highway or road that has been officially closed by a governmental unit, the Mississippi State Highway Department, a city or a county.

(f) "Officially opened" shall mean any highway that does not have signs or barriers stating that it is closed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8160:5; Laws, 1972, ch. 397, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1972).

§ 63-3-325. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; penalties.

Every person convicted of a violation of Section 63-3-321 shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars (\$5.00) nor more than one hundred dollars (\$100.00), or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The conviction of a violation of Section 63-3-321 shall not be competent evidence in any civil action.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8160.7; Laws, 1972, ch. 397, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1972).

Cross References — Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see § 63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

ARTICLE 9.

ACCIDENTS AND REPORTS.

SEC.

- 63-3-401. Duties of driver involved in accident resulting in personal injury or death; offenses and penalties.
- 63-3-403. Duties of driver involved in accident resulting in property damage to attended vehicle; offenses and penalties.
- 63-3-405. Duty of driver involved in accident resulting in injury or death or property damage to give information and render aid; liability for rendering assistance.
- 63-3-407. Duties of driver involved in accident involving unattended vehicle.
- 63-3-409. Duties of driver striking fixtures upon or adjacent to highway.
- 63-3-411. Duties of drivers involved in accidents involving injury or death or property damage of \$500 or more to report accidents; supplemental reports; investigations and reports by law enforcement officers.
- 63-3-413. Reporting of accident by occupant of vehicle when driver incapable of reporting.
- 63-3-415. Accident report forms.
- 63-3-417. Disclosure of information in accident reports.
- 63-3-419. Reporting by hospitals and medical examiners of deaths from motor vehicle accidents.
- 63-3-421. Tabulation and analysis of accident reports.
- 63-3-423. Requirement of accident reports by municipal corporations; confidentiality of reports.

§ 63-3-401. Duties of driver involved in accident resulting in personal injury or death; offenses and penalties.

(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 63-3-405.

(2) Every stop under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be made without obstructing traffic or endangering the life of any person more than is necessary.

(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, if any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that results in injury to any person willfully fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section, then such person, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year, or by fine of not less than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(4) If any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that results in the death of another or the mutilation, disfigurement, permanent disability or the destruction of the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb, organ or member of another willfully fails to stop or to comply with the requirements under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, then such person, upon conviction, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, or by fine of not less than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(5) The commissioner shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of any person convicted under this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8161; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1996, ch. 461, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 2, 1996).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Indictment — held sufficient.

Denial of petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief was proper where his indictment was not defective because the indictment clearly charged an offense cognizable under the laws of Mississippi; it

tracked the language in Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-401 and was therefore sufficient. *Holifield v. State*, 852 So. 2d 653 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 847 So. 2d 866 (Miss. 2003), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 124 S. Ct. 409, 157 L. Ed. 2d 294 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.2d 564.

Criminal responsibility of one other than driver at time of accident, under "hit-and-run" statute. 62 A.L.R.2d 1130.

Applicability of criminal "hit-and-run" statute to accidents occurring on private property. 77 A.L.R.2d 1171.

Instructions on sudden emergency in motor vehicle cases. 80 A.L.R.2d 5.

Violation of statute requiring one involved in accident to stop and render aid as affecting civil liability. 80 A.L.R.2d 299.

Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 287, Identification of Hit-and-Run Vehicle and Driver.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

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§ 63-3-403. Duties of driver involved in accident resulting in property damage to attended vehicle; offenses and penalties.

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 63-3-405. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

Any person failing to stop or comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8162; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 287, Identification of Hit-and-Run Vehicle and Driver.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

Law Reviews. 1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 887, December, 1979.

§ 63-3-405. Duty of driver involved in accident resulting in injury or death or property damage to give information and render aid; liability for rendering assistance.

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall, upon request and if available, exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant

of or person attending any vehicle collided with. Said driver shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person. No such driver who, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, renders emergency care to any injured person at the scene of an accident or in transporting said injured person to a point where medical assistance can be reasonably expected, shall be liable for any civil damages to said injured person as a result of any acts committed in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care or omission in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care by such driver in rendering the emergency care to said injured person.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8163; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1979, ch. 376, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

Cross References — “Good Samaritan” statute, see § 73-25-37.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Application.
3. Construction.
4. Procedural matters.

1. In general.

A state “hit and run” statute, requiring the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property to stop at the scene and give his name and address, does not violate the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. *California v. Byers*, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1971).

2. Application.

This section [Code 1942, § 8163], which makes it mandatory for the driver of a vehicle to stop such vehicle at the scene of accident and render reasonable assistance to the person injured, is not limited in its application to persons who have contributed to the accident in the sense that such persons must be shown to have been at fault or to have been guilty of negligence, which was a contributing approximate cause of the accident. *Meadows v. State*, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289 (1951).

3. Construction.

The duty to “render assistance” to persons injured in the first accident did not relieve the defendant, whose negligence

caused the first accident, of the duty of removing or attempting to remove his disabled vehicle from the highway where his vehicle was struck by a second vehicle. *Huff v. Boyd*, 242 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1971).

One of the main purposes of this section [Code 1942, § 8163] is to enable the persons injured and the officers investigating the accident to determine who is at fault, and to compel the driver of the car involved in the accident to render humanitarian assistance to the persons injured, whether he was guilty of negligence in the operation of his vehicle at the time of the accident or not. *Meadows v. State*, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289 (1951).

4. Procedural matters.

Since no question of negligence is involved in the failure to comply with this section [Code 1942, § 8163], the trial court properly refused to instruct that the fact that the defendant left the scene of the motor vehicle accident was a strong presumption that he was guilty of negligence by failing to stay at the scene of the accident and rendering first aid to the plaintiff and assisting in calling an ambulance and discharging other duties owed to the plaintiff. *Clark v. Mask*, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467 (1957).

An indictment under this section [Code 1942, § 8163] was not defective where it

did not show the highway on which the accident occurred, or described the scene of accident or show the extent of injuries

of the persons involved in the accident. *Meadows v. State*, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289 (1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Sufficiency of compliance with requirement of criminal "hit and run" statute that motorist identify himself. 48 A.L.R.3d 685.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property. 73 A.L.R.4th 737.

Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to

support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

§ 63-3-407. Duties of driver involved in accident involving unattended vehicle.

The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a conspicuous place in the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and of the owner of the vehicle doing the striking and a statement of the circumstances thereof. However, the provisions herein shall not apply where no material damage is done and where the owner of the unattended vehicle was guilty of negligence in leaving said vehicle parked as same was when so struck.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8164; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

§ 63-3-409. Duties of driver striking fixtures upon or adjacent to highway.

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damages to fixtures legally upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of such fact and of his name and address and of the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator's or

chauffeur's license and shall make report of such accident when and as required in Section 63-3-411.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8165; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

§ 63-3-411. Duties of drivers involved in accidents involving injury or death or property damage of \$500 or more to report accidents; supplemental reports; investigations and reports by law enforcement officers.

(1) The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an apparent extent of Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) or more shall immediately, by the quickest means of communication, give notice of the collision to the local police department if the collision occurs within an incorporated municipality, or if the collision occurs outside of an incorporated municipality to the nearest sheriff's office or highway patrol station.

(2) The department may require any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, of which report must be made as provided in this section, to file supplemental reports whenever the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the department. Additionally, the department may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the department.

(3) It shall be the duty of the highway patrol or the sheriff's office to investigate all accidents required to be reported by this section when the accident occurs outside the corporate limits of a municipality, and it shall be the duty of the police department of each municipality to investigate all accidents required to be reported by this section when the accidents occur within the corporate limits of the municipality.

Every law enforcement officer who investigates an accident as required by this subsection, whether the investigation is made at the scene of the accident or by subsequent investigation and interviews, shall forward within six (6) days after completing the investigation a written report of the accident to the department if the accident occurred outside the corporate limits of a municipality, or to the police department of the municipality if the accident occurred within the corporate limits of such municipality. Police departments shall forward such reports to the department within six (6) days of the date of the accident.

(4) Whenever an engineer of a railroad locomotive, or other person in charge of a train, is required to show proof of his identity under the provisions of this article, in connection with operation of such locomotive, to any law

enforcement officer, such person shall not be required to display his operator's or chauffeur's license but shall display his railroad employee number.

(5) In addition to the information required on the "statewide uniform traffic accident report" forms provided by Section 63-3-415, the department shall require the parties involved in an accident and the witnesses of such accident to furnish their phone numbers in order to assist the investigation by law enforcement officers.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8166; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 446, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 441, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 563, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment deleted former (2) which read: "The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an apparent extent of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) or more shall forward within ten (10) days after such accident, a written report of such accident to the department" and redesignated former (3) through (6) as present (2) through (5).

Cross References — Accident report required to be furnished sheriff following boating accident or collision, see §§ 59-21-51, 59-21-53.

Use of statewide uniform traffic accident report forms, see § 63-3-415.

Confidentiality of accident reports, see § 63-3-417.

Accident report required to be furnished public service commission by proper officer of motor carrier, see § 77-7-181.

Accident report required to be furnished public service commission following railway accident, see § 77-9-431.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.2d 564.

Admissibility of police officer's testimony at state trial relating to motorist's admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law. 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to

support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

§ 63-3-413. Reporting of accident by occupant of vehicle when driver incapable of reporting.

Whenever the driver of a vehicle is physically incapable of making a required accident report and there was another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of making a report, such occupant shall make or cause to be made said report.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8167; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 38. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

§ 63-3-415. Accident report forms.

(1) The department shall prepare and furnish “statewide uniform traffic accident report” forms to other agencies, municipal police departments, county sheriffs and other suitable law enforcement agencies or individuals. The department may charge an amount not exceeding the actual costs incurred by the department in preparing and furnishing the forms. The Department of Public Safety also may make such forms available in electronic format, which shall be accessible by law enforcement departments and other agencies without charge.

(2) Every accident report required by Section 63-3-411 from a law enforcement officer or individual shall be made on the statewide uniform traffic accident report form provided by the department.

(3) In addition to the information required on the accident report forms provided for herein, the department shall include a place on such report forms for the phone numbers of the parties involved in the accident and any witnesses to such accident.

(4) “Statewide uniform traffic accident report” forms shall not have printed upon them the name of any elected state official.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8168; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1984, ch. 485; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 36; Laws, 1990, ch. 441, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 446, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), deleted “without cost to other agencies” following “shall prepare and furnish,” inserted “other agencies” preceding “municipal police departments,” and added the last two sentences; and inserted “traffic” preceding “accident” in (4).

Cross References — Witnesses to accident to furnish phone numbers in order to assist investigation by law enforcement officers, see § 63-3-411.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-417. Disclosure of information in accident reports.

(1) All required accident reports and supplemental reports shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department; however, the department may, upon written request of any person involved in an accident or upon written request of the represen-

tative of his estate, his surviving spouse or one or more of his surviving next of kin, disclose to such requester or his legal counsel or a representative of his insurer any information contained in such report except the parties' version of the accident as set out in the written report filed by such parties, or may disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when such identity is not otherwise known or when such person denies his presence at such accident. The admissibility of an accident report into evidence in any court shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. However, the department shall furnish, upon demand of any person who has, or claims to have, made such a report or, upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or has not been made to the department solely to prove a compliance or a failure to comply with the requirement that such a report be made to the department.

(2) The report required by Section 63-3-411 may be used in proving uninsured status of the owner and operator of a vehicle in any action to enforce a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability policy, but only as provided in Section 13-1-124.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8170; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1981, ch. 361, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 303; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 116, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor's Note — Section 13-1-124, referred to in subsection (2), was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Similar provision regarding use of accident report required by the motor vehicle safety-responsibility law as evidence of uninsured status, see § 63-15-23.

Action against owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, see § 83-11-105.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Reports by law enforcement.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] applies only to reports required to be filed by parties involved in accidents. *Boyd v. Donald*, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661 (1964).

2. Reports by law enforcement.

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] does not require the police officer investigating

an accident to make a report. *Boyd v. Donald*, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661 (1964).

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] did not preclude the admission of a report prepared by highway patrolman who had investigated the accident for the purpose of impeaching the officer's testimony. *Boyd v. Donald*, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661 (1964).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Accident report or portions of it written by persons involved giving their version of facts are private and are not to be released under our law, including copies in possession of police department; however, police officer's investigative report, including of-

ficer's report or oral statements of persons involved, is not prohibited from release. *Twiford*, July 22, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0496.

Municipalities and police departments may adopt reasonable procedures, including release forms, to verify that persons

requesting accident report information are eligible, under statute, to receive it. Long, March 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0092.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records. 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

Admissibility of police officer's testimony at state trial relating to motorist's

admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law. 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-419. Reporting by hospitals and medical examiners of deaths from motor vehicle accidents.

(1) Every county medical examiner or county medical examiner investigator shall, on or before the tenth day of each month, report in writing to the department the death of any person within his jurisdiction during the preceding calendar month as the result of an accident involving a motor vehicle and the circumstances of such accident.

(2) Every hospital shall notify the county medical examiner or county medical examiner investigator of the county in which the accident occurred of the death within the hospital of any person who dies as a result of injuries apparently sustained in an accident involving a motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8169; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 446, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 37, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References — Mississippi Medical Examiner Act of 1986, see §§ 41-61-51 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-421. Tabulation and analysis of accident reports.

The department shall receive accident reports required by this article, and shall tabulate and may analyze all accident reports and shall publish annually or at more frequent intervals statistical information based thereon as to the number and circumstances of traffic accidents.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8171; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 446, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1976.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-423. Requirement of accident reports by municipal corporations; confidentiality of reports.

Any incorporated city, town, village, or other municipality, may by ordinance require that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident shall also file with a designated city department a report of such accident or a copy of any report required under this article to be filed with the department. Any such report shall be for the confidential use of the city department and shall be subject to the provisions of Section 63-3-417.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8172; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records. 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 349 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 41.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1488 et seq.

ARTICLE 11.

RESTRICTIONS ON SPEED; USE OF RADAR.

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| SEC. | |
| 63-3-501. | Maximum speed limits on state, interstate and controlled access highways. |
| 63-3-503. | Modification of maximum speed limits by state highway commission; maximum penalties for violations. |
| 63-3-505. | Conditions under which speed must be decreased. |
| 63-3-507. | Details of complaint and summons or notice to appear alleging speeding violation. |
| 63-3-509. | Minimum speed limits. |
| 63-3-511. | Modification of speed limits by local authorities; establishment of speed limits upon roads of correctional facilities; modification of local limits to conform to lower limits established by state highway commission. |
| 63-3-513. | Special speed limitation on bridges and elevated structures; proof of violations. |
| 63-3-515. | Speed limits near schools and churches, upon levees and causeways, and in other designated special zones. |
| 63-3-516. | Speed limits within highway work zones; penalties for violations. |
| 63-3-517. | Applicability of speed restrictions to emergency vehicles; duties of drivers of emergency vehicles. |
| 63-3-519. | Use of radar speed detection equipment; authorization and limitations. |
| 63-3-521. | Use of radar speed detection equipment; penalties for violations. |

§ 63-3-501. Maximum speed limits on state, interstate and controlled access highways.

No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of the state at a speed greater than sixty-five (65) miles per hour.

The Mississippi Transportation Commission may, in its discretion, by order duly entered on its minutes, increase the speed restrictions on any portion of the Interstate Highway System provided such speed restrictions are not increased to more than seventy (70) miles per hour. The commission may likewise increase the speed limit to seventy (70) miles per hour on controlled access highways with four (4) or more lanes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 318; Laws, 1996, ch 303, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved February 29, 1996).

Cross References — Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see § 65-1-8.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Duty of motorists.
3. Presumption of negligence.
4. Liability.
5. Proximate cause.
6. Comparative negligence.
7. Manslaughter.
8. Evidence.
9. Questions for jury.
10. Instructions.
11. Verdict.
12. Miscellaneous.
- 13.-20. [Reserved for future use.]
21. Under former law.

1. In general.

The law fixing a permissible speed presupposes a compliance with the duty to keep the car under control and be on the alert for objects on the highway. *Robertson v. Welch*, 242 Miss. 110, 134 So. 2d 491 (1961).

A motorist about to turn left in front of an approaching car may assume that such car is not exceeding a lawful speed, only until he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the speed is such that the turn cannot be safely made. *Cothern v. Brewer*, 234 Miss. 676, 107 So. 2d 361 (1958).

This section [Code 1942, § 8176] makes the prohibited speed prima facie evidence of guilt, but does not exclude any valid defense. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

Maximum speed allowed is such rate of speed as is reasonable and proper having due regard to the traffic or use of the highway, or such as will not endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).

2. Duty of motorists.

The presence of an intersection with which the motorist was fully familiar heightened his duty to exercise reasonable care in operating his car at such speed as would permit him to take the necessary steps to avoid colliding with a pedestrian using the road, and within his length of vision ahead as provided by his headlights. *Parkins v. Brown*, 241 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1957).

"Control" of vehicles within statute requiring control of vehicles at all times means that driver shall have ability to

stop readily and easily. *Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker*, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8 (1932).

Motorist must drive at rate of speed enabling him to avoid injury to persons who should come under his observation. *Frazier v. Hull*, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775 (1930).

Driver must keep automobile under control and be on alert for pedestrians. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. *Flynt v. Fondren*, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188 (1920).

Automobile driver must keep his machine constantly under control and be on the alert for and anticipate the presence of pedestrians and others using the streets. *Ulmer v. Pistole*, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522 (1917).

3. Presumption of negligence.

In an action arising out of intersection motor vehicle collision, the court's instruction that if the driver of a truck which was not a "pick-up" truck, was violating the law in driving the truck at a speed of more than 45 miles per hour, such fact did not raise any presumptions of negligence on the part of the driver, was error in view of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. *Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream & Creamery Co.*, 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634 (1957).

Motorist approaching and entering intersection at unabated speed of approximately 30 miles per hour is prima facie negligent. *Moore v. Abdalla*, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502 (1944).

Statutory presumption of negligence on part of party shown to have violated motor vehicle law disappears when all facts and circumstances on issue of liability are in evidence. *White v. Weitz*, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484 (1934).

One driving automobile at more than ten miles an hour at night without lights was prima facie negligent. *McLaurin v. McLaurin Furn. Co.*, 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933).

Prima facie case of negligence arising from violation of statute governing speed of automobile is rebuttable. *Rhodes v. Fullilove*, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 840 (1931).

Automobile driver, killing mule while driving at excessive speed, was prima fa-

cie negligent. *Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill*, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871 (1929).

4. Liability.

Driving an automobile on a highway under the influence of intoxicants, or at a high and unlawful rate of speed, is not only dangerous but is negligence per se, and if such negligence contributes to an injury the defendant is liable in damages. *Freeze v. Taylor*, 257 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1972).

Motorist prevented by bright lights of truck standing on highway from seeing beyond such lights, held negligent in failing to reduce speed and to proceed with caution, rendering him liable for striking person standing on highway. *Kettle v. Musser's Potato Chips, Inc.*, 249 Miss. 212, 162 So. 2d 243 (1964).

Motorist failing to slow down on being blinded by lights of approaching car held liable for death of pedestrian struck while walking on side of road. *Layton v. Cook*, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964).

Motorist who, while traveling at unlawful rate of speed, struck pedestrian after seeing him on highway, held liable for injuries to pedestrian, even though pedestrian was contributorily negligent, since damages recoverable would be reduced in proportion to pedestrian's negligence. *Hadad v. Lockeby*, 176 Miss. 660, 169 So. 691 (1936).

Presence of ditched car on right-hand side of road and another automobile backed near it to render aid, held not independent intervening cause of passenger's injury when bus, claimed to have been operated at excessive speed and without proper lookout on approaching curve, ran into ditch to avoid collision. *Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs*, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9 (1935).

Employer held liable for wilful and wanton acts resulting in injury to boy whom driver of truck had invited to ride thereon. *Trico Coffee Co. v. Clemens*, 168 Miss. 748, 151 So. 175 (1933).

Motorist exceeding legal speed limit, and as a result inflicting injury on another, is liable therefor. *Teche Lines v. Bateman*, 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159 (1932).

Driving automobile at night at speed not permitting driver to avoid injury to persons coming within range of lights is negligence. *Frazier v. Hull*, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775 (1930).

Pedestrian's negligence does not relieve automobile driver from exercising reasonable care. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).

Pedestrian's recovery for injuries by automobile should be reduced in proportion to negligence in crossing street. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).

Driving automobile at dangerous rate of speed upon a populous and frequently used street is negligence per se. *Ulmer v. Pistole*, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522 (1917).

5. Proximate cause.

Presence of ditched car on right-hand side of road and another automobile backed near it to render aid, held not independent intervening cause of passenger's injury when bus, claimed to have been operated at excessive speed and without proper lookout on approaching curve, ran into ditch to avoid collision. *Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs*, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9 (1935).

Court may, notwithstanding all facts regarding automobile collision are in evidence, instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by defendant is negligence and entitles plaintiff to recover where it is proximate cause of injury, or that violation of statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff's recovery. *White v. Weitz*, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484 (1934).

Bus company was liable for injury to automobile occupant if proximately caused by gravel thrown by bus because of its reckless negligence and excessive speed. *Teche Lines v. Bateman*, 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159 (1932).

Undisputed testimony held to establish that automobile driver's violation of state statute regulating speed, constituting negligence, was proximate cause of collision. *Terry v. Smylie*, 161 Miss. 31, 133 So. 662 (1931).

Unlawful speed of automobile must be proximate contributing cause of injury to make unlawful speed an element of liability. *Pounders v. Day*, 151 Miss. 436, 118

So. 298 (1928); *Rowlands v. Morphis*, 158 Miss. 662, 130 So. 906 (1930).

6. Comparative negligence.

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff's coal truck struck defendant's pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff's vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. *Cobb v. Williams*, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17 (1956).

Where defendant's driver was grossly negligent in entering intersection at 50 miles per hour without stopping as required by Code 1942, § 8213, and collided with plaintiff's driver who, in entering the intersection on a through street at unabated speed of 30 miles per hour, was prima facie negligent under this section [Code 1942, § 8176], the negligence of plaintiff's driver was a contributing factor to the accident and warranted application of the comparative negligence statute (Code 1942, § 1454). *Moore v. Abdalla*, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502 (1944).

7. Manslaughter.

Motorist exceeding speed fixed by law fails to exercise legal measure of due care prescribed by state, and speed so much above legal rate as to leave no doubt that excess was intentional and wilful constitutes culpable want of due care as respects injuries proximately resulting therefrom, so that homicide proximately caused by such wilfully excessive speed is manslaughter. *Wilson v. State*, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744 (1935).

Motorists' habitual violation of statute, limiting speed in closely built-up territory to twenty miles an hour, and disregard of pedestrians' rights by many motorists, furnish no excuse for courts to refuse to enforce law or depart therefrom in case wherein facts justify conviction of motorist for manslaughter in causing pedestri-

an's death by wilful violation of speed law. *Wilson v. State*, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744 (1935).

8. Evidence.

Where the speed of a vehicle is a factor in determining the proximate cause of a collision, evidence as to speed should be limited to the time of, or immediately before, the collision, and the court should exclude evidence of speed prior to and remote from the collision in question; but evidence of prior speed may be admitted if the evidence shows that the vehicle continued to be operated at approximately the same speed until collision occurs, or where the circumstances are such that prior speed has substantial evidential values as to the speed of the vehicle at the time of, or immediately before, the collision. *Barrett v. Shirley*, 231 Miss. 364, 95 So. 2d 471 (1957).

Error in personal injury case in admitting evidence of a municipal speed ordinance because it was not pleaded in the declaration could not be complained of where the pertinent provision of the ordinance as to the applicable speed limit was identical with that of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] and it was alleged in the declaration that defendant was running at a reckless speed in violation of the law. *Howell v. George*, 201 Miss. 783, 30 So. 2d 603 (1947).

Defendant could not complain of conviction for violating city ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] on ground that the summons or notice to appear and defend contained no specification of speed at which defendant was charged to have driven, where defendant appeared and defended without making such point in the trial court. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

Evidence that defendant was driving at greater speed than that prescribed by this section [Code 1942, § 8176], or by city ordinance adopting provisions thereof, establishes defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, where defendant fails to offer any evidence in justification thereof. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

In an action by an automobile owner to recover for personal injuries sustained by him when he attempted to avoid an anticipated collision with the defendant's truck which was entering the intersection from a side road, evidence of the physical condition at the scene of the accident and that the truck stopped either before entering the paved part of the intersection or when it reached the center thereof, disproved any contention that the truck was driving at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable and proper when it approached the intersection in question or that the driver in any manner violated the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. *Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Hand*, 186 Miss. 893, 191 So. 674 (1939).

Evidence as to bus driver's violation of speed statute and sharp curve statute and of failure to keep proper lookout held sufficient to make issue for jury of driver's negligence in action for passenger's injuries when bus ran into ditch as result of driver's effort to avoid striking automobile on side of road. *Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs*, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9 (1935).

Evidence of motorists' wilful and intentional operation of automobile at speed grossly exceeding statutory limit across pedestrians' path alongside railroad track at street crossing and death of pedestrian as proximate or concurrently proximate result of such law violation held to sustain conviction of manslaughter. *Wilson v. State*, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744 (1935).

Privilege tax statute defining trucks as motor vehicles used in business of transporting property not applying to statute restricting speed of trucks to thirty miles per hour, plaintiff in personal injury action held not required to show that defendant's automobile exceeding speed limit for trucks was engaged in business of transporting property. *Pollard v. Stansell*, 169 Miss. 136, 152 So. 646 (1934).

In prosecution against automobile driver for failure to reasonably turn to right, evidence showing defendant exceeded speed limit was inadmissible. *Naylor v. State*, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102 (1930).

Under evidence jury could not find defendant motorist's negligent speed did not contribute to injury of plaintiff struck

when replacing tools in automobile on highway at night. *Frazier v. Hull*, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775 (1930).

9. Questions for jury.

In an action for damages resulting when defendant's truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff's truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant's driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. *Green Truck Lines v. Hooper*, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443 (1958).

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant's automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff's vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. *Buntyn v. Robinson*, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126 (1958).

In an action for the death of eight-year-old child killed when struck by a large diesel trailer truck, not equipped with service brakes, it was for the jury to determine whether the truck driver was negligent in driving at a speed in excess of 45 miles an hour, in failing to maintain a proper lookout for persons on the highway, and failing to observe the movements of a child crossing the highway in time to avoid injuring her; in failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle after he saw, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have seen the child on the highway, and whether the driver's negligence, if any, was the approximate or contributing cause of the death of the child. *Reed v. Eubanks*, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132 (1957).

In an action by occupant of a truck against driver to recover for injuries sustained when the truck went off highway on curve, where evidence was conflicting to some extent, there was no prejudicial

error in submitting issue of negligence for determination of jury. *Shearron v. Shearron*, 219 Miss. 27, 68 So. 2d 71 (1953), suggestion of error sustained in part, overruled in part, 219 Miss. 27, 69 So. 2d 801 (1954), suggestion of error sustained in part, overruled in part, 219 Miss. 66, 70 So. 2d 922 (1954).

Whether bus driver could have reasonably foreseen possibility of injury, held for jury. *Wheat v. Teche Lines*, 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553 (1938).

Under evidence, question whether bus driver was traveling at reasonable rate of speed, and whether bus was in such close proximity to plaintiff as to endanger life or limb, held for jury. *Wheat v. Teche Lines*, 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553 (1938).

Automobile chauffeur's negligence in permitting owner's son to drive automobile while intoxicated, resulting in injury to child, held for jury. *Slaughter v. Holsomback*, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318 (1933).

Whether motorist in rear had automobile under control and whether truck driver ahead, stopping on bridge, exercised ordinary care at and immediately before collision held for jury. *Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker*, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8 (1932).

Whether excessive speed of truck, or plaintiff's act in placing himself at rear of stalled automobile, was proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, held for jury under evidence. *Rhodes v. Fullilove*, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 840 (1931).

Whether automobile driver was exceeding fifteen miles per hour at time of striking mule held for jury. *Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill*, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871 (1929).

Negligence in driving automobile fifteen miles per hour at time of striking pedestrian crossing the street held for jury. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).

10. Instructions.

In a suit for the death of a child pedestrian struck by an automobile, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by reason of the driver's alleged failure to decrease the speed of his automobile as he approached

the intersection, where the evidence as to the automobile's speed was in conflict. *Young v. Schwarz*, 230 So. 2d 583 (Miss. 1970).

The admission of a defendant motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to reduce her speed on approaching the intersection would only entitle the plaintiff to an instruction that the defendant's failure to reduce her speed was negligence and that if such negligence caused or contributed to the accident then he was entitled to a verdict against her. *Richardson v. Adams*, 223 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1969).

Where there was evidence that defendant's truck was traveling at about 60 miles an hour as it approached and entered the intersection, the lower court properly instructed the jury that if the truck was being operated at a greater rate of speed than 50 miles per hour immediately before the collision such speed would constitute negligence, and if such negligence proximately contributed to the collision then the verdict should be for the plaintiffs. *Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters*, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900 (1964).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant's truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of the plaintiff's truck-trailer unit, instructions, which when read together, focused the attention of the jury on the real issue of whether the plaintiff's truck was overtaken from behind, run into and damaged by the negligence of the defendant's driver in operating his truck without proper control, without keeping a proper lookout, and at a negligent rate of speed, or whether plaintiff's driver negligently stopped his truck on the half-moon curve in the right lane of the pavement when it was unnecessary and impractical to do so, and, if so, whether such negligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision, were not reversibly erroneous, even though some imperfections could be found therein. *Green Truck Lines v. Hooper*, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443 (1958).

In an action against an automobile driver for injuries sustained by a bicyclist, where in instructions the jury was told that the plaintiff failed to keep his bicycle

under control and to keep a proper lookout for others on the highway and to use due care not to place himself in a place of danger and not to create emergency he could not recover, the instruction failed to take into account the provisions of comparative negligence statutes which provide that the plaintiff's contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, if the proof showed that the defendant was negligent and the defendant's negligence was the proximate contributing cause to the plaintiff's injuries. *Rivers v. Turner*, 223 Miss. 673, 78 So. 2d 903 (1955).

An instruction that if driver of plaintiff's bus was operating it at night over public streets at such speed as not to permit driver to avoid striking vehicles coming within range of his lights, which was sole proximate cause of collision with defendant, jury should return verdict for defendant, announced sound law. *Jackson City Lines v. Harkins*, 204 Miss. 707, 38 So. 2d 102 (1948).

Instruction authorizing jury to find defendant guilty of violating city ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176], if jury believed from the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully drove automobile on city street more than 55 miles per hour, was proper, where defendant made no attempt to overcome prima facie case. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

In action for injuries sustained in collision between trucks in municipality, instructions which did not refer to regulatory statutes which were allegedly violated by defendant's truck driver, or declare that violation of statutes must contribute proximately to the collision, but which left jury to guess at what constituted negligence, were insufficient. *McDonough Motor Express, Inc. v. Spiers*, 180 Miss. 88, 177 So. 655 (1937).

Instruction that it was truck driver's duty to operate truck at safe rate of speed held properly refused; law requiring only reasonably safe rate. *Robinson v. Haydel*, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7 (1936).

In action for injuries sustained when automobile in which plaintiff was riding

was struck by truck, instruction which invoked for plaintiff aid of statute regarding excessive speed and prima facie rule of evidence held erroneous, where declaration was merely sufficient to state case of common-law liability for negligence. *Gulf Research Dev. Co. v. Linder*, 177 Miss. 123, 170 So. 646 (1936).

In prosecution for manslaughter by automobile, instruction that, if defendant was exceeding twenty miles per hour and exceeding speed at which reasonable or prudent man would have driven, he was guilty of culpable negligence, and authorizing conviction if death was proximate result of such culpable negligence, held reversible error. *Bailey v. State*, 176 Miss. 579, 169 So. 765 (1936).

Instruction that it is violation of state law to drive automobile on public highway at greater speed than reasonable and proper, having due regard to traffic and use of highway, and that motorist must anticipate presence of other persons and vehicles on highway and drive at such rate of speed as to enable him to avoid injury to such persons, held proper. *Hadad v. Lockeby*, 176 Miss. 660, 169 So. 691 (1936).

In action arising out of collision between automobile and truck on bridge, deficiency in instruction relating to precautions truck driver should have taken in approaching bridge held cured by instruction setting out statutory provisions defining duty of operator of automobile approaching bridge. *Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Screws*, 175 Miss. 383, 166 So. 754 (1936).

Court may, notwithstanding all facts regarding automobile collision are in evidence, instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by defendant is negligence and entitles plaintiff to recover where it is proximate cause of injury, or that violation of statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff's recovery. *White v. Weitz*, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484 (1934).

Instruction that plaintiff, if exceeding speed permitted by statute, was prima facie negligent, held erroneous, where all facts and circumstances of collision were in evidence, since violation of statute

would not prevent recovery unless it was sole proximate cause of collision. *White v. Weitz*, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484 (1934).

Instruction on rate of speed on highway where territory contiguous thereto was closely built up held erroneous under evidence. *Bradford v. State*, 158 Miss. 210, 127 So. 277 (1930).

11. Verdict.

A verdict of \$25,000 for the loss of an arm was excessive where the evidence showed that the negligence of the plaintiff to a very large extent contributed proximately to the injury, in that he was driving a truck without any brakes with knowledge thereof, and was violating the 30-mile speed limit for trucks prescribed by previous enactment of similar section (Code 1930, § 5569 [repealed]), during the nighttime and while he was crossing three bridges in a creek bottom one of which was very narrow. *E.L. Bruce Co. v. Bramlett*, 188 So. 532 (Miss. 1939).

12. Miscellaneous.

A declaration in an action seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident which charged special hazards, excessive rate of speed, and that the defendant negligently and in complete disregard of the rights and safety of others attempted to drive his truck between two vehicles, one stalled on the left hand lane and the other traveling in the right hand lane, was sufficient to state a cause of action. *Bullock v. Sim Ramsey, Jr. Trucking Co.*, 207 So. 2d 628 (Miss. 1968).

In an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, where the evidence as to whether at the time defendant entered the intersection the plaintiff's vehicle was approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard was in sharp conflict, and the plaintiff admitted that he did not reduce his speed as he approached the intersection, the trial court did not err in refusing plaintiff's request for directed verdict. *Junakin v. Kuykendall*, 237 Miss. 255, 114 So. 2d 661 (1959).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes a misdemeanor and fine of \$100 may be imposed therefor, by

virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

Affidavit that defendant wilfully and unlawfully drove automobile over public street or highway in city at rate of more than fifty-five miles per hour, contrary to laws and ordinances of city, sufficiently charges offense of violating ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

Recovery could not be sustained for death of truck driver occurring at night when he drove his truck into an unlighted railroad car on a railroad crossing, where if the decedent had been observing the requirements of this section [Code 1942, § 8176], and of the law with respect to lights on motor vehicles, the accident would not have occurred. *Mississippi Ex-*

port Ry. v. Summers, 194 Miss. 179, 11 So. 2d 429 (1943), error overruled, 194 Miss. 193, 11 So. 2d 905 (1943).

13.-20. [Reserved for future use.]

21. Under former law.

Ford coupe, equipped with pick-up body and capable of carrying half ton of freight, was "truck" within statute prohibiting driving of truck on highway at speed exceeding thirty miles per hour. *Pollard v. Stansell*, 169 Miss. 136, 152 So. 646 (1934).

Highway running through unincorporated village, with railroad depot and several buildings, was public highway where territory contiguous thereto is closely built up within statute. *Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill*, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871 (1929).

Ordinance regulating pedestrian's use of the street held reasonable. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Where State Highway Commission has acted in response to federal laws, speed limit on county roads is automatically reduced to 55 miles per hour, regardless of

whether board of supervisors has passed ordinance or resolution setting limit. *Clark*, Dec. 9, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0908.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert's testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 288 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 845 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 201-210.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 887.1 (speed contest), 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 63 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 578 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1435 et seq.

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§ 63-3-503. Modification of maximum speed limits by state highway commission; maximum penalties for violations.

Whenever the state highway commission shall determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that any speed set forth in Section 63-3-501 is greater than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of a highway, said commission shall determine and declare a reasonable and safe speed limit thereat which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection or other place or part of highway.

Whenever the state highway commission determines that speed limits set forth in Section 63-3-501 are different from those speeds set forth in applicable laws of the Federal Government, then said commission may declare a speed limit which is consistent with such laws and which shall be effective immediately upon adoption by the commission. Appropriate signs giving notice of the adopted speed limits shall be erected upon order of the commission.

The maximum fine and sentence to be imposed for a violation of excessive speed above the maximum limits set by the state highway commission pursuant to the authority granted by this section shall be one-half (½) the fine and sentence imposed by Section 63-9-11 if the excessive speed does not exceed the maximum limits imposed by Section 63-3-501.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 314, eff from and after passage (approved Feb. 28, 1974).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes misdemeanor and fine of \$100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue

of Code 1942, § 8275. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert's testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor

vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 290.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 887.1 (speed contest).

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 63 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 578 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1435 et seq.

§ 63-3-505. Conditions under which speed must be decreased.

The driver or operator of any motor vehicle must decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic. All trucks, or truck-trailer combinations and passenger buses shall be required to reduce speed to forty-five miles per hour during inclement weather when visibility is bad.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1 eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

Cross References — Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see § 65-1-8.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Criminal sanctions.
3. Jury instructions.
4. Jury issues.
5. Directed verdict.
6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Mother was required under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-505 to decrease the speed of her vehicle when she approached the intersection; the mother failed to keep a proper lookout as she approached the intersection, where a reasonable person would have recognized the need to slow the vehicle down when approaching the

intersection. *Clark v. Clark*, 863 So. 2d 1027 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In an action arising from an accident at an intersection between a bus with the right-of-way and an automobile which failed to stop at a stop sign, the statute was properly applied to require the bus driver to slow down as he approached the intersection and to brake when it became apparent that the automobile was not going to stop. *Greyhound Lines v. Sutton*, 765 So. 2d 1269 (Miss. 2000).

A truckdriver, in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, should have reduced the speed of his truck so as to enable him to keep his truck under control

and avoid striking the decedent when decedent came within the range of truck's headlights; the fact that the decedent was at or near the center of the road, under the influence of intoxicating liquor and a black man dressed in black clothing does not in and of itself absolve the truckdriver of his liability. *Hornburger v. Baird*, 508 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

A motorist driving approximately 85 miles per hour who failed to reduce his speed while approaching an intersection was liable for injuries sustained by a passenger during a collision where the motorist's speed was a proximate contributing cause of the collision. *Youngblood v. Monteith*, 340 So. 2d 4 (Miss. 1976).

Notwithstanding that it was raining hard on the morning of an accident, neither the owner nor the operator of a tractor-semi-trailer were guilty of negligence per se for failing to reduce speed from 50 to 45 miles per hour, where the operator testified that visibility was approximately one-quarter of a mile, and other witnesses for the plaintiff testified to the fact that it was raining but that they had no trouble seeing the highway and automobiles in front of them. *Harpole v. Harrison*, 279 So. 2d 150 (Miss. 1973).

Motorist who, in violation of ¶ 2 of subd (b) of Code 1942, § 8185, attempted to pass another car on the left within 100 feet of a dangerous intersection, and at the same time failed to decrease his speed as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8176] was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision at the intersection. *McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.*, 253 Miss. 169, 175 So. 2d 480 (1965).

Motorist approaching and entering intersection at unabated speed of approximately 30 miles per hour is prima facie negligent. *Moore v. Abdalla*, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502 (1944).

2. Criminal sanctions.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes misdemeanor and fine of \$100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

3. Jury instructions.

Where a driver turned left in front of another vehicle, causing an accident, there was no error in the trial court's refusal to give a special hazard instruction, as there were no stalled or wrecked vehicles obstructing the highway, no emergency vehicles, and no emergency lights; the Supreme Court of Mississippi has never held, and Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-505 did not provide, that a momentarily inattentive driver was a special hazard for which another driver had to reduce speed. *Enterger Miss., Inc. v. Bolden*, 854 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 2003).

In an action arising from a one-car accident that occurred when the 16-year-old driver lost control of her car when she hit some loose asphalt or gravel as she entered a curve, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury either that it was their sworn duty to return a verdict for the plaintiff or that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of her motor vehicle as a matter of law where (1) the defendant estimated her speed at around 35 to 40 mph, but contended that she did not believe she was speeding, and (2) her response to the question of whether she slowed down before entering the curve was, "I do not recall applying my brakes before I entered the curve," but slowing down can also be accomplished by letting off the gas, as opposed to braking. *Jones v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*, — So. 2d —, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 86 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2001), *aff'd*, 822 So. 2d 946 (Miss. 2002).

The court properly instructed the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff to reduce her speed when approaching and going around a curve and that if the jury believed from the evidence that the plaintiff failed to reduce the speed of her automobile on approaching and going around a curve and, in the exercise of reasonable care, she should have reduced her speed while traveling on a wet highway, then she was guilty of negligence. *Fielder v. Magnolia Bev. Co.*, 757 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1999).

A jury instruction in a negligence action arising from an automobile accident that required the defendant to "decrease her speed as may be necessary to avoid collid-

ing with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on the highway in compliance with legal requirements" was erroneous because it placed a higher burden on the defendant than that of reasonable care. Similarly, an instruction that required the defendant to be "vigilant and to anticipate the presence of vehicles at all times and under all circumstances" was erroneous for the same reason, and also warranted reversal and remand of the case. *Turner v. Turner*, 524 So. 2d 942 (Miss. 1988).

In a suit for the death of a child pedestrian struck by an automobile, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by reason of the driver's alleged failure to decrease the speed of his automobile as he approached the intersection, where the evidence as to the automobile's speed was in conflict. *Young v. Schwarz*, 230 So. 2d 583 (Miss. 1970).

The admission of a defendant motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to reduce her speed on approaching the intersection would only entitle the plaintiff to an instruction that the defendant's failure to reduce her speed was negligence and that if such negligence caused or contributed to the accident then he was entitled to a verdict against her. *Richardson v. Adams*, 223 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1969).

4. Jury issues.

In order to be in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] a motorist must fail to reduce his speed from a maximum provided when one of the conditions set out in this section is present, and the question of whether the plaintiff motorist involved in an intersectional accident when travelling at a speed less than the maximum failed further to reduce his

speed under the prevailing circumstances constituted negligence was one for the jury to determine. *Richardson v. Adams*, 223 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1969).

Evidence that motorist approached intersection without reducing speed in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] was sufficient to submit to the jury the question of whether he was guilty of any negligence which proximately caused or contributed to the accident. *Shaw v. Phillips*, 193 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1967).

5. Directed verdict.

The admission by a motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to decrease her speed upon approaching the intersection is not sufficient ground to support a directed verdict for the plaintiff on the basis of the contention that the defendant motorist was in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] and therefore negligent as a matter of law. *Richardson v. Adams*, 223 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1969).

6. Miscellaneous.

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff's coal truck struck defendant's pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff's vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. *Cobb v. Williams*, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17 (1956).

Duty of drivers of motor vehicles in approaching curves defined. *Flynt v. Fondren*, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188 (1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert's testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 201-210.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 191, Meteorological Conditions at a Particular Time and Place.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 582.

§ 63-3-507. Details of complaint and summons or notice to appear alleging speeding violation.

In every charge of violation of Sections 63-3-501 through 63-3-505, and subsection (2) of Section 63-3-509 the complaint as well as the summons or notice to appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven as well as the speed applicable within the district or at the location.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1, **eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).**

Cross References — Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law —Traffic Violations Procedure, see Chapter 9 of this title.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Evidence.

1. In general.

Defendant could not complain of conviction for violating city ordinance adopting provisions of Code 1942, § 8176, on ground that the summons or notice to appear and defend contained no specification of speed at which defendant was charged to have driven, where defendant appeared and defended without making such point in the trial court. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

2. Evidence.

Error in personal injury case in admitting evidence of a municipal speed ordinance because it was not pleaded in the declaration could not be complained of where the pertinent provision of the ordinance as to the applicable speed limit was identical with that of Code 1942, § 8176, and it was alleged in the declaration that defendant was running at a reckless speed in violation of the law. *Howell v. George*, 201 Miss. 783, 30 So. 2d 603 (1947).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 63-3-507 requires that speed alleged to have been traveled needs to be on ticket. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

Miss. Code Section 63-3-507 deals specifically with speeding; although helpful,

it is not mandated that exact speed be alleged when driving in excess of speed limit is part of reckless driving charge. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles
§ 1443.

§ 63-3-509. Minimum speed limits.

(1) No motor vehicle shall be driven at a speed less than thirty miles per hour on federal designated highways where no hazard exists. An exception to this requirement shall be recognized when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation, or when a vehicle or combination of vehicles is necessarily, or in compliance with law or police direction, proceeding at a reduced speed.

Police officers are hereby authorized to enforce this provision by directions to drivers. In the event of apparent wilful disobedience to this provision and refusal to comply with the direction of an officer in accordance herewith the continued slow operation by a driver shall be a misdemeanor.

(2) In the event a speed limit of seventy miles per hour is established on any portion of the Interstate Highway System or on four-laned U.S. designated highways as is provided in Section 63-3-501, a minimum speed of forty miles per hour shall be established for those vehicles having a maximum speed restriction of seventy miles per hour. Notice of said minimum speed shall be posted on such roads.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8176, 8178; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, §§ 1, 3; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

In an action for personal injuries and property damages resulting when plaintiff's automobile ran into defendant's truck which was going in the same direction on a U. S. highway, where it appeared that the speed of defendant's truck at the time of the accident was from 10 to 20 miles per hour, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge that the jury should find for plaintiff if the defendant was driving his vehicle on a federal designated highway at the time and place of the accident at a speed of less than 30 miles per hour where no fact existed justifying such slow speed under this section [Code 1942, § 8178], and the

reduced speed was the proximate, or a contributory cause of the accident. *Netterville v. Crawford*, 233 Miss. 562, 103 So. 2d 1 (1958).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]**11. Under former law.**

Truckdriver traveling less than 30 miles per hour on highway is not negligent if reduced speed is out of necessity; physical limitation on rate of acceleration of tractor trailer which is traveling at reduced speed due to just having entered highway falls within "necessary" exception to minimum speed. *Byrd v. F-S Prestress, Inc.*, 464 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1985).

Operation of motor vehicle at less than fixed maximum rate of speed may be negligence. *Wheat v. Teche Lines*, 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553 (1938).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 288 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 851.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 63 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 580.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1435.

§ 63-3-511. Modification of speed limits by local authorities; establishment of speed limits upon roads of correctional facilities; modification of local limits to conform to lower limits established by state highway commission.

Whenever local authorities, including boards of supervisors, within their respective jurisdictions, determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the speed permitted under this article on any street, or any county road or any portion thereof, or at any intersection is greater than is reasonable or safe under conditions found to exist upon such street, or any county road or any portion thereof, or at such intersection, such local authorities shall determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit, which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected on such street, or any county road or any portion thereof, or at such intersection, or upon the approaches thereto. However, no speed limit shall be fixed by any such local authorities at less than fifteen (15) miles per hour.

The Commissioner of Corrections is authorized to establish by regulation reasonable and safe speed limits upon the roads of the correctional facilities under his jurisdiction which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected. Speed limits may be based upon road or traffic conditions or upon security considerations.

Provided, however, that whenever the State Highway Commission shall, pursuant to Section 63-3-503, lower the maximum speed limit in response to federal laws, regulations or guidelines for purposes of energy conservation, local authorities, including boards of supervisors, shall immediately lower maximum speed limits on local highways, not to exceed a maximum speed of fifty-five (55) miles per hour.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8177; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 2; Laws, 1956, ch. 397; Laws, 1960, ch. 208; Laws, 1974, ch. 321; Laws, 1986, ch. 485, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1986).

Cross References — Provision that speed limits within the grounds of correctional facilities may be enforced by employees of the Department of Corrections by citation or otherwise, see § 47-5-54.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Burden of proof.
- 3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

In cases involving injuries arising out of vehicular traffic on municipal streets or county roads where special municipal or county speed restrictions have been placed in effect, the party expecting to rely upon a violation of such restrictions should plead the existence of the special speed limit established by local authority, and its violation. *Niles v. Sanders*, 218 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1969).

2. Burden of proof.

If the existence of a special county or municipal speed restriction is alleged and denied, or if its legality is put in issue by a responsive pleading, proof should then be required, the burden resting upon the party having the affirmative, as in other cases of disputed fact; but where the existence of the speed zone and rate of speed are properly alleged and not denied, proof that speed signs were in fact posted is sufficient to create a presumption that they reflect appropriate action by competent authority in restricting speeds. *Niles v. Sanders*, 218 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1969).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]**11. Under former law.**

In action for injuries sustained in collision alleged to have resulted from defendant's negligence in driving truck in excess of thirty miles per hour on left side of highway through municipality, in absence of showing city ordinance limiting speed of motor vehicles within its limits, statutes limiting maximum speed of thirty miles per hour would apply. *McDonough Motor Express, Inc. v. Spiers*, 180 Miss. 88, 177 So. 655 (1937).

City ordinance, fixing automobile speed limit outside business district, not statute fixing lower limit on highways in closely built-up territory, controls speed in city outside such district. *Robinson v. Haydel*, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7 (1936).

Former statute, since repealed [Code 1930, § 5569] delegated, with certain limitations, to governing authorities of municipalities power to fix their own traffic rules within corporate limits within bounds fixed. *Meridian Coca Cola Co. v. Watson*, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824 (1931).

Where city had regulated traffic within its limits, state regulation of eight miles an hour in passing pedestrians held inapplicable. *Meridian Coca Cola Co. v. Watson*, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824 (1931).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 289, 291.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 65-67.

§ 63-3-513. Special speed limitation on bridges and elevated structures; proof of violations.

The state highway commission upon request from any local authority shall, or upon its own initiative may, conduct an investigation of any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway, and if it shall thereupon find that such structure cannot with safety to itself withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this article, the commission shall determine and declare the maximum speed of vehicles which such structure can withstand, and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating such maximum speed to be erected and maintained at a distance of one hundred feet before each end of such structure.

No person shall drive a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge or structure, when such structure is signposted as provided in this section.

Upon the trial of any person, charged with a violation of this section, proof of said determination of the maximum speed by said commission and the existence of said signs shall constitute conclusive evidence of the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge or structure.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8179; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

§ 63-3-515. Speed limits near schools and churches, upon levees and causeways, and in other designated special zones.

The boards of supervisors of counties and the governing authorities of municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt by order or resolution and to enforce within their respective territorial boundaries the maximum legal rate of speed at which a motor vehicle may be run or operated along any public street, road, highway (except state-maintained highways), or portion thereof in the vicinity of schools and churches, upon levees and causeways and in other special zones which the board or governing authorities may designate. The rate of speed so established shall be determined upon the basis of an engineering and traffic study. The order or resolution setting such speed limits may provide that such limits are only effective during specified times of the day, days of the week and months of the year.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1917, § 5776; Laws, 1930, § 5570; Laws, 1942, § 8060; Laws, 1916, ch. 116; Laws, 1986, ch. 353, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The statute prohibiting drivers from passing a school during regular school hours faster than ten miles per hour was not repealed by implication by a subsequent statute prohibiting a motorist from

driving faster than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances where the two statutes could be harmonized and expressed a clear legislative intent. *Brown v. McCoy*, 362 So. 2d 186 (Miss. 1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Meaning of “residence district,” “business district,” “school area,” and the like, in statutes and ordinances regulating speed of motor vehicles. 50 A.L.R.2d 343.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 302-305.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

§ 63-3-516. Speed limits within highway work zones; penalties for violations.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle within a highway work zone at a speed in excess of the maximum speed limit specifically established for the zone whenever workers are present and whenever the zone is indicated by appropriately placed signs displaying the reduced maximum speed limit. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished, upon conviction, for a first offense by a fine of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00); and for second, third and subsequent offenses by a fine of double the maximum fine imposed for second, third or subsequent offenses under Section 63-9-11.

(2) For the purposes of this section the term “highway work zone” means a construction or maintenance area that is located on or along any public highway, road or street within this state that is marked:

(a) By appropriate warning signs or other traffic control devices indicating that work is in progress; and

(b) By signs of a design approved by the Department of Transportation indicating that any person who operates a motor vehicle within a highway work zone at a speed in excess of the reduced maximum speed limit may be punished by a fine of double the maximum amount otherwise authorized by law.

(3) Nothing in this section shall preclude the prosecution or conviction for reckless driving of any motor vehicle operator whose operation of a motor vehicle in a highway work zone, apart from speed, demonstrates a reckless disregard for life, limb or property.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 324, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment, in (1), inserted “for a first offense” preceding “by a fine of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00)” and added “and for second, third and subsequent offenses by a fine of double the maximum fine imposed for second third or subsequent offenses under Section 63-9-11”; and rewrote (2).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Controlling Statute.

1. In general.
Although there was no violation of § 63-

3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of § 63-3-313 as he did not obey an official traffic-control device. *Harrison v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), *aff'd*, 800 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 2001).

Although there was no violation of § 63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of § 65-1-71 as he did not obey a sign that was erected to control the use of the road during construction. *Harrison v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App.

Feb. 8, 2000), *aff'd*, 800 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 2001).

Although there was no violation of § 63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of § 65-1-8, which allows the Transportation Commission to adopt rules, regulations and ordinances for the control of and the policing of the traffic on the state highways. *Harrison v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), *aff'd*, 800 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 2001).

2. Controlling Statute.

Specific provision of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-516 prevails over the general speeding statutes. *Harrison v. State*, 800 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 2001).

§ 63-3-517. Applicability of speed restrictions to emergency vehicles; duties of drivers of emergency vehicles.

The speed limitations set forth in this article shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency calls and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle. This section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street, nor shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8180; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Law enforcement immunity.

1. In general.

In an action arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by a constable in pursuit of a reckless driver and one operated by plaintiff, where the evidence was in conflict as to such matters as to whether the siren on constable's car was sounded, speed, and position of vehicles at time of accident, the issue was properly submitted to a jury. *Johnson v. Richardson*, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194 (1959).

2. Law enforcement immunity.

Police officer's decision to answer a burglary call without lights or sirens was not a discretionary decision entitling him and his employer to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 through 11-46-23, because the officer had no element of choice or judgment in how to respond to an emergency dispatch, pursuant to the terms of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-517. *City of Jackson v. Lipsey*, 834 So. 2d 687 (Miss. 2003).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Municipal law enforcement officers of a municipality with a population of 2,000 or more may operate radar speed-detection equipment upon a state-designated highway projecting through its corporate limits as well as on other public streets; however, officers of a municipality having a population of less than 15,000 cannot

lawfully operate such equipment on any federally designated highway within the corporate limits of the municipality; this is true even if the federally designated highway is also designated a city street. *Levingston*, Feb. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0062.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damages to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 4 A.L.R.4th 865.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, *Automobiles and Highway Traffic* §§ 1033, 1034.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), *Automobiles and Highway Traffic*, Forms 591-601, 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

10 Am. Jur. *Proof of Facts* 3d 203, *Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle*.

§ 63-3-519. Use of radar speed detection equipment; authorization and limitations.

It shall be unlawful for any person or peace officer or law enforcement agency, except the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, to purchase or use or allow to be used any type of radar speed detection equipment upon any public street, road or highway of this state. However, such equipment may be used:

1. By municipal law enforcement officers within a municipality having a population of two thousand (2,000) or more upon the public streets of the municipality;

2. By any college or university campus police force within the confines of any campus wherein more than two thousand (2,000) students are enrolled;

3. By municipal law enforcement officers in any municipality having a population in excess of fifteen thousand (15,000) according to the latest federal census on federally designated highways lying within the corporate limits.

The Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol will not set up radar on highways within municipalities with a population in excess of fifteen thousand (15,000) according to the latest federal census.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176.5; Laws, 1966, ch. 383, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 542, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1968).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The court would reject the contention that a state highway running through a municipality is not a "public street" within

the meaning of the exception stated in subparagraph (1). *Moore v. City of Louisville*, 716 So. 2d 1136 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

In order to come within the exception to the rule that only the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol can use radar speed detection equipment, a municipality must have, according to the latest federal census, a population of 2,000 or more. Hickman, June 24, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0441.

Intent of Miss. Code Section 63-3-519 is to prohibit use of all devices for detection of speed of automobiles, not just those which use emission of electronic waves; system of using table to calculate speed of car, which is timed between two points falls, within statutory prohibition of use of radar speed-detection equipment. Ewing, Feb. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0002.

Municipality with population of over 2,000 but under 15,000 may use radar on state highways within municipal corporate limits. Gentry, Feb. 16, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0067.

VASCAR, time and motion device, is within prohibition of radar speed detection equipment in Section 63-3-519; intent of statute is to prohibit use of all devices for detection of speed of automobiles, not just those which use emission of electronic waves. Chism, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0013.

Laser speed detection device falls within prohibition of radar speed detection equipment in Section 63-3-519. Schwing, March 31, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0176.

This section requires a municipality to have a population of two thousand or more according to the latest federal census in order to operate radar upon the public streets of the municipality. Davis, July 19, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0473.

A town may not use electronic timing devices to calculate the speed of an automobile since the statute prohibits the use of all devices for the detection of the speed

of automobiles except for the use of radar as limited by statute. Moore, August 10, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0461.

Since the statute only allows the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol to use radar speed detection equipment on federally designated highways located within the corporate limits of a municipality having a population of 15,000 or less according to the latest federal census, a city could not use a radar-based traffic monitoring device on federally designated highways within the corporate limits, although it could be used on other public streets of the municipality. Johnson, November 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0688 (superseded by Payne, Jan. 18, 2000, A.G. op. #99-0709).

Municipal law enforcement officers of a municipality with a population of 2,000 or more may operate radar speed detection equipment upon a state designated highway, however, such officers of a municipality having a population of less than 15,000 cannot lawfully operate such equipment on any federally designated highway. Scruggs, December 11, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0752.

The legislative intent of the statute does not prohibit the purchase and use of a radar-based device that will be used for driver safety awareness and not for enforcement purposes. Payne, Jr., Jan. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #1999-0709.

A city is entitled to use radar speed detection equipment on any portion of a federally designated highway lying within its corporate limits which is removed from the state maintained system and, if the population of the city exceeds 15,000, radar may be used regardless of whether the street is a public street of the municipality. Lawrence, Apr. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0164.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Proof, by radar or other mechanical or electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations. 47 A.L.R.3d 822.

Possession or operation of device for detecting or avoiding traffic radar as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.4th 1334.

Am Jur. 11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

§ 63-3-521. Use of radar speed detection equipment; penalties for violations.

Any person who violates section 63-3-519 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176.5; Laws, 1966, ch. 383, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 542, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1968).

Cross References — Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see § 63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

ARTICLE 13.

DRIVING ON RIGHT SIDE OF ROADWAY: OVERTAKING AND PASSING; FOLLOWING.

SEC.

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 63-3-601. | Vehicles to be driven on right half of roadway; exceptions. |
| 63-3-603. | Driving on roadways laned for traffic. |
| 63-3-605. | Driving upon one-way roadways and around rotary traffic islands. |
| 63-3-607. | Passing by vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. |
| 63-3-609. | Overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in same direction. |
| 63-3-611. | Overtaking and passing vehicles on left side of roadway. |
| 63-3-613. | Overtaking and passing upon right of another vehicle. |
| 63-3-615. | Meeting or overtaking school bus. |
| 63-3-617. | Driving in center of highway; refusal to turn to right to allow overtaking vehicle to pass. |
| 63-3-619. | Distances to be maintained between traveling vehicles. |
| 63-3-621. | Distance to be maintained between vehicle and traveling or parked fire apparatus. |

§ 63-3-601. Vehicles to be driven on right half of roadway; exceptions.

Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows:

1. When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement;
2. When the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair;
3. Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon; or
4. Upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8181; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Particular circumstances as negligence.
3. Exception in emergency.
4. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

When a motor vehicle is driven upon the wrong side of the highway at a time not within the exception set out in this section [Code 1942, § 8181], such an operation of the vehicle is negligence, and if the driver's negligence is the sole cause of the accident, damages cannot be recovered for his injury caused by his own act. *Lum v. Jackson Indus. Uniform Serv., Inc.*, 253 Miss. 342, 175 So. 2d 501 (1965).

2. Particular circumstances as negligence.

Driver of automobile who, in attempt to avoid hitting dead possum on road, loses control of automobile causing it to go off to right side and hit tree is liable for resulting injury to passenger; passenger who advises driver to avoid hitting possum is not contributorily negligent. *Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Patrick ex rel. Patrick*, 469 So. 2d 92 (Miss. 1985).

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child's parents' home, the driver was not negligent per se for driving on the "wrong" side of the street where the infant was not within the protected class of pedestrians or drivers who act in reliance upon the orderly flow of

traffic dictated by the statute and where the driver's admitted violation of this section was not the proximate cause of the injuries since the accident would have been no less likely to occur if the automobile had been facing in the opposite direction. *Haver v. Hinson*, 385 So. 2d 605 (Miss. 1980).

The fact that driver of pulpwood truck, in which plaintiff was riding, was violating this section [Code 1942, § 8181] by having a portion of the truck on the left side of the highway at the time of colliding with a pickup truck which was coming out of a driveway, would only constitute contributory negligence which, under the comparative negligence statute, would cause damages to be reduced, and a mere violation of the law in the operation of a motor vehicle would not entitle the opposite party to a peremptory instruction. *Winfield v. Magee*, 232 Miss. 57, 98 So. 2d 130 (1957).

3. Exception in emergency.

This section [Code 1942, § 8181] would not prevent a motorist turning to the left hand in an emergency, upon giving the proper and timely signal, to avoid striking a pedestrian. *Robinson v. Sims*, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318 (1956).

4. Jury instructions.

Instructions granted under this section [Code 1942, § 8181] were not applicable to a city street with two traffic lanes and one parking lane. *Critelli v. Blair*, 203 So. 2d 604 (Miss. 1967).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Driving in the left lane of a four lane highway does not violate this section or

§ 63-3-611. *Blakney*, Oct. 11, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0566.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Rights, duties, and liability with respect to narrow bridge or passage as between motor vehicle approaching from opposite directions. 47 A.L.R.2d 142.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 269.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobile and Highway Traffic, Forms 291 et seq., 311-326, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 812-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1455.

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Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-603. Driving on roadways laned for traffic.

Whenever any roadway has been divided into three (3) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, except through or bypassing a municipality, the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply:

(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

(b) A vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane upon a roadway which is divided into three (3) lanes except when:

(i) Overtaking and passing another vehicle where the roadway is clearly visible and such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance;

(ii) Such vehicle is in preparation for a left turn; or

(iii) Such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the direction such vehicle is proceeding and is signposted to give notice of such allocation.

(c) Official signs may be erected directing slow-moving traffic to use a designated lane or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving in the same direction, and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such sign.

(d) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.

(e) Persons riding bicycles upon a roadway shall not ride more than two (2) abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two (2) abreast shall not impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall ride within a single lane.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8187; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1977, ch. 321, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Liability for negligence.
3. —Particular circumstances.
4. Proximate cause.
5. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Liability for collision resulting when automobile proceeding east on 4 lane highway collides with truck which is blocking eastbound lanes while preparing to turn left onto westbound lanes is determined under statute governing right of way at intersection (§ 63-3-805), not under change of lane statute (§ 63-3-603). *Mills v. Nichols*, 467 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1985).

2. Liability for negligence.

A violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8187], when neither explained nor excused, constitutes negligence as a matter of law. *Vicksburg Concrete Co. v. Poindexter*, 198 So. 2d 245 (Miss. 1967).

A motorist who drives his vehicle into the lane of opposing traffic without first ascertaining that it is free of oncoming vehicles or other obstructions is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. *Vicksburg Concrete Co. v. Poindexter*, 198 So. 2d 245 (Miss. 1967).

3. —Particular circumstances.

Automobile driver making a left turn at an intersection, who stopped his vehicle 3 or 4 feet across the center line into the lane of an oncoming police motorcycle, violated Mississippi Code 63-3-603, and was guilty of negligence, and, if such negligence was the proximate cause of the

accident, motorist would be liable for injuries sustained by police officer when his motorcycle struck the stopped car. *McRee v. Raney*, 493 So. 2d 1299 (Miss. 1986).

Motorist held negligent in turning into another lane to avoid stalled car without first ascertaining the position of a following car. *Cipriani v. Miller*, 248 Miss. 672, 160 So. 2d 87 (1964).

4. Proximate cause.

The alleged negligence, in driving contrary to part one of this section, by a truck driver who collided head-on with a station wagon was not, even if it occurred, the proximate cause of the accident where evidence indicated that the accident was inevitable because of the negligence of the station wagon's driver, who was going in the wrong direction on a four lane divided highway. *Ward v. Valley Steel Prods. Co.*, 339 So. 2d 1361 (Miss. 1976).

5. Directed verdict.

Under this section, a violation of which constitutes negligence as a matter of law, a municipality was entitled to a directed verdict, where the evidence showed that plaintiff-motorist moved into the adjoining left lane of southbound traffic to pass a vehicle at night and ran through a barricade before falling into a shallow excavation dug earlier in the day to repair a water line leak, and where the barricade was lit by smudge pots; plaintiff failed to ascertain that the adjoining lane was clear before she proceeded to pass the vehicle in front of her. *City of Jackson v. Sullivan*, 349 So. 2d 527 (Miss. 1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 269.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 311-326, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident — Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1455.

§ 63-3-605. Driving upon one-way roadways and around rotary traffic islands.

(1) Upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated.

(2) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only to the right of such island.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8186; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

<p>Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 259.</p> <p>3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Auto-</p>	<p>mobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861 et seq., 872, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.</p> <p>CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 45.</p>
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§ 63-3-607. Passing by vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.

Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right. Upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic in each direction each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8182; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury issues.
- 3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former laws.

1. In general.

Instructions granted under this section [Code 1942, § 8182] were not applicable to a city street with two traffic lanes and one parking lane. *Critelli v. Blair*, 203 So. 2d 604 (Miss. 1967).

In action arising out of collision of two trucks on highway, plaintiff insurer is entitled to peremptory instruction on whole question of liability of defendants when it is shown without any dispute that defendants' truck came approximately thirty inches across center line and onto wrong side of highway and ran into left rear wheel of insured truck at time when two trucks were meeting each other and at time when insured truck was wholly upon its side of highway, and peremptory

instruction on behalf of defendants is properly refused. *West v. Aetna Ins. Co.*, 208 Miss. 776, 45 So. 2d 585 (1950).

2. Jury issues.

Where evidence showed that defendant's vehicle, encountering an icy patch of pavement, slid over into its left lane in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8182] and struck plaintiff's automobile proceeding in the opposite direction, the question of negligence was one for the jury. *Kight v. Murdock*, 253 Miss. 572, 176 So. 2d 320 (1965).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former laws.

In prosecution against automobile driver for failure to seasonably turn to right, evidence showing defendant exceeded speed limit was inadmissible. *Naylor v. State*, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102 (1930).

Affidavit in prosecution of automobile driver for failure to seasonably turn to right held sufficient, if defective, for purposes of res judicata. *Naylor v. State*, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102 (1930).

Instruction authorizing recovery for damages in automobile collision, in case defendant undertook to pass plaintiff at more than 8 miles per hour, held erroneous. *Gardner v. Comer*, 151 Miss. 443, 118 So. 300 (1928).

Affidavit in prosecution for failing to turn motor truck to right of center of highway on meeting another held sufficient. *Sullivan v. State*, 150 Miss. 542, 117 So. 374 (1928).

Defendant held entitled to instruction on theory that automobile driver turned left to avoid collision. *Priestley v. Hays*, 147 Miss. 843, 112 So. 788 (1927).

Instruction making it absolute duty of automobile driver to turn right held erroneous, where defense was defendant turned left to avoid collision. *Priestley v. Hays*, 147 Miss. 843, 112 So. 788 (1927).

Automobile held required to turn to right of center of highway on meeting automobile. *Crystal v. State*, 147 Miss. 40, 112 So. 687 (1927).

Failure to look for motor vehicle on wrong side of street held not contributory negligence. *Clarke v. Hughes*, 134 Miss. 377, 99 So. 6 (1924).

Driver of motor vehicle not turning to right is liable for colliding with other vehicle on proper side of highway. *Flynt v. Fondren*, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188 (1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for collision due to swaying or swinging of motor vehicle or trailer. 1 A.L.R.2d 167.

Liability for accident arising from failure of motorist to give signal for left turn at intersection, as against oncoming or intersecting motor vehicle. 39 A.L.R.2d 65.

Rights, duties, and liability with respect to narrow bridge or passage as between motor vehicle approaching from opposite directions. 47 A.L.R.2d 142.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the right. 48 A.L.R.2d 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 276, 277.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic §§ 900 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 291-304, 311-326, 331-336, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898, 1981-1984.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 613 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1543.

§ 63-3-609. Overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in same direction.

The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, exceptions and special rules otherwise provided in this article:

(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle.

(b) Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8183; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.
3. Jury issues.

1. In general.

Motorist overtaking and passing bicycle is required to do so at safe distance; motorist's admission that he did not entirely clear bicyclist's lane of traffic as he passed bicyclist but was only straddling center line and was unaware of location of vehicle in relation to bicycle as he passed it is sufficient basis upon which jury may find that collision between motorist's vehicle and bicycle was caused by motorist's negligence. *Rideout v. Knight*, 463 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1985).

2. Instructions.

The trial court in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident properly granted plaintiff's peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, where defendant driver testified that on the day of the accident it was raining and the road was wet, where he admitted knowing that oil rises to the surface of wet asphalt and admitted seeing a road sign that said "slippery when wet," and where he further stated that, while passing plaintiff, he had

lost control of his truck, in that §§ 63-3-609 and 63-3-611 imposed upon defendant a duty of care in passing plaintiff, a duty he failed to exercise in ignoring the danger he knew lay ahead, which resulted in the loss of control of his truck. *Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc.*, 450 So. 2d 416 (Miss. 1984).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant's truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff's truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant's driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. *Green Truck Lines v. Hooper*, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443 (1958).

3. Jury issues.

Where defendant driver of overtaken truck permitted his vehicle to drift across the centerline and speeded up when plaintiff attempted to pass on the left, the evidence was sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of the truckdriver's negligence. *Lewis Grocery Co. v. Blackwell*, 209 So. 2d 639 (Miss. 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Duty and liability of overtaken driver with respect to adjusting speed to that of passing vehicle. 91 A.L.R.2d 1260.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 271-275.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 929 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 231-239, 411.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Auto-

mobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 911-924, 1341-1524, 1971-1973.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 629 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1543.

§ 63-3-611. Overtaking and passing vehicles on left side of roadway.

(1) No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within one hundred (100) feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.

(2) No vehicle shall, in overtaking and passing another vehicle or at any other time, be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:

(a) When approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the highway where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed;

(b) When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of any marked or readily distinguishable bridge, viaduct or tunnel on any roadway other than a four-lane roadway;

(c) When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of or traversing any marked or readily distinguishable intersection or railroad grade crossing;

(d) When official signs are in place directing that traffic keep to the right, or a distinctive center line is marked, which distinctive line also so directs traffic as declared in the sign manual adopted by the State Transportation Commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8185; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1991, ch. 402, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 447, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Applicability.
3. Negligence.
4. Contributory negligence.
5. Proximate cause.
6. Instructions.

1. In general.

Code 1972 § 63-3-611(2)(a) is concerned not only with oncoming traffic but also with traffic to the rear, and if a driver cannot see to the rear, he cannot comply with the requirements of Code 1972 § 63-3-707. *Gates v. Murphree*, 286 So. 2d 291 (Miss. 1973).

In enacting this section [Code 1942, § 8185] it was the intention of the legis-

lature to prohibit a car from being on the left hand side of the road undertaking to pass another car going in the same direction while within 100 feet of any hazards, and the entire statute puts emphasis upon prohibiting overtaking and passing another car headed in the same direction except at a safe distance from places where hazards and dangers might be anticipated. *Rayborn v. Freeman*, 209 So. 2d 193 (Miss. 1968).

An intersection not marked by signs and not observable by reasonably careful motorist is not an intersection within the meaning of the statute. *Gore v. Patrick*, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169 (1963).

Violation of this provision is negligence. *Gore v. Patrick*, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169 (1963).

2. Applicability.

Where a statute provided that no vehicle shall in overtaking and passing other vehicle be driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection, this statute was not applicable to overtaking automobile which attempted to pass truck as the truck driver attempted to make a left turn into a driveway leading to a store, where there was no showing that the driveway was a highway within the meaning of the statute. *Frizell v. Guthrie*, 222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361 (1954).

3. Negligence.

Where the driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle on a curve testified that he looked in his rear view mirror and did not see a third vehicle which was overtaking him, even accepting his testimony as true, this did not absolve him from negligence, since he was violating Code 1972 § 63-3-611 intended to prevent passing when a driver cannot see a vehicle behind him because of a curve. *Gates v. Murphree*, 286 So. 2d 291 (Miss. 1973).

In attempting to pass three motor vehicles within 100 feet of an intersection, the existence of which was well known to him, the defendant was clearly negligent. *Huff v. Boyd*, 242 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1971).

A truck driver who drove on the left side of a highway while attempting to pass an automobile while both vehicles were approaching an unmarked T intersection which was difficult to see, was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law on the theory that he violated the statute prohibiting driving on the left side of the highway when approaching within 100 feet of any intersection, since it would be unreasonable to require a motorist to observe this statute with respect to intersections which are not marked by signs or observable by the operator of a vehicle in the exercise of reasonable care. *Coleman v. Ward*, 232 So. 2d 731 (Miss. 1970).

Motorist who, in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8185], attempted to pass another car on the left within 100 feet of a dangerous intersection, and at the same

time failed to decrease his speed as required by subd (b) of Code 1942, § 8176 was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision at the intersection. *McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.*, 253 Miss. 169, 175 So. 2d 480 (1965).

A bus driver did not have the right under the law to overtake and pass a preceding vehicle, regardless of the fact that the vision of the driver of the preceding vehicle was lessened or obscured, when the bus driver observed conditions that would cause a reasonably prudent driver to proceed with caution. *Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co.*, 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965).

To cross a yellow line marking center of a highway in making a left turn into an intersecting road or a driveway is not negligence per se. *Edwards v. Murphree*, 249 Miss. 78, 160 So. 2d 689 (1964).

Violation of this provision is negligence. *Gore v. Patrick*, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169 (1963).

4. Contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff's truck, in violating this section [Code 1942, § 8185] and failing to observe other requirements of the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law when it collided with defendant's car, negligently stopped on the traveled highway at the entrance to bridge, warranted reduction of verdict for plaintiff by 50 per cent. *Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown*, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944).

5. Proximate cause.

Even if a railroad company were negligent for placing its guard rail too close to the paved portion of a highway, the acts of the host driver and of an overtaken motorist in attempting to pass a pickup truck within 100 feet of a railroad crossing, were the efficient, independent intervening proximate causes of the fatal accident resulting in decedent's death when the host driver's automobile smashed into the guard rail. *Milam v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R.*, 284 So. 2d 309 (Miss. 1973).

6. Instructions.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred

within an "intersection" so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to § 63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an "intersection" within the meaning of § 63-3-129. An "intersection" requires the conjunction of "2 highways," and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a "highway" where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a "Plant Entrance" sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. *Stewart v. Davis*, 571 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1990).

Instruction to jury that it would constitute negligence per se if tractor-trailer was attempting to pass another vehicle and crossed double-yellow no passing line going up hill with 79,000 pound load would be proper. *Blackmon v. Payne*, 510 So. 2d 483 (Miss. 1987).

The trial court in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident properly granted plaintiff's peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, where defendant driver testified that on the day of the accident it was raining and the road was wet, where he admitted knowing that oil rises to the surface of wet asphalt and admitted seeing a road sign that said "slippery when wet," and where he further stated that, while passing plaintiff, he had lost control of his truck, in that §§ 63-3-609 and 63-3-611 imposed upon defendant a duty of care in passing plaintiff, a duty he failed to exercise in ignoring the danger he knew lay ahead, which resulted in the loss of control of his truck. *Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc.*, 450 So. 2d 416 (Miss. 1984).

In a personal injury suit, instructions which required the defendant overtaking motorist under all circumstances to be diligent and to anticipate the presence of others, and placing an absolute duty to pass safely and to avoid injury to others on such defendant, who collided with an oncoming motorist, were erroneous in placing a higher standard of care on the

defendant than required by law and providing no factual guide for determining his negligence, since the standard of the law is reasonable care. *Acord v. Moore*, 243 So. 2d 55 (Miss. 1971).

It was erroneous to grant the "emergency instruction" where it raised an inference that if the driver of a truck had suddenly turned his vehicle across the center line into the left lane of the highway at the time when the defendant's bus was about to pass, that then the defendant was not guilty of contributory negligence in driving at an unlawful speed and approaching the truck at an unreasonable rate in an unreasonable manner. *Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co.*, 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965).

It was erroneous to instruct the jury that a bus driver could pass a preceding truck regardless of the surrounding circumstances if he did not know of the iced-over condition of the rear and side windows of the truck, because these instructions told the jury the defendant bus driver was not guilty of contributory negligence, regardless of the known surrounding circumstances and his duty to foresee the changes and to proceed with caution at a speed at which he could control the operation of the bus. *Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co.*, 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965).

An instruction is erroneous which tells the jury for the defendant bus driver that the defendant cannot be held for negligence if, while exercising ordinary care to see, he did not see or know the condition of the glass on the rear and sides of the preceding pickup truck, when the evidence showed in fact that before attempting to pass the truck the bus driver was aware of the iced-over condition of the rear and side windows of the truck. *Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co.*, 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965).

In a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, an instruction that if the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding negligently attempted to pass the defendant's vehicle within 100 feet of an intersection, and such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the jury could find for the defendant, was correct, where the defendant's

proof showed that the attempt to pass was made within 50 or 60 feet of the intersection, and the intersection involved was one coming within the contemplation of the statute. *Clark v. Mask*, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467 (1957).

Peremptory instruction to jury, that plaintiff violated Mississippi statute providing that a person riding a bicycle is prohibited from passing another vehicle going in the same direction on the right hand side of said vehicle and is also pro-

hibited from passing another vehicle under any circumstances when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection, was proper in an action for injuries where plaintiff bicyclist, approaching defendant's truck from rear, tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. *Cochran v. Peeler*, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806 (1950).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Driving in the left lane of a four lane highway does not violate this section or

§ 63-3-601. *Blakney*, Oct. 11, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0566.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence of motorist colliding with vehicle approaching in wrong lane. 47 A.L.R.2d 6.

Negligence of motorist as to injury or damage occasioned in avoiding collision with vehicle approaching in wrong lane. 47 A.L.R.2d 119.

Construction, applicability, and effect of traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from passing one another at street or highway intersection. 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Comment Note. — What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 271-275.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 929 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 231-239, 411.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 911-924, 1341-1524, 1971-1973.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 629 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1543.

§ 63-3-613. Overtaking and passing upon right of another vehicle.

(1) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.

(2) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and, allowing sufficient clearance, pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction either upon the left or upon the right on a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for four (4) or more lines of moving traffic when such movement can be made in safety. The left lane shall be the preferred passing lane. No person shall drive off the pavement or upon the shoulder of the roadway overtaking or passing on the right.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8184; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1977, ch. 321, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 4, 1977).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Where a driver of an oil truck in order to make a right turn first swung to the left, the driver of following pole truck ought not to have attempted to pass on the right unless the vehicle in front of him was making or about to make a left turn. *American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros.*, 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220 (1951).

Evidence in prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence in the operation of a motor truck supported defense that defendant had right to pass to the right of an overtaken wagon which was making or about to make a turn to the left. *Goudy v. State*, 203 Miss. 366, 35 So. 2d 308 (1948).

2. Instructions.

Peremptory instruction to jury, that plaintiff violated Mississippi statute providing that a person riding a bicycle is prohibited from passing another vehicle going in the same direction on the right hand side of said vehicle and is also prohibited from passing another vehicle under any circumstances when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection, was proper in an action for injuries where plaintiff bicyclist approaching defendant's truck from rear tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. *Cochran v. Peeler*, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806 (1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass on right of other motor vehicle proceeding in same direction. 38 A.L.R.2d 114.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the right. 48 A.L.R.2d 232.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 275.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 933 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 921-923, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 646.

§ 63-3-615. Meeting or overtaking school bus.

(1) The driver of a vehicle upon a street or highway upon meeting or overtaking any school bus which has stopped on the street or highway for the purpose of receiving or discharging any school children shall come to a complete stop and shall not proceed until the children have crossed the street or highway and the school bus has proceeded in the direction it was going.

(2) Any person violating the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than Two Hundred Dollars (\$200.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00), or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or both.

(3) This section shall be applicable only in the event the school bus shall bear upon the front and rear thereon a plainly visible sign containing the words "school bus" in letters not less than four (4) inches in height.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8226; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 341; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 10; Laws, 1974, ch. 304; Laws, 1986, ch. 368, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References — Transportation of school children generally, see §§ 37-41-1 et seq.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 307.

§ 63-3-617. Driving in center of highway; refusal to turn to right to allow overtaking vehicle to pass.

It shall be unlawful for the driver of any truck or other vehicle to drive in or near the center of any highway for a distance of more than two hundred yards, or at any time to refuse to turn to the right in order that any driver desiring to pass said truck or other vehicle, may drive at a higher legal rate of speed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8188; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1962, ch. 525, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 933, 938, 939.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 924, 1341-1524, 1972.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 641, 642.

§ 63-3-619. Distances to be maintained between traveling vehicles.

(1) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.

(2) The driver of any motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district shall not follow within three hundred feet of another motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle. The provisions of this subsection shall not be

construed to prevent overtaking and passing nor shall the same apply upon any lane specially designated for use by motor trucks.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8188; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1962, ch. 525, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1962).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Negligence.
3. —Proximate cause.
4. —Sudden emergency.
5. Instructions.
6. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Minimum following distances specified in § 63-3-619 are applicable to vehicle approaching slow moving truck which has just turned into left-easternmost lane of southbound lanes of 4 lane highway. *Byrd v. F-S Prestress, Inc.*, 464 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1985).

One truck should not follow another truck more closely than is reasonable and prudent. *American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros.*, 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220 (1951).

2. Negligence.

Driver of motor vehicle was entitled to peremptory instruction or directed verdict on liability, although there is no per se rule that driver of following car is negligent if he collides with rear of preceding vehicle, where driver of following car did not know her approximate speed, was driving approximately one car length behind preceding vehicle when she saw truck turn off in front of preceding vehicle, and saw preceding vehicle's brake lights come on; there was no way any rational jury could reach any conclusion but that following driver failed in either one or more of her duties to keep proper lookout ahead, keep her car under proper control, and drive at speed and sufficient distance behind preceding vehicle to stop without colliding into its rear end when that vehicle stopped to allow truck to turn off street. *White v. Miller*, 513 So. 2d 600 (Miss. 1987).

One who on attempting to pass a car ahead of him was prevented by an approaching car and on returning to his proper lane was obliged to apply his

brakes to avoid striking the car ahead, resulting in a skid, held negligent toward a passenger. *Gregory v. Thompson*, 248 Miss. 431, 160 So. 2d 195 (1964).

Evidence held to show negligence in following another's car too closely on a highway made slippery by hail. *Klumok v. Young*, 239 Miss. 393, 123 So. 2d 535 (1960).

Where, under either plaintiff's or defendant's evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff's decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant's negligence proximately caused the collision and death. *Meeks v. McBeath*, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791 (1957).

3. —Proximate cause.

Where the driver of a cattle truck suddenly pulled his truck across the wrong lane of traffic in order to avoid the danger created by the action of a bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop which was stopped suddenly, partially on traveled portion of a highway, the action of the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop partly on the paved and main portion of the highway was a proximate cause of the collision. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

4. —Sudden emergency.

In an action for injuries sustained in a three vehicle collision, it was error to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine with respect to the defendant motorist, where it was shown that just before striking the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant had been following behind at a

distance of only 36 feet while traveling 45 miles per hour in violation of Code 1942, § 8188. *Dailey v. Acme Fin. Corp.*, 234 So. 2d 902 (Miss. 1970).

Where, under either plaintiff's or defendant's evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff's decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant's negligence proximately caused the collision and death; and the defendant could not invoke the sudden emergency rule because his own testimony showed that the emergency was proximately caused by his own fault. *Meeks v. McBeath*, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791 (1957).

Where the death of a driver of an automobile resulted from collision from an oncoming truck which entered the wrong lane when a truck before it stopped to avoid hitting a bus which suddenly stopped partially on a highway, and the driver of the truck was found to be following too closely, the driver of the truck was not entitled to invoke the doctrine of sudden emergency in order to show that the sole proximate cause of the collision was negligence of the bus driver, since the emergency was caused by truck driver. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

5. Instructions.

In an action for injuries sustained in a three vehicle collision, it was error to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine with respect to the defendant motorist, where it was shown that just before striking the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant had been following behind at a distance of only 36 feet while traveling 45 miles per hour in violation of Code 1942, § 8188. *Dailey v. Acme Fin. Corp.*, 234 So. 2d 902 (Miss. 1970).

Court's instruction for plaintiff that it was the duty of the driver of defendant's truck at all times to maintain a reasonably safe and proper distance between his vehicle and any vehicle proceeding in

front of his truck, that it was his duty to anticipate that preceding vehicles would slow or would stop on the highway, and that it was his duty to keep the truck under reasonable control at all times and to take reasonable precautions commensurate with the type of vehicle and load thereon, imposed no absolute liability on the truckdriver for the consequences of his actions. *Bill Hunter Truck Lines v. Jernigan*, 384 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1967).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant's truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff's truck-trailer unit, instructions, which when read together, focused the attention of the jury on the real issue of whether the plaintiff's truck was overtaken from behind, run into and damaged by the negligence of the defendant's driver in operating his truck without proper control, without keeping a proper lookout, and at a negligent rate of speed, or whether plaintiff's driver negligently stopped his truck on the half-moon curve in the right lane of the pavement when it was unnecessary and impractical to do so, and, if so, whether such negligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision, were not reversibly erroneous, even though some imperfections could be found therein. *Green Truck Lines v. Hooper*, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443 (1958).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant's truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff's truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant's driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. *Green Truck Lines v. Hooper*, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443 (1958).

Where, under either plaintiff's or defendant's evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff's decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant's negligence proximately caused the collision and death. *Meeks v. McBeath*, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791 (1957).

Since Code 1942, § 8149, provides that this section [Code 1942, § 8188] is applicable to a person riding a bicycle, an instruction to the jury, that if they believe that the plaintiff violated this section [Code 1942, § 8188] and such violation was proximate cause of accident they should find for the defendants, was proper in an action for injuries to the plaintiff bicyclist who, approaching the defendant's truck from the rear, tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. *Cochran v. Peeler*, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806 (1950).

In action for damages to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, it was error for court to refuse plaintiff instruction that failure of any person to perform duty imposed by statute is negligence in itself, and that should jury find that defendant in his truck immediately prior to and at time of collision followed vehicle of plaintiff more closely than was reasonable and prudent, having due regard to speed of such vehicles and traffic

upon and condition of highway, and that such failure was proximate cause of collision, his conduct constituted actionable negligence, and refusal to grant this instruction is not cured by granting of instruction which also includes another point. *Wilburn v. Gordon*, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844 (1950).

6. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant's automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff's vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. *Buntyn v. Robinson*, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126 (1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Driver's failure to maintain proper distance from motor vehicle ahead. 85 A.L.R.2d 613.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 270.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 924 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 266-277, 412.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 933-935, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

19 Am. Jur. Trials 567, Handling a Rear-End Collision Case.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 43, Tailgating.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 640.

§ 63-3-621. Distance to be maintained between vehicle and traveling or parked fire apparatus.

The driver of any vehicle other than one on official business shall not follow any fire apparatus traveling in response to a fire alarm closer than five hundred (500) feet or drive into or park such vehicle within the block where fire apparatus has stopped in answer to a fire alarm. The driver of any vehicle other than an official emergency vehicle shall not follow any moving ambulance that is engaged in an emergency medical call closer than five hundred (500) feet, or park the vehicle within two hundred (200) feet of where the

ambulance has stopped to pick up or deliver a patient or otherwise render care at the scene of an ambulance call.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8223; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 425, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added the second sentence.

ARTICLE 15.

STARTING AND TURNING; SIGNALING.

SEC.

63-3-701.	Starting of stopped, standing, or parked vehicle.
63-3-703.	Turning at intersections.
63-3-705.	Turning on curves or crests of grades.
63-3-707.	Requirements as to signalling of turns or stops.
63-3-709.	Manner of signalling generally.
63-3-711.	Hand and arm signals.

§ 63-3-701. Starting of stopped, standing, or parked vehicle.

No person shall start a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8191; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 16 A.L.R.2d 979.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 334.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1015.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 805, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 600, 601.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-703. Turning at intersections.

The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows:

(a) Both the approach for a right turn and the turn itself shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.

(b) The approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered.

(c) The approach for a left turn from a two-way street into a one-way street shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and by passing to the right of such center line where it enters the intersection. A left turn from a one-way street into a two-way street shall be made by passing to the right of the center line of the street being entered upon leaving the intersection.

Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause markers, buttons, or signs to be placed within or adjacent to intersections and thereby require and direct that a different course from that specified in this section be traveled by vehicles turning at an intersection. When markers, buttons, or signs are so placed no driver of a vehicle shall turn a vehicle at an intersection other than as directed and required by such markers, buttons, or signs.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8189; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Negligence.
3. Evidence.
4. Instructions.

1. In general.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8189] may warrant a jury in finding that an automobile was being negligently operated. *West v. Armstrong*, 248 Miss. 617, 159 So. 2d 805 (1964).

2. Negligence.

Motorist who turns into left hand-easternmost lane of southbound lane of 4 lane highway is not negligent as matter of law. *Byrd v. F-S Prestress, Inc.*, 464 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1985).

In an action by a motorcyclist against a motorist for injuries resulting from an intersectional collision which occurred when the automobile driver made a left turn in front of the motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction immediately prior to the collision, evidence that the motorcycle struck the front bumper of the car to the left of center, together with the motorist's admission that his vehicle was at an angle with the direction of the highway from which he was turning, at the time of the collision, clearly established that the automobile driver made

his left turn by "cutting the corner" before reaching the center of the intersection, in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8189]. *Lynch v. Suthoff*, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969), overruled on other grounds, *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.* 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

3. Evidence.

Testimony of accident reconstruction expert is admissible to prove the relative speed of vehicles, the angle of impact of vehicles, and what diverted their course. *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.*, 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

Allowing an investigating officer not an eyewitness to an accident, to give his opinion, in an action for injuries resulting from the collision, as to the place of impact and to depict this point on a map, was harmless error where the negligence of the defendant motorist was clearly established by other evidence. *Lynch v. Suthoff*, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969), overruled on other grounds, *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.* 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

In an action for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision, it was proper for the investigating officer to testify as to the location of the vehicles at the time of his investigation, the location of the injured

plaintiff, and the location of debris created by the impact, and equally proper for him to mark the location of these things on the map of the intersection. *Lynch v. Suthoff*, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969), overruled on other grounds, *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.* 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

4. Instructions.

In an action for injuries sustained by a 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to this section [Code 1942, § 8189], and a city ordinance, "cut the corner" in making a left turn, the court properly instructed that the truck driver was guilty of negligence which was a proximate, contributing cause of the collision. *City of Jackson v. Reed*, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342 (1958), motion overruled, 233

Miss. 304, 103 So. 2d 6 (1958), overruled on other grounds, *City of Jackson v. Williamson*, 1999 Miss. Lexis 89 (Miss. Feb. 25, 1999).

In action by wife for damages for injuries sustained in automobile collision when husband's and defendant's cars, both going east, attempted to make left turn from different traffic lanes, refusal of defendant's instruction predicated upon theory that plaintiff's husband had no right to drive car in north lane of south half of highway and granting to plaintiff of instruction on facts of case under which jury found plaintiff's husband was in proper lane for left turn and defendant in wrong lane, was proper. *Kouvarakis v. Hawver*, 208 Miss. 697, 45 So. 2d 278 (1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for accident arising from failure of motorist to give signal for left turn between intersections. 39 A.L.R.2d 103.

Automobiles: liability for U-turn collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 265-268.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 950 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 181-186.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 961-967, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Motorcycle Accidents.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 405, Negligent Left Turn of Motor Vehicle.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 749 et seq.

§ 63-3-705. Turning on curves or crests of grades.

No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon any curve, or upon the approach to or near the crest of the grade, where such vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle approaching from either direction within five hundred feet.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8190; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Automobiles: liability for U-turn collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 265-268.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 961-963.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 405, Negligent Left Turn of Motor Vehicle.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 612.

§ 63-3-707. Requirements as to signalling of turns or stops.

No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement or after giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this article in the event any other vehicle may be affected by such movement.

A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously for a reasonable distance before turning.

No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this article to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8192; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Negligence.
3. Contributory negligence.
4. Instructions.
5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

A motorist is not only under a duty to keep a proper lookout and be on the alert for other vehicles using the highway, but is also under duty not to turn his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal by hand, arm or other signal device, in the event that any other vehicle might be affected by such movement. *Sohio Petro. Co. v. Fowler*, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350 (1957).

Where a driver of an oil truck turned to the left on a highway before making a right turn and he was hit by a truck attempting to pass, the driver of the oil truck was under a duty to give the proper sign for stopping, or turning right or left. *American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros.*, 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220 (1951).

2. Negligence.

That a motorist actuated a stop signal on the automobile by applying the brake does not necessarily exonerate the motorist from a charge of negligence toward a following car. *Box v. Swindle*, 306 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1962).

A motorist who signaled an intention to stop may be found negligent if there was insufficient time and distance to bring a following car to a halt. *Box v. Swindle*, 306 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1962).

Code 1972 § 63-3-611(2)(a) is concerned not only with oncoming traffic but also with traffic to the rear, and if a driver cannot see to the rear, he cannot comply with the requirements of Code 1972 § 63-3-707. *Gates v. Murphree*, 286 So. 2d 291 (Miss. 1973).

The fact that a motorist, who had previously given a lawful notice that she was reducing the speed of her vehicle, failed to signal of her ultimate intention to make a right turn, this was not a proximate contributing cause of the collision which resulted when she was struck in the rear by the plaintiff's automobile which was fol-

lowing too closely, being driven at a high, excessive and unlawful rate of speed, at a time when its driver was not maintaining a proper lookout ahead, and did not have the vehicle under control. *Callender v. Cockrell*, 217 So. 2d 643 (Miss. 1969).

3. Contributory negligence.

Plaintiff's testimony that he observed defendant's approaching vehicle until it was about 150 feet behind him and although he realized it was traveling at a faster speed and overtaking him, he drove about 15 seconds from the time he last looked before he made his left turn, that by merely glancing in his rear view mirror he could have ascertained the location of the defendant's car before he began his left turn, and that he relied completely on his blinker signal to keep traffic behind him from coming around him, established that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. *Stockton v. Lamberth*, 278 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1973).

Failure to give a signal at a reasonable distance of intention to make a left turn is contributory negligence. *Gore v. Patrick*, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169 (1963).

A motorist was guilty of contributory negligence who, without giving any warning signal of any kind to indicate her intention, had turned from her right lane of traffic and was proceeding across the left or oncoming traffic lane of the highway to enter a driveway when she was struck by defendant's automobile, which, at the time of the motorist's turn, had been approaching some 40 to 60 feet away. *Sohio Petro. Co. v. Fowler*, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350 (1957).

4. Instructions.

A plaintiff motorist was entitled to an instruction that a preceding motorist was negligent as a matter of law under § 63-3-707, which provides that a driver should not turn a vehicle from a highway unless the turn can be made with reasonable safety, where the preceding driver admitted that he turned his vehicle to the left out of his lane of traffic without first looking to see whether the plaintiff was following him, and the court's refusal to give this requested instruction was reversible error. *Conner v. Harris*, 624 So. 2d 482 (Miss. 1993).

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. *Davis v. Waterman*, 420 So. 2d 1063 (Miss. 1982).

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident at an intersection in which the defendant was struck by the plaintiff's automobile as he made a left turn across the plaintiff's traffic lane, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed that the accident had been proximately caused by the negligence of a truck driver who had allegedly indicated to the defendant that he could safely cross the plaintiff's traffic lane; the defendant did not have the legal right to rely on the truck driver and had a duty to ascertain whether he could cross the traffic lane with reasonable safety. *Boyd v. Smith*, 390 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1980).

Where the evidence made a jury issue as to whether defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to give a signal indicating his intention to turn left for a reasonable distance before turning, and in turning his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway when such movement could not be made with reasonable safety, the trial court should not have granted defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction. *Cronier v. Denson*, 198 So. 2d 252 (Miss. 1967).

In a wrongful death action arising out of a collision of defendant's automobile with a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon a highway, the trial court did not err in instructing that the rider of a bicycle or other vehicle along a public highway should not turn from a direct course unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving an appropriate signal, and the signal for a left turn should be given by extending the hand and arm horizontally. *Moak v. Black*, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957).

The trial court properly refused defendant a peremptory instruction where, in an action for a personal injury sustained when the truck in which plaintiff was a

passenger was struck by defendant's automobile while undertaking to turn from the right lane of traffic across the oncoming traffic lane to enter a driveway, the jury was warranted in finding that the truck driver's movements were consistent with reasonable safety as required by this section. [Code 1942, § 8192], and that, in view of defendant's admission that although she saw the truck slowing down for one-half mile and thought he was going to turn in to the driveway, she did not slow down, but continued to operate her automobile at 50 miles per hour, the contributing, if not the sole, cause of accident was defendant's negligence. *Hamilton v. McCry*, 229 Miss. 481, 91 So. 2d 564 (1956).

In action for damages to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, there being no controversy in record that car was equipped with signal light in rear in good order, instruction for defendant that person driving upon highway is required by law, before stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of his automobile, to

give proper signal of such intention, and if jury believe from evidence in case that plaintiff so stopped or decreased his speed without giving such proper signal, then jury must find plaintiff was negligent is reversibly erroneous and cannot be cured by other instructions in conflict with it. *Wilburn v. Gordon*, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844 (1950).

5. Miscellaneous.

In an action by a passenger for injuries sustained when the taxicab, which was stopped upon a highway, was struck from behind by a motorist, in view of the uncontradicted testimony that when the motorist first saw the taxicab it had already stopped and its headlights and taillights were burning, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of the alleged negligence of the taxicab driver in stopping upon the highway without giving any warning by hand signals, arm signals, blinker lights or other signals. *Snowden v. Skipper*, 230 Miss. 684, 93 So. 2d 834 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for accident arising from motorist's failure to give signal for right turn. 38 A.L.R.2d 143.

Duty and liability as to signaling following driver to pass or giving him warning of approaching danger. 48 A.L.R.2d 252.

Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle in public street or highway. 63 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle from private premises into public street or highway. 63 A.L.R.2d 108.

Liability for injury or damage occasioned by backing of motor vehicle within private premises. 63 A.L.R.2d 184.

Automobiles: duty and liability with respect to giving audible signal at intersection. 21 A.L.R.3d 268.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 266, 278, 306, 307.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 916, 964 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 961-963, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 608, 645.

§ 63-3-709. Manner of signalling generally.

The signals required in this article shall be given either by means of the hand and arm or by a signal lamp or signal device of a type approved by the department. When a vehicle is so constructed or loaded that a hand and arm

signal would not be visible both to the front and rear of such vehicle, then said signals must be given by such a lamp or device.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8193; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist is not only under a duty to keep a proper lookout and be on the alert for other vehicles using the highway, but is also under duty not to turn his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway unless such movement can be made with

reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal by hand, arm or other signal device, in the event that any other vehicle might be affected by such movement. *Sohio Petro. Co. v. Fowler*, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am Jur. 7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

§ 63-3-711. Hand and arm signals.

All signals given by hand and arm shall be given from the left side of the vehicle in the following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows:

1. Left turn-hand and arm extended horizontally.
2. Right turn-hand and arm extended upward or moved with a sweeping motion from the rear to the front.
3. Stop or decrease speed-hand and arm extended downward.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8194; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. *Davis v. Waterman*, 420 So. 2d 1063 (Miss. 1982).

2. Instructions.

In a wrongful death action arising out of

a collision between defendant's automobile and a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon the highway, the trial court properly instructed that the rider of a bicycle along a public highway should not turn from a direct course unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving the appropriate signal, and the signal for a left turn should be given by extending the hand and arm horizontally. *Moak v. Black*, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Duty and liability as to signaling following driver to pass or giving him warning of approaching danger. 48 A.L.R.2d 252.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

ARTICLE 17.

RIGHT-OF-WAY.

SEC.

- 63-3-801. Vehicle approaching intersection; vehicles entering intersection at same time.
- 63-3-803. Vehicle turning left at intersection.
- 63-3-805. Vehicle entering through highway.
- 63-3-807. Vehicle entering or crossing highway from private road or driveway.
- 63-3-809. Procedure upon approach of authorized emergency vehicles; duty of driver of emergency vehicle.

§ 63-3-801. Vehicle approaching intersection; vehicles entering intersection at same time.

(1) Except as may otherwise be provided in this article, the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway.

(2) Except as may otherwise be provided in this article, when two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at the same time the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8195; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Right of way, generally.
3. Instructions.
4. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. *Gates v. Green*, 214 So. 2d 828 (Miss. 1968).

The statutory rule announced in subsection (2) of this section [Code 1942, § 8195] is inapplicable to the intersection of an existing public road and a new highway under construction which is not yet open for general vehicular traffic. *Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Constr. Co.*, 238 Miss. 681, 119 So. 2d 918 (1960).

Right-of-way statutes have no legal application to traffic on private property. *Vaughan v. Lewis*, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247 (1959).

Violation of statutory rules of the road is negligence per se. *Vaughan v. Lewis*, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247 (1959).

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. *Jones v. Carter*, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519 (1942).

2. Right of way, generally.

Unless priority is otherwise given, the vehicle first entering an intersection has the right of way. *Vaughan v. Lewis*, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247 (1959).

If two vehicles arrive at an intersection at the same time, it is the duty of the driver to yield to the other driver who is on the right. *Herring v. Hart*, 225 Miss. 115, 82 So. 2d 710 (1955).

Where an automobile was first to reach an intersection, a driver of a truck approaching from the other street had the duty to yield the right of way to the first automobile and if necessary, to stop so as to permit him to pass through the intersection without interference. *Jefferson v. Pinson*, 219 Miss. 427, 69 So. 2d 234 (1954).

3. Instructions.

A party is not entitled to an instruction that one should yield to the car first entering an intersection where the statute requires stopping before entering the intersection in response to a red signal light, and Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. *Gates v. Green*, 214 So. 2d 828 (Miss. 1968).

Since common-law principles of negligence applied to an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision at an intersection of an existing public road, and a new highway under construction which was not open to general vehicular traffic, the court committed reversible error in giving the favored driver instruction which is solely statutory in origin. *Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Constr. Co.*, 238 Miss. 681, 119 So. 2d 918 (1960).

A motorist who approached an intersection with the signal light flashing red in

her direction, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, was not entitled to an instruction under this section [Code 1942, § 8195], providing that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. *Bates v. Walker*, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611 (1958).

The action of the trial court in a manslaughter prosecution in instructing the jury in reference to the so-called "rules of the road" as contained in previous repealed section (Code 1930, § 5574) was not error as against the contention that such rules had no application in a criminal case, since the jury was entitled to know the relative rights and duties of the driver of the truck and of the driver of the automobile in order to be able to determine who was at fault when the driver of the automobile was killed in a collision. *Turner v. State*, 183 Miss. 658, 183 So. 522 (1938).

4. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant's automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff's vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. *Buntyn v. Robinson*, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126 (1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Right of motorist on through, favored, or arterial street or highway to proceed where lateral view at intersection is obstructed by physical obstacle. 59 A.L.R.2d 1202.

Duty and liability of vehicle drivers approaching intersection of one-way street with other street. 62 A.L.R.2d 275.

Motorist's liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highway as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Comment Note. — What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to collisions between motor vehicles crossing at intersection. 20 A.L.R.3d 124.

Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to intersectional collision between motor vehicles meeting from opposite directions. 20 A.L.R.3d 287.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 308 et seq.

Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 865 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 141 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898, 899, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 729 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1551.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

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Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

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Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-803. Vehicle turning left at intersection.

The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver, having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by Article 15, may make such left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection from said opposite direction shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle making the left turn.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8196; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Negligence.
3. Evidence.
4. Questions for jury.
5. Instructions.
6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

One who had turned left at an intersection while the traffic signal was red, pursuant to a green arrow signal, and who had traversed almost the entire distance of the intersection before another car, when the signal turned from red to green, had entered the intersection, is not required to yield the right of way. Jackson

Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So. 2d 674 (1963).

2. Negligence.

In an action by a police officer for personal injuries sustained when his motorcycle struck a left turning automobile which had come to a stop 3 or 4 feet across the center line into the officer's lane, § 63-3-803 was a more appropriate basis, than § 63-3-603, for an instruction that violation thereof constituted negligence. McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299 (Miss. 1986).

In an action by a motorcyclist against a motorist for injuries resulting from an

intersectional collision, testimony of the automobile driver that he did not see the motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction until the instant of collision which occurred when the automobile turned left in front of the motorcycle, together with the acknowledged fact that the intersection was well lighted, indicated that the motorist was negligent in making a left turn without making sure that he could do so in safety, and failing to keep a proper lookout for approaching traffic. *Lynch v. Suthoff*, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969), overruled on other grounds, *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.* 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

3. Evidence.

Testimony of accident reconstruction expert is admissible to prove the relative speed of vehicles, the angle of impact of vehicles, and what diverted their course. *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.*, 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

Allowing an investigating officer, not an eyewitness to an accident, to give his opinion, in an action for injuries resulting from the collision, as to the place of impact and to depict this point on a map, was harmless error where the negligence of the defendant motorist was clearly established by other evidence. *Lynch v. Suthoff*, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969), overruled on other grounds, *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.* 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

In an action for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision, it was proper for the investigating officer to testify as to the location of the vehicles at the time of his investigation, the location of the injured plaintiff, and the location of debris created by the impact, and equally proper for him to mark the location of these things on the map of the intersection. *Lynch v. Suthoff*, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969), overruled on other grounds, *Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co.* 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).

4. Questions for jury.

In action for injuries sustained by a 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to Code 1942, § 8189(a), and a city ordinance, "cut the corner" in making a left turn, the question of whether the truck driver's negligence

was a proximate, contributing cause of the collision was for the jury. *City of Jackson v. Reed*, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342 (1958), motion overruled, 233 Miss. 304, 103 So. 2d 6 (1958), overruled on other grounds, *City of Jackson v. Williamson*, 1999 Miss. Lexis 89 (Miss. Feb. 25, 1999).

5. Instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident at an intersection in which the defendant was struck by the plaintiff's automobile as he made a left turn across the plaintiff's traffic lane, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed that the accident had been proximately caused by the negligence of a truck driver who had allegedly indicated to the defendant that he could safely cross the plaintiff's traffic lane; the defendant did not have the legal right to rely on the truck driver and had a duty to ascertain whether he could cross the traffic lane with reasonable safety. *Boyd v. Smith*, 390 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1980).

An instruction that the operator of a vehicle continuing its course is bound to have his vehicle under such control that another vehicle, entering the intersection first, can safely make the left turn, is improper as making such operator the insurer of the other's safety without regard to whether such other had at the time a right to turn across the traffic lane, and without regard to whether or not he was in such close proximity to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard. *Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Brown*, 236 Miss. 253, 109 So. 2d 858 (1959).

An instruction that the driver of an oncoming truck who saw a car signalling at a controlled-traffic intersection for a left turn but continued on a green light was bound to know that the car's driver contemplated turning, is objectionable as ignoring whatever right the truck driver had to assume that the car would wait until the traffic lane was clear. *Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Brown*, 236 Miss. 253, 109 So. 2d 858 (1959).

In an action for injuries sustained by 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to Code 1942, § 8189(a), and a city ordinance, "cut the

corner" in making a left turn, instructions permitting the jury to find that the motorcycle had already entered the intersection at the time of the left turn, and was readily visible to the truck driver, was not reversible error, where, under conflicting evidence, the jury could, and evidently did, reject the version of defendant's witnesses. *City of Jackson v. Reed*, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342 (1958), motion overruled, 233 Miss. 304, 103 So. 2d 6 (1958), overruled on other grounds, *City of Jackson v. Williamson*, 1999 Miss. Lexis 89 (Miss. Feb. 25, 1999).

6. Miscellaneous.

The action of a truckdriver, whose view of the road ahead was admittedly obstructed by a preceding pulpwood truck, who pulled into the left lane of traffic in

order to make a turn into a county road was guilty of violating this section [Code 1942, § 8196] and should have stopped or slowed down until the pulpwood truck ceased to obstruct his view. *Necaise v. Blalock*, 210 So. 2d 637 (Miss. 1968).

In an action for injuries sustained when plaintiff's truck was struck by defendant's truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff's vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, where the defendant's own testimony showed that he had failed to maintain a proper lookout, and was negligent in failing to comply with this section [Code 1942, § 8196], the jury's verdict for defendant was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. *Cobb v. Williams*, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17 (1956).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Comment Note. — What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 311, 313.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 144, 145, 182-186.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Auto-

mobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898, 899, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 751-754.

§ 63-3-805. Vehicle entering through highway.

The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this chapter at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through highway.

The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required by this chapter at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8197; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Applicability.
3. Construction.
4. What constitutes immediate hazard.
5. Negligence — In general.
6. —Contributory negligence.
7. —Comparative negligence.
8. Questions for jury.
9. Instructions.
10. Negligence not found.

1. In general.

As the driver failed to reduce his speed and keep a lookout as he approached an intersection that he knew was dangerous, the trial court did not err in assessing 54 percent liability against him. *Classic Coach, Inc. v. Johnson*, 823 So. 2d 517 (Miss. 2002).

Although this section places a burden on a driver to yield the right-of-way before entering a through highway, and further provides that when a STOP sign is present the driver is to observe the sign, it does not mandate that the state or a county place a STOP sign at an intersection. *Jones v. Mississippi DOT*, 744 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1999).

The general rule is that a vehicle which first enters and occupies the intersection has the right of way. *Tant v. Fairchild*, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78 (1956), suggestion of error sustained in part, overruled in part, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 905 (1956).

The general rule that the first vehicle in intersection has the right of way does not relieve a truck owner from the duty of having a flagman present to direct and stop traffic at busy intersection where the truck carried a huge cargo and was very slow in going through the intersection. *Tant v. Fairchild*, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78 (1956), suggestion of error sustained in part, overruled in part, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 905 (1956).

2. Applicability.

Employee was required to obey the stop sign and then proceed onto the highway intersection only after yielding to automobiles that were approaching and were close enough to be considered an immediate hazard; however, the mother failed to keep a proper lookout when approaching

the intersection, and a reasonable person would have recognized the need to slow the vehicle when approaching the intersection, and the employee was unable to avoid an accident. *Clark v. Clark*, 863 So. 2d 1027 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Liability for collision resulting when automobile proceeding east on 4 lane highway collides with truck which is blocking eastbound lanes while preparing to turn left onto westbound lanes is determined under statute governing right of way at intersection (§ 63-3-805), not under change of lane statute (§ 63-3-603). *Mills v. Nichols*, 467 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1985).

3. Construction.

Injured party's interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-805, was incorrect because the injured party seemed to contend that the uncontradicted proof that the injured party was traveling on the through highway at the time of the accident necessarily establishes the driver's negligence for the accident, but because the driver testified that the injured party's vehicle was not in sight just moments before the collision and the driver made reference to the degree of damage inflicted on the driver's truck as evidence tending to show that the injured party's vehicle was speeding, there was evidence that the injured party was speeding, which supported an inference that the injured party's speeding was the cause of the collision; thus, the jury verdict in favor of the driver and against the injured party was not against the weight of the evidence. *Redmond v. Breakfield*, 840 So. 2d 828 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

A motorist either at, or when entering, an intersection to cross a through highway has no right of way, and must yield to another car farther from the intersection but yet so close as to present a hazardous situation. *Walton v. Owens*, 244 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1957), reh'g denied, 249 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1957).

The standard of care required of a motorist backing a vehicle into a public street is defined in this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. *Ramage v. Kelly*, 253 Miss. 582, 176 So. 2d 324 (1965).

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. *Jones v. Carter*, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519 (1942).

The statute requires that motorists must stop and look at the intersection of a highway with a through highway. *Avent v. Tucker*, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940).

No driver of an automobile is absolved from exercising care and diligence when proceeding upon a crossing which is much traveled and at which people are known to travel at a high rate of speed, notwithstanding such driver may have stopped at a stop sign before entering into the intersection. *Avent v. Tucker*, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940).

4. What constitutes immediate hazard.

Where plaintiff's automobile which was approaching intersection in highway was only sixty to one hundred feet away, at a time defendant's truck entered intersection, plaintiff's automobile constituted an immediate hazard within this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. *Meo v. Miller*, 227 Miss. 11, 85 So. 2d 568 (1956).

5. Negligence — In general.

Failure of motorist on unfavored street to continue to look for approaching vehicles after having stopped at stop sign and looked at intersection of highway with through highway constitutes negligence; motorist who claims to have looked and failed to see vehicles in intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute immediate hazard is guilty of negligence as matter of law. *Dogan v. Hardy*, 587 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Miss. 1984).

Defendant motorist who drove to within a car's length of a highway stop sign located 40 feet from paved portion of intersecting road, looked to her right and left and did not see any traffic approaching, remained motionless quite a while and then proceeded upon the highway

without again looking to her right or left was guilty of negligence. *Campbell v. Schmidt*, 195 So. 2d 87 (Miss. 1967).

6. —Contributory negligence.

Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence where it appeared that while traveling on his side of a city street, without excessive speed, he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, who, upon entering the intersection, had seen the plaintiff's automobile approaching at such a distance as to constitute an immediate hazard, but, without looking again, continued across the intersection. *Wells v. Bennett*, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199 (1956).

Since defendant's own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff's approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. *Wells v. Bennett*, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199 (1956).

The doctrine of contributory negligence applies to a suit brought against a driver who allegedly violated this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. *Baird v. Harrington*, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82 (1947).

7. —Comparative negligence.

Since defendant's own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff's approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. *Wells v. Bennett*, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199 (1956).

In action for injuries resulting from automobile collision at intersection of cross road with through traffic lane, failure to give a comparative negligence instruction on behalf of plaintiff is not erroneous when instruction was not requested

and plaintiff predicated liability on finding that defendant was negligent and defendant's negligence was the sole, proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. *Davidian v. Wendell*, 37 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1948), error overruled, 37 So. 2d 771 (Miss. 1948).

8. Questions for jury.

When ultimate issue in intersection collision negligence case is relative position and speed of parties in moments prior to collision and evidence offered by witnesses is sharply conflicting, it is proper for jury to resolve conflict. *Mills v. Nichols*, 467 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1985).

In an action for personal injuries arising out of a multiple vehicle collision, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant where a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant had been negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff's vehicle. *Marshall v. Conley*, 391 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 1980).

What is a "through highway" may be answered categorically and absolutely, but the question who has the "right of way" cannot, since the answer to that question is variable, changing as the circumstances and facts of each situation change, so that it must be for the jury to decide under the facts of a particular case. *Shivel v. Ferguson*, 259 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1972).

Although the driver of the automobile in which the infant decedent was riding was guilty of negligence in entering the intersection, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict in an action for the wrongful death of the child, where the evidence raised a jury question as to whether defendant's driver was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the collision. *Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters*, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900 (1964).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8197] may warrant a jury in finding that an automobile was being negligently operated. *West v. Armstrong*, 248 Miss. 617, 159 So. 2d 805 (1964).

Evidence, although conflicting, was sufficient to present question for jury as to whether truck driven from private road onto highway in front of an approaching

car at nighttime constituted an immediate hazard. *Miller Petro. Transporters, Ltd. v. Price*, 237 Miss. 284, 114 So. 2d 756 (1959).

Whether one entering a through highway intersection after stopping should have yielded a right of way to an approaching car as presenting an immediate hazard, held for the jury where there was evidence that when he started, 15 to 20 feet from the edge of the highway, the approaching car was still several hundred feet distant and that its driver did not reduce speed after he saw or should have seen the other car entering the intersection. *Junakin v. Kuykendall*, 237 Miss. 255, 114 So. 2d 661 (1959).

In an action for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant when defendant allegedly drove, without stopping, from a private driveway into the highway upon which plaintiff was proceeding in such manner that plaintiff could not avoid striking him, conflicting evidence raised jury questions as to defendant's negligence, and whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. *Stewart v. Madden*, 233 Miss. 206, 101 So. 2d 353 (1958).

Since defendant's own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff's approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. *Wells v. Bennett*, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199 (1956).

It was for the jury to say whether the defendants, in an action for death of a motorist resulting from an automobile collision, were negligent in entering an intersection without looking in the direction from which another motorist was coming, after making a stop at a stop sign some distance from the intersection. *Avent v. Tucker*, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940).

The fact that the defendants stopped at a stop sign a short distance from the intersection before proceeding into the in-

tersection of a through highway would not discharge them of their duty to exercise ordinary care and diligence in proceeding upon the crossing and whether their failure to look to the south in entering the intersection was negligence proximately causing or contributing to the injury or death of a motorist approaching from that direction was for the jury. *Avent v. Tucker*, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940).

9. Instructions.

In an action for damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff's motorcycle and defendant's automobile in an intersection with a flashing red light and stop sign facing plaintiff and a flashing yellow light and warning sign facing defendant, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff's standard of care instruction which included the language, "the defendant had no lawful right to go forward...under the assumption that it would be open and clear," where a granted instruction detailed the crucial point that the yellow light facing defendant demanded caution, and that a finding of negligence would flow from her failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff if, as he claimed, he had lawfully entered the intersection and stalled unexpectedly. The trial court also properly refused to grant an instruction which stated in part, "the driver of a motor vehicle has a lawful duty to decrease his speed upon approaching an intersection," since § 63-3-311(2) merely states that a driver "may proceed...only with caution" and caution is a relative concept not necessarily entailing decrease in speed since the current speed may already be a cautious speed. *Allen v. Blanks*, 384 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1980).

An instruction to the effect that it is the duty of a motorist approaching a through highway to anticipate the presence of other persons and vehicles thereon and keep a reasonable lookout for them, and to stop for the stop sign at the intersection and yield the right of way to traffic on the through highway, and to see if she could enter the intersection with safety to herself and the traveling public, and that if she failed in any one of those particulars or respects such failure was the sole proximate cause of an intersectional accident

then it was the jury's duty to find against her, is erroneous in the absence of a further statement that after complying with these stated conditions the motorist had a right to enter the intersection and that vehicles on the through highway must yield the right of way to her. *Richardson v. Adams*, 223 So. 2d 536 (Miss. 1969).

An instruction was properly refused where it would have told the jury that when the operator of an automobile is confronted with a stop sign at an intersection, he, before entering the intersection, is under a duty to appraise traffic on the intersecting highway and to make certain that the way is clear for him to make a safe passage across the highway. Such an instruction would make the person entering the intersection an insurer of his own safety, regardless of the negligence of others. *Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters*, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900 (1964).

Although the defendant was entitled to an instruction under this section [Code 1942, § 8197], the trial court properly refused to give an instruction which was calculated to confuse the jury and did not properly present the issues. *Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters*, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900 (1964).

Trial court did not err in refusing an instruction that would have required a holding that defendant, who was traveling along a through highway, was guilty of negligence as a matter of law even though the jury could have found that, when plaintiff had entered the intersection, defendant was so close at hand that he could not possibly have stopped or averted a collision. *Walton v. Owens*, 244 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1957), reh'g denied, 249 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1957).

In cross actions for damages and personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle intersectional collision, the trial court erred in instructing that the defendant who had been traveling along a road upon which a stop sign was located, not only had the duty to stop his automobile at the intersection but "to wait until he could safely proceed," since that duty is not required by this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. *Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream & Creamery Co.*, 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634 (1957).

Where the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which he was riding both testified that before entering the intersection of a through highway they had looked to the north and the south, the trial court committed reversible error in instructing that the driver of the car was guilty of negligence in driving his car into the intersection without looking to the north immediately before doing so. *Moore v. Herman Guy Auto Parts, Inc.*, 230 Miss. 189, 92 So. 2d 373 (1957).

Where defendant testified that at the time he had stopped before entering a through street he had seen plaintiff's car approaching thereon from a distance of about 100 yards and traveling at about 40 miles per hour, but that he did not look any further before driving slowly into the through street where the collision occurred, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction in his action for personal injuries sustained as the result of the collision. *Wells v. Bennett*, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199 (1956).

In action for injuries resulting from automobile collision at intersection of cross road with through traffic lane, failure to give a comparative negligence instruction on behalf of plaintiff is not erroneous when instruction was not requested and plaintiff predicated liability on finding that defendant was negligent and defendant's negligence was the sole, proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. *Davidian v. Wendell*, 37 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1948), error overruled, 37 So. 2d 771 (Miss. 1948).

10. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at a prudent speed, keeping a proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. *Partlow v. McDonald*, — So. 2d —, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Motorist's liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Comment Note. — What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Automobiles: accidents arising from merger of traffic on limited access highway with that from service road or ramp. 40 A.L.R.3d 1429.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 262, 263, 308 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 141-148.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898-904, 1341-1524, 1954.

§ 63-3-807. Vehicle entering or crossing highway from private road or driveway.

The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on said highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8198; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury questions.

1. In general.

The statute does not require the driver

of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. *Jones v. Carter*, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519 (1942).

between plaintiff's automobile and that of defendant when defendant allegedly drove, without stopping, from a private driveway into the highway upon which plaintiff was proceeding in such a manner that plaintiff could not avoid striking him, conflicting evidence raised jury questions as to defendant's negligence, and whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. *Stewart v. Madden*, 233 Miss. 206, 101 So. 2d 353 (1958).

2. Jury questions.

In an action for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a collision

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Comment Note. — What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 315.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1027.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 221-

223, 570.1 (complaint in collision between bicyclists when minor bicyclist enters roadway from private driveway).

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 900, 901, 1341-1524, 1955.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 684 et seq.

§ 63-3-809. Procedure upon approach of authorized emergency vehicles; duty of driver of emergency vehicle.

(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.

(2) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8199; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Warning lights used on authorized emergency vehicles, see § 63-7-19.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, a driver who had a green light was not negligent as a matter

of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to an emergency police vehicle pursuant to § 63-3-809 because the driver of an emergency vehicle has a duty under § 63-3-315

to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching a red traffic light controlling an intersection. *Andrews v. Jitney Jungle Stores of Am., Inc.*, 537 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1989).

Even though engaged on an emergency call, the driver of a vehicle is subject to the doctrine of contributory negligence. *Baird v. Harrington*, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82 (1947).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Construction and Application of Statutory Provision Requiring Motorists to Yield Right-of-Way to Emergency Vehicle. 87 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 317.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 899.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 79, Negligent Vehicular Police Chase.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

ARTICLE 19.

STOPPING, STANDING AND PARKING.

SEC.

- 63-3-901. Stopping, standing or parking prohibited in specified places.
- 63-3-903. Stopping, standing or parking upon highway outside of business or residence districts.
- 63-3-905. Authority of police officers to remove or provide for removal of illegally stopped vehicles.
- 63-3-907. Parking parallel with right-hand curb.
- 63-3-909. Parking of unattended motor vehicles.
- 63-3-911. Opening door of stopped motor vehicle.
- 63-3-913. Designation of areas of private property as restricted for emergency vehicle access; parking in or blocking restricted access areas.

§ 63-3-901. Stopping, standing or parking prohibited in specified places.

(1) No person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or traffic control device, in any of the following places:

- a. On a sidewalk;
- b. In front of a public or private driveway;
- c. Within an intersection;
- d. Within ten feet of a fire hydrant;
- e. On a crosswalk;
- f. Within twenty feet of a crosswalk at an intersection;
- g. Within thirty feet upon the approach to any flashing beacon, stop sign, or traffic-control signal located at the side of a roadway;
- h. Between a safety zone and the adjacent curb or within thirty feet of points on the curb immediately opposite the ends of a safety zone, unless the traffic authority indicates a different length by signs or markings;

- i. Within fifteen feet of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing;
- j. Within twenty feet of the driveway entrance to any fire station and on the side of a street opposite the entrance of any fire station within seventy-five feet of said entrance when properly signposted;
- k. Alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when such stopping, standing, or parking would obstruct traffic;
- l. On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street;
- m. Upon any bridge or other elevated structure upon a highway or within a highway tunnel;
- n. At any place where official signs prohibit stopping.

(2) No person shall move a vehicle not owned by such person into any such prohibited area or away from a curb such distance as is unlawful.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8217; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

- 1. Parking vehicle.
- 2. Slowing vehicle down.
- 3. Standing or stopping.

1. Parking vehicle.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile intersectional collision allegedly caused by defendant's bus being parked in such a manner as to obscure a stop sign, any negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which he was riding, as well as the driver of the other automobile, did not supersede defendant's negligence. *Meridian Hatcheries, Inc. v. Troutman*, 230 Miss. 493, 93 So. 2d 472 (1957).

In an action to recover for the death of a child who was fatally injured when thrown from an automobile fender on which she was riding when the automobile struck an unattended parked automobile on a bridge, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the parking of the automobile upon the bridge and leaving it there unattended for a period of eleven hours was not a proximate contributing cause of the death of the child. *Belk v. Rosamond*, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461 (1952).

When the legislature has said that there shall be a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of the main traveled portion of the highway for the free passage of vehicles, and that an au-

tomobile shall not be parked upon a bridge, it cannot be reasonably contended that the parking of an automobile upon a bridge nineteen feet three inches in width and leaving the car unattended for a period of eleven hours did not constitute an act of negligence. *Belk v. Rosamond*, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461 (1952).

2. Slowing vehicle down.

Since this statute does not require that a motorist drive his vehicle off the pavement while slowing down but only requires him to do so before coming to a stop, it was not violated by a truck driver who, after his airbrakes failed, slowed down but was still moving toward the shoulder of the highway when the truck was struck by an automobile. *Sprayberry v. Blount*, 336 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1976).

The general rule that the first vehicle in intersection has the right of way does not relieve a truck owner from the duty of having a flagman present to direct and stop traffic at busy intersection where the truck carried a huge cargo and was very slow in going through the intersection. *Tant v. Fairchild*, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78 (1956), suggestion of error sustained in part, overruled in part, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 905 (1956).

3. Standing or stopping.

Where defendant stopped his car, to aid a pedestrian, on the traveled portion of

the highway with part of his car extending on a highway bridge, so as to leave less than 20 feet clearance, although shoulders of the road were such that defendant could have parked entirely off highway, and plaintiff's truck struck the rear of defendant's car causing the damage complained of, defendant was guilty of violation of paragraph m of subsection (1) of this section [Code 1942, § 8217]. *Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown*, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944).

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff's truck, in colliding with defendant's car, stopped on the traveled highway and at the entrance to a highway bridge in violation of law, was more responsible for the damages sued for than negligence of defendant and warranted reduction of recovery by 50 per cent. *Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown*, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 329 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 895 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 341-363, 431-434.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 971-980, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 575, Feasibility of Stopping or Parking Vehicle off Roadway.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 633 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1549-1550.

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Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-903. Stopping, standing or parking upon highway outside of business or residence districts.

(1) No person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of any highway outside of a business or residence district when it is practical to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway. In every event, however, a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty (20) feet of such part of the highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle be available from a distance of two hundred (200) feet in each direction upon such highway.

(2) This section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of a highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position.

(3) Any vehicle used solely for the purpose of collecting solid waste, under a contract with any county, municipality, resident or business for the collection of solid waste may stop or stand on the road, street or highway for the sole purpose of collecting solid waste. Such solid waste collection vehicle shall maintain hazard lights on the vehicle at all times that it is engaged in stopping or standing for the purpose of solid waste collection.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8215; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1992, ch. 583 § 16, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Applicability.
3. Construction in general.
4. Impossibility of leaving highway unobstructed.
5. Leaving disabled vehicle on highway.
6. Parked vehicle.
7. Slow moving vehicle.
8. Standing or stopped vehicle.
9. Turning.
10. Questions for jury.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. *Davis v. Waterman*, 420 So. 2d 1063 (Miss. 1982).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] will not support an action for injury unless it is the proximate cause thereof. *Mississippi City Lines v. Bullock*, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, 145 A.L.R. 1199 (1943).

2. Applicability.

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] applies only to highways outside of a business or residence district. *Filgo v. Crider*, 251 Miss. 234, 168 So. 2d 805 (1964).

3. Construction in general.

The two paragraphs of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] should be construed together so as to give effect to their true meaning. *Hankins v. Harvey*, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).

The constitutionality of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] can be sustained by giving the word "practical" in subsection

(1) an operation throughout the entire section, and by preserving as referable to the words, "in any event," the provision that, when possible, a clear view for 200 feet shall be available. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

4. Impossibility of leaving highway unobstructed.

The word "impossible" as used in subsection (2) should be construed as "not reasonably practical". *Hankins v. Harvey*, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).

Where the driver of a motor vehicle was actually negligent in bringing his motor vehicle to a stop partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, the fact that he may have pulled his motor vehicle as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, and that there may have been a clear view of this stopped vehicle for a distance of 200 feet in each direction, does not relieve him from the liability for injuries proximately caused by his negligence. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] is to be construed to the effect that when 20 feet of clearance is impossible, the vehicle shall turn as far to the right as practical including sound and safe shoulders, but must

not stop upon any part of the traveled highway unless and until at least 200 feet clear view is available in each direction from the point where the stop is made, save when the vehicle is disabled, as provided for under subsection (2); and save further, when on account of obstructions or equivalent conditions ahead, it is impossible to proceed so as to leave the 200 feet of clear view; and that all this is for the determination of the jury. *Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown*, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944); *Teche Lines v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

In construing this section [Code 1942, § 8215] the court will take judicial notice that at least 85 per cent of the public highways in the state are of such width that it is only occasionally possible, and that at distant intervals, to stop a vehicle so as to leave as much as 20 feet of unobstructed highway. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

5. Leaving disabled vehicle on highway.

Truck driver negligently violated this section where, though he made several attempts to start his truck after it became

disabled and stopped on the highway, he did not look under the hood and thus did not discover that a recently installed battery cable had become unfastened and was the cause of the problem. *Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Conduct*, 417 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] does not relieve the driver of negligence in leaving his disabled vehicle on the highway where it was disabled as a result of an earlier accident caused by his negligence. *Huff v. Boyd*, 242 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1971).

Motorist who, without negligence on his part, struck a car making a left turn ahead of him, disabling it, is under no duty to other motorists to remove it from traveled portion of highway. *Brent v. Heath*, 235 Miss. 324, 109 So. 2d 314 (1959).

6. Parked vehicle.

Parking of a tractor and trailers at least two feet on the paved portion of the road, although there was room to park them entirely off, on a dark, foggy night, without rear lights, reflectors, or flares, is a violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215]. *Jester v. Bailey*, 239 Miss. 384, 123 So. 2d 442 (1960).

When the legislature has said that there shall be a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of the main traveled portion of the highway for the free passage of vehicles, and that an automobile shall not be parked upon a bridge, it cannot be reasonably contended that the parking of an automobile upon a bridge nineteen feet three inches in width and leaving the car unattended for a period of eleven hours did not constitute an act of negligence. *Belk v. Rosamond*, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461 (1952).

In an action for personal injuries where the plaintiff's car ran into defendant's truck parked on a highway the court did not err in giving an instruction based on this section [Code 1942, § 8215] which requires any vehicle parking upon a highway to leave a width of at least twenty feet of the highway opposite such standing vehicle for the passage of other cars, where the parked truck could have been moved back from seven to ten feet. *Planters Whse. Grocery v. Kincade*, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So. 2d 578 (1951).

7. Slow moving vehicle.

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

Where defendant's truck became partially disabled because of water damage to engine and was proceeding slowly ahead of plaintiff's automobile, which was struck in the rear by an overtaking truck, and at the time of the collision the driver of defendant's truck was attempting to move it to place where he could get off the highway and the forward movement of defendant's truck was halted for very brief intervals, the driver of the defendant's truck did not violate the parking statute. *Fant v. Commercial Carriers, Inc.*, 210 Miss. 474, 49 So. 2d 887 (1951).

8. Standing or stopped vehicle.

Where a truck driver stopped his rig on an interstate highway to aid a disabled motorist, § 63-3-903 required him to pull off the road to the extent practicable. *Stong v. Freeman Truck Line*, 456 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1984).

Where the driver of a tractor-trailer, while attempting to turn the rig around, had stopped the vehicle in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] in such a fashion that it was blocking both lanes of a two way highway, the fact that there was no time later in which he could extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had deliberately placed himself cannot excuse his original act of negligence. *Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines*, 423 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1970).

Where the exigencies of the traffic situation require, a motorist can stop momentarily in the highway without being guilty of negligence and is not required to drive the vehicle off the main portion of the

highway prior to stopping. *Burt v. Duckworth*, 206 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1968).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] should be construed in a practical manner, and it does not mean that a motorist forced to stop momentarily upon the paved portion of a highway because the vehicle in front of him stopped and oncoming traffic prevented him from passing is guilty of negligence in not immediately driving from the highway onto the shoulder. *Whitten v. Land*, 188 So. 2d 246 (Miss. 1966).

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

The driver of a passenger bus, like the operator of any other motor vehicle on the public highway, must not only observe the statutory requirements of bringing his vehicle to a stop, but he must also exercise due care not to endanger the safety of other persons using the highway and this duty to exercise due care exists independently of any statutory regulation. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff's truck, in colliding with defendant's car, stopped on the traveled highway and at the entrance to a highway bridge in violation of law, was more responsible for the damages sued for than negligence of defendant and warranted reduction of recovery by 50 per cent. *Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown*, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944).

Where defendant stopped his car, to aid pedestrian, on traveled portion of highway at entrance to bridge so as to leave less than 20 feet clearance, although the

shoulders of the road were in such condition that defendant could have parked entirely off the highway, and plaintiff's truck struck the rear of defendant's car causing the damage complained of, trial judge was warranted in finding that the stopping of defendant's car at the particular place shown by the evidence was in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215], and constituted actionable negligence. *Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown*, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] by stopping a bus with the rear end thereof out into the highway was not the proximate cause of injury to a passenger, who after alighting from the bus passed around the rear end of the bus into traffic and was struck by an automobile. *Mississippi City Lines v. Bullock*, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, 145 A.L.R. 1199 (1943).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

The right to travel being the right to go from one place to another includes the right to stop on the way, temporarily, for a legitimate or necessary purpose when that purpose is an immediate incident to travel; and such rights, being fundamental, are constitutional rights which the legislature may regulate in pursuance of the police power but may not arbitrarily or unreasonably restrict. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

9. Turning.

Where the driver of a tractor-trailer, while attempting to turn the rig around,

had stopped the vehicle in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] in such a fashion that it was blocking both lanes of a two way highway, the fact that there was no time later in which he could extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had deliberately placed himself cannot excuse his original act of negligence. *Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines*, 423 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1970).

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. *Continental S. Lines v. Klaas*, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 575 (1953), error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 65 So. 2d 833, error overruled 217 Miss. 795, 67 So. 2d 256.

10. Questions for jury.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when pickup truck in which he was riding collided with a passenger bus where the bus driver stopped his bus to discharge passengers at nighttime in the rain with approximately one-half of the bus on paved portion of the highway whether the bus driver was negligent in not parking entirely off the paved portion of the highway was a question for the jury. *Continental S. Lines v. Williams*, 226 Miss. 624, 85 So. 2d 179 (1956), error overruled 226 Miss. 624, 85 So. 2d 910.

In an action to recover for the death of a child who was fatally injured when thrown from an automobile fender on which she was riding when the automobile struck an unattended parked automobile on a bridge, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the parking of the automobile upon the bridge and leaving it there unattended for a period of eleven hours was not a proximate contributing cause of the death of the child. *Belk v. Rosamond*, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461 (1952).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a

bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed

width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. *Teche Lines, v. Danforth*, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Duties and liabilities between owners or drivers of parked or parking vehicles. 25 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Sudden or unsignalled stop or slowing of motor vehicle as negligence. 29 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability for injury or damage growing out of pulling out of parked motor vehicle. 29 A.L.R.2d 107.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* where motor vehicle stops on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 153.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 329 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 973 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Accidents, Forms 341-363, 431-434.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 971-979, 1341-1524, 2002.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 575, Feasibility of Stopping or Parking Vehicle off Roadway.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 633 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1549-1550.

§ 63-3-905. Authority of police officers to remove or provide for removal of illegally stopped vehicles.

(1) Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle standing upon a highway in violation of Section 63-3-903, such officer is hereby authorized to move such vehicle, or require the driver or other person in charge of the vehicle to move the same, to a position off the paved or improved or main traveled part of such highway.

(2) Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle unattended upon any bridge or causeway or in any tunnel where such vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traffic, such officer is hereby authorized to provide for the removal of such vehicle to the nearest garage or other place of safety.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8216; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In view of the statute requiring police officers to remove a vehicle from the highway when it is a danger to the traveling public, the partial unloading of a rental truck, which was so heavily loaded that it

could not be moved without being partially unloaded, and the removal of the truck to the courthouse, was not an illegal search, where at the time the officers moved the truck, they did not search it or seize any of its contents, and did not know

that a crime had been committed. *Williamson v. State*, 248 So. 2d 634 (Miss. 1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 336.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1549-1550.

§ 63-3-907. Parking parallel with right-hand curb.

Except where angle parking is permitted by local ordinance or usage, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a roadway where there is an adjacent curb shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels of such vehicle parallel with and within twelve inches of the right-hand curb.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8218; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles Municipal police officers may issue citations for violations of this section within the corporate limits. In addition, municipal governing authorities may

adopt ordinances regulating parking of vehicles and setting forth penalties for parking violations. *Hamilton*, April 12, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0210.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 337.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 659, 661-663.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 976.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1549-1550.

§ 63-3-909. Parking of unattended motor vehicles.

No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8219; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Estoppel by acquiescence.

left it unattended, without removing the ignition key, was not liable for injuries caused when his automobile, driven by a thief, ran through a red traffic light at a reckless rate of speed and crashed into the

1. In general.

Owner, who parked his automobile and

car in which the plaintiff was riding. *Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co.*, 229 Miss. 385, 91 So. 2d 243 (1956).

2. Estoppel by acquiescence.

In an action based on the negligence of defendant car dealer in placing plaintiff's car on its parking lot with the key in the ignition, which resulted in its theft, the

county judge was in error in sustaining the affirmative defense of estoppel by acquiescence, because the custom and usage of the defendant in parking the cars of its customers on its parking lot with the keys in the ignition was against public policy. *Gates v. Owen Chevrolet Co.*, 294 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 16 A.L.R.2d 979.

Liability for damage or injury by stranger starting motor vehicle left parked on street. 51 A.L.R.2d 633.

Failure of motorist to cramp wheels against curb or turn them away from traffic, or to shut off engine, as causing accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 42 A.L.R.3d 1283.

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Liability of motorist who left key in ignition for damage or injury caused by stranger operating the vehicle. 45 A.L.R.3d 787.

Presumption of negligence and application of *Res ipsa loquitur* Doctrine in action

for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of a parked motor vehicle. 55 A.L.R.3d 1260.

Liability for personal injury or property damage caused by unauthorized use of automobile which has been parked with keys removed from ignition. 70 A.L.R.4th 276.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 329 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1010-1013.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 363.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1341-1524, 2001.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 664-666.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1549-1550.

§ 63-3-911. Opening door of stopped motor vehicle.

No person shall open any door on a motor vehicle unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so and can be done without interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a door open on a side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

§ 63-3-913. Designation of areas of private property as restricted for emergency vehicle access; parking in or blocking restricted access areas.

(1) The designation of areas on private property which are clearly marked to restrict access thereto to emergency vehicles shall be considered permission by the owner of such property that law enforcement officers may enter such

private property to enforce such restricted access; and all municipal, county and state law enforcement officers are authorized to enforce such restriction.

(2) It is unlawful to park a motor vehicle, other than an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency, in an area which has been marked as provided in subsection (1) of this section; and any person who unlawfully parks a motor vehicle in such an area or who blocks access thereto is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) for each violation. For the third and any subsequent offense under this section, the offender's driver's license shall be suspended for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 63-1-53, Mississippi Code of 1972, in addition to any fine imposed.

(3) For the purpose of this section "emergency vehicle" means fire department vehicles, law enforcement vehicles, ambulances and any other vehicle designated as an emergency vehicle by the governing authority of the county or municipality within which the private property is located.

SOURCES: Laws, 1995, ch. 461, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. "Clearly marked."

The area in which the defendant parked was clearly marked to restrict access to emergency vehicles, notwithstanding that there were no signs posted to indicate that

the area was restricted, where there was evidence presented that the area was marked with yellow and black stripes. *Langston v. City of Iuka*, 792 So. 2d 1013 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 329.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 661 et seq.

ARTICLE 21.

REQUIRED STOPS.

SEC.

- 63-3-1001. Designation of stop intersections; design and placement of stop signs.
- 63-3-1003. Designation of yield right-of-way entrances; conduct of driver at yield-right-of-way intersection; proof of failure to yield right-of-way.
- 63-3-1005. Stops before emerging from alley, driveway or building.
- 63-3-1007. Stops at railroad grade crossings in obedience to signal indicating approach of train; effect of noncompliance upon right of recovery in civil action.
- 63-3-1009. Stops at designated particularly dangerous railroad grade crossings.
- 63-3-1011. Stops at railroad grade crossings by vehicles carrying passengers for hire or explosive substances and school buses.
- 63-3-1013. Moving heavy equipment at railroad grade crossing.

§ 63-3-1001. Designation of stop intersections; design and placement of stop signs.

(1) The state highway commission with reference to state highways, and local authorities with reference to other highways under their jurisdiction, may designate through highways and erect stop signs at specified entrances thereto or may designate any intersection signs at specified entrances thereto or may designate any intersection as a stop intersection and erect like signs at one or more entrances to such intersection.

(2) Every said sign shall bear the word "Stop" in letters not less than 8" in height which sign shall be self-illuminated at night or if not shall be reflectorized. Every stop sign shall be located as near as practical at the property line of the highway at the entrance to which the stop must be made, or at the nearest line of the crosswalk thereat, or, if none, at the nearest line of the roadway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8213; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 325.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Where defendant's driver was grossly negligent in entering intersection at 50 miles per hour without stopping as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8213], and collided with plaintiff's driver who, in entering the intersection on a through street at unabated speed of 30 miles per hour, was prima facie negligent under Code 1942, § 8176, the negligence of plaintiff's driver was a contributing factor to the accident and warranted application of the comparative negligence statute (Code 1942, § 1454). *Moore v. Abdalla*, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502 (1944).

2. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant's automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff's vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. *Buntyn v. Robinson*, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126 (1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 262, 263.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic §§ 888-894.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 166-170.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 895, 896, 1341-1524, 1876.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 723.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1552.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, De-

fense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-1003. Designation of yield right-of-way entrances; conduct of driver at yield-right-of-way intersection; proof of failure to yield right-of-way.

(1) The state highway commission with reference to state highways under its jurisdiction and local authorities with reference to other highways under their jurisdiction may, when traffic conditions warrant such action, give preference to traffic through any intersection on any highway and designate specified entrances to said intersections as yield right-of-way entrances by erecting yield-right-of-way signs in lieu of stop signs as required or permitted in Section 63-3-1001.

(2) The driver of a vehicle in obedience to a yield-right-of-way sign shall reduce the speed of his vehicle to not more than twenty miles per hour and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersecting highway either from the right or left or which are approaching so closely on said intersecting highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver having so yielded may proceed at such time as a safe interval occurs.

(3) If a driver is involved in a collision at an intersection or interferes with the movement of other vehicles after driving past a yield-right-of-way sign, such collision or interference shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the driver's failure to yield right-of-way.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8213; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 325.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 894.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 728.

§ 63-3-1005. Stops before emerging from alley, driveway or building.

The driver of a vehicle within a business or residence district emerging from an alley, driveway, or building shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or into the sidewalk area extending across any alley way or private driveway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8214; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.

1. In general.

The failure of a motorist, who was backing his automobile out of his driveway onto the street in a thickly populated neighborhood, to stop his automobile upon the rear of the driveway before reaching the sidewalk was prima facie negligence. *Hatten v. Brame*, 233 Miss. 509, 103 So. 2d 4 (1958).

struck when defendant backed his automobile from his driveway to a public street in a thickly populated neighborhood, where the evidence established that the defendant failed to stop his automobile upon the rear of the driveway before entering the sidewalk area, the trial court properly granted the pedestrian a peremptory instruction on liability. *Hatten v. Brame*, 233 Miss. 509, 103 So. 2d 4 (1958).

2. Instructions.

In an action for personal injuries sustained when a blind pedestrian was

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 315.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1027 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 221-223.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 941-949, 1341-1524, 1991, 1992.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 684-692.

§ 63-3-1007. Stops at railroad grade crossings in obedience to signal indicating approach of train; effect of noncompliance upon right of recovery in civil action.

(1) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing and a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a train, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so safely.

(2) The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain standing and not traverse such a grade crossing when a crossing gate is lowered or when a human flagman gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train. The violation of this section shall not of itself defeat recovery and the question of negligence or the violation aforesaid, shall be left to the jury and the comparative negligence statute and prima facie statute of this state shall apply in these cases as in other cases of negligence.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8209; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in (1); and made a minor stylistic change.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Proof of violation of statute is not necessary in order to prove negligence, and injured party established prima facie case of negligence by proving that driver violated statute by not stopping at crossing even though approaching train was plainly visible and in dangerous proximity to crossing, and by proving that driver was negligent in that he failed to keep

proper lookout by looking back as he approached railroad crossing, rejecting contention of driver that because there was no evidence crossing was marked by signal or stop sign injured party had failed to prove driver had violated statute and therefore had failed to prove negligence. *Dale v. Bridges*, 507 So. 2d 375 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.
37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 439, Inadequacy of Warning Device at Railroad Crossing.

§ 63-3-1009. Stops at designated particularly dangerous railroad grade crossings.

The Mississippi Transportation Commission is hereby authorized to designate particularly dangerous highway grade crossings of railroads and to erect stop signs thereat. When such stop signs are erected the driver of any vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest track of such grade crossing and shall proceed only upon exercise of due care.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8210; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment substituted “Mississippi Transportation Commission” for “state highway commission” in the first sentence; substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in the second sentence; and made a minor stylistic change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

§ 63-3-1011. Stops at railroad grade crossings by vehicles carrying passengers for hire or explosive substances and school buses.

(1) The driver of any motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire, or of any school bus carrying any school child, or of any vehicle carrying explosive substances of flammable liquids as a cargo or part of a cargo, before crossing at

grade any track or tracks of a railroad, shall stop such vehicle within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and while so stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track for any approaching train and for signals indicating the approach of a train, except as hereinafter provided, and shall not proceed until he can do so safely.

(2) No stop need be made at any such crossing where a police officer or a traffic control signal directs traffic to proceed.

(3) This section shall not apply at street railway grade crossings within a business or residence district.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8211; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in (1); and made a minor stylistic change.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Violation of this requirement held to establish negligence of driver of truck struck by train at crossing. Illinois Cent.

R.R. v. Nelson, 245 Miss. 395, 146 So. 2d 69 (1962), corrected, 245 Miss. 411, 148 So. 2d 712, 4 A.L.R.3d 1217 (1963).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure of occupants of motor vehicle stalled on railroad crossing to get out and move to place of safety as contributory negligence. 21 A.L.R.2d 742.

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms

(Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

§ 63-3-1013. Moving heavy equipment at railroad grade crossing.

No person shall operate or move any caterpillar tractor, steam shovel, derrick, roller, or any equipment or structure having a normal operating speed of six (6) or less miles per hour or a vertical body or load clearance of less than nine (9) inches above the level surface of a roadway upon or across any tracks at a railroad grade crossing without notice of any such intended crossing first being given to a superintendent of such railroad and a reasonable time being given to such railroad to provide proper protection at such crossing.

Before making any such crossing the person operating or moving any such vehicle or equipment shall first stop the same not less than fifteen (15) feet nor more than fifty (50) feet from the nearest rail of such railway and while so stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track for any approaching train and for signals indicating the approach of a train, and shall not proceed until the crossing can be made safely.

No such crossing shall be made when warning is given by automatic signal or crossing gates or a flagman or otherwise of the immediate approach of a railroad train or car.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8212; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in the second paragraph; and made a minor stylistic change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms 23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing
(Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Accident Litigation.
Forms 1885-1887. 10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

ARTICLE 23.

PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

SEC.

- 63-3-1101. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control signals at intersections; privileges and restrictions at other locations.
- 63-3-1103. Pedestrians' right-of-way at crosswalks lacking traffic control signals; duty of vehicle approaching vehicle stopped for pedestrian.
- 63-3-1105. Pedestrians crossing roadways at locations other than crosswalks.
- 63-3-1107. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks.
- 63-3-1109. Solicitation of rides by pedestrians.
- 63-3-1111. Rights of blind and otherwise incapacitated pedestrians crossing at or near intersections or crosswalks; effect of failure to employ cane or guide dog; regulation of use of canes.
- 63-3-1112. Duty of driver to avoid collision with pedestrian or person propelling human-powered vehicle; warning signal.
- 63-3-1113. Driving through safety zone.

§ 63-3-1101. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control signals at intersections; privileges and restrictions at other locations.

Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic control signals at intersections as heretofore declared in this chapter. At all other places pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and shall be subject to the restrictions stated in this article.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8200; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

- 1.-10. [Reserved for future use.] of streets held reasonable because of automobile traffic. *Snyder v. Campbell*, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926).
- 11. Under former law.
- 1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
- 11. Under former law.
Ordinance regulating pedestrian's use

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Application of “assured clear distance ahead” or “radius of lights” doctrine to accident involving pedestrian crossing street or highway. 31 A.L.R.2d 1424.

Contributory negligence of one standing in highway to attempt to warn approaching motorists of dangerous situation. 53 A.L.R.2d 1002.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 345.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 486, 489 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 782, 783.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

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Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-1103. Pedestrians’ right-of-way at crosswalks lacking traffic control signals; duty of vehicle approaching vehicle stopped for pedestrian.

Where traffic control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise provided in this article.

Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8201; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Motorist’s duty is to drive upon a highway at no greater speed than is reasonable, having regard to traffic, and to keep his car under control and to be on the alert for other persons and vehicles, and to

anticipate their presence. *Williams v. Moses*, 234 Miss. 453, 106 So. 2d 45 (1958).

2. Instructions.

An instruction as to the liability of a motorist to a pedestrian who unexpectedly walks in front of his car is not proper in a case in which the pedestrian had almost

completed the crossing of a three-lane highway and was within 3 feet of the curb.

Williams v. Moses, 234 Miss. 453, 106 So. 2d 45 (1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 318, 320, 345 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 477.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 481-505, 903, 904, 1341-1524, 1784-1789, 1985.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 782, 784.

§ 63-3-1105. Pedestrians crossing roadways at locations other than crosswalks.

(1) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.

(2) Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.

(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8202; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Duty of motorists-In general.
2. —To sound horn.
3. Duty of pedestrians.
4. Jury instructions.
5. Questions for jury.
6. Negligence not found.
- 7.-15. [Reserved for future use.]
16. Under former laws.

1. Duty of motorists-In general.

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child's parents' home, the trial court properly declined to give a peremptory instruction on liability favorable to the parents where the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, portrayed circumstances from

which reasonable minds could find that the driver had afforded the infant all of the care which was due under the circumstances, including the presence of her parents in the immediate vicinity, and where the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the driver had violated the duty imposed by statute to "exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway." Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605 (Miss. 1980).

The absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal; The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the

highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. *Smith v. Walton*, 271 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1973).

If a pedestrian, standing stationary at the edge of a paved portion of a highway is a child of tender years, or communicates by appearance or action that he is intoxicated, ill, or otherwise not in possession of his faculties, the approaching driver may be bound to anticipate that he will, or that there is sufficient risk that he might, leave his place of safety and come on to the traveled highway. *Wendelken v. McMurray*, 388 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 952, 88 S. Ct. 1850, 20 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1968), reh'g denied, 404 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1968).

2. —To sound horn.

In an action for death of pedestrian who was struck by a motorist as she was crossing a highway, it was an error to peremptorily instruct the jury that it was the duty of a driver of the truck to sound his horn. *Robinson v. Sims*, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318 (1956).

It is unnecessary for a motorist to blow his horn at a pedestrian who knows that the car is overtaking or meeting him or her on the highway, and the purpose of the blowing of horn is to give notice of approach of the automobile. *Robinson v. Sims*, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318 (1956).

3. Duty of pedestrians.

Where the collision which resulted in the decedent's death occurred at a point in the roadway where there was not a marked crosswalk or an intersection, the decedent owed a duty to yield the right-of-way to the defendant's truck and his failure to do so was negligent. *Hornburger v. Baird*, 508 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

The absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal; The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. *Smith v. Walton*, 271 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1973).

4. Jury instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an accident in which a pedestrian was struck by an automobile, an instruction which conformed to the first part of § 63-3-1105, dealing with the duty of a pedestrian to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles operating on the road, but which failed to incorporate the last portion of § 63-3-1105, dealing with the duty of a driver to pedestrians already within a roadway, was incomplete; the instruction as worded was virtually peremptory for defendant, and thus plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. *Ross v. Miller*, 441 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1983).

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child's parents' home, the trial court properly declined to give a peremptory instruction on liability favorable to the parents where the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, portrayed circumstances from which reasonable minds could find that the driver had afforded the infant all of the care which was due under the circumstances, including the presence of her parents in the immediate vicinity, and where the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the driver had violated the duty imposed by statute to "exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway." *Haver v. Hinson*, 385 So. 2d 605 (Miss. 1980).

In an action for death of pedestrian who was struck by a motorist as she was crossing a highway, it was an error to peremptorily instruct the jury that it was the duty of a driver of the truck to sound his horn. *Robinson v. Sims*, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318 (1956).

5. Questions for jury.

In a personal injury action, a truck driver who struck a pedestrian was not negligent as a matter of law by virtue of the fact that he did not see the pedestrian in the highway in time to avoid striking him; the issue of the driver's negligence was for the jury to decide. *Hood v. Oakley*, 519 So. 2d 1236 (Miss. 1988).

6. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at a prudent speed, keeping a proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. *Partlow v. McDonald*, — So. 2d —, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003).

7-15. [Reserved for future use.]**16. Under former laws.**

Negligence of pedestrian, under the circumstances, was very slight, consisting of being on the right-hand side of the highway instead of the left side, but off the traveled part of the highway where it was unlikely that any injury would be inflicted by automobiles passing along the same side of the highway in the same direction, because the paved part of the highway was ample for the passage of the vehicles, without leaving the pavement. *Evans Motor Freight Lines v. Fleming*, 184 Miss. 808, 185 So. 821 (1939).

Issue of injured pedestrian's contributory negligence in walking on right side of highway was properly submitted to jury, under statute requiring pedestrians to walk on left side. *Basque v. Anticich*, 177 Miss. 855, 172 So. 141 (1937).

Motorist had duty upon observing pedestrian walking on right side of highway with back to automobile to sound horn until pedestrian became aware of approach, and, if pedestrian continued unaware, to slow down and come to stop, if necessary. *Avery v. Collins*, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695 (1934), motion overruled, 171 Miss. 636, 158 So. 552 (1935).

Motorist who, although observing that boy walking on right side of road with back to approaching automobile was unaware of automobile, failed to slacken speed, and drove on left side to pass boy, who suddenly, becoming aware of automobile, jumped to left into its path, held liable for death of boy. *Avery v. Collins*, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695 (1934), motion overruled, 171 Miss. 636, 158 So. 552 (1935).

Instruction that automobile driver was under no duty to sound horn to warn pedestrian, walking along left side of street, if he saw him so close to automobile that he had no time to do so, held erroneous. *Reid v. McDevitt*, 163 Miss. 226, 140 So. 722 (1932).

It was duty of automobile driver on left side of street to give signals of his approach to pedestrian walking ahead of him on such side. *Reid v. McDevitt*, 163 Miss. 226, 140 So. 722 (1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure to comply with statute regulating travel by pedestrian along highway as affecting right to recovery for injuries or death resulting from collision with automobile. 45 A.L.R.3d 658.

Who is "pedestrian" entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 319, 345.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 480, 481.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 481-505, 1341-1524, 1784-1789, 1959.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 595, Motorist's Negligence in Striking Person Lying in Road.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 782, 784.

§ 63-3-1107. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks.

Pedestrians shall move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8203; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1109. Solicitation of rides by pedestrians.

No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting a ride from the driver of any private vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8204; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Anti-hitchhiking laws: their construction and effect in action for injury to hitchhiker. 46 A.L.R.3d 964.

§ 63-3-1111. Rights of blind and otherwise incapacitated pedestrians crossing at or near intersections or crosswalks; effect of failure to employ cane or guide dog; regulation of use of canes.

(1) Whenever a pedestrian is crossing or attempting to cross a public street or highway, at or near an intersection or crosswalk, guided by a guide dog or carrying in a raised or extended position a cane or walking stick which is metallic or white in color, or white tipped with red, the driver of every vehicle approaching in said intersection or crosswalk shall take such precautions as may be necessary to avoid injuring or endangering such pedestrian, and if injury or danger to such pedestrian can be avoided only by bringing his vehicle to a full stop, he shall bring his said vehicle to a full stop. The word "vehicle," when used in this section, does not include a train operated on railroad tracks.

(2) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to deprive any totally or partially blind or otherwise incapacitated person, not carrying such a cane or walking stick or not being guided by a dog, of the rights and privileges conferred by law upon pedestrians crossing streets or highways. The failure of such totally or partially blind or otherwise incapacitated person to carry a cane or walking stick or to be guided by a guide dog upon the streets, highways or sidewalks of this state, shall not be held to constitute or be evidence of contributory negligence.

(3) It shall be unlawful for any person, unless totally or partially blind or otherwise incapacitated, while on any public street or highway, to carry in a raised or extended position a cane or walking stick which is metallic or white in color, or white tipped with red.

(4) The violation of any provision of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ten (10) days.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8203.5; Laws, 1950, ch. 330, §§ 1-4.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 528.
42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negli-

gence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.
CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 772.

§ 63-3-1112. Duty of driver to avoid collision with pedestrian or person propelling human-powered vehicle; warning signal.

Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter or the provisions of any local ordinance, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle and shall give an audible signal when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at prudent speed, keeping

proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. *Partlow v. McDonald*, — So. 2d —, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Motorist's liability for striking person lying in road. 41 A.L.R.4th 303.

§ 63-3-1113. Driving through safety zone.

No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8208; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 264.

ARTICLE 25.

RECKLESS OR CARELESS DRIVING AND MISCELLANEOUS RULES.

SEC.

63-3-1201. Reckless driving.

63-3-1203. Operation of vehicle under circumstances which interfere with driver's

- view or control over driving mechanism; interference with driver's view or control by passenger.
- 63-3-1205. Driving through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways.
- 63-3-1207. Coasting upon down grade.
- 63-3-1209. Crossing unprotected fire hose.
- 63-3-1211. Throwing, etc., of glass or other injurious material on highway; removal of glass or other injurious material by person removing wrecked or damaged vehicle from highway.
- 63-3-1213. Careless driving.

§ 63-3-1201. Reckless driving.

Any person who drives any vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a wilful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. Reckless driving shall be considered a greater offense than careless driving.

Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon a first conviction by a fine of not less than Five Dollars (\$5.00) nor more than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00), and on a second or subsequent conviction he may be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days or by a fine of not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00), or by both.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1993, ch. 317, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1993 (became law without Governor's signature on March 16, 1993).

Cross References — Careless driving, see § 63-3-1213.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. What constitutes reckless driving, in general.
3. Reckless driving under particular circumstances.
4. —Weaving.
5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

The evident purpose of this section [Code 1942, § 8175] is not to punish as criminal acts of simple negligence, or even where gross negligence is shown, in traffic accidents, unless it is of such character as to evince a wilful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property on the highways. *Sanford v. State*, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628 (1944).

2. What constitutes reckless driving, in general.

Reckless driving means the commission of conscious acts or omissions which the

driver knows or should know create an unreasonable risk of injury or damage either to the driver and his property, or to the person or property of others. *Barnes v. State*, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865 (1964).

A motorist is not guilty of reckless driving where there are no persons or vehicles on the highway ahead of and in view of the motorist or where the driving allegedly reckless did not occur on the highway. *Gause v. State*, 203 Miss. 377, 34 So. 2d 729 (1948).

3. Reckless driving under particular circumstances.

Evidence was sufficient to establish reckless driving by the defendant where (1) a police officer observed the defendant driving at an excessively high rate of speed while weaving in and out of traffic in a 45 mile per hour speed zone and

passing other vehicles at an excessive rate of speed, and (2) the officer testified that after questioning the defendant about his speed, the defendant responded and admitted to driving at a speed of 135 miles per hour (although a passenger in his car stated that the defendant drove at 60 to 65 miles per hour) and that he drove at that rate because "I wanted to." *Nix v. State*, 763 So. 2d 896 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

Where defendant drives through a village and he is committing no crime and violating no law, and where two men without possession of any authority undertake to stop him he continues wherein two men shoot at him or at his vehicle and where one of the men jumps into automobile and pursues him and during that pursuit he drives motor vehicle faster than legal speed limit, all as a result of then being pursued by one who had tried to shoot him or the vehicle in which he was riding, the defendant is not guilty of the crime of reckless driving of an automobile. *Brown v. State*, 227 Miss. 823, 87 So. 2d 84 (1956).

Evidence that state witness approached intersection at a speed of 15 or 20 miles per hour and that accused was approaching intersection from another direction at about the same speed and that accused neglected to be on a constant lookout to see the other vehicle in time to stop his car before striking it, did not establish reckless driving which would subject accused to conviction under this section [Code 1942, § 8175]. *Sanford v. State*, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628 (1944).

In the absence of proof that accused was driving in a reckless manner or at a rate of speed such as to indicate a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, it is to be assumed that the presence of passengers for hire in his own car would indicate a contrary state of mind. *Sanford v. State*, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628 (1944).

4. —Weaving.

Where police officers observed the defendant motorist's vehicle weaving from side to side from one traffic lane to the other they were justified in arresting him on a charge of reckless driving. *Watts v. State*, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967).

The driving of a vehicle so as to weave back and forth across the line separating two traffic lanes is such reckless driving as to warrant a constable in stopping it, although there was no traffic. *Barnes v. State*, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865 (1964).

5. Miscellaneous.

City police officers, who, while pursuing motorists for reckless driving and breach of peace, shot at and deflated the rear tires of the automobile, were not liable for property damages or personal injuries sustained by the motorists in view of the jury's adoption of the testimony of officers that they did not shoot at the motorist or automobile generally but aimed at the rear tires. *State, ex rel. Holmes v. Pope*, 212 Miss. 446, 54 So. 2d 658 (1951).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Under Miss. Code Section 63-3-1201, speeding in and of itself is not reckless; however, other circumstances may exist which would cause speeding to be considered reckless driving; such circumstances must appear on ticket. *Thomas*, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

For charges to be considered reckless driving there must be a "wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." *Gordon*, Sept. 21, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0574.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Statute prohibiting reckless driving: Definiteness and certainty. 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 372 et seq.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 647, Driver's Negligence in Backing Up.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1354 et seq.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-1203. Operation of vehicle under circumstances which interfere with driver's view or control over driving mechanism; interference with driver's view or control by passenger.

(1) No person shall drive a vehicle when it is so loaded or when there are in the front seat such number of persons, exceeding three, as to obstruct the view of the driver to the front or sides of the vehicle or as to interfere with the driver's control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.

(2) No passenger in a vehicle shall ride in such position as to interfere with the driver's view ahead or to the sides, or to interfere with his control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8220; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 1802.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 647, Driver's Negligence in Backing Up.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 389, Pre-

mises Liability: Obstruction of Visibility at Intersection.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 677, Liability of Motor Vehicle Passenger for Accident.

§ 63-3-1205. Driving through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways.

The driver of a motor vehicle traveling through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways shall hold such motor vehicle under control and as near the right-hand edge of the highway as reasonably possible and, upon approaching any curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of 200 feet along the highway, shall give audible warning with the horn of such motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8221; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1207. Coasting upon down grade.

The driver of any motor vehicle when traveling upon a down grade shall not coast with the gears of such vehicle in neutral.

The driver of a commercial motor vehicle when traveling upon a down grade shall not coast with the clutch disengaged.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8222; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 815. **CJS.** 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 585.

§ 63-3-1209. Crossing unprotected fire hose.

No vehicle shall be driven over any unprotected hose of a fire department when laid down on any street or private driveway, to be used at any fire or alarm of fire, without the consent of the fire department official in command.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8224; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1211. Throwing, etc., of glass or other injurious material on highway; removal of glass or other injurious material by person removing wrecked or damaged vehicle from highway.

No person shall throw or deposit upon any highway any glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, wire, cans, or any other substance likely to injure any person, animal, or vehicle upon such highway.

Any person who drops, or permits to be dropped or thrown, upon any highway any destructive or injurious material shall immediately remove the same or cause it to be removed.

Any person removing a wrecked or damaged vehicle from a highway shall remove any glass or other injurious substance dropped upon the highway from such vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8225; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1213. Careless driving.

Any person who drives any vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner, without due regard for the width, grade, curves, corner, traffic and use of the streets and highways and all other attendant circumstances is guilty of careless driving. Careless driving shall be considered a lesser offense than reckless driving.

Every person convicted of careless driving shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five Dollars (\$5.00) nor more than Fifty Dollars (\$50.00).

SOURCES: Laws, 1993, ch. 317, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993 (became law without Governor's signature on March 16, 1993).

Cross References — Reckless driving, see § 63-3-1201.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.
2. Instructions.
3. Probable cause.

1. Constitutionality.

The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as, although the language of the statute was broad, ordinary people could understand its meaning. *United States v. Escalante*, 239 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2001).

This section is not unconstitutionally vague, notwithstanding the contention that the phrase "careless or imprudent manner" is vague and subjective and provides no objective criteria by which an individual is put on notice of what conduct the statute proscribes. *Leuer v. City of Flowood*, 744 So. 2d 266 (Miss. 1999).

2. Instructions.

The court properly instructed the jury with regard to careless, rather than reck-

less, driving where the defendant was cited for careless driving after he was stopped after an officer observed him driving 20 to 25 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone and weaving between 2 northbound lanes. *Varvaris v. City of Pearl*, 723 So. 2d 1215 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

3. Probable cause.

Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence, first offense, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a), was proper where there was probable cause for the stop because she had repeatedly crossed over the center line and that constituted careless driving pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-1213; thus, there was probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had been committed and defendant was properly stopped for further police action. *Saucier v. City of Poplarville*, 858 So. 2d 933 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Speeding does not in and of itself constitute careless driving; speeding with other attendant circumstances would constitute careless driving. *Mixon*, March 10, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0883.

A violation of the statute for careless driving is not based solely on whether

traffic is present but should be based on all the combined factors listed in the statute. *Gordon*, Sept. 21, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0574.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Statute prohibiting reckless driving: definiteness and certainty. 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 383.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 500-503, 556 et seq.

CHAPTER 5

Size, Weight and Load

SEC.	
63-5-1.	Short title.
63-5-3.	Construction.
63-5-5.	Definitions.
63-5-7.	Operation of vehicle in violation of chapter.
63-5-9.	Applicability of chapter.
63-5-11.	Power and authority of local authorities to alter limitations.
63-5-13.	Outside width of vehicles.
63-5-15.	Side projecting loads on passenger vehicles.
63-5-17.	Height of vehicles.
63-5-19.	Vehicle length limitations; generally.
63-5-21.	Vehicle length limitations; exceptions.
63-5-23.	Front projecting loads on vehicles.
63-5-25.	Connections for trailers and towed vehicles.
63-5-27.	Wheel and axle loads.
63-5-29.	Gross weight of vehicle and loads; Table I.
63-5-31.	Gross weight of vehicle and loads; Table II.
63-5-33.	Gross weight of vehicle and loads; Table III.
63-5-34.	Gross weight of vehicle and loads; exceptions.
63-5-35.	Factors to be considered by Mississippi Transportation Commission before increasing load limits.
63-5-37.	Axles suspended by equalizing system.
63-5-39.	Inspection of certain vehicles upon registration; special permit; operation of vehicle or combination of vehicles in excess of gross weight limits.
63-5-41.	"Gross weight" and "gross load" defined.
63-5-43.	Enforcement of Sections 63-5-29 through 63-5-41.
63-5-45.	Transportation of perishable commodities of foreign import discharged at Mississippi ports.
63-5-47.	Transportation of commodities to or from terminal or port facilities on Mississippi River.
63-5-49.	Inspection and weighing of vehicles; assessment of penalty against owner or operator of overweight vehicle; removal of load in excess of legal limit; failure to stop and submit vehicle to inspection or weighing.
63-5-51.	Special permits for excess size and weight; special permits for commercial movement of recreational vehicles and motor homes that comply with vehicle width requirements.
63-5-52.	Special permits for vehicles transporting heavy equipment with nondivisible loads having gross vehicle weight of 140,000 pounds or less [Repealed effective from and after July 1, 2006].
63-5-53.	Liability for damage to highway or structure caused by vehicle.
63-5-55.	Spilling loads on highways.

§ 63-5-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Size, Weight and Load Regulations.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Rules of the Road, see §§ 63-3-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Equipment and Identification Regulations, see §§ 63-7-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Traffic Violations Procedure, see §§ 63-9-1 et seq.

Authority of county board of supervisors to declare unusual or uncommon load or weight to be conveyed on or over county roads, etc, see § 65-7-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Automobiles: construction and operation of statutes or regulations restricting the weight of motor vehicles or their loads. 45 A.L.R.3d 503.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 208, 232, 237.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

Practice References. Mississippi

Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

§ 63-5-3. Construction.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8282; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-5-5. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter, the meanings ascribed to the words and phrases in Article 3 of Chapter 3 of this title, shall be fully applicable to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-5-7. Operation of vehicle in violation of chapter.

It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive or move or for the owner to cause or knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any highway any vehicle or vehicles of a size or weight exceeding the limitations stated in this chapter or otherwise in violation of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8264; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 236.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1505-1510.

§ 63-5-9. Applicability of chapter.

The provisions of this chapter governing size, weight and load shall not apply to:

- (a) Fire apparatus;
- (b) Road machinery;
- (c) Vehicles operated under the terms of a special permit issued as provided in this chapter;

(d) Any machinery or equipment used for normal farm purposes only, having a width in excess of the maximum requirements prescribed by this chapter, where such movement is performed during daylight hours, within a radius of fifty (50) miles of the point of origin thereof, and no part of such operation or movement is upon any highway designated and known as a part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, or accesses thereto. Such machinery or towing vehicle shall be equipped with reflector lights, front and rear, and a blinking light clearly visible from the front and rear;

(e) Any machinery or equipment intended to be used for normal farm purposes only and being delivered by an equipment dealer to a customer, having a width in excess of the maximum requirements prescribed by this chapter, where such movement is performed during daylight hours, and no part of such operation or movement is upon any highway designated and known as a part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, or accesses thereto. Such machinery or any vehicle towing such equipment shall be equipped with reflector lights, front and rear, and a blinking light clearly visible from the front and rear;

(f) Rubber-tire vehicles used for construction, warehousing, transportation of equipment or material or for other purposes not exempted under this section if such vehicles are not designed primarily for use or operation on a public road, street or highway; provided, that such vehicles shall not be operated on any public road, street or highway of this state except along and adjacent to the site where such vehicles are primarily used. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as requiring the vehicles described in this paragraph to obtain a motor vehicle license tag or a motor vehicle inspection sticker when operated on a public road, street or highway in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph; or

(g) Rubber-tire vehicles designed or adapted to be used exclusively in the preparation and loading of chemicals or other material for aerial agricultural application to crops, where such movement is performed during daylight hours, within a radius of fifty (50) miles of the point of origin thereof, and no part of such operation or movement is upon any highway designated and known as a part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8264; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 351; Laws, 1988, ch. 400; Laws, 2002, ch. 505, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 433, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment inserted present (e) and redesignated former (e) as present (f); and made minor punctuation changes throughout the section. The 2003 amendment added (g).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The exception of implements of husbandry temporarily moved upon a highway does not apply to a farm tractor

driven thirty miles along a highway from one farm of its owner to another. *Farmer v. Humphreys County Mem. Hosp.*, 236 Miss. 35, 109 So. 2d 356 (1959).

§ 63-5-11. Power and authority of local authorities to alter limitations.

The maximum size and weight of vehicles specified in this chapter shall be lawful throughout the state, and local authorities shall have no power or authority to alter the limitations stated in this chapter except as express authority to do so may be granted in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8264; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Power of county board of supervisors to declare what is an unusual or uncommon load or weight to be conveyed on or over roads or bridges, see § 65-7-43.

Power of county board of supervisors, by order, to regulate tire width and maximum load of any vehicle using public roads and bridges, see §§ 65-7-45 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 233, 235.

§ 63-5-13. Outside width of vehicles.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the total outside width of any vehicle, exclusive of required safety devices, or the load thereon shall not exceed eight and one-half (8-½) feet; provided, however, that appurtenances on recreational vehicles shall be allowed so long as they are inside the exterior rearview mirrors of the recreational vehicle or inside the exterior rearview mirrors of the vehicle towing the recreational vehicle, and such mirrors do not extend further than necessary to obtain the appropriate field of view.

(2) The total outside load width of any vehicle hauling unprocessed forest products on public roads, streets or highways, other than interstate highways, shall not exceed nine and one-half (9-½) feet if such products may not be shortened without rendering them useless for the end product for which they were cut; provided, however, the total outside vehicle width of such a vehicle,

exclusive of required safety devices and the load of such vehicle, shall not exceed eight and one-half (8-½) feet.

(3) The total outside width of a farm tractor shall not exceed ten (10) feet, except that farm tractors shall not be operated upon the interstate highways without a special permit from the Mississippi Department of Transportation.

(4) A vehicle designed and especially constructed to transport raw cotton from harvest to the cotton gin may have a total outside width not to exceed nine (9) feet whenever any such vehicle is being operated within a radius of fifty (50) miles of the vehicle's home base or its contractual customer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8265; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 1; ch. 430; Laws, 1983, ch. 428, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 492, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 318, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 55; Laws, 2002, ch. 405, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment added (4).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The limitation of the width of farm tractors moving upon a highway, to ten

feet, includes attachments thereto. *Farmer v. Humphreys County Mem. Hosp.*, 236 Miss. 35, 109 So. 2d 356 (1959).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 234.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 839.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-5-15. Side projecting loads on passenger vehicles.

No passenger-type vehicle shall be operated on any highway with any load carried thereon extending beyond the line of the fenders on the left side of such vehicle or extending more than six inches beyond the line of the fenders on the right side thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8266; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Liability for injury or damage caused by collision with portion of load projecting beyond rear or side of motor vehicle or trailer. 21 A.L.R.3d 371.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 234.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 839.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 43, 44.

§ 63-5-17. Height of vehicles.

No vehicle unladen or with load shall exceed a height of thirteen feet, six inches. However, no person, firm or corporation, or the State of Mississippi or any subdivision thereof, shall be required to raise, alter, construct or reconstruct any underpass, wire, pole, trestle, or other structure to permit the passage of any vehicle having a height, unladen or with load, in excess of twelve feet, six inches. Full liability for damage to any structure caused by any vehicle having a height in excess of twelve feet, six inches, shall be borne entirely by the motor carrier or operator of the vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8267; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 480; Laws, 1956, ch. 380; Laws, 1958, ch. 502; Laws, 1962, ch. 530; Laws, 1971, ch. 354, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1971).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In view of the maximum height permissible for vehicles under this section [Code 1942, § 8267], a railroad is negligent in

maintaining an underpass not affording sufficient clearance for such vehicles. *Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Farris*, 259 F.2d 445, 67 A.L.R.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 234.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 839 et seq

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 63-5-19. Vehicle length limitations; generally.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no single vehicle, unladen or with load, shall have an overall length, inclusive of front and rear bumpers, in excess of forty (40) feet.

(2) No semitrailer operating in a truck tractor-semitrailer combination and no trailer drawn by a motor vehicle shall exceed a length of fifty-three (53) feet.

(3) No semitrailer or trailer operating in a truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer combination and no trailer operating in a double trailer combination drawn by a motor vehicle shall exceed a length of thirty (30) feet.

(4) No semitrailer or trailer combinations in excess of two (2) units, excluding the towing motor vehicle, shall be allowed to operate on the highways of this state.

(5) No motor home shall have an overall length exclusive of front and rear bumpers, in excess of forty-five (45) feet.

(6) The load upon the rear vehicle of a combination of vehicles transporting forest or agricultural products in their natural state shall not project more than twenty-eight (28) feet beyond the rear axle of the vehicle except in the special circumstance hereinafter prescribed. If such products project more than twenty-eight (28) feet beyond the rear axle and, due to the end use for which they are intended (such as tall utility poles or light poles or the like), such products cannot be shortened without rendering them useless for the finished product for which they have been cut, then such special circumstance may be considered good cause for the obtaining of a permit which shall be procured pursuant to Section 63-5-51 before vehicles transporting such products may operate. Except as otherwise provided in Section 63-5-21, any vehicle transporting projecting loads as described in this subsection that extend four (4) feet or more beyond the rear or body of the vehicle shall operate only during daylight hours, and the load on vehicles designed to transport forestry products shall be secured by at least two (2) chains, two (2) wire ropes, or two (2) nylon straps, one (1) positioned behind the front bolster and one (1) in front of the back bolster.

(7) Except as otherwise provided in Section 63-5-21, the rear projecting load of any vehicle operating during the period described under Section 63-7-11 may not extend four (4) feet or more beyond the rear or body of the vehicle.

(8) The length limitations on projecting loads prescribed in this section do not apply to a single vehicle or the rear vehicle of a combination of vehicles designed for on-farm delivery and unloading of any agricultural product, in its natural or manufactured form, which is fitted with an auger or similar unloading device permanently affixed to the vehicle that extends no more than eight (8) feet horizontally beyond the rear or body of the vehicle provided that no portion of such device which extends four (4) feet or more beyond the rear or body of the vehicle is less than seven (7) feet above the roadway surface. However, any such vehicle may not be operated on the public highways, roads or streets of this state during the period described under Section 63-7-11.

(9) A vehicle designed and especially constructed to transport raw cotton from harvest to the cotton gin may have a total overall length not to exceed fifty (50) feet whenever any such vehicle is being operated within a radius of fifty (50) miles of the vehicle's home base or its contractual customer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8267; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 480; Laws, 1956, ch. 380; Laws, 1958, ch. 502; Laws, 1962, ch. 530; Laws, 1971, ch. 354, § 1; ch. 317; Laws, 1980, ch. 316, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 447, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 428, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 629, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 318, § 3; Laws, 2001, ch. 557, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 405, § 2; Laws, 2003, ch. 460, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 23, 2003.)

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment added (9).

The 2003 amendment substituted "fifty-three (53)" for "fifty (50)" in (2).

Cross References — Additional exceptions to maximum vehicle length, see § 63-5-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Federal regulation of tractor-trailer configuration under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (49 USCS

Appendix §§ 2301 et seq). 77 A.L.R. Fed. 350.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 234.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 839.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 63-5-21. Vehicle length limitations; exceptions.

The length limitations provided in Section 63-5-19 shall not apply to vehicles operated at nighttime by a public utility transporting poles, pipes, machinery or other objects of a structural nature which cannot readily be dismembered when required for emergency repair of public service facilities or properties. However, in respect to such night transportation every such vehicle and the load thereon shall be equipped with a sufficient number of clearance lamps on both sides and marker lamps upon the extreme ends of any projecting load to clearly mark the dimensions of such load.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8267; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 480; Laws, 1956, ch. 380; Laws, 1958, ch. 502; Laws, 1962, ch. 530; Laws, 1971, ch. 354, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 447, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 557, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without, or with improper, clearance, load, or similar auxiliary lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 844.

Federal regulation of tractor-trailer configuration under the Surface Transporta-

tion Assistance Act of 1982 (49 USCS Appendix §§ 2301 et seq). 77 A.L.R. Fed. 350.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 234.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 839-841.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 43, 44.

§ 63-5-23. Front projecting loads on vehicles.

The load upon any vehicle operated alone, or the load upon the front vehicle of a combination of vehicles, shall not extend more than three feet beyond the front wheels of such vehicle or the front bumper of such vehicle if it is equipped with such bumper.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8267; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 480; Laws, 1956, ch. 380; Laws, 1958, ch. 502; Laws, 1962, ch. 530; Laws, 1971, ch. 354, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 234.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 839 et seq

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-5-25. Connections for trailers and towed vehicles.

(1) Every trailer which shall be towed on the public highways at a speed in excess of twenty (20) miles per hour shall be coupled to the towing vehicle by means of a safety chain, chains, cables, or equivalent devices in addition to the regular trailer hitch or coupling. This requirement does not apply to a semitrailer having a connecting device composed of a fifth wheel and kingpin assembly meeting the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commission, nor to a pole, pipe, casing, long or piling dolly. No more slack shall be left in any such safety chains, cables or equivalent devices than shall be necessary to permit proper turning. The safety chains, cables or equivalent device shall be so connected to the towed and towing vehicles and to the drawbar to prevent the drawbar from dropping to the ground if the drawbar fails, and shall be of sufficient strength to control the trailer in event of failure of the regular trailer hitch or coupling.

(2) When one (1) vehicle is towing another the drawbar or other connection shall be of sufficient strength to pull all weight towed thereby. Said drawbar or other connection shall not exceed fifteen (15) feet from one (1) vehicle to the other except the connection between any two (2) vehicles transporting poles, pipe, machinery or other objects of structural nature which cannot readily be dismembered.

(3) When one (1) vehicle is towing another and the connection consists of a chain, rope, or cable, there shall be displayed upon such connection a white flag or cloth not less than twelve (12) inches square.

(4) No more than three (3) vehicles in combination shall be towed by saddle-mounts, provided the overall length of the towing and towed vehicles shall not exceed seventy-five (75) feet in length. No more than one (1) motor vehicle shall be towed by tow bar.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8267, 8269; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 480; Laws, 1956, ch. 380; Laws, 1958, ch. 502; Laws, 1962, ch. 530; Laws, 1964, ch. 457; Laws, 1971, ch. 354, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 327, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 478, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1993).

Cross References — Sanitary regulation of mobile homes, house trailers, trailer and tourist camps, see § 41-25-13.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Safety chain requirement.

1. In general.

This statute being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed, and since it does not identify the protected class or group of persons, and has no exclusions, and does not exclude one riding in a trailer, it can be assumed that it is a safety measure enacted for the benefit and protection of pedestrians, bystanders, motorists, and other individuals who reasonably might be expected to be affected by a violation of the statute, and that the plaintiff in a personal injury suit who was injured while riding in the trailer, was one of the class of persons which the statute

was intended to protect. *U-Haul Co. v. White*, 232 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1970).

2. Safety chain requirement.

Given Legislative intent under this section to protect public from damage and injury resulting from runaway trailers which have separated from towing vehicle, provisions of statute requiring safety chain would be construed as applicable to trailer which was coupled with vehicle being towed in excess of 20 miles per hour even though vehicle and trailer were temporarily slowed to less than 20 miles per hour at which time trailer became uncoupled. *Bullock v. Fairburn*, 353 So. 2d 759 (Miss. 1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Automobiles: liability for accident arising from escape of trailer. 43 A.L.R.3d 725.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Federal regulation of tractor-trailer configuration under the Surface Transpor-

tation Assistance Act of 1982 (49 USCS Appendix §§ 2301 et seq). 77 A.L.R. Fed. 350.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 843, 1020-1026.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 681, 682.

§ 63-5-27. Wheel and axle loads.

(1) Subject to the maximum gross single axle or tandem axle weights hereinafter specified, the gross single or tandem axle weights shall not exceed five hundred fifty (550) pounds per inch of tire width. The gross weight on any single or tandem axle thus derived shall be subject to a tolerance not in excess of five hundred (500) pounds provided that the total allowable gross weight of the single or tandem axle shall not exceed the maximum limitations allowed hereinafter.

(2) The gross weight imposed on the highway by the wheels of any one (1) single axle of a vehicle shall not exceed twenty thousand (20,000) pounds exclusive of the tolerance provided in Section 63-5-33. A single axle shall be defined as an assembly of two (2) or more wheels whose centers are in one (1) transverse vertical plane or may be included between two (2) parallel transverse vertical planes forty (40) inches apart extending across the full width of the vehicle.

(3) The gross weight imposed on the highway by any tandem axle shall not exceed thirty-four thousand (34,000) pounds exclusive of the tolerance provided in Section 63-5-33. A tandem axle shall be defined as any two (2) or more consecutive axles whose centers are more than forty (40) inches but not

more than ninety-six (96) inches apart. No one (1) axle of any such group of two (2) or more consecutive axles shall exceed the weight permitted for a single axle.

(4)(a) Vehicles designed and especially constructed to transport concrete products and which are not available for purchase in sizes and capacities to fully comply with the road and bridge weight laws of the State of Mississippi shall not be made to conform to the axle spacing requirements or axle or tire loadings of this section or to the total combined weights as set out in Section 63-5-33 in Table III, provided (i) that such vehicles shall be limited to a gross weight of sixty thousand (60,000) pounds; (ii) that such vehicles shall only be operated within fifty (50) miles of their home base; (iii) that any such vehicles shall be limited to a maximum load of the rated capacity of the vehicle; (iv) that all such vehicles shall have at least three (3) axles; and (v) that all vehicles with only three (3) axles shall have all wheels brake-equipped. Any two (2) or more axles close enough to be considered an axle group shall be suspended by an equalizing system and be spaced a minimum of four (4) feet apart in order to be eligible for the maximum load as provided in this subsection. It shall be a violation if vehicles to which this subsection applies travel upon any federal interstate highway or upon any roads or bridges designated and posted as incapable of carrying such loads by the Transportation Commission, a board of supervisors, or municipal governing authorities as provided in subsection (5) or (6) of this section.

(b) Vehicles designed and especially constructed to transport raw cotton from harvest to the cotton gin shall not be made to conform to the axle spacing or axle or tire loadings of this section. However, such vehicles (i) shall be limited to a gross weight of sixty thousand (60,000) pounds; (ii) may be operated only within a fifty-mile radius of their home base or their contractual customer; (iii) shall be limited to a maximum load of the rated capacity of that vehicle; (iv) shall have all wheels brake equipped; and (v) are prohibited from traveling upon any federal interstate highway or upon any roads or bridges designated and posted as incapable of carrying such loads by the Mississippi Department of Transportation, a board of supervisors or municipal governing authorities as provided in subsection (5) or (6) of this section.

(c) Vehicles designed and especially constructed to collect and transport solid waste and which are not available for purchase in sizes and capacities to fully comply with the road and bridge weight laws of the State of Mississippi, shall not be made to conform to the axle spacing or tire loadings of this section. However, such vehicles (i) shall be limited to a gross weight of sixty thousand (60,000) pounds; (ii) may be operated only within a fifty-mile radius of their home base or their contractual customer; (iii) shall be limited to a maximum load of the rated capacity of that vehicle; (iv) shall have all wheels brake-equipped; and (v) are prohibited from traveling upon any federal interstate highway or upon any roads or bridges designated and posted as incapable of carrying such loads by the Mississippi Department of Transportation, a board of supervisors or the governing authorities of a municipality as provided in subsection (5) or (6) of this section.

(d) The rear axle of trailer mounted knuckle boom log loaders shall be exempt from the tire loading limitation provided for in subsection (3) of this section; provided, however, that the gross weight imposed on the highway by such an axle shall not exceed forty-one thousand (41,000) pounds.

(5) The board of supervisors of any county or the governing authorities of any municipality, by appropriate resolution, may impose limitations more restrictive than those permitted in this section upon the county highways of such county or the streets of such municipality.

(6) The Mississippi Department of Transportation, for cause, may post or limit any road or bridge to weights less than those permitted by this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8270; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 3; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 5; Laws, 1950, ch. 472; Laws, 1981, ch. 366, § 5; Laws, 1982, ch. 479, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 352, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 11, 2001.)

Cross References — Maximum allowable gross weights of vehicles and loads, see §§ 63-5-29, 63-5-31, 63-5-33.

Authority of county board of supervisors to declare unusual or uncommon load or weight to be conveyed on or over county roads, etc, see § 65-7-43.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The statute grants the Transportation Commission the authority to enact police and protective regulations for the control of traffic on the state highways, which may include setting limits that would have the effect of limiting truck traffic on certain highways for public safety reasons; however, the Commission should, in the exercise of this power, establish procedures and criteria for determining the necessity of any such action, and apply those procedures consistently. Hall, Oct. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0499.

A municipality may impose weight limits on streets and issue tickets for viola-

tions; however, such limitations may not be effective solely upon vehicles associated with the oil industry — they must be uniformly applicable to all vehicles exceeding the determined weight limit. Thach, Apr. 23, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0221.

There is no authority for the board of supervisors to ban or limit the type of trucks, i.e. gravel trucks, traveling over county roads without regard to size or weight. Sherard, Aug. 30, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0501.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 208, 232.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 839 et seq

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 63-5-29. Gross weight of vehicle and loads; Table I.

On all highways of the State of Mississippi except those referred to in Sections 63-5-31 and 63-5-33, and subject to the limitations imposed on wheel and axle loads by Section 63-5-27 and to the further limitations hereinafter specified, the total combined weight (vehicles plus load) on any group of axles shall not exceed the value given in the following table (Table I), corresponding to the distance in feet between the extreme axles of the group, measured longitudinally to the nearest foot:

Distance in Feet Between the Extreme of Any Group of Axles	Maximum Load in Pounds Carried on any Group of Axles
4	28,650
5	29,650
6	30,640
7	31,630
8	32,610
9	33,580
10	34,550
11	35,510
12	36,470
13	37,420
14	38,360
15	39,300
16	40,280
17	41,160
18	42,080
19	42,990
20	43,900
21	44,800
22	45,700
23	46,590
24	47,470
25	48,350
26	49,220
27	50,090
28	50,950
29	51,800
30	52,650
31	53,490
32	54,330
33	55,160
34	55,650
35	56,800
36 and greater	57,650 maximum

Moreover, in addition to the per axle weight limitation specified by Section 63-5-27, the maximum load carried on a combination of vehicles shall be

subject to the following additional limitations: The maximum load carried on any group of two (2) axles shall not exceed twenty-four thousand (24,000) pounds in instances where one or more of such axles is a driving axle (that is, an axle turned by the vehicle's engine power).

(2) An axle group shall consist of any two (2) or more consecutive axles of any vehicle or combination of vehicles.

(3) Provided, however, that, subject to the limitations imposed on:

(a) Wheel, axle loads, spacing and weight by Sections 63-5-27 and 63-5-33, and

(b) Weight limitations on highways and bridges by Section 65-1-45, Mississippi Code of 1972, any product produced on or distributed from a location on any highway within or without the State of Mississippi may be transported from such place of production or location of distribution by the nearest route toward its destination on such highway or highways to a point where such highway intersects a highway previously found or hereafter found by the commission to be suitable to carry the maximum load limits pursuant to Sections 63-5-33 and 63-5-35; and provided further, that any goods, materials, and equipment actually used in the supply of an activity of producing, manufacturing or distributing products on any such highway within the State of Mississippi may be transported on such highway to the site of such manufacture, production or distribution. However, any penalty assessed against a vehicle operating under the provisions of this paragraph (3) (b) shall be calculated according to the maximum weight which that particular vehicle is legally permitted to transport and not the maximum gross weight limit established for that highway.

Nothing herein contained shall be construed to permit movements of weights in excess of those provided for in this section (63-5-29) over a route or section thereof for the purpose of a shortcut between two (2) highways found by the commission to be suitable to carry the maximum load limits pursuant to Sections 63-5-33 and 63-5-35 or any other purpose not consistent with the aforementioned provisions.

Nothing in Sections 63-5-29, and 63-5-34, shall be construed to imply any general variation from the maximum weight limitations designated by the Mississippi Department of Transportation other than specified in Sections 63-5-29 and 63-5-34.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex Sess ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex Sess ch. 33; Laws, 1974, ch. 574, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 427, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 56, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References — Fee for emergency permit to haul weight in excess of that authorized by this section, see § 27-19-81.

Exceptions made for the purpose of calculating weight limits under this section, see § 63-5-34.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A County Board of Supervisors has the authority to prohibit full 80,000 loads of logs produced on "such places of production" from being transported by the "nearest route" if such nearest route has a low weight limit imposed on it by the county. Barrett, Dec. 5, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0723.

Concrete trucks must comply with the

maximum gross weight of 57,650 pounds and the gross weight requirements based upon the axle spacing when traveling upon the highways designated by this section and otherwise known as low weight roads. Warren, August 13, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0420.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 208, 232.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 839 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-5-31. Gross weight of vehicle and loads; Table II.

Subject to the limitations imposed on wheel and axle loads by Section 63-5-27, and to the further limitations hereinafter specified, the total combined weight (vehicles plus load) on any group of axles shall not exceed the value given in the following table (Table II) corresponding to the distance in feet between the extreme axles of the group, measured longitudinally to the nearest foot, on those highways or parts of highways found by the Mississippi Transportation Commission to be suitable to carry such increased load limits from an engineering standpoint, and so designated as such by order of said commission entered on its minutes and published once each week for three successive weeks in a daily newspaper of general circulation in this state:

TABLE II

Distance in feet between the extreme of any group of axles	Maximum load in pounds carried on any group of axles
4	32,000
5	32,000
6	32,000
7	32,000
8	32,610
9	33,779
10	34,942
11	36,097
12	37,246
13	38,387
14	39,522
15	40,649
16	41,770
17	42,883

Distance in feet between the extreme of any group of axles	Maximum load in pounds carried on any group of axles
18	43,990
19	45,089
20	46,182
21	47,267
22	48,346
23	49,417
24	50,482
25	51,539
26	52,590
27	53,633
28	54,670
29	55,699
30	56,722
31	57,737
32	58,746
33	59,747
34	60,742
35	61,729
36	62,710
37	63,683
38 and greater	64,650 maximum

Moreover, in addition to the per axle weight limitations specified by Section 63-5-27, the maximum load carried on a combination of vehicles shall be subject to the following additional limitations: The maximum load carried on any group of two (2) axles shall not exceed twenty-seven thousand (27,000) pounds in instances where one or more of such axles is a driving axle (that is, an axle turned by the vehicle's engine power).

An axle group shall consist of any two (2) or more consecutive axles of any vehicle or combination of vehicles.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex Sess ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex Sess ch. 33; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 57, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References — Fee for emergency permit to haul weight in excess of that authorized by this section, see § 27-19-81.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.	8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 839.
Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 208, 232.	CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-5-33. Gross weight of vehicle and loads; Table III.

(1) Subject to the limitations imposed on wheel and axle loads by Section 63-5-27, and to the further limitations hereinafter specified, the total combined weight (vehicles plus load) on any group of axles of a vehicle or a combination of vehicles shall not exceed the value given in the following table (Table III) corresponding to the distance in feet between the extreme axles of the group, measured longitudinally to the nearest foot, on those highways or parts of highways designated by the Mississippi Transportation Commission as being capable of carrying the maximum load limits and, in addition thereto, such other highways or parts of highways found by the commission to be suitable to carry the maximum load limits from an engineering standpoint, and so designated as such by order of the commission entered upon its minutes and published once each week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a daily newspaper published in this state and having a general circulation therein. The maximum total combined weight carried on any group of two (2) or more consecutive axles shall be determined by the formula contained in the Federal Weight Law enacted January 4, 1975, as follows: $W = 500 (LN/N-1+12N+36)$ where W = maximum weight in pounds carried on any group of two (2) or more axles computed to nearest five hundred (500) pounds, L = distance in feet between the extremes of any group of two (2) or more consecutive axles, and N = number of axles in group under consideration.

TABLE III

DISTANCE IN FEET BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF ANY GROUP OF 2 OR MORE CONSECUTIVE AXLES	MAXIMUM LOAD IN POUNDS CARRIED ON ANY GROUP OF 2 OR MORE CONSECUTIVE AXLES					
	2 axles	3 axles	4 axles	5 axles	6 axles	7 axles
4	34,000					
5	34,000					
6	34,000					
7	34,000					
8 and less	34,000	34,000	Axle groups in these spacings			
More than						
8	38,000	42,000				
9	39,000	42,500				
10	40,000	43,500	impractical			
11		44,000				
12		45,000	50,000			
13		45,500	50,500			
14		46,500	51,500			
15		47,000	52,000			
16		48,000	52,500	58,000		
17		48,500	53,500	58,500		

DISTANCE
IN FEET
BETWEEN THE
EXTREMES OF
ANY GROUP
OF 2 OR MORE
CONSECUTIVE
AXLES

MAXIMUM LOAD IN POUNDS CARRIED ON ANY
GROUP OF 2 OR MORE CONSECUTIVE AXLES

	2 axles	3 axles	4 axles	5 axles	6 axles	7 axles
18		49,500	54,000	59,000		
19		50,000	54,500	60,000		
20		51,000	55,500	60,500	66,000	
21		51,500	56,000	61,000	66,500	
22		52,500	56,500	61,500	67,000	
23		53,000	57,500	62,500	68,000	
24		54,000	58,000	63,000	68,500	74,000
25		54,500	58,500	63,500	69,000	74,500
26		55,500	59,500	64,000	69,500	75,000
27		56,000	60,000	65,000	70,000	75,500
28		57,000	60,500	65,500	71,000	76,500
29		57,500	61,500	66,000	71,500	77,000
30		58,500	62,000	66,500	72,000	77,500
31		59,000	62,500	67,500	72,500	78,000
32		60,000	63,500	68,000	73,000	78,500
33			64,000	68,500	74,000	79,000
34			64,500	69,000	74,500	80,000
35			65,500	70,000	75,000	80,000
36			66,000	70,500	75,500	80,000
37			66,500	71,000	76,000	80,000
38			67,500	71,500	77,000	80,000
39			68,000	72,500	77,500	80,000
40			68,500	73,000	78,000	80,000
41			69,500	73,500	78,500	80,000
42			70,000	74,000	79,000	80,000
43			70,500	75,000	80,000	80,000
44			71,500	75,500	80,000	80,000
45			72,000	76,000	80,000	80,000
46			72,500	76,500	80,000	80,000
47			73,500	77,500	80,000	80,000
48			74,000	78,000	80,000	80,000
49			74,500	78,500	80,000	80,000
50			75,500	79,000	80,000	80,000
51			76,000	80,000	80,000	80,000
52			76,500	80,000	80,000	80,000
53			77,500	80,000	80,000	80,000
54			78,000	80,000	80,000	80,000
55			78,500	80,000	80,000	80,000
56			79,500	80,000	80,000	80,000
57			80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000

(2) Moreover, in addition to the per axle weight limitations specified by Section 63-5-27, two (2) consecutive sets of tandem axles may carry a gross load of thirty-four thousand (34,000) pounds each, providing that the overall distance between the first and last axles of such consecutive sets of tandem axles is thirty-six (36) feet or more, except that, until September 1, 1989, the

axle distance for tank trailers, dump trailers and ocean transport container haulers may be thirty (30) feet or more. Such overall gross weight may not exceed eighty thousand (80,000) pounds, except as provided by this section.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 63-5-27 and/or Section 63-5-29 to the contrary, vehicles hauling products in the manner set forth in this subsection, whether or not such vehicles are operating with a harvest permit, shall be allowed a gross weight of not to exceed forty thousand (40,000) pounds on any tandem. Vehicles operating without a harvest permit shall be allowed a tolerance not to exceed five percent (5%) above their authorized gross vehicle weight, tandem or axle weight; except that the maximum gross vehicle weight of any such vehicle shall not exceed eighty thousand (80,000) pounds plus a tolerance thereon of not more than two percent (2%). Vehicles operating with a harvest permit shall be allowed a tolerance not to exceed five percent (5%) above their authorized tandem or axle weight, but the maximum gross vehicle weight of any such vehicle shall not exceed eighty-four thousand (84,000) pounds. However, neither the increased weights in this subsection nor any tolerance shall be allowed on federal interstate highways or on other highways where a tolerance is specifically prohibited by the Transportation Commission, the county board of supervisors or the municipal governing authorities as provided for in Section 63-5-27. The tolerance allowed by this subsection shall only apply to the operation of vehicles from the point of loading to the point of unloading for processing, and to the operation of vehicles hauling sand, gravel, wood chips, wood shavings, sawdust, fill dirt and agricultural products, and products for recycling or materials for the construction or repair of highways. The range of such operation shall not exceed a radius of one hundred (100) miles except where the products are being transported for processing within this state. The tolerance shall not be allowed for vehicles loading at a point of origin having scales available for weighing each individual axle of the vehicle; provided, however, that vehicles loading at a point of origin having scales available for weighing the vehicle shall not be eligible for any tolerance over the gross weight limit of eighty thousand (80,000) pounds.

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 63-5-27 and/or Section 63-5-29 to the contrary, vehicles hauling prepackaged products, unloaded at a state port or to be loaded at a state port, which are containerized in such a manner as to make subdivision thereof impractical shall be allowed a gross weight of not to exceed forty thousand (40,000) pounds on any tandem, and a tolerance not to exceed five percent (5%) above their authorized gross weight, tandem or axle weight; except that the maximum weight of any vehicle shall not exceed eighty thousand (80,000) pounds plus a tolerance thereon of not more than two percent (2%); however, neither the increased weights in this subsection nor any tolerance shall be allowed on federal interstate highways or on other highways where a tolerance is specifically prohibited by the Transportation Commission, the county board of supervisors or the municipal governing authorities as provided for in Section 63-5-27.

(5)(a) Vehicles for which a harvest permit has been issued pursuant to Section 27-19-81(4) shall be allowed a gross vehicle weight not to exceed

eighty-four thousand (84,000) pounds. However, the board of supervisors of any county and the governing authorities of any municipality may designate the roads, streets and highways under their respective jurisdiction on and along which vehicles for which a harvest permit has been issued may travel. This subsection shall not apply to the federal interstate system.

(b) Any owner or operator who has been issued a harvest permit and who wishes to operate a vehicle on the roads, streets or highways under the jurisdiction of a county or municipality at a gross vehicle weight greater than the weight allowed by law or greater than the maximum weight established for such roads, streets or highways by the board of supervisors or municipal governing authorities, shall notify, in writing, the board of supervisors or the governing authorities, as the case may be, before operating such vehicle on the roads, streets or highways of such county or municipality. In his notice, the permit holder shall identify the routes over which he intends to operate vehicles for which the permit has been issued and the dates or time period during which he will be operating such vehicles. The board of supervisors or the governing authorities, as the case may be, shall have two (2) working days to respond in writing to the permit holder to notify the permit holder of the routes on and along which the permit holder may operate vehicles for which a harvest permit has been issued. Failure of the board of supervisors or the governing authorities timely to notify the permit holder and to designate the routes on and along which the permit holder may operate shall be considered as authorizing the permit holder to operate on any of the roads, streets or highways of the county or municipality in accordance with the authority granted to the permit holder by the harvest permit.

(c) Anytime a timber deed is filed with the chancery clerk, the grantee, at that time, may make a written request of the board of supervisors of the county or the governing authorities of the municipality, as the case may be, for the purpose of providing to the grantee, within three (3) working days of the filing of the request, a designated and approved route over the roads, streets or highways under the jurisdiction of the county or city, as the case may be, that the grantee may travel for the purpose of transporting harvested timber. Upon providing such route designation, the county or city, as the case may be, shall also provide to the grantee a map designating the approved route. An approved route designation provided to a grantee under the provisions of this paragraph shall be valid for a period of six (6) months from its date of issue. The permit authorized to be issued under paragraph (b) of this section shall not be required for any person who obtains a permit issued under this paragraph.

(d) This subsection (5) shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2005.

(6) Nothing in this section or subsections (1) through (4) of Section 63-5-27 shall be construed to deny the operation of any vehicle or combination of vehicles that could be lawfully operated upon the interstate highway system of this state on January 4, 1975.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960,

ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex Sess ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex Sess ch. 33; Laws, 1981, ch. 366, § 6; Laws, 1981, ch. 532, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 479, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 364; Laws, 1989, ch. 385, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 478, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 501, § 3; Laws, 1996, ch. 408, § 2; Laws, 1997, ch. 548, § 2; Laws, 1998, ch. 592, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 589, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 386, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment inserted “wood chips, wood shavings, sawdust” preceding “fill dirt” in the fifth sentence of (3); and substituted “July 1, 2005” for “July 1, 2002,” in (5)(d).

Cross References — Fee for emergency permit to haul weight in excess of that authorized by this section, see § 27-19-81.

Exceptions made for the purpose of calculating weight limits under this section, see § 63-5-34.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Amended statutes allowing operators of vehicles hauling sand and gravel to apply for harvest permit to be issued by Transportation Commission, for purpose of authorizing such vehicles to operate on non-federal highways within state at maximum weight of 84,000 pounds, were

unconstitutional in that they removed discretion over maximum vehicle weight limits on county roads from county boards of supervisors and vested this authority in Department of Transportation. *State v. Mississippi Ass’n of Supvrs., Inc.*, 699 So. 2d 1221 (Miss. 1997).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A Supreme Court decision invalidated only those portions of the harvest permit statutes that allow the holder of such a permit to travel county roads without regard to county-set weight limits; the remaining portions of the statute, including

the requirement to collect and distribute fees to the counties, continue in effect and should be carried out by the Department of Transportation. Warren, May 12, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0230.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 208, 232.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-5-34. Gross weight of vehicle and loads; exceptions.

For the purposes of Sections 63-5-29 and 63-5-33, any motor vehicle measuring more than twenty-nine (29) feet between the extreme axles with title to such vehicle registered with the State Tax Commission in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-21-1 et seq. may use public highways, excluding the federal interstate highway system, and be considered as a motor vehicle with a distance between the extreme of any group of axles twelve (12) feet longer than the extreme measurement of any such group.

Any motor vehicle that measures more than twenty-nine (29) feet and less than or equal to forty (40) feet between the extreme axles whose gross weight does not exceed seventy-two thousand (72,000) pounds on four (4) axles or seventy-three thousand two hundred eighty (73,280) pounds on five (5) axles, with title to such vehicle registered with the State Tax Commission on or before April 24, 1974, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-21-1 et seq., may use the federal interstate highway system and be considered as a motor vehicle with a distance between the extreme of any group of axles twelve (12) feet longer than the extreme measurement of any such group.

The provisions of this section may be superseded by action of the Mississippi Transportation Commission, by resolution spread upon its minutes, for any specified segment of a state highway or bridge in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 65-1-45, when, due to any special weather or other hazard, such highways or bridges have been weakened or when such highways have substandard surfacing or weak bridges due to any cause.

This section shall not apply to situations in which its application would create a conflict with any length regulation or weight restriction imposed by federal law on the federal interstate highway system.

SOURCES: Laws, 1974, ch. 574, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 455; Laws, 1978, ch. 486, § 1; reenacted and amended, 1980, ch. 353; Laws, 1983, ch. 463; Laws, 1993, ch. 478, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1993).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The statute does not grant the Transportation Commission the authority to limit weights of vehicles traveling state highways solely for public safety reasons. Hall, Oct. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0499.

§ 63-5-35. Factors to be considered by Mississippi Transportation Commission before increasing load limits.

(1) It is the expressed intent of the Legislature that the Mississippi Transportation Commission shall take into consideration economic factors involving agriculture and industry within the State of Mississippi and shall allow such increased load limits pursuant to Section 63-5-33 for agricultural and industrial well-being where such is shown to be practical or necessary.

(2) The Mississippi Transportation Commission shall designate Mississippi Highway 32 from its intersection with U.S. Highway 49 at Webb, Tallahatchie County, eastward to Charleston as eligible to carry the load limits scheduled in Section 63-5-33, Mississippi Code of 1972.

(3) The Mississippi Transportation Commission shall designate Mississippi Highway 492 beginning at its intersection with Mississippi Highway 21 and extending easterly to its intersection with Mississippi Highway 15 as eligible to carry the load limits scheduled in Section 63-5-33.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex Sess ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws,

1964, 1st Ex Sess ch. 33; Laws, 1977, ch. 367; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 58; Laws, 2003, ch. 467, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 23, 2003.)

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment added (3).

§ 63-5-37. Axles suspended by equalizing system.

Any two or more axles close enough to be considered an axle group shall be suspended by an equalizing system in order to be eligible for the maximum load limits provided in Sections 63-5-29 through 63-5-33.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 33, eff from and after passage (approved July 15, 1964).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

§ 63-5-39. Inspection of certain vehicles upon registration; special permit; operation of vehicle or combination of vehicles in excess of gross weight limits.

(1) The State Tax Commission and county tax collectors, upon registering any vehicle under the laws of this state, when the vehicle is designed and used primarily for the transportation of property or for the transportation of ten (10) or more persons, may require such information and may make such investigations and tests as may be necessary to enable them to determine whether such vehicle may safely be operated upon the highways in compliance with the provisions of this chapter. No vehicle shall be registered for a permissible gross weight in excess of the limitations set forth in this chapter unless a special permit is obtained as provided in Section 63-5-51, nor shall any temporary, trip, or other permit be issued for such vehicle for a gross weight in excess of the limitations set forth in this chapter unless such special permit is obtained. Every vehicle registered shall meet the following requirements:

(a) It shall be equipped with brakes, as required in Sections 63-7-51 and 63-7-53.

(b) Every motor vehicle to be operated outside of business and residence districts shall have motive power adequate to propel, at a reasonable speed, such vehicles and any load thereon or to be drawn thereby.

(2) The State Tax Commission and the county tax collectors shall insert in the registration card issued for every such vehicle the gross weight for which it is registered, and, if it is a motor vehicle to be used for propelling other vehicles, they shall separately insert the total permissible gross weight of such vehicle and other vehicles to be propelled by it. The registration card issued for

every such vehicle shall be carried in such vehicle at all times. They may also issue a special plate with such gross weight or weights stated thereon, which shall be attached to the vehicle and displayed thereon at all times. It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any vehicle or combination of vehicles of a gross weight in excess of that for which registered by the State Tax Commission or the county tax collector, or in excess of the limitations set forth in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex Sess ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex Sess ch. 33; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 59, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

§ 63-5-41. “Gross weight” and “gross load” defined.

“Gross weight” or “gross load,” as used in this chapter and elsewhere in this title, shall mean the actual weight of a vehicle, including all fixtures and equipment, plus any load being transported thereon.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 33, eff from and after passage (approved July 15, 1964).

§ 63-5-43. Enforcement of Sections 63-5-29 through 63-5-41.

The Mississippi Department of Transportation shall designate its agents to enforce Sections 63-5-29 through 63-5-41, Mississippi Code of 1972, and, upon the failure of any person so designated to enforce such sections, any executive order or directive to the contrary notwithstanding, he or they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and be fined not less than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) nor more than Three Hundred Dollars (\$300.00) for each such conviction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 6; Laws, 1954, ch. 335; Laws, 1958, ch. 501; Laws, 1960, ch. 409; Laws, 1963, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 22; Laws, 1964, ch. 458, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1964, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 33; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 20, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Cross References — Personnel charged with enforcement of weight and tax laws pursuant to this section required to complete course of instruction, see § 65-1-44.

§ 63-5-45. Transportation of perishable commodities of foreign import discharged at Mississippi ports.

The transportation by truck of perishable commodities of foreign import discharged at any port in the State of Mississippi shall not exceed sixty-four thousand, six hundred fifty (64,650) pounds load weight on vehicles having wheel base dimensions of not less than forty-five (45) feet, nor more than the maximum allowed by law for any weight. However, such weight and requirements with respect thereto shall never exceed federal limitations for the procurement of federal aid for either maintenance or construction of highways. For vehicles covered by this section, the Mississippi Department of Transportation may prescribe by regulation, from time to time, the number of wheels, axles, size and pressure of tires, and speed, and other related requirements when necessary to such vehicles, which it shall find and determine to be most desirable for the protection and safety of the public highways, considering the size and nature of such vehicles, all in accordance with federal requirements. Transportation permitted under this section shall be limited to the use of U.S. Highway 90 West from the City of Gulfport, Harrison County, Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8271.5; Laws, 1958, ch. 485; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 60, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-5-47. Transportation of commodities to or from terminal or port facilities on Mississippi River.

Motor vehicles engaged in transporting commodities to or from terminal or port facilities on the Mississippi River may be operated with a total weight and/or size in excess of limitations which may be specified by law, although such size or weight limitations shall never exceed federal limitations for the procurement of federal aid for either maintenance or construction, or the limitations then in force in any state immediately adjacent to the county in which such port or terminal facilities are located, provided that:

(a) Said movement is wholly within a county which has therein a bridge across the Mississippi River.

(b) The operation of such vehicle or vehicles with such gross weight shall first be approved by the Mississippi Department of Transportation, and a permit issued by said department specifying the roads, highways or streets within such county over which such vehicle or vehicles may be operated.

(c) Said commodities have been received at such terminal or port facilities by water transportation and are destined for delivery across the bridge or said commodities have been received by movement across the bridge and are to be shipped from such terminal by water.

The operator of each and every motor vehicle operating under the provisions of this section shall, at all times, carry the permit issued by the said Mississippi Department of Transportation, or a certified copy thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8272.5; Laws, 1960, ch. 341; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 61, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References — Special tax on carriers of property for each motor vehicle, truck tractor, or road tractor operated pursuant to this section, see § 27-19-15.

§ 63-5-49. Inspection and weighing of vehicles; assessment of penalty against owner or operator of overweight vehicle; removal of load in excess of legal limit; failure to stop and submit vehicle to inspection or weighing.

(1) Any police officer, law enforcement officer of the Department of Public Safety or authorized enforcement officer of the Mississippi Department of Transportation may require the driver of any vehicle that is required by law or by any rule or regulation of the Mississippi Department of Transportation or the State Tax Commission to stop at inspection stations and submit to an inspection to stop and submit to a weighing of the vehicle, either by means of portable or stationary scales, and may require that such vehicle be driven to the nearest scales for weighing. To aid the enforcement of this chapter, the transportation department may assign up to forty (40) portable scale teams as it deems necessary for efficient enforcement.

(2) Whenever such an officer, upon weighing a vehicle and load as above provided, determines that the weight is unlawful, such officer shall assess a penalty against the owner or operator in accordance with Section 27-19-89, and may require the driver to drive the vehicle to a suitable place and remain standing until such portion of the load is removed as may be necessary to reduce the gross weight of such vehicle to such limit as permitted under this chapter. All material so unloaded shall be cared for by the owner or operator of such vehicle at the risk of such owner or operator.

(3) Any police officer, law enforcement officer of the Department of Public Safety, or authorized enforcement officer of the transportation department who stops a vehicle pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall have the authority to inspect such vehicle to determine whether or not such vehicle is engaged in the illegal transportation of any contraband.

(4) Any driver of a vehicle who fails or refuses to stop and submit the vehicle and load to a weighing, or who fails or refuses, when directed by such an officer upon weighing of the vehicle, to stop the vehicle and otherwise comply with the provisions of this section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00), or by confinement in the county jail for not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and jail sentence and, if operating at a gross weight in excess of the legal limit, such additional penalty or assessment as provided by law.

(5) It is the intent of the Legislature that the Department of Public Safety and all police officers shall cooperate with the transportation department in the enforcement of the highway weight laws of this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8272; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 307, § 5; Laws, 1950, ch. 482; Laws, 1981, ch. 366, § 9; Laws, 1992, ch. 496, § 21; Laws, 1994, ch. 382, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 243.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 63-5-51. Special permits for excess size and weight; special permits for commercial movement of recreational vehicles and motor homes that comply with vehicle width requirements.

(1)(a) The Mississippi Transportation Commission with respect to highways under its jurisdiction and local authorities with respect to highways under their jurisdiction may, in their discretion, upon application in writing and good cause being shown therefor, issue a special permit in writing authorizing the applicant to operate or move a vehicle or combination of vehicles of a size or weight of vehicle or load exceeding the maximum specified in this chapter or otherwise not in conformity with the provisions of this chapter upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the party granting such permit and for the maintenance of which said party is responsible.

(b) The application for any such permit shall specifically describe the general operation and load to be moved, and the particular highways for which the permit to operate is requested, and whether such permit is requested for a single trip, or for continuous operation.

(c) The Mississippi Transportation Commission or local authority is authorized to issue or withhold such permit at its discretion. If such permit is issued, the Mississippi Transportation Commission or local authority is authorized to limit the number of trips, or to establish seasonal or other time limitations within which the vehicles described may be operated on the highways indicated, or otherwise to limit or prescribe conditions of operation of such vehicle or vehicles, when necessary to assure against undue damage to the road foundations, surfaces or structures. The Mississippi Transportation Commission or local authority may require such undertaking or other security as may be deemed necessary to compensate for any injury to any roadway or road structure.

(d) Every such permit shall be carried in the vehicle or combination of vehicles to which it refers and shall be open to inspection by any police officer or authorized agent of any authority granting such permit, and no person shall violate any of the terms or conditions of such special permit. However, permits covering the number of vehicles anticipated in any operation may be issued by the commission.

(2) The Mississippi Transportation Commission or local authorities, in their discretion, upon application in writing and good cause being shown therefor, issue a permit authorizing the commercial movement of one or more recreational vehicles or motor homes which comply with the provisions of Section 63-5-13. Such permits shall be valid for one (1) year from the date they are issued. A copy of the permit shall be carried with all such vehicles while they are being moved. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to the commercial movement of vehicles under a permit issued pursuant to this subsection if such vehicles comply with Section 63-5-13.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8273; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2000, ch. 318, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Cross References — Prohibition against registration of vehicle and issuance of license tag therefor where gross weight of vehicle exceeds legal limits except where excess weight authorization is obtained from state highway commission or local authority, see § 27-19-81.

Permit for excess length of load on vehicle transporting forest or agricultural products in natural state, see § 63-5-19.

Exceptions to maximum vehicle length, see § 63-5-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 237.

Law Reviews. Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

§ 63-5-52. Special permits for vehicles transporting heavy equipment with nondivisible loads having gross vehicle weight of 140,000 pounds or less [Repealed effective from and after July 1, 2006].

(1) In addition to other permits authorized to be issued for overweight loads, the Department of Transportation is authorized to issue annual special permits for vehicles transporting heavy equipment with a nondivisible load having a gross vehicle weight of one hundred forty thousand (140,000) pounds or less. The permit shall be issued for the pulling unit and shall be nontransferable. The fee for such permit shall be Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$4,500.00) and the permit shall expire one (1) year from the beginning movement date. Movements under such permit shall be made under such safety and equipment restrictions as the department may establish. The department shall specify the routes over which such movements may be conducted.

(2) This section shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2006.

SOURCES: Laws, 2003, ch. 538, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Cross References — Prohibition against registration of vehicle and issuance of license tag therefor where gross weight of vehicle exceeds legal limits except where

excess weight authorization is obtained from state highway commission or local authority, see § 27-19-81.

Penalty for failure to obtain permit, see § 27-19-89.

§ 63-5-53. Liability for damage to highway or structure caused by vehicle.

(1) Any person driving any vehicle, object, or contrivance upon any highway or highway structure shall be liable for all damage which said highway or structure may sustain as a result of any illegal operation, driving, or moving of such vehicle, object, or contrivance, or as a result of operation, driving, or moving any vehicle, object or contrivance weighing in excess of the maximum weight in this chapter but authorized by a special permit issued as provided in this chapter.

(2) Whenever such driver is not the owner of such vehicle, object or contrivance, but is so operating, driving, or moving the same with the express or implied permission of said owner, then said owner and driver shall be jointly and severally liable for any such damage.

(3) Such damage may be recovered in a civil action brought by the authorities in control of such highway or highway structure.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8274; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035. **Am Jur.** 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges §§ 685-687.

§ 63-5-55. Spilling loads on highways.

No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent any of its load from dropping, sifting, leaking, or otherwise escaping therefrom, except that sand may be dropped for the purpose of securing traction, or water or other substance may be sprinkled on a roadway in cleaning or maintaining such roadway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8268; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Requirements for open top vehicles when carrying certain loads, see §§ 63-7-83 through 63-7-89.

CHAPTER 7

Equipment and Identification

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GENERAL PROVISIONS

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§ 63-7-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Equipment and Identification Regulations.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Rules of the Road, see §§ 63-3-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Size, Weight and Load Regulations, see §§ 63-5-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Traffic Violations Procedure, see §§ 63-9-1 et seq.

Motor Vehicle Safety Inspection Law, see §§ 63-13-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Driving motor vehicle without lights or with improper lights as affecting liability for collision. 21 A.L.R.2d 7.

Negligence or contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped on highway without flares. 67 A.L.R.2d 12.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by absence or insufficiency of lights on parked or standing motor vehicle. 61 A.L.R.3d 13.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without front lights, or with improper front lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 560.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without or with improper taillights or rear reflectors. 62 A.L.R.3d 771.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without, or with improper, clearance, load, or similar auxiliary lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 844.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by motor vehicle's being driven or parked without dimming lights. 63 A.L.R.3d 824.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 214 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

§ 63-7-3. Construction.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8282; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-7-5. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter, the meanings ascribed to the words and phrases in Article 3 of Chapter 3, of this title shall be fully applicable to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-7-7. Operation of vehicle in violation of chapter.

It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive or move or for the owner to cause or knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any highway any vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter, or which is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter, or for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required under this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8228; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Application of this section to a violation of provisions restricting the tinting or darkening of motor vehicle windows, see § 63-7-59.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Probable Cause to Stop.

That defendant's car was emitting excessive exhaust was a violation of Miss. Code §§ 63-7-55 and 63-7-7, and gave a

police officer probable cause to pull defendant's car over. *Cagler v. State*, 844 So. 2d 487 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Comment Note.—Effect of violation of safety equipment statute as establishing negligence in automobile accident litigation. 38 A.L.R.3d 530.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 214 et seq.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1433, 1434.

§ 63-7-9. Applicability of chapter.

Except as may otherwise be provided in this chapter, the provisions of this chapter with respect to equipment on vehicles shall not apply to implements of husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, or farm tractors.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8228; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 27 Am. Jur. Trials 679, Preparation for Trial of an Action Involving Injury From an Agricultural Harvesting Machine.

§ 63-7-11. Requirements as to use of lights.

Every vehicle upon a highway within this state during the period from sunset to sunrise and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible any person on the highway at a distance of five hundred feet ahead shall be equipped with lighted front and rear lamps as respectively required in Section 63-7-13 for different classes of vehicles and subject to exemption with reference to lights on parked vehicles as hereinafter stated in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-01; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 9; Laws, 1956, ch. 381; Laws, 1968, ch. 543, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1968).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

A motorist is responsible for what he might have seen within the range of his headlights. *Layton v. Cook*, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Recovery against railroad company could not be sustained for death of truck driver occurring at night when he drove his truck into an unlighted railroad car on a railroad crossing, where if decedent had been observing the requirements contained in former enactment of this section (Code of 1930, § 5575), and of the law that a driver of a motor vehicle should decrease its speed to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering a highway when special hazard

exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions in approaching and crossing an intersection, the accident would not have occurred. *Mississippi Export Ry. v. Summers*, 194 Miss. 179, 11 So. 2d 429 (1943), error overruled, 194 Miss. 193, 11 So. 2d 905 (1943).

In automobile collision case, erroneous instruction authorizing verdict for plaintiff if defendant was violating statute regarding headlights at time of accident held not cured by other instructions that evidence must show that statutory violation was proximate cause of injury, since instructions were so radically conflicting as to mislead jury. *Marx v. Berry*, 176 Miss. 1, 168 So. 61 (1936).

In action arising out of collision allegedly resulting from absence of headlights on defendant's truck, instruction that verdict should be for plaintiff if collision occurred more than one-half hour after sunset held reversible error, since violation of

statute would not make out absolute case of liability. *Marx v. Berry*, 176 Miss. 1, 168 So. 61 (1936).

One driving automobile at more than ten miles an hour at night without lights

was prima facie negligent. *McLaurin v. McLaurin Furn. Co.*, 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Driving motor vehicle without lights or with improper lights as affecting liability for collision. 21 A.L.R.2d 7.

Driving motor vehicle without lights or with improper lights as gross negligence or the like warranting recovery by guests under guest statute or similar common-law rule. 21 A.L.R.2d 209.

Negligence or contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped on highway without flares. 67 A.L.R.2d 12.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by absence or insufficiency of lights on parked or standing motor vehicle. 61 A.L.R.3d 13.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without front lights, or with improper front lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 560.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without or with improper taillights or rear reflectors. 62 A.L.R.3d 771.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without, or with improper, clearance, load, or similar auxiliary lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 844.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by motor vehicle's being driven or parked without dimming lights. 63 A.L.R.3d 824.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 225.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 833-836.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Form (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 809, 999, 1000, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 173, Defective or Improperly Operated Headlights.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 225, Defective or Improperly Operated Taillights.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540, 572, 616.

§ 63-7-13. Requirements as to lighting equipment.

(1) **Head lamps on motor vehicles.** — Every motor vehicle other than a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall be equipped with at least two head lamps with at least one on each side of the front of the motor vehicle, which head lamps shall comply with the requirements and limitations set forth in Section 63-7-31.

(2) **Head lamps on motorcycles.** — Every motorcycle shall be equipped with at least one and not more than two head lamps which shall comply with the requirements and limitations set forth in Section 63-7-31.

(3) **Rear lamps.** — Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer and any other vehicle which is being drawn in a train of vehicles shall be equipped with at least one rear lamp mounted on the rear, which, when lighted, shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear.

Either a rear lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it

clearly readable from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. Any rear lamp or tail lamps, together with any separate lamp for illuminating the rear registration plate, shall be so wired as to be lighted whenever the head lamps, cowl lamps or fender lamps are lighted.

(4) **Lamps on bicycles.** — Every bicycle shall be equipped with a lighted white lamp on the front thereof visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of at least five hundred feet in front of such bicycle and shall also be equipped with a reflex mirror reflector or lamp on the rear exhibiting a red light visible under like conditions from a distance of at least five hundred feet to the rear of such bicycle.

(5) **Lights on other vehicles.** — All vehicles not required in this chapter to be equipped with special lighted lamps shall carry one or more lights, lamps or lanterns displaying a white light, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred feet to the front of such vehicle and shall display a reflex reflector or red light visible under like conditions from a distance of not less than three hundred feet to the rear of such vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-01; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 9; Laws, 1956, ch. 381; Laws, 1968, ch. 543, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1968).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

The question of whether a collision between an automobile and a bicyclist occurred because the bicycle was not provided with lamps as provided in subsection (4) of this section [Code 1942, § 8229-01] is one for the jury. *Swan v. Campbell*, 252 Miss. 254, 172 So. 2d 566 (1965).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Proof of the fact that an automobile was traveling with only one light in violation of former similar requirement (Code 1930, § 5575), established a prima facie case of negligence, which, however, might have been rebutted by evidence showing that the violation of the statute did not proximately cause or contribute to the injury and damage complained of in an action seeking recovery for the negligent fatal injury to a mule. *Walker v. Dickerson*, 183 Miss. 642, 184 So. 438 (1938).

If negligence of motorist in failing to have his automobile equipped with rear red light contributes to rear end collision, he is liable for his proportion of damages sustained by motorist who ran into his automobile. *Solomon v. Continental Baking Co.*, 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732 (1935).

If truck which automobile ran into at night was not equipped with rear red light, such negligence was proximate cause of collision unless automobile driver was guilty of such negligence as superseded negligence of truck driver and became sole proximate cause of collision. *Solomon v. Continental Baking Co.*, 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732 (1935).

In action for damages sustained when plaintiff's automobile ran into rear of defendant's truck at night, whether truck was being driven without rear red light held by jury. *Solomon v. Continental Baking Co.*, 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732 (1935).

Whether truck in which plaintiff was riding when injured in collision had only one light, and this constituted negligence, held for jury. *Harper v. Wilson*, 163 Miss. 199, 140 So. 693 (1932).

Whether absence of one headlight on truck on which plaintiff was riding was contributing cause to injuries sustained in

collision held for jury. *Harper v. Wilson*, 163 Miss. 199, 140 So. 693 (1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Driving motor vehicle without lights or with improper lights as affecting liability for collision. 21 A.L.R.2d 7.

Driving motor vehicle without lights or with improper lights as gross negligence or the like warranting recovery by guests under guest statute or similar common-law rule. 21 A.L.R.2d 209.

Negligence or contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped on highway without flares. 67 A.L.R.2d 12.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by absence or insufficiency of lights on parked or standing motor vehicle. 61 A.L.R.3d 13.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without front lights, or with improper front lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 560.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without or with improper taillights or rear reflectors. 62 A.L.R.3d 771.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without, or with improper, clearance, load, or similar auxiliary lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 844.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by motor vehicle's being driven or parked without dimming lights. 63 A.L.R.3d 824.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 224-226.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 833-836.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 999-1001, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 447, Defective Bicycle Design.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 173, Defective or Improperly Operated Headlights.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 225, Defective or Improperly Operated Taillights.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident — Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540, 572, 616.

§ 63-7-15. Additional lighting requirements for certain vehicles.

(1) **Every bus or truck.** — —On every bus or truck, whatever its size, there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors:—On the front, two head lamps, one at each side. On the rear, one red tail lamp; one red or amber stop light; two red reflectors, one at each side.

(2) **Every bus or truck eighty inches or more in width.** — —On every bus or truck eighty inches or more in overall width there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors: On the front, two head lamps, one at each side; two amber clearance lamps, one at each side. On the rear, one red tail lamp; one red or amber stop light; two red clearance lamps, one at each side; two red reflectors, one at each side. On each side, one amber side-marked lamp, located at or near the front; one red side-marker lamp, located at or near

the rear; one amber reflector, located at or near the front; one red reflector, located at or near the rear.

(3) **Every truck tractor.** — —On every truck tractor there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors. On the front, two head lamps, one at each side; two amber clearance lamps, one at each side. On the rear, one red tail lamp; one red or amber stop light.

(4) **Every semi-trailer or trailer in excess of three thousand (3,000) pounds gross weight.** — —On every semi-trailer or full trailer having a gross weight in excess of three thousand (3,000) pounds, there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors: On the front, two amber clearance lamps, one at each side. On the rear, one red tail lamp; one red or amber stop light; two red clearance lamps, one at each side; two red reflectors, one at each side. On each side, one amber side-marker lamp, located at or near the front; one red side-marker lamp, located at or near the rear; one amber reflector, located at or near the front; one red reflector, located at or near the rear.

(5) **Every semi-trailer or trailer weighing three thousand (3,000) pounds gross or less.** — —On every semi-trailer or full trailer having a gross weight of three thousand (3,000) pounds or less, there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors: On the front, no requirement. On the rear, one red tail lamp; two red reflectors, one at each side; one red or amber stop light if the semi-trailer or full trailer obscures the stop light on the towing vehicle.

(6) **Every pole-trailer.** — —On every pole-trailer there shall be at least the following lighting devices and reflectors: On the front, no requirement. On the rear, one red tail lamp; two red reflectors, one at each side, placed to indicate extreme width of the pole-trailer or its load, whichever is wider. (A red lantern or flag on the end of a projecting load shall be required as provided in Section 63-7-47.) On each side, on the rearmost support for the load, one combination marker lamp showing amber to the front and red to the side and rear, mounted to indicate maximum width of the pole-trailer or load; one red reflector, located at or near the rear.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-02; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 10.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Parked vehicle.
3. Towed vehicle.

1. In general.

Failure of the owner and driver to equip a truck with clearance lights and side marker lights and reflectors as required by law is negligence, which, if found to be the contributing cause of a collision, with resulting injuries, will impose liability upon the owner and the driver. *Arnold v. Reece*, 229 Miss. 862, 92 So. 2d 237 (1957).

2. Parked vehicle.

Parking of a tractor and trailers at least two feet on the paved portion of the road, although there was room to park them entirely off, on a dark, foggy night, without rear lights, reflectors, or flares, is a violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8229-02]. *Jester v. Bailey*, 239 Miss. 384, 123 So. 2d 442 (1960).

3. Towed vehicle.

Absence of reflectors or other lighting devices on a trailer eight feet wide while being towed after dark by a truck 6 feet 4

inches wide, on a well-traveled country road from 21 to 23 feet in width, held negligence as to driver of vehicle proceed-

ing in opposite direction. *Dent v. Lockett*, 242 Miss. 559, 135 So. 2d 840 (1961).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 224-226.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 833-836, 840.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 38-40.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540, 572, 616.

§ 63-7-17. Use of spot lamps, auxiliary driving lamps, and signal lamps.

(1) **Spot lamps.** — Any motor vehicle or motorcycle may be equipped with not to exceed one (1) spot lamp. Every lighted spot lamp shall be so aimed and used upon approaching another vehicle that no part of the beam will be directed into the eyes of the approaching driver. Spot lamps may not emit other than either a white or amber light.

(2) **Auxiliary driving lamps.** — Any motor vehicle may be equipped with not to exceed two (2) auxiliary driving lamps mounted on the front at a height not less than twelve (12) nor more than forty-two (42) inches above the level surface of which the vehicle stands. Every such auxiliary driving lamp or lamps shall meet the requirements and limitations set forth in subsection (3) of this section.

(3) **Signal lamps.** — Whenever a motor vehicle is equipped with a signal lamp to comply with the provisions of Section 63-3-709, the signal lamp shall be so constructed and located on the vehicle as to give a signal which shall be plainly visible in normal sunlight from a distance of one hundred (100) feet to the rear of the vehicle but shall not project a glaring or dazzling light.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-10; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 18; Laws, 1978, ch. 470, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Absence of signaling device on automobile, if established, held not, under evi-

dence, to have contributed to injuries of pedestrian who stepped suddenly in front of automobile. *Murphy v. Willingham*, 160 Miss. 94, 133 So. 213 (1931).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driv-

er's being blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

§ 63-7-19. Lights on police and emergency vehicles; lights on rural mail carrier vehicles.

(1) Except as otherwise provided for unmarked vehicles under Section 19-25-15 and Section 25-1-87, every police vehicle shall be marked with blue lights. Every ambulance and special use EMS vehicle as defined in Section 41-59-3 shall be marked with red lights front and back and also may be marked with white and amber lights in addition to red lights. Every emergency management/civil defense vehicle, including emergency response vehicles of the Department of Environmental Quality, shall be marked with blinking, rotating or oscillating red lights. Official vehicles of a 911 Emergency Communications District may be marked with red and white lights. Every wrecker or other vehicle used for emergency work, except vehicles authorized to use blue or red lights, shall be marked with blinking, oscillating or rotating amber colored lights to warn other vehicles to yield the right-of-way, as provided in Section 63-3-809. Only police vehicles used for emergency work may be marked with blinking, oscillating or rotating blue lights to warn other vehicles to yield the right-of-way. Only law enforcement vehicles, fire vehicles, private or department-owned vehicles used by firemen of volunteer fire departments which receive funds pursuant to Section 83-1-39 when responding to calls, emergency management/civil defense vehicles, emergency response vehicles of the Department of Environmental Quality, ambulances used for emergency work, and 911 Emergency Communications District vehicles may be marked with blinking, oscillating or rotating red lights to warn other vehicles to yield the right-of-way. This section shall not apply to school buses carrying lighting devices in accordance with Section 63-7-23.

(2) Any vehicle referred to in subsection (1) of this section also shall be authorized to use alternating flashing headlights when responding to any emergency.

(3) Any vehicle operated by a United States rural mail carrier for the purpose of delivering United States mail may be marked with two (2) amber colored lights on front top of the vehicle and two (2) red colored lights on rear top of the vehicle so as to warn approaching travelers to decrease their speed because of danger of colliding with the mail carrier as he stops and starts along the edge of the road, street or highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-08; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 16; Laws, 1950, ch. 407, § 5; Laws, 1962, ch. 527; Laws, 1964, ch. 455, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 484, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 398, § 1; Laws, 1987, ch. 333, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 517, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 581, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 425, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment rewrote (1).

Cross References — Standards for design, construction, equipment and maintenance of ambulances, see § 41-59-25.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Pursuant to this section, the private vehicle of a volunteer fireman may be equipped with a blinking, oscillating or rotating red light to be used only when that fireman is responding to an emergency call. Huskey, July 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0450.

A private vehicle of a volunteer fireman may be equipped with a blinking, oscillating, or rotating red light to be used only when that fireman is responding to an emergency call. Baker, November 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0702.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am Jur. 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 591.1 (complaint arising out of intersection collision with police vehicle with flashing lights and siren activated).

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

§ 63-7-20. Use of blue and red lights and alternating flashing headlights.

(1) It is unlawful for any person, other than a law enforcement officer on duty, to use or display blue lights on a motor vehicle as provided for in Section 63-7-19.

(2) It is unlawful for any person to use or display red lights on a motor vehicle except as provided for in Section 63-7-19. It is not unlawful for the red lights authorized for private or department-owned vehicles used by firemen of volunteer fire departments, as provided in Section 63-7-19, to remain mounted on such vehicles when the lights are not in use.

(3) It is unlawful for any vehicle to use alternating flashing headlights except an emergency vehicle as provided in Section 63-7-19.

(4) A person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Fifty Dollars (\$50.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-08.5; Laws, 1972, ch. 352, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 398, § 2; Laws, 1987, ch. 333, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 517, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 581, § 2; Laws, 1997, ch. 565, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 23, 1997).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A private vehicle of a volunteer fireman may be equipped with a blinking, oscillating, or rotating red light to be used only when that fireman is responding to an

emergency call. Baker, November 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0702.

Modulating headlights, which operate at a lower intensity when an object is in

front of them and at a higher intensity when there is no object in front of them, do not violate the statute. Busby, Aug. 31, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0546.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 224.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

§ 63-7-21. Mounting of electric lamps, clearance lamps, and side-marker lamps.

Where electric lamps are used to meet the requirements of Section 63-7-11, they shall be securely and permanently affixed to the permanent structure of the motor vehicle, except for the combination marker lamps on pole-trailers prescribed in subsection (6) of Section 63-7-15.

Required clearance lamps shall be mounted in such a manner as to indicate the extreme width of the motor vehicle and as near the top thereof as practicable.

Side-marker lamps may be in combination with clearance lamps and may use the same light source.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-03; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 11.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 226.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 840 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540, 572, 616.

§ 63-7-23. Color of lighting devices.

(1) The color of lighting devices shall be as follows:

(a) All front clearance lamps, and all side marker lamps, except the one on each side at or near the rear of any bus, truck, truck tractor, semitrailer, full trailer or pole trailer, shall when lighted display an amber color.

(b) No red lighting device of any character shall be mounted at any place other than on or near the rear of any bus, truck, truck tractor, semitrailer, full trailer or pole trailer. However, school buses owned by or under contract with a school district of this state may have affixed at or near the front end thereof red lighting devices that may be caused to blink when the school bus is stopped or in the process of stopping for the purpose of loading or unloading school children. A school bus also may be equipped with a white, flashing strobe light on the roof of the vehicle installed according to standards promulgated by the Mississippi Department of Education as authorized under Section 37-41-1(c).

(c) All rear clearance lamps, the side marker lamps on each side at or near the rear, and any other lamps mounted on the rear, on any bus, truck, truck tractor, semitrailer, full trailer or pole trailer shall when lighted display a red color. However, the stoplight or other warning device on the rear of any motor vehicle may be red or amber.

(d) Backing lights of any color may be mounted on the rear of any motor vehicle if the switch controlling such lights be so arranged that they may be turned on only when the vehicle is in reverse gear. Such backing lights when unlighted shall be so colored or otherwise arranged as not to reflect objectionable glare in the eyes of drivers of vehicles approaching from the rear.

(2) Auxiliary white lights mounted on or near the rear of a motor vehicle, or visible from the rear of the vehicle, shall not be prohibited under the provisions of this section if (a) the vehicle's gross weight is less than twelve thousand one (12,001) pounds, and (b) the lights are designed by the motor vehicle manufacturer or an after-market parts manufacturer so that they may only be illuminated whenever the vehicle is not in motion and the transmission of the vehicle is not capable of transmitting power to the wheels.

(3) No provision of this section shall be so construed as to prohibit the use of any white light or lights for the purpose of illuminating license plates.

(4) Any lamps illuminated when the vehicle is in motion, other than those expressly required or permitted by the provisions of this chapter, shall, if visible from the front, display a white or amber light; if visible from either side, display an amber light; and if visible from the rear, display a red light.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8229-04, 8229-08; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, §§ 12, 16; Laws, 1950, ch. 407, § 5; Laws, 1962, chs. 526, 527; Laws, 1964, ch. 455, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 484, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 343, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 556, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The use of lights of colors other than white or amber shining from underneath motor vehicles is a violation of this section. Smith, August 20, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0432.

§ 63-7-25. Visibility of clearance, side-marker, and tail lamps.

Clearance, side-marker, and tail lamps shall, when lighted, be capable of being seen at a distance of five hundred feet under normal atmospheric conditions during the time when lights are required. The light from front clearance lamps shall be visible to the front, from side-marker lamps to the side, and from rear clearance and tail lamps to the rear, of the motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-05; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 13.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A driver's employer was negligent per se for violation of § 63-7-27 in furnishing the driver with a truck on which the brake lights were not working. However, the employer was not negligent per se as to the truck's tail lights for violation of § 63-

7-25 where the red plastic covering both tail lights was broken but both bulbs were burning; the issue of the employer's negligence as to the tail lights was a matter for the jury. *M & M Pipe & Pressure Vessel Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts*, 531 So. 2d 615 (Miss. 1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 189, 785-788, 792.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1001, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 225, Defective or Improperly Operated Taillights.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540, 616.

§ 63-7-27. Performance and visibility of stop lights; incorporation with tail lamps.

Stop lights shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake and shall be capable of being seen and distinguished from a distance of one hundred feet to the rear of the vehicle in normal daylight. Stop lights shall not project a glaring or dazzling light.

A stop light may be incorporated with a tail lamp.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-06; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 14.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A driver's employer was negligent per se for violation of § 63-7-27 in furnishing the driver with a truck on which the brake lights were not working. However, the employer was not negligent per se as to the truck's tail lights for violation of § 63-7-25 where the red plastic covering both tail lights was broken but both bulbs were burning; the issue of the employer's neg-

ligence as to the tail lights was a matter for the jury. *M & M Pipe & Pressure Vessel Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts*, 531 So. 2d 615 (Miss. 1988).

That a motorist actuated a stop signal on the automobile by applying the brake does not necessarily exonerate the motorist from a charge of negligence toward a following car. *Box v. Swindle*, 306 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 225.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 836 et seq.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 225, Defective or Improperly Operated Taillights.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540.

§ 63-7-29. Mounting, visibility and color of reflectors; incorporation with tail lamps.

(1) **Mounting of reflectors.** — No reflector required by the provisions of this chapter shall be mounted upon the motor vehicle at a height to exceed sixty inches, nor less than twenty-four inches, above the ground on which the motor vehicle stands.

(2) **Visibility of reflectors.** — Every reflector shall be of such size and characteristics as to be readily visible at night from all distances within five hundred feet to fifty feet from the motor vehicle when directly in front of a normal headlight beam.

(3) **Rear reflectors incorporated with tail lamps.** — One or both of the required rear red reflectors may be incorporated within the tail lamp or tail lamps; any such tail lamps shall be located within the height limits specified for reflectors. Whether or not the rear reflectors are incorporated in tail lamps, they shall be located on the rear of the motor vehicle at opposite sides and shall also meet the requirements as to visibility set forth in this section.

(4) **Color of reflectors.** — All reflectors mounted on any bus, truck, truck tractor, semi-trailer, full trailer, or pole-trailer, shall reflect an amber color, except those placed on the rear and on the sides nearest to the rear thereof, which shall reflect a red color.

Any reflectors on a vehicle, other than those expressly required or permitted by the provisions of this chapter, shall, if visible from the front, reflect a white or amber light, if visible from either side, reflect an amber light, and if visible from the rear, reflect a red light.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8229-07, 8229-08; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, §§ 15, 16; Laws, 1950, ch. 407, § 5; Laws, 1962, ch. 527; Laws, 1964, ch. 455, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 484, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1970.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Absence of reflectors or other lighting devices on a trailer eight feet wide while being towed after dark by a truck 6 feet 4 inches wide, on a well-traveled country

road from 21 to 23 feet in width, held negligence as to driver of vehicle proceeding in opposite direction. *Dent v. Luckett*, 242 Miss. 559, 135 So. 2d 840 (1961).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 224-226.
CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540.

§ 63-7-31. Multiple-beam road-lighting equipment; distributions of light; beam indicator.

Except as hereinafter provided in this chapter, the head lamps or the auxiliary driving lamp or the auxiliary passing lamp or combinations thereof

on motor vehicles other than a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall be so arranged that the driver may control the selection between distributions of light projected to different elevations, subject to the following requirements and limitations:

(a) There shall be an uppermost distribution of light, or composite beam, so aimed and of such intensity as to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least 350 feet ahead for all conditions of loading.

(b) There shall be lowermost distribution of light, or composite beam so aimed and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least 100 feet ahead; and on a straight level road under any condition of loading none of the high-intensity portion of the beam shall be directed to strike the eyes of an approaching driver.

Every new motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, registered in this state after January 1, 1954, which has multiple-beam road-lighting equipment shall be equipped with a beam indicator, which shall be lighted whenever the uppermost distribution of light from the head lamps is in use, and shall not otherwise be lighted. Said indicator shall be so designed and located that when lighted it will be readily visible without glare to the driver of the vehicle so equipped.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-11; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 19; Laws, 1954, ch. 326, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Inability to stop within the range of the headlights is not negligence per se, but the character, appearance and visibility of unlighted vehicles parked on the highway should be considered. *Hankins v. Harvey*, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).

2. Instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an accident in which a pedestrian was struck by an automobile, an instruction to the jury which covered the pedestrian's

duty to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles operating on the road, but which failed to cover the driver's duty to the pedestrian, was incomplete, in view of § 63-7-31, and defendant's testimony that he did not see the plaintiff until he was 30 feet away from her. *Ross v. Miller*, 441 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1983).

Failure of an instruction to state the requirements of this section [Code 1942, § 8229-11] in the language of the statute was held not reversible error. *Hankins v. Harvey*, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by motor vehicle's being driven or parked without dimming lights. 63 A.L.R.3d 824.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being

blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 224-226.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 834 et seq.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 173, Defective or Improperly Operated Headlights.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 537-540, 572, 616.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-7-33. Multiple-beam road-lighting equipment; control by operator.

Whenever a motor vehicle is being operated on a highway or shoulder adjacent thereto during the times specified by law, the driver shall use a distribution of light, or composite beam, directed high enough and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a safe distance in advance of the vehicle, subject to the requirement that whenever the driver of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle within five hundred feet, such driver shall use a distribution of light or composite beam so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-12; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 20; Laws, 1954, ch. 326, § 2.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

Although one federal district judge has in dicta interpreted § 63-7-33 to effect that change to lower beam should be made only when there is oncoming vehicle within 500 feet, statute is also subject to interpretation that driver must switch to lower beam "no later than" within 500 feet of oncoming vehicle but may use low beams sooner if they still reveal persons and objects at safe distance in advance of

vehicle. *Lidy v. Film Transit, Inc.*, 796 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1986).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Failure to depress or dim headlights on a bus stopped on the travelled portion of a highway to permit a passenger to alight did not make out a case of negligence so as to prevent a directed verdict against the passenger where she was struck by a car coming toward the bus while she was undertaking to cross the highway from behind the bus. *Miller v. Dixie Greyhound Lines*, 164 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1947).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by motor vehicle's being driven or parked without dimming lights. 63 A.L.R.3d 824.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 902.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 299.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 810, 811, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 239, Lights.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 173, Defective or Improperly Operated Headlights.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 616.

§ 63-7-35. Single-beam road-lighting equipment.

Head lamps arranged to provide a single distribution of light not supplemented by auxiliary driving lamps shall be permitted on motor vehicles manufactured and sold prior to April 10, 1948 in lieu of multiple-beam road-lighting equipment specified in Section 63-7-31 if the single distribution of light complies with the following requirements and limitations:

(a) The head lamps shall be so aimed that when the vehicle is not loaded none of the high-intensity portion of the light shall at a distance of twenty-five feet ahead project higher than a level of five inches below the level of the center of the lamp from which it comes, and in no case higher than forty-two inches above the level on which the vehicle stands at a distance of seventy-five feet ahead.

(b) The intensity shall be sufficient to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least two hundred feet.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-13; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Am Jur. 22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 173, Defective or Improperly Operated Headlights.

§ 63-7-37. Applicability of Sections 63-7-31 through 63-7-35.

The provisions of Sections 63-7-31 through 63-7-35, relative to lighting equipment, shall take effect and be operative with respect to equipment installed in motor vehicles after April 10, 1948 and with respect to the equipment on other motor vehicles, the provisions of Laws, 1938, ch. 200, shall govern unless new equipment is installed therein, in which event such new equipment shall be governed by the provisions of said sections.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-14; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 22.

§ 63-7-39. Display of lights on parked vehicles.

Whenever a vehicle is parked or stopped upon a highway whether attended or unattended during the times mentioned in Section 63-7-11, there shall be displayed upon the left side of such vehicle one or more lamps projecting a white or amber light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred feet to the front of such vehicle and one or more lamps projecting a red light visible under like conditions from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear. However, local authorities may provide by ordinance that no lights used be displayed upon any such vehicle when parked in accordance with local ordinances upon a highway where there is sufficient light to reveal any person within a distance of five hundred feet upon such highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-15; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 23; Laws, 1960, ch. 407.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

The stopping of a truck on a bridge at night without any lights constituted a violation. *Simmons v. Keyes*, 247 Miss. 315, 152 So. 2d 909 (1963).

Parking of a tractor and trailers at least two feet on the paved portion of the road, although there was room to park them entirely off, on a dark, foggy night, without rear lights, reflectors, or flares, is a violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8229-15]. *Jester v. Bailey*, 239 Miss. 384, 123 So. 2d 442 (1960).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Failure to depress or dim headlights on a bus stopped on the travelled portion of a

highway to permit a passenger to alight did not make out a case of negligence so as to prevent a directed verdict against the passenger where she was struck by a car coming toward the bus while she was undertaking to cross the highway from behind the bus. *Miller v. Dixie Greyhound Lines*, 164 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1947).

Statute requires lights where automobile is stopped on highway for temporary purposes. *Frazier v. Hull*, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775 (1930).

Where plaintiff was placing tools in automobile after changing tire on highway, and was struck by defendant's automobile, statute required plaintiff to have rear light. *Frazier v. Hull*, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775 (1930).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence or contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped on highway without flares. 67 A.L.R.2d 12.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by absence or insufficiency of lights on parked or standing motor vehicle. 61 A.L.R.3d 13.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by motor vehicle's being driven or parked without dimming lights. 63 A.L.R.3d 824.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action as affected by driver's being

blinded by lights of motor vehicle. 64 A.L.R.3d 551.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 227.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 994-997, 1003, 1010.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 346-356.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 972-976, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 669, 670.

§ 63-7-41. Sale, use, etc., of lamps modifying original design or performance of vehicle.

No person shall have for sale, sell or offer for sale for use upon or as a part of the equipment of a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer or use upon any such vehicle any head lamp, auxiliary driving lamp, rear lamp, signal lamp or reflector which reflector is required hereunder, or parts of any of the foregoing, which tend to change the original design or performance, unless of a type which has been submitted to the department of public safety and approved by it.

No person shall have for sale, sell or offer for sale for use upon or as part of the equipment of a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer any lamp or device mentioned in this section which has been approved by the department unless such lamp or device bears thereon the trademark or name under which it is approved so as to be legible when installed.

No person shall use upon any motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer any lamps mentioned in this section unless said lamps are mounted, adjusted and aimed in accordance with instructions of the department.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8246; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1954, ch. 326, § 3.

§ 63-7-43. Authority of department as to lighting devices.

(1) The department is hereby authorized to approve or disapprove lighting devices and to issue and enforce regulations establishing standards and specifications for the approval of such lighting devices, their installation, aiming, and readjustment. Such regulations shall correlate with and, so far as practicable, conform to the then current standards and specifications of the Society of Automotive Engineers applicable to such equipment.

(2) The department is hereby required to approve or disapprove any lighting device, of a type on which approval is specifically required in this chapter within a reasonable time after such device has been submitted.

(3) The department is further authorized to set up the procedure which shall be followed when any lighting device is submitted for approval.

(4) The department upon approving any lighting device shall issue to the applicant a certificate of approval together with any instructions determined by it.

(5) The department shall publish lists of all lighting devices by name and type which have been approved by it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8247; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1954, ch. 326, § 4.

§ 63-7-45. Revocation or suspension of approval of lighting device.

When the department has reason to believe that an approved lighting device as being sold commercially does not comply with the requirements of this chapter, it may, after giving thirty days' previous notice to the person holding the certificate of approval for such device in this state, conduct a hearing upon the question of compliance of said approved device. After said hearing the department shall determine whether said approved device meets the requirements of this chapter. If said device does not meet such requirements, it shall give notice to the person holding the certificate of approval for such device in this state.

If after the expiration of ninety days after such notice the person holding the certificate of approval for such device has failed to satisfy the department that said approved device as thereafter to be sold meets the requirements of this chapter, the department shall suspend or revoke the approval issued

therefor until or unless such device is resubmitted to and retested by an authorized testing agency and is found to meet the requirements of this chapter. The department may require that all said devices sold since the notification following the hearing be replaced with devices that do comply with the requirements of this chapter. The department may at the time of the retest purchase in the open market and submit to the testing agency one or more sets of such approved devices, and if such device upon such retest fails to meet the requirements of this chapter, the department may refuse to renew the certificate of approval of such device.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8248; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-7-47. Display of lamp or flag on projecting load.

Whenever the load upon any vehicle extends to the rear four (4) feet or more beyond the rear or body of such vehicle, there shall be displayed at the extreme rear end of the load a red flag or cloth not less than sixteen (16) inches square.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-16; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 24; Laws, 2001, ch. 557, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 841.

§ 63-7-49. Electrical connections between towing and towed vehicles.

Means for establishing electric connection between towing and towed vehicles, and other detachable electric connections, shall be mechanically and electrically adequate, and free of short or open circuits. Suitable provision shall be made in every detachable connection to afford reasonable assurance against accidental disconnection. Precaution shall be taken to provide sufficient slack in the connecting wire or cable without twisting or kinking thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8229-09; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 17.

§ 63-7-51. General vehicle brake equipment requirements.

(1) Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle, when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including two separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least two wheels. If these two separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels.

(2) Every motorcycle, and bicycle with motor attached, when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with at least one brake, which may be operated by hand or foot.

(3) Every trailer carrying over one ton, when operated upon a highway, shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement thereof and to stop and to hold such vehicle, and so designed to be applied by the driver of the towing motor vehicle from its cab; said brakes shall be so designed and connected that in case of an accidental breakaway of the towed vehicle, the brakes shall be automatically applied.

(4) Every new motor vehicle, except a motorcycle, hereafter sold in this state and operated upon the highways, and every new trailer, except a trailer of two axles of less than 2,000 pounds gross towed by an automobile, hereafter sold in this state and operated upon the highways, shall be equipped with service brakes upon all wheels of every such vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8249; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Brakes on school transportation vehicles, see § 37-41-53.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Instructions.
3. Jury questions.
4. Miscellaneous.
- 5.-15. [Reserved for future use.]
16. Under former laws.

1. In general.

Motorist invoking sudden emergency rule must prove that his car had brake equipment required by this section [Code 1942, § 8249], that in exercise of reasonable care he could not have known of any defects therein, that he made reasonable effort to use both braking systems, that both failed, or that on failure of foot brakes he could not have stopped with the emergency brakes, and that after the emergency arose he exercised the care of a reasonable prudent driver. *Fink v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n*, 234 Miss. 221, 105 So. 2d 548 (1958).

2. Instructions.

An instruction calling for a court ruling that the driver of a truck which struck a car ahead, halted by a traffic light, when the brakes failed to hold, was negligent as a matter of law, is properly refused as lacking the qualification that the failure of the brakes must have been attributable to negligence. *Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines*, 235 Miss. 1, 108 So. 2d 409 (1959).

In an action against the driver by a share-the-expense guest for injuries allegedly sustained when the automobile foot brake failed to function properly resulting in the driver's automobile colliding with the rear of another automobile which had come to a stop, a sudden emergency instruction was erroneous which assumed by the use of the words "failure of the defendant's brakes" that there was evidence in the record upon which the jury might find that both braking systems were defective, when in fact there was no evidence to show that the emergency brake was in any way defective, and which omitted entirely the statement that after the emergency arose, the defendant exercised such care as a reasonably prudent and capable driver would use under the unusual circumstances. *Moore v. Taggart*, 233 Miss. 389, 102 So. 2d 333 (1958).

In action for damage to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, trial court committed no error in refusing instruction to plaintiff based on assumption that brakes on defendant's truck were not efficient, when, as a matter of fact, there was no such evidence in record. *Wilburn v. Gordon*, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844 (1950).

3. Jury questions.

In an action for the death of an eight-year-old child killed when struck by a large diesel trailer-truck, which was not equipped with service brakes, the question of the truck driver's negligence was for the jury under conflicting evidence. *Reed v. Eubanks*, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132 (1957).

4. Miscellaneous.

Jury's finding that noncompliance with this requirement did not contribute to accident which occurred when heavily-loaded trailer, on losing rear wheel, veered into lane of oncoming traffic, held unsupported by evidence. *Braud v. Baker*, 324 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1963).

Widow of employee who drove city tractor towing trailer of fair concessionaire over public streets in conjunction with state fair being operated by city, knowing that the trailer was not equipped with brakes as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8249], could not recover against the city or the fair concessionaire for the death of the employee resulting from injuries sustained in an accident caused by the lack of such brakes, even though the employee without compulsion or protest merely obeyed the orders of his superior who also knew that the trailer lacked brakes, since, in view of Code 1942,

§§ 8277 and 8278, both the city and the employee were in *pari delicto* in violating the criminal statute. *Downing v. City of Jackson*, 199 Miss. 464, 24 So. 2d 661 (1946).

5-15. [Reserved for future use.]

16. Under former laws.

In salesman's action against employer for injuries sustained when employer's truck in which salesman was riding while on employer's business and which was driven by another employee overturned, allegedly because of defective brakes, statute making *prima facie* case for plaintiff upon showing injury and that motor vehicle at time of accident was operated contrary to provisions of Motor Vehicle Law held inapplicable, since statute cannot be invoked by servant against master. *Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Gordy*, 174 Miss. 392, 164 So. 236 (1935).

Motorist on highway with brakes so defective that when applied they caused automobile to turn to right was negligent. *Wheat v. Wheat*, 162 Miss. 595, 139 So. 849 (1932).

That pedestrian when injured by automobile coming from behind was on right side of road held not to bar recovery for injuries due to defective brakes. *Wheat v. Wheat*, 162 Miss. 595, 139 So. 849 (1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Automobiles: liability of owner or operator of motor vehicle for injury, death, or property damage resulting from defective brakes. 40 A.L.R.3d 9.

Failure to set brakes, or maintain adequate brakes, as causing accidental run-away of parked motor vehicle. 42 A.L.R.3d 1252.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 223.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 828-830.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 373.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Auto-

mobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 992-994, 1341-1524, 2013-2017.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Brakes.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 447, Defective Bicycle Design.

47 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 127, Negligent Operation of Motorcycle.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident — Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 532-535, 588.

§ 63-7-53. Stopping ability of brakes; maintenance and adjustment of brakes.

(1) The service brakes upon any motor vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be adequate to stop such vehicle or vehicles when traveling twenty miles per hour within a distance of thirty feet when upon dry asphalt or concrete pavement surface free from loose material where the grade does not exceed one per cent.

(2) Under the above conditions the hand brake shall be adequate to stop such vehicle or vehicles within a distance of fifty-five feet and said hand brake shall be adequate to hold such vehicle or vehicles stationary on any grade upon which operated.

(3) Under the above conditions, the service brakes upon a motor vehicle equipped with two-wheel brakes only, and when permitted under Section 63-7-51, shall be adequate to stop the vehicle within a distance of forty feet and the hand brake adequate to stop the vehicle within a distance of fifty-five feet.

(4) All braking distances specified in this section shall apply to all vehicles mentioned, whether such vehicles are not loaded or are loaded to the maximum capacity permitted under law.

(5) All brakes shall be maintained in good working order and shall be so adjusted as to operate as equally as practicable with respect to the wheels on opposite sides of the vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8249; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Brakes on school transportation vehicles, see § 37-41-53.

Gross weight of vehicles and loads, see §§ 63-5-29 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 223.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 828-830.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 532-535, 588.

§ 63-7-55. Mufflers.

Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in good working order and in constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise and annoying smoke. No person shall use a muffler cutout, bypass or similar device upon a motor vehicle on a highway.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8251; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Probable Cause to Stop.

That defendant's car was emitting ex-

cessive exhaust was a violation of Miss. Code §§ 63-7-55 and 63-7-7, and gave a

police officer probable cause to pull defendant's car over. *Cagler v. State*, 844 So. 2d 487 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Products liability: motor vehicle exhaust systems. 72 A.L.R.4th 62.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 230.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 838.

13 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 223, Defective Exhaust Systems.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

§ 63-7-57. Mirrors.

Every motor vehicle which is so constructed or loaded as to obstruct the driver's view to the rear thereof from the driver's position shall be equipped with a mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway for a distance of at least two hundred feet to the rear of such vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8252; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

care for those in rear. *Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker*, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8 (1932).

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Truck driver was bound to use ordinary

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for failure to provide motor vehicle with adequate rearview mirror. 27 A.L.R.2d 1040.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 837.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 530, 531.

§ 63-7-59. Windows and window glass generally; windshield wipers.

(1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle required to be registered in this state upon the public roads, streets or highways in this state with any sign or poster, or with any glazing material which causes a mirrored effect, upon the front windshield, side wings or side or rear windows of such vehicle, other than a certificate or other paper required or authorized to be so displayed by law. No person shall drive any motor vehicle required to be registered in this state upon the public roads, streets or highways in this state with any tinted film, glazing material or darkening material of any kind on the windshield of a motor vehicle except material designed to replace or provide a sun shield in the

uppermost area as authorized to be installed by manufacturers of vehicles under federal law.

(2) From and after January 1, 1989, no person shall drive any motor vehicle required to be registered in this state upon the public roads, streets or highways in this state with any window so tinted or darkened, by tinted film or otherwise, that the interior of the vehicle is so obscured that a viewer with vision sufficient to qualify for a Mississippi driver's license cannot readily see into the interior of the vehicle by looking into it from outside the vehicle; provided, however, this prohibition shall not apply to school buses, other buses used for public transportation, any bus or van owned or leased by a nonprofit organization duly incorporated under the laws of this state, any limousine owned or leased by a private or public entity or any other motor vehicle the windows of which have been tinted or darkened before factory delivery as permitted by federal law or federal regulations. Notwithstanding the prohibitions of this subsection, no person shall be charged with a violation of this subsection and it shall be a complete defense for any person charged with a violation of this subsection if:

(a) Each window of the vehicle upon which tinted or darkening material has been applied has affixed to it a label approved under subsection (6) of this section certifying that the window:

(i) Has a luminous reflectance not exceeding twenty percent (20%); and

(ii) Has a light transmittance of thirty-five percent (35%) or more; or

(b) The person has a certificate of compliance for the vehicle issued by a law enforcement officer of the Department of Public Safety, as hereinafter provided.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, it shall be lawful for any person who has been diagnosed by a licensed physician in this state as having a physical condition or disease which is seriously aggravated by minimum exposure to sunlight to place or have placed upon the windshield or windows of any motor vehicle which he owns or operates or within which he regularly travels as a passenger tinted film or other darkening material which would otherwise be in violation of this section. However, any such vehicle, in order to be exempt under this subsection, shall have prominently displayed on the vehicle dashboard a certificate of medical exemption on a form prepared by the Commissioner of Public Safety and signed by the person on whose behalf the certificate is issued. The special certificate authorized by this subsection (3) shall be issued free of charge to the applicants through the offices of the tax collectors of the counties. Each applicant shall present to the issuing official (a) an affidavit signed personally by the applicant and signed and attested by a physician which states the applicant's physical condition or disease which entitles him to an exemption under this subsection, and (b) proof of ownership of the motor vehicle by the applicant, or a signed affidavit by the owner of a motor vehicle operated for the use of the applicant, for which he is obtaining the certificate.

(4) The windshield on every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a device for cleaning rain, snow or other moisture from the windshield, which device

shall be so constructed as to be controlled or operated by the driver of the vehicle.

(5) From and after July 1, 1988, any motor vehicle required to be registered in this state with a window therein which has been tinted or darkened with any tinted film or other darkening material after factory delivery may have affixed to the lower left corner of each such window a label legible from outside the vehicle which indicates the label registration number, a certification of compliance with Mississippi law, and such other information as the Commissioner of Public Safety deems appropriate. The label shall be of a type which is pressure-sensitive, self-destructive upon removal, and no larger than one (1) inch square in size.

(6) Before shipping or making any tinted film or darkening material available for installation on a motor vehicle in this state, the manufacturer shall apply to the Commissioner of Public Safety for approval and registration of its tinted film or darkening material and the label which may be used in the identification and certification of compliance with the light transmittance and reflectance standards established under subsection (2) of this section. The commissioner shall approve no tinted film or darkening material or any label to be used upon the window of a vehicle unless the manufacturer demonstrates that the film and label comply with the provisions of this section.

(7) With every delivery of tinted film or darkening material for installation upon the window of a motor vehicle in this state, the manufacturer shall provide the label as approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety with written instructions indicating the proper location for placement of the label as required by this section.

(8) Any labels approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety under subsection (6) of this section may be affixed to the windows of a motor vehicle which have been tinted or darkened with any tinted film or other darkening material after factory delivery. The presence of such label upon the window of a motor vehicle shall indicate that the person who affixed the label certifies that the window meets the restrictions of subsection (2) of this section as to luminous reflectance and light transmittance.

(9) From and after July 1, 1988, no person shall install any tinted film, darkening material, glazing material or any other material upon the windshield or any window of a motor vehicle which, after the installation thereof, would result in such vehicle being in violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section if driven on the public roads, streets or highways of this state after January 1, 1989.

(10) No motor vehicle inspection certificate shall be issued from and after January 1, 1989, for a vehicle on which the windshield or any window of the vehicle has been darkened by the installation of tinted film or by other means, except as authorized under this section. Inspection certificates shall be issued to motor vehicles which have labels affixed pursuant to subsection (8) of this section and to motor vehicles for which a certificate of compliance has been issued by a law enforcement officer of the Department of Public Safety pursuant to subsection (12) of this section.

(11) It shall be unlawful for any person to alter or reproduce any label approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety under this section for the purpose of misleading law enforcement officers or motor vehicle inspection stations, or to knowingly use any approved label except as authorized by this section.

(12) Motor vehicles which do not have labels affixed pursuant to subsection (8) of this section shall be tested for compliance with the light transmittance requirements of this section by law enforcement officers of the Department of Public Safety. Such tests shall be performed with specially manufactured cards designed for such purpose and issued to officers by the Department of Public Safety. Motor vehicles in compliance shall be issued certificates of compliance in a form prescribed by the Department of Public Safety.

(13) Any person violating subsection (9) or (11) of this section, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00), or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than three (3) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(14) Any violation of this section other than a violation as described in subsection (13) of this section shall be punishable upon conviction as provided in Section 63-7-7.

(15) Violations of this section shall be enforced only by law enforcement officers of the Mississippi Department of Public Safety and municipal law enforcement officers of municipalities having a population of two thousand (2,000) or more on the public roads, streets and highways under their jurisdiction.

(16) The Department of Public Safety shall initiate a public awareness program designed to inform and educate persons of the provisions of this section. Funds for such public awareness program shall be available through the office of the Governor's representative for highway safety programs.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8253; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 416; Laws, 1988, ch. 521, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 438, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 320, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1990, ch. 438, § 2, repealed Section 3, Chapter 521, Laws, 1988, which provided for the repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

"Each window of the vehicle" that is tinted must have a label affixed to it to show that the tinting is in compliance with state law; in the alternative, a certificate of compliance issued by the Department of Public Safety may accompany the vehicle to show that the tinting is in

compliance with state law. Davis, Jr., Apr. 27, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0252.

It is suggested that if a tint card must be used to issue a certificate of compliance, then a tint card may be used for enforcement purposes. Joseph, Dec. 20, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0693.

While the language of the statute speaks to one possible device for enforcement, a tint card, the same language does

not exclude the use of any other such as a tint meter. Joseph, Dec. 20, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0693.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Motor vehicle operator's liability for accident occurring while driving with vision obscured by smoke or steam. 32 A.L.R.4th 933.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 853.

40 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 411, Driver's Failure to Maintain Proper Lookout.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 191, Meteorological Conditions at a Particular Time and Place.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 998, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 530, 531.

§ 63-7-61. Safety glass.

No person shall sell any new motor vehicle nor shall any new motor vehicle be registered unless such motor vehicle is equipped with safety glass throughout.

No person shall replace any glass in any motor vehicle except with safety glass, provided same can be easily or readily obtained.

The term "safety glass" shall mean any product composed of glass, so manufactured, fabricated, or treated as substantially to prevent shattering and flying of the glass when struck or broken or such other or similar product as may be approved by the department.

The department shall compile and publish a list of types of glass by name approved by it as meeting the requirements of this section. The State Tax Commission and county tax collectors shall not register any motor vehicle which is subject to the provisions of this section unless it is equipped with an approved type of safety glass, and the State Tax Commission shall suspend the registration of any motor vehicle so subject to this section which it finds is not so equipped until it is made to conform to the requirements of this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8255; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 62, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Products liability: defective vehicular windows. 3 A.L.R.4th 489.

Am Jur. Answers, counterclaims, and replies, 3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),

Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 997, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

§ 63-7-62. Unlawful installation of an object in lieu of an airbag.

Any person who knowingly installs or reinstalls any object in lieu of an airbag that was designed in accordance with federal safety regulations for the make, model and year of vehicle, as a part of a vehicle inflatable restraint system, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be

punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both.

SOURCES: Laws, 2003, ch. 477, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

§ 63-7-63. Safety belts.

It shall be unlawful for any person to buy, sell, lease, trade or transfer from or to Mississippi residents, at retail, an automobile which is manufactured or assembled commencing with the 1963 models, unless such automobile is equipped with safety belts installed for use in the left front and right front seats thereof. The violation of the provisions of this section shall be a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, the violator shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars (\$25.00), nor more than fifty dollars (\$50.00), for each offense.

All such safety belts shall be of such type and be installed in a manner approved by the department of public safety of the State of Mississippi. The department shall establish specifications and requirements of approved types of safety belts and attachments. The department will accept, as approved, all seat belt installations and the belt and anchor meeting the specifications of the Society of Automotive Engineers.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8254.5; Laws, 1962, ch. 532, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Failure to use automobile seat belts does not constitute negligence as a matter

of law. *D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith*, 244 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Nonuse of seat belt as failure to mitigate damages. 80 A.L.R.3d 1033.

Automobile occupant's failure to use seat belt as contributory negligence. 92 A.L.R.3d 9.

Nonuse of automobile seatbelts as evidence of comparative negligence. 95 A.L.R.3d 239.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 652, 653.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 1427.1 (failure to use safety belt).

35 Am. Jur. Trials 349, The Seatbelt Defense.

37 Am. Jur. Trials 401, Auto Product Liability: Defective Seatbelt.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 350, Seat Belt Accidents.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 71, The Seatbelt Defense.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 131, Crashworthiness of Motor Vehicle — Defective Automobile Seatbelts.

§ 63-7-64. Motorcycle or motor scooter crash helmets.

No person shall operate or ride upon any motorcycle or motor scooter upon the public roads or highways of this state unless such person is wearing on his or her head a crash helmet of the type and design inspected and approved by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. Violation of this section shall be deemed a violation of the traffic regulations and rules of the road and punishable as provided by Section 63-9-11.

SOURCES: Laws, 1974, ch. 461, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1974).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Even though the phrase “of the type and design inspected and approved by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators” in § 63-7-64 can no longer

be enforced, the requirement of a helmet survives. Younger, Sept. 9, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0467.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure of motorcyclist to wear protective helmet or other safety equipment as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or failure to avoid consequences of accident. 40 A.L.R.3d 856.

Motor scooter as within policy provisions relating to automobiles or motorcycles. 43 A.L.R.3d 1400.

Motorcyclist's failure to wear helmet or other protective equipment as affecting recovery for personal injury or death. 85 A.L.R.4th 365.

Validity of traffic regulations requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets or other protective gear. 72 A.L.R.5th 607.

§ 63-7-65. Horns and other warning devices.

(1) Every motor vehicle when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than two hundred (200) feet. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use such horn upon a highway. No horn or other warning device shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a whistle.

(2) Any authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet and of a type approved by the department. No such siren shall be used except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the driver of such vehicle shall sound such siren when necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the approach thereof.

(3) No vehicle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a vehicle any siren, whistle, or bell, except as otherwise permitted in this section.

No bicycle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a bicycle any siren or whistle.

(4) Any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8250; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1994, ch. 324, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Jury instructions.
3. Questions for jury.
- 4.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. *Davis v. Waterman*, 420 So. 2d 1063 (Miss. 1982).

In a wrongful death action arising out of defendant's automobile colliding with a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon the highway, the jury's verdict for defendant was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence where it appeared that the road in the vicinity of the accident was straight and defendant's view was entirely unobstructed, and defendant testified that he had seen the boy for a distance of several hundred feet before overtaking him, and yet had not sounded his horn nor applied his brakes until he was within 12 or 15 feet of the boy, when it was too late to avoid hitting him. *Moak v. Black*, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957).

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff's coal truck struck defendant's pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff's vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the

amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. *Cobb v. Williams*, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17 (1956).

2. Jury instructions.

In an action for injuries sustained in a collision which occurred when the defendant motorist was attempting to overtake the plaintiff motorcyclist, an instruction that if the defendant had a right to pass the plaintiff, and he was not speeding, he was not required by law to blow his horn unless the plaintiff was at the time giving a signal indicating his intention to turn from a straight path of travel, was erroneous, where it was undisputed that at the time the defendant attempted to overtake the plaintiff the motorcycle was rapidly slowing down, since such activity of the motorcyclist would have indicated to a reasonable and prudent man situated in a following vehicle traveling at a rapid rate of speed that it was reasonably necessary to insure safe operation to give audible warning with his horn. *McHale v. Daniel*, 233 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1970).

Instruction to the effect that constable in pursuit of reckless driver, sounding his siren, was entitled to assume that other drivers would yield right of way, held, in view of other instructions on proximate cause and duty to have regard to safety of others, no error. *Johnson v. Richardson*, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194 (1959).

There being no statute imposing a duty upon the driver of an overtaking vehicle the absolute duty of sounding an audible signal before passing without regard to whether the sounding of the signal is reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, an instruction that such was the law constituted reversible error where the proof was uncontradicted that the driver of the overtaking vehicle in which plaintiff was riding, did not sound his horn before

attempting to pass defendant's vehicle, since it in effect peremptorily instructed the jury that the driver of the overtaking vehicle was guilty of negligence. *Clark v. Mask*, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467 (1957).

The court erred in instructing that if a nine-year-old boy, riding a bicycle on the highway, was aware of the approach of the defendant's automobile, or that the actions of the boy while riding on the highway were such that reasonably led the defendant to believe that the child had noticed and was fully aware of the approach of his automobile, the defendant was under no legal duty to sound his horn and continue sounding his horn at short and frequent intervals when approaching the child, where there was no showing which warranted a finding that the boy was aware of the approach of the automobile prior to the time the defendant had sounded his horn when he was only 12 or

15 feet from the child. *Moak v. Black*, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957).

3. Questions for jury.

The question of whether it was negligence on the part of a motorist, when engaged in attempting to pass another vehicle on its right on a four-lane highway, to fail to sound his horn or give a passing signal was properly submitted to the jury. *Carona v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co.*, 357 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1966).

4.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Ordinance requiring motorist to signal when passing other vehicles traveling in same direction required use of available sound signal customarily used. *Somerville v. Keeler*, 165 Miss. 244, 145 So. 721 (1933).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The definition of "authorized emergency vehicle" does not include the private vehicle of a volunteer fireman, and therefore, such a vehicle may not be equipped with a

siren, whistle, or bell as allowed by Section 63-7-65. *Baker*, November 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0702.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 229.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 591.1 (complaint arising out of intersection collision with police vehicle with flashing lights and siren activated), 2018.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Neg-

ligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident — Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 530, 531, 574-577.

§ 63-7-67. Tires.

Every solid rubber tire on a vehicle shall have rubber on its entire traction surface at least one (1) inch thick above the edge of the flange of the entire periphery.

No person shall operate or move on any highway any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer having any metal tire in contact with the roadway.

No tire on a vehicle moved on a highway shall have on its periphery any block, stud, flange, cleat, or spike or any other protuberances of any material other than rubber which projects beyond the tread of the traction surface of the

tire. However, it shall be permissible to use farm machinery with tires having protuberances which will not injure the highway, and it shall be permissible to use tire chains of reasonable proportions upon any vehicle when required for safety because of snow, ice, or other conditions tending to cause a vehicle to skid.

The Mississippi Department of Transportation and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may, in their discretion, issue special permits authorizing the operation upon a highway of traction engines or tractors having movable tracks with transverse corrugations upon the periphery of such movable tracks or farm tractors or other farm machinery, the operation of which upon a highway would otherwise be prohibited under this title.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8254; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 63, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of motor vehicle owner or operator for accident occasioned by blowout or other failure of tire. 24 A.L.R.2d 161.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defective tires. 81 A.L.R.3d 318.

Liability for injury or damage caused by snowplowing or snow removal operations and equipment. 83 A.L.R.4th 5.

Products liability: Manufacturer's postsale obligation to modify, repair, or recall product. 47 A.L.R.5th 395.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 218.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 831.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 371.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 995, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

34 Am. Jur. Trials 603, Defective Tire Litigation.

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Automobile Tire Defects.

39 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 209, Defective Tire.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Meteorological Conditions at a Particular Time and Place, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 530, 531.

§ 63-7-69. Warning and safety appliances for trucks and buses; requirement; standards.

(1) No person shall operate any truck or bus on any highway outside the limits of any municipality or residential section adjacent thereto between the hours of one half hour after sunset and one half hour before sunrise unless there be carried in such vehicle, ready for use, certain warning and safety appliances such as flares, fusees, flags, reflectors, fire extinguishers, and the like.

(2) The nature of such appliances, methods of their use, and standards of their quality, shall be prescribed by the department with the condition that no appliance shall be prescribed whose quality is below the standards as follows: for fire extinguishers and flares, the standards adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission; for fusees, the standards adopted by the Bureau of Explosives; for lights and reflectors, the standards adopted by the Society of Automotive Engineers or the Illuminating Engineers Society; and for any

other appliance, the standards adopted by a recognized research body in its respective line. The commissioner shall approve any of the appliances mentioned herein when such appliance has been approved by or meets the minimum standards adopted by either the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Bureau of Explosives, the Society of Automotive Engineers, the Illuminating Engineers Society, or any other recognized research body in its respective line, as the case may be.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8256; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 11; Laws, 1954, ch. 329; Laws, 1962, ch. 528, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1962).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In action arising out of collision between vehicle driven by plaintiff's decedent and disabled truck stopped in middle of roadway, plaintiff was not entitled to negligence per se instruction under statute barring operation of trucks during nighttime hours without proper warning devices; although neither stopped truck nor another truck attempting to start it had safety devices, plaintiff failed to establish time component of statute, i.e., whether half hour had passed since sunset at time of accident. *Thomas v. McDonald*, 667 So. 2d 594 (Miss. 1995).

In an action for death of defendant's employee from burns caused by an explosion where truck caught fire and the driver caused an explosion by throwing dirt wet with gasoline on the truck, instruction as to the duty of the defendant to equip the truck with fire extinguisher was not erroneous as emphasizing unduly in the minds of jurors the importance of strict observance of the statutory requirement, since there was no proof in the record to show that the lack of fire extinguisher added to the plaintiff's damages. *Cornish v. McCoy*, 226 Miss. 366, 84 So. 2d 391 (1956).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence or contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped without flares. 67 A.L.R.2d 12.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 229.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-7-71. Warning and safety appliances for trucks and buses; display.

(1) Whenever any motor truck or bus is stopped upon the highway except for the purpose of picking up or discharging passengers, or its lighting equipment is disabled during the period when lighted lamps must be displayed on vehicles and such motor truck or bus cannot immediately be removed from the main traveled portion of a highway outside of a business or residence district, the driver or other person in charge of such vehicle shall cause such flares, fusees, reflectors, or other signals to be lighted or otherwise placed in an operating condition and placed upon the highway, one at a distance of approximately one hundred feet to the rear of the vehicle, one approximately one hundred feet in advance of the vehicle and the third upon the roadway side of the vehicle. However, if the vehicle is transporting inflammables, no flares

(pot torches) fusees, oil lanterns, or any signal produced by a flame, may be used, and in lieu of such signals, either (a) three red electric lanterns or flares and three red cloth flags, or (b) three emergency reflectors and three red cloth flags shall be used.

(2) Whenever any motor truck or bus is stopped upon the highway except for the purpose of picking up or discharging passengers between the hours of one half hour before sunrise and one half hour after sunset, the driver or person in charge of such vehicle shall place upon the highway in a standing position red flags, one at a distance not less than one hundred feet to the rear of the vehicle and one not less than one hundred feet in advance of the vehicle and the third upon the roadway side of the vehicle.

(3) No person shall at any time operate a motor truck transporting explosives as a cargo or part of a cargo upon the highway unless it carries (a) electric lanterns or flares and red cloth flags or (b) red emergency reflectors and red cloth flags as required in Section 63-7-69. Such electric flares, electric lanterns and emergency reflectors must be capable of producing a red light or red reflection and shall be displayed upon the roadway when and as required in this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8256; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 11; Laws, 1954, ch. 329; Laws, 1962, ch. 528, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1962).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Construction and application.
3. Failure to warn or use safety equipment.
4. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Violation of § 63-7-71 constitutes negligence; motor vehicle operator has reasonable time to place flares where vehicle is stopped within line of traffic unless emergency which originally created need to stop on highway arises out of negligence of operator. *Hauser v. Krupp Steel Producers, Inc.*, 761 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1985).

2. Construction and application.

This provision is to be construed as requiring a flare to be placed first to the rear of the disabled vehicle, next, to the front, and lastly upon the roadway side. *Hankins v. Harvey*, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).

This statute is a criminal statute and should be strictly construed. *Ashe v. Hughes*, 219 Miss. 395, 69 So. 2d 210 (1954).

A wrecker is a "truck" within this section [Code 1942, § 8256]. *Ashe v. Hughes*, 219 Miss. 395, 69 So. 2d 210 (1954).

This section [Code 1942, § 8256] has no application to a wrecker which was engaged in its normal use on a highway and was in no sense disabled. *Ashe v. Hughes*, 219 Miss. 395, 69 So. 2d 210 (1954).

3. Failure to warn or use safety equipment.

The contention that an emergency situation created when the driver of a tractor-trailer was stopped in such a position that the rig blocked both lanes of a two-lane highway while attempting a U-turn did not permit sufficient time for the placing of flares as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8256] was not tenable, for it was the driver's original negligence in attempting an illegal maneuver which created the emergency. *Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines*, 423 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1970).

Truck driver's violation of this statute was negligence per se where, after his truck became disabled on a highway outside a business or residential district, he

placed two reflectors within fifty feet of his vehicle and, instead of placing the third reflector on the roadway side, placed it by the rear of the truck away from the road. *Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Condict*, 417 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

In view of fact that it was uncontroverted that disabled truck with which plaintiff's decedent collided had no lights and was not equipped with reflectors or other warning devices, plaintiff was entitled to negligence per se instruction under statute imposing duty on operators of disabled trucks to provide warning within reasonable time. *Thomas v. McDonald*, 667 So. 2d 594 (Miss. 1995).

Statutory duty imposed on operators of trucks stopped in travelled portion of roadway to display proper warning devices is triggered when truck cannot be immediately removed from roadway, even though operator has reasonable time within which to display devices. *Thomas v. McDonald*, 667 So. 2d 594 (Miss. 1995).

Where a truck driver stopped on interstate highway to aid a disabled motorist, § 63-7-71 required the truck driver to put in place, with reasonable promptness, reflectors or other signals designed to warn approaching vehicles. *Stong v. Freeman Truck Line*, 456 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1984).

Where defendant's truck became partially disabled because of water damage to engine and was proceeding slowly ahead of plaintiff's automobile, which was struck in the rear by an overtaking truck, and the forward movement of defendant's truck was halted for very brief intervals, the defendant was not guilty of negligence per se in not putting out flares or warnings so required by this section [Code 1942, § 8256]. *Fant v. Commercial Carri-*

ers, Inc., 210 Miss. 474, 49 So. 2d 887 (1951).

4. Jury instructions.

In an action for personal injuries resulting from a collision between defendants' truck and plaintiff's automobile, where the undisputed testimony showed that a part of the truck trailer was left extending into the highway and that the driver failed to place reflectors on the highway as required by this section [Code 1972, § 63-7-71], the plaintiff was entitled to Instruction No. 8 to the effect that the conduct of the truck driver constituted negligence. *Powers v. Malley*, 302 So. 2d 262 (Miss. 1974).

This section [Code 1942, § 8256] has no application to a wrecker which was engaged in its normal use on a highway and was in no sense disabled and where the court gave instruction to the contrary, in an action against owners of wrecker for damages sustained when plaintiff's automobile at night crashed into the rear end of a disabled automobile which wrecker was engaged in rescuing, this instruction was in error. *Ashe v. Hughes*, 219 Miss. 395, 69 So. 2d 210 (1954).

In an action for personal injuries where the plaintiff's car ran into the defendant's truck parked on the highway without any flares or fusees or other signals on the highway to the rear of the truck, the court did not err in giving instruction that the failure of defendant to place flares, fusees and other signals on the highway to the rear of the truck, was contrary to the law of the state of Mississippi and defendant was negligent. *Planters Whse. Grocery v. Kincade*, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So. 2d 578 (1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Negligence or contributory negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped without flares. 67. A.L.R.2d 12.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 229.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1004-1008.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Auto-

mobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 347-356.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 972-976, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 671, 672.

§ 63-7-73. Protectors or flaps for rear wheels.

(1) No person shall drive or operate or cause to be driven or operated, upon the public highways, streets, bridges and culverts within the State of Mississippi, or any subdivision thereof, any car, truck, truck-tractor, trailer or semi-trailer or bus used for the transportation of property or persons the gross weight of which, including load, exceeds ten tons unless such motor vehicle is equipped with suitable metal protectors or substantial flexible flaps on the rear-most wheels of such vehicle or combination of vehicles, so as to prevent as far as possible such wheels from throwing dirt, water and other materials on the windshields of following motor vehicles. However, pole trailers, dump trucks, and all trucks carrying an "F" license tag shall be exempt from the provisions of this section.

(2) Such protectors or flaps shall be constructed of substantial and suitable materials approved by the commissioner of public safety and shall have a ground clearance of not more than one-fifth of the distance from the center of the rear-most axle to the center of the flaps under any conditions of loading operation of the motor vehicle. They shall be at least as wide as the tires they are protecting. However, if the motor vehicle is so designed and constructed that the purposes of this section cannot be met, then, in the discretion of the commissioner of public safety, no such protectors or flaps shall be required. If the said rear-most wheels are not adequately covered at the top by fenders, body or other parts of the vehicle, the said protectors or flaps shall be extended to a point directly above the rear-most axle. Lamps or wiring shall not be attached to protectors or flaps, and any reflectors or reflectorized material attached to or made a part of the protectors or flaps shall be in addition to the reflectors required by law on the vehicle.

(3) The commissioner of public safety is hereby charged with the duty of administering the provisions of this section.

(4) Any person convicted for a violation of any of the provisions of this section shall for the first violation thereof be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) or by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days; for a second conviction such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars (\$100.00) or by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) days.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8256.5; Laws, 1954, ch. 338, §§ 1-4, eff July 1, 1954.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 231.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43, 44.

§ 63-7-75. Speedometers.

All motor vehicles operating on the public highways of this state, carrying passengers for hire, shall be equipped at all times with a speedometer, in good workable condition, reflecting the correct speed, with a dial sufficiently large to be read by the passengers on the said motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

§ 63-7-77. Vehicles transporting explosives.

Any person operating any vehicle transporting any explosive as a cargo or part of a cargo upon a highway shall at all times comply with the provisions of this section.

(a) Said vehicle shall be marked or placarded on each side and the rear with the word "explosives" in letters not less than eight inches high, or there shall be displayed on the rear of such vehicle a red flag not less than twenty-four inches square marked with the word "danger" in white letters six inches high.

(b) Every said vehicle shall be equipped with not less than two fire extinguishers, filled and ready for immediate use, and placed at a convenient point on the vehicle so used.

(c) The commissioner is hereby authorized and directed to promulgate such additional regulations governing the transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles by vehicles upon the highways as he shall deem advisable for the protection of the public.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8257; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability in connection with fire or explosion of explosives while being stored or transported. 35 A.L.R.3d 1177.

§ 63-7-79. Color of used school buses operated on highways for other than school purposes.

(1) Any person who owns or operates a used school bus for the purpose of transportation or use of any kind on the public roads and highways of the State of Mississippi, other than for school purposes, shall change the color of such bus from the regular school bus color of yellow or national school bus chrome to a color in contrast to this color before such bus can be used or operated on the highways or public roads in Mississippi.

(2) The vendor or owner of any school bus shall inform the purchaser in writing at or prior to the time of the sale of any bus not to be used for school purposes as to the requirements of this section.

(3) Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars (\$100.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.5; Laws, 1962, ch. 379, §§ 1-4, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1962).

Cross References — Identification markings of publicly-owned school buses, see § 37-41-43.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-7-81. Effect of chapter on right to recover damages in civil actions.

Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to curtail or abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil suit for damages by reason of injuries to person or property resulting from the negligent use of the highways by any motor vehicle, or its owner, or his employee or agent.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1917, § 5785; Laws, 1930, § 5588; Laws, 1942, § 1742; Laws, 1916, ch. 116.

§ 63-7-83. Covering of open top vehicles carrying sand, dirt, gravel or rock.

Every truck, trailer or other carrier with an open top, while traveling upon any state, United States or interstate highway in the State of Mississippi and while carrying any load of sand, dirt, gravel or rock shall be equipped with a tarpaulin, canvas or other such top and same to be secured over the top of any load of sand, dirt, gravel, or rock.

SOURCES: Laws, 1974, ch. 521, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1974.

Cross References — Trucks or other vehicles to be covered when hauling solid waste, see §§ 17-17-11 and 17-17-29.

Prohibition against spilling loads on highways, see § 63-5-55.

Penalty for littering highways and private property with trash or substance likely to cause fire, see § 97-15-29.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for injury or damage from stone or other object on surface of highway thrown by passing vehicle. 56 A.L.R.2d 1392.

Applicability of *res ipsa loquitur* doctrine where objects being transported fall from motor vehicle. 66 A.L.R.2d 1255.

§ 63-7-85. Use of sideboards on open top vehicles carrying sand, dirt, gravel or rock.

In lieu of the tarpaulin provided in Section 63-7-83, a truck, trailer or other carrier with an open top while traveling upon any state, United States or

interstate highway in the State of Mississippi and while carrying any load of sand, dirt, gravel or rock shall be in full compliance with Sections 63-7-83 through 63-7-89 provided same is not loaded within six (6) inches of the top of the bed or is equipped with four (4) six-inch (6") sideboards, which sideboards shall be attached one (1) each to the front, back and two (2) sides of the carrier body, and shall remain lowered while the body is being loaded, provided that no part of the load shall extend above the body of the carrier. After loading, the sideboards shall be raised and secured to remain raised during travel, and the space between the top of the sideboards and the top of the load making contact with the sideboards shall not be less than six (6) inches.

SOURCES: Laws, 1974, ch. 521, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1974.

Cross References — Trucks or other vehicles to be covered when hauling solid waste, see §§ 17-17-11 and 17-17-29.

Penalty for littering highways and private property with trash or substance likely to cause fire, see § 97-15-29.

§ 63-7-87. Enforcement of §§ 63-7-83 and 63-7-85.

The State Tax Commission, Mississippi Highway Patrol and other law enforcement agencies are hereby charged with enforcement of Sections 63-7-83 through 63-7-89.

SOURCES: Laws, 1974, ch. 521, § 3; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 64, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

§ 63-7-89. Penalties for violations of §§ 63-7-83 and 67-3-85.

Any person, firm or corporation operating a truck, trailer or other carrier on any state, United States or interstate highway not properly covered as set forth in Section 63-7-83 or without sideboards as set forth in Section 63-7-85 or in violation of any of the other provisions of said Section 63-7-85 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars (\$25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars (\$100.00) for each separate and distinct violation.

SOURCES: Laws, 1974, ch. 521, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1974.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-7-91. Slow-moving vehicle safety emblem; requirement.

When any vehicle, whether pulled, towed, self-propelled or animal-drawn, which is not under ordinary circumstances moved, operated or driven at a speed in excess of twenty-five (25) miles per hour, is moved, operated or driven on any public highway or city street which is open for vehicular travel, it shall display a triangular slow-moving-vehicle emblem or high intensity reflectorized tape mounted as near as practicable to the center of the mass and at an

approximate height of not less than two (2) nor more than six (6) feet from level ground or pavement surface. In any event, the emblem or tape shall be mounted so as to be entirely visible from the rear, day or night; and the emblem or tape and its position of mounting on the vehicle shall meet the specifications established by rules and regulations properly adopted and promulgated by the Commissioner of Public Safety. Except in cases of emergency, vehicles subject to the provisions of this section that display the reflectorized tape shall not be operated upon any highway on the designated state highway system during the period from sunset to sunrise.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 346, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 592, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-7-93. Slow-moving vehicle safety emblem; prohibition.

The use of the slow-moving-vehicle emblem or high intensity reflectorized tape shall be restricted to the slow-moving vehicles specified in Section 63-7-91 and the use of such emblem or tape on any other type of vehicle or stationary object on or along any public highway or city street is prohibited.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 346, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 592, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-7-95. Slow-moving vehicle safety emblem; rules and regulations.

The Commissioner of Public Safety is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations establishing standards and specifications for the design, materials and mounting of a standard slow-moving-vehicle emblem and high intensity reflectorized tape for the uniform identification of slow-moving vehicles. In adopting said rules and regulations the Commissioner of Public Safety shall consider the standard markings used in other states, the current recommendations of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers and the Society of Automotive Engineers, in order that the slow-moving-vehicle emblem or tape may be more universally recognizable and of adequate quality.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 346, § 3; Laws, 1999, ch. 592, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-7-97. Slow-moving vehicle safety emblem; relationship with other requirements as to lighting and safety equipment.

Nothing in Sections 63-7-91 through 63-7-101 shall be construed to relieve the owner and/or operator of the vehicles identified in Section 63-7-91 from complying with all other requirements for lighting and safety equipment on these vehicles.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 346, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1975.

Cross References — Lighting and safety equipment of motor vehicles generally, see §§ 63-7-1 et seq.

§ 63-7-99. Slow-moving vehicle safety emblem; presumption as to use of reasonable care in operation of vehicle.

Compliance with Section 63-7-91 shall not create a prima facie case or presumption that such owner or operator of the vehicle used reasonable and ordinary care in the operation of such vehicle under the circumstances then existing by the use or display of such slow-moving-vehicle emblem or high intensity reflectorized tape.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 346, § 5; Laws, 1999, ch. 592, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-7-101. Slow-moving vehicle safety emblem; enforcement of provisions.

Sections 63-7-91 through 63-7-101 are hereby made a part of the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law as amended, and their enforcement shall be as provided by said law.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 346, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1975.

TAMPERING WITH OR ALTERATION OF ODOMETERS

SEC.

63-7-201.	Definitions.
63-7-203.	Offenses.
63-7-205.	Warranty relating to odometer mileage.
63-7-207.	Service, repair or replacement of odometer.
63-7-209.	Penalties.

§ 63-7-201. Definitions.

As used in Sections 63-7-201 through 63-7-209:

(1) The term “dealer” means any person who has sold five (5) or more motor vehicles in the past twelve (12) months to purchasers who in good faith purchased such vehicles for purposes other than resale.

(2) The term “distributor” means any person who has sold five (5) or more motor vehicles in the past twelve (12) months for resale.

(3) The term “odometer” means an instrument for measuring and recording the actual distance a motor vehicle travels while in operation; but shall not include any auxiliary odometer designed to be reset by the operator of the motor vehicle for the purpose of recording mileage on trips.

(4) The term “repair and replacement” means to restore to a sound working condition by replacing the odometer or any part thereof or by correcting what is inoperative.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 489, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie). Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

§ 63-7-203. Offenses.

(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to advertise for sale, to sell, to use, or to install on any part of a motor vehicle or on an odometer in a motor vehicle any device which causes the odometer to register any mileage other than the true mileage driven. For the purposes of this section the true mileage driven is that mileage driven by the car as registered by the odometer within the manufacturer's designed tolerance.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any person with the intent to defraud to operate a motor vehicle on any street or highway knowing that the odometer of such vehicle is disconnected or nonfunctional.

(3) It shall be unlawful for any person to disconnect, turn back, reset or alter, or cause to be disconnected, reset or altered, the odometer of any motor vehicle with the intent to reduce the number of miles indicated thereon.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 489, §§ 2-4, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Construction and application of state statute making it unlawful to tamper with motor vehicle odometer. 76 A.L.R.3d 981.

Validity, construction, and application of odometer requirement provisions of Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 USCS §§ 1981-1991). 28 A.L.R. Fed. 584.

Am Jur. 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 115.1

(complaint, petition, or declaration against automobile dealership and salesperson, misrepresentation in sale of used automobile sold as new automobile, fraudulent concealment of disconnection of odometer).

1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 677, Fraudulent Alteration of Odometer.

§ 63-7-205. Warranty relating to odometer mileage.

If a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer of a new motor vehicle makes any warranty to the purchaser of, and with respect to, a new motor vehicle which is based on the amount of miles that the motor vehicle is driven, only those miles which the motor vehicle has been driven on and after the date that the motor vehicle has first been sold as new to the purchaser shall be considered for purposes of the warranty.

The mileage indicated upon the odometer of the motor vehicle on the date that the motor vehicle is first sold as new to the purchaser shall, for the purposes of the warranty, be the mileage upon which the warranty shall commence.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 489, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 115.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against automobile dealership and sales- person, misrepresentation in sale of used automobile sold as new automobile, fraudulent concealment of disconnection of odometer).

§ 63-7-207. Service, repair or replacement of odometer.

Nothing in Sections 63-7-201 through 63-7-209 shall prevent the service, repair, or replacement of an odometer, provided the mileage indicated thereon remains the same as before the service, repair, or replacement. Where the odometer is incapable of registering the same mileage as before such service, repair, or replacement, the odometer shall be adjusted to read zero and a notice in writing shall be attached to the left door frame of the vehicle by the owner or his agent specifying the mileage prior to repair or replacement of the odometer and the date on which it was repaired or replaced. Any removal or alteration of such notice so affixed shall be unlawful.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 489, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 115.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against automobile dealership and sales- person, misrepresentation in sale of used automobile sold as new automobile, fraudulent concealment of disconnection of odometer).

§ 63-7-209. Penalties.

Violation of the provisions of Sections 63-7-201 through 63-7-209 shall be deemed a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 489, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

CHILD PASSENGER RESTRAINT DEVICES

SEC.

- 63-7-301. Requirement of device; failure to provide and use device not deemed negligence.
- 63-7-303. Duties, rights, liabilities, etc., between parent and child.
- 63-7-305. Enforcement.
- 63-7-307. Repealed.
- 63-7-309. Penalties.
- 63-7-311. Notice of requirement for devices.
- 63-7-313. Repealed.

§ 63-7-301. Requirement of device; failure to provide and use device not deemed negligence.

(1) Every person transporting a child under the age of four (4) years in a passenger motor vehicle, and operated on a public roadway, street or highway within this state, shall provide for the protection of the child by properly using a child passenger restraint device or system meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards.

(2) The term "passenger motor vehicle" as used in Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311 has the same meaning as defined in Section 63-2-1(2). Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311 do not apply to the vehicles described in Section 63-2-1(3).

(3) Failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint device or system shall not be considered contributory or comparative negligence.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 325, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 501, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

Cross References — Mandatory use of safety seat belts by operators and front-seat passengers, generally, see § 63-2-1.

Penalties for violation of § 63-7-301, see § 63-7-309.

Rights or liabilities between parent and child from requirement of child passenger restraint devices, see § 63-7-303.

Enforcement of requirement of child passenger restraint devices, see § 63-7-305.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Under this section, child care centers and/or Head Start centers are exempt from the child restraint law only if, in fact, the vehicle used in transporting the children is not registered as "private carrier of passengers." Mahan, June 28, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0283.

A person can be charged with the failure

to utilize a child restraint device or seat belt and child abuse without violating the double jeopardy clause. Bishop, Feb. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0733.

A violation of subsection (1) is a primary violation that requires no other infraction. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure to use or misuse of automobile child safety seat or restraint system as affecting recovery for personal injury or death. 46 A.L.R.5th 557.

Liability under state law for injuries resulting from defective automobile seat-belt, shoulder harness, or restraint system. 48 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 21 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 115, Defective Automobile Child Safety Restraint.

3 Am Law Prod Liab 3d, Contributory Negligence; Comparative Fault § 40:19.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Auto-

bile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).
 fense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).
 Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, De-

§ 63-7-303. Duties, rights, liabilities, etc., between parent and child.

No provision of Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-313 shall be construed as creating any duty, standard of care, right or liability between parent and child that is not recognized under the laws of the state of Mississippi as they exist on July 1, 1983, or as they may at any time in the future be constituted by statute or court decision.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Editor's Note — Section 63-7-313 referred to in this section was repealed by Laws, 1990, ch. 358, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References — Mandatory use of safety seat belts by operators and front-seat passengers, generally, see § 63-2-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Failure to use or misuse of automobile child safety seat or restraint system as affecting recovery for personal injury or death. 46 A.L.R.5th 557.

§ 63-7-305. Enforcement.

The provisions of Section 63-7-301 may be enforced by any duly sworn law enforcement officer of this state, or of any county or political subdivision thereof.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References — Mandatory use of safety seat belts by operators and front-seat passengers, generally, see § 63-2-1.

Rights or liabilities between parent and child from requirement of child passenger restraint devices, see § 63-7-303.

§ 63-7-307. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1998, ch. 501, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1998.
 [Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1983]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-7-307 provided for dismissal of proceedings against persons charged with a first offense if proof of acquisition of a child restraint device or system is produced.

§ 63-7-309. Penalties.

Any person convicted of violating the provisions of Section 63-7-301 shall be fined not more than Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) for each offense.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 5; Laws, 1990, ch. 358, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References — Mandatory use of safety seat belts by operators and front-seat passengers, generally, see § 63-2-1.

Rights and liabilities between parent and child from requirement of child passenger restraint devices, see § 63-7-303.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-7-311. Notice of requirement for devices.

The state tax commission shall provide notice of the requirement for child restraint devices or systems, which notice shall accompany the delivery of a motor vehicle license tag.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References — Mandatory use of safety seat belts by operators and front-seat passengers, generally, see § 63-2-1.

Rights and liabilities between parent and child from requirement of child passenger restraint devices, see § 63-7-303.

§ 63-7-313. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1990, ch. 358, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1990.
[Laws, 1983, ch. 400, § 7]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-7-313 related to applicability of §§ 63-7-301 et seq.

CHAPTER 9

Traffic Violations Procedure

SEC.

- 63-9-1. Short title.
- 63-9-3. Construction.
- 63-9-5. Definitions.
- 63-9-7. Parties deemed guilty of offenses.
- 63-9-9. Requiring or permitting operation of vehicle in manner contrary to law.
- 63-9-11. Penalties for violations of Chapters 3, 5 or 7.
- 63-9-12. Payment of fines by personal check; liability for dishonored check.
- 63-9-13. Disposition of fines and forfeitures for violations of Chapters 3, 5 or 7.
- 63-9-15. Repealed.
- 63-9-17. Maintenance of records relating to charged offenses; records and reports of convictions.
- 63-9-19. Compensation of peace officers for services in traffic violation cases.
- 63-9-21. Uniform Traffic Ticket Law.
- 63-9-23. Exclusivity of procedure prescribed in chapter.
- 63-9-25. Deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail.
- 63-9-27. Posting of guaranteed arrest bond certificate in lieu of cash bail.
- 63-9-29. Repealed.
- 63-9-31. Additional surcharge for traffic violations to fund automation of citations issued by Highway Safety Patrol and wireless radio communications programs. [Repealed effective July 1, 2006].

§ 63-9-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law-Traffic Violations Procedure.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Rules of the Road, see §§ 63-3-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Size, Weight and Load Regulations, see §§ 63-5-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Equipment and Identification Regulations, see §§ 63-7-1 et seq.

Deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see § 63-9-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Horizontal gaze nystagmus test: use in impaired driving prosecution. 60 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1042 et seq.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1311 et seq.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., *Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction* (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, *Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide* (Matthew Bender).

Essen, *Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil* (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, *Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses*, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-9-3. Construction.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8282; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-9-5. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter, the meanings ascribed to words and phrases in Article 3 of Chapter 3 of this title shall be fully applicable to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-9-7. Parties deemed guilty of offenses.

Every person who commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of, any act declared in Chapters 3, 5, or 7 of this title, to be a crime, whether individually or in connection with one or more other persons or as a principal, agent, or accessory, shall be guilty of such offense. Every person who falsely, fraudulently, forcibly, or wilfully induces, causes, coerces, requires, permits, or directs another to violate any provision of said chapter is likewise guilty of such offense.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8277; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Entrapment to commit traffic offense. 34 A.L.R.4th 1167.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1318.

§ 63-9-9. Requiring or permitting operation of vehicle in manner contrary to law.

It is unlawful for the owner, or any other person, employing or otherwise directing the driver of any vehicle to require or knowingly to permit the operation of such vehicle upon a highway in any manner contrary to law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8278; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-9-11. Penalties for violations of Chapters 3, 5 or 7.

(1) It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of Chapter 3, 5 or 7 of this title, unless such violation is by such chapters or other law of this state declared to be a felony.

(2) Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of such chapters for which another penalty is not provided shall for first conviction thereof be punished by a fine of not more than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) or by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days; for a second such conviction within one (1) year thereafter such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than Two Hundred Dollars (\$200.00) or by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) days or by both such fine and imprisonment; upon a third or subsequent conviction within one (1) year after the first conviction such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(3)(a) Whenever a person not covered under Section 63-1-55 is charged with a misdemeanor violation of any of the provisions of Chapter 3, 5 or 7 of this title, the person shall be eligible to participate in not less than four (4) hours of a traffic safety violator course and thereby have no record of the violation on the person's driving record if the person meets all the following conditions:

- (i) The defendant has a valid Mississippi driver's license or permit.
- (ii) The defendant has not had a conviction of a violation under Chapter 3, 5 or 7 of this title within three (3) years before the current offense; any conviction entered before October 1, 2002, does not constitute a prior offense for the purposes of this subsection (3).
- (iii) The defendant's public and nonpublic driving record as maintained by the Department of Public Safety does not indicate successful completion of a traffic safety violator course under this section in the three-year period before the offense.
- (iv) The defendant files an affidavit with the court stating that this is the defendant's first conviction in more than three (3) years or since October 1, 2002, whichever is the lesser period of time; the defendant is not in the process of taking a course under this section; and the defendant has not completed a course under this section that is not yet reflected on the defendant's public or nonpublic driving record.
- (v) The offense charged is for a misdemeanor offense under Chapter 3, 5 or 7 of this title.
- (vi) The defendant pays the applicable fine, costs and any assessments required by law to be paid upon conviction of such an offense.
- (vii) The defendant pays to the court an additional fee of Ten Dollars (\$10.00) to elect to proceed under the provisions of this subsection (3).

(b)(i)1. An eligible defendant may enter a plea of nolo contendere or guilty in person or in writing and present to the court, in person or by mail postmarked on or before the appearance date on the citation, an oral or written request to participate in a course under this subsection (3).

2. The court shall withhold acceptance of the plea and defer sentencing in order to allow the eligible defendant ninety (90) days to successfully complete not less than four (4) hours of a court-approved

traffic safety violator course at the cost of the defendant. Upon proof of successful completion entered with the court, the court shall dismiss the prosecution and direct that the case be closed. The only record maintained thereafter shall be the nonpublic record required under Section 63-9-17 solely for use by the courts in determining eligibility under this subsection (3).

(ii) If a person pleads not guilty to a misdemeanor offense under any of the provisions of Chapter 3, 5 or 7 of this title but is convicted, and the person meets all the requirements under paragraph (a) of this subsection, upon request of the defendant the court shall suspend the sentence for such offense to allow the defendant forty-five (45) days to successfully complete not less than four (4) hours of a court-approved traffic safety violator course at his own cost. Upon successful completion by the defendant of the course, the court shall set the conviction aside, dismiss the prosecution and direct that the case be closed. The court on its own motion shall expunge the record of the conviction, and the only record maintained thereafter shall be the nonpublic record required under Section 63-9-17 solely for use by the courts in determining an offender's eligibility under this subsection (3).

(c) An out-of-state resident shall be allowed to complete a substantially similar program in his home state, province or country provided the requirements of this subsection (3) are met, except that the necessary valid driver's license or permit shall be one issued by the home jurisdiction.

(d) A court shall not approve a traffic safety violator course under this subsection (3) that does not supply at least four (4) hours of instruction, an instructor's manual setting forth an appropriate curriculum, student workbooks, some scientifically verifiable analysis of the effectiveness of the curriculum and provide minimum qualifications for instructors.

(e) A court shall inform a defendant making inquiry or entering a personal appearance of the provisions of this subsection (3).

(f) The Department of Public Safety shall cause notice of the provisions of this subsection (3) to be available on its official website.

(g) Failure of a defendant to elect to come under the provisions of this subsection (3) for whatever reason, in and of itself, shall not invalidate a conviction.

(h) No employee of the sentencing court shall personally benefit from a defendant's attendance of a traffic safety violator course. Violation of this prohibition shall result in termination of employment.

(i) The additional fee of Ten Dollars (\$10.00) imposed under this subsection (3) shall be forwarded by the court clerk to the State Treasurer for deposit into a special fund created in the State Treasury. Monies in the special fund may be expended by the Department of Public Safety, upon legislative appropriation, to defray the costs incurred by the department in maintaining the nonpublic record of persons who are eligible for participation under the provisions of this subsection (3).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8275; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2002, ch. 566, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 315, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment, effective October 1, 2002, rewrote the section.

The 2004 amendment deleted former (3)(j), which contained a repealer provision for (3).

Cross References — Imposition and collection of an assessment in addition to a fine or bail forfeiture for any hazardous moving traffic violation which must be deposited in an emergency medical services operating fund, see § 41-59-61.

Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see § 63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

Insurer setting up violation of various traffic laws by insured as defense to action on policy excepting death in consequence of violation of law, may not be required to prove all the violations charged. *Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hinton*, 247 Miss. 838, 157 So. 2d 486 (1963).

This section [Code 1942, § 8275] governs the punishment which may be im-

posed for violation of Code 1942, § 8176, which pertains to lawful rates of speed. *White v. City of Philadelphia*, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493 (1944), error overruled, 197 Miss. 178, 19 So. 2d 744 (1944).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Under an earlier statute containing similar provisions, a sentence of \$50 fine and 30 days in jail for first offense was held erroneous. *Snipes v. State*, 144 Miss. 266, 109 So. 722 (1926).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A defendant must inform the court either orally or in writing postmarked on or before the date listed on the citation that he/she plans on attending a traffic safety violator course or he/she becomes ineligible to have the violation removed from his/her record as authorized by this section. *Mullen*, Oct. 4, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0573.

A court may supply to a defendant a list of the courses that have been approved by the court and allow the defendant to choose which course to attend from that list. *O'Brien*, Oct. 18, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0598.

The affidavit required by this section may be acknowledged by the court clerk or judge or any individual who has the authority to acknowledge an oath. *Cruber*, Oct. 18, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0599.

It is the defendant's choice whether he/she will attend the traffic safety violator course, if he/she is eligible; if the court determines that the defendant is not eligible to attend the traffic safety violator course, the court should process the traffic ticket in the normal course of business. *Cruber*, Oct. 18, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0599.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license

for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations. 48 A.L.R.4th 367.

§ 63-9-12. Payment of fines by personal check; liability for dishonored check.

Personal checks shall be accepted from Mississippi residents in payment of any fine imposed as a result of a violation of Chapters 3, 5 and 7 of Title 63, Mississippi Code of 1972. The person accepting a check in payment of such a fine shall not be liable if such check is returned not paid provided he makes reasonable efforts to collect the fine.

SOURCES: Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Authority of justice court clerk to refuse to accept personal checks, except as provided in this section, see § 9-11-27.

§ 63-9-13. Disposition of fines and forfeitures for violations of Chapters 3, 5 or 7.

All fines and forfeitures collected upon conviction or upon forfeiture of bail of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of Chapters 3, 5 or 7 of this title constituting a misdemeanor shall be deposited in the treasury of the county maintaining the court wherein such conviction or forfeiture was had.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8276; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References — Imposition and collection of an assessment in addition to fine or bail forfeiture for any hazardous moving traffic violation which must be deposited in an emergency medical services operating fund, see § 41-59-61.

Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see § 63-9-12.

§ 63-9-15. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.
[Codes, 1942, § 8280; Laws, 1938, ch. 200]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-9-15 related to disposition of fines and forfeitures.

§ 63-9-17. Maintenance of records relating to charged offenses; records and reports of convictions.

(1) Every court shall keep a full record of the proceedings of every case in which a person is charged with any violation of law regulating the operation of vehicles on the highways, streets or roads of this state.

(2) Unless otherwise sooner required by law, within forty-five (45) days after the conviction of a person upon a charge of violating any law regulating the operation of vehicles on the highways, streets or roads of this state, every court in which such conviction was had shall prepare and immediately forward to the Department of Public Safety an abstract of the record of said court covering the case in which said person was so convicted, which abstract must

be certified by the person so authorized to prepare the same to be true and correct.

(3) Said abstract must be made upon a form approved by the Department of Public Safety, and shall include the name and address of the party charged, the registration number of the vehicle involved, the nature of the offense, the date of hearing, the plea, the judgment, and if the fine was satisfied by prepayment or appearance bond forfeiture, and the amount of the fine or forfeiture, as the case may be.

(4) Every court shall also forward a like report to the Department of Public Safety upon the conviction of any person of manslaughter or other felony in the commission of which a vehicle was used.

(5) Every court shall also forward a like report to the Department of Public Safety after the satisfactory completion by a defendant of an approved traffic safety violator course under Section 63-9-11, and the department shall make and maintain a private, nonpublic record to be kept for a period of three (3) years. The record shall be solely for the use of the courts in determining eligibility under Section 63-9-11, as a first-time offender, and shall not constitute a criminal record for the purpose of private or administrative inquiry. Reports forwarded to the Department of Public Safety under this subsection shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983.

(6) The failure by refusal or neglect of any such judicial officer to comply with any of the requirements of this section shall constitute misconduct in office and shall be grounds for removal therefrom.

(7) The Department of Public Safety shall keep copies of all abstracts received hereunder for a period of three (3) years at its main office and the same shall be open to public inspection during reasonable business hours. This subsection shall not apply to nonpublic records maintained solely for the use of the courts in determining offender eligibility.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8281; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1985, ch. 363, § 4; Laws, 1990, ch. 351, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 566, § 2; Laws, 2004, ch. 315, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment, effective October 1, 2002, rewrote the section.

The 2004 amendment deleted the former last sentence of (5), which contained a repealer provision for (5).

Cross References — Municipal courts generally, see §§ 21-23-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The conduct of a justice court judge warranted his removal from office where, during a 3-year period, he adjudicated approximately 28 driving under the influence cases wherein he did not file an abstract of the court record of convictions

with the Commissioner of Public Safety as required by § 63-11-37 and he adjudicated approximately 552 routine traffic convictions but failed to report these to the Department of Public Safety as required by § 63-9-17. *In re Quick*, 553 So. 2d 522 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Admissibility of traffic conviction in later state civil trial, 73 A.L.R.4th 691.

§ 63-9-19. Compensation of peace officers for services in traffic violation cases.

The collection of fees for the performance of services in making arrests in traffic violation cases and taking the accused before the court for trial or to jail awaiting trial shall be restricted to that peace officer who performs such services, and, if performed by a highway patrolman, shall not be compensated. No peace officer accompanying a highway patrolman in the performance of such duties shall receive any compensation.

No peace officer shall be compensated for attending court in traffic violation cases wherein a plea of guilty is entered unless said peace officer was the arresting officer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285.7; Laws, 1958, ch. 288.

§ 63-9-21. Uniform Traffic Ticket Law.

(1) This section shall be known as the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law.

(2) All traffic tickets, except traffic tickets filed electronically as provided under subsection (8) of this section, shall be printed in the original and at least two (2) copies and such other copies as may be prescribed by the State Auditor. All traffic tickets shall be uniform as prescribed by the State Auditor and the Attorney General, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3)(b) and except that such state officers may alter the form and content of traffic tickets to meet the varying requirements of the different law enforcement agencies. The State Auditor and the Attorney General shall prescribe a separate traffic ticket, consistent with the provisions of subsection (3)(b) of this section, to be used exclusively for violations of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law.

(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, every traffic ticket issued by any sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, county patrol officer, municipal police officer or State Highway Patrol officer for any violation of traffic or motor vehicle laws shall be issued on the uniform traffic ticket consisting of an original and at least two (2) copies and such other copies as may be prescribed by the State Auditor.

(b) The traffic ticket, citation or affidavit which is issued to a person arrested for a violation of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law shall be uniform throughout all jurisdictions in the State of Mississippi. It shall contain a place for the trial judge hearing the case or accepting the guilty plea, as the case may be, to sign, stating that the person arrested either employed an attorney or waived his right to an attorney after having been properly advised of his right to have an attorney. If the person arrested employed an attorney, the name, address and telephone number of the attorney shall be written on the ticket, citation or affidavit.

(c) Every traffic ticket shall show, among other necessary information, the name of the issuing officer, the name of the court in which the cause is to be heard, and the date and time such person is to appear to answer the charge. The ticket shall include information which will constitute a complaint charging the offense for which the ticket was issued, and when duly sworn to and filed with a court of competent jurisdiction, prosecution may proceed thereunder.

(4) All traffic tickets, except traffic tickets filed electronically under subsection (8) of this section, shall be bound in book form, shall be consecutively numbered and each traffic ticket shall be accounted for to the officer issuing such book. Said traffic ticket books shall be issued to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables and county patrol officers by the chancery clerk of their respective counties, to each municipal police officer by the clerk of the municipal court, and to each State Highway Patrol officer by the Commissioner of Public Safety.

(5) The chancery clerk, clerk of the municipal court and the Commissioner of Public Safety shall keep a record of all traffic ticket books issued and to whom issued, accounting for all books printed and issued.

(6) The original traffic ticket, unless the traffic ticket is filed electronically as provided under subsection (8) of this section, shall be delivered by the officer issuing the traffic ticket to the clerk of the court to which it is returnable to be retained in that court's records and the number noted on the docket. The officer issuing the traffic ticket shall also give the accused a copy of the traffic ticket. The clerk of the court shall file a copy with the State Auditor within forty-five (45) days after judgment is rendered showing the amount of the fine and cost or, in cases in which no judgment has been rendered, within one hundred twenty (120) days after issuance of the ticket. Other copies that are prescribed by the State Auditor pursuant to this section shall be filed or retained as may be designated by the State Auditor. All copies shall be retained for at least two (2) years.

(7) Failure to comply with the provisions of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punishable by a fine of not less than Ten Dollars (\$10.00) nor more than One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00).

(8)(a) Law enforcement officers and agencies may file traffic tickets by computer or electronic means if the ticket conforms in all substantive respects, including layout and content, as provided under subsection (2) of this section. The provisions of subsection (4) of this section requiring tickets bound in book form do not apply to a ticket that is produced by computer or electronic means. Information concerning tickets produced by computer or electronic means shall be available for public inspection in substantially the same manner as provided for the uniform tickets described in subsection (2) of this section.

(b) The defendant shall be provided with a paper copy of the ticket. A law enforcement officer who files a ticket electronically shall be considered to have certified the ticket and has the same rights, responsibilities and liabilities as with all other tickets issued pursuant to this section.

(c) The provisions of this subsection (8) do not apply to tickets issued for a violation of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285.5; Laws, 1958, ch. 260, §§ 1-7; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 13; Laws, 1982, ch. 464; Laws, 1984, ch. 352; Laws, 1985, ch. 363, § 3; Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 3; Laws, 2003, ch. 550, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2003.)

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment added (8); and inserted "except traffic tickets filed electronically as provided under subsection (8) of this section" following "traffic tickets" throughout the section.

Cross References — Duties of constables generally, see § 19-19-5.

Sheriffs generally, see §§ 19-25-1 et seq.

Highway safety patrol, generally, see § 45-3-21.

County patrol officers generally, see §§ 45-7-1 et seq.

Deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see § 63-9-25.

Mississippi Implied Consent Law, see §§ 63-11-1 et seq.

Traffic ticket, citation or affidavit issued for a violation of Implied Consent Law to conform to requirements of this section, see § 63-11-5.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of driving under the influence in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 over his objection to irregularities in the "copy" of the citation/affidavit he received because, although defendant did not have an exact blood alcohol content (BAC) reading listed on the copy of the citation that he received, he was nevertheless aware that his BAC level was above that allowable for individuals under the legal age to purchase alcohol; thus, defendant's traffic ticket complied with Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-21(6) and (3)(b) and (c). *Palmer v.*

City of Oxford, 860 So. 2d 1203 (Miss. 2003).

A uniform traffic ticket contained the required information where the notice of the date, time, and court where the defendant was to appear were clearly noted on the ticket signed by the issuing officer. *Wheeler v. Stewart*, 798 So. 2d 386 (Miss. 2001).

Justice court judge whose ignorance and incompetence results in skimming of traffic ticket funds or other funds is to be removed from office. *In re Garner*, 466 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1985).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Formal requisites of affidavit are title, venue, signature, jurat, and authentication, but essentials are that it is in writing and that it is sworn to by some legally

authorized officer; traffic ticket form, i.e. affidavit, when sworn to shall be read and considered as whole, which would include parts in issue, i.e. (State of Mississippi,

County of), (location) and (highway/Street). Moss, Sept. 12, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0667.

Uniform Traffic Ticket may be used to charge person with reckless driving; police officer or any other witness to crime may testify to any relevant facts and is not limited to facts stated in affidavit or ticket. Gross, July 15, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0462.

Although Miss. Code Section 21-23-7 requires complaint filed in municipal court to state statute or ordinance relied upon, Uniform Traffic Ticket Law, Miss. Code Section 63-9-21(2), constitutes exception thereto for traffic violations. Baker, Feb. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0035.

On traffic ticket, it is required by Miss. Code Section 63-9-21(3)(c) that county of infraction be written on blank signifying location. Bonds, Apr. 7, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0101.

Under Uniform Traffic Ticket Law, Miss. Code Section 63-9-21, copy of official document is usable when copy is duly sworn to, as was original. Cooke, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0239.

Section 63-9-21 is the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law and states that the State Auditor and the Attorney General shall prescribe a uniform traffic ticket. Upon notification by the State Auditor's Office, the city clerk should have the new tickets printed and collect all of the old tickets from the municipal law enforcement officers. Thompson, October 11, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0678.

As long as the municipality's ticket conforms to the requirements of Section 63-9-21, which is known as the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law, the designation of the Town of Burnsville as the "City of Burnsville" does not deprive the municipal court of jurisdiction. Such a scrivener's error does not deprive the individual issued the ticket of notice concerning the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Therefore, the Town of Burnsville may continue to issue the citations already printed up but, any newly printed tickets should properly

identify Burnsville as a town and not a city. Cadle, December 13, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0725.

A patrol officer appointed as a deputy court clerk may not administer an oath of affidavit to himself or herself for traffic citations issued by that officer, and each citation must be sworn to separately to be considered an affidavit. Pickens, July 3, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0365.

Original traffic tickets must be retained for at least two years and, while there are no prescribed means or methods of destruction or notification prior to destruction of such tickets after two years, nor any requirements for record keeping past two years, reference should be made to the Local Government Records Committee to ascertain whether there are any schedules mandating retention for a longer time. Harmon, January 30, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0036.

A dispatcher who takes original information from an incoming telephone call, thereby becoming a potential fact witness, may perform the administrative function of acknowledging or taking an officer's oath on a charging document that results from the situation. Holland, Apr. 5, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0158.

Because § 63-9-21(3)(c) requires the date and time for appearance on the face of a traffic ticket, notice to a defendant to either pay the ticket or contact the court does not satisfy the requirements of the statute. Payne, Sept. 6, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0487.

By using the mandatory "shall" in subsection (3)(c) of this section, the Legislature has required the date and time for appearance to be shown on the face of the citation. Payne, Oct. 10, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0559.

In regard to revising Implied Consent or DUI citations because of changes in the law, a municipality must comply with this section and may not delay ordering revised citations until the current supply is exhausted. Mullen, Oct. 18, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0572.

§ 63-9-23. Exclusivity of procedure prescribed in chapter.

The foregoing provisions of this chapter shall govern all police officers in making arrests without a warrant for violations of Chapters 3, 5 and 7 of this

title for offenses committed in their presence, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of like grade.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8279; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Statutes authorize officer of Mississippi Highway Patrol to use Uniform Traffic Ticket for certain violations which are committed in their presence, regardless of whether officer was on highway or on county road or city street; preprinted affidavit used by law enforcement for D.U.I.

may be used by highway patrol for any D.U.I. charge filed by officer without reference to whether offense was committed on highway, county road, city street, etc. Huffman, April 26, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0278.

§ 63-9-25. Deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail.

(1) Whenever any person lawfully possessed of a driver's license theretofore issued to him by the Department of Public Safety of the State of Mississippi, or under the laws of any other state or territory, or the District of Columbia of the United States, shall be arrested and charged with any offense against the traffic or motor vehicle laws or rules of the road of this state, or any municipality thereof, he shall have the option of depositing his driver's license so issued to him with the arresting officer or the court in lieu of any other security which may be required for his appearance in any court in this state in answer to such charge lodged in such court.

(2) If such person arrested elects to deposit his license as provided, the arresting officer or court shall issue such person a receipt for said license upon a form furnished or prescribed by the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, and thereafter said person shall be permitted to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state and streets of the municipalities thereof during the pendency of the case in which the license was deposited unless his license or privilege is otherwise revoked, suspended or canceled, but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days.

(3) The clerk of the court in which the charge is lodged shall immediately forward to the department the license of the driver deposited in lieu of bail if the driver fails to appear in answer to the charge against him. The Commissioner of Public Safety or his authorized agent shall, upon receipt of a license so forwarded by the court, suspend the driver's license and driving privilege of the defaulting driver until notified by the court that the charge against such driver has been finally adjudicated.

(4) The commissioner shall, upon receipt of a license of a nonresident driver, forward notice to his counterpart in the state of the driver's residence of the fact that such driver has been charged with a traffic or motor vehicle offense or a violation of the rules of the road and has so deposited his license in lieu of bail.

(5) The making of an application for a duplicate driver's license during the period when the original license is posted for an appearance in a court shall be

unlawful, shall constitute a misdemeanor and a person convicted thereof shall be subject to a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both fine and imprisonment.

(6) The provisions of this section shall not govern arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. The procedure set forth in the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, Sections 63-11-1 through 63-11-47, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall apply.

SOURCES: Laws, 1975, ch. 384; Laws, 1976, ch. 387; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 11; Laws, 1990, ch. 350, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References — Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person's driver's license or driving privileges, see § 63-1-52.

Guaranteed arrest bond certificate in lieu of cash bail for certain traffic violations, see § 63-9-27.

Applicability of this section to nonresident traffic violator compact, see § 63-10-3.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-9-27. Posting of guaranteed arrest bond certificate in lieu of cash bail.

(1) A guaranteed arrest bond certificate with respect to which a fidelity and surety company has become surety as provided in subsection (2) of this section, when posted by the person whose signature appears thereon, shall be accepted in lieu of cash bail in an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars (\$200.00), as a bail bond, to guarantee the appearance of such person in any court in this state at such time as may be required by the court, when such person is arrested for violation of any traffic laws of any municipality or county of this state, except for the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs or narcotics, or for any felony, and the alleged violation was committed prior to the date of expiration shown on such guaranteed arrest bond certificate.

Any such guaranteed arrest bond certificate so posted as a bail bond in any court in this state shall be subject to the forfeiture and collection provisions of law applicable to a bail bond, except that any judgment forfeiting a guaranteed arrest bond certificate rendered under such forfeiture and collection provisions shall, at any time within thirty (30) days after rendition, be set aside upon the surrender, or the appearance and trial and conviction or acquittal of the defendant, or upon a continuance granted upon motion of the district attorney after such appearance.

(2) Any domestic or foreign insurance company which has qualified to transact fidelity and surety insurance business in this state may, in any year, become surety in an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars (\$200.00) with respect to each guaranteed arrest bond certificate issued in such year by an automobile club, automobile association or insurance company authorized to transact automobile liability insurance business within this state or by the fidelity and surety company itself.

The term “guaranteed arrest bond certificate,” as used in this section, means a printed card or other certificate issued by an automobile club, automobile association, insurance company authorized to transact automobile liability insurance within this state, or an insurance company authorized to transact fidelity and surety insurance business within this state to any of its members or insureds, which is signed by such member or insured, and contains a printed statement that a fidelity and surety company authorized to do business in this state guarantees the appearance of the person whose signature appears on the card or certificate, and that such company will, in the event of the failure of such person to appear in court at the time of trial, pay any fine or forfeiture imposed on such person in an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars (\$200.00).

The issuance of a “guaranteed arrest bond certificate,” as defined above, by an automobile club, automobile association or insurance company not authorized to transact fidelity and surety insurance business in this state shall not be construed as engaging in fidelity and surety insurance business in this state by such automobile club, automobile association or insurance company.

(3) This section shall be supplementary and complementary to section 63-9-25 and shall not be construed as affecting or amending that section in any way.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 318; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1981.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (1). The letter “s” was deleted from the end of the word “offenses” so that “except for the offenses of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs or narcotics” now reads as “except for the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs or narcotics.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting.

Cross References — Authorized automobile club services, see § 83-11-203.

Fidelity or surety company authorized to give bail, see § 99-5-7.

Cash bail bond, see § 99-5-9.

Forfeiture of bond-scire facias, see § 99-5-25.

Authority of sureties to arrest and surrender principal, see § 99-5-27.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. 1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Insurance, 50 Miss. L. J. 813, December, 1979.

§ 63-9-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2002, ch. 320, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

[Laws, 1985, ch. 363, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 403, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-9-29 provided for the waiver of trial and payment of fine without appearing in justice court.

§ 63-9-31. Additional surcharge for traffic violations to fund automation of citations issued by Highway Safety Patrol and wireless radio communications programs. [Repealed effective July 1, 2006].

(1) In addition to any other monetary penalties and other penalties imposed by law, any county or municipality which participates in a wireless radio communications program approved by the applicable governing authorities may assess an additional surcharge in an amount not to exceed Ten Dollars (\$10.00) on each person upon whom a court imposes a fine or other penalty for each violation of Title 63, Mississippi Code of 1972, except offenses relating to vehicular parking or registration. On all citations issued by Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol officers, a surcharge in the amount of Ten Dollars (\$10.00) shall be collected by the court and deposited as provided in subsection (2) of this section. The proceeds from the surcharge on citations issued by county and municipal law enforcement officers may be used by a county or municipality only to fund that county's or municipality's participation in the wireless radio communications program by funding public safety wireless communications systems and related computer and communications equipment. The proceeds from the surcharge on citations issued by Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol officers shall be used as provided in subsection (2) of this section. All proceeds from the surcharge imposed by this subsection shall be deposited into a special fund in the Department of Public Safety's Office of Public Safety Planning. The Office of Public Safety Planning shall promulgate rules and procedures relating to the administration of the special fund and the disbursement of monies in the fund to participating governmental entities. The maximum amount that a governmental entity may receive from the special fund shall be an amount equal to the deposits made into the fund by that entity, less one percent (1%) to be retained by the Office of Public Safety Planning to defray the costs of administering the special fund. Interest earned on the special fund shall remain in the fund and shall be used by the Office of Public Safety Planning to further defray the costs of administering the special fund.

(2) Deposits into the special fund resulting from citations issued by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol shall be utilized as follows: Fifty percent (50%) of the deposits into the special fund shall be used to automate the citations issued by Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol officers (including the transmittal of citations to the justice court, retrieval of the disposition from the justice court, and updating the driver's records) and fifty percent (50%) of the deposits into the special fund shall be used for the purpose of funding wireless communications and related computer equipment and computer software, subject to the approval of the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services.

(3) Approval of a wireless radio communications program must be given by the applicable governing authorities when:

(a) The program includes the sharing of support facilities, including, but not limited to, towers, shelters and microwave, by participating entities; or

(b) The program includes the establishment of a mutual aid system using common radio frequency channels between participating entities; or

(c) The program sets forth a feasible methodology that utilizes the radio frequency spectrum in an efficient manner.

(4) Participating counties, municipalities and the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol must provide notification of facilities available for interoperability to the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services annually.

(5) Counties and municipalities participating in a wireless radio communications program and the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol must comply with competitive bidding requirements prescribed in Section 31-7-13 and are encouraged to utilize an open architecture, nonproprietary system.

(6) This section shall stand repealed on July 1, 2006.

SOURCES: Laws, 2001, ch. 569, § 12; Laws, 2002, ch. 486, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 441, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2004 amendment inserted “and computer software” following “related computer equipment” in (2); and extended the date of the repealer in (6) from “July 1, 2004” until “July 1, 2006”.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The statute does not require that all municipalities in a participating county participate or that a county participate if municipalities within that county wish to participate; however, for a municipality to participate in an intergovernmental wireless radio communications program, there

must be at least one other governmental entity in that program, as one municipality cannot, by itself, participate in an intergovernmental wireless radio communications program. Crow, Jr. Oct. 5, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0613.

CHAPTER 10

Nonresident Traffic Violator Compact

SEC.

63-10-1. Definitions.

63-10-3. Issuance of citation to resident of reciprocating state; security for appearance; reporting of noncompliance with citation.

63-10-5. Proceedings upon noncompliance with traffic citation by nonresident.

§ 63-10-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

(a) "State" means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(b) "Reciprocating state" means any state which extends by its laws to residents of Mississippi, substantially the same rights and privileges as provided for by this chapter.

(c) "Citation" means any citation, ticket or other document issued by a state highway patrol officer for the violation of a traffic law, ordinance, rule or regulation, ordering the alleged offender to appear.

(d) "License" means any operator's or chauffeur's permit or license, or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of this state or a reciprocating state including:

(i) Any temporary or learner's permit;

(ii) The privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license; and

(iii) Any nonresident's operating privilege conferred upon a nonresident of a state pertaining to the operation by such person of a motor vehicle in such state.

(e) "Collateral" or "bond" means any cash or other security deposited to secure an appearance for trial following the issuance of a citation by a state highway patrol officer for the violation of a traffic law, ordinance, rule or regulation.

(f) "Personal recognizance" means a signed agreement by an alleged offender that he will comply with the terms of a court's directive as the result of a traffic citation served him.

(g) "Nonresident" refers only to a person who is a resident of or holds a drivers license issued by a reciprocating state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 421, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1979).

Cross References — Highway safety patrol officers generally, see §§ 45-3-1 et seq.

Comparable Laws from other States — Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-54-101.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 1441 et seq.

Texas Transportation Code §§ 703.001 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 18.

§ 63-10-3. Issuance of citation to resident of reciprocating state; security for appearance; reporting of noncompliance with citation.

(1) A state highway patrol officer, in lieu of arrest for a traffic violation, may issue a citation, as would be appropriate under the circumstances, to any motorist who is a resident of this state or holds a license issued by a reciprocating state and shall not, subject to the exceptions noted in subsection (2) of this section, require such motorist to post collateral or bond to secure his appearance but shall accept such motorist's drivers license in lieu of bond or security as provided by Section 63-9-25, Mississippi Code of 1972, provided, however, that a person so charged shall have the right, upon his request, to post collateral or bond in a manner as provided by law, and in such case, the provisions of this chapter shall not apply.

(2) No motorist shall be entitled to receive a citation under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section nor shall any state highway patrol officer issue a citation as provided for therein if the offense be included in the following:

(a) An offense for which the issuance of a citation in lieu of a hearing or the posting of collateral or bond is prohibited by the laws of this state; or

(b) An offense for which state statutes require the revocation or suspension of a motorist's license.

(3) Upon the failure of any resident or nonresident to comply with the terms of a traffic citation, the issuing officer shall request that a warrant be issued and shall report same to the commissioner of public safety or his duly authorized agent, who shall suspend such person's drivers license until such time as a disposition is had on said undisposed of traffic citation. Such report shall clearly identify the person charged; describe the violation, specify the statute, code or ordinance violated; indicate the location of the offense; give a description of the vehicle involved; and show the registration or license number of the vehicle. Such report shall be signed by the issuing officer.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 421, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1979).

Cross References — Revocation of municipal license of bus operator, see § 21-27-155.

Authority of highway patrol officers to arrest for traffic violations, see § 45-3-21.

Revocation of operators' licenses, see § 63-1-51.

§ 63-10-5. Proceedings upon noncompliance with traffic citation by nonresident.

(1) Upon receipt of a state highway patrol officer's report as described in Section 63-10-3 the commissioner of public safety or his duly authorized agent

shall transmit a certified copy of such report to the official in charge of the issuance of licenses in the reciprocating state in which the nonresident resides or by which he is licensed.

(2) Upon receipt from the licensing authority of this state or a reciprocating state in which a citation was issued of a certification of noncompliance with a citation issued in this state or a reciprocating state by a person holding a valid license issued by this state, the commissioner of public safety or his duly authorized agent shall immediately suspend such person's drivers license. The order of suspension shall indicate the reason therefor and notify the motorist that his license shall remain suspended until he has furnished satisfactory evidence indicating that he has fully complied with the terms of the court having jurisdiction in the matter. However, the department of public safety, or any employee thereof, shall not collect nor act as a collecting agency for any court-imposed fine in relation to an outstanding, undisposed of traffic case.

(3) A copy of any suspension order issued hereunder shall be furnished to the licensing authority of the reciprocating state in which the citation was issued.

(4) It shall be the duty of the director of driver services, department of public safety, to ascertain and remain informed as to which states are "reciprocating states" hereunder and, accordingly, to maintain a current listing of such states. The listings shall periodically be disseminated among the appropriate official positions of any state agency, county or municipality of this state and the licensing authorities in all other reciprocating states pursuant hereto.

SOURCES: Laws, 1979, ch. 421, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 21, 1979).

CHAPTER 11

Implied Consent Law

SEC.

- 63-11-1. Short title.
- 63-11-3. Definitions.
- 63-11-5. Implied consent to chemical tests; administration of tests; warnings; form of traffic tickets, citations or affidavits; advice regarding right to request legal or medical assistance; rules and regulations.
- 63-11-7. Authorization of blood test for dead or unconscious accident victims; use of test results.
- 63-11-8. Testing of motor vehicle operator involved in accident resulting in death.
- 63-11-9. Administration of blood test under § 63-11-7.
- 63-11-11. Taking of urine specimens.
- 63-11-13. Right of accused to have test administered by person of his choice; effect of failure to obtain additional test.
- 63-11-15. Availability of information concerning test directed by law enforcement officer to accused or his attorney.
- 63-11-17. Liability for administering test or analysis.
- 63-11-19. Requirements as to methods of testing and qualifications of test administrators; certification of administrators; testing and certification of accuracy of methods, machines or devices.
- 63-11-21. Actions by law enforcement officer upon refusal of driver to submit to test generally.
- 63-11-23. Review of report of law enforcement officer by Commissioner of Public Safety; notice of suspension; seizure of license where test indicates blood alcohol concentration above specified level; temporary permit to drive; denial of permit; representation of state in proceedings.
- 63-11-25. Appeals from forfeiture, suspension or denial of license by commissioner generally; exercise of driving privilege suspended during pendency of appeal.
- 63-11-26. Actions which foreclose judicial review.
- 63-11-27. Notification of authorities in home state of suspension of nonresident drivers privilege.
- 63-11-29. Repealed.
- 63-11-30. Operation of vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs or controlled substances, or other substances impairing ability to operate vehicle or with blood alcohol concentrations above specified levels; penalties generally; granting of hardship driving privileges; penalties for violations resulting in death, disfigurement, etc., of another; penalties for multiple offenses; concurrent running of suspensions.
- 63-11-31. Impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles registered to person convicted of DUI; installation of ignition interlock system.
- 63-11-32. Development, implementation and funding of driver improvement program for first offenders convicted of driving while intoxicated or under influence of another substance which impairs ability to operate motor vehicle.
- 63-11-33, 63-11-35. Repealed.
- 63-11-37. Contents and disposition of record of conviction under § 63-11-30.
- 63-11-39. Reduction of charges under chapter.
- 63-11-40. Driving while driving license or privilege cancelled, suspended or revoked.

- 63-11-41. Admissibility in criminal prosecution of evidence of refusal to submit to chemical test.
- 63-11-43. Repealed.
- 63-11-45. Denial of insurance coverage on ground of refusal to submit to test or upon basis of test results.
- 63-11-47. Selection and purchase of equipment and supplies.
- 63-11-49. Authorization for impoundment and forfeiture of vehicle seized under chapter; notice of intention to forfeit; forfeiture to spouse; request for judicial review.
- 63-11-51. Institution of forfeiture proceedings; filing and service of petition for forfeiture.
- 63-11-53. Disposition of forfeited vehicles; disposition of money derived from forfeited vehicles.

§ 63-11-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Mississippi Implied Consent Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-01; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 1, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

Cross References — Provisions of this chapter applicable to Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law, see § 63-1-74.

Mississippi Commercial Driver's License Law exemptions not exemption from provisions of this chapter, see § 63-1-78.

Provisions of the Implied Consent Law applying instead of statute allowing deposit of driver's license in lieu of bail, in cases of driving while intoxicated, see § 63-9-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Snowmobile operation as DWI or DUI. 56 A.L.R.4th 1092.

Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving statutes. 73 A.L.R.4th 1139.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 356 et seq.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1382 et seq.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

Law Reviews. Fraiser, Mississippi Informed Consent Law: A Survey of Decisions Responding to Recent Scientific Research on Tests for Intoxication, 72 Miss. L.J. 1037, Spring, 2003.

§ 63-11-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases shall have the meaning ascribed herein, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

- (a) "Driving privilege" or "privilege" means both the driver's license of those licensed in Mississippi and the driving privilege of unlicensed residents and the privilege of nonresidents, licensed or not, the purpose of this section being to make unlicensed and nonresident drivers subject to the same penalties as licensed residents.

(b) "Community service" means work, projects or services for the benefit of the community assigned, supervised and recorded by appropriate public officials.

(c) "Chemical test" means an analysis of a person's blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance for the determination of the presence of alcohol or any other substance which may impair a person's mental or physical ability.

(d) "Refusal to take breath, urine and/or blood test" means an individual declining to take a chemical test, and/or the failure to provide an adequate breath sample as required by the Implied Consent Law when requested by a law enforcement officer.

(e) "Alcohol concentration" means either grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath.

(f) "Qualified person to withdraw blood" means any person who has been trained to withdraw blood in the course of their employment duties including but not limited to laboratory personnel, phlebotomist, emergency medical personnel, nurses and doctors.

(g) "Victim impact panel" means a two-hour seminar in which victims of DUI accidents relate their experiences following the accident to persons convicted under the Implied Consent Law. Paneling programs shall be based on a model developed by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) victim panel or equivalent program approved by the court.

(h) "Booked" means the administrative step taken after the arrested person is brought to the police station, which involves entry of the person's name, the crime for which the arrest was made, and other relevant facts on the police docket, and which may also include photographing, fingerprinting, and the like.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-24; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 24; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 3, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

"SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act."

§ 63-11-5. Implied consent to chemical tests; administration of tests; warnings; form of traffic tickets, citations or affidavits; advice regarding right to request legal or medical assistance; rules and regulations.

(1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways, public roads and streets of this state shall be deemed to have given his consent,

subject to the provisions of this chapter, to a chemical test or tests of his breath for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. A person shall give his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the presence in his body of any other substance which would impair a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of any highway patrol officer, any sheriff or his duly commissioned deputies, any police officer in any incorporated municipality, any national park ranger, any officer of a state-supported institution of higher learning campus police force if such officer is exercising this authority in regard to a violation that occurred on campus property, or any security officer appointed and commissioned pursuant to the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District Security Officer Law of 1978 if such officer is exercising this authority in regard to a violation that occurred within the limits of the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, when such officer has reasonable grounds and probable cause to believe that the person was driving or had under his actual physical control a motor vehicle upon the public streets or highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any other substance which had impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle. No such test shall be administered by any person who has not met all the educational and training requirements of the appropriate course of study prescribed by the Board on Law Enforcement Officers Standards and Training; provided, however, that sheriffs and elected chiefs of police shall be exempt from such educational and training requirement. No such tests shall be given by any officer or any agency to any person within fifteen (15) minutes of consumption of any substance by mouth.

(2) If the officer has reasonable grounds and probable cause to believe such person to have been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways, public roads, and streets of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, such officer shall inform such person that his failure to submit to such chemical test or tests of his breath shall result in the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways of this state for a period of ninety (90) days in the event such person has not previously been convicted of a violation of Section 63-11-30, or, for a period of one (1) year in the event of any previous conviction of such person under Section 63-11-30.

(3) The traffic ticket, citation or affidavit issued to a person arrested for a violation of this chapter shall conform to the requirements of Section 63-9-21(3)(b).

(4) Any person arrested under the provisions of this chapter shall be informed that he has the right to telephone for the purpose of requesting legal or medical assistance immediately after being booked for a violation under this chapter.

(5) The Commissioner of Public Safety and the State Crime Laboratory created pursuant to Section 45-1-17 are hereby authorized from and after the passage of this section to adopt procedures, rules and regulations, applicable to the Implied Consent Law.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-09; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 9; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 568, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 4; Laws, 1991, ch. 577, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 525, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 354, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 4; Laws, 1998, ch. 551, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1998).

Editor's Note — Laws 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

"SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act."

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

"SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act."

Cross References — Pearl River Valley Water Supply District Security Officer Law of 1978, see §§ 51-9-171 et seq.

Confiscation of driver's license by arresting officer upon refusal of driver to submit to chemical test under this section, see § 63-11-21.

Penalty for conviction following tests provided for by this section, see § 63-11-30.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Constitutionality.
3. Types of tests authorized.
4. Mandatory pre-test observation.
5. Admissibility and sufficiency of test results.
- 5.5. Jury instructions.
6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

There was no authority in support of the defendant's contention that the officer must arrest the individual before administering the breath test. *Green v. State*, 710 So. 2d 862 (Miss. 1998).

As long as there is probable cause to believe that the person is impaired by some substance, an officer has acted in accordance with the statute, and consequently, the results of a blood alcohol concentration tests are admissible. *Green v. State*, 710 So. 2d 862 (Miss. 1998).

The statute provides for an affidavit containing the required information as well as a ticket. *Green v. State*, 710 So. 2d 862 (Miss. 1998).

Language in the statute that the arresting officer shall inform a driver arrested

for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor that his failure to submit to a chemical test will result in the suspension of his driver's license does not mandate an arresting officer to advise a suspect of the law's existence. *Ewing v. State*, 300 So. 2d 916, 95 A.L.R.3d 701 (Miss. 1974).

2. Constitutionality.

Initial stop of motorists at highway sobriety checkpoints conducted by state police did not violate Fourth Amendment, as balance among state's interest in preventing drunk driving, extent to which checkpoint program could reasonably be said to advance that interest, and degree of intrusion upon individual motorists, weighed in favor of program. *Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz*, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), on remand, 193 Mich. App. 690, 485 N.W.2d 135 (1992).

The statutory law providing for pre-hearing suspension of a driver's license when the driver refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test is not violative of minimum due process requirements.

Lavinghouse v. Mississippi Hwy. Safety Patrol, 620 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1993).

3. Types of tests authorized.

The language “chemical test or test of his breath,” as provided in §§ 63-11-5 and 63-11-30, contemplates the use of an intoxilyzer machine as a proper means of measuring alcohol content of the blood; as long as accuracy, reliability, and all other factors questioning the competency of the test as proof of intoxication are complied with by the administering officers, the proof thereunder is admissible. *Fulton v. City of Starkville*, 645 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1994).

The statutes under the Implied Consent Law allow not only a chemical test or tests of a person’s breath, but also other tests of a person’s blood or urine for determining alcoholic content; all 3 methods—breath, blood and urine tests—are valid tests for determining alcoholic content in a person’s body which would impair that person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. *Fulton v. City of Starkville*, 645 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1994).

4. Mandatory pre-test observation.

The length of time that a person charged with driving under the influence must be observed prior to the administration of the breath test is mandatory. By statute, that length of time is 15 minutes; however, police procedure requires that the person be observed for 20 minutes. The observation itself can be performed as long as the defendant is in the presence of the officer. The officer is not required to “stare at” the defendant for the observation to be effective. A dispute as to whether the observation lasted the mandatory length of time or whether the observation was performed while in the presence of an officer goes to the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses. *Fisher v. City of Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

5. Admissibility and sufficiency of test results.

Officer testified that approximately 45 minutes passed from the time he encountered defendant until the time the breathalyzer test was run, that defendant was in his presence the entire time and was not

allowed to take anything by mouth during that time; the trial judge properly held the evidence to be admissible, and the jury found the testimony of the officer to be credible on this question. *Graham v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 54 (Miss. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2004).

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-5, the officer properly read defendant his rights before attempting to administer the intoxilyzer test and obtaining a blood alcohol content reading. *Palmer v. City of Oxford*, 860 So. 2d 1203 (Miss. 2003).

The language “chemical test or test of his breath,” as provided in §§ 63-11-5 and 63-11-30, contemplates the use of an intoxilyzer machine as a proper means of measuring alcohol content of the blood; as long as accuracy, reliability, and all other factors questioning the competency of the test as proof of intoxication are complied with by the administering officers, the proof thereunder is admissible. *Fulton v. City of Starkville*, 645 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1994).

A defendant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated was legal, and therefore the subsequent intoxilyzer test was not tainted, even though the arresting officer did not observe the defendant driving, where the defendant admitted to the arresting officer that he had been driving an automobile which was involved in an accident, and the defendant was publicly intoxicated in the presence of the officer and others in violation of § 97-29-47. *Goforth v. City of Ridgeland*, 603 So. 2d 323 (Miss. 1992).

An officer’s failure to inform the defendant that he had a right to refuse the officer’s request for a blood sample did not render the test results inadmissible in a manslaughter prosecution against the defendant where the officer had probable cause to obtain the blood sample in that the officer knew that the defendant was the driver of an automobile which had collided head on with another vehicle, the collision occurred on a straight and level highway when the road condition was dry, the officer knew that at least two people were dead in the vehicle which the defendant hit, the officer had observed a beer in the defendant’s vehicle, and the defendant had slurred speech and dilated pupils. For

a search which would otherwise be illegal, absent consent, knowledgeable waiver of one's constitutional right not to be searched is guaranteed by Article 3, § 23 of the Mississippi Constitution. However, blood searches which are based upon probable cause are not illegal, and, therefore, the question of the defendant's knowledgeable waiver was not relevant. *Longstreet v. State*, 592 So. 2d 16 (Miss. 1991).

A conviction for driving under the influence may be based upon intoxilyzer results if the test is administered in accordance with the proper procedures and the defendant fails to introduce credible evidence which overcomes the statutory presumption of intoxication. Thus, defendants could be convicted on the basis of a breath test which presumed a 2100 to 1 breath to blood ratio where the defendants did not introduce any evidence concerning their particular ratios. *Fisher v. City of Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

5.5. Jury instructions.

A jury instruction that "a person who operates a motor vehicle over the public roads of this state has given his or her implied consent to submit to the test administered using the Intoxilyzer 5000 to determine the person's blood alcohol con-

tent" did not improperly emphasize one piece of evidence over the rest, thereby helping the state by implication by focusing the jury's attention on defendant's refusal to submit to the test. *Price v. State*, 752 So. 2d 1070 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

6. Miscellaneous.

A city was not liable to a man who was arrested for public intoxication and placed in a drunk tank, even though he was never given an intoxication test and even though it was later determined that he had in fact suffered a stroke, where there was no evidence that the city had either tacitly or explicitly encouraged the improper arrest and detention of stroke victims on charges of public drunkenness and where there was no showing that the city had been reckless or grossly negligent in its training, supervising, or disciplining of the officers or jailers involved in plaintiff's arrest and detention; although state law required that an intoximeter test must be given to those arrested for driving while intoxicated, such test was not required for those arrested merely for public drunkenness and liability would not attach on the basis of the city's policy against giving the test to persons in plaintiff's situation. *Reeves v. City of Jackson*, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Constable has authority to make arrest for D.U.I., but cannot direct giving of breath test. *Compton*, March 19, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0201.

Law enforcement officers may administer blood and urine tests for the purpose of determining the presence of a substance other than alcohol that might impair the person's ability to operate a motor vehicle. *Livingston*, July 3, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0364.

A DUI blood sample may be taken from a driver without an arrest or the driver's consent so long as there exists probable cause to make such a search, and it is not necessary to obtain a search warrant prior

to taking such a sample. *Henry*, Aug. 8, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0464.

If a police officer has probable cause to believe that an individual is driving under the influence on the state fairgrounds in violation of Section 63-11-30, the officer may stop the individual and charge the violator accordingly; however, if the operator of the vehicle refuses to submit to a chemical test, it must be shown that the vehicle was being operated on the public highways, public roads, and streets of the state before the violator can be subjected to the penalties of Section 63-11-5. *DeLaughter*, Nov. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0679.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Admissibility, in criminal case, of evidence obtained by search by private individual. 36 A.L.R.3d 553.

Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence obtained by search conducted by school official or teacher. 49 A.L.R.3d 978.

Driving while intoxicated: duty of law enforcement officer to offer suspect chemical sobriety test under implied consent law. 95 A.L.R.3d 710.

Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.

Admissibility in criminal case of blood alcohol test where blood was taken despite defendant's objection or refusal to submit to test. 14 A.L.R.4th 690.

Sufficiency of showing of physical inability to take tests for driving while intoxicated to justify refusal. 68 A.L.R.4th 776.

Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving statutes. 73 A.L.R.4th 1139.

Challenges to use of breath tests for drunk drivers based on claim that partition or conversion ratio between measured breath alcohol and actual blood alcohol is inaccurate. 90 A.L.R.4th 155.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 366-369.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1084, 1085.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 475 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license).

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 585, Blood Tests.

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Defense to Charge of Driving Under Influence of Alcohol.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 459, Proof and disproof of alcohol-induced driving impairment through evidence of observable intoxication and coordination testing.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1403, 1404.

§ 63-11-7. Authorization of blood test for dead or unconscious accident victims; use of test results.

If any person be unconscious or dead as a result of an accident, or unconscious at the time of arrest or apprehension or when the test is to be administered, or is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, such person shall be subjected to a blood test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood as provided in this chapter, if the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways, public roads and streets of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The results of such test or tests, however, shall not be used in evidence against such person in any court or before any regulatory body without the consent of the person so tested, or, if deceased, such person's legal representative. However, refusal of release of evidence so obtained by such officer or agency will in criminal actions against such person result in the suspension of his or her driver's license for a period of ninety days as provided in this chapter for conscious and capable persons who have refused to submit to such test. Blood may only be withdrawn under the provisions of Section 63-11-9. It is the intent of this chapter that blood samples taken under this section shall be used exclusively for statistical

evaluation of accident causes with safeguards established to protect the identity of such victims and to extend the rights of privileged communications to those engaged in taking, handling and evaluating such statistical evidence.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-10; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 10, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Admissibility of test results.
3. —Criminal case.

1. In general.

The privilege created by Sections 63-11-7 and 63-11-43 [repealed] to prevent the introduction into evidence of the results of blood alcohol tests taken pursuant to the provisions of the implied consent laws without the consent of the person tested are inconsistent with the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, Rules 501 and 1103, and therefore must yield. *Whitehurst v. State*, 540 So. 2d 1319 (Miss. 1989).

2. Admissibility of test results.

Blood alcohol test results were admissible in civil case when performed on driver who died as result of accident, both because decedent's representative waived statutory protection and results of test were submitted in defense of person tested, *Miss Code* §§ 63-11-7 and 63-11-43 [repealed] (1972) being intended to protect interests of person submitted to blood alcohol test. *Clark v. Pascagoula*, 507 So. 2d 70 (Miss. 1987), overruled on other grounds, *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins*, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 593 (Miss. Dec. 10, 1998).

Blood alcohol test administered as part of medical treatment is admissible in civil action where driver from whom blood is taken has made contractual waiver of physician-patient privilege. *Edwards v. Ellis*, 478 So. 2d 282 (Miss. 1985).

Where decedent ran into a truck stopped on highway, and where, several hours later, after he had been pronounced dead, a blood sample was taken from his heart and found to contain a blood alcohol level of .17, the trial judge, pursuant to § 63-11-7, properly refused to allow the defense in any way to present to the jury

the results of the blood test. *Stong v. Freeman Truck Line*, 456 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1984).

3. —Criminal case.

The results of a blood alcohol content test, which was performed on a defendant pursuant to § 63-11-7 while he was semi-conscious in a hospital, were admissible in a criminal action against the defendant, even though the statute provides that the results of such tests shall not be used in evidence against the person without the person's consent, since the statutory exclusion yielded to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, under which admission of the blood test results was permissible. *Whitehurst v. State*, 540 So. 2d 1319 (Miss. 1989).

Results of blood-alcohol test performed on defendant after automobile accident resulting in death of 2 people were admissible where officers at scene of accident smelled alcohol and saw several beer cans and whiskey bottle on floorboard, at hospital informed defendant that he was being charged with 2 counts of manslaughter, read defendant his rights, and requested and obtained his consent for blood sample; evidence was sufficient to provide probable cause to search for and seize evidence of intoxication; contention of defendant that test results should not have been admissible because evidence indicated he was unable to consent was rejected, although testimony showed that defendant was belligerent and slurred his speech, was unco-operative, and unsuccessfully resisted efforts to procure blood sample. *Whitley v. State*, 511 So. 2d 929 (Miss. 1987).

In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising out of a traffic accident, in which the defendant contended that the deceased caused the accident by suddenly turning into the defendant's lane of traffic,

the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to permit the introduction into evidence of the results of the blood alcohol test given to the deceased. This section does not prohibit the use of such evidence, over the objection of the legal representa-

tive, in favor of an accused in a criminal trial. *McNamee v. State*, 313 So. 2d 392 (Miss. 1975), overruled on other grounds, *Baker v. State*, 391 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 1980).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Section 63-11-7 makes test results obtained pursuant to 63-11-7 exempt from

scope of public records act. Younger Dec. 29, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0910.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Admissibility in criminal case of blood alcohol test where blood was taken from unconscious driver. 72 A.L.R.3d 325.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 366-369.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1084, 1085.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 475 (complaint, petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not

listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license).

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 585, Blood Tests.

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Defense to Charge of Driving Under Influence of Alcohol.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1403, 1404.

§ 63-11-8. Testing of motor vehicle operator involved in accident resulting in death.

(1) The operator of any motor vehicle involved in an accident that results in a death shall be tested for the purpose of determining the alcohol content or drug content of such operator's blood, breath or urine. Any blood withdrawal required by this section shall be administered by any qualified person and shall be administered within two (2) hours after such accident, if possible. The exact time of the accident, to the extent possible, and the exact time of the blood withdrawal shall be recorded.

(2) If any investigating law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is the operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident that has resulted in a death, it shall be such officer's duty to see that a chemical test is administered as required by this section.

(3) The results of a test administered pursuant to this section may be used as evidence in any court or administrative hearing without the consent of the person so tested.

(4) No person may refuse to submit to a chemical test required under the provisions of this section.

(5) Analysis of blood or urine to determine alcohol or drug content pursuant to this section shall be conducted by the Mississippi Crime Labora-

tory or a laboratory whose methods and procedures have been approved by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory.

SOURCES: Laws, 1995, ch. 540, § 4; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 5, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 1.5. Constitutionality.
2. Time for test.

1. In general.

In a prosecution for DUI manslaughter, the results of chemical analysis of a blood sample extracted from the defendant shortly after the accident at issue was properly admitted into evidence, notwithstanding that the blood sample was withdrawn by an uncertified technician trainee who was unable at trial to confirm that the defendant's treating physician had approved the drawing of blood in advance of her work. *Jones v. State*, 761 So. 2d 907 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

Admissibility turns on relevance, not on the timing or documentation of the blood testing. *Acklin v. State*, 722 So. 2d 1264 (Ct. App. 1998).

1.5. Constitutionality.

This section, which mandates that blood be taken from any driver involved in a fatal accident regardless of the existence of probable cause to believe that alcohol or drugs were involved, is unconstitutional, because it requires search and seizure absent probable cause. *McDuff v. State*, 763 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 2000).

This section, which mandates that blood be taken from any driver involved in a fatal accident regardless of the existence of probable cause to believe that alcohol or drugs were involved, does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. *McDuff v. State*, 763 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 2000).

2. Time for test.

The results of a blood test performed two and one-half to three hours after an accident were properly introduced into evidence as there was no evidence of deliberate delay on the part of the arresting officers and the time lapse was in no way prejudicial to the defendant. *Wash v. State*, 790 So. 2d 856 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

The administration of a blood test within two and ½ hours after an accident constituted substantial compliance with statute where the delay was caused by travel time to a hospital and waiting for a nurse to obtain permission from her supervisor to perform the test. *Wilkerson v. State*, 731 So. 2d 1173 (Miss. 1998).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

An example where four persons were killed in a 32 car pile-up, under Section 63-11-8, such a multi-vehicle accident may be considered to be several "accidents," only one of which accident "resulted in a death." The officer may, through his investigation, determine which drivers were involved in the particular accident that resulted in a death, and limit blood testing to those drivers. *Perkins*, August 23, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0563.

Section 63-11-8 does not require a vehicle operator to pay for a blood test. The test is administered in order to provide

evidence for a possible prosecution. Costs of prosecution are to be paid for by the county and would include a blood test. *Perkins*, August 23, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0563.

If a law enforcement officer requests a qualified person to withdraw blood under the statute and a qualified person draws blood, the person who is qualified to withdraw blood can not be held civilly or criminally liable as the result of the proper administration of a blood test when requested in writing by a law enforcement officer to administer such a

test. Head, April 24, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0200.

Where a person qualified to withdraw blood refuses to do so, that person may not be charged with the crime under the statute. Head, April 24, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0200.

If an operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident that results in a death is taken out of state for treatment, a law enforcement officer may request the out of state medical personnel draw blood to be used to test alcohol or drug content;

however, the medical personnel are under no obligation to honor that request. Head, April 24, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0200.

The operator of any motor vehicle involved in an accident that results in a death must be tested for the purpose of determining the alcohol content or drug content of such operator's blood, breath, or urine, and there is no requirement that an officer have reasonable grounds to believe that the driver is impaired. Mitchell, July 10, 1998, A. G. Op. #98-0329.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Authentication of organic nonblood specimen taken from human body for purposes of analyss. 78 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 132 et seq., 366-369.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1080-1082, 1084-1087, 1093, 1290.

CJS. 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1321-1328.

§ 63-11-9. Administration of blood test under § 63-11-7.

Under Section 63-11-7, any qualified person acting at the request of a law enforcement officer may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of breath or urine specimens.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-17; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 17; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 6, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

It is within the duties and responsibilities of the sheriff to maintain records related to the accuracy of an intoxilyzer

machine that is located within the custody or possession of the sheriff's department. Howell, July 10, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0379.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Sufficiency of showing of physical inability to take tests for driving while in-

toxicated to justify refusal. 68 A.L.R.4th 776.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 367, 368.

§ 63-11-11. Taking of urine specimens.

If the test given under the provisions of this chapter is a chemical test of urine, the person tested shall be given such privacy in the taking of the urine specimen as will insure the accuracy of the specimen and, at the same time, maintain the dignity of the individual involved.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-19; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 19, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.

Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

False light invasion of privacy — accusation or innuendo as to criminal acts. 58 A.L.R.4th 902.

Sufficiency of showing of physical inability to take tests for driving while intoxicated to justify refusal. 68 A.L.R.4th 776.

Authentication of organic nonblood specimen taken from human body for purposes of analysis. 78 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 367, 368.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 459, Proof and disproof of alcohol-induced driving impairment through evidence of observable intoxication and coordination testing.

§ 63-11-13. Right of accused to have test administered by person of his choice; effect of failure to obtain additional test.

The person tested may, at his own expense, have a physician, registered nurse, clinical laboratory technologist or clinical laboratory technician or any other qualified person of his choosing administer a test, approved by the state crime laboratory created pursuant to Section 45-1-17, in addition to any other test, for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol in his blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of his blood, breath or urine. The failure or inability to obtain an additional test by such arrested person shall not preclude the admissibility in evidence of the test taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-18; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 18; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1981.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-13 makes clear that test results from persons performing analyses at the behest of the accused may be admitted, and the language in § 63-11-13, regarding "any other test" is comparable to the language in former Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-39(2), which authorized ad-

mission of "any other competent evidence" bearing upon the issue of whether a person was intoxicated; clearly "any other test," properly administered under appropriate procedures and designed to determine the alcohol or drug content of one's blood or urine, constitutes other competent evidence. *Jones v. State*, — So. 2d —,

2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 869 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

Trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the results of defendant's urine analysis performed by a hospital employee simply because the employee did not hold a valid permit from the State Crime Laboratory (Mississippi) pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-19; because the employee, who had 40 years experience, was clearly qualified to perform the analysis at issue, and defendant did not question the credibility of the test or the procedures used by the employee in performing the analysis, the court found that the test was reasonable and the results admissible under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 63-11-39, 63-11-13. *Jones v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 869 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

Defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide was affirmed where the appellate

court found that a hospital employee's analysis of his urine that showed defendant had cocaine in his system at the time of the fatal accident was properly admitted even though the employee was not licensed by the State crime laboratory; while Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-13 addressed tests offered by the accused, it would constitute an anomaly in the law to allow the accused to present evidence of the test analysis done by a person who was not licensed by the State crime laboratory, while, at the same time, preventing the State from using such analysis. *Jones v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

The statute does not provide for notification to be given regarding an individual's right to independent testing. *Green v. State*, 710 So. 2d 862 (Miss. 1998).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Sufficiency of showing of physical inability to take tests for driving while intoxicated to justify refusal. 68 A.L.R.4th 776.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 367, 368.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test.

§ 63-11-15. Availability of information concerning test directed by law enforcement officer to accused or his attorney.

Upon the written request of the person tested, or his attorney, full information concerning the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made available to him or to his attorney.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-20; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 20, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test.

§ 63-11-17. Liability for administering test or analysis.

No qualified person, hospital, clinic or funeral home shall incur any civil or criminal liability as the result of the proper administration of a test or chemical analysis of a person's breath, blood or urine when requested in writing by a law enforcement officer to administer such a test or perform such chemical analysis.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-21; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 21; Laws, 1973, ch. 354, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 7, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

§ 63-11-19. Requirements as to methods of testing and qualifications of test administrators; certification of administrators; testing and certification of accuracy of methods, machines or devices.

A chemical analysis of the person's breath, blood or urine, to be considered valid under the provisions of this section, shall have been performed according to methods approved by the State Crime Laboratory created pursuant to Section 45-1-17 and the Commissioner of Public Safety and performed by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the State Crime Laboratory for making such analysis. The State Crime Laboratory and the Commissioner of Public Safety are authorized to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and to issue permits which shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the State Crime Laboratory. The State Crime Laboratory shall not approve the permit required herein for any law enforcement officer other than a member of the State Highway Patrol, a sheriff or his deputies, a city policeman, an officer of a state-supported institution of higher learning campus police force, a security officer appointed and commissioned pursuant to the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District Security Officer Law of 1978, a national park ranger, a national park ranger technician, a military policeman stationed at a United States military base located within this state other than a military policeman of the Army or Air National Guard or of Reserve Units of the Army, Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps, a marine law enforcement officer employed by the Department of Marine Resources, or a conservation officer employed by the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks. The permit given a conservation officer or a marine law enforcement officer shall authorize such officer to administer tests only for violations of Sections 59-23-1 through 59-23-7.

The State Crime Laboratory shall make periodic, but not less frequently than quarterly, tests of the methods, machines or devices used in making chemical analysis of a person's breath as shall be necessary to ensure the accuracy thereof, and shall issue its certificate to verify the accuracy of the same.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-16; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 16; Laws, 1978, ch. 526, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 3; Laws, 1988, ch. 568, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 577, § 2;

Laws, 1995, ch. 620, § 5; Laws, 1999, ch. 585, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act.

Cross References — Pearl River Valley Water Supply District Security Officer Law of 1978, see §§ 51-9-171 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Qualifications of administrator and methods of administration.
3. —Particular circumstances.
4. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Certificates of intoxilyzer calibration were an example of a public record, the authentication of which was contemplated by Miss. R. Evid. 901(b)(7); because defendant did not contest that the certificates came from the county jail, they satisfied the authentication requirements of Rule 901(b)(7) and were properly admissible. *Pulliam v. State*, 856 So. 2d 461 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Certification of the intoxilyzer machines have to take place at least quarterly. *Meeks v. State*, 800 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

The statutes under the Implied Consent Law allow not only a chemical test or tests of a person's breath, but also other tests of a person's blood or urine for determining alcoholic content; all 3 methods—breath, blood and urine tests—are valid tests for determining alcoholic content in a person's body which would impair that person's ability to operate a motor vehicle. *Fulton v. City of Starkville*, 645 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1994).

2. Qualifications of administrator and methods of administration.

Trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the results of defendant's urine analysis performed by a hospital employee simply because the employee did not hold a valid permit from the State Crime Laboratory (Mississippi) pursuant

to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-19; because the employee, who had 40 years experience, was clearly qualified to perform the analysis at issue, and defendant did not question the credibility of the test or the procedures used by the employee in performing the analysis, the court found that the test was reasonable and the results admissible under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 63-11-39, 63-11-13. *Jones v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 869 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

State laid sufficient predicate for accuracy of intoxilyzer results in prosecution for felony driving under the influence (DUI), despite failure to produce the original certificate attesting to machine's accuracy, where officer testified that he was certified with state crime lab to run simulator test on intoxilyzer to certify calibration on it. *McIlwain v. State*, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

Prior to admitting results of chemical analysis in prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI), court must determine that proper procedures were followed, that operator of machine was properly certified to perform test, and that accuracy of machine was properly certified. *McIlwain v. State*, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

State is not required, for purposes of admitting certificate of accuracy for intoxilyzer, to present testimony and allow cross-examination of calibrating officer; rather, state must present testimony and allow cross-examination of calibrating officer only in absence of certification of intoxilyzer or where there is genuine issue as to authenticity of certification.

McIlwain v. State, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

A blood alcohol test is admissible into evidence when performance of the test "substantially complied" with § 63-11-19. Bearden v. State, 662 So. 2d 620 (Miss. 1995).

A chemical analysis of a person's breath, blood, or urine is deemed valid only when performed according to approved methods, by a person certified to do so, and on a machine certified to be accurate. Certification of the machine must take place at least quarterly. These safeguards ensure a more accurate result in the gathering of scientific evidence through intoxilyzers and are strictly enforced. Where one of the safeguards is deficient, the State bears the burden of showing that the deficiency did not affect the accuracy of the result. Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1990).

3. —Particular circumstances.

Although the urinalysis evidence came under the Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-21(1) physician-patient privilege, defendant could not rely on the privilege to exclude the incriminating evidence of cocaine in defendant's system where the procedure allegedly failed to comply with Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-19. Jones v. State, 858 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 2003).

State provided sufficient evidence regarding calibration of intoxilyzer used to test defendant's blood alcohol level, in prosecution for driving while intoxicated, even if state did not provide actual test cards used in calibration; best evidence rule did not apply where officer responsible for calibration testified at trial and state presented records of results of tests performed. Young v. City of Brookhaven, 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997).

There was substantial compliance with § 63-11-19, and the trial judge did not err in admitting intoxilyzer test results into evidence in a prosecution for negligently causing injury while intoxicated under § 63-11-30, where the police dispatcher who administered the intoxilyzer test had attended a one-day school for intoxilyzer test operators conducted by the Mississippi Highway Patrol and had been issued a permit, she testified that she had administered the test "on hundreds," the intoxi-

lyzer machine had been calibrated by someone from the Highway Safety Patrol a few days before the test was administered on the defendant, the dispatcher followed the checklist provided for machine operators, she told the defendant he had a right to refuse the test, the defendant blew into a mouthpiece attached to the machine until a bell rang, the printout card showed .19 percent, and the dispatcher testified that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated. Estes v. State, 605 So. 2d 772 (Miss. 1992).

The evidence was sufficient to establish that an officer who administered an intoxilyzer test was certified to operate the intoxilyzer, even though no evidence was introduced to show that the intoxilyzer used by the officer was the same model on which he was certified; the statute only requires that the person performing the test be certified to do so. However, the officer's testimony that the intoxilyzer was calibrated every month was insufficient to meet the calibration requirements of the statute where a certificate of calibrations indicated that the machine was not calibrated every month, there was no evidence to establish that the machine had been calibrated within the statutory period, and the State made no effort to carry its burden that even if the intoxilyzer was not properly certified the deficiency did not affect the accuracy of the test. Strictly enforcing the statutory requirements, there is no support for the accuracy of the results absent evidence of proper certification, and the trial court abused its discretion in finding a sufficient predicate for admitting the results of the intoxilyzer in the testimony of the officer. Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1990).

A city policeman was fully qualified to administer a breath test for alcohol content under § 63-11-19, where he had received training at the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol under the Mississippi Department of Public Safety on the use of the intoxilyzer and its predecessor machine, the intoximeter, had taken a written examination on which he made a correct score of more than 85 percent, and held a permit from the Department of

Public Safety to conduct tests on this machine; furthermore, the result of the test was properly admitted as competent evidence, where the officer precisely followed the procedure recommended by the Department of Public Safety in conducting the examination, the machine had been checked for accuracy only two days prior to the test, and the officer scrupulously followed the Department of Public Safety checklist of steps to take in administering the test, in spite of defendant's claim that the officer failed to determine that defendant's mouth was empty at the time of administering the test. *Williams v. State*, 434 So. 2d 1340 (Miss. 1983), but see *Fisher v. Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

4. Miscellaneous.

Defendant's conviction for first-offense driving under the influence of alcohol, which was based on an intoxilyzer result, was reversed because the State failed to properly authenticate copies of a page from the intoxilyzer log book and the calibration certificate; the State was required to offer either the testimony of the calibrating officer, the original certificate of calibration, or a certified copy of the

certificate as evidence of the machine's accuracy. *Jones v. State*, 798 So. 2d 592 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

When a city's intoxilyzer has been inspected and a certificate of accuracy issued, the municipal clerk's office is fairly seen as the statutorily authorized location for the certificate to be filed. *Callahan v. State*, 811 So. 2d 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

Where one of the safeguards in statute governing validity of a chemical analysis of a person's breath, blood, or urine is deficient, state bears burden of showing that deficiency did not affect accuracy of result. *McIlwain v. State*, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

A chemical analysis of defendant's blood performed by an individual not possessing a valid permit issued by the State Board of Health for making such analysis (Code 1972 § 63-11-19) was nevertheless admissible as other competent evidence under Code 1972 § 63-11-39 where evidence detailed in opinion established that test was reasonable. *Cutchens v. State*, 310 So. 2d 273 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061, 96 S. Ct. 799, 46 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1976).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Any law enforcement officer permitted to administer a chemical analysis test under this section is authorized to enforce the Alcohol Boating Safety Act within his jurisdiction. Whitmore, May 10, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0148.

Based on this section, the State Crime Laboratory and the Commissioner of Public Safety have the authority to set the

qualifications for individuals to receive a permit to conduct a chemical analysis of a person's breath, blood or urine. The only restriction is that a permit may not be issued to any law enforcement officer except those specifically enumerated in Section 63-11-19. Head, August 2, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0500.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Challenges to use of breath tests for drunk drivers based on claim that partition or conversion ratio between measured breath alcohol and actual blood alcohol is inaccurate. 90 A.L.R.4th 155.

Authentication of blood sample taken from human body for purposes of deter-

mining blood alcohol content. 76 A.L.R.5th 1.

Authentication of organic nonblood specimen taken from human body for purposes of analysis. 78 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 367, 368.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving

Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 459, Proof and disproof of alcohol-induced driving

impairment through evidence of observable intoxication and coordination testing.

§ 63-11-21. Actions by law enforcement officer upon refusal of driver to submit to test generally.

If a person refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test of his breath designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in Section 63-11-5, none shall be given, but the officer shall at that point demand the driver's license of the person, who shall deliver his driver's license into the hands of the officer. If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test under the provisions of this chapter, the person shall be informed by the law enforcement officer that the refusal to submit to the test shall subject him to arrest and punishment consistent with the penalties prescribed in Section 63-11-30 for persons submitting to the test. The officer shall give the driver a receipt for his license on forms prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner of Public Safety. The officer shall forward the driver's license together with a sworn report to the Commissioner of Public Safety stating that he had reasonable grounds and probable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways, public roads and streets of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or any other substance which may impair a person's mental or physical ability, stating such grounds, and that the person had refused to submit to the chemical test of his breath upon request of the law enforcement officer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-11; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 11; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 4; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 3; Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 5; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 8, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

"SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act."

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

"SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act."

Cross References — Implied consent to chemical test, see § 63-11-5.

Review by commissioner of arresting officer's sworn report, see § 63-11-23.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The statutory law providing for pre-hearing suspension of a driver's license when the driver refuses to submit to a

breathalyzer test is not violative of minimum due process requirements. *Lavinghouse v. Mississippi Hwy. Safety Patrol*, 620 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1993).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Under Section 63-11-21, if a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, the officer should inform the person that he is subject to arrest and upon conviction faces the same penalties as one who does submit to the test. The law enforcement office need not provide such a warning if the person does not refuse to submit to a chemical test. See also Section 63-11-30. *Jones*, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0786.

The failure to advise the person as set forth in Section 63-11-21 would not effect the prosecution. This amendment to the code section affords the defendant no additional rights. See also Section 63-11-30. *Jones*, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0786.

Pursuant to Section 63-11-21 it is only necessary for the officer to inform the driver of the consequences if the driver refuses to submit to a chemical test. See also Section 63-11-30. *Henderson*, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0763.

Section 63-11-21 does not require any checklist or form to be filled out regarding the information given to a driver who refuses to submit to a chemical test prior to the driver being charged with D.U.I. *Henderson*, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0763.

The intention of the Legislature under Section 63-11-21 was to insure that a driver was made fully aware of the consequences the driver faced if he refused to submit to a chemical test when requested by a law enforcement officer. *Henderson*, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0763.

If a defendant is convicted of DUI first offense and he also refused the intoxilyzer test, his driver's license is suspended for two years and 90 days (one year pursuant to Section 63-11-30(2)(a) plus 90 days pursuant to Section 63-11-23(1) plus one year pursuant to Section 63-11-30(4)); the two years and 90 days is reduced to 270 days upon successful completion of MASEP. *Shirley*, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Request before submitting to chemical sobriety test to communicate with counsel as refusal to take test. 97 A.L.R.3d 852.

Admissibility in criminal case of evidence that accused refused to take test of intoxication. 26 A.L.R.4th 1112.

Sufficiency of showing of physical inability to take tests for driving while intoxicated to justify refusal. 68 A.L.R.4th 776.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 122 et seq.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 475 (complaint,

petition, or declaration — by license holder — against administrative agency — to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license).

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol- Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 328-335.

§ 63-11-23. Review of report of law enforcement officer by Commissioner of Public Safety; notice of suspension; seizure of license where test indicates blood alcohol concentration above specified level; temporary permit to drive; denial of permit; representation of state in proceedings.

(1) The Commissioner of Public Safety, or his authorized agent, shall review the sworn report by a law enforcement officer as provided in Section 63-11-21. If upon such review the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his authorized agent, finds (a) that the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds and probable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways, public roads and streets of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any other substance which may impair a person's mental or physical ability; (b) that he refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer; and (c) that the person was informed that his license and/or driving privileges would be suspended or denied if he refused to submit to the chemical test, then the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his authorized agent, shall give notice to the licensee that his license or permit to drive, or any nonresident operating privilege, shall be suspended thirty (30) days after the date of such notice for a period of ninety (90) days in the event such person has not previously been convicted of a violation of Section 63-11-30, or, for a period of one (1) year in the event of any previous conviction of such person under Section 63-11-30. In the event the commissioner or his authorized agent determines that the license should not be suspended, he shall return the license or permit to the licensee.

The notice of suspension shall be in writing and given in the manner provided in Section 63-1-52(2) (a).

(2) If the chemical testing of a person's breath indicates the blood alcohol concentration was eight one-hundredths percent (.08%) or more for persons who are above the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, or two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more for persons who are below the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's blood, or breath, or urine, the arresting officer shall seize the license and give the driver a receipt for his license on forms prescribed by the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall promptly forward the license together with a sworn report to the Commissioner of Public Safety. The receipt given a person as provided herein shall be valid as a permit to operate a motor vehicle for a period of thirty (30) days in order that the defendant be processed through the court having original jurisdiction and a final disposition had. If the defendant requests a trial within thirty (30) days and such trial is not commenced within thirty (30) days, then the court shall determine if the delay in the trial is the fault of the defendant or his counsel. If the court finds that such is not the fault of the defendant or his counsel, then the court shall order the defendant's driving privileges to be extended until such time as the

defendant is convicted. If a receipt or permit to drive issued pursuant to the provisions of this subsection expires without a trial having been requested as provided for in this subsection, then the Commissioner of Public Safety or his authorized agent shall suspend the license or permit to drive or any nonresident operating privilege for the applicable period of time as provided for in subsection (1) of this section.

(3) If the person is a resident without a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in this state, the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his authorized agent, shall deny to the person the issuance of a license or permit for a period of one (1) year beginning thirty (30) days after the date of notice of such suspension.

(4) It shall be the duty of the county prosecuting attorney, an attorney employed under the provisions of Section 19-3-49, or in the event there is no such prosecuting attorney for the county, the duty of the district attorney to represent the state in any hearing held under the provisions of Section 63-11-25, under the provisions of Section 63-11-37(2) or under the provisions of Section 63-11-30(2)(a).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-12; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 12; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 5; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 4; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 25; Laws, 1991, ch. 412, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 9; Laws, 1998, ch. 505, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 542, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 367, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Editor's Note — Subsection (2) of § 63-11-37, referred to in subsection (4) of this section, was repealed effective July 1, 1987.

Laws 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

“SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act.”

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

“SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act.”

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment substituted “eight one-hundredths percent (.08%)” for ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) in the first sentence of (2).

Cross References — Right to petition for review of decision of commissioner of public safety, see § 63-11-25.

Additional suspension or denial of license or permit, see § 63-11-30.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Constitutionality.
3. Suspension procedure.
4. Evidence held sufficient.

1. In general.

Statute relied upon by motorist did not support claim that circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over motorist's pe-

tition for reduction of term of driver's license suspension for operating under influence, as statute in question was no longer in effect when motorist filed petition, and additionally statute applied only to Department of Public Safety's decision to suspend license pursuant to statute giving Department discretion whether to suspend license after driver had refused to submit to breath test. *State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prine*, 687 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 1996).

Section 63-11-23 is penal in nature and effect, and it will be construed strictly though reasonably against infliction of penalty. *State v. Martin*, 495 So. 2d 501 (Miss. 1986).

2. Constitutionality.

The statutory law providing for pre-hearing suspension of a driver's license when the driver refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test is not violative of minimum due process requirements. *Lavinghouse v. Mississippi Hwy. Safety Patrol*, 620 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1993).

3. Suspension procedure.

Fact that police officer arrested driver prior to requesting that driver submit to official breath test did not establish that improper procedures were followed in suspending driver's license for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) refusal, notwithstanding statute requir-

ing finding that person was placed under arrest after refusal to take test; "arrest" as used in statute referred to arrest for DUI, and probable cause to arrest had to exist before test could be requested, so requiring arrest only after test refusal was unworkable and was inconsistent with intent of statute. *Sheppard v. Mississippi State Hwy. Patrol*, 693 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1997).

Before the license of one subject to § 63-11-23(2) is effectively suspended, the Commission of Public Safety or his authorized agent must (1) in the appropriate administrative manner, take the affirmative step of suspending that person's license or permit to drive, and (2) give the driver notice of the suspension by registered or certified mail as provided in subsection (1) of the statute. *State v. Martin*, 495 So. 2d 501 (Miss. 1986).

4. Evidence held sufficient.

Sufficient evidence existed to find defendant guilty where although there was some argument that the results of the intoxilyzer test were within the margin of error, no evidence of the margin of error, if any, of the testing procedures was offered and the appellate court could not review the claim; the admissibility of the calibration evidence satisfied the need to prove the accuracy of the intoxilyzer. *Pulliam v. State*, 856 So. 2d 461 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

If an individual has his license suspended under this section prior to going to court, and is subsequently charged with violating § 63-11-40, (driving with license suspended for DUI), an acquittal for the original DUI charge has no effect on the charge for driving with license suspended for DUI. *Hester*, May 21, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0242.

The cost associated with impoundment, immobilization, or ignition interlock is a cost of court that should be paid by the defendant upon conviction; if the defendant is indigent, the cost may be borne by the prosecution and the defendant placed on a work program to satisfy the costs. *Dantin*, July 14, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0377.

The method of immobilization is not specified in the law and is left to the discretion of the judge; as such, the judge may tailor the method of immobilization in order to contain the costs incurred by the city or county, i.e., the removal of the tires or car battery or some other part so as to immobilize the vehicle. *Dantin*, July 14, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0377.

If a defendant is convicted of DUI second offense and he also refused the intoxilyzer test, his driver's license is suspended for five years (two years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(2)(b) plus one year pursuant to Section 63-11-23(1) plus two years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(4)); the five years is reduced to three 3 years upon successful completion of chemical

dependency treatment at a facility approved by the Department of Mental Health. Shirley, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

If a defendant is convicted of DUI third offense and he also refused the intoxilyzer test, his driver's license is suspended for 11 years (five years pursuant to Section

63-11-30(2)(c) plus one year pursuant to Section 63-11-23(1) plus five years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(4)); the 11 years is reduced to seven 7 years upon successful completion of chemical dependency treatment at a facility approved by the Department of Mental Health. Shirley, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Sufficiency of showing of physical inability to take tests for driving while intoxicated to justify refusal. 68 A.L.R.4th 776.

Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle on private property, of legislation

making drunken driving a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.5th 655.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 165 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 347 et seq.

§ 63-11-25. Appeals from forfeiture, suspension or denial of license by commissioner generally; exercise of driving privilege suspended during pendency of appeal.

If the forfeiture, suspension or denial of issuance is sustained by the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his duly authorized agent pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 63-11-23, upon such hearing, the person aggrieved may file within ten (10) days after the rendition of such decision a petition in the circuit or county court having original jurisdiction of the violation for review of such decision and such hearing upon review shall proceed as a trial de novo before the court without a jury. Provided further, that no such party shall be allowed to exercise the driving privilege while any such appeal is pending.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-13; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 13; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 5; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 10, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

"SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act."

Cross References — Representation of state in proceedings held under this section, see § 63-11-23.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Licensee was entitled to have driver's license suspension hearing conducted as trial de novo, and, thus, licensee should not have been required to present his case first and should not have been party who carried burden of persuasion. *Sheppard v. Mississippi State Hwy. Patrol*, 693 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1997).

Circuit court's erroneous placement of burden of proof upon licensee, in driver's license suspension hearing requested by licensee, was not reversible error, where facts were undisputable. *Sheppard v. Mississippi State Hwy. Patrol*, 693 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1997).

Driver's alleged confusion regarding belief that Miranda rights applied to chemical testing procedures, following stop for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) did not preclude finding that driver refused to submit to chemical testing within meaning of implied consent statute, as statute contained no requirement that such refusal be made with full knowledge of driver's rights and consequences, and driver was informed of his

right to refuse test as well as fact that, if he refused test, his license would be suspended for 90 days. *Sheppard v. Mississippi State Hwy. Patrol*, 693 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1997).

Statute relied upon by motorist did not support claim that circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over motorist's petition for reduction of term of driver's license suspension for operating under influence, as statute in question was no longer in effect when motorist filed petition, and additionally statute applied only to Department of Public Safety's decision to suspend license pursuant to statute giving Department discretion whether to suspend license after driver had refused to submit to breath test. *State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prine*, 687 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 1996).

The statutory law providing for pre-hearing suspension of a driver's license when the driver refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test is not violative of minimum due process requirements. *Lavinghouse v. Mississippi Hwy. Safety Patrol*, 620 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 175-177.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 371 et seq.

§ 63-11-26. Actions which foreclose judicial review.

When the commissioner of public safety, or his authorized agent, shall suspend the driver's license or permit to drive of a person or shall deny the issuance of a license or permit to a person as provided in Section 63-11-30, the person shall not be entitled to any judicial review of or appeal from the actions of the commissioner. A final conviction under said section shall finally adjudicate the privilege of such convicted person to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways, public roads and streets of this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 9; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Editor's Note — Laws 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

"SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act."

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

“SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act.”

§ 63-11-27. Notification of authorities in home state of suspension of nonresident drivers privilege.

When it has been finally determined under the procedures of Sections 63-11-21 through 63-11-25, that a nonresident's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended, the commissioner, or his duly authorized agent, shall give information in writing of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person's residence and of any state in which he has a license.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-14; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 14, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Necessity and sufficiency of proof were conducted in conformance with pre-
that tests of blood alcohol concentration scribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.

§ 63-11-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 1983.
[Codes, 1942, §§ 8175-02, 8175-03; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, §§ 2, 3]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-11-29 made it unlawful for a habitual user of drugs or a person under the influence of drugs to operate a vehicle, and provided penalties for a violation.

§ 63-11-30. Operation of vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs or controlled substances, or other substances impairing ability to operate vehicle or with blood alcohol concentrations above specified levels; penalties generally; granting of hardship driving privileges; penalties for violations resulting in death, disfigurement, etc., of another; penalties for multiple offenses; concurrent running of suspensions.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within this state who (a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (b) is under the influence of any other substance which has impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle; (c) has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths percent (.08%) or more for persons who are above the legal age

to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, or two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more for persons who are below the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, in the person's blood based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's breath, blood or urine administered as authorized by this chapter; (d) is under the influence of any drug or controlled substance, the possession of which is unlawful under the Mississippi Controlled Substances Law; or (e) has an alcohol concentration of four one-hundredths percent (.04%) or more in the person's blood, based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath or urine, administered as authorized by this chapter for persons operating a commercial motor vehicle.

(2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), upon conviction of any person for the first offense of violating subsection (1) of this section where chemical tests provided for under Section 63-11-5 were given, or where chemical test results are not available, such person shall be fined not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00), or imprisoned for not more than forty-eight (48) hours in jail or both; and the court shall order such person to attend and complete an alcohol safety education program as provided in Section 63-11-32. The court may substitute attendance at a victim impact panel instead of forty-eight (48) hours in jail. In addition, the Department of Public Safety, the Commissioner of Public Safety or his duly authorized agent shall, after conviction and upon receipt of the court abstract, suspend the driver's license and driving privileges of such person for a period of not less than ninety (90) days and until such person attends and successfully completes an alcohol safety education program as herein provided; provided, however, in no event shall such period of suspension exceed one (1) year. Commercial driving privileges shall be suspended as provided in Section 63-1-83.

The circuit court having jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction was had or the circuit court of the person's county of residence may reduce the suspension of driving privileges under Section 63-11-30(2)(a) if the denial of which would constitute a hardship on the offender, except that no court may issue such an order reducing the suspension of driving privileges under this subsection until thirty (30) days have elapsed from the effective date of the suspension. Hardships shall only apply to first offenses under Section 63-11-30(1), and shall not apply to second, third or subsequent convictions of any person violating subsection (1) of this section. A reduction of suspension on the basis of hardship shall not be available to any person who refused to submit to a chemical test upon the request of a law enforcement officer as provided in Section 63-11-5. When the petition is filed, such person shall pay to the circuit clerk of the court where the petition is filed a fee of Fifty Dollars (\$50.00), which shall be deposited into the State General Fund to the credit of a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury to be used for alcohol or drug abuse treatment and education, upon

appropriation by the Legislature. This fee shall be in addition to any other court costs or fees required for the filing of petitions.

The petition filed under the provisions of this subsection shall contain the specific facts which the petitioner alleges to constitute a hardship and the driver's license number of the petitioner. A hearing may be held on any petition filed under this subsection only after ten (10) days' prior written notice to the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his designated agent, or the attorney designated to represent the state. At such hearing, the court may enter an order reducing the period of suspension.

The order entered under the provisions of this subsection shall contain the specific grounds upon which hardship was determined, and shall order the petitioner to attend and complete an alcohol safety education program as provided in Section 63-11-32. A certified copy of such order shall be delivered to the Commissioner of Public Safety by the clerk of the court within five (5) days of the entry of the order. The certified copy of such order shall contain information which will identify the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the name, mailing address, street address, social security number and driver's license number of the petitioner.

At any time following at least thirty (30) days of suspension for a first offense violation of this section, the court may grant the person hardship driving privileges upon written petition of the defendant, if it finds reasonable cause to believe that revocation would hinder the person's ability to:

- (i) Continue his employment;
- (ii) Continue attending school or an educational institution; or
- (iii) Obtain necessary medical care.

Proof of the hardship shall be established by clear and convincing evidence which shall be supported by independent documentation.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), upon any second conviction of any person violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be fined not less than Six Hundred Dollars (\$600.00) nor more than One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$1,500.00), shall be imprisoned not less than five (5) days nor more than one (1) year and sentenced to community service work for not less than ten (10) days nor more than one (1) year. The minimum penalties shall not be suspended or reduced by the court and no prosecutor shall offer any suspension or sentence reduction as part of a plea bargain. Except as may otherwise be provided by paragraph (d) of this subsection, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend the driver's license of such person for two (2) years. Suspension of a commercial driver's license shall be governed by Section 63-1-83. Upon any second conviction as described in this paragraph, the court shall ascertain whether the defendant is married, and if the defendant is married shall obtain the name and address of the defendant's spouse; the clerk of the court shall submit this information to the Department of Public Safety. Further, the commissioner shall notify in writing, by certified mail, return receipt requested, the owner of the vehicle and the spouse, if any, of the person convicted of the second violation of the

possibility of forfeiture of the vehicle if such person is convicted of a third violation of subsection (1) of this section. The owner of the vehicle and the spouse shall be considered notified under this paragraph if the notice is deposited in the United States mail and any claim that the notice was not in fact received by the addressee shall not affect a subsequent forfeiture proceeding.

For any second or subsequent conviction of any person under this section, the person shall also be subject to the penalties set forth in Section 63-11-31.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), for any third or subsequent conviction of any person violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be guilty of a felony and fined not less than Two Thousand Dollars (\$2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), shall serve not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections; provided, however, that for any such offense which does not result in serious injury or death to any person, any sentence of incarceration may be served in the county jail rather than in the State Penitentiary at the discretion of the circuit court judge. The minimum penalties shall not be suspended or reduced by the court and no prosecutor shall offer any suspension or sentence reduction as part of a plea bargain. The law enforcement agency shall seize the vehicle operated by any person charged with a third or subsequent violation of subsection (1) of this section, if such convicted person was driving the vehicle at the time the offense was committed. Such vehicle may be forfeited in the manner provided by Sections 63-11-49 through 63-11-53. Except as may otherwise be provided by paragraph (e) of this subsection, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend the driver's license of such person for five (5) years. The suspension of a commercial driver's license shall be governed by Section 63-1-83.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), any person convicted of a second violation of subsection (1) of this section shall receive an in-depth diagnostic assessment, and if as a result of such assessment is determined to be in need of treatment of his alcohol and/or drug abuse problem, such person shall successfully complete treatment of his alcohol and/or drug abuse problem at a program site certified by the Department of Mental Health. Such person shall be eligible for reinstatement of his driving privileges upon the successful completion of such treatment after a period of one (1) year after such person's driver's license is suspended. Each person who receives a diagnostic assessment shall pay a fee representing the cost of such assessment. Each person who participates in a treatment program shall pay a fee representing the cost of such treatment.

(e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), any person convicted of a third or subsequent violation of subsection (1) of this section shall receive an in-depth diagnostic assessment, and if as a result of such assessment is determined to be in need of treatment of his alcohol and/or drug abuse problem, such person shall enter an alcohol and/or drug abuse program approved by the Department of Mental Health for treatment of

such person's alcohol and/or drug abuse problem. If such person successfully completes such treatment, such person shall be eligible for reinstatement of his driving privileges after a period of three (3) years after such person's driver's license is suspended.

(f) The Department of Public Safety shall promulgate rules and regulations for the use of interlock ignition devices as provided in Section 63-11-31 and consistent with the provisions therein. Such rules and regulations shall provide for the calibration of such devices and shall provide that the cost of the use of such systems shall be borne by the offender. The Department of Public Safety shall approve which vendors of such devices shall be used to furnish such systems.

(3)(a) This subsection shall be known and may be cited as Zero Tolerance for Minors. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only when a person under the age of twenty-one (21) years has a blood alcohol concentration two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more, but lower than eight one-hundredths percent (.08%). If such person's blood alcohol concentration is eight one-hundredths percent (.08%) or more, the provisions of subsection (2) shall apply.

(b) Upon conviction of any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years for the first offense of violating subsection (1) of this section where chemical tests provided for under Section 63-11-5 were given, or where chemical test results are not available, such person shall have his driver's license suspended for ninety (90) days and shall be fined Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00); and the court shall order such person to attend and complete an alcohol safety education program as provided in Section 63-11-32. The court may also require attendance at a victim impact panel.

The court in the county in which the conviction was had or the circuit court of the person's county of residence may reduce the suspension of driving privileges under Section 63-11-30(2) (a) if the denial of which would constitute a hardship on the offender, except that no court may issue such an order reducing the suspension of driving privileges under this subsection until thirty (30) days have elapsed from the effective date of the suspension. Hardships shall only apply to first offenses under Section 63-11-30(1), and shall not apply to second, third or subsequent convictions of any person violating subsection (1) of this section. A reduction of suspension on the basis of hardship shall not be available to any person who refused to submit to a chemical test upon the request of a law enforcement officer as provided in Section 63-11-5. When the petition is filed, such person shall pay to the circuit clerk of the court where the petition is filed a fee of Fifty Dollars (\$50.00), which shall be deposited into the State General Fund to the credit of a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury to be used for alcohol or drug abuse treatment and education, upon appropriation by the Legislature. This fee shall be in addition to any other court costs or fees required for the filing of petitions.

The petition filed under the provisions of this subsection shall contain the specific facts which the petitioner alleges to constitute a hardship and

the driver's license number of the petitioner. A hearing may be held on any petition filed under this subsection only after ten (10) days' prior written notice to the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his designated agent, or the attorney designated to represent the state. At such hearing, the court may enter an order reducing the period of suspension.

The order entered under the provisions of this subsection shall contain the specific grounds upon which hardship was determined, and shall order the petitioner to attend and complete an alcohol safety education program as provided in Section 63-11-32. A certified copy of such order shall be delivered to the Commissioner of Public Safety by the clerk of the court within five (5) days of the entry of the order. The certified copy of such order shall contain information which will identify the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the name, mailing address, street address, social security number and driver's license number of the petitioner.

At any time following at least thirty (30) days of suspension for a first offense violation of this section, the court may grant the person hardship driving privileges upon written petition of the defendant, if it finds reasonable cause to believe that revocation would hinder the person's ability to:

- (i) Continue his employment;
- (ii) Continue attending school or an educational institution; or
- (iii) Obtain necessary medical care.

Proof of the hardship shall be established by clear and convincing evidence which shall be supported by independent documentation.

(c) Upon any second conviction of any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) and shall have his driver's license suspended for one (1) year.

(d) For any third or subsequent conviction of any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be fined not more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) and shall have his driver's license suspended until he reaches the age of twenty-one (21) or for two (2) years, whichever is longer.

(e) Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years convicted of a second violation of subsection (1) of this section, may have the period that his driver's license is suspended reduced if such person receives an in-depth diagnostic assessment, and as a result of such assessment is determined to be in need of treatment of his alcohol and/or drug abuse problem and successfully completes treatment of his alcohol and/or drug abuse problem at a program site certified by the Department of Mental Health. Such person shall be eligible for reinstatement of his driving privileges upon the successful completion of such treatment after a period of six (6) months after such person's driver's license is suspended. Each person who receives a diagnostic assessment shall pay a fee representing the cost of such assessment. Each person who participates in a treatment program shall pay a fee representing the cost of such treatment.

(f) Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years convicted of a third or subsequent violation of subsection (1) of this section shall complete treatment of an alcohol and/or drug abuse program at a site certified by the Department of Mental Health.

(g) The court shall have the discretion to rule that a first offense of this subsection by a person under the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be nonadjudicated. Such person shall be eligible for nonadjudication only once. The Department of Public Safety shall maintain a confidential registry of all cases which are nonadjudicated as provided in this paragraph. A judge who rules that a case is nonadjudicated shall forward such ruling to the Department of Public Safety. Judges and prosecutors involved in implied consent violations shall have access to the confidential registry for the purpose of determining nonadjudication eligibility. A record of a person who has been nonadjudicated shall be maintained for five (5) years or until such person reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years. Any person whose confidential record has been disclosed in violation of this paragraph shall have a civil cause of action against the person and/or agency responsible for such disclosure.

(4) In addition to the other penalties provided in this section, every person refusing a law enforcement officer's request to submit to a chemical test of his breath as provided in this chapter, or who was unconscious at the time of a chemical test and refused to consent to the introduction of the results of such test in any prosecution, shall suffer an additional suspension of driving privileges as follows:

The Commissioner of Public Safety or his authorized agent shall suspend the driver's license or permit to drive or deny the issuance of a license or permit to such person as provided for first, second and third or subsequent offenders in subsection (2) of this section. Such suspension shall be in addition to any suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 63-11-23. The minimum suspension imposed under this subsection shall not be reduced and no prosecutor is authorized to offer a reduction of such suspension as part of a plea bargain.

(5) Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb, organ or member of another shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a separate felony for each such death, mutilation, disfigurement or other injury and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time of not less than five (5) years and not to exceed twenty-five (25) years for each such death, mutilation, disfigurement or other injury, and the imprisonment for the second or each subsequent conviction, in the discretion of the court, shall commence either at the termination of the imprisonment for the preceding conviction or run concurrently with the preceding conviction. Any person charged with causing the death of another as described in this subsection shall be required to post bail before being released after arrest.

(6) Upon conviction of any violation of subsection (1) of this section, the trial judge shall sign in the place provided on the traffic ticket, citation or affidavit stating that the person arrested either employed an attorney or waived his right to an attorney after having been properly advised. If the person arrested employed an attorney, the name, address and telephone number of the attorney shall be written on the ticket, citation or affidavit. The judge shall cause a copy of the traffic ticket, citation or affidavit, and any other pertinent documents concerning the conviction, to be sent to the Commissioner of Public Safety. A copy of the traffic ticket, citation or affidavit and any other pertinent documents, having been attested as true and correct by the Commissioner of Public Safety, or his designee, shall be sufficient proof of the conviction for purposes of determining the enhanced penalty for any subsequent convictions of violations of subsection (1) of this section.

(7) Convictions in other states of violations for driving or operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or while under the influence of any other substance that has impaired the person's ability to operate a motor vehicle occurring after July 1, 1992, shall be counted for the purposes of determining if a violation of subsection (1) of this section is a first, second, third or subsequent offense and the penalty that shall be imposed upon conviction for a violation of subsection (1) of this section.

(8) For the purposes of determining how to impose the sentence for a second, third or subsequent conviction under this section, the indictment shall not be required to enumerate previous convictions. It shall only be necessary that the indictment state the number of times that the defendant has been convicted and sentenced within the past five (5) years under this section to determine if an enhanced penalty shall be imposed. The amount of fine and imprisonment imposed in previous convictions shall not be considered in calculating offenses to determine a second, third or subsequent offense of this section.

(9) Any person under the legal age to obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle convicted under this section shall not be eligible to receive such license until the person reaches the age of eighteen (18) years.

(10) Suspension of driving privileges for any person convicted of violations of Section 63-11-30(1) shall run consecutively.

(11) The court may order the use of any ignition interlock device as provided in Section 63-11-31.

SOURCES: Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 6; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, §§ 7, 13; Laws, 1989, ch. 565, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 6; Laws, 1992, ch. 500, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 340, § 4; Laws, 1995, ch. 540, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 11; Laws, 1998, ch. 505, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 542, § 3; Laws, 2002, ch. 367, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 503, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 4, 2004.)

Editor's Note — Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

"SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act".

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, provides as follows:

“SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver’s licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act.”

Laws, 1994, ch. 340, § 6, as amended by Laws, 1995, ch. 540, § 5, provides as follows:

“SECTION 6. Sections 2 and 3 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after passage. Section 4 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the passage of House Bill No. 438, 1995 Regular Session [Laws, 1995, ch. 540].”

Amendment Notes — The 2002 amendment substituted “eight one-hundredths percent (.08%)” for “ten one-hundredths percent (.10%)” in (1).

The 2004 amendment, in (2)(c), substituted “shall serve” for “shall be imprisoned” and “in the custody of the Department of Corrections; provided, however, that for any such offense which does not result in serious injury or death to any person, any sentence of incarceration may be served in the county jail rather than in the State Penitentiary at the discretion of the circuit court judge” for “in the State Penitentiary” in the first sentence; substituted “The court in the county” for “The circuit court having jurisdiction in the county” in the second paragraph of (3)(b); and in (5), substituted “be guilty of a separate felony for each such death, mutilation, disfigurement or other injury” for “be guilty of a felony” and added the language following “(25) years” in the first sentence.

Cross References — Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§ 41-29-101 et seq.

Juvenile names and addresses of those who violate this section as public records, see § 43-21-261.

Required order denying a driver’s license and driving privileges for a child adjudicated delinquent for an offense under § 63-11-30, see § 43-21-605.

Guaranteed arrest bond certificate in lieu of cash bail for certain traffic violations, see § 63-9-27.

Warnings of consequences of refusal to submit to chemical tests, see § 63-11-5.

Requirement that person who refuses to submit to chemical test be informed by law enforcement officer that such refusal shall subject such person to penalties provided by this section, see § 63-11-21.

Review by commissioner of public safety of confiscation of license of driver who refused to submit to chemical test, see § 63-11-23.

Finality of commissioner’s action in suspending or denying driving privilege of one convicted under this section, see § 63-11-26.

Assessments imposed upon violation of this section to fund Mississippi Alcohol Safety Education Program, see § 63-11-32.

Bond forfeiture operating, for purposes of this section, as a conviction, see § 63-11-37.

Duty of trial judge, upon conviction of driver under this section, to mail copy of abstract of court record to the commissioner of public safety, see § 63-11-37.

Forfeiture of vehicle seized for violation of this chapter, see § 63-11-49.

Petition for forfeiture of vehicle seized for violation of implied consent law, see § 63-11-51.

Funds derived from seized and forfeited vehicles to be deposited in special fund, see § 63-11-53.

Prohibition on suspension by justice courts of fines imposed under the Implied Consent Law, see § 99-19-25.

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JUDICIAL DECISIONS

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1. In general.

To be guilty of “operating” a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or with an illegally high blood alcohol content, a person must be shown to have driven the vehicle while in that condition by direct proof of reasonable inferences; therefore, defendant’s conviction was reversed because it was insufficient to prove “operating” by showing that defendant was intoxicated and sitting behind the wheel of a parked car that was out of gas. *Lewis v. State*, 831 So. 2d 553 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Subsection (5) does not limit its coverage to those specific parts of the body listed; the use of the phrase includes “any other limb, organ or member of another” person’s body permits the application of the subsection to parts of the body other than those specifically listed. *Crowley v. State*, 791 So. 2d 249 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

Disfigurement is not an essential element of the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. *Harris v. State*, 757 So. 2d 195 (Miss. 2000).

Prosecution of defendant for violating sections of statute prohibiting driving under influence of intoxicating liquor and driving with blood alcohol level of .10% or more was not improper, as charges were not separate crimes but were different methods of establishing same offense, notwithstanding assertion that charges could be defended differently. *Young v. City of Brookhaven*, 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997).

In a prosecution for DUI maiming under § 63-11-30, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s negligence caused mutilation, disfigurement, or permanent disability of another where his negligence was evidenced by testimony regarding the speed of his vehicle and his failure to stop for a red light, and the victim’s fractured pelvis and resulting limp were evidence that the defendant’s negligence caused disfigurement of another. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

In a prosecution for DUI manslaughter under § 63-11-30, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s culpable negligence caused the death of another where evidence was presented regarding the speed of the defendant’s vehicle and his failure to attempt to stop for a red light, and the victim was killed as a result of the ensuing collision. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

The language “chemical test or test of his breath,” as provided in §§ 63-11-5 and 63-11-30, contemplates the use of an intoxilyzer machine as a proper means of measuring alcohol content of the blood; as long as accuracy, reliability, and all other factors questioning the competency of the test as proof of intoxication are complied with by the administering officers, the proof thereunder is admissible. *Fulton v. City of Starkville*, 645 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1994).

The statutes under the Implied Consent Law allow not only a chemical test or tests of a person’s breath, but also other tests of a person’s blood or urine for determining alcoholic content; all 3 methods—breath, blood and urine tests—are valid tests for determining alcoholic content in a person’s body which would impair that person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. *Fulton v. City of Starkville*, 645 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1994).

The crime of aggravated DUI proscribed in § 63-11-30(4) is a lesser included offense necessarily encompassed under the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence set forth in § 97-3-47. *Mayfield v. State*, 612 So. 2d 1120 (Miss. 1992).

2. Constitutionality.

The statute does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, notwithstanding that persons above and below the age of 21 are treated differently under the statute, since the distinction made is rationally related to the legitimate governmental ends of protecting public safety and prohibiting under-age drinking and driving. *Mason v. State*, 781 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 2000).

Subsection (1)(a) of this section does not fail to adequately advise citizens as to how much an individual may drink without subjection to criminal penalties; nor does it fail to provide law enforcement officers with adequate guidance in its enforcement; thus, it is not unconstitutionally vague. *Leuer v. City of Flowood*, 744 So. 2d 266 (Miss. 1999).

The fact that the statute carries a criminal sanction greater than that for manslaughter creates no constitutional infirmity. *Wilkerson v. State*, 731 So. 2d 1173 (Miss. 1998).

Section 63-11-30, which imposes a maximum 5-year penalty for the operation of a vehicle in violation of the implied consent law coupled with negligently causing the death or mutilation of another, is not arbitrary and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. *Banks v. State*, 525 So. 2d 399 (Miss. 1988).

3. Construction.

Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1) distinguishes the charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor from that of driving while under the influence of another substance that impairs driving ability. Given the distinction in statutory language, where a defendant is charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the State is not obligated to offer proof of impairment of a defendant's driving ability, only proof of his driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. *Christian v. State*, 859 So. 2d 1068 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Inmate's felony conviction under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(c) was proper, where the inmate's two previous driving-under-the-influence convictions occurred in Georgia; Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(7) permitted the use of out-of-state convic-

tions as predicate offenses under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(c). *Atwell v. State*, 848 So. 2d 190 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Statute contained no requirement that the negligence had to be caused by the alcohol; a conviction merely required a negligent act, from which death or injury resulted, simple negligence was enough to support a conviction. *Murphy v. State*, 798 So. 2d 609 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1125, 123 S. Ct. 895, 154 L. Ed. 2d 809 (2003).

Subsection (5), pertaining to the death or disfigurement of another, does not require that the negligence of the defendant must be caused by his consumption of alcohol. *Ware v. State*, 790 So. 2d 201 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

Statute providing penalties for operation of vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor or other substance provides only for concurrent suspension periods for multiple offenses; time of license suspension begins to run when Commissioner of Public Safety receives abstract of judgment and issues order of suspension, regardless of whether some other period of suspension is also running. *State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prine*, 687 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 1996).

Circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over motorist's petition for reduction of driver's license suspension imposed for four violations of prohibition against operation of vehicle while under influence; petition claimed hardship and asserted that motorist had completed alcohol course, which may have been "treatment" approved by Department of Mental Health. *State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prine*, 687 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 1996).

Simple negligence is sufficient for a conviction pursuant to § 63-11-30(4), as the statute requires only negligence, not gross or culpable negligence. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

Subsection (4) of § 63-11-30 imposes criminal liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle which causes death or injury to another person, subject to the satisfaction of a condition arising out of the conjunctive integration, by subsection (4), of the provisions of subsection (1) of that same statute, making imposition of

the penalty for a violation of the statute dependent upon the existence of a concurrent violation of subsection (1) and subsection (4); accordingly, § 63-11-30 imposes criminal liability only if the injury to, or death of, the victim was caused by the defendant's negligent operation of a motor vehicle "while intoxicated." *Matter of Slocum v. Jolly*, 637 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1994).

4. Charging affidavit or indictment.

That an indictment's caption identified the charge as "driving under the influence (DUI) manslaughter" rather than "DUI negligent death statute," and referenced the wrong subsection of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30, was immaterial, as the indictment made it clear that the inmate was charged with causing the death of his passenger while feloniously and negligently operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and his guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the indictment. *Turner v. State*, 864 So. 2d 288 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Because the indictment charged defendant with operating "a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor," which was the language of the offense codified at Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a), the statement adequately informed defendant of the elements that the State was required to prove and the indictment was sufficient as required by Miss. Const. art. 3, § 27. *Harris v. State*, 830 So. 2d 681 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 842 So. 2d 578 (Miss. 2003).

Because the indictment gave clear notice that the charge was operating "a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor," in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a), it was not fatally flawed by the inclusion of the surplus language that defendant "refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath"; the deletion of the surplus language from jury instruction was not an error. *Harris v. State*, 830 So. 2d 681 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 842 So. 2d 578 (Miss. 2003).

When a defendant is charged with subsequent violations of the statute, an indictment containing evidence of prior convictions should not be read to the jury and the jury should not be made aware of the

defendant's prior convictions for the same crime as the one for which he is currently facing trial; the prior convictions are only relevant as to sentencing and should only be admitted during a separate sentencing phase. *Strickland v. State*, 784 So. 2d 957 (Miss. 2001).

An indictment charging DUI maiming was sufficient, notwithstanding the assertion that it failed to charge that the defendant's negligent driving caused the accident, where it actually read that the defendant in a negligent manner caused the mutilation of the victim's left arm, as the indictment gave sufficient notice of the charges pending against the defendant. *McCollum v. State*, 785 So. 2d 279 (Miss. 2001).

An indictment for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor was valid where it included the proper code section and subsection number, provided the date, time, and location of the offense, and described the offense as driving negligently while intoxicated, striking the victim's vehicle and causing numerous injuries to her face and body. *Harris v. State*, 757 So. 2d 195 (Miss. 2000).

It was plain error to convict and sentence the defendant for a felony DUI conviction rather than a second offense misdemeanor where the first three convictions cited in the indictment occurred more than five years prior to the date of the incident at issue; therefore, the court would reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2)(c) of this section in effect at the time of his arrest. *Porter v. State*, 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

A statutorily sufficient indictment, as measured by § 63-11-30(7), goes beyond the requirements of § 63-11-5(3) and § 63-9-21(3)(b); an indictment in compliance with these statutes and recent holdings by the court is sufficient to charge a defendant with felony DUI and a traffic ticket, citation, or affidavit is not required. *Williams v. State*, 708 So. 2d 1358 (Miss. 1998).

Failure to demur to the indictment for felony DUI does not waive a defect not otherwise curable by amendment. *Porter v. State*, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 948

(Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1998), subst. op., 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

An indictment for DUI-third offense, a felony, was sufficient where not only were the convictions and the courts in which they were tried enumerated on the face of the indictment, but the state went further and each abstract of court record showing the defendant's prior convictions for DUI were attached and made a part of the indictment. *Weaver v. State*, 713 So. 2d 860 (Miss. 1997).

Affidavit and indictment were sufficient to charge defendant with third offense felony driving under the influence (DUI), and thus, defendant's guilty plea was not invalid on that basis; indictment specifically set forth two prior offenses and convictions, and clearly designated dates, fines imposed, and location of record for each prior conviction. *Drennan v. State*, 695 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1997).

4.5. Bifurcation.

There is no requirement that the prosecution of a felony DUI comply with the guidelines for bifurcation found in Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, Rule 11.03. *Williams v. State*, 708 So. 2d 1358 (Miss. 1998).

4.75. Defenses.

The fact that the defendant was unaware that his continued violations of the statute would subject him to a felony charge did not constitute a defense to DUI-third offense, a felony. *Weaver v. State*, 713 So. 2d 860 (Miss. 1997).

5. Admissibility of evidence.

Public safety department printout of defendant's driving record was admissible under Miss. R. Evid. 803(8) after being certified as correct by the signature of the custodian of the records, and because the record was under seal, it was self-authenticated pursuant to Miss. R. Evid. 902(1); this printout met Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(c), which requires evidence of two prior driving under the influence convictions of defendant, and no prejudice resulted from the admission of the corroborating justice court record in this regard. *Doolie v. State*, 856 So. 2d 669 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

While medical science may not be able to inform the courts as to exactly what

level of particular narcotics must be ingested to safely lead to the conclusion that the user is under the influence of the drug, the similar issue of whether a person is under the influence of alcohol has for many years been routinely submitted to the jury based on evidence other than scientific testing; such determinations can properly be based upon observed behavior and the common understanding of jurors that persons under the influence of certain chemical substances, whether alcohol or narcotics, behave in ways that are different from the average person and thus, there is no basis to draw a distinction between narcotic use and alcohol use and the appellate court declines to do so. *Holloman v. State*, 820 So. 2d 52 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

When a defendant is charged with subsequent violations of the statute, an indictment containing evidence of prior convictions should not be read to the jury and the jury should not be made aware of the defendant's prior convictions for the same crime as the one for which he is currently facing trial; the prior convictions are only relevant as to sentencing and should only be admitted during a separate sentencing phase. *Strickland v. State*, 784 So. 2d 957 (Miss. 2001).

Defendant's conviction for first-offense driving under the influence of alcohol, which was based on an intoxilyzer result, was reversed because the State failed to properly authenticate copies of a page from the intoxilyzer log book and the calibration certificate; the State was required to offer either the testimony of the calibrating officer, the original certificate of calibration, or a certified copy of the certificate as evidence of the machine's accuracy. *Jones v. State*, 798 So. 2d 592 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

The repeal of § 63-11-39(2) in 1991 combined with the 1983 amendment to this section nullified the defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it sustained the state's motion in limine and thus denied him the opportunity of offering evidence that his ingestion of alcohol had not impaired his ability to operate his pickup truck. *Porter v. State*, 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

The state must prove the prior charges and convictions of the defendant in order

to meet its burden and obtain a conviction for a felony DUI, and, therefore, the trial judge properly admitted evidence of the defendant's prior convictions. *Weaver v. State*, 713 So. 2d 860 (Miss. 1997).

The repeal of § 63-11-39(2) in 1991 combined with the 1983 amendment to § 63-11-30 nullified the defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it sustained the state's motion in limine and thus denied him the opportunity of offering evidence that his ingestion of alcohol had not impaired his ability to operate his pickup truck. *Porter v. State*, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 948 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1998), subst. op., 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

In a prosecution for third offense driving under the influence of alcohol, the court properly denied a motion in limine to prevent evidence of his two prior convictions of DUI from being presented to the jury. *Smith v. State*, 736 So. 2d 381 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

Improper admission of evidence regarding use of horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, in which person's eye movements are evaluated as potential evidence of intoxication, in prosecution for driving while intoxicated, was harmless error, in view of overwhelming evidence against defendant. *Young v. City of Brookhaven*, 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997).

A defendant's prior convictions were admissible at the sentencing hearing for enhancement of his punishment under § 63-11-30, in spite of his argument that these convictions could not be used because they occurred when he was without counsel, since lack of counsel does not render a conviction arising from a guilty plea "irregular" or otherwise unfit for purposes of sentence enhancement. *Ghoston v. State*, 645 So. 2d 936 (Miss. 1994).

In a prosecution for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant's statement to a police officer that the breathalyzer machine would "probably show I'm in a coma" was essentially a confession that the defendant was drunk, and was therefore admissible into evidence as a voluntary statement where it was made spontaneously after the defendant had been given the Miranda warnings. *Ricks v. State*, 611 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1992).

In a prosecution for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the admission into evidence under § 63-11-41 of the defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test did not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, even though the defendant was not specifically warned that his refusal could be admitted into evidence against him; the penalty of introducing a refusal serves an important state interest in encouraging defendants to submit to a chemical test, and as the refusal is physical instead of testimonial, its introduction into evidence violates neither the Fifth Amendment nor § 26. *Ricks v. State*, 611 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1992).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) pursuant to § 63-11-30, 3 prior DUI convictions and one conviction for driving while license suspended were admissible for the purpose of enhancing the defendant's punishment under § 63-11-30 and could be considered for any lesser administrative sanctions included in the statute, such as suspension of one's driver's license, even though the city could not show that the defendant had been represented by counsel or had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel with respect to these previous convictions, where the prior convictions were constitutionally valid in and of themselves; to find otherwise would have the illogical effect of penalizing those defendants who do obtain counsel in misdemeanor cases and of finding a prior constitutionally valid misdemeanor conviction unconstitutional in certain future instances. *Sheffield v. City of Pass Christian*, 556 So. 2d 1052 (Miss. 1990).

6. —Test results.

The state cannot use the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test to show that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to prove the requisite elements of subsection (1)(a) and, furthermore, the state cannot attempt to introduce the HGN test as scientific evidence to show a defendant's degree of intoxication; however, the test can still be used as a field sobriety test to establish probable cause to administer the intoxily-

zer. *Graves v. State*, 761 So. 2d 950 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

The defendant was entitled to reversal of his conviction and a new trial where the court improperly allowed the introduction of evidence of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to show intoxication; the state's evidence of guilt was not so overwhelming as to render allowing the improper evidence harmless error. *Holmes v. State*, 740 So. 2d 952 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

Prior to admitting results of chemical analysis in prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI), court must determine that proper procedures were followed, that operator of machine was properly certified to perform test, and that accuracy of machine was properly certified. *McIlwain v. State*, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

State laid sufficient predicate for accuracy of intoxilyzer results in prosecution for felony driving under the influence (DUI), despite failure to produce the original certificate attesting to machine's accuracy, where officer testified that he was certified with state crime lab to run simulator test on intoxilyzer to certify calibration on it. *McIlwain v. State*, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

Horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, in which person's eye movements are evaluated as potential evidence of intoxication, was scientific test which was not generally accepted within scientific community and could not be used as scientific evidence to prove intoxication or as mere showing of impairment, in prosecution for driving while intoxicated, although test could be used to prove probable cause to arrest and administer intoxilyzer or blood test. *Young v. City of Brookhaven*, 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997).

There was substantial compliance with § 63-11-19, and the trial judge did not err in admitting intoxilyzer test results into evidence in a prosecution for negligently causing injury while intoxicated under § 63-11-30, where the police dispatcher who administered the intoxilyzer test had attended a one-day school for intoxilyzer test operators conducted by the Mississippi Highway Patrol and had been issued a permit, she testified that she had administered the test "on hundreds," the intoxi-

lyzer machine had been calibrated by someone from the Highway Safety Patrol a few days before the test was administered on the defendant, the dispatcher followed the checklist provided for machine operators, she told the defendant he had a right to refuse the test, the defendant blew into a mouthpiece attached to the machine until a bell rang, the printout card showed .19 percent, and the dispatcher testified that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated. *Estes v. State*, 605 So. 2d 772 (Miss. 1992).

A defendant's arrest for driving while intoxicated was legal, and therefore the subsequent intoxilyzer test was not tainted, even though the arresting officer did not observe the defendant driving, where the defendant admitted to the arresting officer that he had been driving an automobile which was involved in an accident, and the defendant was publicly intoxicated in the presence of the officer and others in violation of § 97-29-47. *Goforth v. City of Ridgeland*, 603 So. 2d 323 (Miss. 1992).

7. Sufficiency of evidence.

State presented evidence that when stopped at a roadblock, defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, his speech was slurred, he had trouble walking to the back of the vehicle, and a breath alcohol test showed a blood alcohol level of .188; reasonably minded jurors had substantial credible evidence, upon which to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI. *Graham v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 54 (Miss. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2004).

Trial court properly found defendant guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor; although the State was not obligated to offer proof on impairment of defendant's driving ability, a police officer testified that defendant ran a stop sign and failed to turn off his high beams as he passed the officer. *Christian v. State*, 859 So. 2d 1068 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1). The State offered proof that defendant ran a stop sign and did not dim his headlights when an officer passed his car, that the officer

smelled the odor of alcohol coming from defendant's vehicle and saw two six-packs of beer inside the car, that defendant was belligerent and hostile to the officer, and that defendant refused to take an intoxilyzer test at the jail. *Christian v. State*, 859 So. 2d 1068 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Where defendant was found asleep behind the wheel of defendant's parked car, defendant's statement to the deputy that defendant had consumed some beer prior to driving the vehicle to its then location, in conjunction with the deputy's observations of defendant and the results of the intoxilyzer test, provided sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty of operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. *Holloway v. State*, 860 So. 2d 1244 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence, first offense, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a), was proper where there was probable cause for the stop as she had repeatedly crossed over the center line and that constituted careless driving pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-1213; thus, there was probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had been committed and defendant was properly stopped for further police action. *Saucier v. City of Poplarville*, 858 So. 2d 933 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence basically asserted that the victims' careless conduct had made the accident unavoidable and that his driving while intoxicated was not a contributing factor to the accident; however, it was not necessary for the State to prove that an intoxicating liquor was a proximate cause or a proximate contributing cause of a death, and the jury was entitled to find that defendant had committed an act of negligence when he chose to driving while intoxicated and caused the death of another. *Campbell v. State*, 858 So. 2d 177 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of felony driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a); a trained DUI officer observed defendant's vehicle weaving at least three times; after defendant stopped, the officer noticed that

defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes; defendant failed a field sobriety test; and defendant refused to give an adequate breath sample for the intoxilyzer test. *Doolie v. State*, 856 So. 2d 669 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Trial court did not err in finding that sufficient probable cause existed for the discovery of defendant's DUI violation, where the underlying charge for possession of beer, which led to the revealing search and seizure, was dismissed; where the officer testified that an open container was in defendant's vehicle and defendant admitted he had been drinking, and the officer smelled an intoxicating substance on defendant's breath, the presence of beer provided sufficient probable cause to conduct a search of defendant and his vehicle. *Mayo v. State*, 843 So. 2d 739 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30, in effect on October 7, 1999, because there was evidence that defendant was driving while intoxicated, that defendant did not stop at a stop sign before entering an intersection at a high rate of speed, that defendant collided with the victim's car, and that the victim died from cardiac arrest related to trauma; state was not required to provide autopsy evidence to establish the cause of death. *Joiner v. State*, 835 So. 2d 42 (Miss. 2003).

Evidence that defendant drove with a blood alcohol content of .20 and was involved in a traffic accident in which a passenger in defendant's vehicle was killed, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated driving while intoxicated; evidence of blood test results was properly admitted despite the fact that defendant demanded that hospital personnel stop trying to draw a sample of defendant's blood after a third unsuccessful attempt, as defendant had consented to have the sample drawn. *Gates v. State*, 829 So. 2d 1283 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Facsimile copy of a prior driving under the influence conviction was properly admitted into evidence, despite the fact that the seal was blurred, because it was self-authenticating under Miss. R. Evid. 902(1), and no genuine question was

raised as to the authenticity of the original under Miss. R. Evid. 1003. *Lewis v. State*, 831 So. 2d 553 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Officer's testimony was sufficient to support the guilty verdict of driving under the influence because the officer testified (1) that the officer smelled alcohol in defendant's vehicle, on defendant's breath, and defendant's clothes; (2) that defendant admitted to consuming alcohol; and (3) that defendant could not pass the field sobriety test, defendant's gait was impaired, and defendant swayed when standing still. *Harris v. State*, 830 So. 2d 681 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 842 So. 2d 578 (Miss. 2003).

The State showed, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a), that defendant was driving or operating a vehicle through an officer's testimony that the officer observed defendant drive up to the "no parking" area, and while talking with defendant, the officer noticed that he had an open can of beer in his hand, there was a twelve-pack of beer on the passenger side in plain view, his eyes were red, his pupils were dilated, his speech was slurred and he had an odor of an intoxicating beverage on his breath, and that defendant failed the sobriety tests given. *Rhoades v. State*, 832 So. 2d 544 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 832 So. 2d 533 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

The uncontroverted evidence that defendant had ingested illegal narcotics that were still present in measurable quantities in defendant's body, together with evidence of remarkably unusual behavior and defendant's demonstrably reckless operation of a motor vehicle were enough, when considered in conjunction, to support a reasonable inference by the jurors that defendant was, in fact, under the influence of the narcotic substances at the time of the fatal accident; thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of vehicular homicide, Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(d). *Holloman v. State*, 820 So. 2d 52 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony DUI negligent death where the record contained testimony that the defendant was speeding, that he was under the influence, and that he

made no effort to slow his vehicle to avoid hitting a child who fell in the road with his bicycle on his leg. *Smith v. State*, 812 So. 2d 1045 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

The trial court acted within its discretion by taking judicial notice of the conversion from milligrams per deciliter to grams per milliliter so as to express the plaintiff's blood alcohol content in the manner used in subsection (1). *Buel v. Sims*, 798 So. 2d 425 (Miss. 2001).

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty of driving under the influence where he did not attack the accuracy of the intoxilizer's analysis of his blood alcohol content, which was .164%. *Porter v. State*, 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

Abstract of defendant's prior court record, which county court clerk testified was accurate, was sufficient to prove conviction of second offense for driving under the influence (DUI) in prosecution for felony DUI. *McIlwain v. State*, 700 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1997).

In a prosecution for DUI maiming under § 63-11-30, the State was required to prove that (1) the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or had .10 percent or more of alcohol in his blood while operating a motor vehicle; (2) the defendant was, while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle, negligent; and (3) the defendant's negligence caused mutilation, disfigurement, or permanent disability of another. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

In a prosecution for DUI manslaughter under § 63-11-30, the State was required to prove that (1) the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or had .10 percent or more of alcohol in his blood while operating a motor vehicle; (2) the defendant was, while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle, culpably negligent; and (3) the defendant's culpable negligence caused the death of another. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

In a prosecution for DUI maiming in violation of § 63-11-30, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the victim was permanently disabled or disfigured within the meaning of the statute

where he suffered a fractured pelvis, there was testimony that his injuries were serious and would have been life-threatening without medical treatment, and he still suffered pain and an occasional limp at the time of the trial. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

The evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under § 63-11-30 for causing the death of another person by negligent operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, since there was a lack of evidence that the defendant was intoxicated "at the time" his vehicle struck the victim where a breathalyzer test indicating that the defendant had .13 percent alcohol in his system was administered 3 hours after the accident, there was no evidence demonstrating that the defendant was intoxicated immediately prior to, or at the time of, the accident, and there was uncontroverted testimony that the defendant drank the remains of a half-pint of gin between the time of the accident and the administration of the breathalyzer test. *Matter of Slocum v. Jolly*, 637 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1994).

In a prosecution against a driver whose intoxicated condition contributed to the death of a small child, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty of culpably negligent manslaughter under § 97-3-47, in spite of the defendant's argument that the evidence would only support a conviction for negligently causing the death of another while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor as defined by § 63-11-30(4), where eyewitnesses testified that the defendant's automobile was traveling down the wrong side of the road and barely missed striking a parked car immediately prior to veering off the pavement on the opposite side of the road and striking the child, the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .24, and the defendant failed to give a reason for driving down the left side of the road and then veering suddenly to the right and striking the child, but merely denied that his vehicle was on the wrong side of the road, denied that he narrowly missed the parked vehicle, denied that his vehicle ever left the pavement, and denied that his blood alcohol level was a result of

anything other than 2 pre-accident beers and some whiskey consumed after the accident. *Hopson v. State*, 615 So. 2d 576 (Miss. 1993).

A conviction for driving under the influence may be based upon intoxilyzer results if the test is administered in accordance with the proper procedures and the defendant fails to introduce credible evidence which overcomes the statutory presumption of intoxication. Thus, defendants could be convicted on the basis of a breath test which presumed a 2100 to 1 breath to blood ratio where the defendants did not introduce any evidence concerning their particular ratios. *Fisher v. City of Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

The evidence was not sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence with respect to an automobile accident where the State proved only that the defendant's car collided with the rear of a pickup truck and that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, the defendant and his passenger testified that the defendant was driving well, and not recklessly, negligently, unlawfully, or at a high rate of speed, and no other witnesses contradicted the testimony of the defendant and his passenger. However, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of negligently killing another while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. *Evans v. State*, 562 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1990).

Evidence that the defendant ran a stop sign while intoxicated and collided with a truck resulting in the death of a passenger was not sufficient to prove manslaughter by culpable negligence under § 97-3-47 but was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of negligently killing another while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor pursuant to § 63-11-30. *Childs v. State*, 521 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1988).

7.5. Instructions to jury.

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence where the State introduced direct evidence of guilt under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (1)(a) and (c) by introducing defendant's blood alcohol level and incrim-

inating statements made to the arresting officer. *Lewis v. State*, 831 So. 2d 553 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence of alcohol causing death arising from an incident in which the defendant struck and killed an elderly man as he walked across a street, it was reversible error to instruct the jury that any contributory negligence of the victim was not a defense to the crime charged unless such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the defense of contributory negligence had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; such instruction effectively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. *Frambes v. State*, 751 So. 2d 489 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

8. Double jeopardy.

Double jeopardy was not implicated in a driving-while-impaired case when a trial court instructed the jury on Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a) and (c) because they were not separate offenses; rather, they were alternative routes to establishing a violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30. *Lewis v. State*, 831 So. 2d 553 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions do not preclude criminal prosecution for violation of § 63-11-30 subsequent to administrative license suspension pursuant to § 63-11-23(2). *Keyes v. State*, 708 So. 2d 540 (Miss. 1998).

Section 63-11-30 proscribes the act of drunk driving rather than the act of negligent killing; thus, an indictment charging the defendant with 2 counts of violating § 63-11-30 based on only one act of drunk driving subjected the defendant to double jeopardy and required reversal of the conviction on the second count. *Mayfield v. State*, 612 So. 2d 1120 (Miss. 1992).

Where a defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol, forfeiture of his bond and entry of a sentence of guilty into the docket constituted a conviction such that a subsequent trial for felonious driving under the influence was barred by the principle of double jeopardy. *Bennett v. State*, 528 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1988).

9. Sentencing.

Where defendant failed to object to testimony regarding his prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) during a felony DUI trial, he waived his right to appeal, despite the fact that the prior convictions were only relevant to sentencing under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(8). *Watson v. State*, 835 So. 2d 112 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(c), a trial court was permitted to impose a sentence for a third conviction of driving under the influence of not less than one year nor more than five years, and petitioner's sentence did not exceed the five-year maximum where he served one year, was involved in a three-year period of supervised release, his supervised release was revoked, and the suspended four-year sentence was imposed as the three-year supervised release period did not count towards his sentence but was merely time he was under supervision. *Johnson v. State*, 802 So. 2d 110 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

Sentence of 20 years with eight years suspended and five years' probation was within the statutory sentencing limit allowed under Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(5) for a conviction under that statute for felony driving under the influence of alcohol causing death and was not constitutionally excessive. *Havard v. State*, 800 So. 2d 1193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

Although at the time of defendant's first conviction felony DUI required four rather than the current three convictions, that first conviction may be counted toward the current requirement. *Boyd v. State*, 751 So. 2d 1050 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

A 10-year sentence imposed upon a defendant pursuant to § 63-11-30(4) for a DUI maiming conviction did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, as it was within the statutory limits. *Holloman v. State*, 656 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1995).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, enhanced 9-month sentences received by the defendants after they sought a trial de novo in the circuit court were not improper, even though the defendants were originally tried and sentenced in municipal court under § 21-13-19 which provides for a maximum penalty of

6 months' incarceration; when the defendants filed their appeals for trial de novo in the circuit court, they took the chance that the penalties would be greater than allowed by § 21-13-19 since the actions were brought under § 63-11-30(1)(c). *Fisher v. City of Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

Trial judge acted without statutory authority in suspending defendant's driving privileges for 5 years, and imposed sentence exceeding maximum penalty provided by law, where defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide following head-on collision, because statute provided for period of suspension of driving privileges varying from 90 days to 3 years. *Slaymaker v. State*, 513 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1987).

9.5. Non-adjudication of minors.

Because defendant's blood alcohol content level was .127 percent, it was not within the parameters of the Mississippi Zero Tolerance for Minors provision of the Implied Consent Law, Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(3)(a); therefore, he was not eligible for non-adjudication under that law. *Palmer v. City of Oxford*, 860 So. 2d 1203 (Miss. 2003).

10. Miscellaneous.

Where defendant's girlfriend suddenly became violently ill in a secluded, rural location, attempts to summon help were fruitless, and time was clearly of the essence, defendant argued that his decision to drive after drinking was excusable; the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's necessity defense because it applied the wrong legal standard and made no findings to support its conclusion that defendant had other options for getting his girlfriend to a hospital. *Stodghill v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 87 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2004).

While the circuit court, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-103(b), could have decided the question of law raised by the prosecution on appeal, it erred by reversing defendant's acquittal on a charge of driving under the influence (DUI) second offense, granting the prosecution's motion to amend the charge to DUI first offense (which the lower court had denied), and affirming a conviction for

DUI first offense which the lower court had not entered. *Jamison v. City of Carthage*, 864 So. 2d 1050 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of driving under the influence in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 over his objection to irregularities in the "copy" of the citation/affidavit he received because, although defendant did not have an exact blood alcohol content (BAC) reading listed on the copy of the citation that he received, he was nevertheless aware that his BAC level was above that allowable for individuals under the legal age to purchase alcohol; thus, defendant's traffic ticket complied with Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-21(6) and (3)(b) and (c). *Palmer v. City of Oxford*, 860 So. 2d 1203 (Miss. 2003).

Operating a vehicle involves both the moving and the stopping of a vehicle, and when these are done under the influence of alcohol it is considered criminal activity, which operates to limit the duty owed by police and fire personnel under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c); however, in order for recovery from a governmental entity to be barred, the criminal activity has to have some causal nexus to the wrongdoing of the tortfeasor. *Estate of Williams v. City of Jackson*, 844 So. 2d 1161 (Miss. 2003).

Inmate's petition for post-conviction relief failed, as a factual basis for the charge of driving under the influence (DUI) manslaughter had been established by the inmate's acknowledgement on the record that he drove a vehicle, that he was involved in an accident in which his passenger was killed, that his vehicle was in the wrong lane, and that a test revealed that his blood alcohol level was .29 percent. *Turner v. State*, 864 So. 2d 288 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

The trial court committed reversible error in denying the defendant's request for a jury trial where he was tried for a violation of subsection (2)(b) of this section, which provided (in its version effective July 1, 1995) for a statutory maximum sentence of one year for second offense D.U.I. *Harkins v. State*, 735 So. 2d 317 (Miss. 1999).

Even if statute providing that person shall not be entitled to any judicial review

of or appeal from actions of Commissioner of Public Safety suspending person's driver's license pursuant to statute prescribing penalties for operation of vehicle while under influence had been in effect when motorist filed petition for reduction of driver's license suspension, statute would only have prevented appeal of suspension, and would not have prevented petition for reduction. *State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prine*, 687 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 1996).

Initial stop of motorists at highway sobriety checkpoints conducted by state police did not violate Fourth Amendment, as balance among state's interest in preventing drunk driving, extent to which checkpoint program could reasonably be said to advance that interest, and degree of intrusion upon individual motorists, weighed in favor of program. *Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz*, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), on remand, 193 Mich. App. 690, 485 N.W.2d 135 (1992).

In a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, the trial court's refusal to compel production of an intoxilyzer machine into court to conduct a demonstration did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, where the trial court ordered the city to allow the defendant the opportunity to run a test in the police station where the intoxilyzer machine was situated, the defendant failed to show that he would be unable to do what was needed in order to properly defend the case by examining and testing the machine at the police station, the defendant made no showing that he could substantially replicate the conditions of the night of his arrest, and moving the intoxilyzer machine to the

court house would have been substantially disruptive and inconvenient to the city law enforcement authorities. *Goforth v. City of Ridgeland*, 603 So. 2d 323 (Miss. 1992).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' requests for an expert on the breath testing device used by the arresting officers, where the requests were no more than undeveloped assertions and the defendants made no showing that the requested assistance would benefit them in any way. *Fisher v. City of Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

11.-20. [Reserved for future use.]

21. Under former law.

One need not be legally intoxicated in order for question of impairment of reaction time by intoxicating liquors to be properly submitted to jury in negligence action; driver's admission to having consumed several beers in hours preceding traffic accident forms sufficient evidentiary basis for submission of question to jury notwithstanding absence of alcohol on driver's breath and absence of liquor bottles in driver's car. *Mills v. Nichols*, 467 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1985).

Being under the influence of marijuana is not a designated criminal offense under our statutes except in conjunction with the operation of a vehicle. *Murray v. State*, 310 So. 2d 919 (Miss. 1975).

Driving an automobile on a highway under the influence of intoxicants, or at a high and unlawful rate of speed, is not only dangerous but is negligence per se, and if such negligence contributes to an injury the defendant is liable in damages. *Freeze v. Taylor*, 257 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1972).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Miss. Code Section 63-11-30(2)(b) provides that justice court may fine person full amount provided for, that is, up to \$1,500, even though justice court's civil jurisdiction is still limited to \$1,000. *Tallant*, Apr. 21, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0236.

Miss. Code Section 63-11-30 requires justice court judges to sentence persons

convicted of driving under influence (DUI) to complete safe driving course; this statute places duty on judge, not clerk, to sign order requiring defendant to attend these programs. *Ferguson*, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

Constable, where probable cause does exist, may charge an individual with

D.U.I. under statute, even though constable may not administer breath test under Section 63-11-5. Lewis, July 14, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0369.

Section 99-15-26 of Mississippi Code, which allows judge to withhold adjudication upon defendant's completion of certain conditions, specifically does not apply to any offense under the Mississippi Implied Consent Law. Stephens, Jan. 12, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0889.

Section 21-23-7(5) authorizes a municipal court judge, in the judge's discretion to suspend the jail time under Section 63-11-30(2)(b). Crow, February 23, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0105.

Under this section, a conviction of the charge of DUI, where the defendant had refused to submit to a breath test, would count as a DUI conviction for enhancement purposes. Fike, April 6, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0195.

Double jeopardy does not necessarily prohibit charging a defendant with public drunkenness under Section 97-29-47, even if that defendant has been acquitted of DUI under Section 63-11-30. The two are separate and distinct criminal charges and contain different elements. Moffett, June 6, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0277.

Section 63-11-30(7) overrules *Page v. State*, 607 So. 2d 1163 (Miss. 1992) and *Ashcraft v. City of Richland*, 620 So. 2d 1210 (Miss. 1993) in that Section 63-11-30(7) states that the indictment shall not be required to enumerate previous DUI convictions. It shall only be necessary that the indictment state the number of times that a defendant has been convicted and sentenced within the required time. Mitchell, August 14, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0522.

The date of the offense and not the date of trial determines when the 1995 amendment to Section 63-11-30, which extends the time period for which prior D.U.I. offenses may be considered for enhancement purposes to ten years, should apply. Solomon, August 14, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0521.

Under this section, there is no requirement that a breath alcohol intoxilizer test be given to an individual who is suspected of DUI. Gentry, May 3, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0251.

Under this section the Legislature intended for second and subsequent DUI offenders to serve the mandatory minimum incarceration time consecutively. O'Cain, September 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0621.

Based on Section 63-11-30 the fee that is required to be paid when filing a hardship petition is non-refundable. Coleman, October 11, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0703.

Under Section 63-11-21, if a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, the officer should inform the person that he is subject to arrest and upon conviction faces the same penalties as one who does submit to the test. The law enforcement office need not provide such a warning if the person does not refuse to submit to a chemical test. See also Section 63-11-30. Jones, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0786.

The failure to advise the person as set forth in Section 63-11-21 would not effect the prosecution. This amendment to the code section affords the defendant no additional rights. See also Section 63-11-30. Jones, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0786.

Pursuant to Section 63-11-21 it is only necessary for the officer to inform the driver of the consequences if the driver refuses to submit to a chemical test. See also Section 63-11-30. Henderson, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0763.

Pursuant to Section 63-11-30 the law enforcement officer must inform a driver who refuses to submit to a chemical test that he is subject to arrest and upon conviction faces the same penalties as one who does submit to the test. Henderson, November 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0763.

Section 63-11-30(5) does not provide the exclusive method of establishing prior convictions for enhancement purposes under the DUI law and that a certified copy of a conviction from the clerk of the court where the defendant was previously convicted would be sufficient. Cadle, November 15, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0791.

The vehicle forfeiture provisions of Miss Code Section 63-11-30(2)(c) only apply to a vehicle that is owned by the driver charged with a third DUI violation and not to a vehicle owned by someone other than such a driver. Bryan, Aug. 15, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0498.

Courts have discretion to allow amendments of improper tickets issued for driving under the influence of alcohol or other impairing substances if the defendant is given a fair opportunity to prepare a defense. *McCarty*, Aug. 15, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0502.

In certain circumstances, an officer may legally sign an affidavit charging an individual with DUI even if another officer makes the initial traffic stop. *Gentry*, Dec. 12, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0759.

The statute mandates that the court order an offender to attend MASEP and does not make exceptions for out-of-state drivers who are convicted of a first offense DUI. *Miller*, September 4, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0520.

The Zero Tolerance for Minors law only applies when a person under the age of 21 years has a blood alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more, but lower than eight one-hundredths percent (.08%); therefore, if a person refuses to take an intoxilizer test and there is no blood alcohol level reading, the Zero Tolerance for Minors section of the DUI law would not apply. *Johnston*, October 27, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0607.

It must be shown that a DUI defendant either employed an attorney or waived his right to an attorney, regardless of whether a defendant is given jail time on a DUI 1st and 2nd offense. *Rushing*, November 25, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0711.

A forfeiture action after the final disposition of the DUI case should be brought promptly upon final conviction. *Bruni*, August 20, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0401.

A second offense DUI may be tried in absentia, and a first offense DUI conviction that was tried in absentia may be used for enhancement purposes. *Belk, Jr.*, March 24, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0126.

It is not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to releasing a vehicle to a third party or lienholder. *Pace*, April 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0178.

The justice court record of a juvenile who is arrested and charged with DUI is a public record until and unless a court orders the charge nonadjudicated. *Little*, Oct. 6, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0592.

If a police officer has probable cause to believe that an individual is driving under

the influence on the state fairgrounds in violation of Section 63-11-30, the officer may stop the individual and charge the violator accordingly; however, if the operator of the vehicle refuses to submit to a chemical test, it must be shown that the vehicle was being operated on the public highways, public roads, and streets of the state before the violator can be subjected to the penalties of Section 63-11-5. *DeLaughter*, Nov. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0679.

If a defendant is convicted of DUI second offense and he also refused the intoxilyzer test, his driver's license is suspended for five years (two years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(2)(b) plus one year pursuant to Section 63-11-23(1) plus two years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(4)); the five years is reduced to three 3 years upon successful completion of chemical dependency treatment at a facility approved by the Department of Mental Health. *Shirley*, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

If a defendant is convicted of DUI third offense and he also refused the intoxilyzer test, his driver's license is suspended for 11 years (five years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(2)(c) plus one year pursuant to Section 63-11-23(1) plus five years pursuant to Section 63-11-30(4)); the 11 years is reduced to seven 7 years upon successful completion of chemical dependency treatment at a facility approved by the Department of Mental Health. *Shirley*, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

Subsection (1)(d) requires that the prosecution show that the defendant was under the influence of any drug or controlled substance, the possession of which is unlawful under the Mississippi Controlled Substances Law; there is no requirement that the prosecution show a level of impairment, but merely that the defendant is under the influence of such a drug. *Knight*, Apr. 23, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0227.

A minor charged with being impaired by any substance other than alcohol does not qualify for the Zero Tolerance for Minors provisions (subsection 3) since he will not have a blood alcohol reading between .02 percent and .08 percent. *Knight*, Apr. 23, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0227.

A conviction for a DUI violation within the last five years may be used for en-

hancement purposes even if the defendant was a minor at the time he was convicted of the prior DUI and is no longer a minor when cited for the current DUI charge. Baker, Sr., Apr. 23, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0225.

A justice court has authority to nonadjudicate a charge only in the instance of a DUI under the Zero for Tolerance for Minors Act found in subsection (3)(g); the nonadjudication of a charge does not automatically expunge the record of such charges, but the court has the discretion to expunge a nonadjudicated charge on its own motion or the defendant may petition the court to expunge a nonadjudicated charge; unless or until the nonadjudicated charges are expunged, they remain on the docket with the disposition of nonadjudicated/dismissed. Shirley, Nov. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0719.

If a judge non-adjudicates a DUI charge under § 63-11-30(3) but imposes a \$250.00 fine as a condition of such non-adjudication, such fine is a "penalty" un-

der § 99-19-73 and, therefore, the assessment must be collected. Cruber, Feb. 22, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0102.

Law enforcement officers may revise existing uniform Implied Consent or DUI citations from .10 BAC to .08 BAC to reflect the current threshold level of alcohol concentration. Mullen, Oct. 18, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0572.

In regard to revising Implied Consent or DUI citations because of changes in the law, a municipality must comply with § 63-9-21 and may not delay ordering revised citations until the current supply is exhausted. Mullen, Oct. 18, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0572.

The provisions of the Zero Tolerance for Minors subsection apply only to someone under the age of twenty-one who is being charged under subsection(1)(c) which requires a specific amount of alcohol in the person's blood; they do not apply to someone who is charged under subsection (1)(d). Baker, Dec. 6, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0698.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What amounts to violation of drunken-driving statute in officer's "presence" or "view" so as to permit warrantless arrest. 74 A.L.R.3d 1138.

What constitutes driving, operating, or being in control of motor vehicle for purposes of driving while intoxicated statutes. 93 A.L.R.3d 7.

Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes directly proscribing driving with blood-alcohol level in excess of established percentage. 54 A.L.R.4th 149.

Alcohol-related vehicular homicide: nature and elements of offense. 64 A.L.R.4th 166.

Passenger's liability to vehicular accident victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor vehicle driver. 64 A.L.R.4th 272.

Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evils" defense that driving was necessary to protect life or property. 64 A.L.R.4th 298.

Cough medicine as "intoxicating liquor" under DUI statute. 65 A.L.R.4th 1238.

Operation of mopeds and motorized recreational two-, three-, and four-wheeled vehicles as within scope of driving while intoxicated statutes. 32 A.L.R.5th 659.

Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle on private property, of legislation making drunken driving a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.5th 655.

Validity, construction, and application of statute permitting forfeiture of motor vehicle for operating while intoxicated. 89 A.L.R.5th 539.

Validity, construction, and operation of school "zero tolerance" policies towards drugs, alcohol, or violence. 117 A.L.R.5th 459.

Vertical gaze nystagmus test: Use in impaired driving prosecution. 117 A.L.R.5th 491.

Assimilation, under Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 13), of state

statutes relating to driving while intoxicated or under influence of alcohol. 175 A.L.R. Fed. 293.

Am Jur. 19 Am. Jur. Trials 123, Defense on Charge of Driving While Intoxicated.

34 Am. Jur. Trials 499, Failure to Protect the Public from an Intoxicated Driver.

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Defense

to Charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 545, Negligent Failure to Detain Intoxicated Motorist.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 459, Proof and disproof of alcohol-induced driving impairment through evidence of observable intoxication and coordination testing.

§ 63-11-31. Impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles registered to person convicted of DUI; installation of ignition interlock system.

(1) In addition to the penalties authorized for any second or subsequent convictions of Section 63-11-30, the court shall order either the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles registered to the person convicted for the entire length of license suspension to commence upon conviction and persist during the entire driver's license suspension period. However, a county, municipality, sheriff's department or the Department of Public Safety shall not be required to keep, store, maintain, serve as a bailee or otherwise exercise custody over a motor vehicle impounded under the provisions of this section.

(2)(a) If other licensed drivers living in the household are dependent upon the vehicle subject to impoundment or immobilization for necessary transportation, the court may order the installation of an ignition interlock system on the vehicle in lieu of impoundment or immobilization. Additionally, the court shall order the installation of an ignition interlock system on all vehicles registered to the person for a minimum period of six (6) months to occur upon reinstatement of the person's driver's license if the court determines it is a vehicle to which the person has access and which should be subject to ignition interlock. The cost associated with impoundment, immobilization or ignition interlock shall be paid by the person convicted. For the purpose of this section, "ignition interlock device" means a device which connects a motor vehicle ignition system to a breath-alcohol analyzer and prevents a motor vehicle ignition from starting if the driver's blood alcohol level exceeds the calibrated setting on the device.

(b) A person may not tamper with, or in any way attempt to circumvent the immobilization or impoundment of vehicles ordered by the court. A violation of this paragraph (b) is a misdemeanor and upon conviction the violator shall be fined an amount not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year or both.

(c) When a court orders a person to operate only a motor vehicle which is equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device, the court shall establish a specific calibration setting no lower than two one-hundredths percent (.02%) nor more than four one-hundredths percent (.04%) blood alcohol concentration at which the ignition interlock device will prevent the motor vehicle from being started.

(d) Upon ordering use of an ignition interlock device, the court shall:

(i) State on the record the requirement for and the period of use of the device, and so notify the Department of Public Safety;

(ii) Direct that the records of the department reflect that the person may not operate a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device;

(iii) Direct the department to attach or imprint a notation on the driver's license of any person restricted under this section stating that the person may operate only a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device;

(iv) Require proof of the installation of the device and periodic reporting by the person for verification of the proper operation of the device;

(v) Require the person to have the system monitored for proper use and accuracy by an entity approved by the department at least semianually, or more frequently as the circumstances may require;

(vi) Require the person to pay the reasonable cost of leasing or buying, monitoring, and maintaining the device, and may establish a payment schedule therefore.

(e)(i)1. A person prohibited under this section from operating a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device may not solicit or have another person attempt to start or start a motor vehicle equipped with such a device.

2. A person may not attempt to start or start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device for the purpose of providing an operable motor vehicle to a person who is prohibited under this section from operating a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

3. A person may not tamper with, or in any way attempt to circumvent, the operation of an ignition interlock device that has been installed in a motor vehicle.

4. A person may not knowingly provide a motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device to another person who the provider of such vehicle knows or should know is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

(ii) A violation of this paragraph (e) is a misdemeanor and upon conviction the violator shall be fined an amount not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$250.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or both.

(iii) A person shall not be in violation of this paragraph (e) if:

1. The starting of a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device is done for the purpose of safety or mechanical repair of the device or the vehicle, and the person subject to the court order does not operate the vehicle; or

2. The court finds that a person is required to operate a motor vehicle in the course and scope of the person's employment. If the vehicle is owned by the person's employer, the person may operate that vehicle during regular working hours for the purposes of employment without installation of an ignition interlock device if the employer has been notified of such driving privilege restriction and if proof of that notification is kept with the vehicle at all times. This employment exemption does not apply if the business entity that owns the vehicle is owned or controlled by the person who is prohibited from operating the motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

(f)(i) A judge may also order that the vehicle owned or operated by a person or a family member of any person who committed a violation of Section 63-11-30 be equipped with an ignition interlock device for all or a portion of the time the driver's license of the operator of such vehicle is suspended or restricted pursuant to this section, if:

1. The operator of the vehicle used to violate Section 63-11-30 has at least one (1) prior conviction for driving a motor vehicle when such person's privilege to do so is cancelled, suspended or revoked as provided by Section 63-11-30; or

2. The driver's license of the operator of such vehicle was cancelled, suspended or revoked at the time of the violation of Section 63-11-30.

(ii) The provisions of this paragraph (f) shall not apply if the vehicle used to commit the violation of Section 63-11-30, was, at the time of such violation, rented or stolen.

(3) The provisions of this section are supplemental to the provisions of Section 63-11-30.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 542, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 477, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 23, 2001.)

Editor's Note — Former § 63-11-31 made it unlawful to operate a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and provided the penalties for a violation.

A prior § 63-11-31 [Codes, 1942, §§ 8175-04, 8175-05; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, §§ 4, 5] was repealed by Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1981. That section made it unlawful to operate a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and provided the penalties for a violation.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Although federal regulations allow the revocation or suspension of a motor vehicle license plate in order to immobilize a motor vehicle, the statute does not provide for revocation or suspension of a tag. White, Jr., Nov. 27, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0662.

Confiscation of a vehicle license plate does not constitute immobilization or impoundment. White, Jr., Nov. 27, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0662.

§ 63-11-32. Development, implementation and funding of driver improvement program for first offenders convicted of driving while intoxicated or under influence of another substance which impairs ability to operate motor vehicle.

(1) The State Department of Public Safety in conjunction with the Governor's Highway Safety Program, the State Board of Health, or any other state agency or institution shall develop and implement a driver improvement program for persons identified as first offenders convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or another substance which had impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle, including provision for referral to rehabilitation facilities.

(2) The program shall consist of a minimum of ten (10) hours of instruction. Each person who participates shall pay a nominal fee to defray a portion of the cost of the program.

(3) Such assessments as are collected under subsection (2) of Section 99-19-73 shall be deposited in a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury and designated the "Mississippi Alcohol Safety Education Program Fund." Monies deposited in such fund shall be expended by the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning as authorized and appropriated by the Legislature to defray the costs of the Mississippi Alcohol Safety Education Program operated pursuant to the provisions of this section. Any revenue in the fund which is not encumbered at the end of the fiscal year shall lapse to the General Fund.

(4) Such assessments as are collected under subsection (2) of Section 99-19-73 shall be deposited in a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury and designated the "Federal-State Alcohol Program Fund." Monies deposited in such fund shall be expended by the Department of Public Safety as authorized and appropriated by the Legislature to defray the costs of alcohol and traffic safety programs. Any revenue in the fund which is not encumbered at the end of the fiscal year shall lapse to the General Fund.

(5) Such assessments as are collected under subsection (2) of Section 99-19-73 shall be deposited in a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury and designated the "Mississippi Crime Laboratory Implied Consent Law Fund." Monies deposited in such fund shall be expended by the Department of Public Safety as authorized and appropriated by the Legislature to defray the costs of equipment replacement and operational support of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory relating to enforcement of the Implied Consent Law. Any revenue in the fund which is not encumbered at the end of the fiscal year shall not lapse to the General Fund but shall remain in the fund.

SOURCES: Laws, 1973, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 305; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 7; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 8; Laws, 1990, ch. 329, § 11; Laws, 1991, ch. 356 § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 12, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or

suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act.

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

"SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act."

Cross References — Court ordering completion of alcohol safety education program by one convicted of driving while intoxicated or under influence of other substance which impairs ability to operate motor vehicle, see § 63-11-30.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Horseback riding or operation of horse-drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute. 71 A.L.R.4th 1129.

§§ 63-11-33, 63-11-35. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1981.

[Codes, 1942, §§ 8175-04, 8175-06, 8175-07; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, §§ 4, 6,

7]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-11-33 made it unlawful to operate a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and provided the penalties where chemical test results were not available. Former § 63-11-35 made it unlawful to operate a vehicle while intoxicated, and provided the penalties for a violation.

§ 63-11-37. Contents and disposition of record of conviction under § 63-11-30.

It shall be the duty of the trial judge, upon conviction of any person under Section 63-11-30, to mail a true and correct copy of the traffic ticket, citation or affidavit evidencing the arrest that resulted in the conviction and a copy of the abstract of the court record within five (5) days to the Commissioner of Public Safety at Jackson, Mississippi. The trial judge in municipal and justice courts shall show on the docket and the trial judge in courts of record shall show on the minutes:

- (a) Whether or not a chemical test was given and the results of the test;
- (b) Where conviction was based in whole or in part on the results of such a test.

The abstract of the court record shall show the date of the conviction, the results of the test if there was one and the penalty so that a record of same may be made by the Department of Public Safety.

For the purposes of Section 63-11-30, a bond forfeiture shall operate as and be considered as a conviction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-08; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 8; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 8; Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 9; Laws, 1985, ch. 346; Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 15, provides as follows:

“SECTION 15. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to the effective date of this act under laws amended or repealed by this act, or suspensions or denials of driver's licenses or permits made pursuant to laws amended or repealed by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act.”

Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1983, provides as follows:

“SECTION 12. Prosecutions, convictions and penalties for violations which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act, and suspensions or denials of driver's licenses, permits or privileges made pursuant to laws amended by this act, shall not be affected or abated by the provisions of this act. In addition, convictions which occurred prior to July 1, 1983, under laws amended by this act shall be counted for the purposes of determining the penalties which shall be imposed on any person convicted for a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of the laws amended by this act.”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The conduct of a justice court judge warranted his removal from office where, during a 3-year period, he adjudicated approximately 28 driving under the influence cases wherein he did not file an abstract of the court record of convictions

with the Commissioner of Public Safety as required by § 63-11-37 and he adjudicated approximately 552 routine traffic convictions but failed to report these to the Department of Public Safety as required by § 63-9-17. In re Quick, 553 So. 2d 522 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Admissibility of traffic conviction in later state civil trial. 73 A.L.R.4th 691.

Am Jur. 1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 475 (complaint, petition, or declaration-by license holder — against administrative

agency — to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license — attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license).

§ 63-11-39. Reduction of charges under chapter.

The court having jurisdiction or the prosecutor shall not reduce any charge under this chapter to a lesser charge.

SOURCES: Laws, 1992, ch. 500, § 5; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 13, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Editor's Note — Former § 63-11-39 [Codes, 1942, § 8175-15; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 15; 1981, ch. 491, § 10; 1983, ch. 466, § 10], which allowed admission of evidence of a person's refusal to take a chemical test of his blood and prohibited reduction of a driving under the influence charge, was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
- 2.-10. [Reserved for future use].
11. Under former law.

1. In general.

Sole function of statute was to prohibit reduction of DUI charges to non-DUI charges, the modifying phrase "under this chapter," signifying DUI offenses, was not repeated after the phrase "to a lesser charge." *Ostrander v. State*, 803 So. 2d 1172 (Miss. 2002).

Reducing three citations for driving under influence (DUI) in violation of statute precluding such reductions, assessing costs of fines in excess of statutory maximum in six criminal cases, failing to require affidavits in four criminal cases, issuing orders without authority, and allowing cameras in courtroom warranted public reprimand, fine of \$2,628, and assessment of costs. *Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Emmanuel*, 688 So. 2d 222 (Miss. 1996).

Justice court judge improperly handled driving under the influence charges (DUI) and acted beyond his legal authority in violation of judicial canons when he reduced charges to possession of beer and whiskey because prosecuting attorney informed him that evidence was not clear as to whether defendant was driving and that he had an agreement with defendant to pay fines on lesser charge. *Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds*, 680 So. 2d 180 (Miss. 1996).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use].**11. Under former law.**

Trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the results of defendant's urine analysis performed by a hospital employee simply because the employee did not hold a valid permit from the State Crime Laboratory (Mississippi) pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-19; because the employee, who had 40 years experience, was clearly qualified to perform the

analysis at issue, and defendant did not question the credibility of the test or the procedures used by the employee in performing the analysis, the court found that the test was reasonable and the results admissible under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 63-11-39, 63-11-13. *Jones v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 869 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-13 makes clear that test results from persons performing analyses at the behest of the accused may be admitted, and the language in § 63-11-13, regarding "any other test" is comparable to the language in former Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-39(2), which authorized admission of "any other competent evidence" bearing upon the issue of whether a person was intoxicated; clearly "any other test," properly administered under appropriate procedures and designed to determine the alcohol or drug content of one's blood or urine, constitutes other competent evidence. *Jones v. State*, — So. 2d —, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 869 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

In a prosecution for homicide by culpable negligence, results of a blood test revealed that the defendant had considerably more than .10 percent alcohol content in his blood, the demarcation under § 63-11-39 between a presumption of whether he was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. *Williams v. State*, 434 So. 2d 1340 (Miss. 1983), but see *Fisher v. Eupora*, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991).

A chemical analysis of defendant's blood performed by an individual not possessing a valid permit issued by the State Board of Health for making such analysis (Code 1972 § 63-11-19) was nevertheless admissible as other competent evidence under Code 1972 § 63-11-39 where evidence detailed in opinion established that test was reasonable. *Cutchens v. State*, 310 So. 2d 273 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061, 96 S. Ct. 799, 46 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1976).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Section 63-11-39, as reinstated, applies to all cases pending from and after effective date.

Simpson, Nov. 5, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0815.

Miss. Code Section 63-11-39 does not limit court at trial on merits on ultimate disposition of case; it prohibits reduction of charge at any stage of proceeding, but not dismissals or final verdicts. Cooke, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0239.

Statute only applies to cases where defendant is charged with driving under influence of liquor or alcohol and therefore charge of driving under influence of other substance could be reduced on motion of prosecutor. Clinton, June 30, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0436.

Term "lesser charge" referred to in statute means non-DUI offenses and charge of DUI second or DUI third may be changed by amendment to DUI first or DUI second, if facts warrant. Moffett, July 19, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0437.

Based on this section, a DUI charge may only be reduced to a non-DUI offense if there is no BAC (blood alcohol content) reading of .10%. If there is no BAC reading, the DUI charge may be reduced by

the court on a motion by the prosecutor. Spencer, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0154.

The amendment to Section 63-11-39 went into effect July 2, 1996. Therefore, no DUI charge may be reduced to a non-DUI charge after July 2, 1996, regardless of when the offense occurred. Emfinger, September 6, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0617.

Under this section, there is no prohibition against reducing a DUI charge if the defendant registers below .10 on the intoxilyzer. Childers, July 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0444.

A municipal prosecuting attorney may not request a court to reduce a third offense of driving under the influence charge to a second offense as a municipal court does not have jurisdiction over such a charge; instead, after a probable cause finding, the municipal court should bind such a case over to the grand jury and, once a case has been bound over, it must be heard by the grand jury. Johnston, Feb. 26, 2002, A.G. Op. #01-0780.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Am Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1080-1087, 1093.

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 585, Blood Tests.

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Defense to Charge of Driving Under Influence of Alcohol.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1403, 1404, 1406, 1407, 1411.

§ 63-11-40. Driving while driving license or privilege cancelled, suspended or revoked.

Any person whose driver's license, or driving privilege has been cancelled, suspended or revoked under the provisions of this chapter and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways, streets or public roads of this state, while such license or privilege is cancelled, suspended or revoked, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than six (6) months, and fined not less than two hundred dollars (\$200.00) nor more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00).

The commissioner of public safety shall suspend the driver's license or driving privilege of any person convicted under the provisions of this section for an additional six (6) months. Such suspension shall begin at the end of the original cancellation, suspension or revocation and run consecutively.

SOURCES: Laws, 1983, ch. 466, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References — Suspension of driving privileges of person convicted of violations of Uniform Controlled Substance Law, see § 63-1-71.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Statute providing penalties for operation of vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor or other substance provides only for concurrent suspension periods for multiple offenses; time of license suspension begins to run when Commis-

sioner of Public Safety receives abstract of judgment and issues order of suspension, regardless of whether some other period of suspension is also running. *State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prine*, 687 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 1996).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

If an individual has his license suspended under § 63-11-23 prior to going to court, and is subsequently charged with violating this section, an acquittal for the original DUI charge has no effect on the charge for driving with license suspended for DUI. *Hester*, May 21, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0242.

An individual who has had his driving privileges revoked may be charged under the statute for driving while his driving privileges are suspended even though he never had a valid driver's license to begin with. *Franklin*, May 17, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0260.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test.

§ 63-11-41. Admissibility in criminal prosecution of evidence of refusal to submit to chemical test.

If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under the provisions of this chapter, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any criminal action under this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-22; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 22, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a prosecution for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the admission into evidence under § 63-11-41 of the defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test did not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3,

§ 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, even though the defendant was not specifically warned that his refusal could be admitted into evidence against him; the penalty of introducing a refusal serves an important state interest in encouraging defendants to submit to a chemical test, and as the refusal is physical instead of testimonial,

its introduction into evidence violates neither the Fifth Amendment nor § 26. *Ricks v. State*, 611 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1992).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 375-380.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test.

CJS. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1403, 1404, 1406, 1407.

§ 63-11-43. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991. [Codes, 1942, § 8175-23; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 23]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-11-43 related to admissibility of test results or of submission or nonsubmission to test in civil case.

§ 63-11-45. Denial of insurance coverage on ground of refusal to submit to test or upon basis of test results.

No coverage otherwise afforded under any policy of insurance shall be denied on the ground that any person has refused any test provided for by this chapter nor on the basis of the results of any such test. Any provision to such effect in any insurance policy hereinafter issued shall be void.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-25; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 29, eff from and after April 1, 1972.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229, Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test.

§ 63-11-47. Selection and purchase of equipment and supplies.

The commissioner of public safety, acting in concert with the state crime laboratory created pursuant to Section 45-1-17, is hereby expressly authorized and directed to determine the equipment and supplies which are adequate and necessary from both a medical and law enforcement standpoint for administration of this chapter. The commissioner of public safety, upon receiving such recommendation from the state crime laboratory, shall recommend an equipment standard for such equipment to the state fiscal management board. The state fiscal management board, using such a uniform standard for said equipment, shall advertise its intention of purchasing said equipment by one (1) publication in at least one (1) newspaper having general circulation in the

state of Mississippi at least ten (10) days before the purchase of such equipment and supplies, and the advertisement shall clearly and distinctly describe the articles to be purchased, and shall receive sealed bids thereon which shall be opened in public at a time and place to be specified in the advertisement.

The state fiscal management board shall accept the lowest and best bid for said equipment and supplies; in its discretion, it may reject any and all bids submitted. The lowest and best bid for said equipment and supplies accepted by the state fiscal management board shall be the state-approved price of said equipment for purchase by the state, county and city governments.

Title to all such testing equipment in the state purchased hereunder shall remain in the commissioner of public safety regardless of what entity pays the purchase price.

The state, counties and municipalities may purchase in the name of the commissioner of public safety such equipment and supplies from other vendors of said equipment and supplies necessary to implement this chapter, provided they purchase of the same quality and standard as certified to the state fiscal management board and approved by the department. However, such equipment and supplies shall not be purchased by the state, counties and municipalities unless it is at a price equivalent to or lower than that approved by the state fiscal management board, pursuant to the bid procedure as outlined herein.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8175-26; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 30; Laws, 1981, ch. 491, § 13; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 263, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Editor's Note — Section 27-104-1 provides that the term "Fiscal Management Board" shall mean the "Department of Finance and Administration".

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Duties and responsibilities, including allowing authority for Educational Television to contract (§ 37-63-11), giving concurrence for the use of funds to travel outside the continental United States (§ 25-3-41), advertising for and accepting bids on equipment for the State Crime Laboratory (§ 63-11-47), granting authority for the purchase of motor vehicles by state departments, institutions, or agen-

cies (§ 25-1-77), and approving disbursement of funds by the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Commission (§ 49-17-13), are administrative functions within the prerogative of the executive department, and statutes vesting those powers and functions in members of the legislature violate Miss. Const. Art. 1 § 2 and are unconstitutional. *Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain*, 441 So. 2d 1329 (Miss. 1983).

§ 63-11-49. Authorization for impoundment and forfeiture of vehicle seized under chapter; notice of intention to forfeit; forfeiture to spouse; request for judicial review.

(1) When a vehicle is seized under Section 63-11-30(2)(c) or (d), the arresting officer shall impound the vehicle and the vehicle shall be held as evidence until a court of competent jurisdiction makes a final disposition of the

case and the vehicle may be forfeited by the administrative forfeiture procedures provided for in this section upon final disposition as provided in Section 63-11-30(2)(c).

(2) The attorney for the law enforcement agency shall provide notice of intention to forfeit the seized vehicle administratively, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to all persons who are required to be notified pursuant to Section 63-11-51.

(3) In the event that notice of intention to forfeit the seized vehicle administratively cannot be given as provided in subsection (2) of this section because of refusal, failure to claim, insufficient address or any other reason, the attorney for the law enforcement agency shall provide notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the seizure occurred for once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.

(4) Notice pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall include the following information:

(a) A description of the vehicle;

(b) The approximate value of the vehicle;

(c) The date and place of the seizure;

(d) The connection between the vehicle and the violation of Section 63-11-30;

(e) The instructions for filing a request for judicial review; and

(f) A statement that the vehicle will be forfeited to the law enforcement agency if a request for judicial review is not timely filed.

(5) In the event that a spouse of the owner of the seized vehicle makes a showing to the department that the seized vehicle is the only source of transportation for the spouse, the chief law enforcement officer shall declare that the vehicle is thereby forfeited to such spouse. A written declaration of forfeiture of a vehicle pursuant to this subsection shall be sufficient cause for the title to the vehicle to be transferred to the spouse. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to one (1) forfeiture per vehicle; if the vehicle is the subject of a subsequent forfeiture proceeding by virtue of a subsequent conviction of either spouse, the spouse to whom the vehicle was forfeited pursuant to the first forfeiture proceeding may not utilize the remedy provided herein in another forfeiture proceeding.

(6) Persons claiming an interest in the seized vehicle may initiate judicial review of the seizure and proposed forfeiture by filing a request for judicial review with the attorney for the law enforcement agency within thirty (30) days after receipt of the certified letter or within thirty (30) days after the first publication of notice, whichever is applicable.

(7) If no request for judicial review is timely filed, the attorney for the law enforcement agency shall prepare a written declaration of forfeiture of the subject vehicle and the forfeited vehicle shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-11-53.

(8) Upon receipt of a timely request for judicial review, the attorney for the law enforcement agency shall promptly file a petition for forfeiture and proceed as provided in Section 63-11-51.

SOURCES: Laws, 1992, ch. 500, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 14, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (7). The reference to “63-11-51” was changed to “63-11-53.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 8, 2004 meeting.

Cross References — Forfeiture of vehicle owned by person convicted of third or subsequent violation of drunk or drugged driving law, see § 63-11-30.

Petition for forfeiture of vehicle seized for violation of implied consent law, see § 63-11-51.

Money derived from seized and forfeited vehicles to be deposited in special fund, see § 63-11-53.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A district attorney and law enforcement agency may agree that the district attorney will file DUI vehicle forfeiture petitions on behalf of that entity upon final conviction of the defendant. Mitchell, Jan. 25, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0003.

It is not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to releasing a vehicle to a third party or lienholder. Pace, April 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0178.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Relief to claimant of interest in motor vehicle subject to state forfeiture for use in violation of liquor laws. 14 A.L.R.3d 221.

Relief to owner of motor vehicle subject

to state forfeiture for use in violation of narcotics laws. 50 A.L.R.3d 172.

Am Jur. 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Forfeitures and Penalties §§ 14 et seq.

§ 63-11-51. Institution of forfeiture proceedings; filing and service of petition for forfeiture.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 63-11-49, when a vehicle is seized under Section 63-11-30(2)(c) or (d), proceedings under this section shall be instituted promptly upon final conviction.

(2) A petition for forfeiture shall be filed promptly in the name of the State of Mississippi, the county or the municipality and may be filed in the county in which the seizure is made, the county in which the criminal prosecution is brought or the county in which the owner of the seized vehicle is found. Forfeiture proceedings may be brought in the circuit court or the county court if a county court exists in the county and the value of the seized vehicle is within the jurisdictional limits of the county court as set forth in Section 9-9-21. A copy of such petition shall be served upon the following persons by service of process in the same manner as in civil cases:

(a) The owner of the vehicle, if address is known;

(b) Any secured party who has registered his lien or filed a financing statement as provided by law, if the identity of such secured party can be ascertained by the law enforcement agency by making a good faith effort to

ascertain the identity of such secured party as described in subsections (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of this section;

(c) Any other bona fide lienholder or secured party or other person holding an interest in the vehicle in the nature of a security interest of whom the law enforcement agency has actual knowledge;

(d) Any person in possession of the vehicle subject to forfeiture at the time that it was seized.

(3) If the vehicle is susceptible of titling under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law and if there is any reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle has been titled, the law enforcement agency shall inquire of the State Tax Commission as to what the records of the State Tax Commission show regarding who is the record owner of the vehicle and who, if anyone, holds any lien or security interest which affects the vehicle.

(4) If the vehicle is not titled in the State of Mississippi, then the law enforcement agency shall attempt to ascertain the name and address of the person in whose name the vehicle is licensed, and if the vehicle is licensed in a state which has in effect a certificate of title law, the agency shall inquire of the appropriate agency of that state as to what the records of the agency show regarding who is the record owner of the vehicle and who, if anyone, holds any lien, security interest or other instrument in the nature of a security device which affects the vehicle.

(5) In the event the answer to an inquiry states that the record owner of the vehicle is any person other than the person who was in possession of it when it was seized, or states that any person holds any lien, encumbrance, security interest, other interest in the nature of a security interest, which affects the vehicle, the law enforcement agency shall cause any record owner and also any lienholder, secured party, other person who holds an interest in the vehicle in the nature of a security interest, to be named in the petition of forfeiture and to be served with process in the same manner as in civil cases.

(6) If the owner of the vehicle cannot be found and served with a copy of the petition of forfeiture, the law enforcement agency shall file with the clerk of the court in which the proceeding is pending an affidavit to such effect, whereupon the clerk of the court shall publish notice of the hearing addressed to "the Unknown Owner of . . .," filling in the blank space with a reasonably detailed description of the vehicle subject to forfeiture. Service by publication shall contain the other requisites prescribed in Section 11-33-41, and shall be served as provided in Section 11-33-37 for publication of notice for attachments at law.

SOURCES: Laws, 1992, ch. 500, § 3; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 15, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Cross References — Forfeiture of vehicle seized for violation of this chapter, see § 63-11-49.

Money derived from seized and forfeited vehicles to be deposited in special fund, see § 63-11-53.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A district attorney and law enforcement agency may agree that the district attorney will file DUI vehicle forfeiture peti-

tions on behalf of that entity upon final conviction of the defendant. Mitchell, Jan. 25, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0003.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Relief to claimant of interest in motor vehicle subject to state forfeiture for use in violation of liquor laws. 14 A.L.R.3d 221.

Relief to owner of motor vehicle subject to state forfeiture for use in violation of narcotics laws. 50 A.L.R.3d 172.

Validity, construction, and application of statute permitting forfeiture of motor vehicle for operating while intoxicated. 89 A.L.R.5th 539.

Am Jur. 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Forfeitures and Penalties §§ 14 et seq.

§ 63-11-53. Disposition of forfeited vehicles; disposition of money derived from forfeited vehicles.

(1) All money derived from the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles under Section 63-11-30(2)(c) and (d) and Sections 63-11-49 and 63-11-51 by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol shall be forwarded to the State Treasurer and deposited in a special fund which is hereby created for use by the Department of Public Safety upon appropriation by the Legislature. Unexpended amounts remaining in such special fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, and any interest earned on amounts in such special fund shall be deposited to the credit of the special fund. All other law enforcement agencies shall establish a special fund which is to be used for law enforcement purposes to purchase equipment for the law enforcement agency, and any interest earned on the amount in such special fund shall be deposited to the credit of the special fund.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), all vehicles that have been forfeited shall be sold at a public auction for cash by the law enforcement agency, to the highest and best bidder after advertising the sale for at least once each week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the last notice to appear not more than ten (10) days nor less than five (5) days prior to such sale, in a newspaper having a general circulation in the county in which the vehicle was seized. Such notices shall contain a description of the vehicle to be sold and a statement of the time and place of sale. It shall not be necessary to the validity of such sale either to have the vehicle present at the place of sale or to have the name of the owner thereof stated in such notice. The proceeds of the sale shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) To any bona fide lienholder, secured party, or other party holding an interest in the vehicle in the nature of a security interest, to the extent of his interest; and

(b) The balance, if any, remaining after deduction of all storage, court costs and expenses of liquidation shall be deposited in the manner described in subsection (1) of this section.

(3) The law enforcement agency may maintain, repair, use and operate for official purposes all vehicles that have been forfeited if the vehicles are free from any interest of a bona fide lienholder, secured party or other party who holds an interest in the nature of a security interest. The agency may purchase the interest of a bona fide lienholder, secured party or other party who holds an interest so that the vehicle can be released for its use. If the vehicle is susceptible of titling under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law, the agency shall be deemed to be the purchaser, and the certificate of title shall be issued to it as required by subsection (4) of this section.

(4) The State Tax Commission shall issue a certificate of title to any person who purchases vehicles under the provisions of this section when a certificate of title is required under the laws of this state.

SOURCES: Laws, 1992, ch. 500, § 4; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 16, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Cross References — Petition for forfeiture of vehicle seized for violation of implied consent law, see § 63-11-51.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Proceeds from the public sale of a forfeited vehicle should be applied to any bona fide liens to the extent of the liens, and if the proceeds are insufficient to pay off the liens, then the liens are extinguished and no longer secured by the vehicle. Bryan, Aug. 15, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0498.

All forfeited vehicles, except those which the agency chooses to keep for its own official use, must be sold at a public

auction; there are no provisions for forfeited DUI vehicles to be sold through sealed bids. King, Dec. 17, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0686.

A governing authority may utilize funds obtained from DUI forfeitures to retain counsel and support staff to handle DUI vehicle forfeitures, and may enter into an agreement with the district attorney's office for this purpose. Mitchell, Jan. 25, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0003.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Relief to claimant of interest in motor vehicle subject to state forfeiture for use in violation of liquor laws. 14 A.L.R.3d 221.

Relief to owner of motor vehicle subject

to state forfeiture for use in violation of narcotics laws. 50 A.L.R.3d 172.

Am Jur. 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Forfeitures and Penalties §§ 14 et seq.

CHAPTER 13

Inspection of Motor Vehicles

SEC.

- 63-13-1. Short title.
- 63-13-3. Operation of vehicles without required properly operating equipment or in unsafe mechanical condition.
- 63-13-5. Motor vehicle inspection department.
- 63-13-7. Requirement of periodic inspection and approval of motor vehicles, trailers, and school buses; display of certificate of inspection and approval; exemption of certain motor vehicles.
- 63-13-8. Grace period for obtaining valid inspection sticker.
- 63-13-9. Details of inspection; inspection of certain vehicles by representative of Liquified Compressed Gas Board; suspension of registration of unsafe vehicles.
- 63-13-11. Inspection fees; disposition of funds.
- 63-13-13. Issuance, use, etc. of false certificate of inspection; display of false or improperly obtained certificate of inspection.
- 63-13-15. Licensing of official inspection stations; qualifications of inspectors; inspection of stations; list of inspection stations.
- 63-13-17. Improper representation of establishment as official station; issuance of certificate by unauthorized person.
- 63-13-19. Inspections by vehicle dealers.
- 63-13-21. Highway inspection by members of Highway Safety Patrol; written notice for correction of defects.
- 63-13-23. Correction of defects covered in notice issued under § 63-13-21.
- 63-13-25. Effect of inspection certificate; effect of failure to discover defects during inspection.
- 63-13-27. Administration of chapter.
- 63-13-29. Penalties for violations of chapter.

§ 63-13-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and cited as "The Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Inspection Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-01; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 1961.

Cross References — Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law — Equipment and Identification Regulations, see §§ 63-7-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 242. Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40. Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Practice References. Mississippi

§ 63-13-3. Operation of vehicles without required properly operating equipment or in unsafe mechanical condition.

No person shall drive or move on any highway any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer or pole trailer, or any combination thereof, unless the equipment upon any and every said vehicle is in good working order and adjustment as required in this chapter, and said vehicle is in such safe mechanical condition as not to endanger the driver or other occupant or any person upon the highway. This section shall not apply to disabled vehicles being moved to a garage or service station by means of another vehicle, or to farm trailers engaged in farm operations, or to any farm tractor, combine, cotton picker, semitrailer, pole trailer, or other agricultural or farming equipment or machinery, or any combination thereof, used primarily for agricultural purposes, and not normally used on the public highways of the state. Moreover, pulpwood trucks or log trucks used exclusively during daylight hours shall not be required under the provisions of this chapter to have any lights in addition to headlights and taillights.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-02; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 2; Laws, 1966, ch. 572, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved June 7, 1966).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A truck hauling water well drilling equipment from one site to another is not exempt from this section's requirement for a valid inspection sticker. O'Bryant, Aug. 22, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0524.

§ 63-13-5. Motor vehicle inspection department.

The commissioner of public safety, together with the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, and the commissioner of revenue shall constitute the motor vehicle inspection department of this state and as such are hereby authorized to make necessary rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of this chapter, including therein a reasonable provision for the bonding of the official inspection stations. In any said rules and regulations no specific brand or type of equipment shall be named or designated as inspection equipment, and only standard of performance shall be set; moreover, said rules and regulations shall be so drawn as not to provide a monopoly of one (1) type of equipment but shall provide approval of at least two (2) different brands of competitive equipment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-05; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 456; Laws, 1968, ch. 544, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 561, § 24, eff from and after July 2, 1980.

Cross References — Governor generally, see §§ 7-1-1 et seq.
Attorney general generally, see §§ 7-5-1 et seq.

§ 63-13-7. Requirement of periodic inspection and approval of motor vehicles, trailers, and school buses; display of certificate of inspection and approval; exemption of certain motor vehicles.

(1) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall, not more than once each year, require that every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer registered in this state be inspected and that an official certificate of inspection and approval be obtained for each such vehicle. Each such vehicle must display at all times a certificate of inspection and approval duly issued for such vehicle upon the lower left hand corner of the windshield thereof or upon such vehicle in such position as to be visible from the outside.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, every motor vehicle registered in any other state and operated over the highways of this state shall be inspected and shall display an inspection certificate which shall be different either in color or design from the inspection certificates issued for use on state registered vehicles.

However, the Commissioner of Public Safety may authorize the acceptance in this state of a certificate of inspection and approval issued under the authority of a qualified agency or department of another state, provided that every municipality, county and state office in such other state accepts under a mutually acceptable reciprocal agreement, Mississippi's certificate of inspection and approval. The commissioner shall except from the provisions of this chapter all passenger buses and other vehicles certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission and subject to its rules and regulations and its periodical inspections.

(3) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall require all school buses in the State of Mississippi to be inspected during the months of July or August each year and may provide such special certificate of inspection and approval as he may deem necessary.

(4) A motor vehicle manufactured or having a model year earlier than 1961 shall not be required to be inspected or to display a certificate of inspection under the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-05; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 456; Laws, 1968, ch. 544, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 389, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 556 § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 12, 1991).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 242.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

§ 63-13-8. Grace period for obtaining valid inspection sticker.

A grace period for obtaining a valid inspection sticker, according to the provisions of Chapter 13, Title 63, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be granted in the following situations:

(a) Whenever a motor vehicle inspection sticker expires on a legal holiday or on a weekend, the owner of the vehicle involved shall have a grace period of three (3) days in which to obtain a valid inspection sticker.

(b) Whenever a motor vehicle inspection sticker expires while the vehicle is being repaired or restored, the owner of the vehicle involved shall have a grace period of three (3) days in which to obtain a valid inspection sticker. The period of three (3) days shall start to run from the date the owner takes possession of the vehicle after said expiration date.

SOURCES: Laws, 1977, ch. 317, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved February 25, 1977).

§ 63-13-9. Details of inspection; inspection of certain vehicles by representative of Liquefied Compressed Gas Board; suspension of registration of unsafe vehicles.

Such inspections shall be made of every such vehicle, and such certificates shall be obtained with respect to the mechanism, lights, tires, brakes and equipment as shall be designated by the motor vehicle inspection department by rules and regulations.

No vehicle equipped with a liquefied petroleum or natural gas carburetion system may be issued a certificate under this chapter unless the vehicle shall have first been inspected and approved by an inspector or qualified installer authorized by the State Liquefied Compressed Gas Board to inspect and approve the installation of such systems, and unless such approval is exhibited to the person making the actual inspection under this chapter.

The Commissioner of Public Safety may suspend the registration of any vehicle which he determines is in such unsafe condition as to constitute a menace to safety and which, after notice and demand, is not equipped as required in this chapter and for which a required certificate has not been obtained.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-05; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 456; Laws, 1968, ch. 544, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 437, § 7; Laws, 1995, ch. 475, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 242.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.

§ 63-13-11. Inspection fees; disposition of funds.

A fee of Five Dollars (\$5) shall be charged for an inspection and issuance of a certificate of inspection for vehicles registered in this state. A fee of Ten Dollars (\$10.00) shall be charged for an inspection and issuance of a certificate of inspection for vehicles registered in another state unless a reciprocal agreement, as provided for in Section 63-13-7 has been approved, in which event no Mississippi certificate of inspection shall be required. The fee for state registered vehicles shall include a charge of Two Dollars (\$2.00) per certificate of inspection, which shall be remitted to the Mississippi Department of Public Safety. The fee for motor vehicles registered in another state includes a charge of Nine Dollars (\$9.00) per certificate of inspection, which shall be remitted to the Department of Public Safety. The funds so received by the department shall be deposited in the General Fund of the State Treasury in accordance with the provisions of Section 45-1-23(2). The portion of the fee which is not remitted to the department may be retained by the official inspection stations.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-05; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 456; Laws, 1968, ch. 544, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 389, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 396, § 6; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 52, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References — Highway patrol operating fund, see § 45-1-23.

§ 63-13-13. Issuance, use, etc. of false certificate of inspection; display of false or improperly obtained certificate of inspection.

No person shall make, issue or knowingly use any imitation or counterfeit of an official certificate of inspection.

No person shall display or cause or permit to be displayed upon any vehicle any certificate of inspection and approval knowing the same to be fictitious or issued for another vehicle or issued without an inspection having been made.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-09; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 9, eff from and after January 1, 1961.

§ 63-13-15. Licensing of official inspection stations; qualifications of inspectors; inspection of stations; list of inspection stations.

(1) The commissioner of public safety shall annually issue permits for and furnish instructions and all necessary forms to official inspection stations for the inspection of vehicles as required by this chapter in the issuance of official certificates of inspection and approval.

(2) Application for permit shall be made on an official form and shall be granted only when the commissioner of public safety is satisfied that the station is properly equipped and has competent personnel to make such inspections and that such inspections will be properly conducted. A fee of ten dollars (\$10.00) shall be charged any person or facility seeking a permit as an

official inspection station, or a renewal thereof, for the purpose of defraying the cost of administering the processing of the application.

(3) The person making the actual inspection for the station or under whose immediate personal supervision such inspection is made shall have not less than one year's practical experience as an automotive mechanic. No person shall be designated by such station to make such inspections for it unless the person has been approved for that purpose by the department of public safety.

(4) The commissioner of public safety shall properly supervise and cause inspections to be made of such stations and may, after reasonable notice, suspend or revoke and require the surrender of the permit issued to a station which he finds is not properly equipped or conducted. The commissioner of public safety shall maintain and post at the office of the department of public safety lists of all stations holding permits and of those whose permits have been suspended or revoked.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-06; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 6, eff from and after January 1, 1961.

§ 63-13-17. Improper representation of establishment as official station; issuance of certificate by unauthorized person.

No person shall in any manner represent any place as an official inspection station unless such station is duly licensed as provided in this chapter.

No person or persons other than those described in Section 63-13-15 shall issue an official certificate of inspection and approval.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-07; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 7, eff from and after January 1, 1961.

§ 63-13-19. Inspections by vehicle dealers.

(1) Every licensed new and used car and/or truck dealer doing business in this state shall inspect or have inspected every new and used vehicle sold by such dealer in the manner prescribed by Section 63-13-9, and shall affix an official dealer's inspection certificate, which shall be furnished by the commissioner of public safety, to each new and used vehicle, if such dealer is authorized to make inspections. If such dealer is not so authorized, such dealer shall have such vehicle inspected by an authorized inspection station. No new or used vehicle shall be sold that does not have a properly affixed and current inspection certificate. Such certificates shall be valid until the next official inspection is required.

(2) The commissioner of public safety may suspend or revoke, for any reasonable time not to exceed one year, the privilege of any dealer to make such an inspection and affix such dealer's inspection certificate to his vehicle upon abuse of any dealer of this right.

(3) No person or persons other than those described in this section shall issue a dealer's certificate of inspection and approval.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8258-04, 8258-07; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, §§ 4, 7; Laws, 1962, ch. 529, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

§ 63-13-21. Highway inspection by members of Highway Safety Patrol; written notice for correction of defects.

(1) Members of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol may at any time, upon reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the driver of such vehicle to stop and submit such vehicle to an inspection and such test with reference thereto as may be reasonably appropriate. No person driving a vehicle shall refuse to submit such vehicle to an inspection and test when required to do so by a member of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol.

Such authority, however, shall be limited to the inspection of said vehicle for mechanical defects and shall not authorize the search of the vehicle or the occupants thereof for any other purpose without due process of law. Evidence of the commission of an unlawful act, procured by such inspection and such test, shall not be admissible in any criminal prosecution except such as may be provided for in this chapter.

(2) In the event such vehicle is found to be in unsafe condition, or any required part or equipment is not present or is not in proper repair and adjustment, the officer shall give a written notice to the driver and shall send a copy to the department. Said notice shall require that such vehicle be placed in safe condition and its equipment in proper repair and adjustment, specifying the particulars with reference thereto, and that a certificate of inspection and approval be obtained within five (5) days.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8258-03, 8258-04; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, §§ 3, 4; Laws, 1962, ch. 529; Laws, 1977, ch. 317, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved February 25, 1977).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Enforcement of Mississippi Motor Vehicle Inspection Laws is placed solely in Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol and	Highway Patrol does not have power to institute charges in municipal court. Hewes, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0119.
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RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 242.	CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 38-40.
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§ 63-13-23. Correction of defects covered in notice issued under § 63-13-21.

(1) Every owner or driver, upon receiving a notice as provided in Section 63-13-21, shall comply therewith and shall, within five days, secure an official certificate of inspection and approval which shall be issued in duplicate, one

copy to be retained by the owner or driver and the other copy to be forwarded to the department. In lieu of compliance with the provisions of this subsection, the vehicle shall not be operated, except as provided in the next succeeding subsection, and each day upon which such motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer or pole trailer, or any combination thereof is operated over any highway of this state after failure to comply with this subsection shall constitute a separate offense.

(2) No person shall operate any vehicle after receiving a notice with reference thereto as provided in Section 63-13-21, except as may be necessary to return such vehicle to the residence or place of business of the owner or driver, if within a distance of twenty miles, or to take such vehicle to a garage or service station in the nearest town in which there is an open and operating inspection station, until such vehicle and its equipment has been placed in proper repair and adjustment and otherwise made to conform to the requirements of this chapter.

(3) In the event repair or adjustment of any vehicle or its equipment is found necessary upon inspection, the owner of said vehicle may obtain such repair or adjustment at any place he may choose. However, in every event an official certificate of inspection and approval must be obtained, otherwise such vehicle shall not be operated upon the highways of this state.

(4) Any person who wishes to make his own repairs may do so. He may not be charged twice for both inspection and repairs.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-04; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 4; Laws, 1962, ch. 529, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d
207, Negligent Repair of Motor Vehicle.

§ 63-13-25. Effect of inspection certificate; effect of failure to discover defects during inspection.

The inspection of any vehicle under the provisions of this chapter and the issuance of an official certificate of such inspection therefor shall not be construed in any court as a warranty of the mechanical condition of the vehicle inspected. The failure to discover any defect in any such vehicle in the course of an inspection under the provisions of this chapter shall not be made the basis of an action for damages in any court.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-08; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 8, eff from and after January 1, 1961.

§ 63-13-27. Administration of chapter.

For the purpose of administering this chapter, the commissioner of public safety may hire necessary and qualified personnel and purchase the necessary equipment and vehicles out of funds appropriated therefor by the legislature.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-05; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 456; Laws, 1968, ch. 544, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 396, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1976.

Cross References — Highway patrol operating fund, see § 45-1-23.

§ 63-13-29. Penalties for violations of chapter.

Any person violating the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars (\$50.00) or sentenced to not more than six (6) months in the county jail, or both.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8258-10; Laws, 1960, ch. 408, § 10, eff from and after January 1, 1961.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

CHAPTER 15

Motor Vehicle Safety — Responsibility

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63-15-4.	Insurance card; exemptions; card to be kept in vehicle; insurance company to provide; penalty.
63-15-5.	Applicability of chapter to government owned vehicles.
63-15-7.	Administration of chapter; judicial review of orders and acts of department.
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63-15-11.	Requirement by department of deposit of security for damages resulting from accident generally; suspension of licenses and registrations upon failure to provide security.
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63-15-53.	Self-insurance.
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- 63-15-67. Surrender of license or registration.
- 63-15-69. Particular offenses and penalties.
- 63-15-71. Furnishing by department of abstract relating to person's operating record.
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§ 63-15-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the "Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-40; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 39, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

Cross References — Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Uninsured motorist coverage.

1. In general.

The safety responsibility law does not require that an automobile owner or operator obtain automobile liability insurance in order to drive in Mississippi. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal*, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988), overruling, *United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stafford*, 253 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971), *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore*, 289 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1974) and *Vaughn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 359 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1978).

The omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy which allows the insured to include others as insureds under the policy merely by granting permission to use the vehicle should be construed in the light of the manifest public policy of this state as indicated by the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law and the Un-

insured Motor Vehicle Law, both of which clearly indicate the legislative policy of protecting the public and providing insurance coverage where persons are injured on the highways of the state. *Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watkins*, 209 So. 2d 630 (Miss. 1968).

2. Uninsured motorist coverage.

Uninsured motorist coverage is available despite exclusion in policy that insured vehicle cannot be uninsured so as to prevent insured claiming uninsured motorist benefit after being denied recovery based on other policy exclusions, such as household exclusion; uninsured motorist coverage may be stacked. *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Randall*, 753 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1985).

Section 83-11-101 does not mandate limits of uninsured motorist coverage equivalent to limits of liability coverage. *Johnston v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.*, 727 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability of insurer under compulsory statutory vehicle liability policy, to injured third persons, notwithstanding insured's failure to comply with policy conditions, as measured by policy limits or by limits of financial responsibility act. 29 A.L.R.2d 817.

Construction and effect of exclusionary clause in automobile liability policy making policy inapplicable while vehicle is used as "public or livery conveyance." 30 A.L.R.2d 273.

Trailers as affecting automobile insurance. 31 A.L.R.2d 298.

Effect of provision of liability policy covering hired automobiles but excluding from definition of "insured" the owner of such vehicle or his employee. 32 A.L.R.2d 572.

Validity of motor vehicle financial responsibility act. 35 A.L.R.2d 1011.

Rescission or avoidance, for fraud or misrepresentation, of compulsory, financial responsibility, or assigned risk automobile insurance. 83 A.L.R.2d 1104.

Policy provision extending coverage to comply with financial responsibility act as applicable to insured's first accident. 8 A.L.R.3d 388.

Share-the-ride arrangement or car pool as affecting status of automobile rider as guest. 10 A.L.R.3d 1087.

Motor scooter as within policy provisions relating to automobiles or motorcycles. 43 A.L.R.3d 1400.

Automobile liability insurance: what are accidents or injuries "arising out of ownership, maintenance, or the use" of insured vehicle. 15 A.L.R.4th 10.

Construction and application of "automatic insurance" or "newly acquired vehicle" clause ("replacement," and "blanket," or "fleet" provisions) contained in automobile liability policy. 39 A.L.R.4th 229.

Construction and application of substitution provision of automobile liability policy. 42 A.L.R.4th 1145.

Automobile insurance coverage for drive-by shootings and other incidents involving the intentional discharge of firearms from moving motor vehicles. 41 A.L.R.5th 91.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 190 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 316-323.

Law Reviews. 1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Insurance. 50 Miss. L. J. 813, December, 1979.

Practice References. Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal — Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-15-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases, when used in this chapter, shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section, except in those instances where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

(a) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of any road, street, way, thoroughfare or bridge in the State of Mississippi not privately owned or controlled, when any part thereof is open to the public for vehicular traffic and over which the state has legislative jurisdiction under its police power.

(b) "Judgment" means any judgment which shall have become final by expiration, without appeal, of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected, or by final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States, upon a cause of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, for damages, including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury to or death of any person, or for damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for such damages.

(c) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle (other than traction engines, road rollers and graders, tractor cranes, power shovels, well drillers, implements of husbandry and electric personal assistive mobility devices as defined in Section 63-3-103) which is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such vehicles, and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires but not operated upon rails.

For purposes of this definition, "implements of husbandry" shall not include trucks, pickup trucks, trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such trucks and pickup trucks.

(d) "License" means any driver's, operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffeur's license, temporary instruction permit or temporary license, or restricted license, issued under the laws of the State of Mississippi pertaining to the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles.

(e) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident of the State of Mississippi.

(f) "Nonresident's operating privilege" means the privilege conferred upon a nonresident by the laws of Mississippi pertaining to the operation by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor vehicle owned by him, in the State of Mississippi.

(g) "Operator" means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.

(h) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle; in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this chapter.

(i) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.

(j) "Proof of financial responsibility" means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident, and subject to said limit for one (1) person, in the amount of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident, and in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one (1) accident.

(k) "Registration" means a certificate or certificates and registration plates issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the registration of motor vehicles.

(l) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety of the State of Mississippi, acting directly or through its authorized officers and agents,

except in such sections of this chapter in which some other state department is specifically named.

(m) “State” means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any province of the Dominion of Canada.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-01; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 349, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment inserted “and electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (c).

Cross References — Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where parents’ child was severely and permanently injured after wandering onto a road adjacent to their home, and the father sued the mother for negligence, seeking coverage under a household liability policy, the appellate court, noting general policy concerns and following stare decisis, declined to extend the holding of *Glaskox By and Through Denton v. Glaskox* and allow a minor child to sue a parent for negligence not involving the

operation of a motor vehicle. *Pack v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, — So. 2d —, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 117 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004).

Golf cart was not “motor vehicle” within Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, and thus, exclusion of golf carts definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” in automobile policy did not violate statute. *Dowdle v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.*, 697 So. 2d 788 (Miss. 1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What constitutes ownership of automobile within meaning of automobile insurance owner’s policy. 36 A.L.R.4th 7.

Construction and application of statute imposing liability expressly upon motor

vehicle lessor for damage caused by operation of vehicle. 41 A.L.R.4th 993.

State regulation of motor vehicle rental (“you-drive”) business. 60 A.L.R.4th 784.

§ 63-15-4. Insurance card; exemptions; card to be kept in vehicle; insurance company to provide; penalty.

(1) The following vehicles are exempted from the requirements of this section:

(a) Vehicles exempted by Section 63-15-5;

(b) Vehicles for which a bond or a certificate of deposit of money or securities in at least the minimum amounts required for proof of financial responsibility is on file with the department;

(c) Vehicles that are self-insured under Section 63-15-53; and

(d) Implements of husbandry.

(2)(a) Every motor vehicle operated in this state shall have an insurance card maintained in the vehicle as proof of liability insurance that is in compliance with the liability limits required by Section 63-15-3(j). The insured parties shall be responsible for maintaining the insurance card in each vehicle.

(b) An insurance company issuing a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance as required by this section shall furnish to the insured an insurance card for each vehicle at the time the insurance policy becomes effective.

(3) Upon stopping a motor vehicle for any other statutory violation, a law enforcement officer, who is authorized to issue traffic citations, shall verify that the insurance card required by this section is in the motor vehicle. However, no driver shall be stopped or detained solely for the purpose of verifying that an insurance card is in the motor vehicle.

(4) Failure of the owner or the operator of a motor vehicle to have the insurance card in the motor vehicle is a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) and suspension of driving privilege for a period of one (1) year or until the owner of the motor vehicle shows proof of liability insurance that is in compliance with the liability limits required by Section 63-15-3(j). Fraudulent use of an insurance card shall be punishable in accordance with Section 97-7-10. The funds from such fines shall be deposited in the State General Fund in the State Treasury.

(5) If, at the hearing date or the date of payment of the fine, the motor vehicle owner shows proof of motor vehicle liability insurance in the amounts required by Section 63-15-3(j), the fine shall be reduced to One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00). If the owner shows proof that such insurance was in effect at the time of citation, the fine of One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00) and court costs shall be waived.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 302, § 1, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — Laws, 2000, ch. 302, § 2, provides:

"SECTION 2. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2001."

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A violation of the statute occurs only when both the owner and operator fail to have proof of insurance; therefore, there is no violation if the operator has proof of insurance that covers his operation of the vehicle but the owner does not, or if the owner of the motor vehicle has proof of insurance in the vehicle but the operator does not. Lawrence, Feb. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0052.

A municipal judge has the authority to suspend any portion of the fine imposed under the statute. Lawrence, Feb. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0052.

A municipal court judge has the authority to sentence a defendant convicted of violating the statute to public service in lieu of part or all of the fine imposed.

Lawrence, Feb. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0052.

The Commissioner of Public Safety is responsible for suspending the driving privilege of an individual convicted of violating the statute. Ringer, Mar. 9, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0117.

If a defendant, who was ticketed for violation of the statute, shows proof that his liability insurance was in effect on the date of the citation, the ticket should be dismissed. Fountain, Apr. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0217.

If a defendant was ticketed for a violation of the statute and later obtained liability insurance as required by law, the violator should be fined \$ 100.00; however, that fine, or a portion thereof, may be

suspended by the judge. Fountain, Apr. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0217.

§ 63-15-5. Applicability of chapter to government owned vehicles.

This chapter shall not apply with respect to any motor vehicle owned by the United States, the State of Mississippi or any political subdivision of this state. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to exclude from this chapter its applicability to taxicabs, jitneys or other vehicles for hire operating under franchise or permit of any incorporated city, town or village.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-33; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 32, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

Cross References — Prohibition against issuance of municipal certificate or permit for motor vehicle for hire until liability insurance or bond is filed and approved, see § 21-27-133.

Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Section 83-11-103(c)(iv), which defines uninsured motor vehicle to include vehicle to which there is no bond or deposit of cash or securities or other compliance with financial responsibility law (§ 63-15-5), does not apply to municipal vehicle; "bond or deposit of cash" referred to in

statute must be more than reserve of funds set aside such as bank account or monies placed with Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan, but must actually comply with financial responsibility law. *Coleman v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 930 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Miss. 1996).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of exclusion of government vehicles

from uninsured-motorist provision. 58 A.L.R.5th 511.

§ 63-15-7. Administration of chapter; judicial review of orders and acts of department.

(1) The department shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration, and shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the department under the provisions of this chapter.

(2) Any order or act of the department, under the provisions of this chapter, may be subject to review within ten days after notice thereof, by appeal to the county court at the instance of any party in interest and in the county wherein the person aggrieved by such order or act resides, or if there be no county court therein, then such jurisdiction shall be in the circuit court of said county, and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction. The court shall determine whether the filing of the appeal shall operate as a stay of any such order or decision of the department. The court may, in disposing of the issue

before it, modify, affirm, or reverse the order or decision of the department in whole or in part.

(3) Trial in the court shall be de novo, with the burden of proof upon the department. The same shall be tried without regard to any prior holding of fact or law by the department, and judgment entered only upon the evidence offered at the trial by the court. A trial by jury may be had under the rules of the court.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-02; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Administrative hearing.
3. Appeal.
4. —Admissibility of evidence.

1. In general.

Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

2. Administrative hearing.

A hearing before the safety-responsibility bureau to suspend the driver's license and registration of the automobile of an owner, who had been involved in a public highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and who was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, was purely an administrative matter. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

3. Appeal.

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and he was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the au-

tomobile owner was not entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit court, and it was not incumbent upon the department to prove that the owner was guilty of negligence. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

4. —Admissibility of evidence.

The safety-responsibility bureau's records of its action in revoking the license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and who was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, was properly admitted on an appeal from the department's action to the circuit court. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and who was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the automobile owner was not entitled to introduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of negligence in connection with the accident. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

§ 63-15-9. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

[Codes, 1942, § 8295-04; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 4; Laws, 1970, ch. 486, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch 488, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 366, eff from and after passage (approved April 16, 1984).]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-15-9 required operators of motor vehicles to file accident reports when involved in an accident.

§ 63-15-11. Requirement by department of deposit of security for damages resulting from accident generally; suspension of licenses and registrations upon failure to provide security.

(1) If twenty (20) days after the receipt of a report of a motor vehicle accident in this state which has resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage to the property of any one (1) person in excess of two hundred fifty dollars (\$250.00), the department does not have on file evidence satisfactory to it that the person who would otherwise be required to file security under subsection (2) of this section has been finally adjudicated not to be liable, or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments with respect to all claims for injuries or damages resulting from the accident, the department shall determine the amount of security which shall be sufficient in its judgment to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from such accident as may be recovered against each operator or owner.

(2) The department shall, within sixty (60) days after the receipt of such report of a motor vehicle accident, suspend the license of each operator and all registrations of each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in such accident, and if such operator is a nonresident the privilege of operating a motor vehicle within this state, and if such owner is a nonresident the privilege of the use within this state of any motor vehicle owned by him, unless such operator or owner or both shall deposit security in the sum so determined by the department and shall also furnish proof of financial responsibility. Notice of such suspension shall be sent by the department to such operator and owner not less than ten (10) days prior to the effective date of such suspension and shall state the amount required as security. Where erroneous information is given the department with respect to the matters set forth in subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (4) of this section, it shall take appropriate action as hereinbefore provided, within sixty (60) days after receipt by it of correct information with respect to said matters.

(3) Any person so notified of suspension may, within ten (10) days after receipt of such notification, make a written request to the department for a hearing, and such request shall operate as a stay of any suspension pending the outcome of such hearing. For the purposes of this section, the scope of such hearing shall cover the issues of whether there is a reasonable probability of a judgment being rendered against such person in a lawsuit arising out of the accident and whether such person is exempt from the requirement of depos-

iting security under subsection (4) of this section. At such hearing the department may also consider the amount of security required to be deposited, if any. The hearing shall be in accordance with rules and regulations which shall be adopted by the department and furnished to the operator or owner with the notice of suspension. For the purposes of this section, a "hearing" may consist of a determination of such issues by the department based solely on written reports submitted by the operator or owner and by investigatory officers, provided that the owner or operator, in his request to the department for a hearing, has expressly consented to such type hearing and that the department has consented thereto.

Any person whose suspension has been sustained shall have the right to appeal as provided in Section 63-15-7. However, such suspension shall not be stayed by the department or any court while such appeal is pending.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall not apply: (1) to such operator or owner if such owner had in effect at the time of such accident a liability policy with respect to the motor vehicle involved in such accident; (2) to such operator, if not the owner of such motor vehicle, if there was in effect at the time of such accident a liability policy with respect to his operation of motor vehicles not owned by him; (3) to such operator or owner if the liability of such operator or owner for damages resulting from such accident is, in the judgment of the department, covered by any other form of liability insurance policy or bond of a surety company authorized to do business in this state; (4) to any person qualifying as a self-insurer under Section 63-15-53, or to any person operating a motor vehicle for such self-insurer; (5) to the operator or the owner of a motor vehicle legally parked at the time of the accident; (6) to the owner of a motor vehicle if at the time of the accident the vehicle was stolen; or (7) to any person for whom the department has found in the hearing provided for in subsection (3) of this section, that there is not a reasonable probability of a judgment being rendered against such person in a lawsuit arising out of the accident.

No such policy shall be effective under this section unless issued by an insurance company or surety company authorized to write motor vehicle liability insurance in this state, except that if such motor vehicle was not registered in this state, or was a motor vehicle which was registered elsewhere than in this state at the effective date of the policy or the most recent renewal thereof, such policy shall not be effective under this section unless the insurance company or surety company if not authorized to do business in this state shall execute a power of attorney authorizing the department to accept service on its behalf of notice or process in any action upon such policy arising out of such accident. However, every such policy shall be subject, if the accident has resulted in bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of interest and cost, of not less than ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident and, subject to said limit for one (1) person, to a limit of not less than twenty thousand dollars (\$20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident, and if the accident has resulted in injury to or destruction of property,

to a limit of not less than five thousand dollars (\$5,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one (1) accident.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-05; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 5; Laws, 1960, ch. 411, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 487, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 349, § 2; Laws, 1980, ch. 488, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1980.

Cross References — Revocation and suspension of license following conviction of certain offenses see §§ 63-1-51 through 63-1-55.

Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Duties of department.
3. Due process rights.
4. Findings of negligence.
5. Uninsured motorists' benefits.

1. In general.

In essence, the safety responsibility law is a "first bite" law, in that it allows one accident before an owner or operator without liability coverage is required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. An owner or operator with liability coverage in effect, for at least the minimum limits stated in § 63-15-11(4), is not required to furnish proof of financial responsibility at all. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal*, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988), overruling, *United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stafford*, 253 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971), *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore*, 289 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1974) and *Vaughn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 359 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1978).

2. Duties of department.

The safety-responsibility bureau is not obligated to make a finding of negligence on the part of an automobile owner who is involved in a highway accident, and not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, prior to the suspension of the driver's license and automobile registration. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and he was not

covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the automobile owner was not entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit court, and it was not incumbent upon the department to prove that the owner was guilty of negligence. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

3. Due process rights.

Before a state may suspend the license and registration of an uninsured motorist who was involved in an accident and did not post security to cover the amount of damages claimed by another party involved in the accident, procedural due process requires a determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment will be rendered against the motorist, where liability plays a crucial role in the state's statutory scheme for motor vehicle safety responsibility. *Bell v. Burson*, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971), on remand, 124 Ga. App. 220, 183 S.E.2d 416 (1971).

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and who was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the automobile owner was not entitled to introduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of negligence in connection with the accident. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the

driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and he was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the automobile owner was not entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit court, and it was not incumbent upon the department to prove that the owner was guilty of negligence. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

4. Findings of negligence.

The safety-responsibility bureau is not obligated to make a finding of negligence on the part of an automobile owner who is involved in a highway accident, and not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, prior to the suspension of the driver's license and automobile registration. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and he was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the automobile owner was not entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit court, and it was not incumbent upon the department to prove that the owner was guilty of negligence. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

On an appeal from the action of the safety-responsibility bureau revoking the driver's license and automobile registration of an owner who had been involved in a highway accident resulting in property damages in excess of \$50, and who was not covered in any manner under the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law, the automobile owner was not entitled to introduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of negligence in connection with the accident. *Morehead v. Mississippi Safety-Responsibility Bureau*, 232 Miss. 412, 99 So. 2d 446 (1958).

5. Uninsured motorists' benefits.

Under Mississippi law, stacking of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is not mandated by statute, but rather is required in cases where policy is ambiguous concerning whether more than one premium is being charged for more than one UM coverage. *Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 969 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Under Mississippi law, where insured's three vehicles were covered under same automobile policy, her successors could not stack more than two \$10,000 uninsured motorist (UM) coverage limits after insured died in accident involving uninsured motorist, even though insured paid separate premium for liability coverage on each of her three vehicles, where policy contained clear and unambiguous anti-stacking provision and insurer charged this insured and all its insureds only one extra premium for multi-vehicle UM coverage no matter how many vehicles insured owned. *Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 969 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Provision in automobile liability insurance policy providing that amounts payable under uninsured motorist insurance shall be reduced by amount paid and present value of all amounts payable under any workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law or similar law cannot reduce uninsured motorist benefits below statutory minimum, however, such provision can be applied to supplemental benefits, as Miss. Code Annotated § 83-11-111 provides that any coverage in excess of coverage required by law shall not be subject to provisions of law, such that supplemental benefits may be reduced by amounts received under workmen's compensation law. *Porter v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co.*, 678 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

An insurance company may not validly offset payments made pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage against payments due under the bodily injury liability provision of the same policy, and a policy clause permitting such offset was void as against public policy. *Missouri Gen. Ins. Co. v. Youngblood*, 515 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Joinder of insurer and insured under policy of compulsory indemnity or liability insurance in action by injured third person. 20 A.L.R.2d 1097.

Fact that passenger in negligently operated motor vehicle is owner as affecting passenger's liability to or rights against third person-modern cases. 37 A.L.R.4th 565.

Cancellation of compulsory or "financial responsibility" automobile insurance. 44 A.L.R.4th 13.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 195, 196 .

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 72.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:65 33:71 et seq. (exemption from deposit of security), §§ 33:81 et seq. (deposit of security after accident), §§ 33:91 et seq. (suspension of driver's license).

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 316-323.

Law Reviews. 1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Insurance. 50 Miss. L. J. 813, December, 1979.

Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1983.

§ 63-15-13. Exemptions from security and suspension requirements of § 63-15-11.

The requirements as to security and suspension for failure to deposit security in Section 63-15-11 shall not apply: (1) to the operator or owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident wherein no injury or damage was caused to the person or property of anyone other than such operator or owner; or (2) if, prior to the date that the department would otherwise suspend license and registration or nonresident's operating and use privilege under Section 63-15-11, there shall be filed with the department evidence satisfactory to it that the person who would otherwise have to file security has been finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments, with respect to all claims for injuries or damages resulting from the accident.

Nevertheless, the requirements as to furnishing proof of financial responsibility and suspension for failure to furnish same in Section 63-15-11, shall apply notwithstanding any provision of this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-06; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 6; Laws, 1960, ch. 411, § 2; Laws, 1970, ch. 485, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1970).

§ 63-15-15. Duration of suspension under § 63-15-11.

The license and registration and nonresident's operating privilege suspended as provided in Section 63-15-11 shall remain so suspended and shall not be renewed nor shall any such license or registration be issued to such person until he shall have furnished proof of financial responsibility and until: (1) such person shall deposit or there shall be deposited on his behalf the security required under Section 63-15-11; or (2) one year shall have elapsed following the date of such accident and evidence satisfactory to the department has been filed with it that during that period no action for damages arising out

of the accident has been instituted; or (3) evidence satisfactory to the department has been filed with it of a final adjudication of nonliability, or a duly acknowledged written agreement, in accordance with Section 63-15-13. However, in the event there shall be any default in the payment of any installment under any duly acknowledged written agreement, then upon notice of such default, the department shall forthwith suspend the license and registration or nonresident's operating privilege of such person defaulting which shall not be restored unless and until (1) such person deposits and thereafter maintains security as required under Section 63-15-11 in such amount as the department may then determine; or (2) one year shall have elapsed following the date when such security was required and during such period no action upon such agreement has been instituted in a court in this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-07; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 7; Laws, 1960, ch. 411, § 3, eff July 1, 1960.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 195, 196.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 64.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:72, 33:73.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 316-323.

§ 63-15-17. Application of chapter to nonresidents, unlicensed drivers, and accidents in other states.

(a) In case the operator or the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident within this state has no license or registration, or is a nonresident, he shall not be allowed a license or registration until he has complied with the requirements of this chapter to the same extent that would be necessary if, at the time of the accident, he had held a license.

(b) When a nonresident's operating privilege is suspended pursuant to Section 63-15-11 or Section 63-15-15, the department shall transmit a certified copy of the record of such action to the official in charge of the issuance of licenses in the state in which such non-resident resides, if the law of such other state provides for action in relation thereto similar to that provided for in subsection (c) of this section.

(c) Upon receipt of certification that the operating privilege of a resident of this state has been suspended or revoked in any such state pursuant to a law providing for its suspension or revocation for failure to deposit security for the payment of judgments arising out of a motor vehicle accident, under circumstances which would require the department to suspend a nonresident's operating privilege had the accident occurred in this state, the department shall suspend the license of such resident if he was the operator, and all of his licenses and operating permits if he was the owner of a motor vehicle involved in such accident. Such suspension shall continue until such resident furnishes evidence of his compliance with the law of such other state relating to the deposit of such security.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-08; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 8, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

Cross References — Driver License Compact Law, see §§ 63-1-101 et seq.

§ 63-15-19. Form and amount of security; form of deposit; reduction of amount of security required.

The security required under this chapter shall be in such form and in such amount as the department may require but in no case in excess of the limits specified in Section 63-15-11 in reference to the acceptable limits of a policy. The person depositing security shall specify in writing the person or persons on whose behalf the deposit is made and, at any time while such deposit is in the custody of the state treasurer, the person depositing it may, in writing, amend the specification of the person or persons on whose behalf the deposit is made to include an additional person or persons. However, a single deposit of security shall be applicable only on behalf of persons required to furnish security because of the same accident.

The department may reduce the amount of security ordered in any case within six months after the date of the accident if, in its judgment, the amount ordered is excessive. In case the security originally ordered has been deposited the excess deposited over the reduced amount ordered shall be returned to the depositor or his personal representative forthwith, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 63-15-21.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-09; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 9, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 61.

§ 63-15-21. Custody, disposition and return of security.

Security deposited in compliance with the requirements of this chapter shall be placed by the department in the custody of the state treasurer and shall be applicable only to the payment of a judgment or judgments rendered against the person or persons on whose behalf the deposit was made, for damages arising out of the accident in question in an action at law, begun not later than one year after the date of such accident, or within one year after the date of deposit of any security under provision 3 of Section 63-15-15, or to the payment in settlement, agreed to by the depositor, of a claim or claims arising out of such accident. Such deposit or any balance thereof shall be returned to the depositor or his personal representative when evidence satisfactory to the department has been filed with it that there has been a final adjudication of nonliability, or a duly acknowledged agreement in accordance with provision 2 of Section 63-15-13, or whenever, after the expiration of one year from the date

of the accident, or two years from the date of deposit of any security under provision 3 of Section 63-15-15, the department shall be given reasonable evidence that there is no such action pending and no judgment rendered in such action left unpaid.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-10; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 10; Laws, 1960, ch. 411, § 4, eff July 1, 1960.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Rescission or avoidance, for fraud or misrepresentation, of compulsory, financial responsibility, or assigned risk automobile insurance. 83 A.L.R.2d 1104.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 62, 63.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:101 et seq. (return of deposit; termination of requirement as to filing proof of financial responsibility).

§ 63-15-23. Admissibility in evidence in civil actions of reports, etc. of department.

Neither the report required by Section 63-15-9, the action taken by the department pursuant to this chapter, the findings, if any, of the department upon which such action is based, nor the security filed as provided in this chapter shall be referred to in any way, or be any evidence of the negligence or due care of either party, at the trial of any action at law to recover damages. However, the report required by Section 63-15-9 may be referred to in proving uninsured status of the owner and the operator of a vehicle in any action to enforce a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability policy, but only as provided in Section 13-1-124.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-11; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 11; Laws, 1981, ch. 361, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1981.

Editor's Note — Section 13-1-124, referred to in this section, was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.

Section 63-15-9, referred to in this section, was repealed by Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 2, effective from and after July 1, 2003.

Cross References — For similar provision regarding use of accident report to the department of motor vehicles as evidence of uninsured status, see § 63-3-417.

Action against owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, see § 83-11-105.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Statement in testimony of police officer who had investigated automobile-truck collision, that he had not given any special instructions to anyone at the accident scene except how to take care of a citation, was not so prejudicial to defendant truck-

driver and his employer as to require a new trial, where the lower court sustained defendants' objections and instructed jury to disregard statement, the statement did not specify that citation was issued to defendant truckdriver, defendants did not move for a mistrial, and lower court

granted a directed verdict on liability. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Parker, 491 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1986).

If defendants, in an action arising out of a truck-automobile collision, believed that testimony of the investigating police offi-

cer, containing a reference to a citation, was so prejudicial that it could not be cured by court's instructing jury to disregard it, then defendants should have requested a mistrial. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Parker, 491 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1986).

§ 63-15-25. Certification to department of unsatisfied judgment; reports of convictions, pleas or actions in judicial proceedings for violations of motor vehicle laws.

(1) Whenever any person fails within sixty days to satisfy any judgment, upon the written request of the judgment creditor or his attorney it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court, or of the judge of a court which has no clerk, in which any such judgment is rendered within this state, to forward to the department immediately after the expiration of said sixty days, a certified copy of such judgment.

(2) If the defendant named in any certified copy of a judgment reported to the department is a nonresident, the department shall transmit a certified copy of the judgment to the official in charge of the issuance of licenses of the state of which the defendant is a resident.

(3) The clerk of the court, or the judge of a court which has no clerk, in which any conviction for violation of a motor vehicle law is rendered, or in which a person charged with violation of a motor vehicle law has pleaded guilty or forfeited bail, shall forward immediately to the department a certified copy of the judgment, order or record of other action of the court. This copy shall be prima-facie evidence of the conviction, plea or other action stated.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-12; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 12, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 71.

§ 63-15-27. Suspension of license, registration or operating privilege for nonpayment of judgment generally.

(1) Upon the receipt of a certified copy of a judgment, the department shall forthwith suspend the license and registration and any nonresident's operating privilege of any person against whom such judgment was rendered, except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this section and in Section 63-15-33.

(2) If the judgment creditor consents in writing, in such form as the department may prescribe, that the judgment debtor be allowed license or nonresident's operating privilege, the same may be allowed by the department, in its discretion, for six months from the date of such consent and thereafter

until such consent is revoked in writing, notwithstanding default in the payment of such judgment, or of any installments thereof prescribed in Section 63-15-33, provided the judgment debtor furnishes proof of financial responsibility.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-13; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 13, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 194.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 324-327.

§ 63-15-29. Duration of suspension; effect of discharge in bankruptcy.

(1) Such license and nonresident's operating privilege shall remain so suspended and shall not be renewed, nor shall any such license be thereafter issued in the name of such person, including any such person not previously licensed, unless and until every such judgment is stayed, satisfied in full or to the extent hereinafter provided and until the said person gives proof of financial responsibility subject to the exemptions stated in Sections 63-15-27 and 63-15-33.

(2) A discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-14; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 14, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A state motor vehicle safety responsibility statute providing that an unsatisfied automobile accident judgment is a ground for suspension of the judgment debtor's license and registration, even if the debtor has received a discharge in bankruptcy after the rendering of the judgment, has

both the effect and the purpose of frustrating federal law under the Bankruptcy Act (11 USCS §§ 1 et seq.) and is therefore invalid under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. *Perez v. Campbell*, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 29 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 194.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 324-327.

§ 63-15-31. Amounts required for satisfaction of judgment.

Judgments referred to in this chapter shall, for the purpose of this chapter only, be deemed satisfied:

(a) When ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) has been credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) person as the result of any one (1) accident; or

(b) When, subject to such limit of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) person, the sum of twenty thousand dollars (\$20,000.00) has been credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons as the result of any one (1) accident; or

(c) When five thousand dollars (\$5,000.00) has been credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount because of injury to or destruction of property of others as a result of any one (1) accident.

However, payments made in settlement of any claims because of bodily injury, death or property damage arising from a motor vehicle accident shall be credited in reduction of the amounts provided for in this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-15; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 15; Laws, 1972, ch. 349, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1972.

§ 63-15-33. Allowance and effect of payment of judgment in installments; default.

(1) A judgment debtor upon due notice to the judgment creditor may apply to the court in which such judgment was rendered for the privilege of paying such judgment in installments and the court, in its discretion and without prejudice to any other legal remedies which the judgment creditor may have, may so order and fix the amounts and times of payment of the installments.

(2) The department shall not suspend a license or a nonresident's operating privilege, and shall restore any license or nonresident's operating privilege suspended following nonpayment of a judgment, when the judgment debtor gives proof of financial responsibility and obtains such an order permitting the payment of such judgment in installments, and while the payment of any said installment is not in default.

(3) In the event the judgment debtor fails to pay any installment as specified by such order, then upon notice of such default, the department shall forthwith suspend the license or nonresident's operating privilege of the judgment debtor until such judgment is satisfied, as provided in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-16; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 16, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, and Highway Traffic, §§ 33:76, 33:77. Forms 73-77.

§ 63-15-35. Requirement of proof of financial responsibility upon conviction, etc., of offense requiring suspension or revocation of license.

(1) Whenever the department, under any law of this state, suspends or revokes the license of any person upon receiving record of a conviction or a forfeiture of bail, the department shall also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles licensed in the name of such person. However the department shall not suspend such license, unless otherwise required by law, if such person has previously given or shall immediately give and thereafter maintain proof of financial responsibility with respect to all motor vehicles licensed by such person.

(2) Such license or licenses, as the case may be, shall remain suspended or revoked and shall not at any time thereafter be renewed nor shall any license be thereafter issued to such person until permitted under the motor vehicle laws of this state and not then unless and until he shall give and thereafter maintain proof of financial responsibility.

(3) If a person is not licensed, but by final order of judgment is convicted of or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to secure an appearance for trial for any offense requiring the suspension or revocation of license, or for operating a motor vehicle upon the highways without being licensed to do so, no license shall thereafter be issued to such person until he shall give and thereafter maintain proof of financial responsibility.

(4) Whenever the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's operating privilege by reason of a conviction or forfeiture of bail, such privilege shall remain so suspended or revoked unless such person shall have previously given or shall immediately give and thereafter maintain proof of financial responsibility.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-17; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 17, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 197.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 316-323.

§ 63-15-37. Methods of giving proof of financial responsibility generally.

Proof of financial responsibility when required under this chapter with respect to a motor vehicle or with respect to a person who is not the owner of a motor vehicle may be given by filing:

1. a certificate of insurance as provided in Section 63-15-39 or Section 63-15-41; or
2. a bond as provided in Section 63-15-49; or
3. a certificate of deposit of money or securities as provided in Section 63-15-51; or

4. a certificate of self-insurance as provided in section 63-15-53, supplemented by an agreement by the self-insurer that, with respect to accidents occurring while the certificate is in force, he will pay the same judgments and in the same amounts that an insurer would have been obligated to pay under an owner's motor vehicle liability policy if it had issued such a policy to said self-insurer.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-18; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 18, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Certificate of self-insurance is not commercial insurance policy subject to provisions of Uninsured Motorist Act. *McCoy v.*

South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 688 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1996), reh'g denied, 691 So. 2d 1026 (Miss. 1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to

Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1983.

§ 63-15-39. Certificate of insurance as proof of financial responsibility; residents.

Proof of financial responsibility may be furnished by filing with the department the written certificate of any insurance company duly authorized to write motor vehicle liability insurance in this state certifying that there is in effect a motor vehicle liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. Such certificate shall give the effective date of such motor vehicle liability policy, which date shall be the same as the effective date of the certificate, and shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles covered thereby, unless the policy is issued to a person who is not the owner of a motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-19; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 19, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

Cross References — Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Insurers participating in the automobile assigned risk plan are under no duty to investigate and screen out potentially

dangerous drivers. *Ervin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 365 So. 2d 1208 (Miss. 1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 32-37.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 72.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 33:65.

34 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 585, Use of Motor Vehicle by Person Claiming Insurance Coverage.

Law Reviews. Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1983.

§ 63-15-41. Certificate of insurance as proof of financial responsibility; nonresidents.

(1) The nonresident owner of a motor vehicle, the owner or operator of which is not licensed in this state, may give proof of financial responsibility by filing with the department a written certificate or certificates of an insurance company authorized to transact business in the state in which the motor vehicle or motor vehicles described in such certificate or certificates are registered, or if such nonresident does not own a motor vehicle, then in the state in which the insured resides, provided such certificate otherwise conforms to the provisions of this chapter. The department shall accept the same upon condition that said insurance company complies with the following provisions with respect to the policies so certified:

(a) Said insurance company shall execute a power of attorney authorizing the department to accept service on its behalf of notice or process in any action arising out of a motor vehicle accident in this state;

(b) Said insurance company shall agree in writing that such policies shall be deemed to conform with the laws of this state relating to the terms of motor vehicle liability policies issued herein.

(2) If any insurance company not authorized to transact business in this state, which has qualified to furnish proof of financial responsibility, defaults in any said undertakings or agreements, the department shall not thereafter accept as proof any certificate of said company whether theretofore filed or thereafter tendered as proof, so long as such default continues.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-20; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 20, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 32-37.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 72.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 33:65.

§ 63-15-43. Motor vehicle liability policy; definition; required provisions.

(1) A "motor vehicle liability policy" as said term is used in this chapter shall mean an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in Section 63-15-39 or Section 63-15-41, as proof of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in Section 63-15-41, by an

insurance company duly authorized to write motor vehicle liability insurance in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as insured.

(2) Such owner's policy of liability insurance:

(a) shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted.

(b) shall pay on behalf of the insured named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as follows: ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident and, subject to said limit for one (1) person, twenty thousand dollars (\$20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident, and five thousand dollars (\$5,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one (1) accident.

(3) Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall pay on behalf of the insured named therein all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and subject to the same limits of liability as are set forth above with respect to an owner's policy of liability insurance.

(4) Such motor vehicle liability policy shall state the name and address of the named insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the premium charged therefor, the policy period and the limits of liability, and shall contain an agreement or be endorsed that insurance is provided thereunder in accordance with the coverage defined in this chapter as respects bodily injury and death or property damage, or both, and is subject to all the provisions of this chapter.

(5) Such motor vehicle liability policy shall not insure:

(a) any obligation for which the insured or any company as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation law;

(b) any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of any employee of the insured while engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured, or in domestic employment if benefits therefor are either payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law; or

(c) any liability because of injury to or destruction of property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the insured.

(6) Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following provisions which need not be contained therein:

(a) the liability of the insurance company with respect to the insurance required by this chapter shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be cancelled or annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the insurance company and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or

damage; no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat or void said policy;

(b) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the insurance company to make payment on account of such injury or damage;

(c) the insurance company shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability specified in subdivision (b) of subsection (2) of this section; or

(d) the policy, the written application therefor, if any, and any rider or endorsement which does not conflict with the provisions of the chapter shall constitute the entire contract between the parties.

(7) Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy, and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter. With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional coverage, the term "motor vehicle liability policy" shall apply only to that part of the coverage which is required by this section.

(8) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured shall reimburse the insurance company for any payment the insurance company would not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except for the provisions of this chapter.

(9) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide for the prorating of the insurance thereunder with other valid and collectible insurance.

(10) The requirements for a motor vehicle liability policy may be fulfilled by the policies of one or more insurance companies which policies together meet such requirements.

(11) Any binder issued pending the issuance of a motor vehicle liability policy shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements for such a policy.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-21; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 21; Laws, 1972, ch. 349, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1972.

Editor's Note — Section § 71-3-1 provides that the words "workmen's compensation" shall mean "workers' compensation" and "commission" shall mean "workers' compensation commission".

Cross References — Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Applicability.
3. Liability coverage.
4. —Omnibus clause.
5. Uninsured motorists coverage.
6. Miscellaneous.
7. Exemptions.
8. Waiver.

1. In general.

Mississippi's Uninsured Motorist Act (UM Act) was designed to fill three gaps in coverage that were left after enactment of Mississippi's Safety Responsibility Act: negligent drivers would often fail to purchase liability insurance mandated by law; denial of coverage on basis of unin-

sured motorist exclusions or policy breaches; and tortfeasor sometimes happened to be hit-and-run driver. *Boatner v. Atlanta Specialty Ins. Co.*, 115 F.3d 1248 (5th Cir. 1997).

It is the law in Mississippi, as in most jurisdictions, that if there is any difference between an insurance policy as written by the company and the statutory requirements of the state, the requirements of the statute are incorporated into and become a part of the policy. *United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stafford*, 253 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971), overruled on other grounds, *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal*, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988).

2. Applicability.

The provisions of Miss Code Ann. § 63-15-43 do not apply to all policies of liability insurance issued within the State of Mississippi, but only to those policies that were certified as proof of financial responsibility; where there was no evidence that the auto dealer had to get a policy certified as proof of financial responsibility and where the action was a declaratory action between insurers and not against the auto dealer, the dealer's compliance or noncompliance with the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law was of no moment. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.*, 797 So. 2d 988 (Miss. 2001).

"Limits", as used in Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act (UM Act) section which provides that Act incorporates limits set forth in Mississippi's Safety Responsibility Act, refers to territorial and monetary limitations in the Safety Responsibility Act. *Boatner v. Atlanta Specialty Ins. Co.*, 115 F.3d 1248 (5th Cir. 1997).

Certificate of self-insurance is not commercial insurance policy subject to provisions of Uninsured Motorist Act. *McCoy v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.*, 688 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1996), reh'g denied, 691 So. 2d 1026 (Miss. 1997).

The provisions of § 63-15-43 do not apply to all policies of liability insurance issued within the State of Mississippi, but apply only to those policies which have been certified as proof of financial responsibility. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal*, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988), overruling, *United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*

v. Stafford, 253 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971), *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore*, 289 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1974) and *Vaughn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 359 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1978).

3. Liability coverage.

An automobile insurance policy exclusion specifying that the policy would not provide liability coverage for "injury to or destruction of property. . .rented to or in charge of the insured. . ." applied where the insured's sister accidentally collided with a company car which had been placed in the care and supervision of the insured by her employer to facilitate the carrying out of her corporate responsibilities, even though the car was parked in the insured's garage and was unoccupied at the time of the collision. *Steadman v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.*, 626 So. 2d 588 (Miss. 1993).

Since the aim of the "in charge of" exclusion mandated by § 63-15-43(5)(c) is to protect the affordability of automobile liability insurance by restricting its coverage to property not owned or under the dominion of the insured, the policy behind the statute would be defeated if the definition of "in charge of" were restricted to the act of driving a vehicle; if "in charge of" were restricted to driving, there would still be numerous and frequent occasions where the very thing sought to be prevented by § 63-15-43 would occur—insureds collecting for damage to property over which they exercised dominion. *Steadman v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.*, 626 So. 2d 588 (Miss. 1993).

A 13-year-old daughter was a member of her divorced mother's household, and was therefore excluded from coverage under her mother's automobile liability insurance policy which provided no liability coverage for injuries sustained by a family member, even though the daughter was planning to live with her father and the mother and daughter were driving to the father's home when the accident occurred, where the daughter had lived with her mother and had been under her mother's legal custody, management and control since her parents' divorce 12 years earlier, there had been no application to a court to change such legal custody and control, the daughter was with her mother in her

mother's automobile when the accident occurred, they had not reached the father's residence at the time of the accident, the daughter's belongings were in her mother's automobile and had not yet been transferred to her father's residence, and the daughter had not yet seen or been in contact with her father and was not under his management and control at the time of the accident. *Thompson v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.*, 602 So. 2d 855 (Miss. 1992).

This statute does not guarantee that all persons who drive motor vehicles in the state are to be covered for the minimum amount of insurance specified in subsection (2)(b); in particular, under subsection 5(b), it is possible to exclude coverage of employees, regardless of whether the employee is eligible for workmen's compensation benefits. *Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poole*, 411 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Miss. 1976), *aff'd*, 539 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976).

An insurance company may not validly offset payments made pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage against payments due under the bodily injury liability provision of the same policy, and a policy clause permitting such offset was void as against public policy. *Missouri Gen. Ins. Co. v. Youngblood*, 515 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1975).

4. —Omnibus clause.

Omnibus clauses in motor vehicle liability policies are required by statute to cover persons who use a vehicle with either the express or implied permission of the named insured. *Vaughn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 359 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1978), overruled on other grounds, *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal*, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988).

The rule that a permittee may not allow a third party to use a named insured's automobile does not preclude recovery under the omnibus clause where first permittee has "broad and unfettered domination" over the insured automobile, and the permission from the insured may be implied particularly where the operation by the second permittee serves some purpose of the first permittee. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore*, 289 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1974), overruled on other grounds,

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988).

Where it appeared that the son of an insured had often allowed others to drive the insured vehicle with the insured's apparent knowledge, and without his objection, and at the time of a fatal accident the son was occupying the right front seat of the vehicle which was driven by another, the insured automobile was being operated, at the time of the accident, with the insured's implied permission within the meaning of the omnibus clause of an automobile policy, defining the insured as any person using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured, provided that the actual operation or his other actual use was within the scope of such permission. *United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stafford*, 253 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1971), overruled on other grounds, *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mettetal*, 534 So. 2d 189 (Miss. 1988).

The omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy which allows the insured to include others as insureds under the policy merely by granting permission to use the vehicle should be construed in the light of the manifest public policy of this state as indicated by the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law and the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Law, both of which clearly indicate the legislative policy of protecting the public and providing insurance coverage where persons are injured on the highways of the state. *Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watkins*, 209 So. 2d 630 (Miss. 1968).

5. Uninsured motorists coverage.

In enacting Mississippi's Uninsured Motorist Act (UM Act), Mississippi legislature intended to put "first accident" insureds in as good a position as they would have been in had uninsured motorist purchased automobile liability insurance pursuant to terms of Mississippi's Safety Responsibility Act. *Boatner v. Atlanta Specialty Ins. Co.*, 115 F.3d 1248 (5th Cir. 1997).

Language in an insurance policy limiting uninsured motorist (UM) coverage to injury or damage caused by an accident "arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle" did not impermissibly narrow the limits of

UM coverage intended under Mississippi's UM statute (§ 83-11-101 et seq.); although the UM statute does not specifically set out the connection that must exist between the injury and the uninsured vehicle, § 83-11-101 states that the limits of UM coverage shall be no less than those set forth in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law (§ 63-15-1 et seq.), which provides in part that an owner's liability insurance policy which has been certified as proof of financial responsibility shall pay damages "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle" (§ 63-15-43(2)(b)), and therefore the UM policy language satisfied the intent and purpose of the UM statute by affording a person injured by an uninsured motorist the same protection he or she would have if injured by a financially responsible driver. *Spradlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 650 So. 2d 1383 (Miss. 1995).

Where uninsured motorist benefits were written into an assigned risk policy through operation of law, the imposed coverage would be the statutory minimum of \$10,000 per vehicle, rather than the amount contracted in a previously canceled policy, where there was no evidence that either party intended to reinstate the policy limits contained in the former policy; since coverage was written into the contract by operation of law, so was the amount of coverage. *Harris v. Magee*, 573 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1990).

Clause in uninsured motorist provision of automobile insurance policy providing that insured may not recover for expenses for medical services payable under separate provision of policy does not reduce policy's uninsured motorist limit below statutory minimum, but merely provides that insured would not be paid for medical expenses twice, once under medical payment coverage and again under uninsured motorist provision. *Tucker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 801 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1986).

An insured may aggregate the limits of liability clause in an insurance policy providing uninsured coverage on two cars to determine the liability of insurer. *St. Arnaud v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 501 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Miss. 1980).

Benefits payable under uninsured motorist insurance policy due to injuries resulting in death of insured need not be paid to persons designated under wrongful death statute (§ 11-7-13), but may be paid to surviving spouse in accordance with "facility of payment" clause. *Overstreet v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 474 So. 2d 572 (Miss. 1985).

6. Miscellaneous.

The insurer of a taxicab was entitled to deny coverage to an injured individual on the ground that it was not notified of the accident as soon as practicable where, even though the policy was issued under a voluntary assigned risk plan, it was not subject to the statutory provision making the insurer's liability absolute. *Hague v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 571 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1978).

A sale of a motor vehicle without furnishing the memorandum required by statute, the effect of which would be to avoid a liability policy, will not be presumed. *Wright v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.*, 279 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1960).

7. Exemptions.

Under either Arkansas or Mississippi law, passenger's bodily injury claim arising out of crash of airplane owned by insured fell within exclusion from coverage in commercial general liability (CGL) policy for bodily injury arising out of ownership, maintenance or use of any aircraft owned or operated by any insured. *Ranger Ins. Co. v. Heirs of Branning ex rel. Tucker*, 984 F. Supp. 466 (S.D. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 966, 120 S. Ct. 402, 145 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1999).

Under Mississippi law, radius limitation in commercial truckers liability policy, which confined liability coverage to 50-mile radius of location where insured vehicle was principally garaged, was not contrary to public policy. *Stratford Ins. Co. v. Cooley*, 985 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Under Mississippi law, radius limitation in commercial truckers policy that excluded coverage for accidents occurring more than 50 miles from "the town" of principal garaging of insured vehicle was not rendered ambiguous when read in conjunction with declarations page that

identified both town of principal garaging and territory in which it was located. *Stratford Ins. Co. v. Cooley*, 985 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Under Mississippi law, where truckers liability policy clearly and unambiguously provided only for coverage within 50 miles of identified "town" where truck was identified as being "principally garaged," insured had no reasonable expectation that he had coverage within 50 miles of wherever he decided to garage vehicle, at least not without notice to and approval by insurer. *Stratford Ins. Co. v. Cooley*, 985 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Under either Arkansas or Mississippi law, limitation on policy coverage for aircraft accidents under aircraft exclusion was not rendered ambiguous under commercial general liability (CGL) policy by presence of other insurance clause that made policy's coverage excess for any loss arising out of maintenance or use of aircraft, where clause specifically recognized that excess coverage existed only to extent it was not subject to aircraft exclusion. *Ranger Ins. Co. v. Heirs of Branning ex rel. Tucker*, 984 F. Supp. 466 (S.D. Miss.

1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 966, 120 S. Ct. 402, 145 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1999).

8. Waiver.

Under Mississippi law, waiver cannot be used to extend coverage afforded by insurance policy. *Stratford Ins. Co. v. Cooley*, 985 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Under Mississippi law, 50-mile radius exclusion upon coverage was limitation on coverage already provided by policy, such that doctrine of waiver could be applied without violating principle that waiver cannot be used to extend coverage afforded by insurance policy. *Stratford Ins. Co. v. Cooley*, 985 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

Insurer waived right to rely on 50-mile radius limitation in truckers liability policy by failing to assert exclusion for one year following accident despite constructive knowledge through its agents within two weeks of accident's exact location and ability to determine thereafter from its claims file that site was beyond geographic area covered by policy. *Stratford Ins. Co. v. Cooley*, 985 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Punitive damages cannot be excluded from insurance policies for automobile li-

ability claims. Dale, Oct. 5, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0660.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Automobile fire, theft, and collision insurance: insurable interest in stolen motor vehicle. 38 A.L.R.4th 538.

Statutory or policy exclusion, from automobile no-fault coverage, of property damage covered by homeowner's policy of household member who is owner, registrant, or operator of vehicle involved. 41 A.L.R.4th 973.

Duty of liability insurer to initiate settlement negotiations. 51 A.L.R.5th 701.

Am Jur. 34 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 585, Use of Motor Vehicle by Person Claiming Insurance Coverage.

Law Reviews. 1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Insurance. 50 Miss. L. J. 97, March, 1979.

Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1983.

§ 63-15-45. Notice of cancellation or termination of certified policy.

When an insurance company has certified a motor vehicle liability policy under Section 63-15-39 or Section 63-15-41, the insurance so certified shall not be cancelled or terminated until at least five days after a notice of cancellation

or termination of the insurance so certified shall be received in the office of the department. However, such a policy subsequently procured and certified shall, on the effective date of its certification, terminate the insurance previously certified with respect to any motor vehicle designated in both certificates.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-22; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 22, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

Cross References — Cancellation or nonrenewal of automobile insurance policy generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability insurer's unconditional right to cancel policy as affected by considerations of public policy. 40 A.L.R.3d 1439.

responsibility" automobile insurance. 44 A.L.R.4th 13.

Am Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 40-44.

Cancellation of compulsory or "financial

§ 63-15-46. Premium reductions for older drivers successfully completing accident prevention course.

(1) Any rates, rating schedules, or rating manuals for the liability, personal injury protection and collision coverages of a motor vehicle insurance policy shall provide for an appropriate reduction in premium charges as to such coverages when the principal operator of the covered vehicle is an insured fifty-five (55) years of age or older who has successfully completed a motor vehicle accident prevention course approved by the Department of Public Safety. Any discount used by an insurer shall be presumed appropriate unless credible data demonstrates otherwise.

(2) The premium reduction required by this section shall be effective for an insured for a period of three (3) years after successful completion of the approved course, except that the insurer may require, as a condition of maintaining the discount, that the insured:

(a) Not be involved in an accident for which the insured is at fault; and

(b) Not be convicted, plead guilty or plead nolo contendere to a moving traffic violation.

(3) Motor vehicle accident prevention courses for the purposes of this section shall be subject to the approval of the Department of Public Safety. The department shall consider the competency of the personnel offering the course, the quality of the content and activities of the course with respect to its capability to prevent accidents by persons fifty-five (55) years of age or older who complete the course, and the reasonableness of the fee for the course. The department shall establish the minimum number of hours necessary for completion of a course. A course approved by the department shall require persons completing the course to pass a written test evaluating the person's knowledge of the content of the course.

(4) Upon successfully completing the approved course, each person shall be issued a certificate by the organization offering the course which shall be used to qualify for the premium discount required by this section.

(5) This section shall not apply in the event the approved course is taken as punishment specified by a court or other governmental entity resulting from a moving traffic violation.

(6) This section shall apply to policies issued or renewed after January 1, 1988.

SOURCES: Laws, 1987, ch. 492, eff from and after passage (approved April 20, 1987), and applicable to policies issued after January 1, 1988.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Motor vehicle insurance: exclusionary provision relating to age of operator. 83 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Representations as to age or identity of persons who will drive vehicle, or as to extent of their relative use, as avoiding

coverage under automobile insurance policy. 29 A.L.R.3d 1139.

Propriety of automobile insurer's policy of refusing insurance, or requiring advance rates, because of age, sex, residence, or handicap. 33 A.L.R.4th 523.

§ 63-15-47. Applicability of chapter to policies of motor vehicle insurance.

This chapter shall not be held to apply to or affect policies of motor vehicle insurance against liability which may now or hereafter be required by any other law of this state. Such policies, if they contain an agreement or are endorsed to conform to the requirements of this chapter, may be certified as proof of financial responsibility under this chapter.

This chapter shall not be held to apply to or affect policies insuring solely the insured named in the policy against liability resulting from the maintenance or use by persons in the insured's employ or on his behalf of motor vehicles not owned by the insured.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-23; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 23, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

Cross References — Automobile insurance generally, see §§ 83-11-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to

Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1993.

§ 63-15-49. Bond as proof of financial responsibility.

(1) Proof of financial responsibility may be furnished by filing a bond with the department, accompanied by the statutory recording fee of the chancery clerk to cover the cost of recordation of the notice provided for herein. The bond may be either a surety bond with a surety company authorized to do business

within the state or a bond with at least two individual sureties each owning real estate within the state not exempt under the constitution or laws of the State of Mississippi and together having equities equal in value to at least twice the amount of such bond. In cases of a bond with two individual sureties, such real estate shall be scheduled and a description thereof shall appear in the bond approved by the clerk of the chancery court of the county or counties in which the real estate is located and also approved by the tax collector of the county or counties where the property is situated as being free from any delinquent tax liens. Such bond shall be conditioned for payments in amounts and under the same circumstances as would be required in a motor vehicle liability policy, and shall not be cancellable except after five days' written notice is received by the department. However, cancellation shall not prevent recovery with respect to any right or cause of action arising prior to the date of cancellation. Such bond shall constitute a lien in favor of the state upon the real estate so scheduled of any surety, which lien shall exist in favor of any holder of a final judgment against the person who has filed such bond. Notice to that effect, which shall include a description of the real estate scheduled in the bond, shall be filed by the department in the office of the chancery clerk of the county where such real estate is situated. Such notice shall be accompanied by the statutory fee for the services of the chancery clerk in connection with the recordation of such notice, and the chancery clerk or his deputy, upon receipt of such notice, shall acknowledge and cause the same to be recorded in the lien records. Recordation shall constitute notice as provided by the statutes governing the recordation of liens on real estate.

(2) If a judgment rendered against the principal on such surety or real estate bond shall not be satisfied within sixty days after it has become final, the judgment creditor may, for his own use and benefit and at his sole expense, bring an action or actions in the name of the state against the persons who executed such bond, including an action or proceeding to foreclose any lien that may exist upon the real estate of a person who has executed such real estate bond, which foreclosure action shall be brought in like manner and subject to all the provisions of law applicable to an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-24; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 24; Laws, 1968, ch. 361, § 13, eff from and after January 1, 1972.

Cross References — Fees of clerks of chancery court, see § 25-7-9.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Cancellation of compulsory or "financial responsibility" automobile insurance. 44 A.L.R.4th 13.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:63, 33:83.

§ 63-15-51. Deposit of cash or securities as proof of financial responsibility.

(1) Proof of financial responsibility may be evidenced by the certificate of the state treasurer that the person named therein has deposited with him fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000.00) in cash, or securities such as may legally be purchased by savings banks or for trust funds of a market value of fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000.00). The state treasurer shall not accept any such deposit and issue a certificate therefor and the department shall not accept such certificate unless accompanied by evidence that there are no unsatisfied judgments of any character against the depositor in the county where the depositor resides.

(2) Such deposit shall be held by the state treasurer to satisfy, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, any execution on a judgment issued against such person making the deposit, for damages, including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury to or death of any person, or for damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle after such deposit was made. Money or securities so deposited shall not be subject to attachment or execution unless such attachment or execution shall arise out of a suit for damages as aforesaid.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-25; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 25, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

§ 63-15-53. Self-insurance.

(1) Any person in whose name more than 25 motor vehicles are licensed may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance issued by the department as provided in subsection (2) of this section.

(2) The department may, in its discretion, upon the application of a person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when it is satisfied that such person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay judgments obtained against such person.

(3) Upon not less than five days notice and a hearing pursuant to such notice, the department may upon reasonable grounds cancel a certificate of self-insurance. Failure to pay any judgment within thirty days after such judgment shall have become final shall constitute a reasonable ground for the cancellation of a certificate of self-insurance.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-34; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 33, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS**1. In general.**

Certificate of self-insurance is not commercial insurance policy subject to provisions of Uninsured Motorist Act. *McCoy v.*

South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 688 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1996), reh'g denied, 691 So. 2d 1026 (Miss. 1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic
§ 33:64.

§ 63-15-55. Acceptance of proof of financial responsibility given by owner for other operators.

Whenever any person required to give proof of financial responsibility under this chapter is or later becomes an operator in the employ of any owner, or is or later becomes a member of the immediate family or household of the owner, the department shall accept proof given by such owner in lieu of proof by such other person to permit such other person to operate a motor vehicle for which the owner has given proof as herein provided. The department shall designate the restrictions imposed by this section on the face of such person's license.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-26; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 26, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Misrepresentation by applicant for automobile liability insurance as to ownership of vehicle as material to risk. 33 A.L.R.2d 948.

Who is a "spouse" within clause of automobile liability, uninsured motorist, or

no-fault insurance policy defining additional insured. 36 A.L.R.4th 588.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic
§ 33:64.

§ 63-15-57. Substitution of proof of financial responsibility.

The department shall consent to the cancellation of any bond or certificate of insurance, or the department shall direct and the state treasurer shall return any money or securities to the person entitled thereto, upon the substitution and acceptance of other adequate proof of financial responsibility pursuant to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-27; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 27, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

§ 63-15-59. Requirement of new proof of financial responsibility.

Whenever any proof of financial responsibility filed under the provisions of this chapter no longer fulfills the purposes for which required, the department shall, for the purpose of this chapter, require other proof as required by this chapter and shall suspend the license or the nonresident's operating privilege pending the filing of such other proof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-28; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 28, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

§ 63-15-61. Duration of maintenance of proof of financial responsibility; cancellation, return or waiver of proof of financial responsibility.

In all cases, under this chapter, in which a person is required to furnish proof of financial responsibility, he shall maintain such proof for a period of three years, except as otherwise required or permitted in this section. The department shall, upon request, consent to the immediate cancellation of any bond or certificate of insurance, or the department shall direct and the state treasurer shall return to the person entitled thereto any money or securities deposited pursuant to this chapter as proof of financial responsibility, or the department shall waive the requirement of filing proof, in any of the following events:

- (a) at any time after three years from the date such proof was required when, during the three-year period preceding the request, the department has not received record of a conviction or a forfeiture of bail which would require or permit the suspension or revocation of the license or nonresident's operating privilege of the person by or for whom such proof was furnished; or
- (b) in the event of the death of the person on whose behalf such proof was filed or the permanent incapacity of such person to operate a motor vehicle; or
- (c) in the event the person who has given proof surrenders his license to the department.

However, the department shall not consent to the cancellation of any bond or the return of any money or securities in the event any action for damages upon a liability covered by such proof is then pending or any judgment upon any such liability is then unsatisfied, or in the event the person who has filed such bond or deposited such money or securities has, within one year immediately preceding such request, been involved as an operator or owner in any motor vehicle accident resulting in injury or damage to the person or property of others. An affidavit of the applicant as to the nonexistence of such facts, or that he has been released from all of his liability, or has been finally adjudicated not to be liable, for such injury or damage, shall be sufficient evidence thereof in the absence of evidence to the contrary in the records of the department.

Whenever any person whose proof has been cancelled or returned under provision (c) of this section applies for a license within a period of three years from the date proof was originally required, any such application shall be refused unless the applicant shall reestablish such proof for the remainder of such three-year period.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-29; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 29; Laws, 1960, ch. 411, § 5; Laws, 1968, ch. 473, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved July 12, 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Cancellation of compulsory or “financial responsibility” automobile insurance. 44 A.L.R.4th 13.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 62-64.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles

and Highway Traffic §§ 33:72, 33:73, 33:102, 33:104.

Law Reviews. Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1983.

§ 63-15-63. Transfer of title to vehicle to member of family by person whose license has been suspended or cancelled.

No person whose license or registration has been suspended or cancelled under the provisions of this chapter shall transfer title to the vehicle owned by him to any member of his immediate family until such person has furnished proof of financial responsibility as is otherwise required by the provisions of this chapter and same shall have been approved by the department. A member of a person's immediate family under the provisions hereof shall include any person related to the transferor by blood or marriage within the third degree computed according to the civil law and any person, whether related or not, residing within the same household as the transferor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-30; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 29-a; Laws, 1958, ch. 491.

§ 63-15-65. Assigned risk plans.

Insurance companies, authorized to issue motor vehicle liability policies in this state, shall establish an administrative agency and make necessary reasonable rules in connection therewith, relative to the formation of a plan and procedure to provide a means by which insurance may be assigned to an authorized insurance company for a person required by this chapter to show proof of financial responsibility for the future and who is in good faith entitled to motor vehicle liability insurance in this state, but is unable to secure it through ordinary methods. Such insurance companies shall establish a plan and procedure for the equitable apportionment among such authorized companies of applicants for such policies and for motor vehicle liability policies, including, but not limited to, voluntary agreements by insurance companies to accept such assignments. The premium for assigned risk plans shall not exceed the basic manual rate for risks of like classification at time of application, plus any surcharge as set by the insurance commission. When any such plan has been approved by the insurance commission, all insurance companies authorized to issue motor vehicle liability policies in the State of Mississippi, shall subscribe thereto and participate therein.

The insurance commission may determine, fix, prescribe, promulgate, change, and amend rates or minimum premiums normally applicable to a risk so as to apply to any and every assignment such rates and minimum premiums as are commensurate with the greater hazard of the risk, considering in

connection therewith the experience, physical or other conditions of such risk of the person applying for insurance under any such plan.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-35; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 34; Laws, 1958, ch. 443.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Insurers participating in the automobile assigned risk plan are under no duty to investigate and screen out potentially dangerous drivers. *Ervin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 365 So. 2d 1208 (Miss. 1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews. Insurance: Enforceability of Automobile Business Exclusion to Automobile Liability Coverage. 53 Miss. L. J. 205, March, 1993.

§ 63-15-67. Surrender of license or registration.

Any person whose license or registration shall have been suspended as provided in this chapter, or whose policy of insurance or bond, when required under this chapter, shall have been cancelled or terminated, or who shall neglect to furnish other proof upon request of the department, shall immediately return his license to the department. If any person shall fail to return to the department his license as provided herein, the department shall forthwith direct any peace officer to secure possession thereof and to return the same to the department.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-31; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 30, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

§ 63-15-69. Particular offenses and penalties.

(1) Where any person fails to report an accident as required in Section 63-15-9, in addition to any other penalties prescribed by law, the department shall suspend the license of the person failing to make such report, or the nonresident's operating privilege of such person, until such report has been filed and for such further period not to exceed thirty days as the department may fix.

(2) Any person who gives information required in a report or otherwise as provided for in Section 63-15-9, knowing or having reason to believe that such information is false, or who shall forge, or without authority, sign any evidence of proof of financial responsibility, or who files or offers for filing any such evidence of proof, knowing or having reason to believe that it is forged or signed without authority, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00) or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, except where the statement may be made under oath, in which case the person making the false statement under oath shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties for perjury.

(3) Any person whose license or nonresident's operating privilege has been suspended or revoked under this chapter, and who, during such suspension or revocation drives any motor vehicle upon any highway or knowingly permits any motor vehicle owned by such person to be operated by another upon any highway, except as permitted under this chapter, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) or imprisoned not exceeding six months, or both.

(4) Any person wilfully failing to return his license as required in Section 63-15-67, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) or imprisoned not to exceed thirty days, or both.

(5) Any person who shall violate any provision of this chapter for which no penalty is otherwise provided shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-32; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 31; Laws, 1970, ch. 488, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1970).

Editor's Note — Section 63-15-9, referred to in subsections (1) and (2), was repealed by Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 2, effective from and after July 1, 2003.

Cross References — Punishment of person convicted of perjury, see § 97-9-61.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-15-71. Furnishing by department of abstract relating to person's operating record.

(1) The department shall, upon request and receipt of proper fees, furnish any person a certified abstract of the operating record of any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, which abstract shall also fully designate the motor vehicles, if any, registered in the name of such person. If there shall be no record of any conviction of such person of violating any law relating to the operation of a motor vehicle or of any injury or damage caused by such person, the department shall so certify.

(2) In addition to any other fees, the department shall charge and collect Two Dollars (\$2.00) for furnishing a certified abstract to any person. This additional fee shall be deposited into the Disability and Relief Fund for the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-03; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 3; Laws, 2004, ch. 561, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment added (2).

§ 63-15-73. Effect of chapter upon motor vehicle laws.

This chapter shall in no respect be considered as a repeal of the motor vehicle laws of this state but shall be construed as supplemental thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8285-36; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 35, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

§ 63-15-75. Effect of chapter upon right of plaintiff to rely upon other legal processes.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as preventing the plaintiff in any action at law from relying for relief upon the other processes provided by law.

SOURCES: Codes 1942, § 8285-38; Laws, 1952, ch. 359, § 37, eff from and after January 1, 1953.

CHAPTER 17

Manufacture, Sales and Distribution

Bill of Sale; Numbers and Marks on Motor Vehicles	63-17-1
Distribution and Sales	63-17-51
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BILL OF SALE; NUMBERS AND MARKS ON MOTOR VEHICLES

SEC.	
63-17-1.	Sale, purchase, etc., of automobile without bill of sale.
63-17-3.	Recordation of bill of sale; affidavit in lieu of bill of sale; fees.
63-17-5.	Display of bill of sale to law enforcement officer.
63-17-7.	Failure of officer to perform acts authorized by § 63-17-5; fees of officers.
63-17-9.	Seizure of automobile by law enforcement officer.
63-17-11 through 63-17-15.	Repealed.
63-17-17.	Penalties.

§ 63-17-1. Sale, purchase, etc., of automobile without bill of sale.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to sell, purchase or own any automobile unless the seller shall furnish to and the buyer shall take and reserve, a bill of sale, signed by the seller, showing the make and model, vehicle identification number and other identifying marks thereof, the address of the seller, and the name and address of the person from whom the seller purchased. Said bill of sale may be in the following form:

"Name of purchaser _____ Address of purchaser _____ Manufacturer _____ Model _____ Vehicle identification number _____ Other marks _____ Name and address of person from whom seller purchased _____ Signature of seller _____ Address of seller _____ ."

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789x; Laws, 1930, § 5589; Laws, 1942, § 8065; Laws, 1920, ch. 222; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved April 6, 1970).

Cross References — Fraudulent conveyances generally, see § 15-3-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Failure to execute bill of sale.
3. Instructions.

1. In general.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8065] will not be presumed. *Wright v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.*, 279 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1960).

2. Failure to execute bill of sale.

Failure of seller to execute bill of sale for motor truck held not to render contract void. *Equitable Credit Co. v. Cooper*, 146 Miss. 868, 111 So. 749 (1927).

3. Instructions.

In action to recover damages arising from operation of truck by companion of one to whom defendant sold the truck, the

trial court properly refused an instruction to the jury that a sale of personal property is not required to be in writing in order to constitute a sale, and that it was not necessary that a bill of sale be executed in

order to convey title, since such instruction was too broad and calculated to confuse the jury. *Richton Tie & Timber Co. v. Smith*, 210 Miss. 148, 48 So. 2d 618 (1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. 56 A.L.R.2d 1309.

Rights of seller of motor vehicle with respect to purchase price or security on failure to comply with laws concerning transfer of title. 58 A.L.R.2d 1351.

Gift of automobile. 100 A.L.R.2d 1219.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 32, 38.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 33:24.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

§ 63-17-3. Recordation of bill of sale; affidavit in lieu of bill of sale; fees.

The bill of sale provided for in Section 63-17-1 may be recorded in a book to be provided and kept for that purpose in the office of the clerk of the chancery court in the county of the residence of the owner of the automobile. The owner or other person having an automobile in his possession who has no bill of sale may make affidavit, stating the name of the party from whom purchase was made, place and date of purchase, particularly describing the automobile, by motor number, and otherwise as prescribed for a bill of sale, which affidavit may be recorded. A copy of the bill of sale, or affidavit of ownership as made and certified by the clerk, shall be received and accepted in lieu of the original. The clerk shall charge and collect a fee of fifty cents for recording and certifying the record thereof, and shall charge and collect a fee of fifty cents for furnishing a certified copy of such bill of sale or affidavit.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789y; Laws, 1930, § 5590; Laws, 1942, § 8066; Laws, 1920, ch. 222.

§ 63-17-5. Display of bill of sale to law enforcement officer.

Any owner or person having an automobile in his possession shall, upon request of any sheriff, constable, justice of the peace, mayor, marshal or police officer, exhibit to such officer for inspection the bill of sale provided for in Section 63-17-1, or shall permit such officer to make inspection of such automobile, and shall answer all inquiries truthfully that may be propounded by such officer with references to such automobile and the history of the title thereto. Refusal so to do shall subject such person to immediate arrest by such officer, without warrant, and subject him to the penalties prescribed by law.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789z; Laws, 1930, § 5591; Laws, 1942, § 8067; Laws, 1920, ch. 222.

Editor's Note — Mississippi Constn., § 171, provides that references in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

§ 63-17-7. Failure of officer to perform acts authorized by § 63-17-5; fees of officers.

If any officer mentioned in Section 63-17-5 shall fail, neglect or refuse, upon request of any person who shall declare himself to be interested, to perform any act authorized in said section, or to furnish a written statement to such person, showing the result of such examination and inquiry, such officer shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by law. Any such request of such officer shall be accompanied by payment, or tender, of a fee of one dollar for each examination, and fifty cents a mile for each mile or fraction thereof over one-fourth, going to and returning from the place of examination; moreover, the place shall not be more than five miles distant and within the jurisdiction of the officer.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789a1; Laws, 1930, § 5592; Laws, 1942, § 8068; Laws, 1920, ch. 222.

§ 63-17-9. Seizure of automobile by law enforcement officer.

Automobile owners shall not be required at all times to keep the bill of sale provided for in Section 63-17-1 with their automobiles. However, failure to have the same therein shall not excuse them, or any person in possession, from furnishing the information required by Section 63-17-5, and upon affidavit made before the officer demanding the information that the person making the same has good reason to believe and does believe that such automobile is stolen, such officer may, in his discretion, take possession thereof and retain the same for such reasonable time as may be required for the necessary investigation to be made.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789b1; Laws, 1930, § 5593; Laws, 1942, § 8069; Laws, 1920, ch. 222.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The highway patrol had no authority to deliver a stolen pickup truck, which had an altered vehicle identification number and had been seized from an innocent purchaser pursuant to a valid search warrant, to an insurance company, which had paid the owner the full value of the truck under a theft loss insurance policy and was therefore the lawful owner of the vehicle, absent court approval with no advance notice to the innocent purchaser of its intent to do so and without giving him an opportunity to contest the matter in a court of competent jurisdiction; the appropriate procedure would have been for the highway patrol, once the truck

served no further purpose in the criminal investigation or prosecution, to make a motion in the justice court for authority to release it to the insurance company, and to give the innocent purchaser and the insurance company reasonable notice of such application and an opportunity to be heard; however, the circuit court erred in directing return of the pickup truck to the innocent purchaser without making the insurance company a party to the hearing or giving it any notice of the proceeding, as this was a blatant violation of the insurance company's right to due process. *Weaver v. State*, 597 So. 2d 609 (Miss. 1992).

§§ 63-17-11 through 63-17-15. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

§ 63-17-11. [Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789c1; 1930, § 5594; 1942, § 8070; Laws, 1920, ch. 222]

§ 63-17-13. [Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789c1; 1930, § 5594; 1942, § 8070; Laws, 1920, ch. 222]

§ 63-17-15. [Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789d1; 1930, § 5595; 1942, § 8071; Laws, 1920, ch. 222]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-17-11 prohibited the changing or mutilation of motor vehicle numbers or marks. For similar provisions, see former § 97-17-101.

Former § 63-17-13 provided for the confiscation of motor vehicles with changed or mutilated numbers or marks. For similar provisions, see former § 97-17-101.

Former § 63-17-15 authorized the board of supervisors to refund or pay automobile owners money realized from the sale of their automobiles condemned and sold for having altered motor identification numbers.

§ 63-17-17. Penalties.

Any person violating any of Sections 63-17-1 through 63-17-9, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) or imprisoned in the county jail not more than six (6) months, or be both so fined and imprisoned.

SOURCES: Codes, Hemingway's 1921 Supp. § 5789d1; Laws, 1930, § 5595; Laws, 1942, § 8071; Laws, 1920, ch. 222; Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

DISTRIBUTION AND SALES

SEC.

63-17-51.	Short title.
63-17-53.	Legislative findings and declarations.
63-17-55.	Definitions.
63-17-57.	Creation of Motor Vehicle Commission; appointment and terms of members; officers.
63-17-59.	Qualifications of members of commission.
63-17-61.	Organization of commission; oath and bond of members; quorum; voting; seal.
63-17-63.	Meetings of commission.
63-17-65.	Compensation of members of commission.
63-17-67.	Executive director; employment of clerical and professional assistance; office.
63-17-69.	Promulgation, etc., of rules and regulations by commission.
63-17-71.	Motor vehicle commission fund.
63-17-73.	Offenses and penalties.
63-17-75.	Applications for licenses.
63-17-77.	License fees; expiration dates.

- 63-17-79. Specification of location of business; effect of change of location.
- 63-17-80. Motor vehicle lessors required to be licensed.
- 63-17-81. License of salesman.
- 63-17-83. License of factory representative or distributor representative.
- 63-17-85. Grounds for denial, revocation, or suspension of license; assessment of civil penalty in lieu of suspension of license; collection and disposition of penalty.
- 63-17-87. Limited revocation or suspension of license.
- 63-17-89. Hearings; prerequisite to denial, revocation or suspension of license.
- 63-17-91. Hearings; calling of hearing.
- 63-17-93. Hearings; notice; location; effect of failure to appear.
- 63-17-95. Hearings; conduct; decisions.
- 63-17-97. Execution and enforcement of summons, citation or subpoena.
- 63-17-99. Appeals from decisions of commission; finality of decisions.
- 63-17-101. Recovery of damages and attorney fees by licensee.
- 63-17-103. Restrictions on right to advertise motor vehicle as new; enforcement of restriction.
- 63-17-105. Penalties.
- 63-17-107. Repealed.
- 63-17-109. Right of first refusal.
- 63-17-111. Owner of dealership may appoint successor by written agreement; manufacturer or dealer must honor succession unless good cause shown; procedure for refusing to honor succession.
- 63-17-113. Modification of franchise agreement; good cause required for termination, cancellation or nonrenewal.
- 63-17-115. Unreasonable discrimination prohibited.
- 63-17-117. Warranty or sales incentive audits to be conducted within certain amount of time after payment of disputed claim; approved and paid claims not to be charged back to dealer absent fraud, improper repair, or failure to substantiate claim.
- 63-17-119. Suit to recover damages; venue.

§ 63-17-51. Short title.

Sections 63-17-51 through 63-17-119 shall be known and may be cited as the "Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-01; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 1; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 305, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a reference appearing in the amendment made to this section by § 11 of ch. 418, Laws 2000. Section 11 of ch. 418 amended the section by substituting "Sections 63-17-51 through 63-17-121" for "Sections 63-17-51 through 63-17-105." However, as directed by the Joint Committee, the reference to "Sections 63-17-51 through 63-17-121" was changed to "Sections 63-17-51 through 63-17-119." The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its June 29, 2000 meeting.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 182 et seq. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-53. Legislative findings and declarations.

The legislature finds and declares that the distribution and sales of motor vehicles in the State of Mississippi vitally affects the general economy of the state and the public interest and the public welfare. The legislature further finds and declares that it is necessary, in the exercise of its police power, to regulate and to license motor vehicle manufacturers, factory branches and divisions, distributors, distributor branches and divisions, distributor representatives, wholesalers, wholesaler branches and divisions, dealers and salesmen doing business in the State of Mississippi in order (1) to prevent frauds, unfair practices, discrimination, impositions and other abuses upon the citizens of the State of Mississippi, (2) to avoid undue control of the independent motor vehicle dealer by motor vehicle manufacturing and distributing organizations, (3) to foster and keep alive vigorous and healthy competition, (4) to prevent the creation or perpetuation of monopolies, (5) to prevent the practice of requiring the buying of special features, accessories, special models, appliances and equipment not desired by a motor vehicle dealer or the ultimate purchaser, (6) to prevent false and misleading advertising, (7) to promote and keep alive a sound system of distribution of motor vehicles to the public, and (8) to promote the public safety and welfare.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-02; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 2; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 305, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-55. Definitions.

The following words, terms and phrases, when used in the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, shall have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

(a) "Motor vehicle" means any motor-driven vehicle of the sort and kind required to have a Mississippi road or bridge privilege license, and shall include, but not be limited to, motorcycles.

(b) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person, firm, partnership, copartnership, association, corporation, trust or legal entity, not excluded by subsection (c) of this section, who holds a bona fide contract or franchise in effect with a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler of new motor vehicles, and a license under the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, and such duly franchised and licensed motor vehicle dealers shall be the sole and only persons, firms, partnerships, copartnerships, associations, corporations, trusts or legal entities entitled to sell and publicly or otherwise solicit and advertise for sale new motor vehicles as such.

(c) The term "motor vehicle dealer" does not include:

(i) Receivers, trustees, administrators, executors, guardians or other persons appointed by or acting under judgment, decree or order of any court;

(ii) Public officers while performing their duties as such officers;

(iii) Employees of persons, corporations or associations enumerated in subsection (c)(i) of this section when engaged in the specific performance of their duties as such employees; or

(iv) A motor vehicle manufacturer operating a project as defined in Section 57-75-5(f)(iv)1; and the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law shall not apply to:

1.a. Any lease by such a motor vehicle manufacturer of three (3) or fewer motor vehicles at any one time and related vehicle maintenance, of any line of vehicle produced by the manufacturer or its subsidiaries, to any one (1) employee of the motor vehicle manufacturer on a direct basis; or

b. Any sale or other disposition of such motor vehicles by the motor vehicle manufacturer at the end of a lease through direct sales to employees of the manufacturer or through an open auction or auction limited to dealers of the manufacturer's vehicle line or its subsidiaries' vehicle lines; or

2. Any sale or other disposition by such a motor vehicle manufacturer of motor vehicles for which the manufacturer obtained distinguishing number tags under Section 27-19-309(8).

(d) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle which has not been previously sold to any person except a distributor or wholesaler or motor vehicle dealer for resale.

(e) "Ultimate purchaser" means, with respect to any new motor vehicle, the first person, other than a motor vehicle dealer purchasing in his capacity as such dealer, who in good faith purchases such new motor vehicle for purposes other than for resale.

(f) "Retail sale" or "sale at retail" means the act or attempted act of selling, bartering, exchanging or otherwise disposing of a new motor vehicle to an ultimate purchaser for use as a consumer.

(g) "Motor vehicle salesman" means any person who is employed as a salesman by a motor vehicle dealer whose duties include the selling or offering for sale of new motor vehicles.

(h) "Commission" means the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission.

(i) "Manufacturer" means any person, firm, association, corporation or trust, resident or nonresident, who manufactures or assembles new motor vehicles.

(j) "Distributor" or "wholesaler" means any person, firm, association, corporation or trust, resident or nonresident, who in whole or in part sells or distributes new motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers, or who maintains distributor representatives.

(k) "Factory branch" means a branch or division office maintained by a person, firm, association, corporation or trust who manufactures or assembles new motor vehicles for sale to distributors or wholesalers, to motor vehicle dealers, or for directing or supervising, in whole or in part, its representatives.

(l) "Distributor branch" means a branch or division office similarly maintained by a distributor or wholesaler for the same purposes a factory branch or division is maintained.

(m) "Factory representative" means a representative employed by a person, firm, association, corporation or trust who manufactures or assembles new motor vehicles, or by a factory branch, for the purpose of making or promoting the sale of his, its or their new motor vehicles, or for supervising or contacting his, its or their dealers or prospective dealers.

(n) "Distributor representative" means a representative similarly employed by a distributor, distributor branch or wholesaler.

(o) "Person" means and includes, individually and collectively, individuals, firms, partnerships, copartnerships, associations, corporations and trusts, or any other forms of business enterprise, or any legal entity.

(p) "Good faith" means the duty of each party to any franchise, and all officers, employees or agents thereof, to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party. However, recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.

(q) "Coerce" means the failure to act in good faith in performing or complying with any terms or provisions of the franchise or agreement. However, recommendation, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.

(r) "Special tools" are those which a dealer was required to purchase by the manufacturer or distributor for service on that manufacturer's product.

(s) "Motor vehicle lessor" means any person, not excluded by subsection (c) of this section, engaged in the motor vehicle leasing or rental business.

(t) "Specialty vehicle" means a motor vehicle manufactured by a second stage manufacturer by purchasing motor vehicle components, e.g. frame and drive train, and completing the manufacturer of finished motor vehicles for the purpose of resale with the primary manufacturer warranty unimpaired, to a limited commercial market rather than the consuming public. Specialty vehicles include garbage trucks, ambulances, fire trucks, buses, limousines, hearses and other similar limited purpose vehicles as the commission may by regulation provide.

(u) "Auto auction" means (i) any person who provides a place of business or facilities for the wholesale exchange of motor vehicles by and between duly licensed motor vehicle dealers, (ii) any motor vehicle dealer licensed to sell used motor vehicles selling motor vehicles using an auction format but not on consignment, or (iii) any person who provides the facilities for or is in the business of selling in an auction format motor vehicles.

(v) "Motor home" means a motor vehicle that is designed and constructed primarily to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use.

(w) "Dealer-operator" means the individual designated in the franchise agreement as the operator of the motor vehicle dealership.

(x) "Franchise" or "franchise agreement" means a written contract or agreement between a motor vehicle dealer and a manufacturer or its distributor or factory branch by which the motor vehicle dealer is authorized to engage in the business of selling or leasing the specific makes, models or classifications of new motor vehicles marketed or leased by the manufacturer and designated in the agreement or any addendum to such agreement.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-03; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 3; Laws, 1982, ch. 392; reenacted, 1983, ch. 344, § 3; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 399, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 8; Laws, 2000, 3rd Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 20, eff from and after passage (approved Nov. 6, 2000.)

Cross References — Applicability of the definition of "manufacturer" to the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (§§ 63-17-151 et seq.), see § 63-17-155.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In an action in which the purchaser of a truck alleged that the seller had represented a used truck as a new one in violation of Mississippi's Consumer Protection Act (§§ 75-24-1 et seq.) and the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law (§§ 63-17-51 et seq.), the trial judge did not err in finding, as a matter of law, that the truck was new, even though a third party had previously attempted to purchase the truck but had returned it one week after driving it home, where no title had ever been issued to the third party, and the purchaser was told at the time of the sale that there were 1,790 miles on the odometer because the truck had either been test driven or had been the subject of a sale that had fallen through. *Hernandez v. Vickery Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Co.*, 652 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1995).

In an action in which the purchaser of a truck alleged that the seller had represented a used truck as a new one in violation of Mississippi's Consumer Protection Act (§§ 75-24-1 et seq.) and the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law (§§ 63-17-51 et seq.), the trial court did not err in failing to consider § 75-2-401(2), which pertains to passing of title, since the issue was whether the truck was new or used when it was purchased and this question could be answered without

exceeding the confines of the Motor Vehicle Commission Law and the Motor Vehicle Title Law (§§ 63-21-1 et seq.). *Hernandez v. Vickery Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Co.*, 652 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1995).

Definition of "coercion" in Miss. Code Annotated § 63-17-55(9) does not impose duty of good faith and fair dealing, in light of stringent definition of "good faith", as definition of good faith is same in both state law and federal Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act (15 USCS §§ 1221-1225); allegations by automobile dealer that manufacturer refused dealer's request to relocate dealership, reduced dealership area of primary responsibility, reduced dealership's planning potential, thereby making it impossible for dealer to continue viable dealership, and manufacturer's refusal to approve new dealership, thereby preventing dealer from selling his dealership, did not state cause of action under Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act (15 USCS §§ 1221-1225) and therefore did not state cause of action under analogous Miss. Act, Miss. Code Annotated § 63-17-73. *Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. GMC*, 682 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 873 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 878 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978, 110 S. Ct. 506, 107 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 38 Am. Jur. Trials, All-Terrain Vehicle Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Defective Design of an All-Terrain Vehicle, §§ 1 et seq.

Law Reviews. 1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 53 Miss. L. J. 167, March 1983.

§ 63-17-57. Creation of Motor Vehicle Commission; appointment and terms of members; officers.

There is hereby created the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission to be composed of eight members, one of whom shall be appointed by the attorney general from the state at large for a term of four years and one of whom shall be appointed by the secretary of state from the state at large for a term of four years, and six licensees who shall be appointed by the governor, one from the state at large and one from each of the five congressional districts of this state for terms of the following duration: the term of the member from the state at large shall expire at the time the incumbent governor's term expires, the term of the member appointed from the first congressional district shall expire on June 30, 1973, the term of the member appointed from the second congressional district shall expire on June 30, 1974, the term of the member appointed from the third congressional district shall expire on June 30, 1976, the term of the member from the fourth congressional district shall expire on June 30, 1977, and the term of the member appointed from the fifth congressional district shall expire on June 30, 1978. Each member shall serve until his successor is appointed and qualified. At the expiration of the term of the member initially appointed by the attorney general each successor member shall be appointed for a term of four years by the incumbent attorney general, and at the expiration of the term of the member appointed by the secretary of state each successor member shall be appointed for a term of four years by the incumbent secretary. At the expiration of a term for which each of the initial appointments of the governor is made, each successor member shall be appointed for a term of seven years except that the term of the member appointed from the state at large shall be coterminous with that of the governor making the appointment.

The member appointed from the state at large by the governor shall serve as chairman of the commission and one of the other members appointed by the governor shall be designated by him to serve as vice-chairman. In the absence of the chairman at any meeting of the commission the vice-chairman shall preside and perform the duties of the chairman.

In the event of a vacancy created by the death, resignation or removal of any member of the commission the vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the governor, attorney general or the secretary of state, as the case may be, for the unexpired portion of the term. All appointments hereunder shall be made with the advice and consent of the senate.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 4; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor's Note — Section 63-17-107 formerly provided that this section would stand repealed as of December 31, 1991. Subsequently, § 63-17-107 was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 305, § 29, effective July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-59. Qualifications of members of commission.

Each of the members appointed to the commission shall be a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Mississippi and a qualified elector of the jurisdiction from which appointed, and each shall be of good moral character. The members of the commission initially appointed by the attorney general and the secretary of state and all members subsequently appointed by them shall never have been engaged in the manufacture, distribution or sale of motor vehicles and shall not thereafter be so engaged as long as they are members of the commission. The members of the commission initially appointed by the governor and all such members subsequently appointed by an incumbent governor shall be qualified to receive a license under the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law and shall be holders of a current license within ninety days after their respective appointments and shall continue to be holders of a current license at all times thereafter so long as they are such members.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 5; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-61. Organization of commission; oath and bond of members; quorum; voting; seal.

The commission shall meet at Jackson and complete its organization immediately after the entire membership thereof has been appointed and has qualified.

The chairman and each member of the commission shall, before entering upon the discharge of the duties of his office, take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by Section 268 of the constitution of this state, and shall file the same in the office of the secretary of state.

The commission shall purchase either a blanket position honesty or faithful performance bond from some surety company authorized to do business in this state in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00), made payable to the State of Mississippi, conditioned for the honest and faithful performance of the duties of the chairman and each member of the commission, the executive secretary of the commission and all other employees of the commission, said bond to be approved by the governor and filed in the office of the secretary of state. The commission shall keep such a bond in force at all times and from and after the date the commission is organized.

A majority of the commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business. Neither the chairman nor the vice-chairman, when the vice-chairman is presiding, shall be entitled to vote unless his vote is necessary to break a tie vote.

The commission shall adopt and use a common seal for the authentication of its records and orders.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 6; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-63. Meetings of commission.

The commission shall hold all of its regular monthly meetings in its office at Jackson, Mississippi. The commission may, upon approval of a majority of its members, hold special meetings and the hearings provided for under Section 63-17-93 at any time and place within the State of Mississippi.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 7; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-65. Compensation of members of commission.

The chairman and members of the commission shall receive per diem in the amount set forth in Section 25-3-69 for each and every day actually and necessarily spent in attending the meetings of the commission, and shall be reimbursed for their reasonable subsistence and traveling expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties in accordance with Section 25-3-41. The chairman shall require itemized statements of all such reimbursable expenses and shall audit or cause to be audited such statements before approving the same for payment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted and amended, 1983, ch. 344, § 8; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Definition in § 63-17-55(9) of coercion as lack of good faith does not in effect revert term "good faith" to its customary common law meaning of imposing duty of good faith and fair dealing, but rather is simply defined with reference to "good

faith" as that term is defined in statute. *Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. GMC*, 682 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 873 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 878 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978, 110 S. Ct. 506, 107 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1989).

§ 63-17-67. Executive director; employment of clerical and professional assistance; office.

The commission shall employ a qualified person to serve as executive director thereof, to serve at the pleasure of the commission, and shall fix his salary, subject to the approval of the State Personnel Board, and shall define and prescribe his duties. The executive director shall be in charge of the commission's office and shall devote full time to the duties thereof. His duties shall include, but not be limited to, the collection of all fees and charges under the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, keeping a record of all proceedings of the commission and an accurate account of all monies received and disbursed by the commission, all of which records shall be considered as public records. The commission may employ such clerical and professional help and incur such expenses as may be reasonably necessary for the proper discharge of its duties.

The commission shall maintain its office and transact its business, except as otherwise provided, at Jackson, Mississippi, and the Department of Finance and Administration shall approve suitable quarters and the remuneration therefor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; Laws, 1977, ch. 411, § 1; reenacted and amended, 1983, ch. 344, § 9; reenacted and amended, 1991, ch. 305, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-69. Promulgation, etc., of rules and regulations by commission.

The commission shall have power to prescribe, issue, amend and rescind such reasonable rules and regulations as may be reasonably necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law. No rule or regulation shall be effective until thirty days after copies of the proposed rule or regulation shall have been mailed to all motor vehicle dealers operating in the State of Mississippi, and a representative of each manufacturer, wholesaler, and distributor whose motor vehicles are sold therein, whether said representative is located within or without the State of Mississippi, and a notice setting forth either the terms or substance of said proposed rule or regulation and the time and place of a hearing thereon shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation in the state and published in the City of Jackson. Such hearing may be held at any time twenty days after publication of such notice, but such rules or regulations shall not become effective until a hearing thereon. All rules, regulations and forms adopted by the commission shall be filed with its executive secretary and shall be readily available for public inspection and examination during reasonable business hours. A copy of said rules, regulations and forms shall also be filed and recorded in the office of the secretary of state. Any interested person shall have the right to petition the commission for issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule or regulation.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 10; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-71. Motor vehicle commission fund.

All funds received by the commission shall be deposited in the State Treasury to the credit of a special fund to be known as the "motor vehicle commission fund." All expenses incurred in the organization, maintenance and operation of the commission shall be paid from such special fund. The expenditure of all such funds shall be made only pursuant to appropriation approved by the legislature and as provided by law. The receipts and disbursements of the commission shall be audited annually by the state auditor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-04; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 4; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 11; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 264; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the first sentence. The word "the" was inserted between "to" and "credit" so that "shall be deposited in the State Treasury to credit of a special fund" now reads as "shall be deposited in the State Treasury to the credit of a special fund." The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting.

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer whenever they appear.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

§ 63-17-73. Offenses and penalties.

(1) It is unlawful and a misdemeanor:

(a) For any person, firm, association, corporation or trust to engage in business as, or serve in the capacity of, or act as a motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle salesman, manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, factory branch or division, distributor branch or division, wholesaler branch or division, factory representative or distributor representative, as such, in this state without first obtaining a license therefor as provided in the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, regardless of whether or not said person, firm, association, corporation or trust maintains or has a place or places of business in this state. Any person, firm, association, corporation or trust engaging, acting, or serving in more than one of said capacities or having more than one place where such business is carried on or conducted shall be required to obtain and hold a current license for each capacity and place of business.

(b) For a motor vehicle dealer or a motor vehicle salesman:

1. To require a purchaser of a new motor vehicle, as a condition of sale and delivery thereof, to also purchase special features, appliances, equip-

ment, parts or accessories not desired or requested by the purchaser. However, this prohibition shall not apply as to special features, appliances, equipment, parts or accessories which are already installed on the car when received by the dealer.

2. To represent and sell as a new motor vehicle any motor vehicle which has been used and operated for demonstration purposes or which is otherwise a used motor vehicle.

3. To resort to or use any false or misleading advertisement in connection with his business as such motor vehicle dealer or motor vehicle salesman.

(c) For a manufacturer, a distributor, a wholesaler, a distributor branch or division, a factory branch or division, or a wholesaler branch or division, or officer, agent or other representative thereof, to coerce, or attempt to coerce, any motor vehicle dealer:

1. To order or accept delivery of any motor vehicle or vehicles, appliances, equipment, parts or accessories therefor, or any other commodity or commodities which shall not have been voluntarily ordered by said motor vehicle dealer.

2. To order or accept delivery of any motor vehicle with special features, appliances, accessories or equipment not included in the list price of said motor vehicles as publicly advertised by the manufacturer thereof.

3. To order for any person any parts, accessories, equipment, machinery, tools, appliances, or any commodity whatsoever.

4. To contribute or pay money or anything of value into any cooperative or other advertising program or fund.

(d) For a manufacturer, a distributor, a wholesaler, a distributor branch or division, a factory branch or division, or a wholesaler branch or division, or officer, agent or other representative thereof:

1. To refuse to deliver in reasonable quantities and within a reasonable time after receipt of dealer's order to any duly licensed motor vehicle dealer having a franchise or contractual arrangement for the retail sale of new motor vehicles sold or distributed by such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division or wholesale branch or division, any such motor vehicles as are covered by such franchise or contract specifically publicly advertised by such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division or wholesale branch or division, to be available for immediate delivery. However, the failure to deliver any motor vehicle shall not be considered a violation of this subsection if such failure be due to acts of God, work stoppages or delays due to strikes or labor difficulties, freight embargoes or other causes over which the manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler, or any agent thereof, shall have no control.

2. To coerce, or attempt to coerce any motor vehicle dealer to enter into any agreement, with such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler

branch or division, or officer, agent or other representative thereof, or to do any other act prejudicial to said dealer by threatening to cancel any franchise or any contractual agreement existing between such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division, and said dealer. However, good faith notice to any motor vehicle dealer of said dealer's violation of any terms or provisions of such franchise or contractual agreement shall not constitute a violation of this subsection.

3. To terminate or cancel the franchise or selling agreement of any such dealer without due cause. The nonrenewal of a franchise or selling agreement, without due cause, shall constitute an unfair termination or cancellation, regardless of the terms or provisions of such franchise or selling agreement. Such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division, or officer, agent or other representative thereof shall notify a motor vehicle dealer in writing, and forward a copy of such notice to the commission, of the termination or cancellation of the franchise or selling agreement of such dealer at least sixty (60) days before the effective date thereof, stating the specific grounds for such termination or cancellation. Such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division, or officer, agent or other representative thereof shall notify a motor vehicle dealer in writing, and forward a copy of such notice to the commission, at least sixty (60) days before the contractual term of his franchise or selling agreement expires that the same will not be renewed, stating the specific grounds for such nonrenewal, in those cases where there is no intention to renew the same. In no event shall the contractual term of any such franchise or selling agreement expire, without the written consent of the motor vehicle dealer involved, prior to the expiration of at least sixty (60) days following such written notice. Any motor vehicle dealer who receives written notice that his franchise or selling agreement is being terminated or cancelled or who receives written notice that his franchise or selling agreement will not be renewed, may, within such sixty-day notice period, file with the commission a verified complaint for its determination as to whether such termination or cancellation or nonrenewal is unfair within the purview of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, and any such franchise or selling agreement shall continue in effect until final determination of the issues raised in such complaint notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in said law or in such franchise or selling agreement.

4. To resort to or use any false or misleading advertisement in connection with his or its business as such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division, or officer, agent or other representative thereof.

5. To offer to sell or to sell any new motor vehicle to any motor vehicle dealer at a lower actual price therefor than the actual price charged to any

other motor vehicle dealer for the same model vehicle similarly equipped or to utilize any device, including, but not limited to, sales promotion plans or programs which result in such lesser actual price. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply so long as a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler, or any agent thereof, offers to sell or sells new motor vehicles to all motor vehicle dealers at the same price. This subsection shall not be construed to prevent the offering of volume discounts if such discounts are equally available to all franchised dealers in this state.

The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to sales to a motor vehicle dealer of any motor vehicle ultimately sold, donated or used by said dealer in a driver education program, or to sales to a motor vehicle dealer for resale to any unit of government, federal, state or local.

6. To offer to sell or to sell any new motor vehicle to any person, except a wholesaler or distributor, at a lower actual price therefor than the actual price offered and charged to a motor vehicle dealer for the same model vehicle similarly equipped or to utilize any device which results in such lesser actual price.

7. To offer to sell or to sell parts and/or accessories to any new motor vehicle dealer for use in his own business for the purpose of repairing or replacing the same or a comparable part or accessory, at a lower actual price therefor than the actual price charged to any other new motor vehicle dealer for similar parts and/or accessories for use in his own business. However, it is recognized that certain motor vehicle dealers operate and serve as wholesalers of parts and accessories to retail outlets, and nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler, or any agent thereof, from selling to a motor vehicle dealer who operates and serves as a wholesaler of parts and accessories, such parts and accessories as may be ordered by such motor vehicle dealer for resale to retail outlets, at a lower actual price than the actual price charged a motor vehicle dealer who does not operate or serve as a wholesaler of parts and accessories.

8. To prevent or attempt to prevent by contract or otherwise any motor vehicle dealer from changing the capital structure of his dealership or the means by or through which he finances the operation of his dealership, provided the dealer at all times meets any capital standards agreed to between the dealership and the manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler, provided such standards are deemed reasonable by the commission.

9. To prevent or attempt to prevent by contract or otherwise any motor vehicle dealer or any officer, partner or stockholder of any motor vehicle dealer from selling or transferring any part of the interest of any of them to any other person or persons or party or parties. However, no dealer, officer, partner or stockholder shall have the right to sell, transfer or assign the franchise or any right thereunder without the consent of the manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler.

10. To condition unreasonably the renewal or extension of a franchise on a motor vehicle dealer's substantial renovation of the dealer's place of

business or on the construction, purchase, acquisition or rental of a new place of business by the motor vehicle dealer. The manufacturer shall notify the motor vehicle dealer in writing of its intent to impose such a condition within a reasonable time prior to the effective date of the proposed renewal or extension, but in no case less than one hundred eighty (180) days prior to the renewal or extension, and the manufacturer shall demonstrate to the commission the need for such demand in view of the need to service the public and the economic conditions existing in the motor vehicle industry at the time such action would be required of the motor vehicle dealer. As part of any such condition the manufacturer shall offer the motor vehicle dealer a reasonable initial supply and model mix of motor vehicles to meet the sales levels necessary to support the increased overhead incurred by the motor vehicle dealer by reason of such renovation, construction, purchase or rental of a new place of business.

11. To require, coerce or attempt to coerce a motor vehicle dealer to refrain from participation in the management of, investment in or the acquisition of any other line of motor vehicles or related products, as long as the motor vehicle dealer maintains a reasonable line of credit for each dealership and the motor vehicle dealer remains in substantial compliance with reasonable facilities' requirements of the manufacturer or distributor. The reasonable facilities' requirements may not include any requirement that a motor vehicle dealer establish or maintain exclusive facilities, personnel or display space when the requirements are unreasonable considering current economic conditions and not otherwise justified by reasonable business considerations. The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the current economic conditions and reasonable business considerations do not justify exclusive facilities is on the dealer.

12. To fail or refuse to sell or offer to sell to all motor vehicle dealers in a line or make, every motor vehicle sold or offered for sale under the franchise agreement to any motor vehicle dealer of the same line or make; or to unreasonably require a motor vehicle dealer to pay an extra fee, purchase unreasonable advertising displays or any other materials, or to unreasonably require the dealer-operator to remodel, renovate or recondition its existing facilities as a prerequisite to receiving a certain model or series of vehicles. However, the failure to deliver any such motor vehicle shall not be considered a violation of this section if the failure is not arbitrary and is due to a lack of manufacturing capacity or to a strike or labor difficulty, a shortage of materials, a freight embargo or other cause of which the manufacturer or distributor has no control. This provision shall not apply to manufacturers of recreational vehicles.

13. To attempt to coerce, or coerce, a motor vehicle dealer to adhere to performance standards that are not applied uniformly to other similarly situated motor vehicle dealers. Any performance standards shall be fair, reasonable, equitable and based upon accurate information. If dealership performance standards are based on a survey, the manufacturer or

distributor shall establish the objectivity of the survey process and provide this information to any motor vehicle dealer of the same line or make covered by the survey request. Upon request of the dealer, a manufacturer or distributor shall disclose in writing to the dealer a description of how a performance standard or program is designed and all relevant information pertaining to that dealer used in the application of the performance standard or program to that dealer.

(2) Concerning any sale of a motor vehicle or vehicles to the State of Mississippi, or to the several counties or municipalities thereof, or to any other political subdivision thereof, no manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler shall offer any discounts, refunds, or any other similar type inducements to any dealer without making the same offer or offers to all other of its dealers within the state. If such inducements above mentioned are made, the manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler shall give simultaneous notice thereof to all of its dealers within the state.

(3) It is unlawful to be a broker. For the purpose of this subsection, "broker" means a person who, for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, arranges or offers to arrange a transaction involving the sale, for purposes other than resale, of a new motor vehicle, and who is not:

(a) A new motor vehicle dealer or agent or employee of such a dealer; or

(b) A distributor or an agent or employee of such a distributor.

However, an individual shall not be deemed to be a broker if he or she is the owner of the new or used motor vehicle which is the object of the brokering transaction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-05; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 5; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 12; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 12; Laws, 1994, ch. 399, § 3; Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Cross References — Denial of an application, or revocation or suspension of a license for commission of a prohibited act or failure to perform requirements of this section, see § 63-17-85.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Termination of franchise without cause.

1. In general.

Definition of "coercion" in Miss. Code Annotated § 63-17-55(9) does not impose duty of good faith and fair dealing, in light of stringent definition of "good faith", as definition of good faith is same in both state law and federal Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act (15 USCS §§ 1221-1225); allegations by automobile dealer that manufacturer refused dealer's request to relocate dealership, reduced deal-

ership area of primary responsibility, reduced dealership's planning potential, thereby making it impossible for dealer to continue viable dealership, and manufacturer's refusal to approve new dealership, thereby preventing dealer from selling his dealership, did not state cause of action under Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act (15 USCS §§ 1221-1225) and therefore did not state cause of action under analogous Miss. Act, Miss. Code Annotated § 63-17-73. *Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. GMC*, 682 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 873 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 878 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978, 110 S. Ct. 506, 107 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1989).

In an action in which the purchaser of a truck alleged that the seller had represented a used truck as a new one in violation of Mississippi's Consumer Protection Act (§§ 75-24-1 et seq.) and the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law (§§ 63-17-51 et seq.), the trial judge did not err in finding, as a matter of law, that the truck was new, even though a third party had previously attempted to purchase the truck but had returned it one week after driving it home, where no title had ever been issued to the third party, and the purchaser was told at the time of the sale that there were 1,790 miles on the odometer because the truck had either been test driven or had been the subject of a sale that had fallen through. *Hernandez v. Vickery Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Co.*, 652 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1995).

In an action in which the purchaser of a truck alleged that the seller had represented a used truck as a new one in violation of Mississippi's Consumer Protection Act (§§ 75-24-1 et seq.) and the

Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law (§§ 63-17-51 et seq.), the trial court did not err in failing to consider § 75-2-401(2), which pertains to passing of title, since the issue was whether the truck was new or used when it was purchased and this question could be answered without exceeding the confines of the Motor Vehicle Commission Law and the Motor Vehicle Title Law (§§ 63-21-1 et seq.). *Hernandez v. Vickery Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Co.*, 652 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1995).

2. Termination of franchise without cause.

Automobile manufacturer's refusal to grant dealer permission to relocate and refusal to approve successor dealership in area did not constitute constructive termination of its dealership without cause, with coercion and without good faith, in violation of § 63-17-73(1)(d). *Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. GMC*, 682 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 873 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 878 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978, 110 S. Ct. 506, 107 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Construction and application of statute making it unlawful to tamper with motor vehicle odometer. 76 A.L.R.3d 981.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

Liability of manufacturer under Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (15 USCS §§ 1221 et seq.) for failure to perform or comply with terms or provisions of franchise agreement. 54 A.L.R. Fed. 314.

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic,

Forms 81 (complaint in misrepresentation in sale of used automobile as new), 81.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration-misrepresentation in sale of used automobile as new automobile-fraudulent concealment of disconnection of odometer).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Act of God, §§ 1 et seq.

28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 267, Proof of Wrongful Termination of Motor Vehicle Dealership.

§ 63-17-75. Applications for licenses.

Within ninety (90) days after July 1, 1970, all persons who on July 1, 1970, are engaged in a business or occupation for which a license is required under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law shall make application on forms prescribed by the commission for their respective licenses. All such persons shall be permitted, without a license, to continue to engage in the business or occupation for which a license is applied for until the license is

either granted or, in case it is denied, until the applicant has exhausted or has had an opportunity to exhaust all of his remedies under Section 63-17-99. No person not engaged in a business or occupation requiring such a license on July 1, 1970, shall be permitted to engage in such business or occupation until he shall have first obtained a license to engage in such business or occupation.

Applications for licenses shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the applicants and shall be on forms prescribed by the commission and furnished to such applicants. Applications shall contain such information as the commission deems necessary to enable it to fully determine the qualifications and eligibility of the several applicants to receive the license or licenses applied for. The commission shall require that there be set forth in each application information relating to the applicant's financial standing, the applicant's business integrity, whether the applicant has an established place of business and is primarily engaged in the pursuit, avocation, or business for which a license or licenses is applied for, and whether the applicant is able to properly conduct the business for which a license or licenses is applied for, and such other pertinent information consistent with the safeguarding of the public interest and public welfare. Applications for license as a motor vehicle dealer shall, in addition to the foregoing, be accompanied by the filing with the commission of a bona fide contract or franchise then in effect between the applicant and a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler of the new motor vehicle or vehicles proposed to be dealt in, unless such contract or franchise has already been filed with the commission in connection with a previous application made by such applicant, in which event the applicant shall, in lieu of again filing the contract or franchise, identify the contract or franchise by appropriate reference and file all revisions and additions, if any, which have been made to said contract or franchise. The applicant must furnish satisfactory evidence that he or it maintains adequate space in the building or structure wherein his or its established business is conducted for the display of new motor vehicles, or he will have such facilities within a reasonable time after receiving a license, and that he or it has or will have adequate facilities in said building or structure for the repair and servicing of motor vehicles and the storage of new parts and accessories for same. However, the failure to furnish the evidence called for in the preceding sentence shall not constitute sufficient cause for denying a license to any motor vehicle dealer who on July 1, 1970, was an enfranchised new motor vehicle dealer in this state of a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler of new motor vehicles and who continued to be such a dealer from such date until application was made for a license as a motor vehicle dealer.

New applications for licenses as a new motor vehicle dealer shall, in addition to the foregoing, be accompanied by the filing with the commission of a corporate surety bond in the penal sum of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars (\$25,000.00) on a bond form approved by the commission. However, an applicant for licenses at multiple locations may choose to provide a corporate surety bond in the penal sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000.00) covering all licensed locations of the same capacity in lieu of separate bonds for each location.

The bond shall be in effect upon the applicant being licensed and shall be conditioned upon his complying with the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law. The bond shall be an indemnity for any loss sustained by any person by reason of the acts of the person bonded when those acts constitute grounds for the suspension or revocation of license. The bond shall be executed in the name of the State of Mississippi for the benefit of any aggrieved party. The aggregate liability of the surety for any claimants, regardless of the number of years this bond is in force or has been in effect, shall not exceed the amount of the bond. The proceeds of the bond shall be paid upon receipt by the commission of a final judgment from a Mississippi court of competent jurisdiction against the principal and in favor of an aggrieved party.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-05; Laws, 1970, ch. 478 § 5; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 13; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 13; Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Cross References — Denial, revocation, or suspension of a license, see § 63-17-85. Filing and approval of dealer contracts generally, see § 63-17-131.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 185. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-77. License fees; expiration dates.

All applications for license or licenses shall be accompanied by the appropriate fee or fees therefor in accordance with the schedule thereof hereinafter set out. In the event any application is denied and the license applied for is not issued, the entire license fee shall be returned to the applicant.

The schedule of license fees to be charged and received by the commission for the licenses issued shall be as follows:

(1) For each manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, factory branch and division or distributor branch and division, and wholesaler branch and division, four hundred dollars (\$400.00).

(2) For each motor vehicle dealer, factory representative, distributor representative and wholesaler representative, one hundred dollars (\$100.00).

(3) For each motor vehicle salesman, ten dollars (\$10.00).

Any person, firm or corporation required to be licensed, who fails to make application for such license at the time required, shall, in addition to the aforesaid fees, pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum for the period of time during which he shall operate without a proper license, and in addition thereto, shall pay a penalty of fifty percent (50%) of the amount of the license fee. Said penalty, however, may be waived in whole or in part within the discretion of the commission.

All licenses shall expire on the thirty-first day of December following the date of issue.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-05; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 5; Laws, 1982, ch. 326; reenacted, 1983, ch. 344, § 14; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Denial of an application, or revocation or suspension of a license for commission of a prohibited act or failure to perform requirements of this section, see § 63-17-85.

§ 63-17-79. Specification of location of business; effect of change of location.

The license issued to each motor vehicle dealer, manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, factory branch or division, distributor branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division, shall specify the location of the factory, office, branch or division thereof. In case such location is changed, the commission shall endorse the change of location on the license without charge if it be within the same county. A change of location to another county shall require a new license.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-05; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 5; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 15; Laws, 1991, ch. 305, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Denial of an application, or revocation or suspension of a license for commission of a prohibited act or failure to perform requirements of this section, see § 63-17-85.

§ 63-17-80. Motor vehicle lessors required to be licensed.

It is unlawful for a motor vehicle lessor or any agent, employee or representative thereof: (a) to represent and to offer for lease any new motor vehicle in Mississippi without first obtaining a new motor vehicle dealer license, or (b) to lease or offer to lease a new motor vehicle from an unlicensed location.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 63-17-81. License of salesman.

Every motor vehicle salesman shall have his license upon his person, or displayed at his place of employment, except as hereinafter provided, when engaged in his business, and shall display the same upon request. The name and business address of the employer of such salesman shall be stated on the license.

In case of a change of employer the following procedure shall be adhered to:

(a) The licensee shall within three (3) days following such change mail or deliver his license to the commission for its endorsement of such change thereon. The license shall be accompanied by a fee of Two Dollars and Fifty Cents (\$2.50) for endorsing each such change of employer and a written

statement of the licensee setting forth the name and business address of his new employer, the date his employment terminated with his last employer, and the date his employment commenced with his new employer.

(b) The last employer of the licensee shall, within three (3) days following the termination of employment of the licensee, make a report to the commission setting forth the reason or reasons why the services of the licensee were terminated and such other information as may be required by the commission.

(c) Upon receipt by the commission of the licensee's license and fee and his last employer's report, the commission shall immediately make an appropriate endorsement on said license showing the change of employer and mail the license, as endorsed, to the licensee unless the commission has grounds to believe and does believe that the licensee is no longer qualified under the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law as a motor vehicle salesman. Under such circumstances the commission shall immediately notify him and his new employer in writing that a hearing will be held for the purpose of determining whether his license should be revoked or suspended, specifying the grounds for revocation or suspension, as the case may be, and the time and place for the hearing. Such hearing and any and all appeals by the licensee with respect thereto shall be in accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-17-89 through 63-17-99.

(d) If, after the commission receives the licensee's license and fee and his last employer's report, the executive director of the commission cannot for any reason endorse and mail to the licensee his license within a period of three (3) days following the receipt by the commission of the licensee's license and fee and his last employer's report, then and in that event he shall mail to the licensee a permit in such form as the commission shall prescribe, which permit shall serve in lieu of a license until such time as the commission endorses and mails the license to the licensee or until such time as the licensee's license is revoked or suspended in accordance with the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law. If the license is ultimately revoked or suspended then immediately upon such revocation or suspension the licensee shall return said permit to the commission for cancellation.

(e) The commission shall maintain a permanent file with respect to each licensed motor vehicle salesman. Each such file shall contain all pertinent information with respect to the fitness and qualifications of each such licensee for the use by the commission in from time to time determining whether his license should be revoked or suspended.

There is no intent under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law to prevent a salesman who has not previously been licensed or a transferee salesman from selling during the time required to process his application. Such applicant shall be allowed to sell from the date of employment as long as he and his dealer follow the procedure for license application.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-05; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 5; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 16; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 16; Laws, 1994, ch. 399, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References — Denial of an application, or revocation or suspension of a license for commission of a prohibited act or failure to perform requirements of this section, see § 63-17-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 185. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-83. License of factory representative or distributor representative.

Every motor vehicle factory representative or distributor representative shall have his license upon his person when engaged in his business, and shall display the same upon request. The name of the employer of such factory representative or distributor representative shall be stated on said license. In case of a change of employer, the holder of such license shall immediately mail same to the commission for its endorsement of such change thereon. A fee of two dollars and fifty cents (\$2.50) shall be charged by the commission for endorsing each such change of employer on said licenses, and said fee shall accompany the application for change.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-05; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 5; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 17; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Denial of an application, or revocation or suspension of a license for commission of a prohibited act or failure to perform requirements of this section, see § 63-17-85.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 185. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-85. Grounds for denial, revocation, or suspension of license; assessment of civil penalty in lieu of suspension of license; collection and disposition of penalty.

The commission may deny an application for a license, or revoke or suspend a license after it has been granted, for any of the following reasons:

(a) On satisfactory proof of unfitness of the applicant or the licensee, as the case may be, under the standards established and set out in the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law.

(b) For fraud practiced or any material misstatement made by an applicant in any application for license under the provisions of Section 63-17-75.

(c) For any willful failure to comply with any provision of said law or with any rule or regulation promulgated by the commission under authority vested in it by said law.

(d) Change of condition after license is granted or failure to maintain the qualifications for license.

(e) Continued or flagrant violation of any of the provisions of said law or of any of the rules or regulations of the commission.

(f) For any willful violation of any law relating to the sale, distribution or financing of motor vehicles.

(g) Willfully defrauding any retail buyer to the buyer's damage.

(h) Willful failure to perform any written agreement with any retail buyer.

(i) Being a manufacturer who, for the protection of the buying public, fails to specify the delivery and preparation obligations of its motor vehicle dealers prior to delivery of new motor vehicles to retail buyers. A copy of the delivery and preparation obligations of its motor vehicle dealers and a schedule of the compensation to be paid to its motor vehicle dealers for the work and services they shall be required to perform in connection with such delivery and preparation obligations shall be filed with the commission by every licensed motor vehicle manufacturer and shall constitute any such dealer's only responsibility for product liability as between such dealer and such manufacturer. The compensation as set forth on said schedule shall be reasonable and the reasonableness thereof shall be subject to the approval of the commission. Any mechanical, body or parts defects arising from any express or implied warranties of any such manufacturer shall constitute such manufacturer's product or warranty liability.

(j) On satisfactory proof that any manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division has unfairly and without due regard to the equities of the parties or to the detriment of the public welfare failed to properly fulfill any warranty agreement or to adequately and fairly compensate any of its motor vehicle dealers for labor, parts and/or incidental expenses incurred by any such dealer with regard to factory warranty agreements performed by any such dealer. In no event shall any such manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division pay to any of its motor vehicle dealers a labor rate per hour for warranty work less than that charged by any such dealer to its retail customers. No such dealer shall charge to its manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, distributor branch or division, factory branch or division, or wholesaler branch or division, a labor rate per hour in excess of the rate charged to its retail customers. All claims made by motor vehicle dealers hereunder for such labor, parts and/or incidental expenses shall be paid within thirty (30) days following their approval. All such claims shall be either approved or disapproved within thirty (30) days after their receipt, and when any such claim is disapproved the motor vehicle dealer who submits it shall be notified in writing of its disapproval within said period, and each such notice shall state the specific grounds upon which the disapproval is based.

(k) For the commission of any act prohibited by Sections 63-17-73 through 63-17-83 or the failure to perform any of the requirements of said sections.

If the commission finds, after notice and hearing in the manner provided for under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, that there is sufficient cause upon which to base the revocation of the license of any licensee involved in the hearing, the commission may in lieu of revoking such license assess a civil penalty against the guilty licensee not to exceed ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00). If the commission finds, after such notice and hearing, that sufficient cause exists for the suspension only of the license of any licensee, the commission may in lieu of suspending such license assess a civil penalty against the guilty licensee of not less than fifty dollars (\$50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) per day for each day such license would otherwise be suspended. However, the amount of such penalty shall not exceed an aggregate of seven thousand five hundred dollars (\$7,500.00). Failure of the licensee to pay all penalties so assessed within the time allowed by the commission for the payment thereof, which time shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days from the date of the commission's order making such assessment, shall, unless an appeal is taken and perfected within the time and in the manner provided by the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, result in an automatic revocation of such licensee's license. Any such penalties assessed by the commission remaining unpaid at the expiration of the time for payment may be recovered by an action in the name of the commission. All such actions shall be brought by the attorney general of the State of Mississippi upon the written request of the commission to do so, and shall be brought in the chancery court of the county or the chancery court of the judicial district of the county to which the commission's order making such assessment is appealable under the provisions of Section 63-17-99. All civil penalties assessed and collected by the commission under the authority of this subsection shall be deposited in the general fund of the state treasury.

SOURCES: Codes 1942, § 8071.7-06; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 6; Laws, 1977, ch. 411, § 2; reenacted, 1983, ch. 344, § 18; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 18, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the first sentence of paragraph (i). The word "retain" was changed to "retail" so that "delivery of new motor vehicles to retain buyers" now reads as "delivery of new motor vehicles to retail buyers." The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

Products liability: Manufacturer's post-sale obligation to modify, repair, or recall product. 47 A.L.R.5th 395.

Causes of action governed by limitations period in UCC § 2-725. 49 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 186.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-87. Limited revocation or suspension of license.

The revocation or suspension of the license of a manufacturer, factory branch or division, distributor, distributor branch or division, wholesaler, or wholesaler branch or division may be limited to:

(a) One or more municipalities or counties.

(b) The sales area of any dealer whose franchise is unfairly cancelled or terminated within the purview of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, or whose franchise is not renewed in violation of the provisions of said law. However, where such a franchise is unfairly cancelled or terminated within the purview of said law or is not renewed in violation of the provisions of said law in a metropolitan area serviced by several motor vehicle dealers handling the same motor vehicles, the revocation or suspension shall not be applicable to the remaining motor vehicle dealers in such metropolitan area.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-06; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 6; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 19; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 19, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Who is "automobile manufacturer" for purposes of the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (15 USCS §§ 1221 et seq). 51 A.L.R. Fed. 812.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 186.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-89. Hearings; prerequisite to denial, revocation or suspension of license.

The commission shall not:

1. Deny an application for a license without first giving the applicant a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, on the question of whether he is qualified under the provisions of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law to receive the license applied for.

2. Revoke or suspend a license without first giving the licensee a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, on the question of whether there are sufficient grounds under the provisions of said law upon which to base such revocation or suspension.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-07; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 7; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 20; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 20, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 186. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 170.

§ 63-17-91. Hearings; calling of hearing.

(1) Any interested party shall have the right to have the commission call a hearing for the purpose of taking action in respect to any matter within the commission's jurisdiction by filing with the commission a verified complaint setting forth the grounds upon which the complaint is based.

(2) The commission may on its own motion call a hearing for the purpose of taking action in respect to any matter within its jurisdiction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-07; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 7; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 21; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-93. Hearings; notice; location; effect of failure to appear.

(1) When a hearing is to be held before the commission, the commission shall give written notice thereof to all parties whose rights may be affected thereby. The notice shall set forth the reason for the hearing and the questions or issues to be decided by the commission at such hearing and the time when and the place where the hearing will be held. All such notices shall be mailed to all parties whose rights may be affected by such hearing by registered or certified mail, and addressed to their last known address. Any such hearing shall be held in the county where the principal office of the commission is located.

(2) If any party who is notified of a hearing in accordance with the requirements of this section fails to appear at such hearing, either in person or by counsel, then and in that event the commission may make any decision and take any action it may deem necessary or appropriate with respect to any issue or question scheduled for hearing and decision by it at such hearing which affects or may affect the rights of such defaulting party.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-07; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 7; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 22; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 22; Laws, 1994, ch. 399, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

§ 63-17-95. Hearings; conduct; decisions.

(1) All parties whose rights may be affected at any hearing before the commission shall have the right to appear personally and by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses appearing against them, and to produce evidence and witnesses in their own behalf. The commission shall make and keep a record of each such hearing and shall provide a transcript thereof to any interested party upon his request and at his expense. Testimony taken at all such hearings shall be taken either stenographically or by machine.

(2) Witnesses who testify at any hearing before the commission shall testify under oath. The form of the oath or affirmation shall be in the form or to the effect following: "You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the evidence you shall give as a witness at this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; so help you God."

(3) Any member of the commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses testifying before the commission.

(4) The commission shall prescribe its rules of order or procedure in hearings or other proceedings before it. However, such rules of order or procedure shall not be in conflict or contrary to the provisions of law governing hearings before the commission, and appeals therefrom.

(5) All decisions of the commission with respect to the hearings shall be incorporated into orders of the commission and spread upon its minutes.

(6) The commission may apply to the chancery court of the county or to the chancery court of the judicial district of the county, or to any chancellor of any such court in vacation, to which its order is appealable under the provisions of Section 63-17-99 for the enforcement of such order by injunction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-07, Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 7; Laws, 1977, ch. 411, § 3; reenacted, 1983, ch. 344, § 23; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-97. Execution and enforcement of summons, citation or subpoena.

It shall be the duty of the sheriffs and constables of the counties of this state and of any employee of the commission, when so directed by the commission, to execute any summons, citation or subpoena which the commission may cause to be issued and to make return thereof to the commission. The sheriffs and constables so serving and returning same shall be paid for so doing the fees provided for such services in the circuit court. Any person who appears before the commission or a duly designated employee thereof in response to a summons, citation or subpoena shall be paid the same witness fee and mileage allowance as witnesses in the circuit court.

In case of failure or refusal on the part of any person to comply with any summons, citation or subpoena issued and served as above authorized or in the case of the refusal of any person to be sworn or affirmed as a witness, or testify or answer to any matter regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated as a witness, or the refusal of any person to produce his record books and accounts relating to any matter regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated as a witness, the chancery court of any county of the State of Mississippi, or any chancellor of any such court in vacation, may, on application of the commission or of the executive director thereof, issue an attachment for such person and compel him to comply with such summons, citation or subpoena and to attend before the commission or its designated employee and to produce the documents specified in any subpoena duces tecum and to be sworn or affirmed as a witness or to give his testimony upon such matters as he may be lawfully

required. Any such chancery court, or any chancellor of any such court in vacation, shall have the power to punish for contempt as in case of disobedience of like process issued from or by any such chancery court, or as in case of refusal to be sworn or affirmed as a witness, or as in case of refusal to testify as a witness therein in response to such process, and such person shall be taxed with the costs of such proceedings.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-07; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 7; Laws, 1977, ch. 411, § 4; reenacted, 1983, ch. 344, § 24; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 24, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References — Fees of sheriffs generally, see § 25-7-19.

Fees of constables generally, see § 25-7-27.

Witness fees and mileage allowance in circuit courts generally, see § 25-7-47.

Service of subpoena in criminal cases, see § 99-9-17.

Subpoenas, see Miss. Rule Civil Proc. 45.

§ 63-17-99. Appeals from decisions of commission; finality of decisions.

The following procedure shall govern in taking and perfecting appeals:

1. Any person who is a party to any hearing before the commission and who is aggrieved by any decision of the commission with respect to any hearing before it shall have the right of appeal to the chancery court of the county of such person's residence or principal place of business within this state; if such person is a nonresident of the state he shall have the right of appeal to the chancery court of the residence of the opposing party, and if the opposing party is also a nonresident, the appeal shall be to the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. All such appeals shall be taken and perfected within sixty days from the date of the decision of the commission which is the subject of the appeal. The chancery court to which such appeal is taken may affirm such decision or reverse and remand the same to the commission for further proceedings as justice may require or dismiss such decision. All such appeals shall be taken and perfected, heard and determined, either in term time or in vacation, on the record, including a transcript of pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary, heard and filed before the commission. In perfecting any such appeal, the provisions of law respecting notice to the reporter and allowance of bills of exceptions, now or hereafter in force, respecting appeals from the chancery court to the supreme court shall be applicable. The reporter shall transcribe his notes, taken stenographically or by machine, and file the record with the commission within thirty days after approval of the appeal bond, unless, on application of the reporter, or of the appellant, an additional fifteen days shall have been allowed by the commission to the reporter within which to transcribe his notes and file the transcript of the record with the commission.

2. Upon the filing with the commission of a petition of appeal to the proper chancery court, it shall be the duty of the commission, as promptly as

possible, and in any event within sixty days after approval of the appeal bond, to file with the clerk of said Chancery Court to which the appeal is taken, a copy of the petition for appeal and of the decision appealed from, and the original and one copy of the transcript of the record of the proceedings and evidence before the commission. After the filing of said petition, the appeal shall be perfected by the filing of a bond in the penal sum of five hundred dollars (\$500.00) with two sureties or with a surety company qualified to do business in Mississippi as surety, conditioned to pay the costs of such appeal, said bond to be approved by any member of the commission or by its executive secretary or by the clerk of the chancery court to which such appeal is taken.

3. No decision of the commission made as a result of a hearing shall become final with respect to any party affected and aggrieved by such decision until such party shall have exhausted or shall have had an opportunity to exhaust all of his remedies. However, any such decision may be made final if the commission finds that failure to do so would be detrimental to the public interest or public welfare; however, the finality of any such decision shall not prevent any party or parties affected and aggrieved thereby to appeal the same in accordance with the appellate procedure set forth in this section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-07; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 7; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 25; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 25, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 63-17-101. Recovery of damages and attorney fees by licensee.

Any licensee suffering pecuniary loss because of any willful failure by any other licensee to comply with any provision of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law or with any rule or regulation promulgated by the commission under authority vested in it by said law may recover reasonable damages and attorney fees therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-09; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 9; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 26; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 26, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Liability for representations and express warranties in connection with sale of used motor vehicle. 36 A.L.R.3d 125.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

§ 63-17-103. Restrictions on right to advertise motor vehicle as new; enforcement of restriction.

(1) Nothing in the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law shall be construed to prohibit the sale of a new motor vehicle by any person who is not

required to be licensed under said law. However, only a motor vehicle dealer as defined in Section 63-17-55 shall have the right to advertise or represent, publicly or otherwise, that a motor vehicle is new in connection with its sale, exchange or other disposition. Any person who is not such a motor vehicle dealer and who advertises or represents that a motor vehicle is new in connection with its sale, exchange or other disposition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished in the manner provided for by Section 63-17-105. However, nothing in this section shall apply to (a) any lease by a motor vehicle manufacturer operating a project as defined in Section 57-75-5(f)(iv)1 of three (3) or fewer motor vehicles at any one time and related vehicle maintenance, of any line of vehicle produced by the manufacturer or its subsidiaries, to any one (1) employee of the motor vehicle manufacturer on a direct basis, or any sale or other disposition of such motor vehicles by the motor vehicle manufacturer at the end of a lease through direct sales to employees of the manufacturer or through an open auction or auction limited to dealers of the manufacturer's vehicle line or its subsidiaries' vehicle lines; or (b) any sale or other disposition by such a motor vehicle manufacturer of motor vehicles for which the manufacturer obtained distinguishing number tags under Section 27-19-309(8).

(2) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section may be enjoined from further violations of such provisions by writ of injunction issued out of a court of equity upon a bill filed in the name of the state by the Attorney General, or any district or county attorney whose duty requires him to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the state, in the county where such violation occurred.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-10; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 10; Laws, 1977, ch. 411, § 5; reenacted, 1983, ch. 344, § 27; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 27; Laws, 2000, 3rd Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 21, eff from and after passage (approved Nov. 6, 2000.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms Form 81 (complaint in misrepresentation
(Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, in sale of used vehicle as new).

§ 63-17-105. Penalties.

Every person committing a willful violation of any provision of subsection (1) of Section 63-17-73 or of Section 63-17-103 or subsection (3) of Section 63-17-73 is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8071.7-08; Laws, 1970, ch. 478, § 8; reenacted without change, 1983, ch. 344, § 28; reenacted without change, 1991, ch. 305, § 28; Laws, 1994, ch. 399, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References — Applicability of this section against a person who is not a motor vehicle dealer and who advertises or represents that a motor vehicle is new, see § 63-17-103.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-17-107. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 305 § 29, eff from and after July 1, 1991.
[Laws, 1979, ch. 301, § 34; ch. 357, § 2; 1983, ch. 344, § 29]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-17-107 was provided for the repeal of §§ 63-17-51 through 63-17-105.

§ 63-17-109. Right of first refusal.

(1) In the event of a proposed sale or transfer of a dealership and the franchise agreement for such dealership contains a right of first refusal in favor of the manufacturer or distributor, notwithstanding the terms of the franchise agreement, the manufacturer or distributor shall be permitted to exercise a right of first refusal to acquire the dealership only if all of the following requirements are met:

(a) The manufacturer or distributor sends by certified mail, return receipt requested, or any other reliable means of communication, notice of its intent to exercise its right of first refusal within sixty (60) days of receipt of the completed proposal for the proposed sale or transfer.

(b) The exercise of the right of first refusal will result in the motor vehicle dealer receiving consideration, terms and conditions that are either the same as or greater than that for which such dealer has contracted for in connection with the proposed transaction;

(2) The manufacturer's or distributor's right of first refusal shall not apply to a transaction involving one (1) of the following:

(a) A designated family member or members, including the spouse, child or grandchild, spouse of a child or grandchild, brother, sister or parent of the dealer-operator, or one or more motor vehicle dealer owners;

(b) A manager employed by the motor vehicle dealer in the dealership during the previous five (5) years that is otherwise qualified as a dealer-operator;

(c) A partnership or corporation controlled by any of the family members of the dealer-operator;

(d) A trust arrangement established or to be established for the purpose of allowing the new motor vehicle dealer to continue to qualify as such pursuant to the manufacturer's or distributor's standards, or provides for the succession of the franchise agreement to designated family members or qualified management in the event of the death or incapacity of the dealer-operator or its principal owner or owners.

(3)(a) The manufacturer or distributor shall pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees which do not exceed the usual, customary, and

reasonable fees charged for similar work done for other clients, incurred by the proposed owner prior to the exercise of the right of first refusal in negotiating and implementing the contract for the proposed sale of the dealership. Such expenses and attorney's fees shall be paid to the proposed new owner at the time of the closing of the sale at which the manufacturer or distributor exercises its right of first refusal.

(b) No payment of such expenses and attorney's fees shall be required if the person claiming reimbursement has not submitted or caused to be submitted an accounting of those expenses within thirty (30) days after the receipt of the manufacturer's or distributor's written request for such an accounting. A manufacturer or distributor may request such an accounting before exercising its right of first refusal.

(4) If the selling dealer discloses the manufacturer's right of first refusal to the proposed owner in writing, the motor vehicle dealer shall not have any liability to any person as a result of a manufacturer or distributor exercising its right of first refusal and the manufacturer or distributor shall assume the defense of the selling motor vehicle dealer for any claims by the proposed owner arising from the exercise of the right of first refusal.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 63-17-111. Owner of dealership may appoint successor by written agreement; manufacturer or dealer must honor succession unless good cause shown; procedure for refusing to honor succession.

(1) Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise agreement, any dealer-operator may appoint by will, or other written instrument, a designated successor to succeed in the ownership of the dealer-operator in the dealership upon the death or incapacity of the dealer-operator.

(2) Unless good cause exists for the refusal to honor the succession on the part of the manufacturer or distributor, any designated successor of a deceased or incapacitated dealer-operator of a dealership may succeed to the ownership of the motor vehicle dealership under the existing franchise agreement if:

(a) The designated successor gives the manufacturer or distributor written notice of his or her intention to succeed to the ownership of the motor vehicle dealership within sixty (60) days after the dealer-operator's death or incapacity; and

(b) The designated successor agrees to be bound by all the terms and conditions of the franchise agreement.

(3) The manufacturer or distributor may request, and the designated successor shall provide promptly upon such request, personal and financial data reasonably necessary to determine whether the succession should be honored.

(4)(a) If the manufacturer or distributor believes that good cause exists for refusing to honor the succession of a deceased or incapacitated dealer, the manufacturer or distributor may, not more than sixty (60) days following

receipt of the notice of the designated successor's intent to succeed and receipt of such personal and financial data, serve upon the designated successor notice of its refusal to honor the proposed succession and of its intent to terminate the existing franchise with the dealer-operator not earlier than six (6) months from the date such notice of refusal is served.

(b) Such notice shall state the specific grounds for the refusal to honor the succession.

(c) If such notice is not timely served upon the designated successor, the franchise agreement shall continue in effect subject to termination only as otherwise provided by the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law.

(5) In determining whether good cause for the refusal to honor the succession exists, the manufacturer or distributor has the burden of proving that the designated successor is not of good moral character or does not otherwise meet the manufacturer's or distributor's reasonable standards for a dealer-operator.

(6) If a manufacturer or distributor refuses to honor the succession to the ownership interest of a deceased or incapacitated dealer-operator for good cause, the manufacturer or distributor shall allow the designated successor a reasonable period of time, which shall not be less than six (6) months, in which to consummate the sale of the dealership.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 63-17-113. Modification of franchise agreement; good cause required for termination, cancellation or nonrenewal.

(1) No person shall modify a franchise agreement during the term of such agreement or upon its renewal if the modification substantially and adversely affects the motor vehicle dealer's rights, obligations, investment, or return on investment without giving sixty (60) days' written notice of the proposed modification to the motor vehicle dealer and without showing good cause to the commission.

(2) Notwithstanding any agreement, the following alone shall not constitute good cause for the termination, cancellation or nonrenewal of a franchise agreement: The fact that the new motor vehicle dealer owns, has an investment in, participates in the management of or holds a franchise agreement for the sale or service of another make or line of new motor vehicles, or that the new motor vehicle dealer has established another make or line of new motor vehicles or service in the same dealership facilities as the manufacturer or distributor prior to the effective date of this law, or is approved in writing by the manufacturer or distributor.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 63-17-115. Unreasonable discrimination prohibited.

A manufacturer or distributor of motor vehicles that directly or indirectly owns or operates a new motor vehicle dealership, in whole or in part, shall not

unreasonably discriminate against any other motor vehicle dealer in the same line or make in any matter governed by the franchise agreement, including, but not limited to, the allocation or availability of:

- (a) Motor vehicles;
- (b) Other manufacturer or distributor products;
- (c) Promotional or advertising allowances;
- (d) The opportunity to perform warranty work; or
- (e) The implementation of dealer programs or benefits.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 63-17-117. Warranty or sales incentive audits to be conducted within certain amount of time after payment of disputed claim; approved and paid claims not to be charged back to dealer absent fraud, improper repair, or failure to substantiate claim.

(1) Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise agreement, warranty and sales incentive audits of a motor vehicle dealer's records may be conducted by the manufacturer or distributor. Any audit for warranty parts or service compensation shall be performed within the eighteen-month period immediately following the date of the payment of the disputed claim by the manufacturer or distributor. Any audit for sales incentives, service incentives, rebates, or other forms of incentive compensation shall be performed within the twenty-four-month period immediately following the date of the payment of the disputed claim by the manufacturer or distributor.

(2) No claim which has been approved and paid may be charged back to the motor vehicle dealer unless it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim was false or fraudulent, that the repairs were not properly made or were unnecessary to correct the defective conditions under generally accepted standards of workmanship, or that the motor vehicle dealer failed to reasonably substantiate the repair in accordance with the manufacturer's or distributor's reasonable written claim requirement.

(3) A manufacturer or distributor shall not deny a claim based solely on a motor vehicle dealer's incidental failure to comply with a specific claim processing requirement that results in a clerical error or other administrative technicality.

(4) Limitations on warranty parts, service compensation, sales incentive audits, rebates, or other forms of incentive compensation, chargebacks for warranty parts or service compensation, and service incentives and chargebacks for sales compensation only, shall not be effective in the case of intentionally false or fraudulent claims.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

§ 63-17-119. Suit to recover damages; venue.

(1) Notwithstanding any provision of a franchise agreement to the contrary, if any motor vehicle dealer or dealer-operator incurs pecuniary loss due

to a violation of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law by a manufacturer or distributor, the motor vehicle dealer or dealer-operator may bring suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and recover damages, together with costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

(2) Venue for any proceeding arising from the franchise agreement shall be in Mississippi and shall be consistent with Mississippi law. It is the public policy of this state that venue provided for in this section may not be modified by contract. Any provision contained in the franchise agreement that requires arbitration or litigation to be conducted outside the State of Mississippi shall be void and unenforceable.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 418, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error appearing in § 7 of ch. 418, Laws, 2000. The Code section number "63-17-121" was changed to "63-17-119." The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its June 29, 2000 meeting.

DEALER CONTRACTS

Sec.

- 63-17-131. Filing and approval of dealer contracts.
- 63-17-133. Liquidation of damages for breach of contract by arbitration.
- 63-17-135. Maintenance of civil action for actual damages for breach of contract.
- 63-17-137. Applicability of provisions; penalties for violations.
- 63-17-139. Proof of damages.
- 63-17-141. Duties of dealer and manufacturer or distributor upon termination or nonrenewal of franchise agreement.

§ 63-17-131. Filing and approval of dealer contracts.

Any person, partnership, association of persons or corporation engaged in the manufacture and/or distribution of motor vehicles, whether resident or nonresident of the State of Mississippi, transacting the business of manufacturing, distribution, or sale of motor vehicles or the parts or accessories thereof in the State of Mississippi, shall file in the office of the secretary of state the form of a contract which is to be entered into between such manufacturer with its agent, dealer or representative in this state. Upon the approval by the attorney general of such contract, the contract shall become binding on all parties thereto. The failure to file such contract with the secretary of state as provided herein and to secure the approval thereof of the attorney general of the state, shall render the contract unenforceable.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8072; Laws, 1935, ch. 35.

Cross References — Duty of attorney general to give opinion in writing upon any question of law relating to offices of various public officers, see § 7-5-25.

Motor Vehicle Commission Law, see §§ 63-17-51 to 63-17-119.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Foreign corporation doing business in state.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 8072] and Code 1942, § 1437 do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. *Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co.*, 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309 (1959).

2. Foreign corporation doing business in state.

In determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the state

within the meaning of this section [Code 1942, § 8072], each case must be decided upon its peculiar facts. *Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co.*, 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309 (1959).

A foreign corporation whose automobile distribution dealer contracts with Mississippi dealers give it almost absolute control over the dealers' manner of doing business, is doing business within the state within this section [Code 1942, § 8072]. *Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co.*, 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309 (1959).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity and construction of statute regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. 7 A.L.R.3d 1173.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

§ 63-17-133. Liquidation of damages for breach of contract by arbitration.

In the event of a breach of the contract referred to in Section 63-17-131, the party injured or damaged by such breach may have recourse for the liquidation of his damages to a board of arbitration and award as provided in Chapter 15, Title 11, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8072; Laws, 1935, ch. 35.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 8072] and Code 1942, § 1437 do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the

United States. *Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co.*, 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309 (1959).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity and construction of statute regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. 7 A.L.R.3d 1173.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

§ 63-17-135. Maintenance of civil action for actual damages for breach of contract.

Any person, partnership, association of persons, or corporation damaged by the breach of the contract referred to in Section 63-17-131, and desiring to take an appeal as provided by Chapter 15, Title 11, Mississippi Code of 1972, from the findings of the board of arbitration and award may in each instance of such injury or damage recover all actual damages sustained in addition to the penalties provided in Section 63-17-137 and may maintain its, or his, action against one or more of the parties to said contract, its officers or agents.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8073; Laws, 1935, ch. 35.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

Liability of manufacturer under § 2 of the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act

(15 USCS § 1222) for terminating or failing to renew franchise agreement upon dealer's violation of its terms. 50 A.L.R. Fed. 245.

§ 63-17-137. Applicability of provisions; penalties for violations.

Sections 63-17-131 through 63-17-137 shall not affect any contract existing as of October 2, 1935, between any person, partnership, association of persons or corporation acting as the agent, dealer or representative of any motor vehicle manufacturer, nor shall they affect the relationship of any parties now acting as the agent, dealer or representative of any manufacturer without contract in this state. If any motor vehicle manufacturer should, after said date, without good cause or without tendering reimbursement for the damage or injury sustained by its agent, dealer or representative, cancel the existing contract or should without good cause refuse to continue the business relationship existing between manufacturer and agent, dealer or representative without contract the dealer, agent or representative so injured by the loss of his or its dealership, agency or representation may sue and recover all actual damages sustained by him, it or them. For a violation of the provisions of Sections 63-17-131 through 63-17-139 a domestic corporation shall forfeit its charter and a foreign corporation shall forfeit its right to do business in this state and shall also forfeit not less than \$500.00 nor more than \$1,000.00 to the State of Mississippi and shall be proceeded against by the attorney general in the manner and form as provided for a quo warranto proceeding or injunction under the laws of this state.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8074; Laws, 1935, ch. 35.

Cross References — Injunctions generally, see §§ 11-13-1 et seq.
Quo warranto proceedings generally, see §§ 11-39-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

§ 63-17-139. Proof of damages.

In any action taken, proof by the party plaintiff that he has been compelled to discontinue the relationship of manufacturer, agent, dealer or representative on account of the unlawful act or breach of said contract by the party defendant or that the party defendant has threatened to cancel said contract without good cause and without first having submitted the question for an adjustment of a breach of said contract to a board of arbitration and award, shall be conclusive evidence of damage, and in every case proof of any unlawful purpose or agreement to violate the terms of said contract, shall entitle the party injured thereby to all actual damage sustained by him and shall in addition thereto subject the party violating said contract to the penalty provided in Section 63-17-137.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075; Laws, 1935, ch. 35.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees. 82 A.L.R.4th 624.

Am Jur. 28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 267, Proof of Wrongful Termination of Motor Vehicle Dealership.

§ 63-17-141. Duties of dealer and manufacturer or distributor upon termination or nonrenewal of franchise agreement.

(1) A new motor vehicle dealer shall return property, including but not limited to, vehicle inventory, parts, equipment, tools and signs as permitted under this section or as set forth in the franchise agreement to the manufacturer or distributor within ninety (90) days of the effective date of any termination or nonrenewal of a franchise. The manufacturer or distributor shall supply the new vehicle dealer with instructions on the method by which the new vehicle dealer must return the property to the manufacturer or distributor. Within sixty (60) days of tender of the property to the manufacturer or distributor, the manufacturer or distributor shall repurchase from the new vehicle dealer and remit payment to the new vehicle dealer for the following:

(a) Any new, undamaged and unsold motor vehicle inventory of the current or prior model year, that has been acquired from the manufacturer or distributor, including up to five (5) dealer transfers acquired prior to notification of termination or nonrenewal of a franchise.

(b) All new, unused, undamaged parts listed in the current price catalog and in the original, resalable merchandising packages and in unbroken lots

acquired from a manufacturer or distributor or a source approved or recommended by the manufacturer or distributor at the prices listed in the current parts catalog less applicable allowances plus five percent (5%) of the catalog value of the part for the cost of packing and returning the parts to the manufacturer or distributor. Reconditioned or core parts shall be valued at their core value, price listed in the current parts catalog, or the amount paid for expedited return of core parts, whichever is higher.

(c) Any special tools offered for sale during the four (4) years preceding termination, and each trademark or trade name bearing signs which were recommended or required by the manufacturer or distributor at fair market value at the time the notice of termination or nonrenewal is given.

(2) The dealer shall provide evidence of good clear title upon return of the inventory. Any payment owed the dealer is subject to offset of any obligations owed by the dealer to the manufacturer.

(3) This section shall not apply to motor homes.

SOURCES: Laws, 1994, ch. 399, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

MOTOR VEHICLE WARRANTY ENFORCEMENT ACT

SEC.

- 63-17-151. Short title.
- 63-17-153. Legislative findings and declaration of purpose.
- 63-17-155. Definitions.
- 63-17-157. Repair of nonconforming vehicle.
- 63-17-159. Replacement of vehicle or refund of purchase price where nonconformity cannot be corrected; affirmative defenses; presumption of reasonable attempts to conform vehicle to warranties; extension of warranties; notice requirements relating to repair of nonconformity; civil actions.
- 63-17-161. Liability of consumer for bad faith claims.
- 63-17-163. Necessity for resort to informal dispute settlement procedure.
- 63-17-165. Remedies for violations.

§ 63-17-151. Short title.

Sections 63-17-151 et seq. shall be known and may be cited as the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act".

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity of disclaimer of warranty clauses in sale of new automobile. 54 A.L.R.3d 1217.

Automobile repairman's duty to provide customer with information, estimates, or replaced parts, under automobile repair

consumer protection act. 25 A.L.R.4th 506.

Validity, construction, and effect of state motor vehicle warranty legislation (lemon law). 51 A.L.R.4th 872.

Liability under state law for injuries

resulting from defective automobile seat-belt, shoulder harness, or restraint system. 48 A.L.R.5th 1.

Award of attorney fees under state motor vehicle warranty legislation (lemon laws). 82 A.L.R.5th 501.

Validity, construction and effect of state motor vehicle warranty legislation. 88 A.L.R.5th 301.

Am Jur. 67A Am. Jur. 2d, Sales §§ 625 et seq.

39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile Warranty Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

31 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 639, Dealer's Liability for Defective Used Car.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 343, "Lemon Law" Litigation — Existence of Substantial Defect.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 409-428.

Law Reviews. 1987 Mississippi Supreme Court Review, Corporate, contract and commercial law. 57 Miss. L. J. 467, August, 1987.

Practice References. McDonnell and Coleman, Commercial and Consumer Warranties — Drafting, Performing and Litigating (Matthew Bender).

§ 63-17-153. Legislative findings and declaration of purpose.

The Legislature recognizes that a motor vehicle is a major consumer purchase and that a defective motor vehicle creates a hardship for the consumer. The Legislature further recognizes that a duly franchised motor vehicle dealer is an agent of the manufacturer. It is the intent of the Legislature that a good faith motor vehicle warranty complaint by a consumer should be resolved by the manufacturer, or its agent, within a specified period of time. It is further the intent of the Legislature to provide the statutory procedures whereby a consumer may receive a replacement motor vehicle, or a full refund, for a motor vehicle which cannot be brought into conformity with the express warranty issued by the manufacturer. However, nothing in Sections 63-17-151 et seq. shall in any way limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in a statutory reference in the last sentence. The reference to "Sections 63-17-153 et seq." was changed to "Sections 63-17-151 et seq." The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting, and the section has been reprinted in the supplement to reflect the corrected language.

§ 63-17-155. Definitions.

As used in Sections 63-17-151 through 63-17-165, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Collateral charges" means those additional charges to a consumer which are not directly attributable to the manufacturer's suggested retail price label for the motor vehicle. Collateral charges shall include, but not be limited to, dealer preparation charges, undercoating charges, transportation charges, towing charges, replacement car rental costs and title charges.

(b) "Comparable motor vehicle" means an identical or reasonably equivalent motor vehicle.

(c) “Consumer” means the purchaser, other than for purposes of resale, of a motor vehicle, primarily used for personal, family, or household purposes, and any person to whom such motor vehicle is transferred for the same purposes during the duration of an express warranty applicable to such motor vehicle, and any other person entitled by the terms of such warranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty.

(d) “Express warranty” means any written affirmation of fact or promise made in connection with the sale of a motor vehicle by a supplier to a consumer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect-free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time. For the purposes of Section 63-17-151 et seq., express warranties do not include implied warranties.

(e) “Manufacturer” means a manufacturer or distributor as defined in Section 63-17-55.

(f) “Motor vehicle” means a vehicle propelled by power other than muscular power which is sold in this state, is operated over the public streets and highways of this state and is used as a means of transporting persons or property, but shall not include vehicles run only upon tracks, off-road vehicles, motorcycles, mopeds, electric personal assistive mobility devices as defined in Section 63-3-103 or parts and components of a motor home which were added on and/or assembled by the manufacturer of the motor home. “Motor vehicle” shall include demonstrators or lease-purchase vehicles as long as a manufacturer’s warranty was issued as a condition of sale.

(g) “Purchase price” means the price which the consumer paid to the manufacturer to purchase the motor vehicle in a cash sale or, if the motor vehicle is purchased in a retail installment transaction, the cash sale price as defined in Section 63-19-3.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 3; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment inserted “through 63-17-165” in the first paragraph; deleted “For the purposes of Sections 63-17-151 et seq.” from (a); and inserted “electric personal assistive mobility devices as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (f).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Products liability: automobile manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by repairs made under manufacturer’s warranty. 40 A.L.R.4th 1218.

What constitutes “motor vehicle” for purposes of no-fault insurance. 73 A.L.R.4th 1053.

Am Jur. 39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile Warranty Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 343, “Lemon Law” Litigation-Existence of Substantial Defect.

§ 63-17-157. Repair of nonconforming vehicle.

For the purposes of Sections 63-17-151 et seq., if a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties, and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer or its agent during the term of such express warranties or during the period of one (1) year following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, whichever period expires earlier, the manufacturer or its agent shall make such repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such express warranties, notwithstanding the fact that such repairs are made after the expiration of such term or such one-year period.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity of disclaimer of warranty clauses in sale of new automobile. 54 A.L.R.3d 1217.

Automobile repairman's duty to provide customer with information, estimates, or replaced parts, under automobile repair consumer protection act. 25 A.L.R.4th 506.

Am Jur. 67A Am. Jur. 2d, Sales §§ 625 et seq.

39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile Warranty Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

31 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 639, Dealer's Liability for Defective Used Car.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 343, "Lemon Law" Litigation — Existence of Substantial Defect.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 409-428.

Practice References. McDonnell and Coleman, Commercial and Consumer Warranties — Drafting, Performing and Litigating (Matthew Bender).

§ 63-17-159. Replacement of vehicle or refund of purchase price where nonconformity cannot be corrected; affirmative defenses; presumption of reasonable attempts to conform vehicle to warranties; extension of warranties; notice requirements relating to repair of nonconformity; civil actions.

(1) If the manufacturer or its agent cannot conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any default or condition which impairs the use, market value, or safety of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall give the consumer the option of having the manufacturer either replace the motor vehicle with a comparable motor vehicle acceptable to the consumer, or take title of the vehicle from the consumer and refund to the consumer the full purchase price, including all reasonably incurred collateral charges, less a reasonable allowance for the consumer's use of the vehicle. The subtraction of a reasonable allowance for use shall apply when either a replacement or refund of the motor vehicle occurs. A reasonable allowance for use shall be that sum of money arrived at by multiplying the number of miles the motor vehicle has been driven by the consumer by Twenty Cents (20¢) per mile. Refunds shall be

made to the consumer and lienholder of record, if any, as their interests may appear.

(2) It shall be an affirmative defense to any claim under Sections 63-17-151 et seq. that:

(a) An alleged nonconformity does not impair the use, market value or safety of the motor vehicle;

(b) A nonconformity is the result of abuse, neglect or unauthorized modifications or alterations of a motor vehicle by a consumer;

(c) A claim by a consumer was not filed in good faith; or

(d) Any other affirmative defense allowed by law.

(3) It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to the applicable express warranties if within the terms, conditions or limitations of the express warranty, or during the period of one (1) year following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever expires earlier, either:

(a) Substantially the same nonconformity has been subject to repair three (3) or more times by the manufacturer or its agent and such nonconformity continues to exist; or

(b) The vehicle is out of service by reason of repair of the nonconformity by the manufacturer or its agent for a cumulative total of fifteen (15) or more working days, exclusive of downtime for routine maintenance as prescribed by the owner's manual, since the delivery of the vehicle to the consumer. The fifteen-day period may be extended by any period of time during which repair services are not available to the consumer because of conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer or its agent.

(4) The terms, conditions or limitations of the express warranty, or the period of one (1) year following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever expires earlier, may be extended if the motor vehicle warranty problem has been reported but has not been repaired by the manufacturer or its agent by the expiration of the applicable time period.

(5) The manufacturer shall provide a list of the manufacturer's zone or regional service office addresses in the owner's manual provided with the motor vehicle. It shall be the responsibility of the consumer or his representative, prior to availing himself of the provisions of this section, to give written notification to the manufacturer of the need for the repair of the nonconformity, in order to allow the manufacturer an opportunity to cure the alleged defect. The manufacturer shall immediately notify the consumer of a reasonably accessible repair facility to conform the vehicle to the express warranty. After delivery of the vehicle to the designated repair facility by the consumer, the manufacturer shall have ten (10) working days to conform the motor vehicle to the express warranty. Upon notification from the consumer that the vehicle has not been conformed to the express warranty, the manufacturer shall inform the consumer if an informal dispute settlement procedure has been established by the manufacturer in accordance with Section 63-17-163, and provide the consumer with a copy of the provisions of Sections 63-17-151 et seq. However, if prior notice by the manufacturer of an informal dispute settlement

procedure has been given, no further notice is required. If the manufacturer fails to notify the consumer of the availability of this informal dispute settlement procedure, the requirements of Section 63-17-163 shall not apply.

(6) Any action brought under Sections 63-17-151 et seq. shall be commenced within one (1) year following expiration of the terms, conditions or limitations of the express warranty, or within eighteen (18) months following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is earlier, or, if a consumer resorts to an informal dispute settlement procedure as provided in Sections 63-17-151 et seq., within ninety (90) days following the final action of the panel.

(7) If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under Sections 63-17-151 et seq., the court may allow him to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Statute of limitations.

Trial court erred in dismissing, pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12, a purchaser's action to recover for defects in a mobile home; the purchaser's act of filing an amended complaint within the relevant statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann.

§ 63-17-159(6), was sufficient to defeat defendants' motion to dismiss, as the amended complaint, filed pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 15, provided defendants with the required notice under Miss. R. Civ. P. 4. *King v. Am. RV Ctrs., Inc.*, 862 So. 2d 558 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Validity of disclaimer of warranty clauses in sale of new automobile. 54 A.L.R.3d 1217.

Automobile repairman's duty to provide customer with information, estimates, or replaced parts, under automobile repair consumer protection act. 25 A.L.R.4th 506.

Products liability: automobile manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by repairs made under manufacturer's warranty. 40 A.L.R.4th 1218.

Liability for delay in making repair of motor vehicle. 44 A.L.R.4th 1174.

Products liability: Manufacturer's postsale obligation to modify, repair, or recall product. 47 A.L.R.5th 395.

Federal pre-emption of state common-

law products liability claims pertaining to motor vehicles. 97 A.L.R. Fed. 853.

Am Jur. 67A Am. Jur. 2d, Sales §§ 625 et seq.

39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile Warranty Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

31 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 639, Dealer's Liability for Defective Used Car.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 343, "Lemon Law" Litigation — Existence of Substantial Defect.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 409-428.

Practice References. McDonnell and Coleman, Commercial and Consumer Warranties — Drafting, Performing and Litigating (Matthew Bender).

§ 63-17-161. Liability of consumer for bad faith claims.

Any claim by a consumer which is found by the court to have been filed in bad faith, or solely for the purpose of harassment, or in complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the consumer, shall result in the consumer being liable for all court costs incurred by the manufacturer or its agent as a direct result of the bad faith claim.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile
Warranty Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

§ 63-17-163. Necessity for resort to informal dispute settlement procedure.

If a manufacturer has established an informal dispute settlement procedure which complies in all respects with the provisions of 16 C.F.R., Part 703, the provisions of Section 63-17-159 concerning refunds or replacements shall not apply to any consumer who has not first resorted to such procedure.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in a statutory reference. The reference to "Section 67-17-159" was changed to "Section 63-17-159". The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 20, 1998 meeting, and the section has been reprinted in the supplement to reflect the corrected language.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile
Warranty Litigation, §§ 27-30, 65-68.

§ 63-17-165. Remedies for violations.

Any violation of Sections 63-17-151 et seq. shall be subject to the rights and remedies as provided for by Chapter 24, Title 75, Mississippi Code of 1972.

SOURCES: Laws, 1985, ch. 336, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 39 Am. Jur. Trials, Automobile
Warranty Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

CHAPTER 19

Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Law

SEC.	
63-19-1.	Short title.
63-19-3.	Definitions.
63-19-5.	Repealed.
63-19-7.	Requirement of license.
63-19-9.	Application for license.
63-19-11.	License fee.
63-19-13.	Issuance and duration of license; transfer or assignment of license; transaction of business under different name.
63-19-15.	Specification as to location of office in license; display of license.
63-19-17.	Grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of license.
63-19-19.	Liability of licensee for acts of agents.
63-19-21.	Procedure for denial, suspension or revocation of license; judicial review.
63-19-23.	Investigations and examinations of licensees.
63-19-25.	Filing and examination of complaints against licensees.
63-19-27.	Payment of expenses of examination by licensee.
63-19-29.	Issuance of subpoenas; administration of oaths; enforcement of subpoenas, etc.
63-19-31.	Execution, terms and delivery of retail installment contract.
63-19-33.	Purchase of insurance pursuant to retail installment contract.
63-19-35.	Delinquency and collection charges; court costs and attorneys' fees.
63-19-37.	Transfer of equity in motor vehicle; transfer fee.
63-19-39.	Furnishing of buyer with statement of payments and unpaid balance and written receipt for cash payment.
63-19-41.	Restriction of remedies of buyer against holder.
63-19-43.	Maximum finance charge; security interests.
63-19-45.	Assignment of retail installment contract.
63-19-47.	Payment of debt in full prior to maturity.
63-19-49.	Repealed.
63-19-51.	Administration of chapter.
63-19-52.	Administration of chapter; issuance of rules and regulations.
63-19-53.	Waiver of provisions of chapter.
63-19-55.	Penalties for violations of chapter.
63-19-56.	Commissioner authorized to examine persons suspected of conducting business requiring a license.
63-19-57.	Liability of licensees.

§ 63-19-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as "The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-23; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 36, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 28 et seq.

§ 63-19-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases, when used in this chapter, shall have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section, except where the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

(a) "Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled or motored device designed to be used or used primarily for the transportation of passengers or property, or both, and having a gross vehicular weight rating of less than fifteen thousand (15,000) pounds, but shall not include electric personal assistive mobility devices as defined in Section 63-3-103.

(b) "Commercial vehicle" means any self-propelled or motored device designed to be used or used primarily for the transportation of passengers or property, or both, and having a gross vehicular weight rating of fifteen thousand (15,000) pounds or more; however, wherever "motor vehicle" appears in this chapter, except in Section 63-19-43, the same shall be construed to include commercial vehicles where such construction is necessary in order to give effect to this chapter.

(c) "Retail buyer" or "buyer" means a person who buys a motor vehicle or commercial vehicle from a retail seller, not for the purpose of resale, and who executes a retail installment contract in connection therewith.

(d) "Retail seller" or "seller" means a person who sells a motor vehicle or commercial vehicle to a retail buyer under or subject to a retail installment contract.

(e) The "holder" of a retail installment contract means the retail seller of the motor vehicle or commercial vehicle under or subject to the contract or if the contract is purchased by a sales finance company or other assignee, the sales finance company or other assignee.

(f) "Retail installment transaction" means any transaction evidenced by a retail installment contract entered into between a retail buyer and a retail seller wherein the retail buyer buys a motor vehicle or commercial vehicle from the retail seller at a time price payable in one or more deferred installments. The cash sale price of the motor vehicle or commercial vehicle, the amount included for insurance and other benefits if a separate charge is made therefor, official fees and the finance charge shall together constitute the time price.

(g) "Retail installment contract" or "contract" means an agreement entered into in this state pursuant to which the title to or a lien upon the motor vehicle or commercial vehicle which is the subject matter of a retail installment transaction is retained or taken by a retail seller from a retail buyer as security for the buyer's obligation. The term includes a chattel mortgage, a conditional sales contract and a contract for the bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle or commercial vehicle by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation for its use a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of its value and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming, the owner of the motor vehicle upon full compliance with the provisions of the contract.

(h) "Cash sale price" means the price stated in a retail installment contract for which the seller would have sold to the buyer, and the buyer would have bought from the seller, the motor vehicle or commercial vehicle which is the subject matter of the retail installment contract, if such sale had been a sale for cash instead of a retail installment transaction. The cash sale price may include any taxes, registration, certificate of title, if any, license and other fees and charges for accessories and their installation and for delivery, servicing, repairing or improving the motor vehicle or commercial vehicle.

(i) "Official fees" means the fees prescribed by law for filing, recording or otherwise perfecting and releasing or satisfying a retained title or a lien created by a retail installment contract, if recorded.

(j) "Finance charge" means the amount agreed upon between the buyer and the seller, as limited in this chapter, to be added to the aggregate of the cash sale price, the amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits and official fees, in determining the time price.

(k) "Sales finance company" means a person engaged, in whole or in part, in the business of purchasing retail installment contracts from one or more retail sellers. The term includes, but is not limited to, a bank, trust company, private banker, industrial bank or investment company, if so engaged. The term also includes a retail seller engaged, in whole or in part, in the business of creating and holding retail installment contracts which exceed a total aggregate outstanding indebtedness of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$500,000.00). The term does not include the pledgee to whom is pledged one or more of such contracts to secure a bona fide loan thereon.

(l) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association and any other group however organized.

(m) "Administrator" means the Commissioner of Banking and Consumer Finance or his duly authorized representative.

(n) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Banking and Consumer Finance.

(o) "Records" or "documents" means any item in hard copy or produced in a format of storage commonly described as electronic, imaged, magnetic, microphotographic or otherwise, and any reproduction so made shall have the same force and effect as the original thereof and be admitted in evidence equally with the original.

Words in the singular include the plural and vice versa.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-01; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, §§ 1-14; Laws, 1968, ch. 537, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 316, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 303, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 332, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 621, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Editor's Note — Section 81-1-117 abolished the office of state comptroller, and provided that the functions, duties and responsibilities would be assumed by the commissioner of banking and consumer finance.

Amendment Notes — The 2003 amendment added "but shall not include electric personal assistive mobility devices as defined in Section 63-3-103" to the end of (a).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What constitutes “finance charge” under § 106(a) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 USCS § 1605(a)) or applicable regulations. 46 A.L.R. Fed. 657.

§ 63-19-5. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 319, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1942, § 8075-01; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, §§ 1-14; 1968, ch. 537, § 1; brought forward Laws, 1990, ch. 303, § 2]

Editor’s Note — Former § 63-19-5 related to effect of retail installment contract on rights of subsequent lien holders or purchasers.

§ 63-19-7. Requirement of license.

No person shall engage in the business of a sales finance company in this state without a license therefor as provided in this chapter. However, no bank, trust company, private banker, industrial bank or investment company authorized to do business in this state shall be required to obtain a license under this chapter. They shall, however, comply with all of the other provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-02; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 15, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

Cross References — Banks and financial institutions generally, see § 81-1-57 et seq.

Finance charge limitations, see § 63-19-43.

License required of person handling loans or lending money under Small Loan Regulatory Law, see § 75-67-105.

License required of person handling loans or lending money under Small Loan Privilege Tax Law, see § 75-67-205.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-9. Application for license.

The application for such license shall be in writing, under oath and in the form prescribed by the administrator. The application shall contain the name of the applicant; date of incorporation, if incorporated; the address where the business is or is to be conducted and similar information as to any branch office of the applicant; the name and resident address of the owner or partners or, if a corporation or association, of the directors, trustees and principal officers; and such other pertinent information as the administrator may require.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-03; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 16, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-11. License fee.

With each initial application for a license, the applicant shall pay to the commissioner at the time of making the application a license fee of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$750.00), and for renewal applications, an annual renewal fee of Four Hundred Seventy-five Dollars (\$475.00) for each calendar year for each place of business so operated.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-04; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 17; Laws, 1975, ch. 437, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 621, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 23, 2000.)

§ 63-19-13. Issuance and duration of license; transfer or assignment of license; transaction of business under different name.

Upon the filing of an application, and the payment of the required fee, the administrator shall issue a license to the applicant to engage in the business of a sales finance company under and in accordance with the provisions of this chapter for a period which shall expire the last day of December next following the date of its issuance. Such license shall not be transferable or assignable. No licensee shall transact any business provided for by this chapter under any other name.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-06; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 16, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-15. Specification as to location of office in license; display of license.

Each license shall specify the location of the office and must be conspicuously displayed there.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-05; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 18; Laws, 2000, ch. 621, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 23, 2000.)

§ 63-19-17. Grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of license.

(1) The renewal of a license originally granted under this chapter may be denied, or a license may be suspended, denied or revoked by the administrator on the following grounds:

- (a) Material misstatement in application for license;
- (b) Willful failure to comply with provision of this chapter relating to retail installment contracts;
- (c) Defrauding any retail buyer to the buyer's damage;
- (d) Fraudulent misrepresentation, circumvention or concealment by the licensee through whatever subterfuge or device of any of the material particulars or the nature thereof required to be stated or furnished to the retail buyer under this chapter.

(2) Any licensee who is exempt from liability for an act or omission under Section 63-19-57 shall not have his license suspended or revoked or the renewal of his license denied under this section for the same act or omission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-07; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 20; Laws, 1997, ch. 332, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved March 17, 1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-19. Liability of licensee for acts of agents.

If a licensee is a firm, association or corporation, it shall be sufficient cause for the suspension or revocation of a license that any officer, director or trustee of a licensed firm, association or corporation, or any member of a licensed partnership, has so acted or failed to act as would be cause for suspending or revoking a license to such party as an individual. Each licensee shall be responsible for the acts of any or all of his employees while acting as his agent, if such licensee after actual knowledge of said acts retained the benefits, proceeds, profits or advantages accruing from said acts or otherwise ratified said acts.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-08; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 21, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-21. Procedure for denial, suspension or revocation of license; judicial review.

No license shall be denied, suspended or revoked except after hearing thereon. The administrator shall give the licensee at least ten days' written notice, in the form of an order to show cause, of the time and place of such hearing by certified mail addressed to the principal place of business in this state of such licensee. The said notice shall contain the grounds of complaint against the licensee. Any order suspending or revoking such license shall recite the grounds upon which the same is based. The order shall be entered upon the records of the administrator and shall not be effective until after thirty days' written notice thereof given after such entry forwarded by registered mail to the licensee at such principal place of business. No revocation, suspension or surrender of any license shall impair or affect the obligation of any lawful retail installment contract acquired previously thereto by the licensee.

Within thirty days after any such denial, suspension or revocation of a license the person aggrieved may apply for a review thereof by an application to any chancellor or judge of the chancery court of the county wherein is located the principal place of business in this state of such licensee in accordance with the practice of said court. Any chancellor or judge of the chancery court of the county wherein is located the principal place of business in this state of such

licensee shall determine de novo all questions, both of fact and of law, touching upon the legality and reasonableness of the determination of the administrator, and shall render such judgment as shall be lawful and just.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-09; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 22, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-23. Investigations and examinations of licensees.

The administrator shall, at intermittent periods, make such investigations and examinations of any licensee or other person as he deems necessary to determine compliance with this chapter. For such purpose he may examine the books, accounts, records and other documents or matters of any licensee or other person. He shall have the power to compel the production of all relevant books, records and other documents and materials relative to an examination or investigation. Such investigations and examinations shall not be made more often than once during a year unless the administrator has reason to believe the licensee is not complying with the provisions of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-10; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 23, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-25. Filing and examination of complaints against licensees.

Any retail buyer having reason to believe that this chapter relating to his retail installment contract has been violated may file with the administrator a written complaint setting forth the details of such alleged violation. The administrator, upon receipt of such complaint, may inspect the pertinent books, records, letters and contracts of the licensee and of the retail seller involved, relating to such specific written complaint.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-11; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 24, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-27. Payment of expenses of examination by licensee.

The commissioner may charge the licensee an examination fee in an amount not less than Three Hundred Dollars (\$300.00) nor more than Six Hundred Dollars (\$600.00) for each office or location within the State of Mississippi, plus any actual expenses incurred while examining the licensee's records or books that are located outside the State of Mississippi. However, in no event shall a licensee be examined more than once in a two-year period unless for cause shown based upon consumer complaint and/or other exigent reasons as determined by the commissioner.

All expense fees paid to the commissioner shall be deposited by the commissioner in the State Treasury in a special and separate fund to be known as the "Consumer Finance Fund."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-17; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 30; Laws, 1975, ch. 440, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 345, § 1; brought forward, 1990, ch. 303, § 3; Laws, 2000,

ch. 621, § 4; Laws, 2004, ch. 450, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 28, 2004.)

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment substituted “Three Hundred Dollars (\$300.00) nor more than Six Hundred Dollars (\$600.00) for” for “Two Hundred Dollars (\$200.00) nor more than Three Hundred Dollars (\$300.00) per examination of” in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

Cross References — Payment of administration expenses, see § 63-19-51.

Expenditure from Consumer Finance Fund for administration of Samm Loan Regulatory Law (§§ 75-67-101 set seq.), see § 75-67-239.

§ 63-19-29. Issuance of subpoenas; administration of oaths; enforcement of subpoenas, etc.

The administrator shall have power to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, papers, books, records and other evidence before him in any matter over which he has jurisdiction, control or supervision pertaining to this chapter. The administrator shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations to any person whose testimony is required.

If any person shall refuse to obey any such subpoena, or to give testimony, or to produce evidence as required thereby, any judge or chancellor of the chancery court of the first judicial district of Hinds County may, upon application and proof of such refusal, make an order awarding process of subpoena, or subpoena duces tecum, out of said court, for the witness to appear before the administrator and to give testimony, and to produce evidence as required thereby. Upon filing such order in the office of the clerk of the said chancery court, the clerk shall issue process of subpoena, as directed, under the seal of said court, requiring the person to whom it is directed, to appear at the time and place therein designated.

If any person served with any such subpoena shall refuse to obey the same, and to give testimony, and to produce evidence as required thereby, the administrator may apply to any judge or chancellor of the chancery court of the first judicial district of Hinds County for an attachment against such person, as for a contempt. The judge, or chancellor, upon satisfactory proof of such refusal, shall issue an attachment, directed to any sheriff, constable or police officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before such judge, proceed to a hearing of the case. The judge, or chancellor, shall have power to enforce obedience to such subpoena, and the answering of any question, and the production of any evidence, that may be proper by imposition of a fine, not exceeding one hundred dollars (\$100.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail, or by both imposition of a fine and imprisonment, and to compel such witness to pay the costs of such proceeding to be taxed.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-12; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 25, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

§ 63-19-31. Execution, terms and delivery of retail installment contract.

(1)(a) A retail installment contract shall be in writing, shall be signed by both the buyer and the seller, and shall be completed as to all essential provisions prior to the signing of the contract by the buyer.

(b) The printed portion of the contract, other than instructions for completion, shall be in at least eight point type. The contract shall contain in a size equal to at least ten point bold type:

(i) A specific statement that liability insurance coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused to others is not included, if that is the case; and

(ii) The following notice: "Notice to the Buyer: 1. Do not sign this contract before you read it or if it contains any blank spaces. 2. You are entitled to an exact copy of the contract you sign."

(c) The seller shall deliver to the buyer, or mail to him at his address shown on the contract, a copy of the contract signed by the seller. Until the seller does so, a buyer who has not received delivery of the motor vehicle shall have the right to rescind his agreement and to receive a refund of all payments made and return of all goods traded in to the seller on account of or in contemplation of the contract, or if such goods cannot be returned, the value thereof. Any acknowledgment by the buyer of the delivery of a copy of the contract shall be in a size equal to at least ten point bold type and, if contained in the contract, shall appear directly above the buyer's signature.

(d) The contract shall contain the names of the seller and the buyer, the place of business of the seller, the residence or place of business of the buyer as specified by the buyer and a description of the motor vehicle including its make, year model, model and identification numbers or marks.

(2) The contract shall contain the following items:

(a) The cash sale price of the motor vehicle;

(b) The amount of the buyer's down payment, and whether made in money or goods, or partly in money and partly in goods;

(c) The difference between items (a) and (b);

(d) The amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits specifying the types of coverage and benefits;

(e) The amount of official fees;

(f) The amount, if any, actually paid or to be paid by the seller pursuant to an agreement with the buyer to discharge a security interest, lien or lease interest on property traded in;

(g) The principal balance, which is the sum of items (c), (d), (e) and (f);

(h) The amount of the finance charge;

(i) The time balance, which is the sum of items (g) and (h), payable in installments by the buyer to the seller, the number of installments, the amount of each installment and the due date or period thereof.

The above items need not be stated in the sequence or order set forth. Additional items may be included to explain the calculations involved in

determining the stated time balance to be paid by the buyer. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter to the contrary, in any contract evidencing the sale of a commercial vehicle, the statement of the amount of the finance charge (item (h) hereof) and the amount of each installment (item (i) hereof) may be calculated using the finance charge rate applicable to the transaction as of the date of execution of the contract, notwithstanding the fact that such finance charge rate may increase or decrease over the term of the contract according to any formula or index set forth in the contract; provided, however, that under no circumstances may the variable rate under such contract at any time exceed the finance charge limitations found in Section 63-19-43, of this chapter.

(3) No retail installment contract shall be signed by any party thereto when it contains blank spaces to be filled in after it has been signed except that, if delivery of the motor vehicle is not made at the time of the execution of the contract, the identifying numbers or marks of the motor vehicle or similar information and the due date of the first installment may be inserted in the contract after its execution. The buyer's written acknowledgment, conforming to the requirements of subdivision (c) of subsection (1) of this section, of delivery of a copy of a contract shall be conclusive proof of such delivery, that the contract when signed did not contain any blank spaces except as herein provided, and of compliance with Sections 63-19-31 through 63-19-41 in any action or proceeding by or against the holder of the contract.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 26; Laws, 1985, ch. 527, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 426, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 621, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved May 23, 2000.)

Cross References — Written statement furnished buyer concerning payments and amount due, see § 63-19-39.

Finance charge limitations, see § 63-19-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-33. Purchase of insurance pursuant to retail installment contract.

(1) The amount, if any, included in a retail installment contract for insurance, which may be purchased by the holder of the retail installment contract, shall not exceed the applicable premiums chargeable in accordance with the rates filed with the state insurance commission. If dual interest insurance on the motor vehicle is purchased by the holder it shall, within thirty days after execution of the retail installment contract, send or cause to be sent to the buyer a policy or policies or certificates of insurance, written by an insurance company authorized to do business in this state, clearly setting forth the amount of the premium, the kind or kinds of insurance, the coverages and all the terms, exceptions, limitations, restrictions and conditions of the

contract or contracts of insurance. The buyer shall have the privilege of purchasing such insurance from an agent or broker of his own selection; in such case, however, the inclusion of the insurance premium in the retail installment contract shall be optional with the seller.

No holder shall unreasonably or arbitrarily refuse to accept coverage by an insurance company tendered by the buyer.

(2) If any insurance is cancelled, or the premium adjusted, any refund of the insurance premium received by the holder shall be credited to the final maturing installments of the contract except to the extent applied toward payment for similar insurance protecting the interests of the buyer and the holder or either of them.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 26, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

Cross References — Buyer's signature constituting acknowledgement of delivery of contract and that contract did not contain blank spaces, see § 63-19-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-35. Delinquency and collection charges; court costs and attorneys' fees.

The holder may, if the contract or refinancing agreement so provides, collect a delinquency and collection charge on a contract evidencing the sale of a commercial vehicle in an amount not exceeding Five Dollars (\$5.00) or four percent (4%) of the amount of any delinquency in default for a period of not less than fifteen (15) days, whichever is greater, but in no event to exceed Fifty Dollars (\$50.00), and on all other retail installment contracts a delinquency and collection charge in an amount not in excess of five percent (5%) or Five Dollars (\$5.00), whichever is less, on each installment in default for a period of not less than ten (10) days. In addition to such delinquency and collection charge, the contract may provide for the payment of court costs and of attorneys' fee not exceeding fifteen per cent (15%) of the amount actually due and unpaid at the time the balance of the contract is accelerated and the entire amount thereof is declared to be due, if the same is referred to an attorney for collection. However, no such attorneys' fee may be charged or collected where the attorney to whom the contract was referred for collection is a salaried employee of the holder of the contract.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 26; Laws, 1985, ch. 368, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — Buyer's signature constituting acknowledgement of delivery of contract and that contract did not contain blank spaces, see § 63-19-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-37. Transfer of equity in motor vehicle; transfer fee.

The buyer may transfer his equity in the motor vehicle at any time to another person upon agreement by the holder, and, in such event, the holder of the contract shall be entitled to charge and collect a transfer of equity fee which shall not exceed fifteen dollars (\$15.00). No transfer of equity fee shall be charged or collected unless the holder of the contract shall, in writing, release the transferor from all further liability under such contract.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 26, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

Cross References — Buyer's signature constituting acknowledgement of delivery of contract and that contract did not contain blank spaces, see § 63-19-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-39. Furnishing of buyer with statement of payments and unpaid balance and written receipt for cash payment.

Upon written request from the buyer, the holder of a retail installment contract shall give or forward to the buyer a written statement, in conformity with Section 63-19-31, of payments and the total amount unpaid under such contract. A buyer shall be given a written receipt for any payment when made in cash.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 26; Laws, 1985, ch. 527, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References — Buyer's signature constituting acknowledgement of delivery of contract and that contract did not contain blank spaces, see § 63-19-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-41. Restriction of remedies of buyer against holder.

No provision in a retail installment contract relieving the holder from liability for any legal remedies which the buyer may have against the seller

under the contract, or any separate instrument executed in connection therewith, shall be enforceable.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-13; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 26, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

Cross References — Buyer's signature constituting acknowledgement of delivery of contract and that contract did not contain blank spaces, see § 63-19-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-43. Maximum finance charge; security interests.

(1) The maximum finance charge which may be contracted for or received for any purchase money loan or purchase money extension of credit made by any lender or by any licensed retail seller, or by any other entity that is expressly exempt from licensing but expressly subject to compliance with this chapter under the provisions of Section 63-19-7, in connection with sales or financing of motor vehicles and commercial vehicles, as defined in Section 63-19-3(a) and 63-19-3(b), made under this chapter, may result in a yield not to exceed the following annual percentage rates calculated according to the actuarial method:

(a) Class 1. Any new motor vehicle manufactured in the same year or the year immediately prior to the year in which the sale is made — eighteen percent (18%) per annum on the unpaid balance.

(b) Class 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class 1, any used motor vehicle manufactured not more than two (2) years prior to the year in which the sale is made, and any new commercial vehicle or used commercial vehicle manufactured not more than one (1) year prior to the year in which the sale is made — twenty-one percent (21%) per annum on the unpaid balance.

(c) Class 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and manufactured not more than four (4) years prior to the year in which the sale is made and any used commercial vehicle not in Class 2 — twenty-six and seventy-five one-hundredths percent (26.75%) per annum on the unpaid balance.

(d) Class 4. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 or Class 3 and manufactured more than four (4) years prior to the year in which the sale is made — twenty-eight and seventy-five one-hundredths percent (28.75%) per annum on the unpaid balance.

(2) The discount rate referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall be determined, posted and accorded evidentiary weight as provided in Section 75-17-33.

(3) Any subsequent extension, renewal or refinancing of any purchase money loan or purchase money extension of credit under this chapter which is

secured by a perfected security interest in a motor vehicle or commercial vehicle pursuant to Section 63-21-43 shall continue to be secured by such security interest without the necessity of reapplying for a certificate of title under that section.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-14; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 24; Laws, 1974, ch. 564, § 2; Laws, 1975, ch. 316, § 2; Laws, 1980, ch. 492, § 2; Laws, 1982, ch. 468, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 501, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 510, § 11; Laws, 1996, ch. 433, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1980, ch. 492, §§ 6 and 7, provide as follows:

“SECTION 6. The provisions of this act shall apply only to contracts, agreements, or evidences of indebtedness entered into on or after the effective date of this act, and shall not defeat, extinguish or render void any claim or defense existing with respect to contracts, agreements or evidences of indebtedness entered into prior to the effective date of this act.

“SECTION 7. This act shall not be construed as stating explicitly and by its terms that the State of Mississippi does not want the provisions of sections 501(a)(1), 511 and 521 through 523 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 to apply with respect to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances made in this state, and the preemption of state law provided by such sections shall remain in full force and effect in the State of Mississippi.”

Laws, 1982, ch. 468, § 6, provides as follows:

“SECTION 6. This act shall not be construed as stating explicitly and by its terms that the State of Mississippi does not want the provisions of Sections 501(a)(1), 511 and 521 through 523 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 to apply with respect to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances made in this state, and the preemption of state law provided by such sections shall remain in full force and effect in the State of Mississippi.”

Laws, 1984, ch. 501, § 6, provides as follows:

“SECTION 6. This act shall not be construed as stating explicitly and by its terms that the State of Mississippi does not want the provisions of Sections 501(a)(1), 511, and 521 through 523 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, as amended, to apply with respect to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances made in this state, and the preemption of state law provided by such sections, as amended, shall remain in full force and effect in the State of Mississippi.”

Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 17, effective July 1, 1986, provides as follows:

“SECTION 17. This act shall not be construed as stating explicitly and by its terms that the State of Mississippi does not want the provisions of Sections 501(a)(1), 511, and 521 through 523 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, as amended, to apply with respect to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances made in this state, and the preemption of state law provided by such sections, as amended, shall remain in full force and effect in the State of Mississippi.”

Cross References — Provisions of retail installment contract, see § 63-19-31.

Legal rate of interest generally, see § 75-17-1.

Definition of the term “finance charge” as used in this section, inter alia, see § 75-17-25.

Federal Aspects — Provisions of Sections 501(a)(1), 511, and 521 through 523 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, as amended, see 12 USCS §§ 1735f-7 note, 86a, 1831d, 1730g [repealed], and 1785, respectively.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-45. Assignment of retail installment contract.

Any sales finance company may purchase or acquire or agree to purchase or acquire from any seller any contract on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between them. Filing of the assignment, notice to the buyer of the assignment, and any requirement that the holder maintain dominion over the payments or the motor vehicle if repossessed shall not be necessary to the validity of a written assignment of a contract as against creditors, subsequent purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees and lien claimants of the seller. Unless the buyer has notice of the assignment of his contract, payment thereunder made by the buyer to the last known holder of such contract shall be binding upon all subsequent holders.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-14; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 24, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-47. Payment of debt in full prior to maturity.

Notwithstanding the provisions of any retail installment contract to the contrary, any buyer may pay in full at any time before maturity the debt of any retail installment contract and in so paying such debt shall receive a refund credit thereon for such anticipation of payments provided such contract shall have a precomputed finance charge. The amount of such refund shall be calculated on the rule of the sum of the digits, commonly known as the "Rule of 78ths," after deducting from such refund an acquisition cost of Ten Dollars (\$10.00). Where the amount of credit is less than One Dollar (\$1.00), no refund need be made. In the event the finance charge on a contract evidencing the sale of a commercial vehicle is not precomputed, any buyer may pay in full at any time before maturity the then remaining unpaid principal balance of the contract and shall pay a penalty for such prepayment as may have been agreed to by the buyer and the seller in the contract, not to exceed Fifty Dollars (\$50.00).

The provisions of this section shall apply in the event the vehicle is repossessed by the finance company or the dealer, and the dealer is required to pay the balance of indebtedness due the holder thereof.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-15; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 25; Laws, 1985, ch. 527, § 3; brought forward, 1990, ch. 303, § 4; Laws, 1997, ch. 332, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 17, 1997).

§ 63-19-49. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 564, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1974.
[Codes, 1942, § 8075-16; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 29]

Editor's Note — Former § 63-19-49 governed the refinancing of retail installment contracts.

§ 63-19-51. Administration of chapter.

The commissioner is authorized to employ the necessary examiners and other personnel required to administer the provisions of this chapter and to fix their compensation commensurate with their duties. All salaries, travel and other expenses incident to the administration of this chapter shall be paid by the commissioner by warrants issued by the State Auditor. Said State Auditor shall issue his warrant upon requisition signed by the commissioner or his duly authorized agent. All salaries, travel and other expenses incident to the administration of this chapter shall be paid monthly. All travel, subsistence and other expenses shall be audited by the commissioner or his duly authorized agent. All warrants issued by the State Auditor pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be paid by the State Treasurer out of the "Consumer Finance Fund" created by Section 63-19-27.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-18; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 31; Laws, 1985, ch. 345, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Editor's Note — Section 7-7-2 provides that the words "State Auditor of Public Accounts," "State Auditor" and "Auditor" appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor's functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer whenever they appear.

Section 27-104-6 provides that wherever the term "State Fiscal Officer" appears in any law it shall mean "Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration".

§ 63-19-52. Administration of chapter; issuance of rules and regulations.

The commissioner shall have the power and authority to adopt, promulgate and issue such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this article, or any other statute of the State of Mississippi, as he shall deem necessary for the purpose of the administration of this chapter. A copy of every rule and regulation promulgated by the commissioner shall be filed in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Law, Section 25-43-1 et seq.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 332, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved March 17, 1997).

§ 63-19-53. Waiver of provisions of chapter.

Any waiver of the provisions of this chapter shall be unenforceable and void.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-20; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 33, eff from and after 90 days after passage (approved April 22, 1958).

§ 63-19-55. Penalties for violations of chapter.

(1) Any person who willfully and intentionally violates any provision of this chapter or engages in the business of a sales finance company in this state without a license therefor as provided in this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00). However, any licensee who is exempt from liability for an act or omission under Section 63-19-57 shall not be guilty of a misdemeanor under this section for the same act or omission.

(2) If any person engages in business as provided for in this chapter without paying the license fee provided for in this chapter before commencing business or before the expiration of the person's current license, as the case may be, then the person shall be liable for the full amount of the license fee, plus a penalty in an amount not to exceed Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) for each day that the person has engaged in the business without a license or after the expiration of a license.

(3) The commissioner may, after notice and hearing, impose a civil penalty against any licensee if the licensee or employee is adjudged by the commissioner to be in violation of the provisions of this chapter. The civil penalty shall not exceed Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00) per violation and shall be deposited into the Consumer Finance Fund of the Department of Banking and Consumer Finance.

(4) Any person willfully violating Sections 63-19-31 through 63-19-45, shall be barred from recovery of any finance charge, delinquency or collection charge on the contract.

(5) However, any such contract purchased in good faith for value by any bank, trust company, private bank, industrial bank or investment company authorized to do business in this state shall be held and construed to be valid and enforceable in the hands of the purchaser for value, except that such purchaser shall not be permitted to recover on such contract from the buyer anything in excess of the principal balance due thereon, plus the amount of the finance and collection charges permitted under the terms and provisions of this chapter.

(6) When the commissioner has reasonable cause to believe that a person is violating any provision of this chapter, the commissioner, in addition to and without prejudice to the authority provided elsewhere in this chapter, may enter an order requiring the person to stop or to refrain from the violation. The commissioner may sue in any circuit court of the state having jurisdiction and venue to enjoin the person from engaging in or continuing the violation or from doing any act in furtherance of the violation. In such an action, the court may enter an order or judgment awarding a preliminary or permanent injunction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8075-19; Laws, 1958, ch. 495, § 32; Laws, 1997, ch. 332, § 16; Laws, 2000, ch. 621, § 6; Laws, 2004, ch. 450, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 28, 2004.)

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment deleted “shall” following “Any person who” in (1); added (6); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Regulation or licensing of business selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1265.

§ 63-19-56. Commissioner authorized to examine persons suspected of conducting business requiring a license.

The commissioner, or his duly authorized representative, for the purpose of discovering violations of this chapter and for the purpose of determining whether persons are subject to the provisions of this chapter, may examine persons licensed under this chapter and persons reasonably suspected by the commissioner of conducting business that requires a license under this chapter, including all relevant books, records and papers employed by those persons in the transaction of their business, and may summon witnesses and examine them under oath concerning matters relating to the business of those persons, or such other matters as may be relevant to the discovery of violations of this chapter, including without limitation the conduct of business without a license as required by this chapter.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 621, § 7; Laws, 2004, ch. 450, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 28, 2004.)

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment deleted “after receiving a written complaint” following “authorized representative” near the beginning of the section.

§ 63-19-57. Liability of licensees.

(1) A licensee under this chapter shall have no liability for any act or practice done or omitted in conformity with (a) any rule or regulation of the commissioner, or (b) any rule, regulation, interpretation or approval of any other state or federal agency or any opinion of the Attorney General, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred the rule, regulation, interpretation, approval or opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

(2) A licensee under this chapter, acting in conformity with a written interpretation or approval by an official or employee of any state or federal agency or department, shall be presumed to have acted in accordance with applicable law, notwithstanding that after such act has occurred, the interpretation or approval is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be incorrect or invalid for any reason.

SOURCES: Laws, 1997, ch. 332, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved March 17, 1997).

CHAPTER 21

Motor Vehicle Titles

SEC.

- 63-21-1. Short title.
- 63-21-3. Administration.
- 63-21-5. Definitions.
- 63-21-7. Administration.
- 63-21-9. Requirement of certificate of title.
- 63-21-11. Exceptions to requirement of certificate of title.
- 63-21-13. Designated agents of tax commission generally.
- 63-21-15. Application for certificate of title.
- 63-21-16. Electronic transmittal of information by banks and other lending institutions; duties of institutions with respect to applications for certificates of title; entry of applications on statewide title registration system; addition of second lienholder to certificate of title; applications for certificates of title after assignment of liens; issuance of new certificate of title by tax commission; connection of institutions to title registration system; penalties for noncompliance with statute or regulations by institutions.
- 63-21-17. Issuance of certificate of title; record of certificates of title.
- 63-21-18. Automated statewide motor vehicle title registration system.
- 63-21-19. Contents and effect of certificate of title; attachment, etc., of certificate.
- 63-21-21. Delivery of certificate of title.
- 63-21-23. Issuance of certificate of title where questions as to ownership of vehicle or existence of undisclosed security interests exist.
- 63-21-25. Refusal to issue certificate of title.
- 63-21-27. Replacement of lost, stolen, mutilated or destroyed certificates.
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- 63-21-30. Certificate of title issued for manufactured home classified as real property may be delivered to tax commission for cancellation.
- 63-21-31. Procedure upon transfer of interest in vehicle by owner generally.
- 63-21-33. Procedure upon transfer of title to or from dealers; records; duties of persons in possession of vehicles with improperly assigned titles; title to vehicles obtained by insurers upon payment of claims of loss.
- 63-21-35. Procedure upon transfer of interest of owner by operation of law.
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- 63-21-39. Procedure where vehicle scrapped, dismantled or destroyed; obtaining title on vehicle with salvage certificate of title; Salvage Certificate of Title Fund; regulations.
- 63-21-40. Issuance of salvage certificates of title for damaged manufactured or mobile homes.
- 63-21-41. Applicability of chapter to particular liens and security interests.
- 63-21-42. Creation of security interest by transaction involving motor vehicle or trailers which provides for adjustment of rental price.
- 63-21-43. Perfection of security interests.
- 63-21-45. Procedure upon creation of security interest.
- 63-21-47. Assignment of security interest by lienholder.
- 63-21-49. Procedure upon release of security interest.
- 63-21-51. Duty of lienholder named in notice of security interest to disclose security agreement and secured indebtedness.
- 63-21-53. Perfection of unsatisfied security interest in previously registered vehicle.

- 63-21-55. Exclusivity of procedure in chapter for perfecting and giving notice of security interests.
- 63-21-57. Filing and recording of notices of security interests; examination of record prior to issuance or reissuance of certificate of title.
- 63-21-59. Suspension or revocation of certificate of title.
- 63-21-61. Right of review when certificate of title refused, suspended, or revoked, or other right denied under chapter.
- 63-21-63. Schedule of fees.
- 63-21-64. Fees paid to State Tax Commission for issuing and processing necessary documents.
- 63-21-65. Disposition of fees.
- 63-21-67. Use of duplicate copy of application for certificate of title as permit to operate motor vehicle.
- 63-21-69. Application for and issuance of certificate of title and privilege license upon acquisition of vehicle.
- 63-21-71. Penalties for violations of chapter generally.
- 63-21-73. Penalty for felonies.
- 63-21-75. Enforcement of chapter.
- 63-21-77. Construction of chapter.

§ 63-21-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as "The Mississippi Motor Vehicle and Manufactured Housing Title Law."

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-21; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Comparable Laws from other States — Alabama Code, §§ 32-8-1 through 32-8-88.

Georgia Code Annotated, §§ 40-3-1 through 40-3-95.

Cross References — Exceptions on gross weight of short wheelbase trucks registered with state tax commission, see § 63-5-34.

Participation of county tax collectors in automated motor vehicle title registration system, see § 63-21-18.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 28 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 90 et seq.

§ 63-21-3. Administration.

The terms and provisions of this chapter shall be administered by the State Tax Commission. The State Tax Commission shall have charge of all the affairs of administering the laws of the state relative to vehicle registration and titling and manufactured housing titling as hereinafter provided and may employ such administrative and clerical assistance, material, and equipment as may be necessary to enable it to speedily, completely, and efficiently perform the duties as outlined in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-22; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-5. Definitions.

The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for the purpose of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

(a) "State Tax Commission" shall mean the State Tax Commission of the State of Mississippi.

(b) The term "dealer" shall mean every person engaged regularly in the business of buying, selling or exchanging motor vehicles, trailers, semitrailers, trucks, tractors or other character of commercial or industrial motor vehicles in this state, and having in this state an established place of business as defined in Section 27-19-303, Mississippi Code of 1972. The term "dealer" shall also mean every person engaged regularly in the business of buying, selling or exchanging manufactured housing in this state, and licensed as a dealer of manufactured housing by the Mississippi Department of Insurance.

(c) The term "designated agent" shall mean each county tax collector in this state who may perform his duties under this chapter either personally or through any of his deputies, or such other persons as the State Tax Commission may designate. The term shall also mean those "dealers" as herein defined and/or their officers and employees and other persons who are appointed by the State Tax Commission in the manner provided in Section 63-21-13, Mississippi Code of 1972, to perform the duties of "designated agent" for the purposes of this chapter.

(d) The term "implement of husbandry" shall mean every vehicle designed and adapted exclusively for agricultural, horticultural or livestock raising operations or for lifting or carrying an implement of husbandry and in either case not subject to registration if used upon the highways.

(e) The term "vehicle identification number" shall mean the numbers and letters on a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home designated by the manufacturer or assigned by the State Tax Commission for the purpose of identifying the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home.

(f) The term "lien" means every kind of written lease which is substantially equivalent to an installment sale or which provides for a right of purchase; conditional sale; reservation of title; deed of trust; chattel mortgage; trust receipt; and every other written agreement or instrument of whatever kind or character whereby an interest other than absolute title is sought to be held or given on a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home.

(g) The term "lienholder" shall mean any natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation holding a lien as herein defined on a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home.

(h) The term "manufactured housing" or "manufactured home" shall mean any structure, transportable in one or more sections, which in the

traveling mode, is eight (8) body feet or more in width or forty (40) body feet or more in length or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty (320) or more square feet and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and electrical systems contained therein; except that such terms shall include any structure which meets all the requirements of this paragraph except the size requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and complies with the standards established under the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 USCS, Section 5401.

(i) The term "manufacturer" shall mean any person regularly engaged in the business of manufacturing, constructing or assembling motor vehicles, manufactured homes or mobile homes, either within or without this state.

(j) The term "mobile home" shall mean any structure, transportable in one or more sections, which in the traveling mode, is eight (8) body feet or more in width or forty (40) body feet or more in length or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty (320) or more square feet and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and electrical systems contained therein and manufactured prior to June 15, 1976.

(k) The term "motorcycle" shall mean every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground, but excluding a farm tractor.

(l) The term "motor vehicle" shall include every automobile, motorcycle, mobile trailer, semitrailer, truck, truck tractor, trailer and every other device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway which is required to have a road or bridge privilege license, except such as is moved by animal power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

(m) The term "new vehicle" shall mean a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home which has never been the subject of a first sale for use.

(n) The term "used vehicle" shall mean a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home that has been the subject of a first sale for use, whether within this state or elsewhere.

(o) The term "owner" shall mean a person or persons holding the legal title of a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home; in the event a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is the subject of a deed of trust or a chattel mortgage or an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof or other like agreement, with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with the immediate right of possession vested in the grantor in the deed of trust, mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee, said grantor, mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this chapter.

(p) The term “person” shall include every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.

(q) The term “pole trailer” shall mean every vehicle without motive power designed to be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by means of a reach or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to the towing vehicle, and ordinarily used for transporting long or irregularly shaped loads such as poles, pipes, boats or structural members capable generally of sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting connections.

(r) The term “security agreement” shall mean a written agreement which reserves or creates a security interest.

(s) The term “security interest” shall mean an interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home reserved or created by agreement and which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The term includes the interest of a lessor under a lease intended as security. A security interest is “perfected” when it is valid against third parties generally, subject only to specific statutory exceptions.

(t) The term “special mobile equipment” shall mean every vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only incidentally operated or moved over a highway, including, but not limited to: ditch-digging apparatus, well-boring apparatus and road construction and maintenance machinery such as asphalt spreaders, bituminous mixers, bucket loaders, tractors other than truck tractors, ditchers, leveling graders, finishing machines, motor graders, road rollers, scarifiers, earth-moving carryalls and scrapers, power shovels and draglines, and self-propelled cranes, vehicles so constructed that they exceed eight (8) feet in width and/or thirteen (13) feet six (6) inches in height, and earth-moving equipment. The term does not include house trailers, dump trucks, truck-mounted transit mixers, cranes or shovels, or other vehicles designed for the transportation of persons or property to which machinery has been attached.

(u) The term “nonresident” shall mean every person who is not a resident of this state.

(v) The term “current address” shall mean a new address different from the address shown on the application or on the certificate of title. The owner shall within thirty (30) days after his address is changed from that shown on the application or on the certificate of title notify the State Tax Commission of the change of address in the manner prescribed by the State Tax Commission.

(w) The term “odometer” shall mean an instrument for measuring and recording the actual distance a motor vehicle travels while in operation; but shall not include any auxiliary instrument designed to be reset by the operator of the motor vehicle for the purpose of recording the distance traveled on trips.

(x) The term “odometer reading” shall mean the actual cumulative distance traveled disclosed on the odometer.

(y) The term “odometer disclosure statement” shall mean a statement certified by the owner of the motor vehicle to the transferee or to the State Tax Commission as to the odometer reading.

(z) The term “mileage” shall mean actual distance that a vehicle has traveled.

(aa) The term “trailer” shall mean every vehicle other than a “pole trailer” as defined in this chapter without motive power designed to be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle for the purpose of hauling goods or products. The term “trailer” shall not refer to any structure, transportable in one or more sections regardless of size, when erected on site, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and electrical systems contained therein regardless of the date of manufacture.

(bb) The term “salvage mobile home” or “salvage manufactured home” shall mean a mobile home or manufactured home for which a certificate of title has been issued that an insurance company obtains from the owner as a result of paying a total loss claim resulting from collision, fire, flood, wind or other occurrence. The term “salvage mobile home” or “salvage manufactured home” does not mean or include and is not applicable to a mobile home or manufactured home that is twenty (20) years old or older.

(cc) “Salvage certificate of title” shall mean a document issued by the State Tax Commission for a salvage mobile home or salvage manufactured home as defined in this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-23; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 3; Laws, 1986, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 369, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 396, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Section 1 of ch. 396, Laws, 1999, effective from and after July 1, 1999 (approved March 16, 1999), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 556, Laws, 1999, effective July 1, 1999 (approved April 21, 1999), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 556, Laws, 1999, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Cross References — State Tax Commission generally, see §§ 27-3-1 et seq.

Application of mandatory use of safety seat belts to farm vehicles, see § 63-2-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Definition of “owner” in Motor Vehicle Title Law establishes prima facie case of ownership, for purposes of innocent owner defense to forfeiture proceeding; this presumption is rebuttable. One Ford Mustang Convertible Bearing VIN No.

1FACP45EXL1F192944 State ex rel. Clay County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 676 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1996).

In an action in which the purchaser of a truck alleged that the seller had represented a used truck as a new one in violation of Mississippi’s Consumer Pro-

tection Act (§§ 75-24-1 et seq.) and the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law (§§ 63-17-51 et seq.), the trial judge did not err in finding, as a matter of law, that the truck was new, even though a third party had previously attempted to purchase the truck but had returned it one week after driving it home, where no title had ever been issued to the third party, and the purchaser was told at the time of the sale that there were 1,790 miles on the odometer because the truck had either been test driven or had been the subject of a sale that had fallen through. *Hernandez v. Vickery Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Co.*, 652 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1995).

In an action in which the purchaser of a truck alleged that the seller had represented a used truck as a new one in violation of Mississippi's Consumer Protection Act (§§ 75-24-1 et seq.) and the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law (§§ 63-17-51 et seq.), the trial court did not err in failing to consider § 75-2-401(2), which pertains to passing of title,

since the issue was whether the truck was new or used when it was purchased and this question could be answered without exceeding the confines of the Motor Vehicle Commission Law and the Motor Vehicle Title Law (§§ 63-21-1 et seq.). *Hernandez v. Vickery Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Co.*, 652 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1995).

The statutory requirement that an application for a certificate of title must include the vehicle owner's name was satisfied by an application that listed a sole proprietorship as owner since the term "firm," as used in the definition of the term "person" meant a sole proprietorship; thus, the fact that title was so held did not defeat perfection of a lienholder's security interest in the vehicle. Further, a failure to list all of the facts for an application under § 63-21-15 does not defeat the perfection of a security interest under § 63-21-43, which does not require that the owner's name be listed. *Matter of Williams* (C.A.5 (Miss.) 1979) 608 F. 2d 1015

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Comment Note.—Who is "owner" within statute making owner responsible

for injury or death inflicted by operator of automobile. 74 A.L.R.3d 739.

§ 63-21-7. Administration.

(1) The State Tax Commission shall prescribe and provide suitable forms of applications, certificates of title, notices of security interests, and all other notices and forms necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

(2) The State Tax Commission may:

(a) Promulgate such rules and regulations deemed by it to be appropriate to implement the provisions of the chapter.

(b) Make necessary investigations to procure information required to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Assign a new vehicle identification number to a vehicle if it has none, or if its vehicle identification number is destroyed or obliterated, and then shall issue a new certificate of title showing the new identifying number or make an appropriate endorsement on the original certificate.

(3) The State Tax Commission shall make available information concerning the status of a title on any vehicle as reflected by the records in a manner as prescribed by the State Tax Commission. Such information supplied by the State Tax Commission shall be considered official only if in writing. The State Tax Commission shall charge the fees as set forth in Section 63-21-63. However, no fee shall be charged Mississippi law enforcement agencies or law

enforcement agencies of any other state when such state furnishes like or similar information without charge to the State Tax Commission or other Mississippi law enforcement agencies.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-48; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 28; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 65, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A bank that was the first lienholder on a car that was demolished in a collision was entitled to judgment against the negligent driver of the other car and her insurer for the amount of the lien at the time of the accident where the insurer had entered into a settlement agreement and release with the bank's debtor, under the terms of which the insurer sold the wrecked car as salvage, without first making an effort to

inspect the certificate of title on the vehicle, as permitted by law; such failure to investigate was unreasonable under the circumstances, wherein a vehicle was demolished leaving the residue of salvage value only, and the insurer and its insured thus settled the claim with constructive notice of the bank's lien. *Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Bank of Forest*, 368 So. 2d 1273 (Miss. 1979).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

The State Tax Commission has responsibility for the assignment of a new vehicle identification number as authorized by

the statute. Mitchell, III, April 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0157.

§ 63-21-9. Requirement of certificate of title.

Except as provided in Section 63-21-11, every owner of a motor vehicle as defined in this chapter, which is in this state and which is manufactured or assembled after July 1, 1969, or which is the subject of first sale for use after July 1, 1969, and every owner of a manufactured home as defined in this chapter, which is in this state and which is manufactured or assembled after July 1, 1999, or which is the subject of first sale for use after July 1, 1999, shall make application to the State Tax Commission for a certificate of title with the following exceptions:

(a) Voluntary application for title may be made for any model motor vehicle which is in this state after July 1, 1969, and for any model manufactured home or mobile home which is in this state after July 1, 1999, and any person bringing a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home into this state from a state which requires titling shall make application for title to the State Tax Commission within thirty (30) days thereafter.

(b) After July 1, 1969, any dealer, acting for himself, or another, who sells, trades or otherwise transfers any new or used vehicle as defined in this chapter, and after July 1, 1999, any dealer, acting for himself, or another, who sells, trades or otherwise transfers any new or used manufactured home

or mobile home as defined in this chapter, or any designated agent, shall furnish to the purchaser or transferee, without charge for either application or certificate of title, an application for title of said vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and cause to be forwarded to the State Tax Commission any and all documents required by the commission to issue certificate of title to the purchaser or transferee. The purchaser or transferee may then use the duplicate application for title as a permit to operate vehicle as provided in Section 63-21-67, until certificate of title is received.

Any dealer, acting for himself or another who sells, trades or otherwise transfers any vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home required to be titled under this chapter who does not comply with the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined a sum not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00).

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-24; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 4; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 333; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Although dealers might have sold automobiles to each other, without complying with this section, to suit their own convenience, the requirements of the statute

were applicable to such sales, and they were not exempt under § 63-21-11(b). *Rogers v. Hall*, 330 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 29.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:21 et seq. (ob-

taining certificate of title or registration).

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 80-84.

§ 63-21-11. Exceptions to requirement of certificate of title.

No certificate of title need be obtained for:

(a) A vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home owned by the United States or any agency thereof;

(b) A vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home owned by a manufacturer or dealer and held for sale, even though incidentally moved on the highway or used for purposes of testing or demonstration, or a vehicle used by a manufacturer solely for testing;

(c) A vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home owned by a nonresident of this state and not required by law to be registered in this state;

(d) A vehicle regularly engaged in the interstate transportation of persons or property for which a currently effective certificate of title has been issued in another state;

(e) A vehicle moved solely by animal power;

(f) An implement of husbandry;

(g) Special mobile equipment;

(h) A pole trailer;

(i) Utility trailers of less than five thousand (5,000) pounds gross vehicle weight.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-25; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 5; Laws, 1987, ch. 338, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. What constitutes farm vehicle, rarely on highway exempt from registration construction equipment, or vehicle tempo- tion as motor vehicle. 27 A.L.R.4th 843.

§ 63-21-13. Designated agents of tax commission generally.

(1) The tax collector of each of the several counties in this state shall by virtue of his office be a designated agent of the State Tax Commission. Such tax collectors may perform their duties under this chapter either personally or through any of their deputies.

(2) Every licensed dealer as defined in this chapter, shall be a designated agent of the State Tax Commission. Such dealers may perform their duties under this chapter either personally or through any of their officers or employees. Such dealers or persons shall enter into a bond with a surety company authorized to do business in this state as surety thereon, payable to the State of Mississippi in a sum to be determined by the commission, but in no case to be less than Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties under this chapter.

(3) The State Tax Commission may appoint persons other than licensed dealers as its designated agents, provided that such appointees shall enter into a bond with a surety company authorized to do business in this state as surety thereon, payable to the State of Mississippi in a sum to be determined by the commission, but in no case to be less than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties under this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-26; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 6; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 539, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

Cross References — Exemption of designated agents from requirement that dealers file quarterly reports of vehicles that have been wholesaled with motor vehicle comptroller, see § 27-19-316.

Provision that, for purposes of this chapter, the term “designated agent” includes officers and employees of dealers appointed to perform the duties of designated agent under this section, see § 63-21-5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

By executing and filing with the comp-troller a surety bond in the amount of \$5,000 obligating itself that in the event an automobile dealer did not fulfill his duties as "designated agent" under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law it would be liable to the extent of the amount of the bond, a surety company made itself liable to any member of the public to the extent of the amount of the bond for damages resulting from the dealer's failure to fulfill his statutory obligations as a dealer to furnish a buyer of a car with a clear title to a vehicle. Thus, upon the dealer's failure to provide a buyer with

a clear title to a vehicle, the dealer became liable to the buyer for whatever damages were caused from such failure, and the surety was also liable up to \$5,000. The surety, in expressing its willingness to be the buyer's surety on a bond to be executed under the provisions of § 63-21-23, did not fulfill its obligations under the bond it executed with respect to the dealer pursuant to § 63-21-13, since the buyer would have had a contingent liability as principle under the bond for any damages caused to others having some claim of ownership in the car. *McBride v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 583 So. 2d 974 (Miss. 1991).

§ 63-21-15. Application for certificate of title.

(1) The application for the certificate of title of a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home in this state shall be made by the owner to a designated agent, on the form the State Tax Commission prescribes, and shall contain or be accompanied by the following, if applicable:

(a) The name, current residence and mailing address of the owner;

(b)(i) If a vehicle, a description of the vehicle, including the following data: year, make, model, vehicle identification number, type of body, the number of cylinders, odometer reading at the time of application, and whether new or used; and

(ii) If a manufactured home or mobile home, a description of the manufactured home or mobile home, including the following data: year, make, model number, serial number and whether new or used;

(c) The date of purchase by applicant, the name and address of the person from whom the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home was acquired, and the names and addresses of any lienholders in the order of their priority and the dates of their security agreements;

(d) In connection with the transfer of ownership of a manufactured home or mobile home sold by a sheriff's bill of sale, a copy of the sheriff's bill of sale;

(e)(i) An odometer disclosure statement made by the transferor of a motor vehicle. The statement shall read:

"Federal and state law requires that you state the mileage in connection with the transfer of ownership. Failure to complete or providing a false statement may result in fine and/or imprisonment.

I state that the odometer now reads _____ (no tenths) miles and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described herein, unless one of the following statements is checked:

_____ (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits.

_____ (2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is not the actual mileage. WARNING-ODOMETER DISCREPANCY!"

(ii) In connection with the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title, which form shall be prescribed and furnished by the State Tax Commission. This written disclosure must be signed by the transferor and transferee, including the printed name of both parties.

Notwithstanding the requirements above, the following exemptions as to odometer disclosure shall be in effect:

1. A vehicle having a gross vehicle weight rating of more than sixteen thousand (16,000) pounds.
2. A vehicle that is not self-propelled.
3. A vehicle that is ten (10) years old or older.
4. A vehicle sold directly by the manufacturer to any agency of the United States in conformity with contractual specifications.

5. A transferor of a new vehicle prior to its first transfer for purposes other than resale need not disclose the vehicle's odometer mileage.

(iii) Any person who knowingly gives a false statement concerning the odometer reading on an odometer disclosure statement shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of up to One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) or imprisonment of up to one (1) year, or both, at the discretion of the court. These penalties shall be cumulative, supplemental and in addition to the penalties provided by any other law; and

(f) For previously used manufactured homes and mobile homes that previously have not been titled in this state or any other state, a disclosure statement shall be made by the owner of the manufactured home or mobile home applying for the certificate of title. That statement shall read:

"I state that the previously used manufactured home or mobile home owned by me for which I am applying for a certificate of title, to the best of my knowledge:

_____ (1) Has never been declared a total loss due to flood damage, fire damage, wind damage or other damage; or

_____ (2) Has previously been declared a total loss due to:

_____ (a) Collision;

_____ (b) Flood;

_____ (c) Fire;

_____ (d) Wind;

_____ (e) Other (please describe): _____."

(2) The application shall be accompanied by such evidence as the State Tax Commission reasonably requires to identify the vehicle, manufactured

home or mobile home and to enable the State Tax Commission to determine whether the owner is entitled to a certificate of title and the existence or nonexistence of security interests in the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and whether the applicant is liable for a use tax as provided by Sections 27-67-1 through 27-67-33.

(3) If the application is for a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home purchased from a dealer, it shall contain the name and address of any lienholder holding a security interest created or reserved at the time of the sale and the date of his security agreement and it shall be signed by the dealer as well as the owner. The designated agent shall promptly mail or deliver the application to the State Tax Commission.

(4) If the application is for a new vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, it shall contain the certified manufacturer's statement of origin showing proper assignments to the applicant and a copy of each security interest document.

(5) Each application shall contain or be accompanied by the certificate of a designated agent that the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home has been physically inspected by him and that the vehicle identification number and descriptive data shown on the application, pursuant to the requirements of subsection (1)(b) of this section, are correct, and also that he has identified the person signing the application and witnessed the signature. If the application is to receive a clear title for a vehicle for which a salvage certificate of title has been issued, the application shall be accompanied by a sworn affidavit that the vehicle complies with the requirements of this section, Section 63-21-39 and the regulations promulgated by the State Tax Commission under Section 63-21-39.

(6) If the application is for a first certificate of title on a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home other than a new vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, then the application shall conform with the requirements of this section except that in lieu of the manufacturer's statement of origin, the application shall be accompanied by a copy of the bill of sale of said motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home whereby the applicant claims title or in lieu thereof, in the case of a motor vehicle, certified copies of the last two (2) years' tag and tax receipts or in lieu thereof, in any case, such other information the State Tax Commission may reasonably require to identify the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and to enable the State Tax Commission to determine ownership of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and the existence or nonexistence of security interest in it. If the application is for a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home last previously registered in another state or country, the application shall also be accompanied by the certificate of title issued by the other state or country, if any, properly assigned.

(7) Every designated agent within this state shall, no later than the next business day after they are received by him, forward to the State Tax Commission by mail, postage prepaid, the originals of all applications received by him, together with such evidence of title as may have been delivered to him by the applicants.

(8) An application for certificate of title and information to be placed on an application for certificate of title may be transferred electronically as provided in Section 63-21-16.

(9) The State Tax Commission shall issue a certificate of title or any other document applied for under this chapter to the designated agent, owner or lienholder of the motor vehicle or of the manufactured home or mobile home, as appropriate, not more than thirty (30) days after the application and required fee prescribed under Section 63-21-63 or Section 63-21-64 are received unless the applicant requests expedited processing under subsection (10) of this section.

(10)(a) The State Tax Commission shall establish an expedited processing procedure for the receipt of applications and the issuance of certificates of title and any other documents issued under this chapter, except a replacement certificate of title as provided under Section 63-21-27(2), for motor vehicles and for manufactured homes or mobile homes. Any designated agent, lienholder or owner requesting the issuance of any such document, at his or her option, shall receive such expedited processing upon payment of a fee in the amount of Thirty Dollars (\$30.00). Such fee shall be in addition to the fees applicable to the issuance of any such documents under Section 63-21-63 and Section 63-21-64.

(b) When expedited title processing is requested, the applicable fees are paid and all documents and information necessary for the Tax Commission to issue the certificate of title or other documents applied for are received by the commission, then the commission shall complete processing of the application and issue the title or document applied for within seventy-two (72) hours of the time of receipt, excluding weekends and holidays.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-27; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 7; Laws, 1986, ch. 328, § 2; Laws, 1989, ch. 369, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 575, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 539, § 3; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 6; Laws, 2004, ch. 557, § 1, eff from and after Sept. 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes — The 2004 amendment rewrote the disclosure statement in (f); and added (9) and (10).

Cross References — Application for certificate of title for vehicle which has been issued a salvage certificate of title, see § 63-21-39.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Owner's name.

1. In general.

Although dealers might have sold automobiles to each other, without complying with this section, to suit their own convenience, the requirements of the statute were applicable to such sales, and they were not exempt under § 63-21-11(b). *Rogers v. Hall*, 330 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1976).

2. Owner's name.

The statutory requirement that an application for a certificate of title must include the vehicle owner's name was satisfied by an application that listed a sole proprietorship as owner since the term "firm," as used in the definition of the term "person" meant a sole proprietorship; thus, the fact that title was so held did not defeat perfection of a lienholder's security interest in the vehicle. Further, a failure

to list all of the facts for an application under § 63-21-15 does not defeat the perfection of a security interest under § 63-

21-43, which does not require that the owner's name be listed. *GMAC v. Pongetti*, 608 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 115.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against automobile dealership and salesperson, misrepresentation in sale of used

automobile used automobile sold as new automobile, fraudulent concealment of disconnection of odometer).

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:21-33:32.

§ 63-21-16. Electronic transmittal of information by banks and other lending institutions; duties of institutions with respect to applications for certificates of title; entry of applications on statewide title registration system; addition of second lienholder to certificate of title; applications for certificates of title after assignment of liens; issuance of new certificate of title by tax commission; connection of institutions to title registration system; penalties for noncompliance with statute or regulations by institutions.

(1) All designated agents appointed by the State Tax Commission under Section 63-21-13, Mississippi Code of 1972, may electronically transmit to the State Tax Commission information entered by them on applications for a certificate of title given in connection with the sale or transfer of a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home or a loan for which the owner's motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is pledged to that institution as collateral for the loan. The format and the data required to be transmitted shall be established by the State Tax Commission. Transmission of data shall meet minimum criteria and edits established by the State Tax Commission equal to any edit presently existing in the statewide title registration system, or as may be established, to which the county tax collectors shall also conform. All data transmitted must successfully pass edits established by the State Tax Commission, including lienholder name, mailing address and lienholder account number assigned to a lienholder by the State Tax Commission to identify the lienholder, for the purpose of causing the data to appear in the certificate of title for which the application is made.

(2) It shall be the responsibility of the designated agent to verify all data before it is electronically transmitted. It shall also be the responsibility of the designated agent to ensure that the required certification of designated agent and the certification of statement of facts that are contained on the application for certificate of title appear above the signatures of both the owner and the authorized representative of the designated agent. Data which cannot be transmitted because of error shall be corrected by the designated agent when the statewide title registration system indicates that the data is erroneous or is not valid for the purposes of titling the motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home or for transfer of the data.

(3) When an institution has agreed to loan money for the purchase of a motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, the institution shall complete an application for certificate of title or require the borrower to provide to the institution the copy of the application for certificate of title contained in the application packet which is designated "Lienholder's Copy" according to provisions of the Motor Vehicle and Manufactured Housing Title Law, which the owner will receive from the county tax collector or any designated agent upon completion of the application for title and registration process.

(4) An application for certificate of title originating from a designated agent shall be entered on the statewide title registration system by the originating lending institution when the transaction is for the purpose of perfecting the institution's interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home currently owned or purchased by the applicant, in connection with application for certificate of title or the purchase of a license tag or both.

(5) When an institution in this state adds a second lien on a certificate of title in possession of a first lienholder institution in this state, the second lienholder institution seeking to be shown on the certificate of title shall:

(a) Prepare the application for certificate of title in accordance with the requirements of Sections 63-21-15 and 63-21-45(1)(c);

(b) Obtain all required signatures; and

(c) Forward the completed application for certificate of title to the first lienholder together with any necessary remittance advice, a check for the title fee payable to the State Tax Commission and a cover letter to the first lienholder requesting that the first lienholder attach the certificate of title to the required documents sent by the second lienholder and then forward the application, certificate of title and required documents to the State Tax Commission.

(6) Upon receipt of the application for certificate of title from the second lienholder institution to record the second lien, the first lienholder institution shall compare the data contained in the application for certificate of title to the information contained in the original certificate of title. If the first lienholder institution is satisfied as to the ownership, accuracy and order of priority of liens as shown in the application, it shall enter the data contained on the application for certificate of title prepared by the second lienholder on the statewide title registration system, including the designated agent number of the second lienholder. After entering the data from the application for certificate of title, the first lienholder institution shall immediately forward the application for certificate of title with the certificate of title attached to the application, the remittance advice and the second lienholder's check for the title fee to the State Tax Commission within three (3) working days.

(7) In an assignment of lien pursuant to Section 63-21-47, the assignee shall receive the notice of assignment along with the current title attached and with the assignors interest open. The assignee lienholder shall prepare an application for certificate of title according to the notice of assignment, showing the assignee institution as the lienholder, and then shall electronically transmit the data to the State Tax Commission.

The completed application shall be forwarded to the State Tax Commission within three (3) working days.

(8) The State Tax Commission, upon receipt of applications for certificate of title, shall verify the data by accessing it on the statewide title registration system by the title application control number appearing on the application for title. After receiving verification that is satisfactory to the State Tax Commission that the data necessary for the issuance of a new certificate of title exists, the State Tax Commission shall issue a new certificate of title that records the interests of all the parties named in the application for certificate of title.

(9) Designated agents shall be connected to the statewide title registration system for the purpose of electronic transfer of applications for certificate of title data in the order of priority established by the State Tax Commission.

(10) If a participating designated agent fails to comply with the provisions of this section or the rules adopted by the State Tax Commission to implement this section, the State Tax Commission may impose a penalty of Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00) for each instance of noncompliance. Any penalty imposed under this section not paid within thirty (30) days after a notice is given shall be subject to collection from the bond of the designated agent that is required to be provided under the provisions of Section 63-21-13(3). The penalty provided shall also be assessable, due and collectible from any licensed motor vehicle dealer or manufactured home or mobile home dealer for failure to accept an application for certificate of title for each and every vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home he sells to a consumer. These penalties shall be cumulative, supplemental and in addition to the penalties provided by any other law.

(11) This section shall apply to all designated agents appointed by the State Tax Commission under Section 63-21-13, that choose to electronically transmit information on applications for certificates of title to the State Tax Commission. This section shall not apply to other designated agents.

SOURCES: Laws, 1996, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 458, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 396, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Section 2 of ch. 396, Laws, 1999, effective from and after July 1, 1999 (approved March 16, 1999), amended this section. Section 7 of ch. 556, Laws, 1999, effective July 1, 1999 (approved April 21, 1999), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 7 of ch. 556, Laws, 1999, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

§ 63-21-17. Issuance of certificate of title; record of certificates of title.

(1) The State Tax Commission shall examine each application received and, when satisfied as to its genuineness and regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title, shall issue a certificate of title

of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home on the form prescribed by the commission.

(2) The State Tax Commission shall maintain a record of all certificates of title issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter:

- (a) Under a distinctive title number assigned to the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home;
- (b) Under the vehicle identification number;
- (c) Under the name of the owner; and
- (d) In the discretion of the State Tax Commission, by any other method the commission determines.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-28; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 8; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-18. Automated statewide motor vehicle title registration system.

The Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services shall provide equipment for the operation and maintenance of the automated statewide motor vehicle, manufactured housing and mobile home registration system by the State Tax Commission.

The automated statewide motor vehicle, manufactured housing and mobile home registration system shall provide for computer terminals and printers, as authorized by the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services, to be located in the quantity necessary in each county seat tax collector's office and any other office in which more than fifty percent (50%) of the motor vehicle registrations in the county are made.

All county tax collectors shall participate in such system as it applies to Chapter 19, Title 27; Chapter 51, Title 27; Chapter 21, Title 63; Mississippi Code of 1972, in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the State Tax Commission. Such rules and regulations shall provide that counties which have an existing computer system designed to produce registration data may elect to use such existing system to communicate title/registration data to the commission through the computer furnished by the state as hereinabove provided in this section. If the State Tax Commission finds and determines that a county has failed to successfully establish or update title/registration data into the statewide vehicle, manufactured housing and mobile home title/registration system, either through use of equipment supplied by the State Tax Commission or through the interfacing between the network system and county computer equipment, the State Tax Commission shall thereafter cause to be withheld the county's homestead exemption reimbursement monies, except for school districts and municipalities, until such time as the county has complied with this provision. Such monies as are withheld from a county for failure to comply with this provision shall be placed into a special

escrow account to be established in the State Treasury. Once the county achieves compliance by successfully establishing or updating title/registration data into the statewide vehicle, manufactured housing and mobile home title/registration system, then the commission shall cause to be released to the county all funds held in escrow on the county's behalf during the period of noncompliance. All interest earned shall accrue to the benefit of the county on any funds placed in an escrow account. Any cost involved in interfacing between existing county computer systems and the state-provided computer shall be paid by the county.

The computer terminals and printers placed in each county tax collector's office may be utilized to provide additional computer functions as authorized by the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services.

The State Fiscal Officer shall issue his warrants to the State Treasurer for the expenditures for the implementation and maintenance of the system upon requisitions signed by the Chairman of the State Tax Commission, as authorized by the Legislature.

It is the intent of the Legislature that the operation of the statewide motor vehicle, manufactured housing and mobile home title registration system shall be the responsibility of the State Tax Commission.

The State Tax Commission shall provide for the transfer of motor vehicle, manufactured housing and mobile home title and lien registration information to the commission by electronic means from banks and other lending institutions as provided in Section 63-21-18. The Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services shall cooperate with the State Tax Commission in implementing the provisions of Section 63-21-18, and shall provide the State Tax Commission with whatever assistance the commission needs to carry out the provisions of Section 63-21-18.

SOURCES: Laws, 1980, ch. 427, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 309, § 4; Laws, 1983, ch. 320, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 302; Laws, 1990, ch. 415, § 3; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 9, *eff from and after July 1, 1999*.

Cross References — Central data processing authority [Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services], see §§ 25-53-1 et seq.

Other powers and duties of the state tax commission, see § 27-3-31.

Withholding of reimbursements of homestead exemption tax loss for tax collector's failure to comply with this section, see § 27-33-41.

Source of revenue for funding the automated statewide motor vehicle title registration system, see § 63-21-65.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 41 Am. Jur. Trials 683, Computer Research for the Trial Lawyer.

§ 63-21-19. Contents and effect of certificate of title; attachment, etc., of certificate.

(1) Each certificate of title issued by the State Tax Commission shall contain:

- (a) The date issued;
- (b) The name and current address of the owner;
- (c) The names and addresses of the first two (2) lienholders in the order of priority as shown on the application, or if the application is based on a certificate of title as shown on the certificate;
- (d) The title number;
- (e) A description of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, including the following data, if applicable: year, make, model, vehicle identification number, type of body, number of cylinders, whether new or used, odometer reading, a statement which qualifies mileage according to the odometer disclosure certified by the transferor and, if a new vehicle, the date of the first sale of the vehicle for use; and
- (f) Any other data the State Tax Commission prescribes.

(2) Unless security is furnished as provided in subsection (b) of Section 63-21-23, Mississippi Code of 1972, a distinctive certificate of title shall be issued for a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home last previously registered in another state or country the laws of which do not require that lienholders be named on a certificate of title to perfect their security interests. The certificate shall contain the legend "This vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home may be subject to an undisclosed lien" and may contain any other information the State Tax Commission prescribes. If no notice of a security interest in the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is received by the State Tax Commission within four (4) months from the issuance of the distinctive certificate of title, the State Tax Commission shall, upon application and surrender of the distinctive certificate, issue a certificate of title in ordinary form.

(3) The certificate of title shall contain forms for assignment and warranty of title by the owner, and for assignment and warranty of title by a dealer, and may contain forms for applications for a certificate of title by a transferee, the naming of a lienholder and the assignment or release of the security interest of a lienholder.

(4) A certificate of title issued by the State Tax Commission is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it.

(5) A certificate of title for a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is not subject to garnishment, attachment, execution or other judicial process. However, this paragraph shall not prevent a lawful levy upon the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-30; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 10; Laws, 1986, ch. 328, § 3; Laws, 1989, ch. 369, § 3; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-21-21. Delivery of certificate of title.

The certificate of title shall be mailed to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner. If the original certificate of title is delivered to a lienholder, a nontransferable duplicate certificate of title shall be mailed to the owner to serve as a permit for operation of the motor vehicle or use or occupancy of the manufactured home or mobile home.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-31; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 11; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-21-23. Issuance of certificate of title where questions as to ownership of vehicle or existence of undisclosed security interests exist.

If the State Tax Commission is not satisfied as to the ownership of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home or that there are no undisclosed security interests in it, the commission may accept the application but shall either:

(a) Withhold issuance of a certificate of title until the applicant presents documents reasonably sufficient to satisfy the commission as to the applicant's ownership of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and that there are no undisclosed security interests in it; or

(b) As a condition of issuing a certificate of title, require the applicant or dealer to file with the commission a bond in the form prescribed by the commission and executed by the applicant or dealer and by a person authorized to conduct a surety business in this state, or require the application to be accompanied by the deposit of cash with the commission. The bond or cash shall be in an amount equal to one and one-half (1-½) times the value of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home as determined by the commission and conditioned to indemnify any prior owner and lienholder and any subsequent purchaser of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home or person acquiring any security interest in it, and their respective successors in interest, against any expense, loss or damage, including reasonable attorney's fees, by reason of the issuance of the certificates of title of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home or on account of any defect in or undisclosed security interest upon the right, title and interest of the applicant in and to the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home. Any such interested person has a right of action to recover on the bond or cash for any breach of its conditions, but the aggregate liability of the surety to all persons shall not exceed the amount of the bond or cash. The bond or cash shall be returned at the end of three (3) years unless the commission has been notified of the pendency of an action to recover on the bond or cash or that the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home does not belong to the registered owner or that it is encumbered by an undisclosed lien.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-32; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 12; Laws, 1975, ch. 370; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — Provision for issuance of a distinctive certificate of title for vehicles last previously registered in certain other states or countries unless security is furnished pursuant to this section, see § 63-21-19.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Liability for failure to provide clear title.

1. In general.

Section 63-21-23 is to enable a dealer or owner, otherwise unable to provide the supporting documents to secure a certificate of title from the State Tax Commission, to secure a certificate. It is to protect any other persons who have some claim of ownership in the vehicle. The applicant for the title is the principal and the surety company is the surety. *McBride v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 583 So. 2d 974 (Miss. 1991).

2. Liability for failure to provide clear title.

By executing and filing with the comptroller a surety bond in the amount of \$5,000 obligating itself that in the event an automobile dealer did not fulfill his duties as "designated agent" under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law it would be liable to the extent of the

amount of the bond, a surety company made itself liable to any member of the public to the extent of the amount of the bond for damages resulting from the dealer's failure to fulfill his statutory obligations as a dealer to furnish a buyer of a car with a clear title to a vehicle. Thus, upon the dealer's failure to provide a buyer with a clear title to a vehicle, the dealer became liable to the buyer for whatever damages were caused from such failure, and the surety was also liable up to \$5,000. The surety, in expressing its willingness to be the buyer's surety on a bond to be executed under the provisions of § 63-21-23, did not fulfill its obligations under the bond it executed with respect to the dealer pursuant to § 63-21-13, since the buyer would have had a contingent liability as principle under the bond for any damages caused to others having some claim of ownership in the car. *McBride v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.*, 583 So. 2d 974 (Miss. 1991).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 3 *Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d*, §§ 33:21 et seq. (obtaining certificate of Automobiles and Highway Traffic title or registration).

§ 63-21-25. Refusal to issue certificate of title.

The State Tax Commission shall refuse issuance of a certificate of title:

- (a) If any required fee is not paid; or
- (b) If the commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not the owner of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, or that the application contains a false or fraudulent statement, or that the applicant has failed to furnish required information or documents or any additional information the commission reasonably requires.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-33; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 13; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-27. Replacement of lost, stolen, mutilated or destroyed certificates.

(1) If a certificate of title is lost, stolen, mutilated or destroyed or becomes illegible, the first lienholder or, if none, the owner or legal representative of the owner named in the certificate, as shown by the records of the State Tax Commission, shall promptly make application for and may obtain a replacement upon furnishing information satisfactory to the commission. The replacement certificate of title shall contain the legend "This is a replacement certificate and may be subject to the rights of a person under the original certificate." It shall be mailed to the lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.

(2) The State Tax Commission shall not issue a new certificate of title to a transferee upon application made on replacement certificate until fifteen (15) days after receipt of the application.

(3) A person recovering an original certificate of title for which a replacement has been issued shall promptly surrender the original certificate to the State Tax Commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-34; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 14; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 66, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-29. Issuance of distinctive certificate of title.

If the State Tax Commission is not satisfied that there are no undisclosed security interests created before August 9, 1968, in a previously registered vehicle, or created before July 1, 1999, in a previously registered manufactured home or mobile home, the commission may, in addition to the commission's options under Section 63-21-27, issue a distinctive certificate of title of the vehicle containing the legend "This vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home may be subject to an undisclosed lien" and any other information the commission prescribes.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-50; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 30; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-30. Certificate of title issued for manufactured home classified as real property may be delivered to tax commission for cancellation.

The certificate of title issued for a manufactured home that is classified as real property may be mailed or delivered to the State Tax Commission for

cancellation. The State Tax Commission may require any documents or information that it considers necessary to be mailed or delivered to the commission along with the certificate of title.

SOURCES: Laws, 2003, ch. 376, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2003.)

Editor's Note — Laws, 2003, ch. 376, § 2, provides:

“SECTION 2. The provisions of this act shall be codified in Chapter 21 of Title 63, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-21-31. Procedure upon transfer of interest in vehicle by owner generally.

(1) If an owner transfers his interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, other than by the creation of a security interest, he shall, at the time of the delivery of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, execute an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the State Tax Commission prescribes, and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered to the transferee.

(2) Except as provided in Section 63-21-35, the transferee shall, promptly after delivery to him of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, execute the application for a new certificate of title in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the commission prescribes, and cause the certificate and application to be delivered to a designated agent. If however, the transferor is not a designated agent, the certificate and application shall be processed by a county tax collector or a designated agent.

(3) Upon request of the owner or transferee, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall, unless the transfer was a breach of his security agreement, deliver the certificate to the transferee. Upon receipt of the certificate the transferee shall make application to a designated agent for a new certificate as required by Section 63-21-15. The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the lienholder under his security agreement.

(4) If a security interest is reserved or created at the time of the transfer, the certificate of title shall be retained by or delivered to the person who becomes the lienholder and the parties shall comply with the provisions of Section 63-21-47.

(5) Except as provided in Section 63-21-35, and as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section have been complied with.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-35; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 15; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 3; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Validity of title upon transfer.

Mun. Sch. Dist., 431 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1983).

1. In general.

Entrustment statute did not take precedence over title statute where owner and holder of certificate of title of truck never entrusted to merchant within § 75-2-403(2) and purchaser of truck did not acquire truck from merchant. *Hicks v. Thomas*, 516 So. 2d 1344 (Miss. 1987).

It was not necessary for a purchaser to receive the certificate of origin at the time of delivery of a vehicle before title could pass to him, and thus the sale was complete upon delivery, since § 75-2-403(2), providing that the entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, would prevail over § 63-21-31, providing that transfer of a vehicle is not effective unless at the time of the delivery of the vehicle the owner executes an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee. *Atwood Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. Aberdeen*

2. Validity of title upon transfer.

Individual who had been involved in automobile business and related businesses was charged with knowledge that he could have furnished State Motor Vehicle Comptroller with vehicle identification number on truck and, for nominal fee, found whether there was title certificate outstanding with respect to that truck, and if so, in whose name it appeared, and was therefore not innocent purchaser for value without notice of any claim or defense to title to truck. *Hicks v. Thomas*, 516 So. 2d 1344 (Miss. 1987).

Claim by purchaser that he bought truck from one who had title under claim that vehicle had been abandoned and that his transferor had at least voidable title failed because true owner, certificate of title holder, never directly, implicitly, or otherwise transferred to anyone certificate of title to truck. *Hicks v. Thomas*, 516 So. 2d 1344 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 4.

3 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33:21-33:32.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 90-93.

§ 63-21-33. Procedure upon transfer of title to or from dealers; records; duties of persons in possession of vehicles with improperly assigned titles; title to vehicles obtained by insurers upon payment of claims of loss.

If a dealer buys a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and holds it for resale and procures the certificate of title from the owner or the lienholder within ten (10) days after delivery to him of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, he need not send the certificate to the State Tax Commission. However, upon transferring the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home to another person other than by the creation of a security interest, he shall promptly execute the assignment and warranty of title by a dealer, showing the names and addresses of the transferee and of any lienholder holding a security interest created or reserved at the time of the resale and the date of his security agreement, in the spaces provided therefor on the

certificate or as the State Tax Commission prescribes, and deliver the certificate to a designated agent with the transferee's application for a new certificate.

Every dealer shall maintain for five (5) years a record in the form the State Tax Commission prescribes of every vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home bought, sold or exchanged by him or received by him for sale or exchange, which shall be open to inspection by a representative of the State Tax Commission or patrol or peace officer during reasonable business hours.

Any person found to be in possession of a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home with an improperly assigned title which fails to identify the transferee shall immediately establish ownership of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, register the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home and pay the required tax and penalty. The vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home shall be impounded by state or local law enforcement officials until such time as the person in possession can prove ownership or until the rightful owner is located. In the event the rightful owner cannot be established within thirty (30) days, the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home shall be deemed abandoned and shall be disposed of as provided by law.

An insurance company which obtains title to a motor vehicle as a result of paying a total loss claim resulting from collision, fire, flood or other cause shall obtain a salvage certificate of title in its name for such vehicle from the State Tax Commission. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to vehicles ten (10) years old or older with a value of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$1,500.00) or less, or to vehicles with damage which requires the replacement of five (5) or fewer minor components, which such insurer may dispose of by endorsing change in ownership on the certificate of title using space reserved for reassignment of title by licensed dealer without obtaining a salvage certificate of title.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-36; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 16; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 4; Laws, 1991, ch. 575, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 36.

§ 63-21-35. Procedure upon transfer of interest of owner by operation of law.

(1) If the interest of an owner in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home passes to another other than by voluntary transfer the transferee shall, except as provided in subsection (2), promptly deliver to a county tax collector or a designated agent the last certificate of title, if available, proof of the transfer, and make application for a new certificate in the form the State Tax Commission prescribes.

(2) If the interest of the owner is terminated or the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is sold under a security agreement by a lienholder named in the certificate of title, the transferee shall promptly make application to a county tax collector or a designated agent for a new certificate in the form the commission prescribes. The application shall be accompanied by the last certificate of title and an affidavit made by or on behalf of the lienholder that the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home was repossessed and that the interest of the owner was lawfully terminated or sold pursuant to the terms of the security agreement.

If the lienholder succeeds to the interest of the owner and holds the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home for resale, he need not secure a new certificate of title but, upon transfer to another person, shall promptly mail or deliver to the transferee the certificate, affidavit and other documents required to be sent to the commission by the transferee. The transferee shall promptly make application to a county tax collector or a designated agent for a new certificate in the form prescribed by the commission.

(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this section, a person holding a certificate of title whose interest in the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home has been extinguished or transferred other than by voluntary transfer shall mail or deliver the certificate to the commission upon request of the commission. The delivery of the certificate pursuant to the request of the commission does not affect the rights of the person surrendering the certificate. The action of the commission in issuing a new certificate of title as provided herein is not conclusive upon the rights of an owner or lienholder named in the old certificate.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-37; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 17; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 5; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 18, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 33 et seq. **CJS.** 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 90-93.

§ 63-21-37. Issuance of new certificate of title; disposition of surrendered certificates.

The State Tax Commission, upon receipt of a properly assigned certificate of title, with an application for a new certificate of title, the required fee and any other documents required by the commission, shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner and mail it to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.

The commission, upon receipt of an application for a new certificate of title by a transferee other than by voluntary transfer, with proof of the transfer, the required fee and any other documents required by law, shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner. If the outstanding certificate of title is not delivered to the commission, the commission shall make demand therefor from the holder thereof.

The commission shall file every surrendered certificate of title, or a microfilm of every such certificate, for a period of time deemed necessary by it in order to permit the tracing of title of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home designated therein.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-38; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 18; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 19, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-39. Procedure where vehicle scrapped, dismantled or destroyed; obtaining title on vehicle with salvage certificate of title; Salvage Certificate of Title Fund; regulations.

(1) An owner who scraps, dismantles or destroys a vehicle and a person who purchases a vehicle as scrap or to be dismantled or destroyed shall indicate same on the back of the certificate of title and shall immediately cause the certificate of title and any other documents required by the State Tax Commission to be mailed or delivered to the State Tax Commission for cancellation. A certificate of title of the vehicle shall not again be issued except upon application containing the information the State Tax Commission requires, accompanied by a certificate of inspection in the form and content specified in Section 63-21-15(5) and proof of payment of a fee as provided in subsection (2) of this section if a clear title is to be issued.

(2) For the purpose of requesting a clear title on a vehicle with a salvage certificate of title, every owner of a vehicle that has been issued a salvage certificate of title in this state or any other state which has been restored in this state to its operating condition which existed prior to the event which caused the salvage certificate of title to issue shall make application to the State Tax Commission, accompanied by a certificate of inspection in the form and content specified in Section 63-21-15(5) and the payment of a fee of Seventy-five Dollars (\$75.00). All such monies shall be collected by the Department of Public Safety and paid to the State Treasurer for deposit in a special fund that is hereby created in the State Treasury to be known as the "Salvage Certificate of Title Fund." Monies in the special fund may be expended by the Department of Public Safety, upon appropriation by the Legislature. The State Tax Commission shall establish by regulation the minimum requirements by which a vehicle which has been issued a salvage certificate of title may be issued a clear title.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-39; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 19; Laws, 1991, ch. 575, § 3, eff from and after September 1, 1991.

Cross References — Issuance of certificate of title for vehicle for which salvage certificate of title has been issued, see § 63-21-15.

§ 63-21-40. Issuance of salvage certificates of title for damaged manufactured or mobile homes.

(1) An owner who scraps, dismantles or destroys a manufactured home or mobile home for which a certificate of title has been issued, and a person who purchases a manufactured home or mobile home as scrap or to be dismantled or destroyed for which a certificate of title has been issued, shall make such an indication on the back of the certificate of title and shall immediately cause the certificate of title and any other documents required by the State Tax Commission to be mailed or delivered to the commission for cancellation.

(2) An insurance company which as a result of paying a total loss claim becomes the owner of a mobile home or manufactured home and obtains the insured's certificate of title, within seventy-two (72) hours after obtaining the title shall apply to the State Tax Commission for a new certificate of title, surrendering with its application the current certificate of title, including documentation to show if the title applied for is for a salvage mobile home or salvage manufactured home, and including a signed statement on original company letterhead that states: () collision damage, () flood damage, () fire damage, () wind damage, or () other damage. If the damage is "other damage," the company shall describe the nature of the damage. The insurance company shall staple this statement to the certificate of title and make a notation on the face of the certificate of title. The application shall be made by the insurance company in the manner and form prescribed and provided by the State Tax Commission. The provisions of this subsection do not apply to a mobile home or manufactured home that is twenty (20) years old or older.

(3) Brands appearing on certificates of title issued by this state or another state that reveal a pertinent fact or facts about a mobile home or manufactured home shall be continued on certificates of title issued by this state. The State Tax Commission shall brand a certificate of title with "collision damage," "flood damage," "fire damage," "wind damage," or "other damage" where the immediate previous certificate of title was issued by this state. The State Tax Commission shall brand a certificate of title to be issued by this state with the same or other brands where the immediate previous certificate of title was issued by another state and such title indicates the same or other brands are appropriate. Such certificate of title shall not attest to the condition of the mobile home or manufactured home at the time the certificate of title is issued or to whether the mobile home or manufactured home has been rebuilt according to any applicable federal or state laws, rules or regulations.

SOURCES: Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Joint Legislative Committee Note — Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (1). The word "the" was inserted between "to" and "commission" so that "mailed or delivered to commission for cancellation" now reads "mailed or delivered to the commission for cancellation. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting.

§ 63-21-41. Applicability of chapter to particular liens and security interests.

This chapter does not apply to or affect:

(a) A lien given by statute or rule of law to a supplier of services or materials for the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home;

(b) A lien given by statute to the United States, this state, or any political subdivision of this state;

(c) A security interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home for sale; however, a buyer in the ordinary course of trade from the manufacturer or dealer takes title free of the security interest.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-40; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 20; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 20, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — Notice of and rights at forfeiture proceedings under alcoholic beverage control law for lienholders and secured parties, see §§ 67-1-93, 67-1-95.

Security interests under Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-9-101 et seq.

Requirement for filing of purchase money security interest on motor vehicle, see § 75-9-302.

§ 63-21-42. Creation of security interest by transaction involving motor vehicle or trailers which provides for adjustment of rental price.

In the case of motor vehicles, trailers, manufactured homes or mobile homes, notwithstanding any other provision of law, a transaction does not create a sale or security interest merely because it provides that the rental price is permitted or required to be adjusted under the agreement either upward or downward by reference to the amount realized upon sale or other disposition of the motor vehicle, trailer, manufactured home or mobile home.

SOURCES: Laws, 1994, ch. 445, § 5; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-21-43. Perfection of security interests.

(1) Unless excepted by Section 63-21-41, a security interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home of a type which a certificate of title is required is not valid against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home unless perfected as provided in this chapter.

(2)(a) A security interest is perfected at the time the owner signs a security agreement describing the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, the secured party gives value, the owner has rights in the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, and an application for certificate of title signed by the owner is presented to a designated agent.

(b) The designated agent shall deliver to the State Tax Commission the existing certificate of title, if any, an application for a certificate of title containing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his security agreement, and the required fee, but the security interest will perfect at the time the requirements of subsection 2(a) of this section are met.

(3) If a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is subject to a security interest when brought into this state, the validity of the security interest is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home was when the security interest attached, subject to the following:

(a) If the parties understood at the time the security interest attached that the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home would be kept in this state and it was brought into this state within thirty (30) days thereafter for purposes other than transportation through this state, the validity of the security interest in this state is determined by the law of this state.

(b) If the security interest was perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home was when the security interest attached, the following rules apply:

(i) If the name of the lienholder is shown on an existing certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction, his security interest continues perfected in this state.

(ii) If the name of the lienholder is not shown on an existing certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction the security interest continues perfected in this state for four (4) months after a first certificate of title of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home is issued in this state, and also thereafter if, within the period of four (4) months, it is perfected in this state. The security interest may also be perfected in this state after the expiration of the period of four (4) months, in which case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state.

(c) If the security interest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home was when the security interest attached, it may be perfected in this state, in which case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state.

(d) A security interest may be perfected under paragraph (b) (ii) or paragraph (c) of this subsection, either as provided in subsection (2), or by the holder of the lien created out of this state delivering to a county tax collector or a designated agent a notice of security interest in the form the State Tax Commission prescribes, together with documents to support the security interest as required by the State Tax Commission and the required fee. The county tax collector or a designated agent shall process said notice in the manner prescribed by the State Tax Commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-41; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 21; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 6; Laws, 1977, ch. 313; Laws, 1995, ch. 437, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — Continued applicability of security interest upon extension, renewal or refinancing of loan, see § 63-19-43.

Security interests under Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-9-101 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.
2. Relationship with other laws.

1. In general.

Since interest in motor vehicles was not perfected according to former applicable version of Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law, interest was not secured and not valid against bank's perfected lien. *Regan v. Citizens Bank*, 675 So. 2d 1239 (Miss. 1996).

A lender's attached purchase money security interest in an automobile dealership's inventory of used vehicles was not properly perfected under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law where the lender never filed a financing statement. *Ford Motor Credit Co. v. State Bank & Trust Co.*, 571 So. 2d 937 (Miss. 1990).

2. Relationship with other laws.

Security interest in automobiles could not be perfected by using Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) method for nontitled personal property; interest in motor vehicles was not valid unless the security interest was perfected pursuant to applicable version of Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law. *Regan v. Citizens Bank*, 675 So. 2d 1239 (Miss. 1996).

The statutory requirement that an application for a certificate of title must include the vehicle owner's name was sat-

isfied by an application that listed a sole proprietorship as owner since the term "firm," as used in the definition of the term "person" meant a sole proprietorship; thus, the fact that title was so held did not defeat perfection of a lienholder's security interest in the vehicle. Further, a failure to list all of the facts for an application under § 63-21-15 does not defeat the perfection of a security interest under § 63-21-43, which does not require that the owner's name be listed. *GMAC v. Pongetti*, 608 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1979).

Where assignee of automobile conditional sales contract perfected his security interest in Alabama in 1970 and later in June of 1970 the conditional owner moved to Mississippi and neither the conditional owner nor the assignee of the conditional sales contract made application for a Mississippi certificate of title and no financing statement was filed in Mississippi the owner of the conditional sales contract had a security interest in the automobile to remain in effect for only 4 months after the automobile was brought into Mississippi and such security interest did not remain perfected thereafter under either Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law, Code 1942, § 8125-21 or under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, Code 1942, § 41A:9-103. *In re Partain*, 351 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1972).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 48 et seq.

CJS. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 97-104.

§ 63-21-45. Procedure upon creation of security interest.

(1) If an owner creates a security interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home:

(a) The owner shall immediately execute the application in the space provided therefor on the certificate of title, or on a separate form the State Tax Commission prescribes to name the lienholder on the certificate showing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his security

agreement, and cause the certificate, application and the required fee to be delivered to the lienholder.

(b) The lienholder shall immediately cause the certificate, application and required fee to be mailed or delivered to a county tax collector or a designated agent.

(c) Upon request of the owner or subordinate lienholder, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall either mail or deliver the certificate to the subordinate lienholder for delivery to a county tax collector or a designated agent or, upon receipt from the subordinate lienholder of the owner's application and the required fee, mail or deliver them to a county tax collector or a designated agent with the certificate. The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the first lienholder under his security agreement.

(d) Upon receipt of the certificate of title, application and the required fee, the State Tax Commission shall either endorse on the certificate or issue a new certificate containing the name and address of the new lienholder, and mail the certificate to the first lienholder named in it.

(2) Information evidencing a bank or lending institution's lien or other security interest in a motor vehicle's, manufactured home's or mobile home's certificate of title may be transferred by electronic means as provided in Section 63-21-16.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-42; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 22; Laws, 1970, ch. 483, § 7; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — Security interests under Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-9-101 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Section 63-21-45 does not require the lienholder personally to mail or deliver the papers to the issuing agent, nor does it

imply loss of lien upon failure to follow its directive. *South Miss. Fin. Co. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n*, 605 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1992).

§ 63-21-47. Assignment of security interest by lienholder.

A lienholder may assign, absolutely or otherwise, his security interest in the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home to a person other than the owner without affecting the interest of the owner or the validity of the security interest. However, any person without notice of the assignment is protected in dealing with the lienholder as the holder of the security interest and the lienholder remains liable for any obligations as lienholder until the assignee is named as lienholder on the certificate in the manner prescribed by the State Tax Commission.

The commission shall file each assignment received by the commission with the required fee, and note the assignee as lienholder upon the record of notices of security interests maintained by the commission.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-43; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 23; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 24, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

Cross References — Effect of assignment of contract rights under Uniform Commercial Code, generally, see § 75-9-318.

§ 63-21-49. Procedure upon release of security interest.

(1) Upon the satisfaction of a security interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home for which the certificate of title is in the possession of the lienholder, he shall, within ten (10) days after demand and, in any event, within thirty (30) days, execute a release of his security interest, in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the State Tax Commission prescribes, and mail or deliver the certificate and release to the next lienholder named therein, or, if none, to the owner or any person who delivers to the lienholder an authorization from the owner to receive the certificate. The owner other than a dealer holding the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home for resale, shall promptly cause the certificate and release to be mailed or delivered to the commission, who shall release the lienholder's rights on the certificate or issue a new certificate.

(2) Upon the satisfaction of a security interest in a vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home for which the certificate of title is in the possession of a prior lienholder, the lienholder whose security interest is satisfied shall within ten (10) days after demand and, in any event, within thirty (30) days execute a release in the form the commission prescribes and deliver the release to the owner or any person who delivers to the lienholder an authorization from the owner to receive it. The lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall either deliver the certificate to the owner, or the person authorized by him, for delivery to the commission or, upon receipt of the release, mail or deliver it with the certificate to the commission who shall release the subordinate lienholder's rights on the certificate or issue a new certificate.

(3) Upon receipt of the aforementioned releases of security interests, the commission shall file each release in the manner prescribed by the commission and note the same upon the records of notices of security interests maintained by it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-44; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 24; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 25, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

Cross References — Release of collateral under Uniform Commercial Code generally, see § 75-9-406.

§ 63-21-51. Duty of lienholder named in notice of security interest to disclose security agreement and secured indebtedness.

A lienholder named in a notice of security interest filed by the State Tax Commission shall, upon written request of the owner or of another lienholder named on the certificate, disclose any pertinent information as to his security agreement and the indebtedness secured by it.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-45; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 25; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 67, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-53. Perfection of unsatisfied security interest in previously registered vehicle.

If a security interest in a previously registered vehicle is perfected under any other applicable law of this state as of August 9, 1968, and if a security interest in a previously registered manufactured home or mobile home is perfected under any other applicable law of this state as of July 1, 1999, the security interest continues perfected until its perfection lapses under the law under which it was perfected. This would apply only to vehicles, manufactured homes or mobile homes not required to be titled under this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-51; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 31; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 26, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-21-55. Exclusivity of procedure in chapter for perfecting and giving notice of security interests.

Except as provided in Section 63-21-53, the method provided in this chapter of perfecting and giving notice of security interests subject to this chapter is exclusive. Security interests subject to this chapter are hereby exempted from the provisions of law which otherwise require or relate to the filing and recording of instruments creating or evidencing security interests.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-46; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 26, eff from and after passage (approved August 9, 1968).

§ 63-21-57. Filing and recording of notices of security interests; examination of record prior to issuance or reissuance of certificate of title.

The State Tax Commission shall file each notice of security interest received by the commission with the required fee and maintain a record of all notices of security interests filed by the commission:

- (a) Alphabetically, under the name of the owner;

(b) Under the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home identification number;

(c) Under the certificate of title number; and

(d) In the discretion of the commission, by any other method it determines.

The commission, before issuing or reissuing a certificate of title, shall check the name of the owner and the certificate of title number of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home against the record above provided for.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-52; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 32; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 27, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

Cross References — Filing of security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, see §§ 75-9-401 et seq.

§ 63-21-59. Suspension or revocation of certificate of title.

The State Tax Commission shall suspend or revoke a certificate of title, upon notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard, if the commission finds:

(a) The certificate of title was fraudulently procured or erroneously issued, or

(b) The vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home has been scrapped, dismantled or destroyed.

Suspension or revocation of a certificate of title does not in itself affect the validity of a security interest noted on it.

When the commission suspends or revokes a certificate of title, the owner or person in possession of it shall, immediately upon receiving notice of the suspension or revocation, mail or deliver the certificate to the commission.

The commission may seize and impound any certificate of title which has been suspended or revoked.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-47; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 27; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 28, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 46.

§ 63-21-61. Right of review when certificate of title refused, suspended, or revoked, or other right denied under chapter.

The owner of any motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home for which the State Tax Commission has refused to issue a certificate of title, or has suspended or revoked the certificate of title thereon, or any person having an interest in such motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home, or having a lien thereon, who feels that he has been denied any right under this chapter by the commission, or its designated agents, or his designated agents, may, within ninety (90) days thereafter, file a petition in the county or circuit court of either of the counties hereinafter designated for a hearing or review of such action of the commission. The judge of such court shall set the matter for hearing or review upon not less than ten (10) days' notice after the execution of proper process or citation duly served upon the party or parties made defendant thereto, and shall thereupon hear such cause and enter such order as may be proper. Such hearing may be heard either in term time or vacation. Such petition may be filed in either the county or circuit court of the county wherein any petitioner resides; or, in the event of a corporation or an association, in any county in which it is domiciled or does business; or in the county in which such certificate of title was issued; or in the county in which the office of the State Tax Commission is located.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-49; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 29; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 29, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-63. Schedule of fees.

There shall be paid to the State Tax Commission for issuing and processing documents required by this chapter, fees according to the following schedule:

(1) Each application for certificate of title	\$4.00
(2) Each application for replacement or corrected certificate of title	4.00
(3) Each suspension or revocation of certificate of title	4.00
(4) Each notice of security interest	4.00
(5) Each release of security interest	4.00
(6) Each assignment by lienholder	4.00
(7) Each application for information as to the status of the title of a vehicle	4.00

The designated agent may add the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00) to each document processed for which a fee is charged to be retained as his commission for services rendered. All other fees collected shall be remitted to the State Tax Commission.

If more than one (1) transaction be involved in any application on a single vehicle and if supported by all required documents, the fee charged by the

State Tax Commission and by the designated agent for processing and issuing shall be considered as only one (1) transaction.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-53; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 33; Laws, 1980, ch. 427, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 68, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-64. Fees paid to State Tax Commission for issuing and processing necessary documents.

There shall be paid to the State Tax Commission for issuing and processing documents required by this chapter, fees for manufactured homes or mobile homes according to the following schedule:

- (a) Each application for certificate of title.....\$ 8.00
- (b) Each application for replacement or corrected certificate of title 8.00
- (c) Each suspension or revocation of certificate of title.....8.00
- (d) Each notice of security interest.....8.00
- (e) Each release of security interest.....8.00
- (f) Each assignment by lienholder.....8.00
- (g) Each application for information as to the status of the title of a manufactured home or mobile home.....8.00

The designated agent may add the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00) to each document processed for which a fee is charged to be retained as his commission for services rendered. All other fees collected shall be remitted to the State Tax Commission.

For each fee collected according to the schedule provided in this section, Four Dollars (\$4.00) of each such fee shall be paid to the State Tax Commission to defray the costs of the commission in processing and issuing such documents. The disposition of fees collected under this section shall be governed by the provisions of this section and not by any other provisions of this chapter.

If more than one (1) transaction be involved in any application on a single manufactured home or mobile home and if supported by all required documents, the fee charged by the tax commission's designated agent for processing and issuing shall be considered as only one (1) transaction.

SOURCES: Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 32, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-21-65. Disposition of fees.

Except as provided in Section 63-21-64, the State Tax Commission shall pay into the General Fund the fees collected under this chapter. As much of such fees as authorized by the Legislature shall be used by the State Tax Commission to defray the cost of carrying out the duties of the State Tax Commission including the maintenance of the automated statewide motor vehicle and manufactured housing registration system.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-54; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 34; Laws, 1980, ch. 427, § 3; Laws, 1981, ch. 309, § 5; Laws, 1983, ch. 320, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 303; Laws, 1989, ch. 393, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 30, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Cross References — Provisions relating to the Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services, see §§ 25-53-1 et seq.

Requirement that portion of motor vehicle registration or tag fees be paid into the special fund in the state treasury established in this section, see § 27-19-99.

Automated statewide motor vehicle title registration system, generally, see § 63-21-18.

§ 63-21-67. Use of duplicate copy of application for certificate of title as permit to operate motor vehicle.

The rules and regulations promulgated by the State Tax Commission shall make suitable provisions for the use by an applicant of the duplicate copy of his application for a certificate of title to serve as a permit for the operation of the motor vehicle or the use and occupation of a manufactured home or mobile home described in the application until the commission either issues the certificate of title of such motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home or refuses to issue the certificate. The commission and every designated agent receiving an application for the certificate of title, when the provisions of this chapter have been otherwise complied with, shall deliver to the applicant the duplicate copy of his application which shall contain a suitable permit for the purposes mentioned in this paragraph.

In the event the commission refuses to issue the certificate of title the applicant shall, immediately upon receiving written notice from the commission that such certificate will not be issued for the reason or reasons stated in the notice, deliver or mail to the commission by registered mail the duplicate copy of his application containing the permit mentioned in the previous paragraph of this section and, in the case of a vehicle, the current privilege license tag which was issued for the vehicle. The motor vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home described in said application shall not be operated on the highways or other public places of this state or used or occupied after the applicant receives notice that the certificate will not be issued unless its operation is subsequently authorized by the commission either by the issuance of a new permit or by a certificate of title. If for any reason the said duplicate copy of the application for certificate of title and, in the case of a vehicle, the current privilege license tag which was issued for the vehicle in question is not received by the commission within ten (10) calendar days after the commission mails written notice to the applicant that it will not issue the certificate of title applied for, the commission or, at the request of the commission, any state highway patrolman, sheriff or other peace officer of this state, is authorized and empowered to require and compel the surrender of said duplicate copy of the application for certificate of title and, in the case of a vehicle, the said current privilege license tag. The commission, after it obtains possession of said duplicate copy of application for certificate of title and, in the case of a

vehicle, said current privilege license tag, is authorized to retain same until it is satisfied that said applicant is entitled to receive a certificate of title of the vehicle, manufactured home or mobile home in question.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-29; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 9; Laws, 1999, ch. 556, § 31, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-69. Application for and issuance of certificate of title and privilege license upon acquisition of vehicle.

When a vehicle subject to titling under this chapter is acquired from a dealer or another person by sale or otherwise, the new owner of the vehicle shall have seven (7) full working days, exclusive of the date of delivery, within which to make application for the required privilege license tag.

No privilege license tag shall be issued by any tax collector or the State Tax Commission if the vehicle is subject to titling under this chapter unless the vehicle owner makes an application therefor and shall thereupon tender his application for certificate of title with the application for a privilege license. If, however, the vehicle owner already has a certificate of title, then the original certificate or, if his original certificate be in the hands of a lienholder, then his duplicate certificate or other official document as prescribed by the State Tax Commission shall be tendered to the tax collector or the State Tax Commission. The tax collector or the State Tax Commission, as the case may be, shall thereupon enter the number of the application or certificate on the privilege license application and on the privilege license receipt.

The provisions and requirements of this section implement the provisions and requirements of Section 27-19-59 and Section 27-19-61. Nothing contained in this section or in this chapter shall in any way amend or supersede any of the existing statutes of this state or any of the provisions or requirements of such statutes with respect to the registration of vehicles and making applications for privilege licenses for vehicles. However, the State Tax Commission shall by suitable rules and regulations provide for the implementation of the requirements of this section and this chapter with the requirements of existing statutes with respect to the registration of vehicles and with respect to obtaining privilege licenses therefor.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-57; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 37; Laws, 1977, ch. 484, § 15; Laws, 1987, ch. 338, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

A person may retitle a vehicle without purchasing a new tag. Bolen, May 16, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0256.

§ 63-21-71. Penalties for violations of chapter generally.

It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter unless such violation is by the law of this state declared to be a felony.

Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars (\$500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-55; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 35, eff from and after passage (approved August 9, 1968).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Based on this section and Section 63-21-73, any violation under Title 63, Chapter 21 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, is a misdemeanor unless specif-

ically declared to be a felony by some other statute. Head, May 10, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0289.

§ 63-21-73. Penalty for felonies.

Any person who is convicted of a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter herein or by the laws of this state declared to constitute a felony shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years, or by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars (\$500.00) nor more than five thousand dollars (\$5,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-56; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 36, eff from and after passage (approved August 9, 1968).

Cross References — Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Based on Section 63-21-71 and this section, any violation under Title 63, Chapter 21 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, is a misdemeanor unless specif-

ically declared to be a felony by some other statute. Head, May 10, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0289.

§ 63-21-75. Enforcement of chapter.

The State Tax Commission is charged with the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the commission is hereby authorized and empowered to call upon any and all law enforcement agencies and officers of this state for such assistance as it may deem necessary in order to assure such enforcement. It shall be the duty of such law enforcement agencies and officers

to render such assistance to the State Tax Commission when called upon by the commission to so do.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-61; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 41; Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 69, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-21-77. Construction of chapter.

Section headings contained in this chapter shall not be deemed to govern, limit, modify, or in any manner affect the scope, meaning or intent of the provisions of any section of this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-58; Laws, 1968, ch. 531, § 38, eff from and after passage (approved August 9, 1968).

CHAPTER 23

Abandoned Motor Vehicles

SEC.	
63-23-1.	Purpose of chapter.
63-23-3.	"Abandoned motor vehicle" defined.
63-23-5.	Sale or disposal of vehicle generally; notification of lienholders; report of sale; disposition of proceeds of sale.
63-23-7.	Determination of status of vehicle under title law prior to disposition of vehicle.
63-23-9.	Notification of registered owner and lienholders of record prior to disposition of vehicle.
63-23-11.	Claim of vehicle prior to sale.

§ 63-23-1. Purpose of chapter.

The intent of this chapter is to provide a means for removing abandoned motor vehicles from the right-of-way and open lands of the state to enhance the beauty of the countryside and the health and welfare of its citizens. It is also to provide a means of relieving automobile dealers, repairmen, and others dealing in motor vehicles from unnecessary storage of deteriorated cars which prevent the use of such floorspace or property for storage for hire or use in their business, and is therefore in the public interest.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-104; Laws, 1970, ch. 481, § 4, eff 60 days after passage (approved April 6, 1970).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. State or municipal towing, impounding, or destruction of motor vehicles parked or abandoned on streets or highways. 32 A.L.R.4th 728.

§ 63-23-3. "Abandoned motor vehicle" defined.

For the purposes of this chapter, an "abandoned motor vehicle" shall mean a motor vehicle as defined by the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law:

(a) which has been left by the owner, or some person acting for the owner, with an automobile dealer, repairman or wrecker service for repair or for some other reason and has not been called for by such owner or other person within a period of forty (40) days after the time agreed upon or within forty (40) days after such vehicle is turned over to such dealer, repairman or wrecker service when no time is agreed upon.

(b) which is left unattended on a public street, road or highway or other public property for a period of at least five (5) days.

(c) which has been lawfully towed onto the property of another at the written request of a law enforcement officer and left there for a period of not less than forty (40) days without any one having made claim thereto.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-101; Laws, 1970, ch. 481, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 448, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1974).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Truck sitting in yard of landlord, whose tenant was in arrears on his rent and had vacated premises, failed to fit any description of abandoned vehicle under statute. Mere fact that truck may have been left on

landlord's property and in inoperable condition is of no moment, and for purchaser to profit on this point, he would have to show that truck was abandoned in law, not merely in fact. *Hicks v. Thomas*, 516 So. 2d 1344 (Miss. 1987).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

If the Department of Public Safety seizes vehicles pursuant to Section 41-29-153 and it decides not to seek forfeiture of the vehicles and notifies the owners to come and get them, if the owners fail to retrieve their vehicles, the Department of Public Safety may not treat the vehicles as abandoned vehicles as defined in this section and may not dispose of them pursuant to Section 63-23-5. Head, August 23, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0553.

Municipalities cannot immobilize a vehicle for five days and then declare it to be abandoned and sell it; however, if vehicles remain at the impoundment lot or other storage facility for the required 120 days, after due notice has been provided to the owner, they may be deemed abandoned and sold. Pace, March 10, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0111.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. State or municipal towing, impounding, or destruction of motor vehicles

parked or abandoned on streets or highways. 32 A.L.R.4th 728.

§ 63-23-5. Sale or disposal of vehicle generally; notification of lienholders; report of sale; disposition of proceeds of sale.

(1) Any automobile dealer, wrecker service, or repair service owner, or any person or party on whose property a motor vehicle is lawfully towed at the written request of a law enforcement officer, who shall have an abandoned motor vehicle on his property, may sell, free and clear of all claims such motor vehicle by public auction, or if the abandoned motor vehicle has no market value, may dispose of the same after having received at least two (2) written statements from licensed automobile dealers as to the worthlessness of such motor vehicle and after compliance with subsection (2) of this section and Section 63-23-9. An abandoned motor vehicle as defined by Section 63-23-3(b) shall not be sold at auction until thirty (30) days from date of removal from a public street, road or highway.

(2) The person authorized to execute the sale or disposal of an abandoned motor vehicle shall notify, within ten (10) days of receipt of such vehicle, any Mississippi lienholder on such vehicle that unless a claim on the vehicle is made within thirty (30) days of such notice, the vehicle will be sold or destroyed.

(3) After the sale of any vehicle as set out hereinabove is made, the person or officer designated and making the sale of such property shall promptly upon completion of the sale deliver to the chancery clerk a list or itemization of the property sold, the amount paid for each item, the person to whom each item

was sold, and all moneys received from such sale, the gross charges levied by the person making the sale against the property sold and the net amount paid over to the chancery clerk. Any sale made by any person, officer, corporation or association, shall have attached to the report of sale a sworn statement certifying as to the date such personal property or items sold first came into his possession or was abandoned on his premises and the date said personal property or item was sold.

(4) The proceeds of the sale in excess of repair, towing and storage expenses and all expenses incurred in connection with a sale when a sale is made under the provisions of this chapter, shall escheat to the county and shall be paid over to the chancery clerk to be placed into the general fund of the county in which the vehicle is abandoned. However, in those municipalities availing themselves of the provisions of Section 21-39-21, the proceeds of the sale in excess of the repairs, towing, storage or other necessary expenses incurred shall escheat to the general fund of the municipality.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, §§ 8125-102, 8125-103; Laws, 1970, ch. 481, §§ 2, 3; Laws, 1974, ch. 448, § 2; Laws, 1990, ch. 410, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References — Bidding for forfeited beverages and property under alcoholic beverages control law, see § 67-1-18.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

If the Department of Public Safety seizes vehicles pursuant to Section 41-29-153 and it decides not to seek forfeiture of the vehicles and notifies the owners to come and get them, if the owners fail to retrieve their vehicles, the Department of Public Safety may not treat the vehicles as abandoned vehicles as defined in Section 63-23-3 and may not dispose of them pursuant to this section. Head, August 23, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0553.

Municipalities cannot immobilize a vehicle for five days and then declare it to be abandoned and sell it; however, if vehicles remain at the impoundment lot or other storage facility for the required 120 days, after due notice has been provided to the owner, they may be deemed abandoned and sold. Pace, March 10, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0111.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Garagemen's lien: modern view as to validity of statute permitting sale of vehicle without hearing. 64 A.L.R.3d 814.

§ 63-23-7. Determination of status of vehicle under title law prior to disposition of vehicle.

Prior to disposition of an abandoned motor vehicle any automobile dealer, wrecker service or repair service owner, or any person on whose property such a vehicle is lawfully towed at the written request of a law enforcement officer, shall inquire of the State Tax Commission as to status of the vehicle in regard to the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law. Said inquiry shall provide the

description of the vehicle including the vehicle identification number. Upon request of the State Tax Commission, satisfactory evidence must be furnished as to abandonment in compliance with this chapter. Upon receipt of notification of the foregoing, the State Tax Commission shall advise any automobile dealer, wrecker service or repair service owner, or any person on whose property such a vehicle is lawfully towed at the written request of a law enforcement officer, of proper titling procedures, where indicated, depending upon method of disposition of the vehicle.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-102; Laws, 1970, ch. 481, § 2, eff 60 days after passage (approved April 6, 1970); Laws, 2001, ch. 596, § 70, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Editor's Note — The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See § 27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

§ 63-23-9. Notification of registered owner and lienholders of record prior to disposition of vehicle.

The last-known registered owner of an abandoned motor vehicle and all lienholders of record, when such information is reasonably obtainable, shall be notified by registered or certified mail that such vehicle will be sold pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. Said notice shall give such owner and lienholders the date, time and place of sale and name of the person or party who has custody of such vehicle.

If the identity of the last registered owner cannot be determined, or if the registration contains no address for the owner, or if it is impossible to determine with reasonable certainty the identity and addresses of all lienholders, notice by three publications once each week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the motor vehicle was abandoned shall be sufficient to meet all requirements of notice pursuant to this chapter.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-102; Laws, 1970, ch. 481, § 2, eff 60 days after passage (approved April 6, 1970).

Cross References — Compliance with provisions of this section prior to sale of vehicle, see § 63-23-5.

Notice of forfeiture proceedings under alcoholic beverage control law to owner or secured party, see § 67-1-93.

§ 63-23-11. Claim of vehicle prior to sale.

Any person proving ownership or any lienholder may claim subject motor vehicle at any time prior to sale by paying towing, repair, storage and other necessary expenses incurred.

SOURCES: Codes, 1942, § 8125-102; Laws, 1970, ch. 481, § 2, eff 60 days after passage (approved April 6, 1970).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. State or municipal towing, impounding, or destruction of motor vehicles parked or abandoned on streets or highways. 32 A.L.R.4th 728.

CHAPTER 25

Motor Vehicle Chop Shop, Stolen and Altered Property Act

SEC.

63-25-1.	Short title.
63-25-3.	Definitions.
63-25-5.	Offenses and penalties.
63-25-7.	Seizure of property.
63-25-9.	Forfeiture of property.
63-25-11.	Civil proceedings against offenders.
63-25-13.	Scrap processors to maintain records identifying owners and vehicle identification numbers; law enforcement agencies authorized to inspect records and vehicles; penalties.

§ 63-25-1. Short title.

Sections 63-25-1 through 63-25-11 shall be known and may be cited as the "Motor Vehicle Chop Shop, Stolen and Altered Property Act."

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Editor's Note — Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 10, provides as follows:

"SECTION 10. If any section, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase or any part of this act shall be held invalid or unconstitutional, such holding shall not affect any other section, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase or part of this act which is not in and of itself invalid or unconstitutional. Moreover, if the application of this act, or of any portion of it, to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect the application of this act to other persons or circumstances which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application."

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Criminal liability, under state law, concerning illegal removal or alteration of vehicle identification number, including sale or possession of altered motor vehicles or parts. 107 A.L.R.5th 567.

§ 63-25-3. Definitions.

As used in Sections 63-25-1 through 63-25-11 the following terms shall have the meaning ascribed to them herein:

(a) "Chop shop" means any building, lot or other premise where one or more persons are or have been knowingly engaged in altering, destroying, disassembling, dismantling, reassembling or knowingly storing any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part known to be illegally obtained by theft, fraud or conspiracy to defraud, in order to either:

(i) Alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate or remove the identity, including the vehicle identification number of such motor vehicle or motor vehicle part in order to misrepresent the identity of such motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, or to prevent the identification of such motor vehicle or motor vehicle part; or

(ii) Sell or dispose of such motor vehicle or motor vehicle part.

(b) "Motor vehicle" includes every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, which is self-propelled or which may be connected to and towed by a self-propelled device, and shall also include any and all other land-based devices which are self-propelled but which are not designed for use upon a highway, including but not limited to farm machinery and construction equipment.

(c) "Person" includes a natural person, company, corporation, unincorporated association, partnership, professional corporation and any other legal entity.

(d) "Unidentifiable" means that the uniqueness of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part cannot be established by either expert law enforcement investigative personnel specially trained and experienced in motor vehicle theft investigation procedures and motor vehicle identification examination techniques, or by expert employees of not-for-profit motor vehicle theft prevention agencies specially trained and experienced in motor vehicle theft investigation procedures and motor vehicle identification examination techniques.

(e) "Vehicle identification number" means a number or numbers, a letter or letters, a character or characters, a datum or data, a derivative or derivatives, or a combination or combinations thereof, used by the manufacturer for the purpose of uniquely identifying a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle part.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

§ 63-25-5. Offenses and penalties.

(1) Any person who knowingly and intentionally: (a) owns, operates or conducts a chop shop; (b) transports any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part to or from a location knowing it to be a chop shop; or (c) sells, transfers, purchases or receives any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part either to or from a location knowing it to be a chop shop, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years and by a fine of not more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000.00).

(2) Any person who knowingly alters, counterfeits, defaces, destroys, disguises, falsifies, forges, obliterates or knowingly removes a vehicle identification number with the intent to misrepresent the identity or prevent the identification of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years and by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00).

(3)(a) Any person who buys, disposes, sells, transfers or possesses a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part with the knowledge that the vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part has been altered, counterfeited, defaced, destroyed, disguised, falsified, forged, obliterated or removed shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years and by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00).

(b) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to a motor vehicle scrap processor who, in the normal legal course of business and in good faith, processes a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part by crushing, compacting or other similar methods, provided that any vehicle identification number has not been removed from the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part prior to or during any such processing.

(c) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any owner or authorized possessor of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part which has been recovered by law enforcement authorities after having been stolen or where the condition of the vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part is known to or has been reported to law enforcement authorities. It shall be presumed that law enforcement authorities have knowledge of all vehicle identification numbers on a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part which are altered, counterfeited, defaced, disguised, falsified, forged, obliterated or removed when law enforcement authorities deliver or return the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part to its owner or authorized possessor after it has been recovered by law enforcement authorities after having been reported stolen.

(4) Any person who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this section shall be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term authorized for a first offense and shall be fined an amount up to twice the amount authorized for a first offense.

(5)(a) In addition to any other punishment, a person convicted of a violation of this section shall be ordered to make restitution to the lawful owner or owners of the stolen motor vehicle or vehicles or the stolen motor vehicle part or parts, or to the owner's insurer to the extent that the owner has been compensated by the insurer, and to any other person for any financial loss sustained as a result of a violation of this section.

(b) Financial loss shall include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings, out-of-pocket and other expenses, repair and replacement costs and claims payments. "Lawful owner" shall include an innocent bona fide purchaser for value of a stolen motor vehicle or stolen motor vehicle part who does not know that the motor vehicle or part is stolen; or an insurer to the extent that such insurer has compensated a bona fide purchaser for value.

(c) The court shall determine the extent and method of restitution. In an extraordinary case, the court may determine that the best interests of the victim and justice would not be served by ordering restitution. In any such case, the court shall make and enter specific written findings on the record concerning the extraordinary circumstances presented which militated against restitution.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 3; Laws, 1993, ch. 468, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 495, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Cross References — Seizure of property, see § 63-25-7.

Forfeiture of property, see § 63-25-9.

Civil liabilities for violations of this section, see § 63-25-11.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see § 99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Conviction of defendant for individual operation of chop shop violated double jeopardy under *Blockburger* test, as defendant was convicted of operating the same chop shop on different days, and was convicted of joint operation of chop shop;

operation of chop shop is continuing offense when based on same evidence, and offenses of individual and joint operation of chop shop arose from single transaction, same evidence, and same proof. *White v. State*, 702 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. Criminal liability, under state law, concerning illegal removal or alteration of vehicle identification number, in-

cluding sale or possession of altered motor vehicles or parts. 107 A.L.R.5th 567.

§ 63-25-7. Seizure of property.

(1) Any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part with vehicle identification numbers or marks which have been altered, counterfeited, defaced, destroyed, disguised, falsified, forged, obliterated or removed may be seized and detained by law enforcement officials for a determination of the true identity of such property. Any such property seized by law enforcement officials, when ownership cannot be determined, shall be contraband and subject to forfeiture.

(2) Any tool, implement or instrumentality used or possessed in connection with any violation of Section 63-25-5, may be seized by a member of a state or local law enforcement agency upon process issued by any court of competent jurisdiction.

(3) Seizure of property described in subsections (1) or (2) of this section may be made by a member of a state or local law enforcement agency without process:

(a) If in accordance with any applicable law or regulation;

(b) If the seizure is incident to inspection under an administrative inspection;

(c) If the seizure is incident to search made under a search warrant;

(d) If the seizure is incident to a lawful arrest;

(e) If the seizure is made pursuant to a valid consent to search;

(f) If the property seized has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal proceeding, or in an injunction or forfeiture proceeding pursuant to Sections 63-25-1 through 63-25-11;

(g) If there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or

(h) If the property is a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part seized pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.

(4) When property is seized pursuant to this section, the seizing agency may remove the property to a place selected and designated by the seizing agency.

(5) No civil liability shall be attached to any law enforcement officer acting in good faith in regard to the seizure and forfeiture of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts, tools, implements or instrumentalities pursuant to Sections 63-25-1 through 63-25-11.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References — Forfeiture of property, see § 63-25-9.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Phrase "when ownership cannot be determined" made it clear that the legislature did not intend to allow the seizure and forfeiture of private property where the owner was known; a finding that ownership could not be determined was a precursor to a valid forfeiture under the statute. *Bradley v. Tishomingo County*, 810 So. 2d 600 (Miss. 2002).

The highway patrol had no authority to deliver a stolen pickup truck, which had an altered vehicle identification number and had been seized from an innocent purchaser pursuant to a valid search warrant, to an insurance company, which had paid the owner the full value of the truck under a theft loss insurance policy and was therefore the lawful owner of the vehicle, absent court approval with no advance notice to the innocent purchaser

of its intent to do so and without giving him an opportunity to contest the matter in a court of competent jurisdiction; the appropriate procedure would have been for the highway patrol, once the truck served no further purpose in the criminal investigation or prosecution, to make a motion in the justice court for authority to release it to the insurance company, and to give the innocent purchaser and the insurance company reasonable notice of such application and an opportunity to be heard; however, the circuit court erred in directing return of the pickup truck to the innocent purchaser without making the insurance company a party to the hearing or giving it any notice of the proceeding, as this was a blatant violation of the insurance company's right to due process. *Weaver v. State*, 597 So. 2d 609 (Miss. 1992).

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

Filing of forfeiture is not required where ownership of seized motor vehicles cannot be determined. *Turner*, Feb. 18, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0937.

§ 63-25-9. Forfeiture of property.

(1) The following items shall be subject to forfeiture unless obtained by theft, fraud or conspiracy to defraud and the rightful owner of the items is known or can be identified and located: (a) any tool, (b) any implement, or (c) any instrumentality, including but not limited to any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, whether owned or unowned by the person from whose possession or control it was seized, which is used or possessed either in violation of Section 63-25-5 or to promote and facilitate a violation of Section 63-25-5.

(2) Any motor vehicle, other conveyance or motor vehicle part used by any person as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section where the owner or other person in charge of the motor vehicle, other conveyance or motor vehicle part is a consenting party to a violation of Section 63-25-5.

(3) Any motor vehicle, motor vehicle part, other conveyance, tool, implement or instrumentality is not subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or omission which the owner proves to have been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent.

(4)(a) Seizing agencies shall utilize their best efforts to identify any seized motor vehicle or motor vehicle part to determine ownership or the identity of any other person having a right or interest in a seized motor vehicle or motor vehicle part. In its reasonable identification and owner location attempts, the seizing agency shall cause the stolen motor vehicle files of the Highway Safety Patrol to be searched for information on motor vehicles similar to the seized motor vehicle or consistent with the seized motor vehicle part.

(b) Where a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part has an apparent value in excess of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00), the seizing agency shall:

(i) Consult with an expert specially trained and experienced in motor vehicle theft investigative procedures and motor vehicle identification techniques; and

(ii) Request searches of the on-line and off-line files of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB) when the Highway Safety Patrol's files have been searched with negative results.

(5) Forfeiture of a motor vehicle, motor vehicle part or other conveyance encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party where the secured party neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission forming the ground for forfeiture; provided, however, that a forfeiture shall not be subject to the interest of any secured party if the property involved in the forfeiture is a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part seized pursuant to Section 63-25-7(1) and ownership cannot be determined.

(6) Property described in subsection (1) of this section which is seized and held for forfeiture shall not be subject to replevin and is subject only to the order and judgments of a court of competent jurisdiction hearing the forfeiture proceedings.

(7)(a) The seizing agency's attorney or the district attorney in the county in which the seizure occurs may bring an action for forfeiture in a court of competent jurisdiction. The forfeiture action shall be brought within sixty (60) days from the date of seizure. Except when the ownership of the property involved in the forfeiture is a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part seized pursuant to Section 63-25-7(1) and ownership cannot be determined, the prosecutor, may, in the sound exercise of discretion, decide not to bring a forfeiture action because of the rights of property owners, lienholders or secured creditors, or because of exculpatory, exonerating or mitigating facts and circumstances.

(b) The clerk of court shall give notice of the forfeiture proceeding by mailing a copy of the complaint in the forfeiture proceeding and instructions on how the action for forfeiture may be contested to each person whose right, title or interest is of record in the State Tax Commission or any department or agency of any other state or territory of the United States or of the federal

government if such property is required to be registered in any such department or agency.

(c) Notice of the proceeding shall be given to any such other person as may appear, from the facts and circumstances, to have any right, title or interest in or to the property.

(d) The owner of the property, or any person having or claiming right, title or interest in the property, may, within fourteen (14) days after the mailing of such notice, file a verified answer to the complaint and may appear at the hearing on the action for forfeiture.

(e) The prosecutor shall show at a forfeiture hearing by a preponderance of the evidence that such property was used in the commission of a violation of Section 63-25-5, or was used or possessed to facilitate such violation or was seized pursuant to Section 63-25-7(1) and ownership cannot be determined.

(f) The owner of property may show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know, and did not have reason to know, that the property was to be used or possessed in the commission of any violation or that any of the exceptions to forfeiture are applicable.

(g) Unless the prosecutor shall make the required showing, the court shall order the property released to the owner. Where the prosecutor has made such a showing, the court may order:

(i) That the property be destroyed by the agency that seized it or by some other agency designated by the court;

(ii) That the property be delivered and retained for use by the agency which seized it or some other agency designated by the court; or

(iii) That the property may be sold at public auction as provided in subsection (11).

(8) A copy of a forfeiture order shall be filed with the sheriff of the county in which the forfeiture occurs and with each federal or state department or agency with which such property is required to be registered. Such order, when filed, constitutes authority for the issuance, to the agency to whom the property is delivered and retained for use, of a certificate of title, registration certificate or other special certificate as may be required by law considering the condition of the property.

(9) No motor vehicle which has been seized pursuant to Section 63-25-7 or forfeited or sold at public auction pursuant to this section shall be released by the seizing agency, used by an agency designated by the court, or sold at public auction unless any altered, counterfeited, defaced, destroyed, disguised, falsified, forged, obliterated or removed vehicle identification number is corrected by the issuance and affixing of either an assigned or replacement vehicle identification number plate as may be appropriate.

(10) Seizing agencies shall utilize their best efforts to arrange for the towing and storing of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts in the most economical manner possible. In no event shall the owner of a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle part be required to pay more than the minimum reasonable costs of towing and storage.

(11) Property that has been ordered sold pursuant to subsection (7)(iii) shall be sold at public auction for cash by the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or his designee to the highest and best bidder after advertising the sale for at least once each week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the last notice to appear not more than ten (10) days nor less than five (5) days prior to the sale, in a newspaper having a general circulation within the jurisdiction of the seizing agency. The legal notice shall contain a description of the property to be sold and a statement of the time and place of sale. The proceeds of the sale shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) To any bona fide lien holder, secured party, or other party holding an interest in the property in the nature of a security interest, to the extent of his interest; and

(b) The balance, if any, remaining after deduction of all storage, court costs and expenses of liquidation shall accrue to the seizing agency.

(12) A seized motor vehicle or motor vehicle part that is neither forfeited nor unidentifiable shall be held subject to the order of the court in which the criminal action is pending or, if a request for its release from such custody is made, until the district attorney has notified the defendant or the defendant's attorney of such request and both the prosecution and defense have been afforded a reasonable opportunity for an examination of the property to determine its true value and to produce or reproduce, by photographs or other identifying techniques, legally sufficient evidence for introduction at trial or other criminal proceedings. Upon expiration of a reasonable time for the completion of the examination, which in no event shall exceed fourteen (14) days from the date of service upon the defense of the notice of request for return of property as provided herein, the property shall be released to the person making such request after satisfactory proof such person is entitled to the possession thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, upon application by either party with notice to the other, the court may order retention of the property if it determines that retention is necessary in the furtherance of justice.

(13) When a seized motor vehicle is forfeited, restored to its owner or otherwise disposed of, the seizing agency shall retain a report of the transaction for a period of at least one (1) year from the date of the transaction.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 5; Laws, 1993, ch. 495, § 1, eff from and after Jan 1, 1994.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

When a piece of property is ordered forfeited by the court to the sheriff's department, the property should be entered upon the county property rolls in the same manner as other county property being used by the sheriff's department; once the property has been placed upon the property rolls of the county, said property may be sold or traded or disposed of or other-

wise used in the identical manner as other sheriff department property originally purchased with county funds or used by any other county agency or department "designated by the court." Keenum, Mar. 19, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0175.

Under Miss. Code Section 63-25-9(4), where law enforcement officers cannot in and of themselves make final determina-

tion as to ownership of vehicle, they must consult with experts. Turner, Feb. 18, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0937. Mis/63-25-9.

With respect to motor vehicles, Miss. Code Section 63-25-9(7)(a) mandates filing of forfeiture proceeding, except for motor vehicles seized under Miss. Code Section 63-25-7(1) where ownership of that vehicle cannot be determined. Turner, Feb. 18, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0937.

Section 63-25-9(7)(c) requires notice be sent to any person that may appear to have any right, title or interest in or to property and since contraband motor vehicles are forfeited to seizing agency under 63-25-9(7)(g)(ii) as one of two alternatives, seizing agency has right or interest in property as set forth in 63-25-9(7)(c) and notice should therefore be sent to each seizing agency of forfeiture proceed-

ings. Head, August 18, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0286.

The statute mandates the forfeiture of a motor vehicle/motor vehicle part seized pursuant to Section 63-25-7(1) where ownership cannot be determined. Mitchell, III, April 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0157.

Vehicles ordered by a court to be sold at auction should be released by the seizing agency to the purchaser even if the ownership cannot be determined, provided the purchaser of the vehicle obtains an assigned or replacement vehicle identification plate number. Mitchell, III, April 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0157.

A seized motor vehicle whose ownership cannot be determined may only be disposed of as provided in subsection (7)(g). Mitchell, III, April 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0157.

§ 63-25-11. Civil proceedings against offenders.

(1) Any district attorney or any aggrieved person may institute civil proceedings against any person in any court of competent jurisdiction seeking relief from conduct constituting a violation of subsections (1) and (2) of Section 63-25-5. If the plaintiff in such a proceeding proves the alleged violation or its threat, by a preponderance of the evidence, any court of competent jurisdiction after due provision for the rights of innocent persons may grant relief by entering any appropriate order or judgment including but not limited to:

(a) Ordering any defendant to be divested of any interest in any property;

(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the defendant was engaged in previously;

(c) Ordering the suspension or revocation of a license, permit or prior approval granted by any public agency or any other public authority; or

(d) Ordering the surrender of the charter of a corporation organized under the laws of this state or the revocation of a certificate authorizing a foreign corporation to conduct business within the state upon finding that the board of directors or a managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation, in conducting the affairs of the corporation, has authorized or engaged in conduct made unlawful by Sections 63-25-1 through 63-25-11 and that, for the prevention of future criminal conduct, the public interest requires the charter of the corporation be surrendered and the corporation dissolved or the certificate revoked.

(2) In a proceeding under this section, injunctive relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of relief from injury or threatened injury in other cases, but no showing of special or irreparable

injury shall be required to be made. Pending final determination of a proceeding under this section, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may be issued upon a showing of immediate danger of significant injury, including the possibility that any judgment for money damages might be difficult to execute, and, in a proceeding initiated by an aggrieved person, upon the execution of proper bond against injury for an injunction improvidently granted.

(3) Any person injured, directly or indirectly, by conduct constituting a violation by any person of Section 63-25-5 shall, in addition to any other relief, have a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained by the person.

(4) A final judgment or decree rendered against the defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding brought by any person as to all matters as to which the judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties to the civil or criminal proceeding.

(5) Personal service of any process in an action under this section may be made upon any person outside the state if the person has engaged in any conduct constituting a violation of Section 63-25-5 in this state. The person shall be deemed to have thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for the purposes of this provision.

(6) Obtaining any civil remedy under this section shall not preclude obtaining any other civil or criminal remedy under either this act or any other provision of law. Civil remedies under this section are supplemental and not mutually exclusive.

SOURCES: Laws, 1989, ch. 469, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

§ 63-25-13. Scrap processors to maintain records identifying owners and vehicle identification numbers; law enforcement agencies authorized to inspect records and vehicles; penalties.

Any person who delivers, sells or transfers a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part to a motor vehicle scrap processor for the purpose of crushing, compacting or otherwise similarly processing such vehicle or part, shall present to the processor, at the time of delivery, sale or transfer, the name and address of the person delivering, selling or transferring the vehicle or part and the original or a copy of the certificate of title for the vehicle or the vehicle from which such part was taken identifying the owner of such vehicle or part and the vehicle identification number of the vehicle or part. If, because of the age of the vehicle, no certificate of title exists, or, if the certificate of title has been lost, destroyed or is unavailable, then the person delivering, selling or transferring the vehicle or part shall sign an affidavit so stating and declaring that he or she is the owner of the vehicle or part or has the right to sell or transfer the vehicle or part. Every motor vehicle scrap processor shall maintain records of all such transactions together with records of the disposition of such vehicles and parts

and, upon request of the Department of Public Safety or any other law enforcement officer, shall produce such records and permit such law enforcement officers, during regular and usual business hours, to examine them and any vehicles or parts which are on the premises that are subject to the record keeping requirements of this section. No vehicle or vehicle part may be crushed, compacted or otherwise similarly processed except after compliance with this section. The failure or refusal of a motor vehicle scrap processor to maintain or produce such records or to permit inspection of such records, vehicles or vehicle parts as required by this section shall be a misdemeanor punishable upon conviction by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00), by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SOURCES: Laws, 2000, ch. 495, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

CHAPTER 27

Disclosure of Use of Nonoriginal Replacement Parts

Sec.	
63-27-1.	Definitions.
63-27-3.	Identification of manufacturer on part.
63-27-5.	Disclosure of use of nonoriginal replacement parts in repair estimate.
63-27-7.	Construction of chapter.

§ 63-27-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed herein unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

(a) "Aftermarket crash part" means a replacement for any of the nonmechanical sheet metal or plastic parts which generally constitute the exterior of a motor vehicle, including inner and outer panels.

(b) "Installer" means an individual who performs the work of replacing or repairing parts of a motor vehicle.

(c) "Insurer" includes an insurance company and any person authorized to represent the insurer with respect to a claim and who is acting within the scope of the person's authority.

(d) "Nonoriginal equipment manufacturer aftermarket crash part" means an aftermarket crash part made by any manufacturer other than the original vehicle manufacturer or his supplier.

(e) "Repair facility" means a motor vehicle dealer, garage, body shop or other commercial entity which undertakes the repair or replacement of those parts that generally constitute the exterior of a motor vehicle.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch 330, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

§ 63-27-3. Identification of manufacturer on part.

Any nonoriginal equipment manufacturer aftermarket crash part manufactured or supplied for use in this state on or after January 1, 1991, shall have affixed thereto or inscribed thereon the logo, identification number, or name of its manufacturer. Such manufacturer's logo, identification number or name shall be visible after installation whenever practicable.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 330, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

§ 63-27-5. Disclosure of use of nonoriginal replacement parts in repair estimate.

In all instances where nonoriginal equipment manufacturer aftermarket crash parts are used in preparing an estimate for repairs, the written estimate prepared by the insurer and repair facility shall clearly identify each such part. A disclosure document attached to the estimate shall contain the following information in no smaller than ten-point type:

THIS ESTIMATE HAS BEEN PREPARED BASED ON THE USE OF AFTERMARKET CRASH PARTS SUPPLIED BY A SOURCE OTHER THAN THE MANUFACTURER OF YOUR MOTOR VEHICLE. THE AFTERMARKET CRASH PARTS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS ESTIMATE ARE WARRANTED BY THE MANUFACTURER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF SUCH PARTS RATHER THAN THE MANUFACTURER OF YOUR VEHICLE.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 330, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

§ 63-27-7. Construction of chapter.

The provisions of this chapter are severable. If any part of this chapter is declared invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the part which remains.

SOURCES: Laws, 1990, ch. 330, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

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